The Australian Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) is deployed to Afghanistan on Operation SLIPPERto conduct special operations in support of US-led Coalition security and reconstruction efforts in the country.(Photo: Australian DoD)

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

A Theory of Special OperationsThe Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF

Special operations are missions toaccomplish strategic objectiveswhere the use of conventional forc-es would create unacceptable risksdue to Clausewitzian friction. Over-coming these risks requires specialoperations forces that directlyaddress the ultimate sources offriction through qualities that arethe result of the distribution of theattributes of SOF personnel.

special Operations Forces (SOF) are small,specially organised units manned by carefullyselected people using modified equipment andtrained in unconventional applications of tac-tics against strategic and operational objec-tives. Further, the successful conduct of spe-cial operations relies on individual and small

unit proficiency in specialised skills applied withadaptability, improvisation, and innovationagainst adversaries often unprepared to react.

It has often been stated that the uniquecapabilities of SOF complement those of con-ventional forces. What are "the unique capabil-ities of SOF?" They are almost never named.And why should SOF oniy "complement" thecapabilities of conventional forces instead ofhaving strategic roles of their own?

One expert defines special operations as fol-lows: "Unconventional actions against enemyvulnerabilities in a sustained campaign, under-taken by specially designated units, to enableconventional operations and/or resolve eco-nomically politico-military problems at theoperational or strategic level that are difficult orimpossible to accomplish with conventionalforces alone." Unfortunately, even this carefuland thoughtful description is a definition byexception. If special operations are "unconven-tional," they are defined only relative to what is

"conventional." As the capabilities of conven-tional forces improve, they may be able to per-form missions that once were the responsibilityof SOF. For example, fighting at night vi/as oncea characteristic of SOF. while the use of nightvision is now widespread in conventional oper-ations.

Therefore, special operations {and SOF) can-not theoretically be defined in terms of specificand unchanging missions, skills, or capabilities.In practice, special operations have beendefined in the context of the contemporary war.

Dr. Robert Spulak received his Ph.D. in Physics fromthe University of New Mexico in 1988. His prior de-grees were in Physics. Astronomy, and Nuclear Engi-neering. Dr Spulak is presently manager of the Stra-tegic Studies Department at Sandia National Labora-tories.This article is based on excerpts from a longer publi-cation prepared for the Strategic Studies Departmentof the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), atHurlburt Field. Florida.

Military Tecfinology • MILTECH • Special Issue 2009 23

During wartime, special men emerge who havethe personal capability to overcome risk andthe skills that allow them to perform strategical-ly important tasks (when organised into specialand small units) that conventional forces can-not.

A theory of special operations must thereforestart with an understanding of what conven-tional forces cannot do and why. Conventionalforces do have limitations, the most prominentof which is Clausewitzian friction; in fact, mili-tary forces have been shaped by these limita-tions. This is not to say that friction does notapply to SOF as well, but instead that the originof SOF is due to the impact of friction on mili-tary forces. The purpose of the present paper isto generalise this idea to provide a theory ofSOF based on the enduring limitations of con-ventional forces, based in turn on the immut-able nature of war itself.

The Limitationsof Military Forces

Military forces have evolved structurally andhave developed the "principles of war" toaccommodate the realities of war through les-sons learned in blood. In the end. it is theenemy's fear that once his material or moralresources are eroded, he will be subject todestruction in the arena of conflict that removeshis will to continue. The enduring nature of waris that, within the strategic arena of conflict, weand our enemy are both striving to be able todestroy the other.

The requirements of military forces are deter-mined by the need to place ourselves in posi-tion to destroy the enemy while at the sametime avoiding too great a risk of deadly conse-quences to ourselves. These two fundamentalneeds are in direct conflict, and both elementswill always be present. Technology can affecthow we propose to visit destruction upon theenemy and how we might try to avoid it our-selves, but it does not eliminate the underlyingconflict of purposes or its effects upon thehumans engaged in war. The current concernsabout asymmetrical warfare and terrorism illus-trate that the enemy will always find a way to

Portuguese Special Forces.(Photo: Portuguese Army)

hurt us. But avoiding all risk at any cost is asbad as being foolhardy.

The enduring nature of war creates what Carlvon Ciausewitz called friction. Friction is the"effect of reality on ideas and intentions in war"- that is, the difference between plans and real-ity. The three ultimate sources of friction are:constraints imposed by human physical andcognitive limits, informational uncertainties andunforeseeable differences between perceivedand actual reality, and the structural nonlinear-ity of combat processes that can give rise tothe long-term unpredictability of results andemergent phenomena.

Friction will remain the central fact of war,and as such will retain the potential to make thedifference between success and failure. Fric-tion is the reality that will continue to help deter-mine the requirements and the limitations ofmilitary forces, due to the enduring nature ofwar: the need to place ourselves in position todestroy the enemy while at the same timeavoiding too great a risk of deadly consequenc-es to ourselves.

The Relationship betweenConventional Forces and SOF

In general, military forces are large organisa-tions to accomplish all of the requirementsimposed by the nature and principles of war.One reason military forces are large is just thesize of the overall task itself, threatening de-struction against an enemy and guardingagainst catastrophe in the environment includ-ing friction. For both purposes, all else beingequal, more is better. Although large forces arerequired, the characteristics of large forces aresome of the very sources of friction that createfundamental limitations,

A large curve can represent, schematically,the distribution of some attribute of individualmilitary personnel such as physical endurance,clarity of thought under stress, aptitude for lan-guage or culture, or performance of a specifictask. The average ability would be representedby the peak of the curve, but many personnelscore both above and beiow the average. Thearea under the curve would be the totai numberof personnel. If the tota! number of personnel isenlarged or reduced, the height of the distribu-tion will change but not the average or thespread - if the military personnel are represen-

An Iraqi SWAT team member awaits hisnext turn to fire during weapons trainingwith U.S. Army Soldiers from 3rd Battalion,10th Special Forces Group,at Camp Hit, Iraq, 26 August 2007.(Photo: US Navy)

tative of the same recaiiting pool of the gener-al population and the same military organisa-tion and training. A small curve can representthe distribution of the same attribute amongmembers of SOF who are selected out of thelarger military population for superior perfor-mance in this and many other attributes. Theaverage performance is much higher and thespread is smaller because there is a minimumstandard against which these personnel wereselected. Also, since they were selected out ofthe general military population, the number thatscore at any given level are fewer than the num-ber who score at that level in the overall popu-lation. This last factor limits the overall numberof special operators to be a small fraction of theoverall number of military personnel. In fact, inthis schematic representation, the number ofSOF is 3.8% of the total military personnel,which is the approximate percentage of USSOF compared with total US active duty mili-tary personnel. The only ways to increase thearea under the SOF curve are to increase thenumbers of personnel recruited into SOF fromthe high end of the conventional distribution,recruit SOF from outside the conventional mili-tary, or lower the selection standards to widenthe distribution.

Obviously not all of the high-perfonning indi-viduals are recruited into SOF. There are stillmany "high performers" in the conventionaldistribution. In fact, the nature of the conven-tional military organisation and its capabilitiesare determined by the entire distribution of per-sonnel. But there is a maximum fraction of theoverall military personnel that can meet thestandards and be recruited into SOF. Thissmaller and tighter distribution of personnelwith greater average "attributes" is the sourceof the nature and capabilities of SOF.

These distributions help explain how con-ventional forces perform missions that wereonce the responsibility of SOF and how thisdoes not mean that they are becoming more"SOF-like." This is often discussed in the con-text of the application of technology, althoughthe same argument applies to other aspects ofmilitary operations such as operational con-cepts or organisation. One of the distinguishing

Military Technology • MILTECH • Special Issue 2009

characteristics of SOF is the use of technologythat is not widely available to conventional forc-es for a variety of reasons, including limitedavailability, security, cost, extensive or special-ised training, and risk. The technology maylater become more widely adopted in conven-tional forces for one of two reasons: the char-acteristics of the technology may change as itmatures, (e.g., less expensive, easier to oper-ate), allowing its use by the wider distribution ofconventional personnel: or/and, the distributionof conventional personnel may. over time, bepurposely moved to a greater capability to usethis technology through widespread training orrecruiting. In either case, the conventional per-sonnel will still have a wide distribution of capa-bility, and SOF will still have a smaller tighterdistribution with a greater average. If there isthen a perceived lack of distinction betweenSOF and conventional forces, it is likely due tothe lack of adoption by SOF of further technol-ogy or capability beyond the conventional forc-es due to the instltutionalisation of the missionsin SOF that the technology (or other advancesor changes) enabled. It is not the missions thatdefine special operations but rather the person-nel.

This is not to say that special operations aredefined simply as "what SOF do". Of course itis the existence of strategic objectives that arebeyond the limitations of conventional forcesthat creates the need for SOF to overcomethose limitations and perform missions toaccomplish those objectives. But overtime it isnot specific missions that are designated as"special" or assigned to SOF that define specialoperations. The missions will change, but theability to overcome the limitations of conven-tional forces is embodied in the SOF personnel.If the conventional forces can accomplish themission, it is time tor SOF to move on.

Defining SOFThe above is why a "special task" for con-

ventional forces or a "special" capability ortechnology is not the same thing as specialoperations. By the same token, the selection ofpersonnel with a smaller and tighter distributionwith greater average "attributes" is necessarybut not sufficient to explain the nature of SOF.After all, there are many military specialtiesrequiring specific aptitudes, knowledge, andtraining that are not shared by military forces ingeneral. What is the difference between SOFand the Judge Advocate General's Corps? Or,for that matter, what is the difference betweenNavy SEALS and Navy divers? Elite forces mayalso be selected to have a different distributionof some attributes than conventional forces,and they may perform some tasks far better,but they are not organised into the right kind ofunits and the individuals may not have attrib-utes that allow them to be creative or flexible.

It is the attributes of SOF themselves thatmatter, of course - and it is worth noting thatthe most important atthbutes may not be phys-ical capabilities but mental and psychologicalattributes. These attributes create three funda-mental qualities of SOF: SOF are wannors. arecreative, and are flexible. These three qualitiesof SOF that arise from the distribution of attrib-utes of personnel directly address the three ulti-mate sources of friction.

Elite WarriorsSOF directly address the "constraints impo-

sed by human physical and cognitive limits" bythe smaller and tighter distribution of personnelwith greater abilities to deal with the intensestresses, pressures, and responses of combat.This is why SOF must be elite warriors, en-gaged directly in the fundamental nature of warand the implementation of strategy: destroyingthe enemy or creating his fear that he will bedestroyed.

SOF are specially recruited, assessed, se-lected, trained, and equipped; have access tonational-level intelligence and cutting-edgetechnology; and demonstrate boldness, intel-lect, and perseverance. Expected personal val-ues are embodied in the SOF core values ofintegrity, courage, and creativity.

extra courage; in fact, it is not about taking risksat all. because objectively that would just resultin more frequent failure.

Performance of a strategically important mis-sion might justify greater risk, but the value ofthe creativity of SOF is that they can lower therisk associated with accomplishing strategicgoals. At both the individual and organisationallevel. SOF overcome risks that conventionalforces cannot by changing the combat pro-cess, which is made possible by greater attrib-utes, training, and technology.

Conventional forces attempt to change thecombat process as well. This is the reason fornew military technologies, which may be moreeffective at destruction without exposing ourforces to as great a risk. However, friction pre-vents conventional forces from changing the

Colombian Special Forces show counterinsertion tactics to participants of the75th Joint Civilian Orientation Conferenceoutside Bogota, Colombia, 22 April 2008.(Photo: USAF)

CreativitySOF directly address the "structural nonline-

arity of combat processes that can give rise tothe long-temi unpredictability of results andemergent phenomena" by immediately chang-ing the combat process. As discussed, the re-quirements and limitations of conventionalforces are determined in part by the need toplace themselves in position to destroy theenemy while at the same time avoiding toogreat a risk of deadly consequences to them-selves, SOF use all available means to accom-plish mission objectives without unacceptablerisk by using assets in unexpected and "crea-tive" ways. Creativity means the ability toimmediately change the combat process, alter-ing the way in which the tension is accommo-dated between threatening or performingdestruction and avoiding it.

At some level this may seem intuitively obvi-ous. Sending SOF to hit a target that is beyondthe reach of conventional forces does bring athreat to the enemy that the conventional forc-es cannot because the risk is too great. But thisis not about taking extra risks requiring only

combat process immediately during war ex-cept by applying more of existing capabilities,so new combat processes must

be institutionalised in new capabilities to beuseful. This difference between SOF and con-ventional forces is thai immediately changingthe combat process - that is. creativity - is partof SOF's operational capabilities, whereas inconventional forces operational capabilities arethe result of attempting to change the combatprocess.

FlexibilitySOF directly address the "infonnational un-

certainties and unforeseeable differencesbetween perceived and actual reality" by hav-ing a wide range of capabilities to apply to spe-cific goals in the face of uncertainty. With thewide spread in the distribution of attributes ofpersonnel, the challenge for conventional forc-es is to create units that are both large enoughand can perform specific tasks adequately inthe actual operating environment that includesfriction. Thus conventional warriors must havea discipline and a restricted set of specificrequirements and capabilities that can be reli-ably demonstrated even in the most extremeconditions of combat. This reduces the uncer-tainty of whether the units will be able to per-form, either in threatening or performingdestruction or avoiding it.

Military Technology • MILTECH • Special Issue 2009 25

SOF are organised differently, however,made possible by the different distribution ofpersonnel. Ironically, flexibility means that asmall SOF unit can have a much larger range ofcapabilities than even a large conventional unitas a result of the smaller range of more capablepersonnel. This is why modelling conventionalforces on SOF will not work. But the iack ofnumbers is also why SOF cannot win the warby themselves, and why they cannot have thefull range of overall capabilities represented bythe sum of the diverse large units of the muchlarger conventional forces.

The range of capabilities does, however,make SOF more independent of other militaryforces in their operations. And flexibility is an-other reason why SOF have strategic value,since if the strategy changes, SOF (unlike con-ventional forces) can immediately be redirect-ed.

Operational Characteristics of SOFIn an attempt to summarise the wide range

of current and future capabilities in war andoperations other than war, the individual attrib-utes, SOF organisation and capabilities, andthe fundamental qualities of SOF can be inte-grated as a few characteristics of SOF that dis-tinguish them from conventional forces. Thedefinitions of these characteristics are as fol-lows:

- Relative superiority: The ability of small specialoperations units to gain a temporary decisiveadvantage, even over a larger or well-defend-ed enemy force;

- Certain access: The ability to rapidly andsecurely transport, insert, and extract SOF,typically undetected, allowing operations inareas where or when conventional militaryoperations are not possible;

' Unconventional operations: The ability to di-rectly alter the way in which the tensionbetween threatening and avoiding destructionis managed to conduct operations - for exam-ple, operating autonomously and indepen-dently, establishing and utilising the capabil-ities of foreign military and paramilitary forces,sabotage, and subversion;

- Integrated operations: The ability to addresstransnational and asymmetric threats by inte-grating elements of national power and oper-ating with other military forces and non-mili-tary agencies;

- Strategic ir)itiative: The ability to create andmaintain initiative against an enemy at thestrategic level by an orchestrated campaign ofengaging carefully selected objectives un-available to conventional forces.

Strategic Applications of SOFSince SOF have fundamentally different limi-

tations than conventional forces, due to thefundamental qualities of SOF that address theultimate sources cf friction. SOF are not mere-ly complementary to conventional forces butcan make strategic contributions of their own.What follows is an illustration of how theseapplications can be understood using the con-cepts developed.

To help understand the contribution of SOFto warfare and to national security in operationsother than war, we will look at examples of theapplication of SOF to the principles of warwhen used to implement strategy. Once thewar starts and we are executing strategy,plans, and tactics, the misuse of SOF can beavoided if we ask the question, How does thisSOF mission contribute to applying the princi-ples of war to implement the strategy in waysthat conventional forces cannot?

ObjectiveWhen people think of special operations.

they often think of direct action missionsagainst high-value targets, especially targetsthat cannot be attacked by conventional forc-es. This is one of the sources of confusionabout the use of SOF, because technophilesassume that all targets can (eventually) beattacked through appropriately advanced tech-nology. Thinking about applying SOF to Ob-jective, however, should start with the strategicobjectives for which wars are fought. Conven-tional military forces may not provide themeans to acconnplish the political objectives.One of the greatest strategic contributions ofSOF is that they provide unique or additionalmeans to address these objectives. Indeed,there are some political objectives that mayonly be met by the use of SOF.

For example, since SOF have the character-istics of certain access, integrated operations,and relative superiority, they are capable ofhostage rescue. Note that it is not hostage res-

Chilean Special Forces fast-rope on to the flight deck of Canadian ship HMCS Regina (FFH 334) while conducting visit, board, search andseizure (VBSS) exercises during PANAMAX 2007. PANAMAX 2007 is a joint and multinational training exercise tailored to the defense of thePanama Canal, involving civil and military forces from the region.(Photo: US Navy)

26 Mditary Technology • MILTECH Special Issue 3009

One of two pararescuemen from 38tti Rescue Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, GA, follows an inflatable boat outthe back of an HC-130 during a rescue mission 350 miles nortiieast of the Caribbean island of St. Maarten on 23 July 2008.(Photo: USAF)

cue, per se, that is the characteristic of SOF;whether rescuing hostages is strategicallyimportant depends on the political objectives.

As another example, the networit concept iswidely used in modern military thought. Ene-mies, including terrorists, are conceptualisedas networks to provide a basis to discussattacking them. There are at least four ways toattack a network: ovenwhelm the entire net-work; interdict critical nodes or links; establishoperational superiority and interdict nodes orlinks when necessary or convenient; and, iso-late and degrade a portion of the network toreduce its efficiency. SOF can play a strategicrole in each of these potential objectives by e.g.creating strategic initiative in advance of over-whelming conventional forces; attacking criticalnodes; using unconventional warfare to estab-lish a kind of "SOF superiority" (e.g., analogousto air superiority); and, creating friction for theenemy through direct action and psychologicaloperations.

With respect to the war on terrorism, ten-or-ism could be viewed as an intemational prob-lem to be fought through law enforcement, dip-lomacy, intemational cooperation, and foreignassistance. The role of the military is to supportthese activities, and SOF can contribute tomost of these in operations other than war.However the fundamental purpose of the mili-tary is to wage and win the nation's wars. Aspecific terrorist enemy in war would require allof the actions prior described and a primaryrole for military force. This may be especially

justified if the threat is not low-level political vio-lence that could remain in the domain of lawenforcement but is catastrophic terrorism,especially the use of weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD).

The use of WMD by terrorists is likely torequire an identifiable and relatively stable or-ganisational structure to gamer and maintaincontrol over necessary resources and theweapons themselves. Therefore, SOF can con-tribute to this objective in at least two ways;create and sustain strategic initiative againstspecific ten-orist enemies; and, destroy the ter-rorist enemies' capability to conduct large-scale terrorism. The latter may require the poli-tics of war - for example, violation of otherstates' sovereignty, capturing or killing enemypersonnel, interception and destruction of for-eign vessels and aircraft, seizure of foreignassets, and acceptance of collateral damageand accidental innocent casualties. There is acritical role for SOF operatore with strategicimpact at the point of contact to utilise discre-tion in these actions, managing the balancebetween threat and risk at the strategic level.

OffensiveJoint Publication 3-05 says, "The lethal

applications [of special operations] are inher-ently offensive in nature because they seek tostrike or engage an adversary to compel ordeter his actions." However, it is not whetherSOF are offensive, but rather how SOF contrib-ute to the overall principle of the offensive that

matters. This is another great strategic SOFcontribution. SOF can create initiative, evenindependently of conventional forces.

Initiative is taking the fight to the enemyinstead of passively waiting for the enemy toact, making the fight when and where wechoose. Without the initiative, strategists canmake no decisions of their own. Because of thetime gap between strategic cause and effect,we must seize the initiative from the outset,forcing others to react. Seizing, retaining, andexploiting the initiative allows one to set thestrategic agenda, shapes the strategic environ-ment, forces the enemy to react to changingconditions, and provides freedom of action informulating and adapting strategy to the evolv-ing context. Successful special operations canseize and retain the initiative at the tactical leveleven when opposed by an enemy force super-ior in numbers.

In a well-know historical example, after Dun-kirk and until the landing at Normandy, the Bri-tish tumed to the use of special means as away to establish strategic initiative. It was con-sidered an important strategy to fight for theinitiative even though there WEIS no chance toimmediately exploit any gains.

With r^pect to the war on terrorism, SOFcould be used to establish and maintain strate-gic initiative against specific terrorist enemies.For example, one of the strategic issues in thewar on terrorism is that transnational terroristorganisations use ungovemed or denied areasto provide them with freedom to acquire

Military Technology • MILTECH • Special Issue 2009 27

resources, plan, and train. SOF can deny terror-ists these sanctuaries and would force them toreact to our actions, giving the US freedom toadjust operations as the situation demands. Itwouid also interfere with the capabilities of theenemy to perform acts of terror by creatinguncertainty and friction in the enemy as well asdestroying or degrading terrorist capabilitiesand resources. Strategic initiative would alsointerfere with the iimescale of potential terroristattacks and divert terrorist resources awayfrom planning and executing attacks toaddress their organisational security.

MassA critical part of succeeding at war is Mass.

Being able to threaten or perform destructionagainst the enemy requires placing the appro-priate mass of military forces {or effects, somewould argue) in an effective position at theappropriate time. Since SOF are a small frac-tion of overall military forces, it may seem thatthey have no role to play in providing Mass toaccomplish strategic objectives. However, thegreat strategic value of SOF in providing Massis to provide somebody else's Mass throughenabling partner nations and unconventionalwarfare.

One of the strategic elements of the US"National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism" is to expand foreign partnershipsand partnership capacity to counter terrorism.For example, In the Philippines, US specialoperations helped weaken the radical IsîamistAbu Sayyaf Group through miiitary training,road building, and medical aid that won popu-lar support and led to the collection of usefulnew intelligence.

The use of unconventional warfare to provideMass in defeat of an enemy in war is amplyillustrated by Operation "Enduring Freedom"(OEF) in Afghanistan. In early November, 2001Army Special Forces teams (often reinforcedwith Air Force Special Tactics Team members)infiltrated Afghanistan via SOF aircraft andlinked up with anti-Taliban Afghan forces.These SOF teams immediately gained the con-fidence of the Afghans, and between the intelli-gence they received from the Afghans andwhat they were able to determine themselves,the arrival of the SOF teams produced an im-

mediate and exponential increase in the num-ber of Taliban targets that could be identified toconventional strike aircraft. In addition to radi-cally increasing the effectiveness of US airpow-er, the unconventional warfare teams alsoimproved the effectiveness of the Afghan anti-Taliban forces they joined.

Economy of ForceApplying the principle of economy of force

may lead to the misuse of SOF. thinking that asmore capable elite warriors they are just moreeconomical conventional forces. But there aremany cases where one of the strategic objec-tives is to minimise the presence of US forces.Then the use of SOF may make some militaryoperations possible that otherwise would becounter-productive.

Economy of force can also refer to accom-plishing strategic objectives without resortingto the use of force at ail, preventing the com-mitment or use of large numbers of conven-tional forces to resolve a conflict. Many SOFactivities in operations other than war fall intothis category. However, recall that the value ofSOF in "peacetime" is derived from theirunique roles in war. And another way in whichSOF can contribute to economy of force isoperations against critical links or nodes, ifthey exist, in an enemy's networked strategiccapabilities.

ManoeuvreSOF can contribute to Manoeuvre by strate-

gic initiative to create the conditions that allowthe movement of conventional forces to posi-tions of advantage (e.g.. by creating friction forthe enemy) and by strategic reconnaissance(using certain access and unconventionaloperations) to reduce friction for own forces.

Unity of CommandSince SOF have the characteristics of inte-

grated and unconventional operations, theycan play a strategic role in Unity of Commandof US, allied, and coaiition forces. SOF can in-tegrate the elements of national power withother US government agencies for both unilat-eral US and coalition operations. And for appli-cations of the military element cf nationalpower when the US still prefers discernment.

but is willing to participate in multinational orcoalition operations. SOF achieves strategicutility as a tool of US foreign policy. In this lat-ter role, SOF contributes to keeping conflict atthe low end of the spectrum.

A more visible role in achieving unity of com-mand is in coalition operations where SOF canperform liaison functions because of their cul-tural and language capabilities. In Operation"Desert Storm", most of the US Special Forcespersonnel were assigned to the vital task ofaccompanying allied Arab units to ensuresmooth coordination with other allied units(Arab and non-Arab).

SecurityIn some cases, SOF can contribute to

security of the overall military effort by not put-ting the conventional forces at risk to accom-plish a strategic objective. In other cases, SOFcan perform operations specifically to providestrategic security for the overall force. Twoexamples of the latter are the elimination ofHitler's atomic bomb project in WW2 andSOUD hunting in "Desert Storm".

SurpriseAnother way in which SOF can make a stra-

tegic contribution is to contribute to surprise inthe operations of the overall military campaign.

A widely cited example of deception opera-tions during "Desert Storm" was the potentialamphibious landing in Kuwait to hold Iraqiforces in place while US and allied groundforces prepared for the "end run" to the west.The most suitable beach for an amphibiouslanding was apparently also heavily defendedby the Iraqis. The night of the start of the over-ali ground offensive. 15 US Navy SEALs eachplaced 20 pounds of C4 explosives along thebeach to simulate demolition charges thatwould be used to clear obstacles for an amphi-bious landing, and also anchored two rows ofblue-and-white buoys to simulate markinglanes for Marine landing craft. When the charg-es detonated, elements of two Iraqi divisionsreacted and moved to face the perceivedimminent landing.

SimplicityThe use of SOF may be the simplest way to

accomplish a strategic objective. Thus for in-stance the case with combat search and res-cue (CSAR) missions to recover downed pilotsfrom enemy-held or hostile territory, which isincreasingly regarded as a major politicalobjective.

SynthesisA theory of special operations can be stated

concisely: special operations are missions toaccomplish strategic objectives where the useof conventional forces would create unaccept-able risks due to Olausewitzian friction. Over-coming these risks requires speciai operationsforces that directly address the ultimate sourc-es of friction through qualities that are theresult of the distribution of the attributes ofSOF personnel. .--.̂ 7m-\

Austrian Special Forces.(Photo: NATO)

Military Technology • MILTECH Special Issue 2009