A Study on the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation and Its Influence on Buddhist Logic

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    THE JOURNAL

    OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OFBUDDHIST STUDIES

    EDITOR-IN-CHIEFA . K. Narain

    University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

    EDITORSHeinz Bechert Leon Hurvitz

    Universitdt Gottingen, FRG UB C, Vancouve r, CanadaLewis Lancaster A lexander W. MacD onald

    University of California, Berkeley, USA Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, FranceB. f . Stavisky A lex Waym an

    WN IIR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, USA

    ASSOCIATE EDITORStephan Beyer

    University of Wisconsin, Ma dison, USA

    Volume 4 1981 Number I

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    C O N T E N T S

    I . A R T I C L E SThe Co nce pts of Truth and M eaning in the B uddh is t

    S c r i p t u r e s , by Jose I. Cabezon 7Chang ing the Fema le Body : Wise Women and the Bodh i -

    sa t tva Career in Some M aharatnakvtasutras, by NancySchuster 24

    liodhi an d Amhattaphala. From ear ly Buddhism to ear lyM a h a y a n a , h Karel Werner 70

    II . S H O R T P A P E R SA Stud y on the M adhy am ika M ethod of Refuta tion a nd I ts

    Inf luence on Buddhis t Logic , by Shohei Ichimura 87An E xcept iona l G ro u p of Pa in ted B ud dh a Figures a t Ajanta,

    fry Anand Krishna 96R un e E. A. Jo ha ns so n's Analysis of Citta: A Crit ic ism, by

    Arvind Sharma 101

    I I I . B O O K R E V I E W S A N D N O T I C E SCross Cur ren t s in Ea r ly Buddh i sm, fry S. N. Dube 108B ud dh a ' s L ion s T he Lives of the E igh ty -Four S iddhas , by

    James B. Robinson 1 1 1

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    T a n g le s a n d W e b s , by Padmasiri de Silva 11 3Buddhis t and Freud ian Psychology , by Padmasiri de Silva 114B u d d h i s t -C h r i s t i a n E mp a th y , by Joseph J. Spae 115The Re l ig ions o f T ibe t , by Guiseppe Tucci 119

    I V . N O T E S A N D N E W SA R ep or t on the 3 rd Co nferen ce of the IABS 123B ud dh ism and Music 127Presiden tia l Add ress at the 2nd IAB S Con ference a t Nalanda

    hyP.Prndhan 12 8

    contributors 143

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    A Study on the Madhyamika Method ofRefutation and Its Influence onBuddhist Logic

    by Shohei Ichimura

    IDe spi te m o d er n an d con tem po rary scholarship , logical analys is of theM ad hy am ika m eth od of refuta t ion has not suff ic iently op en ed thescope of unders tanding. The pas t achievement in th i s f ie ld i s t a rbehind the level of metaphysical and rel igious interests in the conceptof sunyatd which the m eth od was des ign ed to de m on st ra te . This is anat te m pt to ab r idg e th is d i spar i ty . My conten t ion is tha t the M adhyamika dialect ic has an intr insic relat ion to the inferent ial s t ructure ofIndian syl logism, especial ly, the dual rules of anvaya a n d xyitireka asformulated by Buddhist logicians such as Dignaga. As part of a s tudyon th i s subjec t mat ter , I presented a paper a t the Nalanda conference ,demonst ra t ing the poss ibi l i ty tha t the method of d ia lec t ic may havebeen innovated in para l le l to the pre-Class ica l Abhidharmis t methodof debate as recorded in Kathtivatthu. The purpose of th i s paper i s toc lar i fy fur ther the re la t ionship be tween the Madhyamika method ofdemonst ra t ion and tha t of syl logis t ic inference in reference to Nagar-j u n a ' s Vigrahavyavartani.

    IIO f th e major texts wri t ten by N aga rjun a, I believe the Vigmha-

    vydvartanl i s the most concise and comprehens ive cr i t ique of therealistic system of la ng ua ge and logical co nv en tion . The text isequipped with his self-commentary which, at t imes, inser ts syl logist icarguments , but i ts at t ract iveness is , most of al l , due to the subject87

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    m a t t e r itself, for the points of issue are concerned with the quest ion ast o w h e t h e r w o r d s (sabda) or communicab le symbols have the i r ownpower o f be ing (svabhdva), in the sense that they const i tute an independen t means o f cogn i t i on (pramdna). Nagarjuna 's cr i t ique does notre pu d ia te the pract icali ty of con ven t ion ( langu age and logic) , but itleads to the twofold conclusion: (1) words have no real objectivereference, and (2) they create only i l lusory subject ive cogni t ion. Insho r t , h i s re fu ta tion is des ign ed to dem on s t ra t e these two phases o fo u r p he no m en al o r emp i r ica l un iverse by way of rep udia t ing th eNaiyayika or common sense realist ic conviction in the power of humanc o n v e n t i o n .

    Tra d i t ion a l ly , the M adhyam ika m etho d is def ined as the absolu te type of nega t ion (prasajyaprathedha), which means that , in contrad i s t inc t ion to o rd ina ry nega t ion (anyonyapratlwdha), i t does not accompany any counte r thes i s . Of the na ture o f words , fo r ins tance , theMadhyamika negat ion of the Naiyayika thesis : "sabda i s impermanent ,"does no t mean to asse r t the MImamsaka thes i s : "'sabda i s pe rmanen t , "nor does his negat ion of the la t ter mean to asser t the former . What isreal ly inte nd ed by him is tha t "sabda is devoid of i ts own being (nih-svabhdva), hence void (sunya)." T hi s is ev ide nt in the syllogistic a rg ument Nagarjuna gives in the above text . "Surely , those which havear isen in dependent or iginat ion are not in possess ion of their ownbe in g, " he c la ims, "becau se such own being is not foun d. W hy? because the i r o r ig ina t ion depends on the conca tena t ion of causes andcond i t i ons . " 1 In s imilar token , he arg ue s , we can no t f ind any svabhdvain lan gu ag e, beca use their genesis is der iv ed from m ult iple m ater ia lp r inc ip l e s {mahdbhuta) as well as hu m an anatom ical effor ts. Na garju naeven proposes his ins tant ia t ion e lsewhere in the text in terms of mdydmetaphor fo r the prac t ica l i ty o f convent ion (xyavahdra). He sta tes thatasse r t ion and nega t ion a re equa l ly com parab le to an in te rac t ion between magica l ly c rea ted be ings . 2 As my first step, I am obliged todemons t ra te how the Madhyamika appl ied the sy l log is t ic fo rm of a r gument to h i s method of re fu ta t ion , and why th i s method was re garded as def ic ien t .

    I l lT h e r e is goo d reaso n to bel ieve that Bhavaviveka, the forefathe r

    of the Svatantr ika , who advocated the syl logis t ic argument , may haveob tain ed his idea of syllogist ic form ulat ion from the afo rem enti on ed8 8

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    type of demons t r a t ion Nagar juna app l ied . In h i s Karatalaratna, Bha-vaviveka gives two s tandard forms of argument , respect ive ly repudia t i ng t he own be ing f r om phe nom e na l (samskrta) a nd t r a ns c e nde n t a l(asamskrta) dharmas, both of which, in the Abhidharmis t doctr ine ,cons t i tu te the ul t imate bui lding blocks of the ent i re universe . Let ustake the firs t on e which is des ign ed to rep ud ia te ph en om en al o rpsycho-phys ica l e lements : 3

    Th es i s : Phe no m ena l e lements a r e devoid of own be ing f rom thes tandpoin t o f abso lu te t ru th (paramdrthatas);Reason: Because the i r a r i s ing depends upon causes and condi t ions (hetupratyayatd);Ins tant ia t ion: Jus t l ike magical ly crea ted beings .

    The r iva l l ing Prasahgika , however , who advocated the dia lec t ic as thesole method, vehement ly denounced the Svatantr ika for three bas icreasons. I believe that these reasons precisely point to the fact that theM ad hy am ika dia lec t ic it se lf is s t ruc tura l ly ro oted in and con cern edwith the logical s tructure of syllogist ic inference or demonstration.Firs t , the Prasahgika dialectician, such as Candrakir t i , denounced the adverbia l qual i f ie r " f rom the s tandpoint of absolutet ruth ." Al though this qual i f ica t ion was des igned to indica te tha t theg iven ju d g m en t is t r ansce nde nta l , Cand rak i r t i r ega rd ed it a s super f luous , s e rv ing no purpose , because non-Buddhis t s would ne i the runders tand nor accept the Buddhis t d i f ferent ia t ion of the two levelsof t ru th (xyavahdra a n d paramdrtha). Second, as shown in the foregoing examples , not only Bhavaviveka but a lso Nagar juna himselfappl ied the ir unique pr inc iple which invokes the Buddhis t ins ight ofcausali ty, i .e . , "Whatever ar ises f rom causes and condit ions is devoidof own be ing . " Here , the r eason , "dependent o r ig ina t ion , " cons t i tu tesan antecedent in relat ion to i ts necessary conclusion, "voidness." Or inIndian t radi t ion, these two are concomitant . Let us ques t ion, then:Could th is concomitant re la t ion (or the Buddhis t presuppos i t ion) beacc ep ted universa lly? Th e P rasahgikas th ou gh t tha t it could not be ,especia l ly in mat ters of doctr ina l controversy, because any refuta t ionbased on the pr inc iple admit ted by one par ty a lone would not lead toany conc lus iveness .4

    Thi rd , a l though the P rasahgikas do no t s eem to have brought i tto th e foref ron t , th ere is the prob lem of inadeq uate ins tant ia t ion inthose instances given by Nagarjuna as well as Bhavaviveka. No matterhow exper ient ia l ly profound an impl ica t ion i t might bear , ins tant ia-

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    t ion in terms of magical beings , dreams, or hal lucinat ions , does notseem to be rea l ly convinc ing to the mind of our common humani ty .O n th e o th er ha nd , non-B udd his t s , such as the Mimam sakas , wouldbe prompt in propos ing a counte r a rgument as wel l as i t s ins tan t ia t ion, though this may not convince any Buddhis ts , precisely becauseof thei r doctr inal di f ference. Why, however , does successful demonst ra t ion d e p e n d o n ade qu ate ins tant ia t ion? Obviously it is because anadequate ins tance is supposed to embody the logical val idi ty of thegiven argument, or the validity of the logical or causal relat ion bet ween Reason (hetu) and Conclus ion {sadhya). What a re the condi t ionstha t obs t ruc t adequa te ins tan t ia t ion , and how could th i s be improved?All these quest ions may have been of pr ime importance for thoseanc ien t doc to rs of B ud dh ism and H induism , and I th ink tha t inBuddhis t h i s tory , the problem of ins tan t ia t ion seems to have gradually dif fer en tiat ed th e roles of syllogist ic an d dialectical dem on str at ion respec t ive ly for the sake of phenomenal and t ranscendenta ls p h e r e s . 5 I bel ieve the beginning of this development can be detectedi n Naga r j una .

    IVIt was Dignaga of the 5th century who, for the f irst t ime,

    theor ized the th ree ru les of va l id in fe rence (trairufrya). Let us see howthese ru les a re appl icab le to demons t ra t ion . In order to demons t ra tea breakout of a f i re f rom r is ing smoke on a dis tant hi l l , the speaker i sobl iged to create a deduct ive process in the mind of his l i s tenersthrough three s teps . Here , l e t us t ranscr ibe the log ica l ly concomi tan tpredications, such as "having smoke" and "having fire," respectively as" P " an d "Q ," an d a d i s tan t h ill a s "a . " T h e dem ons t ra t ion proceed s inthe fo l lowing order :

    (1) P(a ) "The h i l l hav ing smoke"Reason(2) (x) (P(x).Q(x)} "W her ev er sm oke, th er e fire"logical Relation(3) Q (a) " T h e re fo re , th e hill ha vin g fire"ConclusionW ha t is req ui red by Dign aga is that the sp eak er is obl iged to give asimilar instance such as a kitchen (Let us transcribe i t as "b") wherebo th sm ok e an d f ire are invar iably obse rved as con com itant , and atthe same t ime, he is obl iged also to give another but diss imilar in-9 0

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    s tance , such as a lake (Let us t ranscr ibe it as "/3") where bo th can n e v e rbe observed . Technica l ly , s imi la r ins tances and dissimilar instancesare respectively called Positive (sapaksa) and Contraposi t ive (vipaksa)c lasses . These two g r o u p s of instances can respectively test the validityof a given logical relation either positively as "P t h e n Q" or c o n t r a p o s -itively " - Q t h e n -P." At the same t ime , these opera t ions can de te r m i n e the given locus, such as a hill, as a possible locality where "P" and" Q " are j o in t ly p robab le . By t r ansc r ib ing the similar and dissimilarc lass members repsec t ive ly as "x" and "y," we have the actual instant ia t ions as:6

    (x){P(x) .Q(x)} and P(b) .Q(b ) anvaw( y ) { - Q ( v ) . - P ( v ) } and - Q G 8 ) . - P ( / 8 ) vyatirekaa n d the s t a n d a r d f o r m u l a of dual instantia t ions conjoint ly as:

    (X){P(X).Q(X)} . ( y ) { - Q ( y ) , _ P ( y ) } .It is c lear tha t the deduct ive process "P(a) t hen Q(a)" and thef irst rule that "the pred ica t ion , i.e., ' hav ing smoke , ' has to be f o u n d , in

    the locus in q u e s t i o n , " are equally implied in the dual ins tan t ia t ions ,a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h a t the dual instantia t ions can be r e g a r d e d ass imul taneous p rocesse s in the m i n d . For, t hey pe r fo rm, on the oneh an d , induc t ive ly c lass d i f fe rent ia t ion be tween sapaksa and vipaksa,a n d on the other hand, ca lcu la t ion of t ru th va lues in t e r m s of verificat ion as "P.Q" and falsification as " - Q . - P . " My con ten t ion is t ha tNaga r juna ' s d ia l ec t i c can be ana lyzed in paral le l to the fo rmula ofanvaya and xyatireka.

    VSome Naiyayika logicians at the t ime of Nagar juna de fended

    t h e i r t h e o r y of fou r pramdnas (Means of Knowledge) as having the i ro w n b e i n g by m e a n s of a m e t a p h o r of lamp-l ight and night ly darkness . Naga r juna re fu te s th i s in Vigrahairyavartani, to the effect that thef o u r m e a n s of cogni t ion are j u s t as d e p e n d e n t as their respectiveobjects (prameya). Since the Naiyayika he ld tha t knowledge is self-l u m i n o u s , it is supposed tha t l igh t is capable of " i l lumining itself" andcapable of "i l lumining oth ers." 7 These predicat ions are concomitant , and91

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    he nc e they can be t ransc r ibed as "P " and "Q " respective ly . Darkn ess ,on th e o th er h an d, is an ent i ty capab le of obs t ruc t in g i l lum inat ion ,an d he nc e f a ls if ie s th e above p red ica t ions a s " - Q " and "P. " Le tw ha teve r i s capab le o f i ll um in ing be a m em be r o f sapaksa "x" andw ha teve r i s capab le o f obs t ruc t ing i l lum ina t ion be a m em be r o f theclass of vipaksa "y." Now, in kdrikd 3 6 , Vigrahavydvartani, Nagarjunaargues tha t when l ight i l lumines both i t se l f and o thers , which meansth a t "x" ver if ies both " P" an d " Q " (anvaya opera t ion) , da rkness "y"which i s supposed to be s imul taneous , opera tes a lso in obs t ruc t ingi l lum inat io n , w hich m ean s tha t "y" fals if ies bo th p redica t ion s as "Q "a n d " P " (vyatireka op era t ion ) . His a r gu m en t he re is per fec tly inaccord with the formula of the dual rules of syl logist ic inference:

    ( x ) { P ( x ) . Q ( x ) } . ( y ) { - Q ( y ) . - P ( y ) } .Yet the p re di ca m en t crea ted by th is d ia lec t ic is d u e to the un exp ecte dcont radic t ion which our convent ion impl ies , and th is fea ture i s sudde nly d isc losed by the pa r t icula r context in which two con t rary e nt i t ie s a re jux tap os ed ove r the sam e sphe re and m om ent o f i l lum ina t ion .There i s no soph i s t ry he re , how ever , because in conven t ion , t he co -pr es en ce of th e age nt of il luminat ion an d i ts objec t is a priori accep ted .Yet I must s ta te tha t the demonst ra t ion acute ly points to the fac t tha to u r co nv en tio n f inds no object ive real i ty as a refe ren ce for the fact ofi l l u m i n a t i o n .

    T h e absenc e of rea l objec t of refere nce is fur th er de m on st ra tedi n t h e s u b s e q u e n t kdrikds. N ote 8 con tains s implif ied trans lat ion s ofkdrikds 36 through 39 and the i r symbol ic nota t ions , inc luding mysupp lem enta ry d ia l ec t i c fo r kdrikds 37 and 39.K Although i t i s notdi rec t ly de tec table in the forms of language , the formulas of symbol icnota t ion can reveal a s igni f icant ins ight behind the apparent absurdity, such as position without contraposition o r vice versa. For instance,kdrikds 37 and 39 show the former case , where i l luminat ion a lone i spr es en t , as (xy) (P(xy) .Q(xy)} , whi le my sup ple m en ts re pre sen t thecase of contraposition but without position, w h ere da rk ness a lon e is p res en t , a s (yx){ -Q (yx) . -P(yx)} . Y e t , e i the r o f the tw o cases equa l ly hasi ts variables as "xy" or "yx" despite "x" and "y" being mutual ly exclusive. In o rd e r to exp lain th e fact of (xy) (P(xy).Q(xy)} or th at of(yx){ -Q (yx) . -P(yx)} s im ul t aneous ly , s ince they a re equa l ly de r ivedin r e fe ren ce to the sam e sphe re and m om en t , t he re is on ly oneco nd i t ion such tha t "x" an d "y" are ident ica l whi le s imul taneous ly9 2

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    they a re d i f fere nt . Th is am ou nts to saying tha t "x" an d "y" couldrec iprocal ly assume each other ' s na ture! How can we ca l l th i s k ind ofent i ty as anything but "a phantom crea ted by magic!"

    V II am obl iged to ref lect upon the s ignif icance of what has been

    discussed above. The way the Madhyamika dia lec t ic could have inf luenced the sys tem of Buddhis t logic ians may be re t roact ive ly infer red.No matter whether i t i s logical or dialect ical , the process of our mindis dua l i zed th ro ug h the du a l ope ra t ions o f anavaya a n d vyatireka. Inthe logica l context we are concerned wi th de termining the givenre fe ren t i a l va r i ab l e a s a member o f sapaksa and also as clearly different iat ing i t f rom the class of vipaksa. The processes o f deduc t ion o rinduct ion here keep two mutual ly cont rapos i t ive var iables in separat ion. In the d ia lec t ica l context , on the other hand, we shi f t ourconcern toward one and the same sphere and moment where we lookfor those two variables for verification or falsification, which necessarily leads to total con trad ict io n. T h e key po int is tha t the logicallyse p ar at ed refe ren t ial p rocess es such as "a hil l hav ing sm oke an d f ire"and i t s cont rapos i t ion "a lake having no f i re nor smoke" are co-present in our mind, a l though in the use of language the pos i t iona lone comes in to be ing o r vice versa. The negated i s never the lessdef in i te ly there in the process of taking tha t a l te rnat ive . The Madhyamika cr i t ique of convent ion cont r ibuted to the c lar i f ica t ion tha tour use of symbols has i ts reference exclusively in our mental processes and not anywhere in the external wor ld , and tha t th i s referent ial object in o u r m in d i tself is invariably co ns truc ted as du al- na tu re dco m pr is in g a poten t ia l se lf -cont radic tion. I be l ieve tha t Bu ddh is t logic ians took the i r cues f rom the Madhyamika dia lec t ics before in t roducing the i r t heor i e s o f apoha as well as ksanabhahga.

    For my closing statement , I must admit that my analysis of theMadhyamika dia lec t ic in te rms of the logica l s t ruc ture of anvaya a n dvyatireka has not been t r ied by any one, nor is i t in accord with thet r ad i t i ona l P rasa r ig ika approach . I f my demons t r a t i on can wi ths t andscrut iny, however , I can conf ident ly say tha t the Madhyamika dia lect icians and Yogacara logicians s t r ived for the same scient i f ic endeavoras regards to the na ture and funct ion of convent ion. We know thatmedieval India witnessed bri l l iant intel lectual act ivi t ies , much of93

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    which we re due to the cont rovers ies sprung spontaneous ly be tweenBuddhis t log ic ians and dialecticians on the one h a n d , and the Naiya-yika and Mimamsaka s choo lmen on the o t h e r . The a fo remen t ionedtheories (i .e. , apoha and ksanabhanga) were the major subject matters oft he i r exchanges . Cons ide r ing the fact that Hindu metaphysics andlogical thoughts were or iginal ly evolved on the basis of the G r a m m a r ian system of t h o u g h t and conven t ion , I find it is of great in teres t thatthose Buddhis t pandi tas regarded the i r c r i t i ca l examina t ion of thebasis of Indian civil ization i tself as a way toward the Buddhis t goa l ofr e l i g ious emanc ipa t i on .

    N O T E S1. Vigraha., Comm. under k. 22: ye hi pratityasamiitpannd khdvas te na smvabhava

    bhfivanti viahhai

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    S u p p l e m e n t : lyatireka without anvawW h e r e t h e r e is d a r k n e s s - | ( x ){P ( x ) . Q ( x ) } | . ( y ) { - Q ( y ) . - P ( y ) }

    th er e is no l ight .How can l ight i l lumine

    a n y t h in g : - = ( y x ) { - Q ( y x ) . - P ( y x ) }k. .SH: nnvaxa (mil vyntirrfot

    Does l igh t i l lumine (x ){P(x).Q(x)} . ( \ ) {- Q (v ) . - P( v) }darkness a t i tsm o m e n t o f a r i s i n g ?

    No. light does not reachi t f rom the beg inn ing .*

    k. S9: amin/i with v\atirrkaIf l igh t he r e i l lumines (x ){P(x) .Q(x)} . - | (y ){ -Q (y ) . -P (y )} |

    da rkness wi thou t reaching it , = (xy){P(xv).Q(xy)}

    This light il lumines allthe wor ld .*

    S u p p l e m e n t : witueka without ammoIf dar kn ess he re destro ys - | (x ) {P(x).Q(x) }|.(y) {-Q(y).- P(y)}

    l igh t wi thou t reach ingi t. = ( y x ) { - Q ( y x ) . - P ( y x ) }

    Ib i s da rkness des t royslight in all the world.

    Kar ikas 3 f i - : i9 in Sanskr i t :\(uli en wapardtmanau trad vmunena praknsayatyagiuh:prarrhddayisyati tamah svapardtmdnau hutdxa ix>ui: 3titidsti tamasta jialonc yatra ilia srnnsthito lumxdt 'M.)

    F.di tor 's note: The fol lowing information should be added to note 3:tath>atah mmskrtdh sihiyd mdydvat pratyayodbhai'dti. Although this sanskri t izat ion does nota p p l y paramdrthatas a n d hetupratyayatd. these usages, as identical with tattvata\ an d prat-xawdhhava respect ively, are authent ic as Bhavaviveka 's in his oth er works.

    95