A Ten-Year Framework for Afghans , a book written by an international known economist Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai

8/14/2019 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghans , a book written by an international known economist Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai

1/48

April 2009

the Atlantic Councilof the united states

A Ten-Year Framework

for AfghanistanExecuting the Obama Plan. . . And Beyond

A Report by the Atlantic Council

Ashraf Ghani


2/48

T A C Ud Ss prms srv U.S. drsp d ggm r rs bsd r r A mmy mg rgs wy-rs ry. T C mprss -prs wrk drs wm brg ds pwr d gv pwr ds by:

stimulatingdialogueand discussionabout critical internationalissueswitha view toenriching pb db d prmg sss pprpr rspss rm dmsr;

Cgrss; rpr d pr srs; md Ud Ss; d drs Erp, As, d Amrs.

conductingeducationalandexchangeprogramsfor successorgenerationsofU.S.leadersso thaty w m v U.S. r ggm d v kwdg d drsdgssry dvp v ps.

Trg s dvrs wrks, C bds brd ss sppr srv U.S.drsp d ps. Is prgrm fs pbs rm yss, v rsmg rr d r drs, d rb pb db rdr gr vws knowledgeableindividualsfromawidevarietyofbackgrounds,interests,andexperiences.

theAtlAnticcouncilof the united states


3/48

A Ten-Year Framework

for AfghanistanExecuting the Obama Plan. . . And Beyond

A Report by the Atlantic Council

Ashraf Ghani

the Atlantic Councilof the united states

April 2009


4/48

11th Floor, 1101 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

F A C U S C S A,

(202) 778-4957 ://..//-.

I A C C ://..

Rq @.

T A C.

theAtlAnticcounciloftheunitedstates


5/48

Table of contents

Foreword v

Executive summarya second chance to get things right vii

Introduction 1

Threats 1

Al Qaeda 2

Insurgency 2

Narcotics 3

Poor governance and corruption 5

Weaknesses 7

International communitya failure to develop a unied strategy 7

The Afghan elitea failure to articulate a clear agenda 8

Assets 8

Natural capital 8

Location 9

Financial capital 9

Institutional successes 10

Human capital 12

International assets 13

Institution-building 14

First-order core functions 14

Second-order functions 18

Third-order functions 21

Fourth-order functions 22

Strategic justication for medium-term objectives 24

A history of state-building 24

The readiness of the Afghan people 25

A counter-insurgency (COIN) approach embraces state-building 25

International understanding of the centrality of governance 26


6/48

A en-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Short-term measures to support medium-term objectives 27

Get the elections right 27

Adopt a coherent international strategy for the medium term 27

Prepare new national programs 29

Use the National Solidarity Program as a platform 29

Create eight model provinces 30

Conclusions 30

References 32


7/48

Foreword

The Obama administrations new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan presented Afghanistan and

the region with renewed opportunities for success The rapid deterioration of security and gover-

nance in Afghanistan will force the United States and its allies to focus on urgent and immediate

steps to help bring about rapid progress to war-weary publics, particularly before the August 2009

presidential elections in Afghanistan

However, short-term policies and actions will not be enough to achieve the goals of a self-sustain-

ing, effective, and accountable Afghan government This report makes the case that for the Obama

administration to translate its dened goals and strategy for Afghanistan into achievements on the

ground, it must adopt a broad, medium-term framework that responds to the needs and aspirations

of the Afghan people

By diagnosing the threats and opportunities that face Afghanistan and offering a coherent ap-proach to state-building, this report offers an excellent guide for building on the new US strategy

and creating a functional state accountable to the needs of its people It points essentially toward

an implementation strategy for the Obama administration, if it is to have longer term success

This report is the product of the diligent efforts of Dr Ashraf Ghani, former Afghan Minister of

Finance and Chairman (on leave) of the Institute for State Effectiveness The Atlantic Councilhas proted enormously from Dr. Ghanis energies and brilliant insights as a member of bothits International Advisory Board and the Program on International Securitys Strategic AdvisorsGroup (SAG) The Atlantic Council is grateful for Dr Ghanis efforts in drafting this report andrecognizes the important contributions by his aide Blair Glencorse

With its important implications for the NATO Alliance and the broader South Asia region, this

publication is a joint effort between the SAG and the Atlantic Councils South Asia Center The

Council wishes to recognize Franklin D Kramer and Julian Lindley-French for their important

contributions to the draft as members of the SAG, Shuja Nawaz for his oversight of the project ef-

fort as Director of the South Asia Center, and Assistant Director Jeffrey Lightfoot for coordinating

the effort

Frederick Kempe

President and CEO


8/48


9/48

Executive summaryA second chance to get things right

Describing the situation in Afghanistan andPakistan as increasingly perilous, PresidentObama has committed his administration toenhancing the military, governance, and eco-

nomic capacity of the two countries On March27, 2009, he announced plans to launch a newstrategy in the region:

To succeed, we and our friends and al-lies must reverse the Talibans gains

and promote a more capable and ac-

countable Afghan government Af-ghanistan has an elected government,but it is undermined by corruption andhas difculty delivering basic services

to its people The economy is under-cut by a booming narcotics trade thatencourages criminality and funds theinsurgency The people of Afghanistanseek the promise of a better future Yet

once again, they have seen the hope ofa new day darkened by violence and

uncertainty

The Obama administration has thus both dened

the problem and set clear goals for American en-gagement in the region Translating these goalsinto achievements on the ground, however, isgoing to require understanding the context, thelessons from the past, and the priority actions

for the future Conditions on the ground are nowmuch more difcult than in 2002 when the Af-ghan people overwhelmingly welcomed the in-ternational intervention The goals set, however,are still achievable if the needs and aspirations of

the Afghan people are the focus of renewed ef-forts The administration has clearly recognizedthat the achievement of goals requires a medium-term approach This report offers an implemen-tation framework for translating the goals into

feasible processes and actions in Afghanistan

There are four major threats to securing Af-ghanistans future First, Al Qaeda is a renewedforce moving fluidly between Afghanistanand Pakistan Second, an expanded, well re-

sourced, and multifaceted insurgency presentsa continual threat to Afghan and internationalactors Third, a narcotics production, process-ing, and distribution network fuels corruptionand violence and is becoming concentrated

in the hands of a few nefarious individualsAnd fourth, poor governance, underpinning

all these problems, is now so entrenched thatmany organs of government are seen as the in-struments of corruption, not of legitimacy andthe rule of law

These threats have been heightened and per-petuated by the inability of the internationalcommunity to develop a unied strategy orcoordination mechanism Securing agreement

on a joint strategy and on the means for coordi-nation is a prerequisite for success in Afghani-

stan The tendency of the Afghan elite to sup-port instability rather than institutional reformis another key obstacle. The political eld in

Afghanistan must therefore be broadened to al-low for the recognition and emergence of stake-holders in a stable and prosperous country

While there are significant constraints to

achieving the stated objectives, there are alsosignicant Afghan and international assets tobuild on On the Afghan side, the assets are inthe natural, nancial, and human capital andthe institutional successes in areas ranging

from the national army to rural developmentThe success of the political process from 2001to 2004, when the rst presidential electionsin the countrys history were held, shows thewillingness of the Afghan public to engage in

democratic processes The National Solidarity


10/48

A en-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Program is one example of a novel approachthat was deployed across a number of sectorsThe success of its programs indicates that the

key to institutional success is not context butthe design of programs and the nature of part-

nerships between the Afghan stakeholders andthe international community

A coherent approach to state-building can pro-

duce a capable and accountable Afghan govern-ment This report offers a prioritized approachto building state functions sequentially and ina way that creates self-sustaining linkages andreform processes With a 10-year timeframe

for achieving control of its territory and the al-legiance of its people, the Afghan government

can break down state functions into four insti-tutional orders. This classication of functionswill allow for a method of benchmarking and

measurement and allow domestic and interna-tional actors to move from endless preparationof strategies on paper to the critical task of im-plementation on the ground

First-order functions include the rule of law,to ensure that the Afghan state can control itsterritory through the use of effective security

and police services that use force within a clearspace dened by strict rules. They also include

public nance, to ensure that resources, bothinternal and external, are channeled effectivelyand spent accountably at every level of govern-ment using robust national accountability sys-tems These functions involve administrative

control, to turn Afghan territory into a hierar-chically national space in which the functionsand levels of governance are clearly denedand coordinated while supported by capable

civil servants These will include human capitaldevelopment, to create stakeholders in positivereform that have the skills to support an effec-tive public sector, a legitimate and productiveprivate sector, and a vibrant civil society

Second-order functions include market-build-

ing, creating sustainable jobs that can draw in

unemployed youth who provide the basis forthe insurgency and the narcotics industry Thiswill involve developing key initiatives in sup-

port of agriculture, through a bold initiative thatworks from market access backward through

value chains, supply chains, knowledge, andinfrastructure and uses trade concessions andinnovative nancial tools to ensure sustainable

and protable production. It involves mining,through transparent licensing frameworks andcredible arbitration and judicial enforcementof contracts And it includes construction,which, through a central construction code, a

central procurement authority, and a construc-tion corps, could build on the private capacityin Afghanistan to truly transform the efciency

and sustainability of infrastructure develop-ment across the country

Third-order functions include a focus on in-frastructure, to consolidate territory, har-ness space, and release market forces usingdomestic and regional capabilities to buildkey roads, develop alternative energies and

capitalize on new technologies while focus-ing on social policy, through rural programsthat allow for generating wealth and develop-

ing social and institutional capital from thebottom up

Fourth-order functions include public borrow-ing, to ensure that external resources can bechanneled effectively in support of the budgetas the central instrument of policy They de-

mand effective management of public, cultural,environmental, and innovation assets throughcredible contracting and regulation and the for-malization of property rights These functions

also include second-generation human capitaldevelopment, through a focus on tertiary andvocational training as part of a long-term, 20-year human development plan

These institution-building processes can be

justied strategically because they build on the

successful state-building efforts under way in


11/48

Executive summary

Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005 and take

advantage of the readiness of the Afghan peo-

ple for good governance, the rule of law, and

an end to violence and poverty

The counter-insurgency (COIN) approach thatis now beginning to guide American militaryactions in Afghanistan, as it has been in Iraq,also emphasizes a coherent and coordinatedapproach to good government to win public

trustto use force only when necessary in theshort term and to avoid its use in the longerterm This is in line with the broader interna-tional thinking on state-building, which nowemphasizes the centrality of governance and

the cost of failure of disparate and piecemeal

development approaches

The coming months are central to Afghani-

stans future for a variety of reasons The new

US strategy can reach the medium-term state-

building priorities outlined above through

short-term actions:

Ensuring a level playing eld for the presi-dential elections in August 2009 and sup-porting a process through which Afghans

can truly engage in constructive debateabout the countrys future

Developing a coherent international strat-egy, using the COIN manual as a basis formilitary operations and a Marshall Plan

approach to simplify the actions of the

broader international community

Preparing new national programs with im-plementation plans in place for immediate

roll-out by the new Afghan administration

Using the National Solidarity Program, acommunity-level development program, asa platform for rural enterprise and wealthgeneration

Focusing on eight model provinces across

the country, which provide a demonstrationand multiplier effect for the rest of Afghan-istan to underpin a slowly broadening area

of good governance

The situation in Afghanistan is difcult, but byno means impossible, and renewed internationalfocus combined with shifting internal dynamicsprovide a real opportunity to change the trajecto-ry of the country and the lives of millions of Af-

ghans. The rst step has been takena coherentUS regional strategy now exists This must betranslated into measurable medium-term goalsthat support a functional and accountable state

These goals must be underpinned by short-termfeasible actions that can generate positive changeand a sense of hope, both within and outside Af-ghanistan, that the future will be more prosper-ous and secure than the past This is essential forAfghan, regional, and global stability

Key numbers

The potential value of Afghanistans opium, morphine, and heroin exports was $34 bil-

lion, a third of the estimated GDP of $102 billion in 2008

Initial US support to Afghanistan was $300 million a year

Afghanistan is at the center of 3 billion potential consumers in China, India, the Gulf, andEurope

Current spending by NATO and Coalition forces is about $20 billion a month

Rural incomes per capita have to increase from $1 a day to at least $4 a day, the tippingpoint for opium production to become unprotable.


12/48


13/48

Introduction 1

Introduction

Describing the situation in Afghanistan andPakistan as increasingly perilous, PresidentObama has committed his administration to

enhancing the military, governance, and eco-nomic capacity of these two countries He stat-ed in his speech launching a new strategy inthe region that:

To succeed, we and our friends and al-lies must reverse the Talibans gains

and promote a more capable and ac-countable Afghan government Af-ghanistan has an elected government,but it is undermined by corruption and

has difculty delivering basic servicesto its people The economy is under-cut by a booming narcotics trade thatencourages criminality and funds theinsurgency The people of Afghanistanseek the promise of a better future Yet

once again, they have seen the hope ofa new day darkened by violence anduncertainty1

The Obama Administration has thus both de-

ned the problem and set the goals for Ameri-can engagement in the region Translatingthese goals into achievements on the ground,

however, is going to require understanding ofthe context, the lessons from the past, and thepriority actions for the future Conditions onthe ground are now much more difcult thanin 2002 when the Afghan people overwhelm-

ingly welcomed the international interventionThe goals set, however, are still achievable ifthe needs and aspirations of the Afghan peo-

ple are the focus of renewed efforts The ad-ministration has clearly recognized that the

achievement of goals requires a medium-term

1 Speech by US President Obama on March 27,

2009 (www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_ofce/Remarks

-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan

-and-Pakistan/)

approach The contribution of this report is tooffer an implementation framework for trans-lating the goals into feasible processes and ac-

tions in Afghanistan

The Obama administrations focus on Afghani-stan offers Afghans and the international com-munity a second chance to support the righttype of state-building and truly secure Afghan-

istans future Afghans once again have the op-portunity to articulate, own, and implement anagenda for building an effective state and a le-gitimate economy And international actors canbecome catalysts to help Afghans break the vi-

cious circle and replace it with a virtuous circleof stability and development

Threats

Afghanistan is now ranked the fourth most

war-torn, fth most corrupt, seventh most frag-ile, and second weakest state in the world2 Thevicious circle of narcotics, crime, corruption,and the erosion of public trust in governmenthas prolonged and heightened the conict, in-

stability, and violence in the country SecretaryHillary Clinton, in her conrmation hearings,

described the conditions in Afghanistan asthose of a narco-state, a term I rst used in2002 when warning against the worst probable

outcome of the international intervention inAfghanistan Indeed, key threats to progress inAfghanistan are Al Qaeda, the insurgency, nar-cotics, and poor governance and corruption

2 For corruption and war-torn rankings, see

Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions

Index 2008 (wwwtransparencyorg/policy_research/

surveys_indices/cpi/2008); for fragility rankings,

see Foreign Policys The Failed States Index 2008

(wwwforeignpolicycom/story/cmsphp?story_

id=4350&page=1); and for weakness rankings, see

Rice and Patricks Index of State Weakness in the

Developing World(wwwbrookingsedu/~/media/Files/

rc/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak_

states_indexpdf)


14/48

2 A en-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Al Qaeda

There is a consensus that a regrouped Al Qaedathreatens global stability Its three key objec-tives, Bruce Reidel argues, are

to create and nurture bleedingwars that will defeat the United Statesjust as the mujahideen defeated the So-viet Union, to build a safe haven in Pak-

istan for the operational headquarters ofthe Al Qaeda leadership and establishfranchises throughout the Islamic worldto overthrow pro-American regimes,and to conduct more raids on the

West like 9/11 and the Madrid and Lon-

don atrocities, someday perhaps with anuclear weapon3

In the aftermath of 9/11, Al Qaeda leadershipretreated to the tribally administered areas ofPakistan Using ideology to gain its foothold,Al Qaeda then used massive funds to consoli-

date its hold on the area It distributed millionsof dollars among tribal elders, paid militantcommanders millions more in advance, andhired local ghters, offering wages far exceed-

ing those paid by the national army4

Al Qaedaalso seems to have invested in purchasing arms

in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2005, when thecountry was relatively quiet and local strong-men were liquidating some of their cachesWitnessing the welcome the Afghan peopleaccorded to the international forces, Al Qaeda

focused on creating a sanctuary in PakistanThe US invasion of Iraq, however, allowedAl Qaeda to paint the war in Afghanistan aspart of a larger US attack on Islam and use

it as a means to recruit disaffected young peo-ple and to justify its actions Since that inva-sion, militants have circulated between the twotheaters, transferring deadly techniques fromone country to the other Continued attacks in

3 Reidel 2008, p 11

4 Hussain 2007, p 148

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India indicate theregional and global dimensions of the threatand the potential threat to global security

Insurgency

The insurgency poses a double threat to peace

In unleashing violence against the Afghan peo-ple and Afghan and international forces, it alsopushes NATO and the Afghan security appa-ratus to use more force in ever-wider areas ofthe country Expanding from its initial base in

the south, the insurgency is active in the east,several provinces surrounding the capital cityof Kabul, the province of Badghis in the north-west, and the province of Kunduz in the north

The insurgency signicantly affects the psy-chological state of the population by disruptingthe ow of trafc on the ring road, the com-munication artery of the country, and by selec-tively attacking highly visible targets such asthe recent attacks on the government buildings

in Kabul and those on the Serena Hotel, theIndian embassy, French forces, and US navyseals The projection of a forward march to-ward Kabul also seems designed for maximumpsychological impact, as the encirclement of

the city reminds its inhabitants of the Talibansconquest of the capital in 1996

Five features of the insurgency are notableFirst, it is cash-based, with steadily expand-

ing nances from Al Qaeda, narcotics, andfees imposed on transport, construction, mer-chants, and landowners With arms and materi-als widely available in Afghanistan, this readycash makes it possible to engage in destructive

operations without developing supply lines or

elaborate logistics Large cash reserves alsoallow the insurgency to pay its recruits higherwages than the government pays the nationalarmy

Second, the insurgency is multifaceted AlQaeda policy pits multiple groups against eachother without a unied command and control


15/48

hreats 3

center, similar to the mujahideen resistance tothe Soviets Evidence suggests that cash is be-ing used to recruit disabled people and drug ad-

dicts as suicide bombers Moreover, given theeconomic conditions, unemployed youth also

provide a large recruitment pool As in insur-gencies elsewhere, individual operatives knowvery little about those giving the orders

Third, the insurgency has created an environ-ment of lawlessness that enables the re-emer-gence of criminal gangs The identity of thesegangs is widely known and their operationsseem to be made possible through collusion

with corrupt government ofcials and the po-lice Even those young insurgents who are mo-

tivated by ideology rather than circumstanceare increasingly operating in illegal spheresand doing so without coordination with their

leaders in exile, engaging in kidnapping, extor-tion and theft on their own initiative

Fourth, the insurgency has a sanctuary andbase in Pakistan The presence of the Afghan

Taliban has provided the Pakistani Talibanideological legitimacy, as the Afghan Talibanare seen as engaged in a legitimate struggle

against international forces Al Qaeda and thePakistani Taliban have capitalized on this by

publicly indicating their allegiance to MullahOmar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, andhis cause

Fifth, the Taliban component of the insurgencyhas gained a reputation for rendering impar-

tial justice in the south Unlike nationalist andcommunist insurgencies, the Taliban have nei-ther produced a compelling story of how they

will transform the lives of the poor in Afghani-stan nor provided social services in their areas

of operation They have, however, stepped intothe vacuum created by corruption in the judi-ciary, which has been using the widespreaddisputes over property rights as occasions toextract extortionate bribes, and this has been

critical to their support

The insurgents narrative of an expanding cam-paign, however, glosses over the fact that theirplans in 2006a push to establish a parallel

government in Kandahar, gain control of sev-eral southern provinces, and turn Kabul into a

second Baghdadfailed NATO prevented theinsurgency from conquering a single province,though international forces have not cleared

the insurgency from any of the southern prov-inces Caught in limbo, the Afghan public hasbecome uncertain of the future and is now try-ing merely to cope with the changing dynamicsby using survival mechanisms developed dur-

ing the intense conict of the 1980s and 1990s,as exemplied by their accommodation of drugcartels

Narcotics

Drugs are a large part of the small Afghaneconomy The potential value of opium, morphine, and heroin exports was $34 billion,5compared with an estimated GDP of $102 bil-lion in 20086 Heroin is the ugly side of global-

ization, as evidenced by its escalating price asit is trafcked to major consuming countries.The UN Ofce of Drugs and Crime reports that

the wholesale price of a gram of heroin is, onaverage, $250 in Afghanistan, $350 in Paki-

stan and Iran, $8 in Turkey, $12 in Albania, $18in Slovenia or Slovakia, $22 in Germany, $30in the United Kingdom, and $33 in Russia7And retail prices can be 10 times the wholesaleprices, a result of cutting that mixes the drugwith other substances

This vicious value chain is an example of an in-tegrated global network, combining production,

credit, distribution, and careful inventory man-agement As with diamonds, there is a differ-ence between the stock and yearly ows. Opi-

um can be stored for long periods, representing

5 UNODC 2008, p 29

6 UNODC 2008, p 5

7 UNODC 2007


16/48


a store of value, while heroin is unstable andmust be consumed within a limited period Thetrafckers must thus decide on the amount to

grow given their stored stock of opium and theamount to convert to heroin. Yearly uctuations

in the land devoted to poppy cultivation shouldtherefore be interpreted carefully

The change in the organization of drug dealers

from a network to a cartel has been critical to

the ability of these dealers to balance supply and

demand. The United Nations Ofce of Drugs

and Crime and the World Bank report that be-

tween 2001 and 2007 a loose network involv-

ing hundreds of thousands of small drug deal-

ers evolved into a cartel of 25 to 30 trafckers,

15 of whom are based in the city of Kandahar8

While Europe has been their key market, there

has been a strong effort to expand the network

of distribution to other continents As early as

2005, evidence shows that heroin trafckers

have penetrated the West Coast of the United

States There has also been speculation about in-

creased coordination by heroin and cocaine car-

tels to expand and consolidate global markets

While legitimate Afghan agriculture has lan-

guished, opium has been fully integrated intothe global prot chain. This unbalance clearlyhas adverse impacts on governance and devel-opmentnot only corrupting individuals butundermining the entire system The narcotics

prot chain produces vested interests in insta-bility, as weak governance enables trafckersto expand their criminal activities into otherareas of the economy Opium cultivation andheroin processing and trafcking require col-

lusion with government ofcials. The UN Of-

ce of Drugs and Crime and World Bank studymakes a convincing argument that the Ministryof the Interior, which until 2008 oversaw bothpolice and local government, became an instru-

ment of protection for criminal elements9 As a

8 Shaw 2006,pp 20406

9 Shaw 2006, pp 19899

result, the economic impact of narcotics seemsto be rapidly overshadowing sectors of the le-gitimate economy The disproportionate cash

owing to trafckers, their penetration of gov-ernment, and their capacity to use force against

competitors is turning the marketplace into anuneven playing eld. The risk of criminalizingthe entire Afghan economy is therefore very

real

Narcotics now provide the critical nancialbasis of the insurgency Besides collecting 10percent in direct taxes from cultivators, the in-surgents are also involved in the protection and

trafcking network. The UN Ofce of Drugsand Crime believes that the narcotics network

could be providing several hundred milliondollars each year in resources to the insurgen-cy Narcotics, therefore, pose a dual threat to

good governance10 By ensnaring the forces oflaw and order in its criminal web and turning

them into its henchman, it weakens public trustin government and in the international commu-nity Simultaneously, its funds provide the fuelfor the insurgencys expansion

A counter-narcotics strategy exists on paper, but

practice has been entirely different Ambassa-dor Thomas Schweich, who led the US coun-ter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, summedup the situation in a 2008 article, arguing thatan odd cabal of timorous Europeans, myopic

media outlets, corrupt Afghans, blinkered Pen-tagon ofcers, politically motivated Democratsand the Taliban were preventing the implemen-tation of an effective counterdrug program Andthe rest of us could not turn them around11The article title asked, Is Afghanistan a Narco

State? His answer is a clear yes To overcomethe threat of narcotics, lessons from the failureof the implementation of the current approachesmust be learned, internalized, and acted on

10 UNODC 2008, p 128

11 Thomas Schweich, Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?,

The New York Times Magazine, July 27, 2008


17/48

hreats 5

Poor governance and corruption

The threats posed by narcotics and the insur-gency are heightened by poor governance,which both enables and perpetuates these prob-

lems In the postSeptember 11 environmentAfghan leaders had the opportunity to becomethe founding fathers of an effective state andan inclusive nation Instead, their widespreadfailures created a vacuum in governance that

led to the ascendancy of the insurgency andthe loss of the populations trust If governanceis understood as the mechanism for translat-ing objectives into measurable outcomes forcitizens and lasting organizational structures,

Afghanistan suffers from the absence of good

governance in multiple forms Five domains ofstate functions illustrate the declining qualityof governance in Afghanistan

Citizen rights. Prominent among them arethe right to movement, the right to property,and the right to personal security Where thegovernment should be a protector of citizenrights, it is instead a predator For example, in

the southern province of Kandahar, where theinsurgency was launched and continues to be

active, a citizen has to pass through multipletolls on the road from the Pakistani border tothe city of Kandahar, with various ofcials de-

manding illegal payments Freedom of move-ment for Afghans is thus restricted by the gov-ernment meant to guarantee freedom More-over, the right to property, enshrined in Islamiclaw and the constitution, has become an area

of ambiguity and corruption, as two decades ofwar and forced migration have led to multipleclaims on the same assets Finally, millions of

citizens are forced to live in informal or illegalsettlements because municipalities impose ob-

solete land management rules from the Sovietmaster-planning era Meanwhile, hundreds ofthousands of hectares of government land areexpropriated through force or falsied records,depriving the public of both current and future

assets

The rule of law. A government that functionsunder the rule of law delineates the spheres

and responsibilities of its ofcials through clearrules, as their duty is to provide for the welfareof citizens Justice then becomes the basis of

a legitimate order, as citizens trust the state tosettle their disputes fairly In Afghan political

culture justice is foundational As the sixteenthcentury poet Khusal Khan Khattak wrote, oneday of justice by a ruler is the equivalent to 40years of prayingToday, the judiciary is amongthe most distrusted sectors of government, asdisputes among citizens are exploited for pri-vate gain by judges and their subordinates Un-

der good governance, public administration be-comes the vehicle for collective power to solve

collective problems In Afghanistan, however,public ofce is increasingly seen as license forpredation and personal gain

The delivery of services. A functional govern-ment delivers effective and inclusive socialservices Health, infrastructure, and educationprovide good yardsticks for the effectiveness ofgovernance While there have been advances

in preventive medicine in Afghanistan, cura-tive medicine continues to suffer from corrup-

tion Individuals operate as doctors without proper certication, pharmacies routinely selldrugs that have expired or do not meet quality

standards, and hospitals meant to be free to thepublic collect illegal fees from patients

While millions of children are enrolled in pri-mary and secondary education in Afghanistan,

the lack of investment in vocational and highereducation is striking The under-29 age group,the vast majority of Afghanistans population,12

faces an estimated rate of 40 percent unemploy-ment13 and have little opportunity to acquirethe skills or education that allow for upwardmobility Without the requisite capabilities,

12 US Census Bureau, Midyear population by age

and sex 2008

13 CIA 2009


18/48


they cannot become the leaders and managersof the future Instead, they form the reservepool of the insurgency and the labor force of

the drug network

Finally, providing infrastructure is now an es-tablished function of the state (either throughdirect managing or creating good conditionsfor public-private partnership), but the Afghan

government allows or ignores corrupt procure-ment and contracting practices in hundredsof construction projects and does not enforceadherence to clear rules for construction andmaintenance

Accountability to citizens. The trend in ac-

countability in Afghanistan has been down-ward The absence of response from the gov-ernment to issues of accountability has made

the availability of public voice an instrumentfor the expression of frustration rather than amechanism for promoting good governanceCorruption in Afghanistan has become en-demic and systematic as the public sector has

become privatized and the private sector be-comes politicized The government has be-come the mechanism not for governance but

for antigovernance, and government positionshave become a license for corruption The po-

lice, rather than protect the people, are seenlargely as instruments to protect the narcot-ics trade Millions of acres of public land havebeen expropriated by corrupt government of-cials. And the countrys natural wealth is be-

ing illegally exploited or given away throughobscure contracting mechanisms Allegationsof the selling of ofces are pervasive, and de-mands for payments are seen as a way of re-

couping the investment in these ofces. Theroutinization of corruption now makes reformconsiderably more difcult than after the over-throw of the Taliban Because corruption hasmajor stakeholders and reform has no visibleconstituency in the government, Afghans will

need to articulate, own, and ght for a coher-ent anticorruption strategy

Such a strategy could focus initially on areaswhere reform is possible and could gener-ate positive momentum for larger, subsequent

reformand where the political will and com-mitment to change exists These might include

the processes for licensing mines, with newrules that can be put in place quickly and en-forced systematically, or key areas of revenue

mobilization such as customs This strategycould have clear goals and benchmarks to mea-sure progress Some examples: The governmentshould agree with the International MonetaryFund on doubling revenue within two years,

against which nancial support would be front-loaded by the international community, giventhat the Ministry of Finance recently estimated

that the country is losing about 70 percent ofits potential revenue The government should

form a commission of international expertsand Afghan civil society to review the awardof mining contracts and to subject awards ofall future contracts for mining to the standardsof the Extractive Industry Transparency Initia-

tive The government should recruit 3,000 civilservants in top positions and ensure that thetop 20 percent of the police force is subject toa transparent recruitment, promotion, and pay-

ment system based on clear criteria The gov-ernment should create an ofce of ombudsman,staffed by both Afghans and qualied interna-tionals, to which allegations of corruption canbe credibly brought and investigated The gov-ernment should set up a systematic process for

urban property rights disputes and a computer-ized cadastre of these rights to eliminate anyroom for corruption The government shouldencourage the use of scorecards by citizens tomeasure bureaucratic performance, to share the

results in public, and to take action

Bad governance is not merely a weakness buta threat to stable and legitimate order, whichthe population can identify with and use to

distance itself from the insurgency Hence,the emerging consensus is that it is not thestrength of the Taliban but the failure of the


19/48

Weaknesses 7

government to govern that has led to the cur-rent crisis

Weaknesses

International communitya failureto develop a unied strategy

Afghanistan was the rst major test of the

twenty-rst century for international organiza-tions inherited from the twentieth century Tomaintain their relevance in todays world, theseorganizations now have to prove themselvesas effective partners in building institutions of

good economic and political governance So far,

this challenge has not been met in AfghanistanTaken by surprise in 2001, the internationalcommunity did not have the opportunity to cre-ate and agree on clear objectives for its efforts

in Afghanistan Instead, the stovepipes of secu-rity, politics, and development operated sepa-rately, without being unied by a consensus ona larger strategy The international communitysfailure to develop a unied strategy produced a

destabilizing effect, whereby their efforts cre-ated organizations parallel to the government

rather than built Afghan institutions When UNagencies acquired $16 billion from the initialTokyo donor conference in January 2002, the

Afghan government received $20 million Aseach UN agency and bilateral aid agency setup ofces, their higher salaries drew the bestof Afghan talent and skills away from the gov-ernment and key public services such as health,

education, and police, further weakening thegovernments ability to function effectively Asthe bulk of the international communitys work

was concentrated on quick impact projects, andthe national government lacked the resources of

the international community, the Afghan publicsaw no sustainable results from either the inter-national community or their own government

From early 2002 onward Afghanistan was

cast in Iraqs shadow, and the scale of the

development task was vastly underestimatedInitial US support to Afghanistan was only$300 million a year; meanwhile, the World

Bank estimates that between the Communistcoup in 1978 and the overthrow of the Taliban

in 2001, the total cost of lost growth, humani-tarian assistance, and military expenditureamounted to around $240 billion14 WhenNewYork Times reporter Thomas Friedman visited

Kabul in early 2002, two-thirds of it in ru-ins, he commented that it looked exactly likeGround Zero15 It was a reminder of the enor-mity of the task As the Bonn process was im-plemented successfully, commitment graduallyincreased, but the invasion of Iraq shifted US

attention, and in 2005 plans for drawing down

American forces in Afghanistan from 15,000to 5,000 were put into motion

The insurgency surprised most policymakers

in the West With the onslaught of the insur-gency, the coordination between military andcivilian components of the international effortcame to the fore While the military has beenable to clear areas of insurgents, the mecha-

nisms to govern and develop these spaces havefailed As a result the momentum seems to be

on the side of the insurgents, who can projectan image of expanding capacity, control, andinuence.

Broader coordination among internationalactors across agencies and sectors is a cen-tral problem The myriad of discrete effortslaunched by actors, which sometimes duplicateand contradict each other, are now understood

to be less effective than efforts unied behindcoherent collective objectives. Efciency is also

bottlenecked by the outsourcing of projects tocontractors, the dominant mechanism for deliv-ery While contractors can deliver projects in

principle, in Afghanistan this involved primarycontractors subcontracting many times, with

14 World Bank 2004

15 NewsHour 2002


20/48


21/48

Assets 9

unprotableis therefore a realistic objective.The experience of the western United States inthe 1950s to 1970s and that of East Asia in the

same period provide a range of options that canbe pursued in Afghanistan

Location

Afghanistans location can turn it into a land bridge between Central Asia, Gulf countries,South Asia, and China Pipelines can delivercentral Asias and Afghanistans gas, as revealed

by the geological survey, to south Asia Watertransfers could be equally substantial, as Iran isinterested in developing water and oil exchangesystems with Afghanistan and its neighboring

central Asian republics The potential for transitis also signicant. Uzbekistan produces 800,000tons of cotton a year, which currently travelsthrough several countries, incurring signicanttransit fees, to reach the port of Riga for inter-national distribution Pakistan, by contrast, im-

ports around 22 million bales of cotton a yearfor its expanding textile industry16 Investing in

the right supply chains could enhance regionalintegration, increase Uzbek and Afghan govern-ment revenues, and reduce costs in Pakistan

Afghanistan could also be the lynchpin for novelforms of cooperative border management The

border with Tajikistan, heavily armed during theSoviet period, is now a line of cooperation, withbridges built by the Aga Khan Foundation facili-tating cross-border trade and other exchanges,including the use of Tajik hospitals by Afghans

Afghanistans topography makes cross-borderinteractions difcult in places, but this could provide the basis for further expansion and a

model for border management elsewhere

Financial capital

The dominance of poverty should not hide themoney in the country Many individuals have

16 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2009, p 1

amassed massive amounts of money since 2001,and the wealth of Afghans in the diaspora runsinto billions of dollars The main obstacles to

mobilizing this money are governance andthe absence of nancial architecture. Afghans

in Iran alone remit an estimated at $500 mil-lion annually,17 while total remittances reachednearly $25 billion in 200618 These sums en-able the recipients to improve their consump-

tion, but there are few instruments to harnessthe money for improving production

Afghans living in the Gulf, Pakistan, Russia,Europe, and the United States have shown seri-ous interest in investing in their country Cor-

ruption, insecurity, and the absence of credible

laws and policies, however, have deprived thecountry of the opportunity, and the ow ofmoney has instead travelled in the opposite di-rection Billions of dollars leave Afghanistan

every year for the Gulf and other safer havens

The emergence of the construction industryshows that legitimate wealth can be generatedand expanded Thanks to international spend-

ing, Afghan rms have emerged to competesuccessfully against regional and international

rms. The construction industry is the rstmanifestation of a sector with specialization inan expanding value chain Leasing and project

design, for instance, have become specializedniches for some rms while others specializedin transport The availability of money is notconned to Kabul. Exports of dry and freshfruits are also expanding and becoming more

organized, earning $144 million in the rstthree quarters of the Afghan scal year end-ing March 21, 200919 Precious stones from

Afghanistan are sold on eBay, with emeraldsfrom Panjshir fetching prices as high as severalhundred thousand dollars A unique feature of

17 UN News Center 2008

18 IFAD 2007

19 As reported by the Afghanistan Ministry of

Commerce inRahe-Nejatin March 2009


22/48


the current situation is the widespread avail-ability of money across the country With goodgovernance and the right nancial architecture,

that money can be harnessed for sustainabledevelopment

Institutional successes

Getting the design right has been critical to in-stitutional success Politically, the relevance ofthis approach has been demonstrated throughthe implementation of the Bonn Agreement

Developmentally, the proof is in the success ofnational programs from 200204 bearing re-sults in areas ranging from the national army torural development In both cases the operating

assumption has been the high demand of theAfghan population for good governance

The Bonn agreement, as Ambassador Brahimi,the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the UN for Afghanistan at the time,repeatedly stated, was arrived at by an unrep-

resentative group of Afghans to create a le-gitimate government To ensure a fair process,temporal benchmarks were set for transferring power to an interim administration, conven-

ing an emergency Loya Jirga (grand council)to elect the head of state and key ofcials ofa transitional government, convening a con-stitutional commission to write a constitution,convening a constitutional Loya Jirga to debateand approve the draft constitution, and holding

direct presidential elections and parliamentaryelections As each phase involved the participa-tion of a broader range of stakeholders withinclear rules, the process generated legitimacyand nurtured hope among the population that

the government would become more transpar-ent and accountable Despite the dire predic-tions of international and domestic observers,the Bonn Process was guided to a successfulconclusion by the collaboration of Afghan and

international actors Participation in the presi-dential elections was both massive and enthusi-astic, thereby providing President Karzai with a

mandate to guide the country toward stabilityThe current frustrations result from disappoint-ment over the failure to fulll this mandate.

The political process was matched by an ambi-

tious but pragmatic agenda for building the func-tions of the state at the appropriate levels and cre-ating mechanisms for Afghan participation al-lowing the Afghan people to govern themselves

directly The key innovation was the nationalprograms, which brought about a specic designfor a social compact between the people and thegovernment The national programs aimed to en-able a government to perform a state function

throughout its territory effectively and transpar-ently by mobilizing relevant forcesgovern-

ment, the private sector, and civil societyto ex-ecute critical tasks The process sought to deliverresults and build domestic capabilities in the light

of medium- to long-term goals

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund,which pooled donors funds, was critical for re-distributive programs Managed by the World

Bank and created in 2002, the Fund supportedthe Afghan system of national accountability, asfunds could be used only to reimburse eligible

government expenditure and were monitoredthrough robust auditing procedures Combined

with an Afghan-driven program of reform thatsecured policy loans from the World Bank andAsian Development Bank, this led to signi-cant reform of the scal and monetary insti-tutions during 200204 Simultaneously, an

International Monetary Fund Staff MonitoredProgram was agreed on for revenue mobiliza-tion and the effectiveness of expenditure

Afghan public nance thus became the driverfor building good governance across sectors

and levels of government Observers agreedthat the country was making signicant prog-ress on transparency and accountability Thegains through this approach enabled a part-nership with the international community to

formulate the Securing Afghanistans Future


23/48

Assets 11

strategy20 after thorough evaluation by donorsand partners Key to the success of the Af-ghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the

Afghanistan Compact, arrived at between thegovernment and donors in London in 2006,21

was a well calibrated sequence of reforms de-livered through national programs and imple-mented gradually yet systematically to changethe governance of the country

As long as new national programs were beingformulated and implemented, coordination im-proved because these programs systematicallyaddressed transparency and accountability in

managing resources long before the interna-tional community demanded them These pro-

grams include:

Afghan National Army. Support for the armyexemplies an integrated approach for men-

toring, training, and embedding interna-tional personnel within Afghan institutionsThe Afghan government had hard politicalwork of demobilizing a militia estimated at400,000 in 2002, reducing it to 12,000 by

December 2004 The United States provid-ed the funding and assigned an impressive

group of senior ofcers, led by LieutenantGeneral Karl Eikenberry, to train and men-tor the new army. Soldiers and ofcers were

recruited using clear criteria and from all theethnic and linguistic groups. American of-cers continued to be embedded in units toensure adherence by ofcers to the consti-tutional order and national rules of conduct

National Solidarity Program. Government-led, the program provides block grants to

villages across Afghanistan, empowering

20 Government of Afghanistan 2004

21 See the Afghanistan Compact agreed on by the

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international

community at the London Conference, January 31

to February 1, 2006 (wwwfcogovuk/resources/en/

pdf/3036656/afghanistan-compact)

communities to identify reconstruction anddevelopment priorities and implement proj-ects in response A key advantage is sim-

plicity To be eligible for a grant, villagesmust fulll three basic criteria. The women

and men of the village must elect a villageCommunity Development Council A quo-rum of the village must meet to reach con-

sensus on priority projects And accountsmust be posted in a public place The pro-gram is rare in enjoying both uniform pop-ular support and repeated endorsements ofits credibility and accountability by moni-

toring systems of the international com-munity Having reached more than 20,000villages across every province, it is truly

national in scale World Bank PresidentRobert Zoellick has drawn attention to the

success of this program in various speechesand pointed to it as a model to be copied inother developing countries22

National Telecoms Program. At the heartof the National Communications Programwas a strategy of transparent licensing oftelecoms, which resulted in awards of twolicenses in 200203 followed by two further

licenses in 2006 When this program beganin 2002, there were only 100 mobile phonesin the country, courtesy of the United Na-tions At the beginning of 2009, the numberof subscriptions had risen to about 8 mil-

lion, and by the end of 2008 telecoms com-panies had contributed a signicant amountto domestic revenue This program hadresulted in more than $1 billion in privateinvestments by the end of 200823 Licens-ing and procurement can thus be managed

transparently in a postconict country.

Health. A national focus on preventive med-icine entailed restructuring the Ministry ofHealth into a regulator and contracting with

22 See wwwnspafghanistanorg

23 See wwwmcitgovaf/


24/48


nongovernmental organizations for service provisions, supported by the EuropeanUnion, United States Agency for Interna-

tional Development, and the World BankThe outcome was a double-digit reduction

of child mortality and immunization for allchildren across the country

Fiscal and monetary policy. The National

Accountability and Transparency Programtransformed public nances. It began withone of the fastest ever changes in currency,followed by overhaul of the budget process,the treasury, revenue collecting, expendi-

ture monitoring, and the banking systemThe changes were driven by timely and de-

tailed reports on revenue and expenditureto the Cabinet, to the national delegates atthe Constitutional Loya Jirgas, and to the

media and the public, backed by improvedaccounting and auditing

Each program created a network of relation-ships and stakeholders with a vested interest in

moving Afghanistan toward prosperity and sta-bility, simultaneously demonstrating to citizensthat the government was successively and co-

herently addressing their needs Combined, theprograms began to create a network of rights

and obligations between citizens and govern-ment, citizens and rms, and rms and thegovernmentgiving the country a real chanceat internally generated development Whenprogress in Afghanistan is cited, reference is

inevitably made to the results of the nationalprogram approach Progress depended on newprograms But the government abandoned theapproach in 2005, without offering an alter-

native vision and donors reverted to their es-tablished ways of outsourcing development tocontractors Even so, the lessons from the suc-cessful national programs provide a platformfor launching new programs

Afghanistans unitary system of governance,

with most subnational government officials

appointed rather than elected, could also be anasset in counter-insurgency. Key ofcials in all provinces and most districts can be changed

by edict Reform, therefore, is more a matter ofpolitical will for the President and Cabinet than

detailed subnational negotiations Perhaps mostimportant, the Constitution provides a clearmechanism for orderly changes in leadership

Afghan presidents are elected by direct univer-sal suffrage, and the presidential elections setfor August 20 provide the rst opportunity forthe Afghan population to elect an incumbent orchoose a new leader Parliamentary elections in

2010 provide the same opportunity for change orcontinuity in members of the legislative branch

Human capital

The human capital of the country, while

underdeveloped, is sufficient to supporttransformation

National programs provide an arena forleaders and managers to emerge, get sec-

toral knowledge, and acquire firsthandknowledge of the requirements and organi-zational culture of international partners

The expanding mediaoral, print, andvisualprovides a career path for younger

Afghans The technicians attending to themedia infrastructure are all Afghans

Seeing skills as the key to a career path,younger generations are availing themselves

of every opportunity to acquire or improvethem Knowledge of computers and English,prerequisites to any job with international

actors, has been expanding steadily Pri-vate institutions have stepped in to ll the

vacuum left by the states failure to reformhigher education Willingness to pay indi-cates the value placed on earning potential

The Afghan contracting industry has beenthe outlet for workers to acquire vocational


25/48

Assets 13

skills and the arena for developing capacityfor project management

Thousands of Afghans working for the ci-

vilian and military sectors of the interna-

tional community form a signicant talentpool, recruited largely through merit ratherthan patronage

Thousands of Afghans working for non-governmental organizations or runninggrassroots civil society organizations havebeen acquiring both technical and manage-rial skills

So, the absence of skills, a genuine problem in

2002, is not the issueit is the deployment ofskills National programs owe their success todesign through tailoring and stitching To tai-lor is to take the context carefully into account

yet use rules and resources to change the play-ing eld and empower new actors to becomestakeholders in the system To stitch is to care-fully asses the capabilities in the country andto forge partnerships for the maximum use of

existing capabilities for achieving a programgoal Contracting nongovernmental organiza-

tions to facilitate the formation of elected vil-lage councils and to deliver public health ser-vices are examples of tailoring and stitching

If the expanded but scattered and fragmentedcapabilities in the country were used within acoherent and systematic agenda of reform, mo-mentum could be regained quickly

International assets

The convening power of the international com-

munity is an asset Beginning with Tokyo in2002, international conferences have been host-ed in Oslo, Brussels, Dubai, Berlin, Bishkek,London, and Paris Gathering at the high lev-

els of decisionmaking, the Afghan governmentand its international partners have reviewed theconditions and pledged resources for the coun-trys development

Among the most successful international in-terventions have been the Oversees Private In-

vestment Corporations guarantee instrumentsfor American investors and businesses, whichhave led to more than $1 billion in guarantees

in Afghanistan since 2001 Providing guaran-tees for investment in Afghanistan was a novel

experiment in 2002, but thanks to its success,the Corporation has extended guarantees tove other postconict countries.

Many other countries and organizations, such asthe World Bank, have programs similar to those

of the Oversees Private Investment Corporationand could encourage rms to mobilize resourcesoutside the traditional aid system to help solve

Afghanistans problems An even bolder stepwould be to design nancial instruments that

would provide guarantees for Afghan investorsto invest in Afghanistan Such a step, truly trans-formative, would enable Afghan entrepreneursto look at risk management from a completelydifferent perspective Guarantees could also be

used to persuade some of the leading agricultur-al, mining, and service rms in Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development coun-tries to invest in Afghanistan or partner with

Afghan entrepreneurs Groups like Business Ex-ecutives for National Security could be the orga-nizational vehicle for mobilizing such rms.24

Green instruments and nancing could alsomobilize resources to underwrite hydropower

and alternative energies such as wind and so-lar power Trade has immense potential fordeveloping the Afghan economy, with NATOcountries an important market for Afghani-stans agricultural produce Translating the pol-

icy of buying Afghan First into partnershipswith major international rms that have intri-cate knowledge of quality standards and valuechains could provide the impetus for export-oriented agriculture Afghanistan is at the cen-

ter of 3 billion potential consumers in China,

24 See wwwbensorg


26/48


India, the Gulf, and Europe A systematic ap-proach developing the physical and human in-frastructure to take advantage of these markets

could produce peace and prosperity

Resources from the aid system are also a big as-set The key is not necessarily more aid but moreeffective aid If thousands of separate contractswere regrouped into a series of core programs to

be jointly managed for maximum transparencyand accountability by Afghans and internationalstaff, there could be a more visible impact fromspending resources on the ground

Most signicant of the international assets isthe commitment of NATO troops, reinforced

by the recent commitment of a further 17,000US troops Parents and leaders in troop-con-tributing countries accept the risk of putting

their children and citizens in harms way Thisis an immense commitment in both value andresourcesthe current spending by NATO andCoalition forces is at about $20 billion a month

Institution-building

Tailoring a strategy to the context requires

breaking institution-building in Afghanistaninto four sequential blocksfocusing on rstorder, second order, third order and fourth orderfunctions This differentiation allows for setting

priorities It does not indicate that functionsare more or less important, only that given thecurrent context, performing some functions ismore necessary in the near term to ensuring thebasis for further reform over the medium and

long terms Throughout, donors and the differ-ent levels of government must align to reinforce

the whole, carefully considering the rules andfunctions of government at each level

First-order core functions

Law and order. The urgent need to contain andeliminate threats puts law and order at the top

of the list of institutional priorities An Afghanstate that can control its territory and ensurethat it cannot be used for launching terrorist at-

tacks is in Afghan, US, and global interestsThis issue has commonly been framed in terms

of security institutions, but sustainability re-quires that it be framed in terms of law and or-der The international community must become

the catalyst for an effective security sector Theargument should not be whether more interna-tional troops are necessary (they are) but howexactly these troops can best train the AfghanNational Army to take over responsibilities for

security effectively and quickly

The creation and expansion of the army sets an

institutional foundation within the frameworkof law and order The approach to police, bycontrast, was not based on such principles, and

investments have actually been counter-produc-tive For the population to rally to the cause ofthe government and the international commu-nity, the Afghan security institutions must em-body the rule of law A law and order approach,

as Thompson long ago pointed out in his clas-sic work on counter-insurgency, is essential toestablishing a governments credentials for be-

havior according to norms and rules25

Com-mitment to legality amounts not to renouncingthe use of force but to using it within a clearspace dened by strict rules so that both thegovernment and public understand when and

how force is drawn on

Within this framework, aligning four institu-tions of law and order becomes important First,the success of the army allows for its expansion,provided there is a 1520 year international -

nancial commitment for meeting its expensesIf the army is to assume the key role in counter-insurgency, its doctrine, training, and capabili-ties will have to change substantially A majorchange will be at the ofcer rank: appointments

and promotions in the future must be based

25 Thompson 1966/2005, p 68


27/48


strictly on transparent meritocratic criteriawhile adhering to standards that ensure recruit-ment from all linguistic groups in the country

A latent asset that can ease the armys expan-sion and reorientation is the group of 125,000

demobilized ofcers, many of them trained incounter-insurgency tactics during the Sovietoccupation A careful review of the records of

these ofcers for their professional knowledgeand adherence to standards of human rightscould result in the recruitment of an ofcerclass with excellent rst-hand knowledge of thecountrys terrain and conditions and that could

strengthen command and control structures

With intelligence vital to successful counter-

insurgency efforts, investments and upgradescan produce intelligence service that is trustedby the population The director-general of the

Afghan intelligence services has the respect ofa broad spectrum of Afghan and internationalactors But unlike the army and the police, theintelligence service has not yet been publiclyreviewed A professional review of the orga-

nization and the creation of mechanisms forcivilian supervision to ensure its effectivenessand accountability can enable the Afghan state

to begin to control its territory

Police reform has been the most problematicarea of the security sector If the police are to bethe public face of law and order, radical reformis necessary The army shows what needs to bedone. Both staff and ofcers need to be recruit-

ed using transparent criteria across all linguis-tic groups and be subject to intensive trainingWhenever possible, international ofcers shouldbe embedded in police units and joint operations

conducted with the police and army While fullreform of the police will require one to two de-cades, the many demobilized ofcers and themany young men and women unable to attenduniversities provide the grounds for recruitment

Mechanisms for community policing in urban

areas and some rural areas could be feasible

if designed carefully Security experts agreethat the best way to deny the use of Afghani-stans territory for terrorist activities is to use

international forces to train and mentor theAfghan institutions of law and order This ap-

proach addresses sustainability through front-loading support in the short and medium termsto reduce and eventually eliminate the need for

long-term international security forces in Af-ghanistan The key issue, yet to be addressed,is affordability Afghanistans current revenueof under $900 million a year is not sufcient topay for the operation and maintenance costs of

an army of 134,000, not to mention the policeand intelligence forces

To legitimize the security institutions, the lawmust receive equal attention While consoli-dating the rule of law will take much time and

effort, special courts and other mechanisms ofaccountability, such as ombudsmen and citi-zens committees, could be created to investi-gate complaints about the security sector andoffer citizens credible proof that these institu-

tions aim to protect them Swift responses to predatory behavior by security institutionswould enhance the legitimacy of the govern-

ment A rule-bound approach to law and orderestablishes and then honestly maintains dos

and donts for lawmakers, law enforcers, andlaw breakersand supports a clear set of citi-zenship rights and responsibilities that can beenacted and if necessary enforced through thelaw Order cannot be consolidated unless the

security sector becomes the magnet for chan-neling centripetal forces Failure to articulateand implement this goal has made the police aninstrument for reinforcing centrifugal forces

Framing security in law and order terms willactually mean a decline in the use of force, notan increase

Public fnance. With affordability as the ulti-mate test of feasibility, public nance must also

be dealt with as a rst order institutional prior-ity Four key sets of actions can institutionalize


28/48


public nance as the foundation of a state thatcan perform its core functions

First, customs is the dominant source of rev-

enue for the government, but up to half of the

potential revenue is lost through poor manage-ment or abuse by the police and local strong-men A systematic approach combining clearand transparent rules, rigorous enforcement,

and a credible mechanism for resolution of le-gitimate claims of merchants can substantiallyreduce corruption and enhance public revenue

Second, implementation of the 200204 reform

agenda for the national accountability systemcan make government revenue and expendi-

ture transparent Success in reforms, rangingfrom banking to budget, customs, and trea-sury, shows that donors are willing to put re-

sources through the government system if theytrust the commitment to accountability andtransparency

Third, following the successful example of theNational Solidarity Program, budgetary mecha-

nisms should be devised to provide predictableresources, with decision rights and clear criteria

for accountability, to each level of the govern-ment: village, district, municipality, province,and central government To ensure maximum

use of resources, performance at each level ofgovernance can be benchmarked against theothers, with mechanisms for disclosure andcitizen-monitoring, such as citizen scorecardsThe widespread availability of cell phones also

allows for a level of citizen participation andscrutiny of revenue and expenditure that was previously impossiblea major impetus for

accountability and effectiveness

Fourth, a medium to long-term revenue mo-bilization framework would force the govern-ment to arrive at clear priorities for growingthe economy The budget must become thekey instrument of policymaking, bringing the

tradeoffs between different ways of balancing

revenue and expenditure within a coherentframework

The approach to the telecoms sector, described

below, increased private investment, made ser-

vice delivery competitive, and yielded consider-able tax revenues for the government The samemechanism can be pursued in other sectors,transforming each into an arena for new stake-

holders and new forms of cooperation amongthe public, private, and community actors Li-censes for mining would be the top priority,since the award of contracts for extractive in-dustries alone could quadruple the government

revenues within 10 years Enforceable propertyrights, again, will unleash the potential of city

dwellers and rural Afghans to operate in func-tioning legal markets

Administrative control. An administrative sys-tem turns a territory into a hierarchically na-tional space. Rules dene both the functionsof the government and the level of governancefor performing a particular function in a par-

ticular manner. The rules dening the decisionrights or authority at each level of governmentare critical to efciency, participation, and le-

gitimacy Greater effectiveness in performingthese functions at different levels produces

trust between citizens and the state and con-solidates the sense of belonging to a nationalspace for upward social mobility

In Afghanistan the administrative sphere is byand large an instrument for the abuse of public

authority for private gain While the institutionsof law and order can clear a space from insur-gents, they alone cannot govern or develop that

space Creating momentum for governing thecountrys territory will require an overhaul of

the administrative system Four sets of changesare again important

First, the states core functions must be clearlyspecied, with credible mechanism for peri-

odic review, and the government organization


29/48


chart must be changed to eliminate bureaucrat-ic overlap

Second, clear criteria for the division of the

country into provinces, municipalities, and dis-

tricts must be devised, and the type of func-tions at each level claried. Given the differ-ences in the intensity of the insurgency and thenature of threats, a short-term exible approach

in the classication of districts and provinces isimportant. Approaches tailored to specic con-texts can win people over from the insurgencyand mobilize them to protect their own assetsMunicipalities in general and Kabul municipal-

ity in particular (popularly referred to as thehouse of loot) are among the most corrupt

organizations in the country Understandably,this fuels discontent with the government Se-cure property rights are the lynchpin here The

rights are well enshrined in Islamic law, but inpractice have come under severe strain as a re-sult of disputes from decades of conicts andoutdated urban master plans that have forcedmany people into informal living arrangements

Providing the urban population with rm prop-erty rights, easily veried through computer-ized systems, could unleash hundreds of mil-

lions of dollars of investment by the people andtransform Afghans into stakeholders in good

governance

Third, the administrative division of Afghani-stan does not reect its natural conguration,as neither rivers nor minerals coincide with

subnational administrative boundaries Effec-tive use of the natural capital requires delin-eating special economic zones to maximizeprogram and project effectiveness in appropri-

ate administrative divisions within the largerframework

And fourth, the administration needs capablestaff. Most civil servants are in their fties andeligible for retirement within the next 5 to 10years This group of civil servants understands

and strongly identies with the organizational

structure and culture of Afghanistans unitarystate Due to enormous differences in the payof international organizations and nongovern-

mental organizations, there has been a steadybrain drain from the civil service Ethnic poli-

tics and refusals to pursue a systematic agendaof reform have turned corruption into a brazensystem The key to change lies in recruiting

3,000 top civil servants A fraction of resourc-es currently used on international advisors andtechnical assistance could be used to recruit topcivil servants with performance-based salariescompetitive with nongovernmental organiza-

tions and international organizations Further-more, social justice and stability require inno-vative retraining and retirement of the current

civil servants to enable them to earn a decentlivelihood outside government in the private

sector

Human capital. Putting people rst is the keyto winning the conict. The Afghan people area constituency in waiting to be claimed eitherfor securing the future or for exploiting ethnic

hatred The goals and means for forming hu-man capital will dictate which prevails

The initial goals for human capital need notbe ambitious Elevating the standards of seven

universities could help them produce peoplewho see their futures as tied to the successof global cooperation and dialogue with theWest One month of NATOs current militaryexpenditure could change the prospects of ve

generations of young Afghan men and women,creating agents of stability and prosperity forAfghanistan and the region

For vocational and higher education, invest-ments need to be part of a systematic 10-yearhuman development plan to develop specicmanagement and leadership capabilities andthe vocational skills to turn latent assets intosources of prosperity Such a human develop-ment strategy must meet the needs of the pub-

lic, private, civil, and community sectors Each


30/48


has a role in securing Afghanistans futureAnd the keys to cooperation are the mentalmodels, work ethics, and moral commitments

of the men and women who will staff and leadthem Global experience indicates that cross-

cutting ties formed in schools and universitiesare among the most enduring sources of trustor distrust So, human development should be

treated not just as a technical domain, but as apolitical vision of hope and trust-building

Second-order functions

Market-building. Unemployed youth providethe reserve pool for both the insurgency and thenarcotics industry A law and order approach is

necessary but not sufcient to deal with thesetwin threats. The denition of a Talib, accord-

ing to leading members of Afghan civil societywho several years ago conducted a survey ofaround 600,000 Afghans in the countrys south,is an unemployed youth Afghanistan has one ofthe fastest rates of demographic growth, mak-

ing it among the ve youngest countries in theworld An estimated 71 percent of the popula-tion is below 30 years old, and the country willneed at least 9 percent annual GDP growth to

merely contain the impact of this demographicgrowth. With signicant unemployment, theburden falls heavily on the youth Hundreds ofthousands of young people from the north andcenter of the country, which have been relativelystable, are ooding cities or desperately seeking

to get into Iran and beyond Of the estimated25 million Afghan refugees in Iran, nearly 15million are considered economic refugees andthus not covered by agreements for the protec-tion of displaced people Failure of the Afghan

government and the international communityto treat job creation as a task that has multi-plicative effects for security, political stability,and economic growth has thus had serious im-plications The approach advocated here brings

both state-building and market-building togeth-er to address this issue A goal, such as the cre-ation of 1 million jobs in two years, could focus

the attention of all stakeholders on this criticalissue and force an examination of all existinginstitutional and environmental constraints, al-

lowing the formulation of clear approaches thatremove constraints and grasp opportunities

Creating market institutions geared initiallytoward agriculture, mining, and constructioncould provide the impetus to sustainable jobcreation

Agriculture. While the National Solidarity Pro-gram has been a success, agriculture has beenneglected The transformation of agriculturein East Asia from the 1950s to 1970s and in

the United States from the 1950s to 1980s pro-vides models for dynamic and competitive ag-

riculture But neither the Afghan governmentnor its international partners have drawn onthese models to design and implement a com-

prehensive agricultural development strategyA bold approach is neededbeginning withmarket access and working backward throughvalue chains, supply chains, knowledge or-ganizations, and infrastructure, both human

and physical, to ensure that rural incomes percapita could increase from $1 a $4 a day, thetipping point for opium production to become

unprotable.

Launching Afghanistans agriculture on a trulysustainable path can best be achieved by open-ing up the EU market for Afghan agricultureAs one of the poorest countries in the world,Afghanistan is eligible for some concessional

trade benets. But to overcome the obstaclesof quality standards and seasonality, a Europe-wide policy for Afghanistan could harness theecological diversity of Afghanistan to satisfy

the demands of the European market Transportis a constraint in the short term But NATO canhelp It has contracted out the transport of itscargo to non-Afghan rms, whose planes ar-rive in Afghanistan full of goods, then y backempty If a portion of the cargo space werecontracted to Afghan entrepreneurs, they could

transport agricultural produce to the Gulf on


31/48


NATO planes at nominal or no cost This wouldopen access to the global supply network fromthe Gulf

Modern agriculture is a knowledge system, so

the institutional network ranging from agri-cultural colleges to soil maps for crop and wa-ter management needs to be put in place TheUS and Canadian experience from the 1950s

to 1970s and the East Asian experience fromthe 1950s to 1980s, heavily supported by theUnited States, provide models that, with mod-ern information management systems, couldcreate the necessary support structures Land

grant colleges in the United States and agricul-tural schools in Canada and Europe can be an

important source of knowledge and support forsuch an approach

Corporations specializing in agricultural valuechains have the knowledge of risks and the ca-pacity for devising and implementing risk man-agement systems for value chains and forwardand backward linkages Special incentives for

these corporations, particularly through draw-ing on special risk guarantee instruments andother tools, could save years of trial and error

by the agricultural consulting industry Invest-ment in power is also critical to export-oriented

agriculture Given Afghanistans immense hy-droelectric potential, power from small, me-dium and large hydroprojects could give

Documents

A Ten-Year Framework for Afghans , a book written by an international known economist Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai