Research Center for Carpathian Studies(Uzhhorod, Ukraine)

Institute of Rusyn Language and Culture, Presov University(Presov, Slovakia)

Carpatho-Rusyn Research Center(New York, NY, U.S.A.)

A ]UBILEE COLLECTION:ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR

PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI

on his 70th Birthday

Uzhhorod - Presov - New YorkValerii Padiak Publishers

2015

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Binnoainansni penaxropn Ta ynopsnamor:Banepiű ITaJJ:H1~,PhD

Ila'rpíuis KpallJqHK, Ph.D.

Editors and Compilers:Valerii Padiak, PhD

Patrieia A. Krafcik, Ph.D.

© KOJleKTYlB asropia, 2015© BYlJlaBHYlUTBO B. ITaJl5lKa, 2015

ISBN 978-966-387-102-8

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3MicT / Contents

XTO TaKHi1:nporpecop II.-P. Maro-tiii?

Who is the Proffesor Magocsi?9

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<poToJIiTOrrHC)l(HTTjIi nayxosoi Ta rpovancsxol.n,ijIJIbHOCTinporpecopa II.-P. Maro-na

Photochronicle of the life and civic activity ofProfessor Magoesi

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P03~IJI / PART 1BiTaJIbHi 'renerpasru Ta JIUCTU)),0 IOBiJIelO

npoipecopa II.-P. MarouíaCongratulatory Messages and Letters

Addressed to Professor Magocsi

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P03~IJI / PART 2~ouIl~a n03)),opOBJIeHb/ Tabula Gratulatoria 59

P03~IJI / PART 3IOBiJIeHHi CTar-ri )),0 70-piqqSl Bi)),)),HSI

Hapo)),*eHHSI npodiecopa II.-P. Maro-na

Congratulatory Articles Addressedto Professor Magocsi in Honor of his 70th Birthday

Oneua J(Yl(b-(JJaiüpep. IIayJIbO P06ePT Maro-riü a Kapnarcxa Pyci,KOHCTpyKlJ,HjI,peKoHcTpyKlJ,IUIlJ,H)l,OCJIi)l,HHqanacaa 71

Taras Kuzio. Andy Warhol and Paul Robert Magocsi:From Pennsylvania and New Jersey to Toronto 81

Haoin KYUlKO. CBii1:cepen qy)l(HX, qy)l(Hi1:cepen CBOIX 95

Banepiű IIai)RK. Hayxosi MaricTpaJIi nporpecopa IIaBJIaP06epTa Maróni: y nopory HaM norpiőni CHp Ta xepaone BHHO 109

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o. Gorazd Andrej Timkovié. Nákazlivo sebavedomy RusínProf. Dr. Paul Robert Magoesi 117

P03~IJI / PART 4Hayxoeí CTar-ri Ha sccrs npoqiecopa TI.-P. Marouis

Scholarly Articles in Honor of Professor Magocsi

Serhiy Bilenky. Russia's Italy, AIgeria of the North,or Poland's Scotland? Ukraine Under Russian and Polish Gazes 125

Marta Botiková. Problematika kultúry Rusínov vo vyskumea vyuébe etnológie na Katedre etnológie a muzeológieFilozofickej fakulte Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave 153

Frantisek Dancák. Prof. Paul Robert Magoesi a Emil Kubek 167

Hlpiű Ilauuneu», Anrnpeniriüua rrOJIiTHKapanaacsxoi BJIa,ll,Hnporn npaBOCJIaBHoYIJ,epKBHHa3aKaprraTTi B 1950-1960 pp. 175

Csilla Fedinec. Some Aspects of Hungarian-Ukrainian Relationsin Our Time 185

Mihajlo Fejsa. The Preservation of the Rusyn Languageand Culture in Serbia/Vojvodina 193

BOJlOOUMUp (})eHUIl. Baopanme sasrpa: nO,ll,OJIaHH5IHeraTHBHoYcnannmaa 5IKo6iHCbKoroMHCJIeHH5Ii rrpaKTHKHB iCTOPHqHiiíocsiri Ta nayui YKpaYHl1 203

Illanoop (})eJlbOOapu. Jlyxac fa611Ha, rrpenonanarens pyCl1HCKl1XCeMl1Hapl1CTOBB r. 3rep (CeBepHa5I BeHrpl15I) - ananerren3K3eMrrJI5Ipanepnoii KHl1fl1.rauorparpa» B Cyrrpacne 235

Chris Hann. Carpathian Rusyns: An Unresolved Problemfor Eurasia in the Heart of the European Macro-Region 247

Boeoan Toptians. IIapJI5IMeHTapHbIBbI60pbIHa lIearpansniii JIeMKOBl1Hi1861-1913 259

Cyril Hovorun. Autocephaly as a Diachronic Phenomenonand its Ukrainian Case 273

Fpueopiű Fpatioeuu. "IIpo6JIeMa Maroaia":nonepezms nexoucrpyxuia Ta xonrexcryanisania 281

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Bacuns H6yp, 3denKa IJimpRK06a. Ilp06JIeMaTiKa xareropií ponanepeB35IThIX cyőcraminis i IX ,lJ;eKJIiHau;ilB pyCI1HhCKiM5I3hIKy 291

Tomasz Kamusella. The Preposition "On" and Poland-Lithuania 301

Tanna Kapace. My3I1QHe Kpa€3HaBCTBo y HayKOBI1X,lJ;oCJIi,lJ;)I(eHH5IXnporpecopa IlaBJIa P06epTa Maroxia 309

Edward Kasinec and Lyubov Ginzburg. American HumanitarianAid and Interwar Subcarpathian Rus': The Letters from Ekaterina("Babushka") Breshko-Breshkovskaia to Irene Dietrichat the New York Public Library 317

Ksenya Kiebuzinski. Captured: On Oral History, Photography,and the Trial of Jura Drahiruk 329

Ipuua Konecuuu. IcTOpi5I YKpaIHI1 Mi)l( iHTeJIeKTyaJIhHI1MI1,lJ;OrMaMI1Ta HOBau;i5IMI1.(3 HarO,lJ;I1JOBiJIeJOIlaBJIa P06epTa Marc-na) 341

Stanislav Koneény: Vseslovanská myslienka v ideovychkonceptoch Rusínov na Slovensku do konca 19. storoöia 351

Keemocnaea Konopoea. O npasonaci npeqiiscisP03-, poc-, 6e3-, 6ec- , 3-, c- B pyCI1HhCKiMHopMaTiBHiM 5I3hIKy 363

o. lPpanmimeK Kpaűnsx. Ilepnru KPOqKhIHa xpecrniá pycaar.cxiiinoposi B€,lJ;HO3 npotpecopoxr IlaBJIoM P06epToM Maro-nu 373

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Inna Mupmuuuy«. Peuenuia npaBI1JI 3aXI1CTyrrpas Hau;ioHaJIhHI1XMeHlIII1HCJIOBaU;hKoJOPecny6JIiKoJO B npoueci BCTynyy Csponeűcsxaű COJ03 (1993-1998 pp.) 393

Feneua Meoetuu. Ken rpanúnr JI€MTaKM5IKnponia 401

Ewa Michna. Wyzwania i dylematy etyczne badaczagrup etnicznych walczacych o uznanie.Próba autoetnograficznej refleksji 409

Wolf Moskovich. Yiddish Lexical Borrowings (Yiddishisms)in West Ukrainian Regional Dialects and Sociolects 423

Alexander J. Motyl. Tolerance and Minority Integration:On the Incoherence ofInternational Norms 431

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Motoki Nomachi. Is a New Slavic Language Born?The Ethnolect of the Kosovan Gorans 441

Banepiű Ilaosuc Ilinxapnaropycmrcsxa őanana «Ilnase xasano THcHHi» - CHMBonyxpaűtcr.xoi Pesomonii rinaocri 453

Anna Ilnuuxoea. ,n:Ba.ll.lJ,51TbpOKiBpycanscxoro nireparypnoro513bIKaHa Cnoaaxii: Bblcni".ll.KbJi nepcrrexriasr 465

Cepeiü Ilnoxiű. Mi)J( icropieio Ta nauicio:Ilasno-Poöepr Marcsiü i rtepernrcynanua yxpaiacsxol icropií 475

Achim Rabus. Current Developments in Carpatho-Rusyn Speech:Pre1iminary Observations 489

IOJlURH Pauau. Hamo 'IH cepőcxe? Harno 'IH KHi")J(KOBO? 497

Ilana Rosen. Fo1k Preachers and Performersin Interwar Carpatho-Rusyn Jewish Communities 503

Robert A. Rothstein. The Stauropegia1 Songbook 513

Volodymyr Sklokin. Between Objectivity and Politics:Debating the Public Use of History in Contemporary Ukraine 523

Anopiű CMUpH06. Hauioaansaa inearnxaicri, ABTOHOMHO"iIlpasocnaaaoi IJ,epKBHB Yxpaini nepiony HiMelJ,bKoi"oxynami 541

Kupunn Llleeuentco. PyCHHbl CnoBaKHH H Ilonxapnarcxoii PyCHB 1920-1930-e rozrsr B OlJ,eHKaX«aaepnsancxoropyccxoro BeCTHHKa» 551

Peter Svorc. Slovenská liga na Slovensku a rusínska otázka 563

Illmetpau Tpe6cm. «BoCTOK- aro zrpyrne!»:IJ,eHTpanbHa51Espona KaK3KCKnJ03HOHHCTCKHHKOHlJ,enT 577

Stephen Velychenko. Medieval My ths and the Imaginary"Kievan Origins" ofRussia 587

Nelson Wiseman. Ukrainian Canadians and Canadian Socialisms 595

Impopwanix npo aaropis eraren / About the authors 603

Iarpopraauia npo nirmoninam.anx penarcrepisTa yrroparmaxis / About the editors and compilers 611

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Some Aspects of Hungarian-Ukrainian Relationsin OurTime*

Csilla Fedinec

After a referendum confirming Ukraine's independence was held onDecember 1, 1991, Hungary was one of the first foreign countries to recog-nize Ukraine as an independent state, whereby an important considerationwas to assist in strengthening the position of the Hungarian minority in thecountry. The Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic Treaty was the first internationalagreement signed by Ukraine, and it was also the first basic treaty to besigned by Hungary with a neighboring country in the post-Communist era.For Ukraine, the particular significance of the treaty was the recognitiontherein of the inviolability ofUkraine's borders.

Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration and its accession to NATO, to theEuropean Union, and to the Schengen Area have not resulted in greater dis-tance in the relations between the two countries. Rather, the process hastended to be accompanied by a search for solutions. For Hungarian-Ukraini-an relations, the touchstone has not been Euro-Atlantic integration but ratherchanges in Hungarian government policy towards the Hungarian minoritycommunities outside Hungary.

In its relations with Ukraine, the first Orbán government, whichtook office in 1998, linked aU issues to the matter of the Hungarians inTranscarpathia. Ukraine, however, took the view that this was just one-albeitimportant-area of bilateral relations. Locations in Transcarpathia have beenemphatically included among the venues for high-level bilateral meetings,or such meetings have been linked with events of symbolic significance toHungarians in Transcarpathia. A key measure taken by Hungary during theperiod was the adoption of the so-called Status Law (2001), which-thanksto the Basic Treaty-did not cause the diplomatic bilateral complicationsthat it did in the case of Romania and especially in the case of Slovakia. In

* This study was commissioned and supported by the Budapest-based Tom LantosInstitute and presented at the workshop "Hungari an Minorities in a European Context:Achievements and Challenges" (13 July 2014, Budapest, Hungary).

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Ukraine, the legal backdrop to the positive attitude was provided by the Acton National Minorities (Artic1es 15 and 17), intergovernmental and inter-agency agreements, and the bilateral joint committees. Ukraine recognizedthat it must grant the possibility of contact between the country's minoritiesand their kin states in both intergovernmental and private relations. l

Ukraine reacted less favorably to a measure taken by the second Orbángovernment, which took office in 2010, namely the amendment of Act LVof 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship. Under the terms of the amendment, asof January 1,2011, Hungarians living outside Hungary's borders have beenable to acquire Hungarian citizenship in a simplified and preferential proce-dure. Much misunderstanding arose from the impression given in Hungary'spublic discourse and media-which was then repeated abroad-that the legalact amounted to an "Act on Dual Citizenship," whereas in reality dual ormultiple citizenship was already an accepted legal institution in Hungary.

Artic1e4 of the Ukrainian Constitution states: "There is a single citizen-ship in Ukraine." The current Act on Citizenship (20 ll) adds the followingexplanatory note: "If a citizen of Ukraine becomes a citizen of any othercountry or countries, then Ukrainian law shall recognize that person only asa Ukrainian citizen." Despite differing theoretical interpretations, this meansin practice that as long as the Ukrainian authorities do not encounter public1yacknowledged instances of dual or multiple citizenship, there is no proce-dure to detect and establish such a fact. Even so, it is advisable, particularlyin view of the uncertainty of the future, for people to conduct themselvesin accordance with the law and to refrain from public displays of dual ormultiple citizenship, which is seemingly illegitimate under Ukrainian law.On several occasions in recent years, the issue of sanctioning has been raisedin the Ukrainian Parliament, but to date no concrete decision has been taken.One might add that this is fortunate because at the moment there is no chanceof legitimizing dual or multiple citizenship, even though the constitutionalexperts of the constitutional assembly established during the Yanukovich eradid for the first time (and probably for the last time for a long period) giveserious consideration to this possibility.

The Ukrainian media regularly publishes reports on how both Hungaryand Romania are "hand ing out" passports through their diplomatic missionson Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian media treats it as fact that membersof the business elite in Ukraine, as well as many ordinary citizens, possesssecond passports, with the latter group being primarily motivated by eco-

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nomic factors. Media reports indicate several hundred thousand people withdual citizenship, but even this figure accounts for no more than 1 percentofUkraine's total population. Importantly, however, most ofthose who arebelieved to be affected have links with well-defined regions (e.g., Trans-carpathia, Bukovina, and Crimea), all of which symbolize, at least from aUkrainian perspective, the propensity for "separatism."

Representatives ofUkraine's minorities, including those of the Hungar-ian, Polish and Romanian minorities, foster close contacts with their kin-states. On the international stage, however, interest representation is limitedmainly to the Crimean Tatars, and the problems of that particular minorityare the only ones the international organizations are prepared to address in asenous manner.

For Ukraine's politicai actors, the events of late 2013 and early 2014-Russia's seizure of Crimea-affirmed the legitimacy of their concerns about"separatism." Consequently, administrative changes within Ukraine involv-ing any kind of autonomy are now even less likely than before. The politi-cization of the issue over a period of two decades or more has resulted inthe conflation of autonomy with secession. It seems that the events of recentmonths will conserve this situation. The change in government of February2014 and the presidential election of May 2014 have clearly demonstratedthat administrative reform can have only one aim: the decentralization ofpower by strengthening regional and local governments, but without grant-ing autonomy (and federalization is also not an option).

In post-independence Ukraine, the idea of autonomy was broached notonly in Crimea, but also in other areas. In the early 1990s, several attemptswere made in this field, rang ing from referendum initiatives to overt separa-tism. Demands for autonomy were made by the Hungarians and Romaniansin Transcarpathia and the Bulgarians and Gagauz in Odessa Oblast. Mean-while the Rusyns of Transcarpathia and the Romanians ofBukovina declaredtheir intention to secede. At the same time, we should not forget the similarendeavors ofUkrainians and Russians.

At the advent of the 1990s, not even the most committed Ukrainianpatriots believed that Ukraine might become independent, particularly whileretaining the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. At the time, the maximumpoliticaI goal was a federative Ukrainian state as part of a confederationof the Soviet republics. One actor in such a process of internal federaliza-tion would have been the Galician Association, which covered the western

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Ukrainian oblasts, including Transcarpathia. However, circumstances III

the aftermath of the failed Soviet coup of August 1991 presented an op-portunity for Ukraine's full independence.' During subsequent planningfor public administrative reforms, the possibility of merging four oblasts-Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Transcarpathia-into a single ob1astwasraised but then dismissed. Opposition to this idea was particularly strong inTranscarpathia.

In addition to Crimea, "Russian separatism" also led to conflict situa-tions in the eastern and southeastern oblasts on two occasions. At the timeof the Orange Revolution in late 2004, a series of eastern and southeasternoblasts declared their separate regional status, and the idea of establishingan Autonomous Republic of Southeastern Ukraine was also raised. In 2014,conflicts arose in roughly the same parts of the country. Indeed, for severalmonths now the Ukrainian Army has been waging an armed struggle in theDombas region to prevent the formation of secessionist republics in Luhanskand Donetsk oblasts, thereby further destabilizing the situation in Ukraine.

In view of this context, it is worth examining the situation inTranscarpathia and the issue of Hungarian autonomy. Although Ukrainedeclared its independence on August 24, 1991, the country receivedinternational recognition only after the decision was confirmed in areferendumheld on December 1, 1991. On the day of the national referendum, twolocal referendums were also held in Transcarpathia. At the initiative of thedistrict council of Berehove, the district's inhabitants were asked to vote foror against the transformation of the district into "a Hungarian autonomousarea." With a voter participation rate of 8l.5 percent, 8l.4 percent voted infavor of this change. Meanwhile, at the initiative of the oblast council, theoblast's inhabitants were asked to vote on a "special self-governing status"for the oblast: with a voter participation rate of 82.7 percent, 78 percentvoted in favor. In Kyiv, neither of these initiatives found support; indeed,the referendums were dismissed as mere public opinion surveys of noconsequence. Some experts argued that the absence of the term "autonomy"from the referendum question on the status ofthe oblast meant that the localreferendum had mere ly confirmed the status of Transcarpathia as a separateoblast within Ukraine, that is, as an entity that could not be merged with otheradministrative units. The two issues, the status of the district of Berehoveand the status of the oblast, were on the local/regional agenda for some time,but they gradually became confined to the theoretical level.'

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Almost concurrently with these referendums, the issue of Hungarianautonomy in Transcarpathia became an issue for Hungary with the signingof the Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic Treaty in December 1991. As early asAugust 1990, Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall told the Ukrainianforeign minister Anatoliy Zlenko, who was on a visit to Budapest, that whileHungary respected European borders, it also wished to see the granting of re-gional autonomy to Transcarpathia." The basic treaty formulated guaranteesfor ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia, but it did not mention the issue ofautonomy. This omission led to adornestic politicai crisis in Hungary whenseveral members of the govern ing party, the Hungarian Demoeratic Forum,rejected the terms of the basic treaty and formed the Hungarian Justice andLife Party. As Zsolt Németh, Fidesz's foreign policy expert, later pointedout, "It was through the rejection [of the treaty] that the Hungarian far rightcarne into being".' Though still disputed, the archival evidence shows thatthe Hungarian government involved the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians inTranscarpathia (still united at the time) in preparations for the basic treaty."

After the Cultural Alliance (est. 1989) split into two parts, the issue ofautonomy also divided the Hungarians in Ukraine. The Cultural Alliancebecame committed to the idea of establishing a district along the Tisza Rivercomprising mostly Hungarian-inhabited towns and villages. This idea be-carne a topic of debate in the 1999 and 2004 Ukrainian presidential electioncampaigns. As an important aside to this issue, it is worth mentioning thatthe 15th Session of the Hungarian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental Joint Com-mittee on the Rights of the National Minorities, held in Budapest on Decem-ber 19,2011, ended with an unsigned protocol. This was an unprecedenteddevelopment in the history of the Joint Committee, which was established onthe basis of a declaration on the rights of the national minorities, signed bythe ministers for foreign affairs of Hungary and Ukraine on May 31, 1991.The two sides declined to sign the draft protocol after both of them madeproposals whose inclusion in the protocol was rejected by the other side. TheUkrainian side insisted that the protocol should contain the following: theparties will consult without delay "on the situation that has arisen in Ukrainein consequence of the implementation of the citizenship law amended byHungary in 2010." For its part, the Hungarian side urged the inclusion in theprotocol of a proposal made by the Cultural Alliance ofHungariaIis in Tran-scarpathia regarding the establishment of a district alongside the Tisza River.Here, it is worth recalling that the protocol of the 10th Session of the Joint

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Committee (held in 2001) included the following sentence: "The Ukrainianside shall examine and support, on the basis of the initiative of the CulturalAlliance ofHungarians in Transcarpathia, the proposal for the establishmentof a district alongside the Tisza River".'

Meanwhile, the Hungarian Demoeratic Alliance in Ukraine, forrnedin the early 1990s from a splinter group that left the Cultural Alliance ofHungarians in Transcarpathia, saw a realistic chance of realizing autonomyby utilizing and developing the opportunities inherent in Ukraine's system oflocal government. The Hungarian Self-Governance Forum in Transcarpathia,in operation since 1994, and its successor from 2000, the Association ofBorder Region Self-Governments in Transcarpathia, have been variouslyactive over the years and have cooperated with the Alliance of HungarianSelf-Governments, the Association of Hungarian Mayors and the organiza-tions of the other local minorities.

In 2014, Ukraine's several conflict zones, alI linked with "separatism"but not of a comparable scale, were as folIows: Crimea, eastern-southeasternUkraine, and, in a very limited form, Transcarpathia. The inclusion of Tran-scarpathia on the "map of conflicts" occurred in the context of the signing ofa treaty between Hungary and Russia on the expansion of the Paks nuclearpower plant and in connection with statements made by the Hungarian po-litical party Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary on Transcarpathia, afurther statement made by a Jobbik representative legitimizing the CrimeanReferendum held on March 16, 2014, and statements made at the end ofMarch by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, call-ing for break-up ofUkraine-all of which repeatedly stirred up the debate inthe media and led to reactions in the broader politicai sphere. The Ukrainian-language press was the scene of much of the media debate. The Hungarian-language media outlets have latent or mani fest links with one or other ofthe Hungarian community organizations and generally provide reports andcommentary on disagreements between these organizations, on the policiesof Hungarian governments towards the Hungarian minorities abroad, andon public indignation concerning the "anti-Hungari an stance" taken by theUkrainian press.

A special feature of the European Parliamentary elections of May 2014from a Hungarian perspective was the inclusion of representatives of theHungarian communities abroad on the Fidesz-Christian Demoeratic Peo-ple's Party joint list. Among these representatives from outside Hungary, wefind a candidate from Transcarpathia and a candidate from Slovakia. Yet in

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both these countries "dual citizenship" is not permitted. The candidate fromSlovakia received only a symbolic place on the list, but the candidate fromTranscarpathia-Andrea Bocskor, history lecturer and institute director at theFerenc Rákóczi II. Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute (which has closeconnections with the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Transcarpathia)-was placed higher on the list and succeeded in winning a seat in the Euro-pean Parliament. The public was not told, either before or after the elect-ion, how or why Bocskor was selected as candidate. Bocskor, who lacksexperience in politics and public life, stated the following in the run-up tothe election: "1 consider it my important task to promote the realization ofUkraine's European integration and to make the situation and efforts of theTranscarpathian Hungarian community visible in the Brussels aréna"." TheCultural Alliance of Hungarians in Transcarpathia stated the following: "Inthe current difficult situation in Ukraine, it is extremely important that thematters and endeavors of the Hungarian community should be made visibleto Europe's politicians, that these politicians should know about the Hungar-ians in Transcarpathia and learn of their endeavors and their problems".?The representation of Transcarpathia in Brussels was also welcomed by theHungarian Demoeratic Alliance in Transcarpathia. In the wake of the do-mestic politicai revolution in Ukraine in February 2014 and despite the factthat Bocskor has publicly acknowledged her dual citizenship, even the mostradical nationalist politicai forces have so far refrained from raising the issueof revoking her Ukrainian nationality.

It is a fact that Hungarians are far more "visible" in Ukraine than onemight infer from their population share. The attitude of intellectuals in theHungarian community, which is based on the strong representation of politi-cai interests and an enhanced role in public life, gives rise to many confiictsev en within the community. Even so, a general and constant feature is a de-sire to balance national (ethnic) identity with citizenship loyalty.

References

Csilla Fedinec, "Ukraine's Place in Europe and Two Decades of Hungarian-Ukrainian Relations." Foreign Policy Review 9 (2013): 69-95.

2 Mihály Tóth, "Az 1996. évi ukrán alkotmány megszületése" [The Birth of theUkrainian Constitution of 1996]. Pro Publico Bono. Állam- és Közgazdaságtu-dományi Szemle no. 1 (2011): 88.

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3 Bucrop Iloropinxo, Bnaoucnae ctJedopeHKo:Peipepenoyuu e Yxpaiui: icmopistma cyuacnicme [Censuses in Ukraine: Historicai Past and Present] KI11B,2000.

4 Ernő Keskeny, A magyar-orosz kapcsolatok 1989-2002 [Hungarian-RussianRelations, 1989-2002]. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 2012, p. 82.

5 András Mink, "Az alapszerződés ma inkább bunkósbot, nem a történelmi meg-békélés eszköze" [The Basic Treaty is More of a Bludgeon than a Means ofHistoricai Reconciliation]. Beszélő 6, no. II http://beszelo.c3.hu/print/8595

6 Ernő Keskeny, A magyar-orosz kapcsolatok ... (2012) op. cit., p. 82.

7 Cf. Géza Gulácsi, "A kárpátaljai magyarság jogi helyzete és autonóm törekvé-sei" [The Legal Situation and Autonomy Ambitions of the Hungarians inTranscarpathia], in Útközben. Tanulmányok a kárpátaljai magyarságról [InTransit. Studies on the Hungarians in Transcarpathia] Ungvár: KMKSZ, 1998.For the text of the protocol, see http://www.nernzetpolitika.gov.hu/data/files/030.pdf

8 "A magyar érdekek érvényesüléséért fogunk dolgozni" [We Shall Work for theRealization of Hungarian Interests]. http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/20 14-04-18/a-magyar-erdekek-ervenyesuleseert-fogunk-kuzdeni/

9 A KMKSZ Elnöksége: Nyilatkozat az EP-választás kapcsán. [Presidency of theCultural Alliance of Hungarians in Transcarpathia: Statement on the EuropeanParliamentary Elections] http://www.karpatalja.com.ualkmkszJhir988.html

ABSTRAKT

(Fedinec, Tschilla)

Einige Aspekte der Ungarisch-Ukrainischen Beziehungenin Unserer Zeit

Die Position der Ungam in der Ukraine kann mit dem Begriff des Ethno-

Regionalismus charakterisiert werden. Darunter versteht man einerseits eine

politische Bewegung, deren Ziel die Starkung der in dieser Region lebenden

ethnischen Gemeinschaften beziehungsweise die Erreichung einerdominantenPosition für sie ist; andererseits steht der Begrifffür die Gesamtheit politischer

Ansichten mit bestimmen Zielsetzungen (gebietsgebundene Ethnopolitik;

Institutionalisierung ethnischer Zugehörigkeit). Die Studie analysiert einige

Aspekte ungarisch-ukrainisch Verhaltnis.

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