A Thoughtful Second Look

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AThoughtfulSecondLook

Table of Contents

TopicPage

Introduction 2A Thoughtful Second Look3

FINAL | V1

An Independent ReviewReport on !"S "irected Review of !#refor the Ill$ In%ured #nd Tr#n&itioning'() *R+T,"- .ARR/ (+ST0)L'$ !"


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A Thoughtful Second LookReport on !"S "irected Review of !#re for the Ill$ In%ured #nd Tr#n&itioning

S Serge#nt '#%or *ret,d- .#rr4 L5 (e&thol6$ !"

Intent7'ethodolog48

The S Tr#in9 :e4 !o66ent#r47Reco66end#tion&

;S !on&tructStr#tegic Level)per#tion#l LevelT#ctic#l LevelTer6inolog4Vit#l Stresses2=Command Philosophy21

Chain o Command21Command and Control Structure23Client Management3=Medical32Policies and Processes33Support39

Branding! Culture and Stigma 39

Summary o "ey #ecommendations 3? $ay Ahead 3; Conclusion 3@

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"ocu6ent Su66#r43@

"#te5 2@ "ece6er$ 2=19

A T0)


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85 Thi& i& not to t#ke #w#4 fro6 or di&re&pect the #uthor of the !"S,& Report Gthe S i& # l#4rinth of unorthodoH ter6inolog4$ non&en&ic#l &tructure$civili#ni#tion$ coBop #rr#nge6ent&$ inCghting$ doctrin#l 6ipplic#tion& #nd #ho&t of other pitf#ll& for #n4one tr4ing to n#vig#te it5 The S in it& pre&entfor6 i& eightB4e#r& in the unB6#king G &t#rting with # &olid concept$ it&

le#der&hip e6#rked on # p#th th#t initi#ted # &erie& of inve&tig#tion&$ 6edi#report& #nd une#&e of unit co66#nder& #& the reput#tion of the &truggling unitec#6e known5

'() *ret,d- .#rr4 (e&thol6$ !"065 ?13 9@; 82=3!ell5 ?13 99> 1312+6#il5 #rr4lw11Jhot6#il5co6

A Thoughtful Second Look.

95 A Thoughtful Second Look introduce& #ddition#l co66ent#r4 #nd !our&e& ofAction *!)A- to e con&idered fro6 #n independent #nd knowledge#leper&pective '#&ter (#rr#nt )Kcer *'()- *Retired- .#rr4 (e&thol65 '()(e&thol6 w#& # founding 6e6er of the oint er&onnel Support nit *S-#nd ore witne&& to the S,& develop6ent fro6 inception in 2==> to 2=13 #&the Region#l '()7Serge#nt '#%or of the S,& 6o&t populou& Region +#&tern)nt#rio Region5

?5 A& the initi#l in#deu#cie& of the S ec#6e #pp#rent$ #nd new ch#llenge&

#ppe#red on the horion$ '() (e&thol6 w#& # &trong voice to t#ke e#rl4corrective 6e#&ure&5 0owever 4 2=13$ the S h#d de&cended to # pointwhere control of the unit #nd proper &upport of the in%ured #nd ill po&ted to theS w#& i6po&&ile5

;5 In Feru#r4 2=13$ '() (e&thol6 took the eHtre6e &tep of re&igning fro6the !AF in prote&t of wh#t he w #& # tr#ged4 developing #t the S5 Aco6ponent of hi& re&ign#tion w#& to #llow hi6 freedo6 to provide per&on#lin&ight& on the S free fro6 pre&&ure&$ inMuence or repercu&&ion& of the S!h#inBofB!o66#nd *!o!-5

@5 Fro6 2=13 until the pre&ent ti6e$ '() *ret,d- (e&thol6 h#& t#ken #n

#dvoc#c4 role for the S #nd tho&e left &tr#nded in #nd 4 the unit5 )ver th#tti6e he petitioned the !AF$ the !AF )6ud&6#n$ 'e6er& of #rli#6ent$the !#n#di#n Sen#te$ 6edi# #nd other& in #n #tte6pt to ring #ttention #nd#&&i&t#nce to the S5 0e #l&o wrote log&$ open letter&$ conducted r#dio #ndtelevi&ion interview&$ #ll with the &ole o%ective of getting 6uchBneeded &upportto the S5

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>5 In doing &o$ '() *ret,d- (e&thol6 h#& re6#ined #n eng#ged$ independent$infor6ed #nd l#rgel4 critic#l o&erver of the !AF,& 6#n#ge6ent of thi&i6port#nt unit5 In the p#&t &evenB4e#r&$ '() *ret,d- (e&thol6 &u6itteddoen& of report& #nd reco66end#tion& #tte6pting to prevent the &itu#tionth#t now f#ce& the S$ it& &t# #nd po&tedBin 6e6er& fro6 ever h#ppening5

1=5 '() *ret,d- (e&thol6 welco6e& the recent intere&t of the !"S in the S#nd


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highlighted nu6er *%- or bolded#nd will h#ve # corre&ponding nu6er #ndco66ent following5 An eH#6ple of oth follow&

11. The JPSU structure was established (originally as a project) in 2! to

(1) care for the influx of ill and injured from operations in Afghanistan that

was o"erwhel#ing the $ear Parties o% parent unit&s'

1?5 The it#licied teHt fro6 the !"S "irected Review of !#re for the Ill$ In%ured#nd Tr#n&itioning w#& then #nnot#ted with p#r#gr#phB4Bp#r#gr#phco66ent#r4 &t#rting #t EMethodology5

1;5 EA Thoughtful Second Look,& co66ent#r4 will e in !#liri .od4$ font 11for6#t #& elow

EPara 11. Commentary

*1- The Cr&t po&tedBin 6e6er& of the S were fro6the for6er &upport &4&te6 G the Service er&onnel0olding Li&t *S0L-5 pon tr#n&ferring the&e in%ured6e6er&$ the S ec#6e full4Bt#&ked #l6o&t in&t#ntl45There were no tr#n&fer& fro6 re#rBp#rtie& #t th#t ti6e$the4 c#6e l#ter5

1@5 Thi& for6#t i& 6#int#ined throughout the Report #nd i& &i6il#r to th#te6plo4ed the #tt#ched h#&e &pre#d&heet *ref5


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215 Now th#t the S tr#in h#& &topped$ # &erie& of !our&e& of Action *!)A&-c#n e con&idered to lv#ge it #nd the &itu#tion5 wal+8in ilitary -lients 2 $etire8ased -lients and 12 a#ily8ased -lients%ro# our ?on8ilitary -usto#er8ase per8day.


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full4 &erviced$ in CneBtune #nd #ck on the doctrin#l r#il& with the re&t of the!#n#di#n Ar6ed Force&5

$ey Commentary%&ecommendations.

2?5 R#ther th#n go through # co6pleH &itu#tion #nd length4 docu6ent #t the

&t#rt$ the :e4 !o66ent#r4 #nd Reco66end#tion& in ro#dB&troke& #re #&follow&

PS! Construct

2;5 Strategic Le'el.

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Strategic Le'elG Command5 It h#& een noted in


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#&ed on # l#toon Elight ut without # higher level of le#der&hip5 The IS!Service& co6ponent i& #l&o light #nd h#& no le#der&hip co6ponent5 The l#toon!o66#nder #nd Service& '#n#ger #re two &ep#r#te entitie& without # po&itionto unite the6 or provide # conduit to their Region#l 0e#du#rter&5

Commentary( EThere are no ormal command relationships *et)een theSupport Platoon! the Services Section! and the IPSC Service Partners7 In someinstances! this has led to riction! in other locations! a smooth and e:ectivemodus vivendi has *een esta*lished , and in all instances e:ectiveness is adirect correlation o interpersonal relationships B thi& i& no w#4 to run # chip&t#nd 6uch le&& # 6ilit#r4 unit5

&ecommendation(The IS! *# ter6 th#t will e #6ended- 6u&t e ch#ngedto # !o6p#n4 &tructure with #n )Kcer !o66#nding$ # 0e#du#rter& &t# #nd#deu#te Service& &t# *led 4 # Service& '#n#ger*&-- #nd # l#toon*&- *led 4l#toon !o66#nder*&--5 The IS! 6u&t e &t#ed #ppropri#tel4 to en&ure&ervice& #nd le#der&hip #re 6#de #v#il#le to the recentl4 rele#&ed$ &erving

&oldier&$ ilor&$ #irwo6en #nd #ir6en$ 6ilit#r4 f#6ilie& #nd veter#n& in theirA)R5

Summary( Construct.

3=5 (ith the #ove reco66end#tion&$ the S eco6e& # recogni#le #ndproven con&truct fro6 topBtoBotto6 with # &olid ch#inBofBco66#nd inBpl#ce5

Terminology.

315 The "!S'7S7IS! e6plo4& &o6e of the 6o&t confu&ing #nd nonBconfor6ing ter6inolog4 in the !AF5 In doing &o$ it #dd& to &tig6#$ &keptici&6$

#nd gener#l 6i&under&t#nding of the 'i&&ion of the S5 Th#t id$ the ter6ES h#& een u&ed for eightB4e#r&$ i& recogni#le #nd &hould re6#in inBpl#ce5

Strategic Le'el.

oint er&onnel nit *For6#tion-

)perational Le'el.

oint er&onnel Support nit *S-

Tactical Le'el.

S "et#ch6ent *"et- Loc#tion

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+ital ,round. The elow i& the reco66ended !on&truct7Ter6inolog4 #t theVit#l


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&t# #pplied for S po&ition& fro6 the RegF #nd were reuired to co6ponenttr#n&fer to e #le to Cll # S po&ition G there w#& no option of Clling # Spo&ition #& # RegF in 2==> G it w#& # &ound #nd logic#l pr#ctice5

395 The u&e of &elect Re& *incl5 RegF willing to tr#n&fer- &t# #llow& the !AF to

c#refull4 &creen #pplic#nt& #nd choo&e tho&e who e&t &uit the S 'i&&ion5The for6er logic for # &ucce&&ful RegF c#ndid#te h#ving to co6ponentBtr#n&ferto Re& w#& rockB&olid5 It w#& done to #void the i&&ue& th#t now pl#gue theS #nd re&olve the ho&t of ch#llenge& ought on 4 e6plo4ing RegF &t#5

3?5 (hile


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815 The preceding #re ro#dB&troke EigBpicture reco66end#tion& intended toeHtric#te the S Tr#in fro6 where it,& 6ired #ck onto the doctrin#l r#il& #ndthen recover it #ck to the &t#tion for rep#ir$ &ervicing #nd 6odiCc#tion5

825 The S h#& # ver4 i6port#nt 6#nd#te #nd$ if properl4 6#n#ged$ #llow&for # ho&t of po&itive i6p#ct& right #cro&& the 6ilit#r47veter#n76ilit#r4 f#6il4&pectru65 .ut it hasn'teen properl4 6#n#ged #nd the "!S'7S7IS! #t theti6e of thi& writing i& in need of recover4 #nd rep#ir$ not # CeldBeHpedient #nd6#ke&hift rep#irBinBpl#ce5

&ecommendation%Commentary Addendum.

835 0ere egin& the p#r#gr#phB4Bp#r#gr#ph co66ent#r4 on the Report of the!"S "irected Review of !#re for the Ill$ In%ured #nd Tr#n&itioning

B-C;$


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Para . Commentary '4 concern$ fro6 #n independent per&pective of


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perspecti"e o% both the soldier and their originating chain o% co##and as well as %ro# that o% the

JPSU / 0PS- structure and %unction. 0n essence this allowed the tea# to $iew theproblemthrough

the lens o% the client the customer and the ser$ice pro$ider.

Para 3. Commentary( Fro6 #r# 1 to #r# 9 the report h#& ch#nged it& tone

fro6 Etime or a revie) to include ter6& &uch #& Eassignment o *lame$Epro*lem #nd Eresponsi*ility/5 If there i& # predeter6ined prole6 with theS th#t i6p#ct& or inMuence& thi& Report$ it would e helpful to know wherethi& infor6#tion origin#ted #nd h#ve it pl#ced pl#inl4 in the teHt r#ther th#neginning with # glowing &t#te6ent of the !AF,& c#p#cit4 incre#&ing E*y leapsand *ounds5

H. 0n order to ensure that the re"iew incorporated both geographical and cultural %actors $egularorce and $eser"e perspecti"es as well as Ser"ice8speci%ic and %unctional %actors (%ield %orce "ersustraining establish#ents) the $e"iew Tea# "isited 0PS-s and JPSU $egional 5Es in Ds*ui#alt Dd#onton

9innipeg Toronto(1)etawawa Trenton'ingston 4alcartier St Jean and ttawa.

Para 4. Commentary( *1- Four of the ten vi&ited &ite& #re fro6 64 for6erRegion *+#&tern )nt#rio Region- which give& thi& docu6ent #dded weight5 Itwould h#ve een worthwhile to h#ve vi&ited the 6o&t re6ote 6iliti# unit#v#il#le to #&cert#in if knowledge of the S h#d re#ched the65 Reg#rdle&&$the f#ct th#t with eightB4e#r& of eort$ knowledge of the S h#d noteectivel4 re#ched even the 6#in .#&e& i& telling5 Further6ore$ there&pon&iilitie& in S +#&tern )nt#rio Region included 33 .rig#de


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I. ;i"en the "aried bac+ground o% those inter"iewed the $e"iew Tea# was able to garner input %ro# a

wide range o% perspecti"es. oreo"er the internal structure of the +e$iew Teamallowed concurrent

analysis at the strategic operational and tactical le"els. ;en Bnderson "iewed the issues through astrategic lens %ocused on those ele#ents o% (1) the problemthat can be addressed by the -,S and other

depart#ents. (2) C Thibault focused on those issuesthat could be sol$edwithin the C* structure

and authorities and r 9ard was hence able to %ocus on those things that were within thepur$iew of

CF*! and C!* - J!". Blthough this report necessarily %ocuses on strategic le"elreco##endations ele#ents o% the operational and tactical will also be reported on especially where *uic+

and ready solutions are at hand.

Para 6. Commentary *1- If there were known Eprole6& #nd Ei&&ue&&oci#ted with the S prior to the Report eing conducted$ it would h#veeen helpful to h#ve the6 li&ted #& #ddition#l r#tion#le for the report5 *2- '#n4of the Ei&&ue& of the S evolved directl4 under ECMP structure andauthorities/7 A& !' i& the l#rge&t &tructure in the !AF$ !o66#nded 4 the&econdedBhighe&t r#nk in the !AF$ it,& #out #& 6uch &tructure #nd #uthorit4 #&one c#n get &hort of the !"S5 The "!S'7S level i& onl4 oneBlevel down fro6the !' #nd therefore #re under direct #nd inti6#te purview of !'5

B ?BTU$B@ 0?@D-T0


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p#u&e to #w#it the re&ult& fro6 other onBgoing inve&tig#tion& prior toi6ple6enting tho&e in thi& report5

1= #5 E8rganic and reactive gro)th i& 6ore # de&cription of #nuntended g#rden th#n # 6ilit#r4 unit5 The &tructure h#d gone

through eightB4e#r& of nonBconfor6ing doctrine #llowing re#ctivit4to eco6e # polic4 r#ther th#n #n #ttriute$ #nd proce&&e&$&tructure #nd 6#nd#te to eco6e #n org#ni#tion#l cr#p&hoot5

1= 5 Fro6 it& inception it w#& &t#ted th#t the S w#& intendedto repl#ce #n ineKcient &4&te6 *the S0L- which !AF !o66#nder&h#d lo&t conCdence in5 At &t#rtBup Afgh#n rel#ted in%urie& in+#&tern )nt#rio Region w#& le&& th#n 1=P with the v#&t 6#%orit4fro6 other 'i&&ion&5 Vi&ile in%urie& #re 6#n4 ti6e& connected to6ent#l in%urie&$ #t ti6e& 6ore &o depending on the &everit47n#tureof the in%ur4D

1= c5 A& with the S0L efore it$ there #re now in%ured 6e6er&eing held #ck fro6 the S 4 their unit co66#nder&5 The S&hould not e #&ed on !AF )per#tion&$ it &hould e # found#tion#lunit prep#red to de#l with ill$ in%ured$ veter#n&$ #nd their f#6ilie&reg#rdle&& of deplo46ent&$ in ti6e& of pe#ce$ N 'i&&ion&$ #id tocivil power or w#rD

1= d5 EAn 8SI vice an 8SI G 4ike&Q Two identic#l #revi#tion& i&notgoodD #nd

1= e5 There w#& #nother !' driven review in 2=18 *!RS- #nd &till#nother 6entioned #t ref5+5

,D4D@


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*1- The Cr&t po&tedBin 6e6er& of the S were fro6 the for6er *f#iled-&upport &4&te6 G the Service er&onnel 0olding Li&t *S0L-5 pon tr#n&ferringthe&e in%ured 6e6er& to the S$ the S ec#6e full4 t#&ked #l6o&tin&t#ntl45 Tr#n&fer& fro6 re#rBp#rtie& c#6e l#ter5

*2- The 8ne&stop&shop 6oniker w#& rought in 4 the civili#nBe&rel#tion&hip with "!S'7S 00O7IS!7Service& #nd i& #6ong # ho&t of otherconfu&ing #nd &tig6#tiing IS! ter6inolog45 There i& no &hopping B the ter6it&elf i& de6e#ning #nd di&tr#ct& fro6 the 'i&&ion of the S G it i&Econ&olid#ted &upport for #n in%ured 6e6er$ veter#n #nd 6ilit#r4 f#6ilie&5

*3- D ut #ll reco66end#tion& wereignored7refu&ed5

*8- /e&$ # 38P incre#&e &ince >?%%$ ut the &t# h#d not incre#&ed &ince>??@#nd I eHpect there w#& # few hundredBpercent incre#&e &ince th#t ti6e5 In2=18$ the "!S'7!) reported to #rli#6ent #nd i&&ued # glowing report of theS *ref +-$ which i& #t odd& with the Eprole6 &t#te6ent5

*9- Thi& ter6 #nd r#tio$ wordBforBword$ w#& u&ed 4 the Region#l 0O inthe p#&t to %u&tif4 6ore &t# #nd w#& refu&ed 4 the S 00O7"!S'5 It re6#in relev#nt point #nd I,6 uo4ed #t


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a. Paci%ic $egion (-hilliwac+ -o#o3 Ds*ui#alt 4ancou"er)

b. Blberta and ?orthern -anada $egion (-algary -old @a+e Dd#onton 9ainwright Lellow+ni%e)

c. Prairie $egion (oose Jaw Shilo 9innipeg)

d. Dastern


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*3- IS! Service& Section& shoulde p#rt of the Region#l IS! con&truct undercontrol of the Region#l 0O5 The Service& direct over&ight$ co66unic#tion& #ndcontrol 4 the Str#tegic Level *"!S'- 6#de it diKcult for the R0O to 6#n#ge it&own IS!,&5 *"!S'7S #re one #nd the e-5

16. The -< JPSU and ,irector ,-S are dual8hatted a single indi"idual holds both line and sta%%

positions and is responsible %or both policy de"elop#ent and ad"ice and progra# deli"ery. Bs ,-S the

indi"idual is the point #an %or %a#ilies o% the %allen all 0?EU0$0DS the hot issue o% day and testi#ony toStanding -o##ittees. Bs -< JPSU the sa#e indi"idual is the -o##anding


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(2) -asualty Trac+ing

(=) ) ase and 9ing partners (Personnel Selection


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each case (in itsel% an onerous and ti#e8consu#ing ad#inistrati"e process) the - lac+s the

#edical and co##and perspecti"e o% the indi"idual and the speci%ic circu#stances that the

Surg and -< ha"e. 0n essence they would be o"er8turning not just a co##and decision butalso a #edical reco##endation.

c. The #e#ber is per#itted to re*uest a posting to the JPSU through his chain o% co##and but the

re*uest is not binding. Bn < can #a+e a reco##endation %or the -< to consider a posting tothe JPSU but it is also not binding.

d. B soldier can be posted to a JPSU on a %irst Te#porary -ategory (T-BT) or subse*uent T-BTs.

0t has increasingly beco#e the nor# %or Unit -


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c. #l6o&t ever4thing in p#r# 1> w#& roughtforw#rd #& point& of i66edi#te #nd7or future concern5 The nu6er of per&on&who ReturnBToB"ut4 *RT"- 6#4 e lower th#n eHpected ec#u&e the S i&overl4 &tre&&ed #nd c#n,t &upport the6 properl45 The ero&ion in crediilit4 i&%u&tiCed$ the S 00O put the unit on # tri#ge$ re#ctive #nd co6pro6i&ingfooting #l6o&t i66edi#tel45 Thi& fr#4ed #nd ripped the S &upport f#ric#llowing in%ured #nd ill to f#ll into the #4&& #nd with the6 &o6e S &t#5 For&o6e$ the depth of th#t #4&& 6#4 h#ve een 6e#&ured with feeling& of##ndon6ent$ pointle&& 6edic#l rele#&e&$ i&ol#tion$ fr#ctured f#6ilie&$per6#nent in%urie&$ grief$ #nger$ p#in$ loneline&&$ depre&&ion de&per#tion #nd

&uicide5

0?,0?;S

2. The $e"iew Tea# #ade a signi%icant nu#ber o% %indings on a wide array o% issues and topics. This

report will group the %indings the#atically and include reco##endations as %indings are disclosed. B

su##ary o% reco##endations will then be pro"ided with speci%ic


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-


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g. (=) There are e*ually soldiers who consider the 0PS- to be a du#ping ground' and they resist

the sel%8percei"ed stig#a attached to the unit and belie$e that a posting to the J!" ine$itably

means that they will be released. Bll ha"e e3pressed concern o"er the loss o% en"iron#entalallowances (and especially @and ,uty Bllowance) upon posting to the JPSU.

h. (2) B nu#ber o% soldiers predo#inantly with non8"isible injuries 8 stated that i% they had just

been allowed to go the 0PS- a%ter their %irst T-BT they would probably be ready to $T,' andthat they just need a brea+ %ro# the unit and to ta+e a +nee %or G8> #onths'. y the ti#e they

actually got posted to the JPSU they had lost %aith in the - o% - and had no intention o%

atte#pting to $T,.

i. (2) The - o% - #istrust o% the 0PS- and the perception that it is where a soldier goes to release

essentially stig#atiKes the 0PS- as well as a soldier that is posted there and by e3tension their

injury especially i% it is non8"isible.

Para . Commentary(*1- Technic#ll4$ the !"S through !ANF)R


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Para . Commentary Chain of Command None of the reco66end#tion&c#n e &ucce&&ful unle&& the "!S'7S7IS! h#& the #ilit4 to &ucceed in it&'i&&ion #nd &t#ed$ tr#ined #nd led properl45 *See &pre#d&heet-5

-


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26. JPSU $egional 5Es. B detailed literature re"iew and indi"idual inter"iews with JPSU $egional sta%%

suggest that there is no clearly de%ined and widely accepted understanding o% the %unction o% the JPSU

$egional 5Es which leads to the %ollowing issues

a. Tas+ed in the original aster 0#ple#entation Plan with pro"id(ing) regional o"ersight and

guidance to the 0PS-s within their Brea o% $esponsibility' the $egional 5E do not actually see# to

ha"e any e3plicit authorities and ha"e little i% any authority to reassign resources such as %unding orsta%%ing %ro# one 0PS- to another. This leads the# to be not #uch #ore than a (1) #ailbo3 in #any

instances. oreo"er they ha"e little i% any control o"er either Ser"ices Sections or 0PS- Ser"ice

Partners so they essentially super"ise the Support Platoons and their clients in the "arious assigned

0PS-s.

b. Blthough also tas+ed in the 0P with being responsi"e to the local ase -o##anders and Unit

-o##anding . 0PS-s. (B) n the whole, the .!C structure is appropriate, and effecti$ei% appropriately sta%%edand resourced. 0ndeed as the tactical %ace o% the organiKation and the ulti#ate deli"erer o% e%%ects they

are essentially the 4ital ;round o% the entire enterprise. The %ollowing obser"ations were #ade

a. (1) There are no %or#al co##and relationships between the Support Platoon the Ser"ices Sectionand the 0PS- Ser"ice Partners. (2) 0n so#e instances this has led to %riction in other locations a

s#ooth and e%%ecti"e #odus "i"endi has been established and in all instances e%%ecti"eness is a

direct correlation o% interpersonal relationships.

b. The Ser"ices Section is predo#inantly #anned by ci"ilian e#ployees although the "ast #ajorities are

retired #ilitary #e#bers. (=) ;i"en the nature o% their e#ploy#ent conditions they pro"ide andbeco#e the continuity within the 0PS-. 0t is also the Ser"ices Section that coordinates the deli"ery o%

the "ast #ajority o% e%%ects and (G) they ha"e a direct technical / pro%essional reporting relationshipwith ,-S which they le"erage to great ad"antage.

c. The Support Platoon is the #ilitary ele#ent o% the 0PS-. Bll (6) clients in an 0PS- are under the

co##and o% the Support Platoon -o##ander who is the (>) de %acto leader o% the 0PS-. any o%

2?73@


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the Support Platoons across the country ha"e #ore clients than they can reasonably be e3pected to

#anage with (H) client bases running %ro# 681> #e#bers o%ten with only one super"isor due to

sta%%ing short%alls (which will be discussed later in the report). (!) This leader to led ratio #ust bereduced to increase e%%ecti"eness o% control.

d. Blthough e"ery client in an 0PS- has indi"idual and o%ten *uite disparate circu#stances they

basically %all into (I) two categories those that want to return to duty and those that want to get outo% the #ilitary. Dach o% those categories ha"e "ery di%%ering needs but at present they are not

di"ided that way #ostly due to a lac+ o% Support Platoon sta%%.

Para 3. Commentary *A- The #ove p#r#gr#ph i& in conMict with the re&t ofthi& docu6ent *#nd in &o6e c#&e& with it&elf-5 It egin& &t#ting Ethe structure isappropriate! and e:ective #nd then det#il& wh4 it i&n,t either of tho&e5

*1- The IS! i& # S 00O7"!S' 6odel forced upon Region#l 0e#du#rter&*R0O-$ pri6#ril4 to control the civili#n *Service&- &t# in the IS!&5 (hilethe IS! i& # &uBunit of the R0O$ intern#ll4 it i& controlled 4 Enood4$#nd eHtern#ll4 not even 4 it& own R0O5 In&te#d the IS! Service& #nd

'ilit#r4 &t# were encour#ged to Eget #long 4 the Str#tegic Level *S00O7"!S'- #nd the R0O &t# were t#&ked e&&enti#ll4 #& 4&t#nder& #ndconMict re&olution &t# #t the )per#tion#l Level5

*2- It &t#te& th#t Ein all instances e:ectiveness is a direct correlation ointerpersonal relationships5 It i& for thi& re#&on th#t E&o6eod4 i&nor6#ll4 in ch#rge of # group of people G thi& provide& # per&on to uildcohe&ivene&&$ en&ure the unit 'i&&ion i& 6#int#ined #nd to &olve interBunit digree6ent&5 'i&&ion eectivene&& &houldn,t e #&ed on the luckBofBtheBdr#w of h#ving good Einter&personal relationships it &hould e#&ed on &ound le#der&hip #nd te#6work5 +ven #t the Cr&t le#der&hiplevel *'#&ter !orpor#l B '!pl- there i& E&o6eone in ch#rge th#t people

c#n turn to$ e it the '!pl or # Serge#nt5 The IS! h#& nothing like th#t$#nd it i& #n etremelyl#rge &uBunit5 The IS! 6odel i& # re6#rk#lenonB&tructure uniue in the !AF *or #n4where for th#t 6#tter-5 There w#l&o # trend for the civili#n &t# to di&&oci#te the6&elve& fro6 the Sit&elf B #t ti6e& &t#ting th#t IS! Service& w#& # &ep#r#te entit4 evenfro6 the coBloc#ted Support l#toon5 Service& often &t#ted the Supportl#toon )asthe S co6ponent of the IS! which to Service& w#& %u&t#nother unit grouped in #6ong the other &upported unit&5

*3-


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*9- The civili#ni#tion of 6ilit#r4 culture *e5g # &oldier eing l#eled #Eclient upon po&ting to the S-$ 6i&6#n#ge6ent *1?= per&onpl#toon&- #nd &tructure *E$ho's in charge here./ 96m , no*ody-/- i&

#nother re#&on unit co66#nder& #re w#r4 of the unit5

*?- The l#toon !o66#nder i& the Ede acto leader ec#u&e per6i&&ioncould not e received to 6#ke the l#toon !o66#nder& the #ctu#l IS!le#der& fro6 "!S'7S 00O5

*;- E!lient .#&e i& # civili#nied ter6 for l#toon Strength th#t will #l&o dr#w&keptici&6 fro6 lineBco66#nder& #& their troop& #re one 6inute #Soldier #nd the neHt # Eclient5 A l#toon i& nor6#ll4 3= people$ #t theS it,& een #llowed to &well to 2== *with le&& &t# th#n # regul#rl#toon-5

*@- The le#derBtoBled r#tio 6#HedBout in 2==>5


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*2- (hen it,& the truth it i&n,t # &tig6#$ it,& #n unple#nt re#lit45 .4 going the routethe4 did$ S 00O7"!S' cre#ted # &4&te6 even wor&e th#n the one it repl#ced*the S0L-5 The S turned fro6 # gre#t eginning into &o6ethingue&tion#le through 6i&6#n#ge6ent5 .eing po&ted to # unit th#t w#& in

per6#nent cri&i& th#t c#lled 4ou # Eclient in&te#d of who 4ou were G # &oldier Gdoe& not in&till conCdence5

+ecommendations

Separate the line position o% -< JPSU and the sta%% position o% ,-S to a"oid the disad"antages o%

dual8hatting the sa#e indi"idual.

,e"ol"e the "ast #ajority o% ad#inistrati"e %inancial and disciplinary authorities %ro# -< JPSU to

the $egional


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&ecommendations$ Commentary The current S 6odel c#nnot e uiltupon B it i& # #ttered &tructure th#t 6u&t e reuilt5 The S 6u&t e led$org#nied #& # 6ilit#r4 unit #nd not civili#nied to the point 4ou need #Mowch#rt$ #n interpreter #nd # glo&r4 of ter6& to Cgure out wh#t the4 #redoing #nd ing5 0owever$ lv#ge of the S it i& notth#t diKcult G it %u&t

h#& to eHtric#ted$ recovered #nd rep#ired5 I6ple6enting For6#tion &tructure$&elect Re& &t#ilit4$ MeHile polic4 #nd onBtheBground deci&ionB6#king#uthorit4 will put it #ck on tr#ck5

ropo&ed Reco66end#tion& #& follow

T#ke # T#ctic#l #u&e5

&e the For6#tion 'odel for the S U oint er&onnel SupportFor6#tion *SB;-5


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b. Selection and screening processes are in place at the national le"el but they are not always %ollowed.

9ith the e"olution o% #ilitary sta%%ing %ro# 17 $eser"ists to predo#inantly $eg by 21H

selection will be o% para#ount i#portance. 0t is also i#perati"e that *uality personnel are posting inwith no perception o% a lessening o% career potential.

c. 9hile the transition to (1) $eg personnel will assist with continuity and reduce sta%%ing swirl there

re#ains a re*uire#ent %or so#e Pres sta%% to re%lect the ser"ice conditions and e3periences o% theclients. This is especially the place in 0PS-s such as Toronto.

d. any o% the clients stated that constant changes in #ilitary sta%%ing #ade it "ery di%%icult to na"igate

through the return to wor+ ($T9) or $T, process. -ontinuity o% sta%%ing is +ey. This %act washighlighted by the signi%icantly higher $T9 rate in 4alcartier which has the #ost stable sta%%ing

le"els o% all 0PS-s "isited.

e. Bll o% the Ser"ices Section positions are #anned by ci"ilian personnel. B substantial percentage o%

those positions are currently un%illed and the %illing o% these positions has not been prioritiKed.

;i"en the leanness o% the Ser"ices structure this #eans that in #any cases there si#ply isn&t anyone

to pro"ide ser"ices to the clients or there are inordinately long delays in ac*uiring assistance.

%. Blthough a %or#al training plan has been established as reco##ended in the 21=


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indoctrin#tion5 Thi& i& the logic#l oppo&ite of #&ic tr#ining when # civili#n i&indoctrin#ted into the 6ilit#r45

$eco##endations

(1) Dstablish a bench#ar+ %or Support platoon Sta%% to clients o% no greater than 1=. This will#ean establishing and #anning section -o##ander positions in the Support Platoons

(2) Dstablish a custo#er ta3'. Parent %or#ations / ases should be tas+ed with pro"iding

rein%orce#ents to the 0PS-s it is a%ter all their people that are being cared %or.

(=) $ein%orce and strengthen the screening and selection process to include inter"iews with JPSU

$egional


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eH#6ple$ I point to !"S e6#il ;52$ where the Serge#nt,& '#%or *# highl4eHperienced Re& #nnuit#nt- contr#ct eHpired week& efore hi&repl#ce6ent *RegF- w#& &cheduled to #rrive5 Thi& 6e#nt hi& repl#ce6ent*fro6 # h#rdBN#v4 tr#de po&tedBto #n Ar64 .#&e- h#d no h#ndover *le&&the one the *now civili#n veter#n SgtB'#%- did on hi& own #ccord-5 Thi&

put the entire Region,& &t# #nd po&tedBin 6e6er& #t ri&k5 *?- )nce #g#in$ there w#& # perfectl4 &uit#le &4&te6 inBpl#ce th#t h#&

&o6e #nnuit#nt& &till inBpl#ce tod#4 in the S for eightB4e#r&5 (h4#n4one would w#nt to repl#ce thi& &4&te6 4 # f#r le&& &uit#le$ highl4co6pleH$ un&t#le$ #d6ini&tr#tivel4 urden&o6e$ eHpen&ive #ndulti6#tel4 unwork#le &4&te6 *which in 6#n4 w#4& re&e6le& the S0L-$i& # 64&ter45

*;- !oncur G #nd 6#ke the&e per6#nent po&ition&5

*@- So6ewh#t concur G ut nor6#ll4 tr#ining reuire6ent& origin#te #tthe top to &uit the need& of the &t# G thi& i& done 4 # ENeed&A&&e&&6ent #nd i& f#irl4 &tr#ightBforw#rd5

*>- So6ewh#t !oncur$ if SA i&n,t lo&t on the tr#n&itioning 6e6er5

-@0D?T B?B;DD?T

2I. There are a nu#ber o% directi"es %ro# JPSU 5E that go"ern the #anage#ent o% clients within the

0PS-s but the $e"iew Tea# %ound that these directi"es are being une"enly applied and in so#e cases not

at all. (1) oreo"er the transition to a predo#inantly non8"isibly injured client base has created newdyna#ics not originally en$isionedwhen the JPSU was established. The %ollowing obser"ations were

#ade

a. The triage syste# is not synchroniKed. The 0PS- uses a syste# o% colour coding (red yellow green)that is designed to re%lect both the #edical and ad#inistrati"e co#ple3ities o% the case whereas the

?urse -ase anagers and -5S uses a binary co#ple3 "s non8co#ple3 con"ention based solely onthe #edical situation. The two syste#s ha"e no point o% co##on re%erence and there is no

established #echanis# %or synchroniKing the two syste#s.

b. Sel%8starters thri"e in the 0PS- en"iron#ent. They #a+e either getting better or preparing %ortransition their job and apply the#sel"es assiduously to the process. ost clients howe"er struggle

with lac+ o% direction and are unable or ill8e*uipped to chart a clear path to success. There are no

#echanis#s that allow the success stories' to share their +nowledge or to encourage others

indeed there is "ery little interaction between the clients at all e"en though they are all #e#bers o%the sa#e unit.

c. (2) There are two types o% soldiers that are in the 0PS- those that want to stay in the #ilitary and

those that want to get out. Dach o% these groups has di%%ering needs and #oti"ation. Bt present due#ostly to under8sta%%ing they are not grouped in that #anner which #eans that sta%% #ust #aster two

di%%erent sets o% processes and policies.

d. The sta%% at the 0PS- has encountered di%%iculties in the #aintenance o% discipline. any o% theclients ha"e edical D#ploy#ent @i#itations that restrict the wearing o% uni%or#s or appearance at

a #ilitary %acility which is not necessarily conduci"e to the #aintenance or nor#al' discipline.

The nature o% their injuries or circu#stances o%ten precludes the application o% nor#al #inor

punish#ents. This lea"es the sta%% with little i% any recourse to #aintain discipline withoute3acerbating the client&s #edical progress.

3373@


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Para 6. Commentary There i& # lot of re#ction#r4 #ctivit4 4 the frontline*IS!- &t# tr4ing to E6#ke it work #nd with th#t$ cert#in i6port#nt proce&&e&of the S get &idelined G it i& # tri#ge upon it&elf5 *1- Thi& &t#te6enti&incorrectD the &enior 6edic#l oKcer of the !AF &t#ted in 2=1= th#t the !AF*S- &hould prep#re for # w#ve of )SIBrel#ted in%urie& fro6 Afgh#ni&t#n5 It w#&

further &t#ted there could e # fourBtoBCveB4e#r *W- l#tenc4 period efore )SIrel#ted &46pto6& &urf#ced #nd to e prep#red for c#&u#ltie& fro6 other)per#tion& #& well5 An in%ur4 i& #n in%ur4 #nd it i& &tig6#tiing to c#tegorievi&ile #nd nonBvi&ile in%urie&5 *2- In%urie& #re 'edic#l +6plo46ent Li6it#tion*'+L-B#&ed #nd fro6 there # &uit#le tr#n&ition7RT( pl#n in&tituted5 'oreover$thi& &t#te6ent neg#te& the f#ct th#t 6#n4 Evi&il4 in%ured per&onnel h#veEnonBvi&ile in%urie&5

#5 erh#p& the4 #ren,t &4nchronied ec#u&e there #re inMuence& th#t#re dierent on the two &4&te6&5

5 So6eti6e& it,& diKcult to e # E&elfB&t#rter when 4ou,re ddled

with &eriou& in%urie&$ TS"$ f#6il4 &tre&& #nd e6plo46ent worrie&5Then #dd to th#t &erie& of woe& th#t 4ou,ve %u&t een po&ted to #unit for help ut there i&n,t #n4one #round to help 4ou5 The l#ck ofdirection h#ving #n i6p#ct on the po&tedBin 6e6er& i& directl4#ttriut#le to the l#ck of S 6ilit#r4 &t#5 In &o6e Region&$6e6er& #ren,t #llowed to know who el&e i& po&ted to the epl#toon5 *So6e Region#l )!,& elieve thi& infor6#tion i&conCdenti#l in th#t &o6e po&tedBin 6e6er& feel it,& # &light to eidentiCed with the S-5

c5 *2- Thi& i& poorl4 &t#tedD the two t4pe& #re tho&e th#t c#n 6eetniverlit4 of Service *#nd c#n re6#in in the !AF-$ #nd tho&e who

do not *#nd 6u&t e rele#&ed-5

d5 The we#ring of unifor6& #nd loc#tion h#ve nothing to do with the6#inten#nce of di&cipline G the4 #re pre&cription& fro6 6edic#l&t#5 There #re 6#n4 6ethod& to 6#int#in di&cipline e&ideEnor6#l 6e#&ure&$ ut the S i& in dirr#4 #nd the6#inten#nce of #n4thing i& diKcult5

$eco##endations

(1) ,e"elop a national and synchronised triage syste# that re%lects #edical ad#inistrati"e and

psycho8social aspects o% each case.

(2) Dstablish a syste# o% peer #entors that pairs the new arri"als with those already so#e way alongthe process o% healing $T, or transition.

(=) ;roup clients according to their goals to $T, or to transition. This will allow Section

-o##anders to de"elop e3pertise in one o% the two processes.

(G) Dstablish a series o% best practices and techni*ues that en%orces discipline without ha#pering

#edical reco"ery.

Para 6. &ecommendations< Commentary

3873@


36/43



*1- So6ewh#t concur$ it 6u&t e kept in 6ind th#t f#ctor& co6plic#tingover&ight of #n in%ured 6e6er *le#der&hip- 6ight not e the eco6pleHitie& #& 6edic#l over&ight *tre#t6ent-5

*2- So6ewh#t concur5 I &ugge&t &t#Kng the S properl4 Cr&t$ rein&tituting

the Re&ervi&t e6plo46ent 6odel$ #nd t#king &tock of the &itu#tion efore6oving forw#rd5

*3- At the S tr#n&ition i& not nor6#ll4 go#lB#&ed$ it i&6edic#ll47niverlit4 of Service driven tow#rd& civili#n or 6ilit#r4&ervice5

*8- The4 #re #lre#d4 inBpl#ce #nd f#ll under theknowledge#le7co6p#&&ion#te le#der&hip 6odel u&ed 4 co6petentle#der&5

D,0-B@

=. Blthough the JPSU is not part o% the -5S #uch o% its wor+ deals with coordinating and super"ising

#edical care and treat#ent %or its clients. 8H7 are also posted to the JPSU) and are the

pri#ary inter%ace with the 0PS-s. There are only >> ?urse case #anagers in the -B and although

the ideal ?urse to case ratio is 16 #any are dealing with in e3cess o% 1 cases. There are clear

signs o% strain within the syste# due to o"erwor+ and a lac+ o% co##on understanding within the-5S and the chain o% co##and o% the "ital role that ?urse -ase #anagers play.

b. There are regional and local stresses to the syste#. Petawawa lac+s ready access to ental 5ealthpro%essionals and Cingston is dra#atically short o% -ase anagers.

c. The P-BT re"iew process is currently o"erwhel#ed with a 1 #onth waiting period %or a P-BTreco##endation %ro# a Surg to be re"iewed by ,irector #edical Policy (, ed Pol). The current

policy is %or e"ery reco##endation to be re"iewed in order to #aintain standard application across

all ele#ents o% the -B. This is a 17 Euality Bssurance process that #aintains %ull control at the

e3pense o% e%%iciency. Bt the re*uest o% the $e"iew Tea# , ed Pol re"iewed their process anddeter#ined that currently only 67 o% reco##endations are being o"er8turned and are nowconsidering so#e a#end#ents to their approach.

d.


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$ein%orce ?urse -ase #anagers through increased sta%%ing using the target o% 16 as the basis %or hiring

and assign#ent. -onduct periodic gatherings o% the ?urse -ase anagers to %ocus on best practices andto pro"ide a plat%or# %or ac+nowledge#ent %ro# the -o%-

und contracted ental 5ealth pro%essionals in


38/43



a. 0n%rastructure %or the 0PS-s "ary greatly %ro# location to location. The JPSU has a detailed

in%rastructure plan on place but it #ay be inade*uate due to the 4B- decision to increase its%ootprint in #ost 0PS-s.

b. 0t was e"ident to the re"iew tea# that o%%8site locations ha"e #any ad"antages. any clients and

sta%% inter"iewed stated that on8ase 0PS-s are inti#idating to a large nu#ber o% clients andreporting8in can contribute heightened an3iety/stress. 0PS-s that are located in o%%8ase

acco##odation (such as Cingston) o%%er perception o% a neutral/non8#ilitary en"iron#ent that

enhances client support.

c. any clients lac+ ,9B? access as they are either not re*uired or not able to attend #ilitary

%acilities.

d. The current process %or appro"al %or rei#burse#ent o% costs %or attending #edical appoint#ents iscu#berso#e and une"en and we are essentially as+ing the #e#bers to sort out their own

transportation.

e. aintaining contact with a large and disparate client base is proble#atic %or the 0PS- Support

Platoons and Ser"ices sections. ace to %ace #eetings are critical but o%ten di%%icult to arrange.

Para //. Commentary( *A- Th#t i& one incredil4 conMicted &t#te6ent giventhe prior conclu&ion& in thi& docu6ent #nd #t odd& with e#rlier &t#te6ent& inthi& report525

#5 A clo&er look &hould e t#ken #t IS! et#w#w# *with the #&enceof .#&e ele6ent& in the uilding-$ the +#&tern )nt#rio R0O i& #&uit#le de&ign *oth .FA-5 VA! i& # v#lu#le co6ponent of #n IS!ut #l&o one th#t c#n e eHp#nded to loc#tion& oB#&e to etter&erve veter#n&5 IS!B#&ed VA! loc#tion& on !AF .#&e& #re perfectfor &erving or &oon to e tr#n&itioning 6ilit#r4 6e6er&5

5 ) #&e &hould e the eHception to the rule G the IS! in :ing&tonw#& # de&per#te 6e#&ure #& there were no &uit#le .#&e uildingv#il#le5 The v#&t 6#%orit4 of per&on& u&ing the S do not h#veli6it#tion& reg#rding going on .#&e$ #nd onB.#&e loc#tion& #llowpeople not po&ted to the S to convenientl4 u&e their &ervice& #&w#lkBin&5 There i& #l&o the perception of the !o! th#t need& to et#ken into #ccount #nd the &tig6#tiing eect of h#ving # 6ilit#r4unit *S- loc#ted in # 6#ll5

c5 Th#t,& ec#u&e it &o #l#r6ingl4 underB6#nned th#t it i& diKcult to#cco6pli&h5

$eco##endations

(1)


39/43



Para //. &ecommendation< Commentary

*1- "igree$ &uit#le #cco66od#tion c#n e h#d on #&e #nd i& convenientto the v#&t 6#%orit4 of tho&e intere&ted in or reuiring S &upport5

.#&e& #l&o h#ve &igniCc#nt 6edic#l$ I5T5$ lecture #nd ph4&io *.#&eRecre#tion- f#cilitie& to e eHploited #nd keep the IS! in the 6ilit#r4 fold#& # 6ilit#r4 unit5

*2- "igree$ # di#lBin c#p#ilit4 for &oldier& &hould onl4 e u&ed #& #neHception to the rule$ ut &till vi#le depending on the circu6&t#nce Gthi& i& # le#der&hip c#ll #t the IS! level5

*3- !oncur5

*8- So6ewh#t !oncur5 The 6#&& 6#%orit4 of in%ured 6e6er& c#n drivethe6&elve&$ 6#n4 IS!,& #lre#d4 h#ve # dedic#ted driver on &t#$ .#&e

Tr#n&port i& #nother option$ civili#n tr#n&port *t#Hi&- #nother G &ugge&t4ou le#ve the lineBunit& #lone5

*9- Thi& i& # !orpor#l,& t#&k G not #


40/43



.ec#u&e of thi&$ the IS! i& intern#ll4 #drift &o direction #nd #dvice co6e&fro6 #ll &ide& G # confu&ing &itu#tion

$eco##endations

-onsider rena#ing the 0PS-s in concert with any planned change to the -2 structure. The clients o% the0PS-s #ade a nu#ber o% suggestions such as 9arrior Transition -enter. randing along the lines o%

isher 5ouse #ay be appropriate such as The 4i#y -enter'.

Para /. &ecommendations< Commentary !#ll it # S "et#ch6ent IS!*in&ert .#&e7loc#tion n#6e- #nd then c#ll it # d#45 Right now the et#w#w# IS!i& S$ IS! et#w#w#$ .l#ck .e#r Support !entre5 If 4ou wi&h to dedic#te theuilding& #fter people *the nor6- then do &o on # re&pectful r#&& pl#ue #t theentr#nce of the uilding5 N#6ing the uilding #fter it& function i& # longB&t#nding #nd eective polic45 +5g5 2 Service .#tt#lion 0e#du#rter& c#n,t e6i&interpreted$ ut c#ll it .lueell 0ou&e$ with R!+'+ 0ou&e #cro&& the &treet#nd :#ng#roo 0ou&e down the ro#d$ then thing& &t#rt to get 6uddled5

!"**A+= F '>= +>C**>?AT.?!

=6. The JPSU syste# is essential to discharging our obligations to our ill injured and transitioning. 0thas ser"ed the institution and #ore i#portantly our soldiers well o"er the last eight years o%ten in spite o%

structural cultural and policy barriers to success. This report has #ade a nu#ber o% reco##endations

ranging %ro# the strategic to the tactical. The +ey reco##endations are as %ollows

(1) 0ssue a -,S -B?) ,irect a one8ti#e progra# using end8year #oney to relocate all o% the stranded' JPSU

#e#bers currently on 0$ but posted to an 0PS- apart %ro# their %a#ilies.

(H) Separate the line position o% -< JPSU and the sta%% position o% ,-S. ,e"ol"e the "ast #ajority

o% ad#inistrati"e %inancial and disciplinary authorities %ro# -< JPSU to the $egional 73@


41/43



*1- !oncur So6ewh#t G I think it,& ti6e for # %oint *!AF7'ini&teri#l7VA!-&t#te6ent5

*2- !oncur So6ewh#t G th#t,& # r#ther ro#d &t#te6ent #nd reuire& 6ore

det#il5

*3- !oncur5

*8- !oncur5

*9- !oncur5

*?- "igree G no in%ured 6e6er &hould e &tr#nded fro6 hi& ho6e$ friendnd f#6il45

*;- Strongl4 concur #nd 6#ke )!& !)&5

*@- !oncur$ le&& &o6e of the reco66end#tion& in thi& docu6ent5

*>- !oncur5

*1=- !oncur G with per6#nent po&ition&5

*11- !oncur5

*12- !h#nge IS! to S "et#ch6ent *in&ert loc#tion here-5

*13- Thi& reco66end#tion &erve& to &how the dire &itu#tion #t the S5


42/43



# &oer &econd review i& conducted u&ing the point& I,ve put forw#rd #nd theinfor6#tion fro6 the 4etBtoBe rele#&ed upco6ing )6ud&6#n,& Report5

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A Thoughtful Second Look