A third port for Southwest Africa/Namibia?1)

GeoJournal 22.3 3 6 3 - 3 7 8

© 1990 (November) by Kluwer Academic Publishers

363

A Third Port for Southwest Africa/Namibia?l) Stanley, William R. Prof. Dr., University of South Carolina, Department of Geography, Columbia, SC 29208, USA

ABSTRACT: The end of South African control over its former Southwest Africa Mandate and the imminent emergence of an independent Namibia provide opportunity for reorientation of South-Central Africa's export metal trade. How rapid this may occur will depend in some measure upon the political and commercial environment still to evolve in the Walvis Bay exclave. This, in turn, may be related to the future treatment of Namibia's critically placed white minority and to the political rhetoric of a SWAPO government. Any reorientation of the region's export trade will place the strategic Caprivi Strip in a new geopolitical perspective, one better resembling that which Imperial Germany had in mind for this sliver of land than had evolved during 75 years of South African rule. Expansion of trade through the Caprivi Corridor should stimulate transportation development in NE Namibia. Were the Walvis Bay situation not to be resolved in a manner conducive to its future use by an independent Namibia or by neighboring states, then pressure to build a new deep water port will accelerate. The strategically placed fishing industry and the use of these waters by large foreign trawler fleets might be the stimuli for the initial financing of the construction of any new port. Luederitz, the country's "true port," is inadequate to the task of modern commerce and is located too far from the economic and population core of the country.

Profound political change is underway in Southwest Africa/Namibia although, by some accounts, the transition to independence got off to a shaky beginning (Christian Science Moni tor 1989). 2) abouth all that is certain at this t ime is that the recently dissolved, overwhelmingly black, In ter im Legislative Assembly has been replaced by an overwhelmingly black, Const i tuent Assembly. The Republic of South Africa has set in mot ion its eventual withdrawal from the SWA/Namibia political arena which, was completed by Apri l 1990. How radical might be the new government must await events; elections were held from November 7 - 1 1 , 1989. To these newly elected members of the Const i tuent Assembly fall the task of preparing a writ ten constitution. Had two-thirds, or 48 or more of the 72 seats been filled by S W A P O (Southwest Africa People 's Organiza- tion) par l iamentar ians or by S W A P O supporters in any of the other n ine political parties contesting the election, then a writ ten const i tut ion incorporat ing some of this organizat ion 's doctrinaire Marxist philosophies when in exile seemed reasonable.3) Such a document would likely cause the relatively early exodus from the country of many of the often critically placed white minori ty, some of whom were born in Namibia.

Need to Retain the Economically Important White Minority

One element of this white minori ty surely to lose its jobs and be prime candidates for departure, sooner or later, is the lower echelon of the Afr ikaner -dominated civil service; police, post office and semi-skilled secre- t a r ia l staff, among others. Many of these positions seem priority slots to be filled by non-white S W A P O supporters in an independent Namibia. A gradual replacement of many whites by non-whites in all sectors of government seems assured. To be sure, the civil service by design already has a majori ty of non-whites; this policy has been in place for several years. Independence should accelerate the process. Whether personnel are replaced abruptly or through natural attrit ion is of major concern and will depend upon the ideological composit ion of the new government . Were sufficient numbers of mid-level to senior government staff and non-civil service whites to le~ave, whites from the farming/ranching sector, for example, then the Namibian economy likely will deteriorate; and the country could very easily become a problem state like some of its neighbors.

364 GeoJournal 22.3/1990

This concern for the white minority in SWA/N may to some appear to be biased considering the years during which they, the whites, readily dominated the non-white ethnic groups and consigned them to the lower ranges of the socio-economic and political environments. Racially structured policies did not begin with the defeat of Germany in Southwest Africa (1915) nor with the 1948 Nationalist victory in South Africa and subsequent codification of Apartheid measures. Rather, cultural discrimination by whites can be traced back to the days of the missionary-trader-explorer and was a fact of life from the outset of the German Protectorate in 1884. The arrival of German settlers, their quest for land (Demhardt 1989) and the almost inevitable land disputes culminating in the Herero wars at the turn of the century, placed the racial environment in sharper focus. Post World War II Apartheid legislation applied to SWA/N changed little; the various social, economic and political environments were well established and well understood even if passionately deplored by many. Blacks, especially the Ovambo, leaving the social sta- bility of the tribal environment for employment in white enterprises in the S of the country frequently suffered personal indignities while obtaining economic gain. Whether racial inequality in SWA/N reached the scale experienced in South Africa still is debated. The very fact that SWAPO and its long-defunct (but recently resurrected for the election) anti-South Africa competitor organization, SWANU, came into being is proof sufficient of the seriousness of the then existing racial environment.

The fact remains, however, that it is the whites who control ranching and mining. The ranching situation seems especially critical since there undoubtedly will be pressure from below to divide the land in order to give blacks greater access to the more desirable (better watered) areas (Thomas 1983). To divide ranches in SWA/N in order to provide a relatively small number of blacks with fenced and heretofore well managed farms would be a mistake of the first order. Even proven pastoralists, as the Herero and Damara would have to readjust, providing a future government still desired to satisfy both domestic needs as well as to export beef, mutton and karakul pelts in order to earn foreign exchange. Animal husbandry is imperative in this semi- desert environment, and the white rancher practices it best. Furthermore, a conspicuous proportion of rural whites are of German ancestry (Weigend 1985), perhaps 30% of the estimated 20,000 German-speaking population. Most of these German-speakers (German medium government schools can be found in Swakopmund. Otji- warongo, Tsumeb, Otavi and Windhoek) are eligible for German passports due to a unique "grandfather clause" promoted by Bonn. These Germans have international mobility and many surely would leave if the political or cultural situation deteriorated to a point where they saw no future for themselves in Namibia.

No researcher is totally detribalized. One sees on the basis of past experience. While one may wish things had been done otherwise, the professional observer has an obligation to assess things as they are. Thus, no matter how the proverbial coin is to be flipped, the fact of the matter is that the numerically inferior white communities occupy important positions of economic strength. They are linked to international markets and foreign currency. The revolutionary might say, "Throw them all out and let us begin anew." That such a program might very likely lead to economic suicide is only part of the equation; this attitude ignores the legitimate history of whites in SWA/N, a historical role which cannot be shrugged off simply for political change. Thus, the manner in which a future government respects "white rights" while striving to eradicate past injustices should resolve questions on the part of many whites as whether to leave or stay. The situation which existed in Zimbabwe in 1980 is not an appropriate model; for one, the populations are too different, and the histories not really comparable. Whatever does evolve in an independent Namibia will be its own model.

A Potential Fourth Pillar to the Economy

On the other hand, were the political environment to incorporate real checks and balances, then not only would the better qualified civil servants and most other whites remain, but the economy could show substantial growth. After all, the three pillars (ranching, mining, and fishing) of the SWA/Namibia economy are funda- mentally strong and, given encouragement, should serve the country well. The latter two sectors have considerable growth potential provided world mineral markets and ecological environments (Logan 1968; Van Wyk and Low 1989) work to Namibia's favor. It will be imperative for a new government to quickly declare an exclusive offshore fishing zone of 200 nautical miles (382 km). At the moment, the zone is only 25 km and is flagrantly violated by foreign trawlers, especially those from Romania (Fig 1). SWA/Namibia is alone among countries with important offshore fishing, yet still lacks a significant exclusive zone.

Another pillar still in the potential category is the possible use of an independent Namibia as a high level nuclear waste burial ground sanctioned and monitored by the United Nations. This would be an above board activity in contrast to some of the surreptitious efforts along these same lines elsewhere in Africa, several of which surfaced in 1988. There is ample space in Namib- ia, a First World level of infrastructural development, especially in the transport and communications sectors, a cadre of skilled mining technicians with proven track records, an ocean port with the desired handling capa- bilities and, not least, a country likely to be in need of vast sums of money to implement post-independence social programs. Were such a scheme ever to mate-

GeoJournal 2 2 . 3 / 1 9 9 0 365

Fig 1 Depicted are foreign trawler inspections, by flag of fishing vessel, during a three month period in 1988. Inspections were carried out at sea by inspectors from the Southwest Africa/Namibia Sea Fisheries De- partment, by authority of the Inter- national Commission for the South- east Atlantic Fisheries. Inspection entails a request for the trawler to come about and stop, then for per- mission to come aboard. Boarding parties must wait for the trawler to lower a ladder, thus permitting the trawler captain or fisheries officer sufficient time to remove incrimi- nating evidence were there something to hide. Some of the Romanian trawlers are well within Southwest Africa/Namibia's exclusive near shore pelagic fishing zone (25 kin). Source of inspection data is the Department of Sea Fisheries, Wind- hoek.

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March, April, and May 1988

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r ia l ize , t h e n a nuc l ea r was te wor ld - sca le scient i f ic re- sea rch c e n t e r l ikely w o u l d be o n e of the spill-offs. E v e n

the tour i s t i ndus t ry migh t be e n h a n c e d by such an unde r t ak ing . As o f yet , h o w e v e r , t he r e is no o r g a n i z e d

vo i ce for a nuc l ea r was te cen te r ; a surpr is ingly large n u m b e r o f we l l -p l aced ind iv idua ls h a v e m e n t i o n e d the

p rospec t s fo r such a cen te r , bu t t he war and espec ia l ly t he p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e rush of act ivi t ies h a v e for the

m o m e n t lef t l i t t le r o o m for sus ta ined c o n s i d e r a t i o n at t he off icial level . F u r t h e r m o r e , and this f ac to r c a n n o t be

e m p h a s i z e d e n o u g h , t he bad publ ic i ty a s soc ia ted wi th abor t ive was te d isposa l s chemes in G u i n e a , S ie r ra L e o n e

and N ige r i a has d imin i shed the pol i t ical scope of ac t ion , if on ly t empora r i l y , for any coun t ry in A f r i c a to pu r sue the nuc l ea r was te r epos i t o ry t h e m e .

W a l v i s B a y as a P o l i t i c a l R e s t r a i n t

O n e cons t ra in t on poss ib le excesses of a fu tu re g o v e r n m e n t , wi th o r w i thou t rea l checks and ba lances


and minority rights, is the political status of the region's only adequate port, Walvis Bay. Aside from its value as a listening post and military base, this port and exclave are of relatively little economic value to its owner, the Republic of South Africa.

Having political access to a portion of the coastline astride the rich fishing grounds of the Benguela Current has some advantage, and South Africa certainly is aware of this consideration. Still, the port of Walvis Bay is at the moment an economic and political factor of the first order within the context of Namibian affairs, but only a political factor in the context of South African affairs. This is more than a subtle difference. Pretoria has made it clear that Walvis Bay could be used as a bargaining chip to ensure a non-hostile attitude toward South Africa by the new government in Windhoek (Barnard 1987). Were any such denial of the use of Walvis Bay to occur, then political and economic pressure inside of Namibia and, possibly even more important, political pressure elsewhere in the world would mount for a purely Namib- ian deep water ocean port. That such a scenario (port denial, then construction of a new port) might be linked to the use of the rich offshore fishing grounds is one of the themes of this paper.

The Walvis Bay issue hardly is new. In August, 1977, South Africa restated and clearly defined its political control over Walvis Bay in response to the January, 1976, Security Council Resolution (Number 385) con- demning its illegal occupation of Namibia. By some accounts, South Africa had permitted its control over Walvis Bay to become fuzzy during the preceding years when, for all practical purposes, Southwest Africa was a fifth province of South Africa. Controversy has been associated with Walvis Bay since at least the late 19th century when Great Britain annexed this only practical port site astride the Benguela Current and assigned its administration to the Cape Colony Government. The 1909 Spanish arbitration between Great Britain and Germany (Lansdown 1911; Barnard 1979) defined the Exclave boundary and helped to resolve a festering sore between the two great imperial powers. There are any number of contrary opinions concerning the status of Walvis Bay. Whether South Africa really wants Walvis Bay is something else and is a decision which might best wait upon events. As for the early documentation record, the investigator is directed to (Lansdown 1911) and (MacDonald 1915). A decidedly anti-South African perspective (Moorsom 1984) and (Goeckner and Gunning 1980) should be balanced against the neutral view (Dale 1982) and South African responses to this momentary war of words represented in (Prinsloo 1977) and (Faris 1979). Whatever, there appears to be only restained opposition in the foreign ministries of the industrialized countries regarding South Africa's legal right to retain Walvis Bay. An interesting counterbalance to the above was a speech in the Transkei by recently released African National Congress leader Walter Sisulu, who backed SWAPO's position

regarding the future of the port (Times of Namibia 1989b).

The harsh rhetoric of an earlier day concerning an independent Namibia's taking over the port of Walvis Bay was muted during the weeks leading up to the November, 1989, election monitored by the United Nations4) For example, at the time of a 1967, post-lec- ture, conversation with guest speaker and SWAPO leader, Mr. Sam Nujoma, at the State University College at New Palz, New York, the author raised the question of Walvis Bay and was told by Mr. Nujoma in no uncertain terms that Walvis Bay would be part of an independent Namibia from its inception. The clear impli- cation was that South Africa would be obliged to relin- quish its control over the port. Recently, however, SWAPO has been unusually quiet on the subject aside from a statement in its Election Manifesto (1989) and a speech by its leader, Mr. Sam Nujoma, at the coastal city of Swakopmund on October 15, 1989 (Cape Times 1989). In the former, the section concerning the Namib- ian State starts with the following paragraph:

SWAPO will establish an independent, unitary, secular and democratic state whose territory includes the 1,124 km2 area of Walvis Bay and all the offshore islands (the Penguin Islands) between the Orange River and Walvis Bay.

At Swakopmund, Mr. Nujoma was quoted as saying:

It is important for us to build more ports in addition to Walvis Bay, Luederitz and Swakopmund.. . perhaps north of Henries Bay, also to serve other countries such as Bots- wana, Zimbabwe and Zambia, and the countries beyond.

Approximately one month earlier, the Southwest Affica/Namibian Government appointed a high level inter-agency committee to investigate the possibility of establishing harbour facilities N of Swakopmund, itself 30 km from Walvis Bay (Namib Times 1989). The mandate of the committee was four-fold: first, to investigate the feasibility of an alternative harbour (alternative to Walvis Bay); second, to determine the location of an alternative port site; third, the planning for the proposed port and fourth, the method of financing and construction. In actuality, the committee decided to start its deliberations with the second item.

D T A (Democratic TurnhaUe Alliance), SWAPO's chief opposition in the Constituent Assembly election, has a statement in its Socio-Economic Policy for obtaining Walvis Bay through negotiation with South Africa.5) Several of the other parties contesting the November, 1989, election had statements regarding Walvis Bay, but no party was advocating the use of force to achieve this objective.

Whose Port(s)?

One port (Luederitz) is too shallow and much too far from the center of national economic affairs and popu-

GeoJournal 22.3/1990 367

Fig 2 Foreign trawler inspections, continued. It's common for trawlers to favor waters between Walvis Bay and the Angolan border rather than to fish the area between Walvis Bay and Luederitz. There are three to five inspections daily in a multi- national trawler fleet which, on any given day, could number 400 vessels. Furthermore, the two inspection vessels are at sea for less time than in port, thus still further reduc- ing the enforcement effect of an already weak constraining environment.

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March, April, and May 1988

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la t ion gravity, whereas the o ther por t , Walvis Bay, is not legally a par t of the nat ional te r r i to ry of SWA/Na mib i a . I t may not have p e r m e a t e d through the exclave popula t ion at large, but within the Walvis Bay business communi ty , there is increased awareness that they (Walvis Bay) need S W A / N a m i b i a , more than the o ther way around. Wi thou t the commerce to and f rom S W A / Namib ia , Walvis Bay l ikely would become a s leepy garr ison site amongst the dunes, its main commerc ia l role being that of home por t to a decl ining fishing f leet wi thout a meaningful mar i t ime hinter land.

On the o ther hand, Walvis Bay (exclave and por t ) and the guano islands afford South Afr ica legal access to the offshore fishing grounds. If only in this regard , and undoub ted ly o ther factors are involved, the Walvis Bay Exclave is a bargaining chip of cons iderab le value. In the

late 1970s, when it ex tended its offshore exclusive fishing zone to the 200 nautical mile (382 km) limit , the Repub- lic of South Afr ica at first hes i ta ted to do the same for its " lapsed manda te" of Southwest Afr ica . I t is general ly accepted that the pr incipal reason for not enforcing the S W A / N a m i b i a exclusive offshore fishing limits was due to South Afr ica ' s not wishing serious confronta t ion with the Soviet Union , which even at this early date had a large f leet fishing these waters (Fig 2). The Admin i s t r a - tor Gene ra l at the t ime issued a p roc lamat ion to the effect that , beginning in 1981, S W A / N a m i b i a would extend its exclusive fishing limits to the 200 naut ical mile (382 km) offshore line. This edict was comple te ly ignored by the fishing fleets and the Republ ic of South Afr ica chose not to enforce it. Therefore , nothing came of it. I t ' s been suggested that the present Admin i s t r a to r


General might well succeed were such a proclamation to be reissued or renewed. The AG officially has been in full control of the SWA/Namibia government since April 1st (technically even earlier, since the Interim Govern- ment's cabinet resigned in March, 1989). Due to the massive presence of the United Nations in the country: administrative personnel of UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group), foreign election observers, and police and troops from a score of countries wearing the blue beret of the United Nations, the trawler fleets might be less inclined to ignore restrictions upon their operations, particularly since most of the countries represented in the trawler fleets also are represented in the various UN groups which monitored the elections and still are in the country.

The International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF) is one of the few international organizations in which South Africa not only is accepted as a full and active member, but is also one organization in which South Africans consistently have held important administrative positions. Officially orga- nized in late 1969 and with working groups first established in 1972, the ICSEAF encompasses (1988) an interesting array of countries. Most, at one time or another, have had trawlers in SWA/N waters. These states are Bulgaria, Cuba, France, Germany (East and West), Japan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, USSR, Israel, Italy, Angola, Romania, Korea and Iraq. South Africa, for example, has chaired the following (ICSEAF 1984): the Scientific Advisory Council, 1972-1977 and 1982-1985; the Standing Committee on Finance and Administration, 1974-1975 and 1978-1979; The Commission, 1984-1985; 1st Vice Chairman, 1982-1983; 2nd Vice Chairman, 1980-1981; Vice Chairman, 1978-1981; the Standing Committee on International Control, 1978-1981; and the Standing Committee on Stock Assessment, 1978-1979. A Cuban presently is Executive Secretary.

For its part, the South African delegation to the annual ICSEAF Meeting in Madrid includes a number of Southwest African/Namibians. Southwest Africa/ Namibia did not plan to attend the Madrid meetings in November (1989) unless invited as a Namibian delegation.6 The earliest scheduled date for independence is April 1, 1990. Thus, there was no official or unofficial presence (as part of the South African delegation) by the country whose waters constitute the raison d'etre of the international commission in the first instance! Upon independence, Namibia not only will extend its exclusive fishing limits to the 200 nautical mile (382 km) offshore line, but also will seek to establish a new, UN-sponsored fisheries commission restricted to the three Southeast Atlantic countries of Angola, Namibia and South Africa! 7) Such a request would pose a difficult situation for the United Nations in general and to the countries with large wide-ranging trawler fleets, in particular.

The Sea Fisheries section of The Department of Agriculture and Nature Conservation in Windhoek is

well-run and staffed by personnel exceptionally well informed about local and world fishing environments, economic and otherwise. From all indications, its voice is heard in Madrid even though essentially powerless to protect its own rich fishing grounds. It is to the avarice of several of the fishing nations of the world, especially those with deep water trawler fleets, that the blame for overfishing is to be attributed. Indeed, one suspects that the trawler fleets, were they to speak with a single voice and without regard to the politics of their respective countries, would prefer a continuation of South African control over SWA/Namibia. An independent Namibia can be expected to make life more expensive for them. For example, two Japanese firms have begun negotiating for joint ventures with Namibia concerning their offshore crabbing operations. A Spanish fishing company also is engaged in negotiations with SWA/Namibia Sea Fisheries concerning a joint venture. These endeavours are the forerunners of what likely will be a tidal wave of joint venture inquiries as Namibian independence draws near. The extraordinarily rich fishing grounds in the offshore Benguela Current have been mentioned in yet another possible post-independence option by the Government in Windhoek. This concerns the trading, in one form or another, of Namibian fishing rights in the offshore Benguela Current for a deep water port not controlled by Pretoria (i.e., Walvis Bay); an idea which appears to be receiving increased attention.

The Russian trawler fleet is far and away the largest in SWA/Namibian waters (the names of more than 200 Russian trawlers are recorded in the log of the inspection vessel 'ORYX, ' aboard which this investigator was privi- leged to spend eight days in 1988). Those freshly painted and, at first glance, highly efficient Russian trawlers carrying all manner of sophisticated equipment likely are a less desirable working place and more inefficient for fish processing than at first appears. Insight into the personal hardships of crew and of the magnitude of waste in processing of catches is vividly described by a trawler captain (Lysenko 1983) who at one time fished in SWA/N waters. Russian trawler crews generally are rotated through Luanda, in Angola, and one sees Russians in Walvis Bay only in an emergency. Roma- nians and Poles, on the other hand, frequently come into Walvis Bay. Their trawlers invariably can be identified by the fact that they are in need of a painting! Transfers of funds, especially from Bucharest, are so erratic that few chandlers in Walvis Bay take the risk of providing items on credit; paint has a much lower priority than engine repairs. Perhaps an even more depressing sight is the rush of seamen to return to their trawler(s) in time for sailing, each carrying a plastic shopping bag contain- ing soap, coffee, cocoa and other items generally not considered luxury items in western or most Asiatic fleets. The miniscule amount of hard currency given to Romanian sailors abroad (and to m o s t East Bloc mariners) is used for items such as these. If one sees an


* ICSEAF Divisions 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. ** Catches made by Namibian registered companies. Due to the

non-independent status of Namibia, vessels ot these companies are flying the flag of the mandate holder, viz South Africa. Nami- bian catch figures are based on FAO statistics.

Source: Sea Fisheries Administration, Windhoek 1988.

Tab 1 Catches of marine species in Namibian waters* in metric tons

Fig 3 Overview of major railroads in S Africa and the ports which serve them. Only representative lines in the Repub- lic of South Africa are depicted. The Caprivi Corridor will provide an independent Namibia with a deep, eastward- trending land protrusion into South-Central Africa and access to the railroads serving Zambia and S Zaire.

Eas t Bloc sailor in a bar , he will of necessi ty "nurse" his bee r for hours.

This f leet , l ike fishing fleets in genera l , is thought to be taking catches (Tab 1) well in excess of its quota , by a factor of anywhere f rom two to th ree t imes! Once inde- pe nden t of South Afr ica , Namib ia might consider permit t ing the Soviets and the o ther t rawler fleets to con- t inue to overfish. In re turn , the Russians, toge ther with f inancial suppor t f rom o the r fishing fleet nat ions using these waters , would be expec ted to cont r ibu te to the bui lding of a mul t i -purpose , deep-sea po r t at, say, Cape Cross or Moewe Bay, among several sites. Thus, with such a por t and anci l lary rail and road links to the Namib ian t ranspor t grid, the commerc ia l l ifeline with Walvis Bay could be severed at will (by W i n d h o e k now as well as by Pre tor ia ) and a po r t would be avai lable for deve loping a pure ly Namib ian fishing infras t ructure (f leet and factories) .

S W A / N a m i b i a Sea Fisher ies wishes to cont inue basing the inshore , or pelagic fish industry in Walvis Bay, but with the s t ipula t ion that their inspectors con- t inue to have policing power after Namib ian independence. F o r the much more impor tan t white fish (deep- sea) industry; however , the Sea Fisher ies Admin i s t r a t ion is coming a round to the concept of a pure ly Namib ian por t , to be const ructed to the N of Walvis Bay and Swakopmund . A por t of sufficient wate r dep th to accom- moda t e deep-sea t rawlers would be expensive. Even were l imited use objec t ives to be agreed upon pr io r to the start of const ruct ion, the pressure for expanding the

handl ing capaci ty of any such por t so that it might ac- commoda te commercia l shipping would be irresist ible, cer ta inly at the poli t ical level. Thus, it is conceivable that Namib ia ' s fishing sector will be in the foref ront of advo- cat ing the bui lding of a new port . Once begun, this por t would have a powerful lobby and a commercia l -pol i t ica l m o m e n t u m of its own, a m o m e n t u m for expanding the facility into an a l l -purpose, deep water port .

A lone , the fishing sector may not be able to genera te sufficient suppor t for a possible third por t , especial ly if South Afr ica were to offer Namib ia a longterm commerc ia l lease for the use of Walvis Bay, while possibly re ta ining sovereignty over por t and exclave. On the o ther hand, were Namib ian fishing interests to be but t ressed by prospects of the shipping of substant ia l tonnage of minerals or ref ined minera l products through such a por t , then the dynamics and pressure for building a new por t could well prevai l i r respect ive of what happens with Walvis Bay. By substant ia l is mean t tonnage on the o rde r of 5 - 1 0 mil l ion tons pe r year , figures only to be achieved by the shipping of coal or i ron ore. These are the figures f requent ly employed in rat ional izing the f inancing of new rail lines. Of equal , if not g rea te r significance, would be the poli t ical clari ty of a Caprivi In te rna t iona l Trade Cor r idor serving the land locked states to the Eas t (Fig 3). A cont inued South Afr ican presence in Walvis Bay, however s t ructured, could de te r southern Afr ican countr ies in using this western t rade route.


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Fig 4 Railroads, major roads and selected settlements in Southwest Africa/ Namibia. Major secondary roads are important links in the transport network, often differing from prim- ary roads only by their lack of a bitumen surface. The three major arid zones of the N Namib (Kaoko- land), S Namib (Namib-Naukluft) and Bushmanland are readily identified by their relative lack of roads. The railroad and roads linking Wal- vis Bay to Tsumeb/Grootfontein are transport connections posed to pe- netrate further into South-Central Africa and, potentially, to attract export metal commerce from that region to Walvis Bay for export. These tonnages currently are exported from East African and Re- public of South Africa ports.

Caprivi Strip

Europe ' s late 19th century scramble for pieces of the black Afr ican pie gave prominence to the long, E - W

(narrow in the N-S dimension) sliver of land to become known to many as Minister Caprivi 's Strip. Imperia l

Germany had sought access to the Zambezi r iver and German East Africa f rom its Southwest Afr ica protec-

torate; what was in the Strip proper or, for that mat ter ,

what is there today often is of less significance than

where it is located. Once granted "t i t le" to the Strip, the Germans seemed unusually slow in establishing their

imprint; perhaps on-site observations proved less gla- morous than lines on a map agreed to by a Eu ropean

Monarch and statesmen. Since the start of civil unrest in N Southwest Afr ica /Namibia in the late 1960s, physical

possession of the Strip has made it possible for South Afr ica to militarily isolate Botswana f rom its N


neighbors. In spite of at least one serious military clash in the 1970s during which shells were fired from Zambian territory on the opposite side of the Zambezi river, South African possession of the Caprivi Strip has restrained Zambia from permitting its territory to be used by SWAPO in cross-border raids and has made more difficult the southward treks of military units belonging to the African National Congress.

As soon as the November, 1989, election was officially certified by the Administrator General's Office in Windhoek and by the United Nations Special Repre- sentative, and as soon as the remaining South African military units had been evacuated from the country [seven days of certification[ then, at that instant, the Caprivi Strip assumed a different geopolitical role. This new role will resemble more what Germany had in mind for this territory nearly a century ago rather than what has been the situation in recent years.

Katima Mulilo, administrative center of East Caprivi (the eastern and central Caprivi Strip), has been given considerable official attention in recent years; a beautiful Legislative Assembly building was constructed, in part as a result of Pretoria's seeking to wean the East Caprivians away from their previously close affiliation with SWAPO. The dominant role of the Ovambo people in SWAPO reportedly led to serious discontent on the part of influential East Caprivians with political ambitions.8) Whether the blandishments of having their own Assem- bly, numerous political office-holding slots and considerable self rule will stand the test of time will depend less upon how this strategically placed region voted in the Constituent Assembly election and more upon policies of the future government. Suffice it, for the moment, to say that East Caprivi and its capital, Katima Mulilo, constitute a communication point of considerable value sitting astride both the Zambezi river and the road to South- Central Africa. This latter factor could become very important were an independent Namibia to benefit from development of new transport routes or from the reorientation of existing international trade in southern Africa.

Let there be no misunderstanding; new routes and the reorientation of certain existing transport routes are almost sure to come into being with the birth of an independent Namibia. The likely losers in any such reorientation of trade and transport will be in East Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique in particular, and not the Republic of South Africa. The relatively positive economic environments at the ports of Dar Es Salaam, Beira and Maputo during the past twenty odd years, have had as much to do with trade benefits derived from "South Africa bashing" than with any inherent local or regional spatial-economic advantage. Indeed, and look- ing still deeper into the crystal ball of the future, the major competition for servicing international trade in southern Africa, N of the Republic of South Africa, should be between Namibia and Angola; South Africa should continue to dominate regional trade but likely

will have less impact on Copper Belt trade (Zambia and Zaire), especially with regard to exports.

Transport Advantages

The Caprivi Strip offers the countries of South-Cen- tral Africa a better than average quality and time competitive road/rail connection to a deep water Atlan- tic Ocean port at Walvis Bay, a port as modern as any in the region. At the important mining center of Tsumeb and the nearby regional service and former military logistics distribution center of Grootfontein in NE SWA/Namibia, access to the well-maintained railroad provides a non-road transport option to Windhoek or to Walvis Bay. Except for a 320 km stretch of gravel road between Rundu, the administrative center of Kavongo- land, and the Kwando river (a small, sluggish stream whose importance on the map is due solely to its cutting in two the Caprivi Strip), there is everywhere a paved road, even to Katima Mulilo in East Caprivi (Fig 4). From Katima, via Botswana, there are good combination gravel and asphalt roads into Central Africa's Copper Belt, through Zambia into the industrialized areas of S Zaire, from Zambia into Malawi and, not least, from Katima Mulilo E into Zimbabwe by way of short stretches of road in Botswana and Zambia. As if the future economic growth potential has suddenly been recognized in Windhoek planning circles, these remaining 320 km of gravel road in Caprivi either are being paved, or have high priority for resurfacing. This likely will be completed before Luederitz, in the SW portion of the country and a popular tourist attraction, has a paved road connection the entire distance to the S transport and administrative center of Keetmanshoop! The Caprivi Corridor can only become more important to the landlocked countries of S Africa.

Existing Corridor Commerce and Future Trade Prospects

What evidence exists that the Caprivi Corridor already is in use as a conduit for international trade? By international trade is meant trade other than supplies to UNITA in SE Angola. First, however, a cautionary note is in order. The reader needs to be made aware of the political and economic sensitivity surrounding traffic along the Caprivi Strip. The military conflict between SWAPO's People's Liberation Army Namibia (PLAN) and the combined South African Defense Force and Southwest Africa Territorial Forces often occurred in this area, even though the bulk of active fighting was more to the west and north. UNITA forces in SE Angola undoubtedly have received considerable military and other logistics support by way of the Caprivi Strip (frequently by rail to Grootfontein, then via truck to Rundu and points further E or, by truck directly from Walvis Bay or from elsewhere in South Africa). This is


an open secret. What is very much classified, however, is specifics. If deciphering the military traffic is a hopeless task, then trying to analyse commercial traffic along the Strip is almost as difficult. Not only is it a question of possible avoidance of sanctions with South Africa but, even more significant, it also is another stage of what likely will be intense economic rivalry between Atlantic coast ports and those situated at the edge of the Indian Ocean. At stake are the export routes for the approximately 600,000 to one million tons of metal extracted yearly from the Central African (Zambia and Zaire) Copper Belt.

Several tantalizing examples of Caprivi Corridor Trade are to be noted.9) Seagoing containers for export, filled with cured tobacco from Malawi, have been transported by road the entire distance to Walvis Bay; presumably, these same containers were filled with con- sumer or other goods when first brought into Malawi or into the general region. Copper concentrate from the mines and sporadically functioning refineries in S Zaire, at Likasi (Jadotville) and Kolwezi, have been transported by road to Tsumeb for partial refining into blister copper which, in turn, has been shipped by rail to Walvis Bay for export. Similar shipments have originated in Zambia. Refined lead from the Tsumeb smelter in SWA/Namibia is regularly shipped via the Caprivi Strip into S Zaire, where it is employed in battery manufacturing; this figurative "carrying of coal to Newcastle" is an indictment on the deteriorating state of Zaire's mining infrastructure. One suspects that the smelters in Zaire suffer from maintenance, fuel delivery and other operational problems.

Tsumeb, in N SWA/N, is best described as a fringe operator, undertaking custom work in addition to processing its own mineral production. Companies in several countries10) avail themselves of Tsumeb's technical know-how in extracting difficult to recover elements from copper concentrate, the ecologically undesirable cadmium and arsenic being two of better known ones. The company usually will purchase copper concentrate from overseas producers, extract the difficult to recover minerals, then sell the blister or nearly pure copper on the world market, most often to European firms. To achieve pure copper, however, blister copper must still be subjected to electrolysis; a proposal has been made to build a refinery at Swakopmund in order to obtain for SWA/N more of the employment and value added benefits of this metal export [FNDC 1989]. Once in place, such a custom copper refinery should add to the attractiveness of a Caprivi Corridor transport route for producers in Central Africa's Copper Belt.

Due in part to its ability to provide smelting at a high technological level, in part to its being connected to a modern, deep water port at Walvis Bay by an excellent rail line and, not least, to the fact that ports in East Africa either have poor rail connections to the Central Africa Copper Belt, or poor port processing environments, or both, it has been suggested that the Tsumeb

facility is capable of taking an added 120,000 to 150,000 tons of copper concentrate per year in addition to present production (Meiring 1989a). There is every indication that this tonnage, were it to materialize, would be taken from exports presently being shipped via East Africa. Road container traffic by way of the Caprivi Strip most likely would be employed to move any added tonnage from the Central Africa Copper Belt to Tsumeb. The potential for two-way traffic should reduce the road haulage costs.

Peace and Economic Growth

Aggressive entrepreneurial instinct and pragmatism rather than ideology on the part of some key leaders in S Africa have led to the growing perception by business leaders in SWA/Namibia that the only obstacle in the way of substantial trade expansion with neighboring states is the continued presence of South Africa in the country. Heretofore, one of the main reasons in support of its role in Southwest Africa/Namibia has been South Africa's desire to protect targeted populations from SWAPO incursions. To some, and not only the whites (but, admittedly, to relatively few among the black majority Ovambo ethnic group who live astride the Angolan border), South Africa's position has not been without merit. Important components, of even the nominally, pro-South African population, however, had grown weary of the struggle and, in some instances, of the constraints on personal liberty which the conflict has necessitated. It is unquestionably the apartheid linkage and its application to SWA/Namibia which engenders some of the strongest anti-South African emotions.

Furthermore, one suspects that important components in the South African Government also had grown weary of a conflict which, in the end, must surely evolve into the birth of an independent Namibia. Rather than continue going against the tide of world opinion, their collective voices might prefer a Namibia with which South Africa would continue to have a strong trading relationship and where the World Community, in something akin to an independence dowry, might be willing to pick up the annual South African financial subsidy to Windhoek of approximately 300 million Rand. These monies have been in addition to military expenditures. Approximately 20% of the SWA/Namibia GNP is exported to the Republic of South Africa and some 75% of consumables and capital goods are imported from South Africa. The South African private sector has placed in excess of two billion Rand in capital investment into SWA/Namibia - primarily in mining, wholesale, engineering and financial services. The favourable balance of trade to South Africa is from 300 to 500 million Rand per year (Meiring 1989b).

By 1988 there was considerable evidence that the commercial community among others, both in Windhoek and in Walvis Bay, was shifting to the view that,

GeoJournal 2 2 . 3 / 1 9 9 0 3 7 3

Fig 5 Historical and recent railroad construction schemes proposed for N Southwest Affica/Namibia and S Angola.

Source: Rothschuh 1985

~ _ . 2 5 0 Kilome5t~rs 100

Ondangwa ~>

Rocky Point

Mi~webaai . . . . . INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

% \ - - - MAJOR ROAD & ' ~ • • NEW RAILWAY PROPOSAL

II II HISTORICAL RAILWAY PROPOSAL

however abhorrent its ideology, a SWAPO-led Namibia likely would be less antagonistic to capitalism than suggested by its previous rhetoric and 1983 draft constitution and, no less important, would offer scope in Namibia for aggressive pursuit of a much greater share of regional international trade, including trade with Angola; Windhoek is connected with Luanda by a bitumein surfaced road. The portion of this route which is in Angola has deteriorated due to the war. Still, this potential first-class road link to SWA/Namibia is one hard surfaced road more than Angola has to any of its neighbors. Being the only practical deep water port to the S of Luanda, much of any commerce generated would also be of benefit to Walvis Bay.

Independence should also bring with it an immediate lifting of the sanctions in Namibia which have been applied against South Africa and its lapsed mandate of Southwest Africa; this would reopen certain foreign markets for Namibian mineral production and likely lead t o increased production. The country's major mining operations (uranium, diamonds and base metals including copper, zinc, lead and tin) represent a diversified minerals sector of different supply/demand fundamentals. In this context, SWA/Namibia should be able to avoid some of the negative economic connotations of single product mineral economies elsewhere in Africa (FNDC 1989). Add to this already substantial mining base the advantages for attracting a portion of the minerals processing and export tonnages of neighboring states, then Namibian economic prospects appear to be good in spite of the negative impact of what one study (Terry 1978) referred to as the three significant factors shaping the economy; size of the country and great distances separating settlements; water shortages; and the diversity and sparsenses of its inhabitants.

Railroad Construction Proposals

The Caprivi Strip has been mentioned in yet another capacity; a proposal to build a railroad through its entire

length (Rothschuh 1985). This proposed line would connect Maramba (Livingstone), in Zambia at Victoria Falls, astride the main rail line between Bulawayo and Cape Town, with the SWA/Namibia rail head at Tsumeb. A variant of this proposal would have new construction extended from Tsumeb into the heart of Ovamboland before heading into N Kaokoland and to the ocean at Moewe Bay (Fig 5). Such a line would provide a future possible port at Moewe Bay with a reasonably direct and, for Namibia, a politically sanitized rail-port connection into South-Central Africa. Economically, however, there seems little justification for this line and economics, perhaps even more so than politics, likely will prove to be the strongest determinant as to whether this railroad is to materialize.

As early as 1900, the Otavi Minen and Eisenbahn- gesellschaft proposed a rail line linking its deposits near what is now Tsumeb to the NW Skeleton or Kaokoland coast, to a point near the mouth of the Khumib river (Shoeman 1984). The company, which even at this time, had a considerable amount of Cape Colony/English capital, apparently wished to avoid the political reper- cussions of using Walvis Bay for the export of its ores and refined products. An all-German route was given priority; the line eventually built from Swakopmund to Tsumeb was to be its lifeline.

The line separating politics and economics can be very thin. For example, Trans Namib Ltd., successor to Transport Services SWA/Namibia, has proposed con- structing a railroad to Rundu as a preliminary to possibly extending the line eastward through the Caprivi Strip. There would be an eventual connection to the Cape Town-Bulawayo line at or near Livingstone. Most observers would agree in saying that the "Civilizing Rails" of Mark Jefferson's classic study (Jefferson 1928) no longer are applicable. A railroad constructed to "open- up" an area, however the opening-up process is defined and however "open" the area in question might be, most likely would be a dubious project; roads are the means for the opening-up process in this age and time. Large


tonnages of a bulk commodity usually will offer rail the advantage over road, but the tonnages need to be large and guaranteed over a lengthy period of time. Trans Namib accepts the argument in principle, but notes that the line they have in mind from Grootfontein to Rundu (a distance of 256 km) would be constructed primarily by hand labor.al) By employing upwards of 20,000 men, the project would play a major role in alleviating the high and likely to become a higher still unemployment rate in SWA/Namibia (officially on the order of 20% in late 1989, but quite likely over 50% when taking into account the traditional sector).

There is potential for mineral haulage over such a line. Besides Zambia's existing and sometimes precari- ous copper export link over the Tanzam rail line to Dar Es Salaam and not infrequent use of South African ports (Loubser 1980), the proposed Caprivi line could be expected to attract copper concentrate from Zaire and possibly copper and other minerals from presently closed mines in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, marginal, low capi- talization mining operations cannot afford to have lengthy delays between the moment of shipping their metal and the time when payment is received. In the case of the Tsumeb, the metal is sent weekly by express freight train to Walvis Bay and is loaded aboard ship within four days of leaving the mine. The railroad is not permitted to extend unloading to the point where over- time wages must be paid. Bills of lading and other documentation are air expressed to the buyer once the ship has left Walvis Bay. By way of contrast, mine operators using East African ports may have to wait days or weeks for the necessary rail rolling stock to collect at the mine/smelter site. Once underway, there is no guarantee that the journey to port will be uniterrupted, and if so, for how long a time. Once at port, delays may continue because of loading problems or uncertain scheduling of ships' arrivals or departures. East African ports must rebuild shipper confidence to compete with the emerging transport advantages of an independent Namibia, which, among other things, should have the Tsumeb smelter, a copper refinery at Swakopmund and the port of Walvis Bay, 30 km to the South.

Another connection has been proposed, one which would attract Botswana coal directly into Walvis Bay for export. In this case, a new rail line would be constructed westward across the Kalahari desert to the regional center of Gobabis, where a spur line built E of Windhoek comes to an end. This is a project which received a great deal of publicity in the early 1980s, but a depressed world market for coal has placed the scheme on hold. Detailed feasibility plans were prepared for the rail line and for a specialized coal loading facility across from Walvis Bay at Pelican Point. The targeted Moruple and Kgasque reserves in E Botswana have been estimated to be as high as 40 billion tons, 17 billion of which are considered to be proven deposits (Bechtel n.d.). Shell Coal Botswana's joint venture agreement with the Botswana Government provided for a 5 - 1 0 Mt/year

export coal mine. According to one report (Mining Journal 1983), were exports to the order of 10 million tons per year to be envisaged, then a line across the Kalahari desert would be economically practical. For exports of around 5 Mt/year, then other outlets would have priority. Construction of this proposed line had strong support among SWAPO planners in exile, but they envisioned a Namibian Walvis Bay able to reduce South Central Africa's reliance upon ports in the Repu- blic of South Africa (UN Institute for Namibia 1986) (Barnard 1987). Trans-Kalahari railroad schemes hardly are new. Potential for developing massive coal deposits in Botswana has brought to light an earlier and now obscure rail construction project. A Kalahari railroad proposal was presented to the Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) Legislative Assembly in 1932. Presumably, the thrust behind it concerned the possible export of coal from the Wankie deposits; this proposed line would have connected with the existing Southwest Africa network at Gobabis, eventually reaching the then newly expanded and modernized Walvis Bay port (Jeffares 1932). This aside, prospects for the recently proposed Kalahari railroad eventually being built seem marginally better than for the line envisioned through the Caprivi Strip. There is little likelihood of commercial loans being made available for any rail construction in Africa unless they are for a line designed primarily to carry one or more bulk commodities and in an economic environment where longterm markets seem assured, criteria to date best satisfied by the proposed Kalahari line.

Geopolitically, the Kalahari line and its eventual funneling of vast quantities of coal into Walvis Bay for export would reinforce the already dominant organic economic linkages between this enclave port and its host country of SWA/Namibia. Were this rail line to be built, then there would be powerful reasons for minimizing future political friction between South Africa and an independent Namibia (not quite the scenario envisioned by SWAPO in exile!). The longer but already in place railroad to Cape Town would be a competitor to any new construction across the Kalahari desert. In turn, either of these routes would have the advantage over a rail line built through the Caprivi Strip, whether that line were to stop at Tsumeb or be extended to Moewe Bay. On the other hand, were a purely Namibian deep water port to become a reality, then the above rankings might well be reversed.

Transport Corridors

Three "main street" transport corridors appear to be in the process of emerging in SWA/Namibia (Trans- portation Study 1986; Van der Merwe 1983). The first is the road/rail connection between Walvis Bay and Tsumeb/Grootfontein and, from there, the road contin- uing to Rundu, Katima Mulilo and into neighboring states. In this context, Caprivi Corridor trade should be


considered in relation to the geographical advantages of Walvis Bay over East African ports. These Indian Ocean ports are inefficient and have locational advantages only to East Africa/East Asia, although the situation at Beira may improve (Commerce 1989).12) European and western hemisphere trade is better served from Atlantic coast ports. Angola's ports will require years before hinterland connections are repaired; Cape Town has political disadvantages and is considered by some to be too distant from neighboring countries. Walvis Bay also has political disadvantages, but these most likely will be downplayed in an independent Namibia.

The second high priority transport corridor also links Walvis Bay, but in this case to Windhoek. This also is a road-rail combination. In both instances, trade corridor flow is in an E to W or NE to W direction as well as to the S (and to South Africa). This S route constitutes the third corridor. Indeed, while newly created Trans Namib13) seems determined to preserve the mainline rail link S from Windhoek, it proposes to shift some of the maintenance effort in favor of containerized and general goods rather than for ores and ore concentrates. These latter commodities require more costly rail maintenance. To capture a significant portion of the trade presently being trucked into SWA/Namibia from South Africa, Trans Namib has under construction a major container depot at Ariamsvlei, just inside the border and to the E of Karasburg. Here, truck-borne containers will be transferred to railroad flat cars. All three major transport corridors are duplicative, in that road and rail are adjacent, except to the N of Tsumeb-Grootfontein. This is a waste of transport and further rationalization of the system can be anticipated.

For example, there is a strong case to use rail piggy- back service along the main corridors and only to use road transport when rail service is not available. Were shippers to continue to insist upon truck delivery, then some form of special road user charge would need to be implemented. More realistic road user charges should be forthcoming! Aside from the hopelessly inadequate and poorly maintained line from Aus to Luederitz, the mainline SWA/Namibia rail system is in good condition and, where necessary, can provide the shipper efficient service. Road delivery, admittedly, is faster but not especially cheap were meaningful road user charges to be applied.

The connections to Luederitz hardly seem so favor- able. Between Aus and the port, the railroad is maintained but only just! One major effort was made in 1977 to redirect some of these concentrates to Luederitz for export, but it was a logistics nightmare. It was prompted by an Imcor (parent company of the Rosh Pinah mine) board member whose father had discovered the deposits and named the site.14) He, like many 'Southwesters' considers Luederitz to be the country's true port whatever its physical or economic disadvantages. Anything which might help to improve this port town's sagging fortunes is viewed with favor. At the time of the

1977 shipment, approximately 8,500 tons of zinc concentrate were trucked (175 km) in the usual fashion to Aus Nek, then carried by train westward to Luederitz. The rail journey demanded careful planning, since the line across the Namib desert is in such poor condition. Much of the track is laid upon a bed of sand and soil rather than one comprised of rock. Special track maintenance and very low train speeds, lower still than the present average 33 km/h for the thrice weekly mixed passenger-freight trains between Luederitz and Keet- manshoop, were required for this single enterprise.

Even more difficult than getting the concentrate to the port was the task in loading the ship.15) There are no conveyor belt-type loaders in the dock area. Rosh Pinah was obliged to send a work crew to Luederitz equipped with "Front Loaders" borrowed from mine operations. By working around the clock, these men were able to load the vessel on its three visits without the company incuring demurrage charges. The need for multiple visits is the result of inadequate water depths. The largest vessel brought to dockside has been 3,500 dwt. 16) So bad were these memories, coupled with the disadvantages of using Luederitz in the maritime sense, that Rosh Pinah management chooses to pay the railroad a special sur- charge (6.4 Rand per ton shipped in 1988) in order to have maintained the line eastward from Aus Nek, to the mainline rail junction at Seeheim. Track at Seeheim eventually reaches to Walvis Bay via Keetmanshoop and Windhoek.

Tab 2 depicts relative transport and handling costs for zinc concentrate from the Rosh Pinah mine to a) Luederitz and to b) Walvis Bay. Luederitz is the more expensive port. Even if underwater mining provided greater water depths, it is unlikely that ships of sufficient size (on the order of 10,000 grt) would frequent this port when so much better facilities were available to the N, at Walvis Bay. Furthermore, a massive investment would be required to bring the rail link into Luederitz to a competitive position. Perhaps of even greater importance over the longer term is the situation whereby Luederitz Harbor is strategically dominated by two relics of 19th century guano trade, Seal and Penguin Islands. All of the old guano rocks belong to The Republic of South Africa (Demhardt 1989); visitors to the islands proper or travelling close in-shore see large sign posts declaring South African sovereignty, in four languages. All else aside, one should think that the political environment needed further clarification before an independent Namibia would be prepared to commit large sums of scarce money to improving water depths at Luederitz. The Walvis Bay option remains as well as the potential option of a third port. Were history reversed and had Great Britain claimed the site of Luederitz and Imperial Germany the site at Walvis Bay, then the "geography" of the truly SWA/Namibian port would warrant serious attention. As it is, Luederitz is tangential to the economic and population heartland of the country; its location is much too far to the South.


* 6.40 Rand/ton in 1988 [SATS: South African Transport Services] Does not include cost of 17.5 km truck haulage from mine to Aus Nek.

Souce: Rosh Pinah Management

Tab 2 Comparative transport costs for Rosh Pinah zinc concentrate to Luederitz and Walvis Bay

Future competition for port supremacy in an independent Namibia will not only be betwen a first class, deep water port, a port under the political control of a foreign power, and the "true" Namibian but physically inadequate port, but between one or both of these and a third, still highly tentative, and yet to be built port. Whether such a third port ever will be built depends upon a number of factors. Mention already has been made of the fishing connection and the fervent desire on the part of SWA/Namibia Sea Fisheries to have their own, Namibian, deep water fishing port. More than balancing the "push for a new port" lobby is the strength inherent in the use of Walvis Bay in some form of extra- territorial fashion, longterm lease, or variation of one or both.

The critical unknown is human emotion and the danger of pushing positions from which there is no escape clause. Both South Africa and an independent Namibia will hold good poker hands. South Africa wishes good relations with Namibia; South Africa owns the only good port site between Saldanha Bay (N of Cape Town) and Namibe (Mocamedes), in S Angola. To build a new port without the physical protection of a Pelican Point (Walvis Bay) likely would add hundreds of millions of dollars to the cost of construction. Even then, how would an independent Namibia import the necessary construction material were South Africa to deny the use of Walvis Bay and ports elsewhere in South Africa? Surely, the very inefficient East Africa ports and central African railways could not be a substitute. Were they to be used of necessity, then where would the connection to the Namibian transport grid take place? The only logical place would be at the E end of the Caprivi Corridor, and then only to a road. South Africa has reassured the

population of Walvis Bay that "their position as part of the Republic was judicially safe . . . that existing agree- ments on the town would still be carried on after Namibian independence (Times of Namibia 1989)." This seems to leave open some arrangement regarding the port, railroad marshalling yards and 30 odd km of track to Swakopmund, in Namibia.

One suspects that the question of how large a per- centage of Namibia's off-shore fishing quota is to be assigned to South Africa (because of its having the Walvis Bay exclave and the Guano islands) will be part of negotiations leading to whatever agreement is made regarding Namibian use of Walvis Bay port. There still remain other factors. These are as diverse as Namibia's retention of the Rand currency and its inclusion in the Rand Customs Union, the use of Namibian territory for African National Congress military units and, possibly as strange as any, the use of the Walvis Bay Airfield at Rooikop Military Base as the Swakopmund international airport. Swakopmund's present airport is totally inadequate. Yet, this city, now the second largest in the country, is a major tourist attraction and jumping-off point for road visits to the Skeleton Coast, to the Bush- man cave paintings at Brandberg and to the Naukluft Nature Park (Namib desert). Swakopmund also is a major competition to Windhoek for visits to the Etosha Pan. Finally, fresh water taken from Kuiseb river wells in the exclave provide Swakopmund with its drinking water and nearby Rossing open pit uranium oxide mine with much of the water for washing ore.

On the other hand, an independent Namibia knows that, without the Namibian hinterland, Walvis Bay would have little purpose in being. Furthermore, the Walvis Bay "plug" can be used only once by South Africa. Afterwards, the world community would find the means and the site for the building of a new port. During the time required to build such a port, however, the Namibian economy would be in a crisis of massive dimensions. The non-precious stone mining economy would come to a stand-still and the social dimensions of mass unemployment would be severe. A Namibian government would have as many reasons for wishing a calm resolution of the future use of Walvis Bay as would a South African government in not wanting a crisis situation to emerge. The danger, as has often been the case, is in the rhetoric getting out of control.

Perhaps it is too early to make firm predictions. Were the third port to come into being, then sites to the N of Swakopmund (formerly the Germans' second port and, in the pre-1915 period, one of the two national rail end points) would seem logical, possibly at Cape Fria, Cape Cross or at Moewe Bay. The latter has featured previously in transport development schemes (Roth- schuh 1985). Viewed almost daily by scores of trawler crews, Moewe Bay is effectively isolated from the SWA/Namibia road network. The 80kin between Moewe Bay and the Nature Conservation resort facility at Terrace Bay to the S can only be traversed by 4-wheel


dr ive veh ic les . A m i n i - w e a t h e r s t a t i on is in p l ace , b u t t he

on ly h u m a n act ivi ty is t h e occas s iona l secur i ty p a t r o l o r t he v is i tor dr iv ing or f ly ing- in fo r a b r i e f s tay at a u n i q u e

p lace . T h e S k e l e t o n C o a s t is as beau t i fu l as it is hos t i l e to t h e u n p r e p a r e d v is i tor (Nol i 1986). M o e w e B a y ' s geo-

pol i t ica l s ign i f icance , a s suming t h e r e is to b e o n e , m u s t awai t e v e n t s in t he r ap id ly c h a n g i n g S o u t h w e s t A f r i c a /

N a m i b i a pol i t ica l e n v i r o n m e n t . In t h e case o f C a p e Fr ia , C a p e Cross a n d M o e w e Bay , n e w rail c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d

to ta l i n f r a s t ruc tu r a l d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d b e neces sa ry .

Acknowledgement

T h e a u t h o r w i shes to t h a n k t h e U n i v e r s i t y of S o u t h C a r o l i n a fo r its f inanc ia l s u p p o r t a n d for ag r ee i n g to

t e a c h i n g s c h e d u l e m o d i f i c a t i o n s w h i c h p e r m i t t e d an ea r - l ier t h a n usua l s ta r t o f t h e 1988 f ie ld r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m .

H e also g ra t e fu l ly a c k n o w l e d g e s the R e s e a r c h Fe l low- ship p r o v i d e d by the H u m a n Sc iences R e s e a r c h Counc i l .

O p i n i o n s e x p r e s s e d in this p a p e r are t h o s e of t he a u t h o r a n d are n o t to b e a t t r i b u t e d to t he H S R C . T h e a u t h o r

also wi shes to a c k n o w l e d g e R o t a r y I n t e r n a t i o n a l fo r t he i r T e a c h i n g F e l l o w s h i p as wel l as t h e S o u t h e r n Reg i -

ona l E d u c a t i o n B o a r d fo r t r ave l a s s i s t ance , f inancia l s u p p o r t w h i c h m a d e poss ib l e a l e n g t h y r e t u r n visit to

S W A / N a m i b i a in 1989. Las t ly , spec ia l t h a n k s a re o f f e r e d to two g e o g r a p h e r s in s o u t h e r n Af r i ca . P r o f e s s o r W. S.

B a r n a r d o f S t e l l e n b o s c h U n i v e r s i t y ' s G e o g r a p h y D e p a r t - m e n t exc i t ed this ind iv idua l to t he na tu ra l b e a u t y a n d

vast s c o p e fo r conf l ic t r e s o l u t i o n in S o u t h w e s t Af r i c a / N a m i b i a . M a n y years ear l ie r , P r o f e s s o r B a r n a r d h a d

w r i t t e n his P h D d i s s e r t a t i o n o n t h e g e o m o r p h o l o g y o f t he c o u n t r y a n d he c o n t i n u e s to do r e s e a r c h t he r e .

P r o f e s s o r W. A . N i e m a n , C h a i r m a n o f t h e G e o g r a p h y D e p a r t m e n t at t h e newly o r g a n i z e d U n i v e r s i t y of

N a m i b i a in W i n d h o e k , g e n e r o u s l y p r o v i d e d m e wi th a p lace to w o r k at a t i m e w h e n space was in ve ry s h o r t

supply . His c o n s t a n t e n c o u r a g e m e n t will long be r e m e m b e r e d and a p p r e c i a t e d .

Notes

1) The author is aware of the sometimes intense pohtical symbo- lism inherent in the use of one or another of these two names for the same country. Insofar as possible, Southwest Africa is employed when the time frame under discussion is decidedly in the past, either during the German period ending in 1915, or for the 75 years during which this political unit was administered directly from Pretoria or through Administrator Generals appointed by the South African Government. Where the emphasis in the text is on the side of the future and for a time when independence should be a reality, then Namibia is used. Otherwise, and the dominant expression in this paper, both names are used.

2) Cross border incursions by People's Liberation Army Namibia (PLAN) troops led in short order to a United Nations-autho- rized release of selected contingents of South African and Southwest African territorial troops from their bases. The first week in April witnessed severe fighting in the North and relatively large numbers of casualties.

3) In what surely has been one of history's most monitored and least dishonest elections, SWAPO took 57.33% of the vote. This equated to 41 seats in the 72-seat Constituent Assembly, an absolute majority which will permit SWAPO to form the Government once a constitution has been ratified by a two- thirds vote. Ratification, however, will require significant compromise. This is especially the case for SWAPO since this party won the majority vote of only the numerically dominant Ovambo people. No other ethnic group gave SWAPO a majority of its vote. Since the election, SWAPO has surprised out- siders with its conciliatory behavior; at the time of submitting this manuscript, however, the awaited compromise-constitution still had not been ratified.

4) The United Nations deployed 1225 foreign civilian election supervisors in addition to police at all polling stations. These personnel monitored the official polling teams from the SWA/ Namibia Government. UN troops also have been deployed, especially along the Angolan border and at military bases. Until mid-November, 1989, when the last of the South African Defense Forces left the country, one of their tasks was to monitor these South African troops. To these numbers could be added, temporarily, approximately 1,000 representatives of the local and world press and numerous official foreign election observers not affiliated with the United Nations (including this writer). Lastly, each of the ten contesting political parties was

entitled to have upwards of four observers at each polling station. It seems safe to say that "UNTAG NAMIBIA" has been the largest mobilization of United Nations forces since the 1964 Congo crisis and, numerically, may even exceed the earlier endeavor (there are approximately 7,000 UN personnel and over 4,000 vehicles having the UN logo in the country; the latter, for the most part, imported by way of Walvis Bay).

5) " . . . The continuation of the use of the port of Walvis Bay by negotiations with the Republic of South Africa, and the trans- ferring of the enclave to Namibia."

6) Personal interview with the Director of Sea Fisheries, Dr. Jan Jurgens, November 2, 1989.

7) Ibid.

8) Mr. Mishake Muyongo, a leading personality in the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) and holder of first position in DTA's Candidate List in the November, 1989, election, is a prominent East Caprivian who at one time was a member of the SWAPO politburo. His defection from SWAPO and subsequent active pre-election campaigning not only helped to deny SWAPO a majority of the East Caprivian vote, but provided high visibility to an outspoken opponent of the organization in general and of its leader, Mr. Sam Nujoma, in particular. At the time of our interview, Mr. Muyongo managed to laugh when conversation shifted to the presence of a modern, parliament building in Katima Mulilo and the relationship between its construction and his defection.

9) This information was derived during the course of several inter- views with senior Woker Freight Service personnel in 1988 and 1989. Woker is a major transport firm in S Africa and has been one of the leaders in moving freight to and from Angola and the countries of South-Central Africa.

10) At a time of official Canadian support for economic sanctions against South Africa, the author observed the unloading in Walvis Bay of a shipment of Canadian-mined and enriched copper concentrate. This ore was being transported to the Tsumeb smelter where it would be converted into copper blister. Such shipments are on a regular basis and, among other things, attest to the economic and technical attractiveness of the Tsumeb facility.

11) Personal interview with Mr. Francois Uys, Managing Director of Trans Namib Ltd., November 2, 1989.


12) Speaking in Harare, Senator Denis Norman, Chairman of the Beira Corridor Group, said that "wharf improvements should be completed by 1992, thus providing Beira with one of the finest container loading facilities in the w o r l d . . . Furthermore, dredg- ing in the channel connecting the port to the Indian Ocean should permit vessels of up to 60,000 tons to enter harbour as opposed to the present limit of 28,000 tons. Security problems, however, limit rail corridor traffic through Mozambique to daylight hours only."

13) The rail and road transport systems (including Luederitz harbour) previously owned and operated by South African Trans- port Services (SAT) in SWA/Namibia, were placed under the authority of Windhoek on May 1, 1985. South African Trans- port Services managed the systems on behalf of the SWA/ Namibia Government until June 30, 1988. The latest change reflects both the acquisition of Namib Air (formerly a private company) and aggressive public relations to stress a separate national identity. At the time of the 1988 separation, and apparently only after hard negotiating, it was agreed that train crew changes would take place in Upington, in the N Cape Province. The SWA/N people wanted their town of Karasburg. Aside from a tent community maintenance site and container transfer facility under construction at Ariamsvlei, there is scarcely any human habitation in the harsh desert between Karasburg and Upington, nearly 200 km distant. Furthermore, train engines were to be painted in the color blue, in contrast to SAT bur- gundy. This change now is accomplished. Of more substantive importance was the request by Transport Services SWA/N (Trans Namib) to the Interim Legislative Assembly in Windhoek for the removal of approximately 1000 jobs from the corporation's personnel list. The Interim Government agreed to this request in order that the corporation might operate free of salary subsidies. Government turned around and made no secret of its intention to rehire and to pay these "redundant" rail and road employees from another fund. Still, major efforts were being made to get the new transport corporation off to a good financial start. Personal interview with the Managing Director of Transport Services SWAfN, Mr. Francois Uys, July 6, 1988.

14) Personal interview with Rosh Pinah General Manager, Mr. Fred Van Der Colff, June 20, 1988.

15) Personal interview with Mr. W. J. Coetzer, Plant Superinten- dent at Rosh Pinah, December 4, 1989. Mr. Coetzer was in charge of ship loading operations at Luederitz in 1977.

16) Source: Private Correspondence with Mr. Peter Duerr, Woker Freight Service.

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Documents

A third port for Southwest Africa/Namibia?1)