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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
A Snapshot of Current Practice of
Occupational Radiation Protection in
Industrial Radiography
WGIR – ISEMIR Richard VAN SONSBEEK1, John C. LE HERON2, Gonzague ABELA3 ,
Francisco C.A. DA SILVA4 , Razak HAMZAH5 , Thomas A. LEVEY6 ,
Matthias PURSCHKE7 , Kamal SAHAIMI8 , Christian LEFAURE9
1Applus RTD; e-mail: [email protected]
2International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria; e-mail: [email protected] 3EDF; Saint Denis, France; e-mail: [email protected]
4Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; e-mail: [email protected] 5Malaysia Nuclear Agency; Kajang, Malaysia; e-mail: [email protected]
6Acuren Group Inc.; Edmonton, Canada; e-mail: [email protected] 7German Society for Non-Destructive Testing (DGZfP); Berlin, Germany; e-mail: [email protected]
8CNESTEN, Rabat, Morocco, [email protected] 9IAEA consultant; Paris, France; [email protected]
IAEA
Background to ISEMIR
• Information System on Occupational
Exposure in Medicine, Industry & Research
• There are some areas in medicine, industry
and research where radiation uses can lead
to significant occupational exposures
• Both in normal operations and in accident
situations
• But detailed information at the operational
level is lacking
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IAEA
ISEMIR – the launch
• January 2009, for an initial 3 year period, to
help improve occupational radiation protection
in targeted areas
• 2 Working Groups, initially
• Interventional Cardiology, commenced Feb 2009
• Industrial Radiography, commenced Jan 2010
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IAEA 4
Working Group Industrial Radiography
(WGIR)
From left to right: Christian Lefaure, Francisco Da Silva, Kamal Sahaimi, Gonzague Abela,
Richard van Sonsbeek, Matthias Purschke, A. Razak Hamzah, John Le Heron
(Thomas Levey is not on the picture)
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WGIR working together
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Composition of WGIR
Name Region Stakeholder
G. Abela Europe Client
M. Purschke Europe NDT Society
T. Levey North America Operating Company
A. Razak Hamzah Asia Technical Service Organization
K. Sahaimi Africa Training provider
F. Da Silva Latin America Technical Service Organization
R. Van Sonsbeek Europe Operating Company
J. Le Heron Scientific Secretary IAEA
C. Lefaure Consultant IAEA
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Objectives of our effort
Keeping ALARA:
1. the dose due to normal exposure • if normal exposure is justified!
2. the risk of exposure due to accidents • (risk= chance X consequence of accident)
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Agreed Mandate
• To draw an overview picture of the situation concerning
occupational exposures and radiation protection of staff in
Industrial Radiography (radiographers and other industry and
client staff members) all over the world.
• To identify both good practices and shortcomings and define all
types of actions (training, managerial, behavioural…) to be
implemented for assisting the industry, clients, and regulatory
bodies in avoiding exposures to accidents, and implementing
the ALARA principle.
• To propose recommendations for harmonising monitoring
procedures.
• To set up a system for regularly collecting occupational doses
for these individuals and for dissemination of this information.
8 WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012
IAEA 9
WGIR conducted a world-wide survey
• to gain insight into the current practice of
occupational radiation protection in industrial
radiography
• respectively addressed to −Regulatory Bodies (Licensing bodies for radiation
protection)
−Operating Companies (Licensees)
− Industrial Radiographers (“Operators”)
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IAEA 10
Subjects of questionnaires
1. qualifications and training of radiographers in radiation
protection,
2. learning from incidents (accidents, near misses, deviations
from normal operations),
3. systems and procedures in place for safe operation,
4. emergency preparedness and response, and
5. individual monitoring.
The IAEA Specific Safety Guide on Radiation Safety in Industrial
Radiography (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-11) was used to
develop questions
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Distribution of questionnaires
Operator Company Regulatory
Body
English X X X
German X X
French X X
Portuguese X X
Spanish X X
Dutch X
Russian X X
Chinese X X
• Questionnaires were translated
in various languages
• Operator and Company
questionnaires were distributed
via the networks of the WGIR
members
• NDT companies
• (Inter)national NDT societies
• Regulatory Body questionnaire
was distributed by IAEA
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Responses to the questionnaires
Operator
Questionnaire
Company
Questionnaire
Regulatory Body (RB)
Questionnaire
Number of
operators
Number of
companies
Number of
countries
Number of
Companies
Number of
Countries
Countries
contacted
Countries
responded
RBs
contacted
RBs
responded
Africa 17 7 3 7 4 35 8 35 8
Asia-
Pacific 49 34 7 33 6 27 13 35 16
Europe 166 60 16 28 13 49 27 49 27
Latin
America 72 17 3 19 4 20 5 20 5
North
America 128 33 2 8 2 2 2 3 3
Global 432 151 31 95 29 133 55 142 59
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Results and discussion
• For each questionnaire the responses to
each item were consolidated in an Excel
workbook
• Responses were statistically analyzed
• Various hypotheses on correlations between
items were tested
• The following slides contain the main
findings from the three questionnaires.
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IAEA
Qualifications and training of
radiographers in radiation protection
• Initial radiation protection training appears to
be well accepted and established • 98% of operators had received RP training
• Refresher training was less well established • 70% of RBs required refresher training
• 80% (60%) of companies offered refresher (practical) RP training
• Emergency response training is also less
established • 87% of operators had received emergency response training
• only 65% of operators had been involved in practical exercises
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Learning from incidents
• Rate of occurrence of incidents in IR:
• Level of dissemination of lessons learned
appears to be low • 40% of NDT companies do not share learning with other organizations
15
Operator responses Company responses
# per operator
per 5 year
# per company
per 5 year
# per operator
per 5 year
# per company
per 5 year
Accidents 0.04 4.0 0.03 1.1
Near Misses 0.1 6.2 0.05 1.8
Deviations 0.6 29.3 0.05 1.8
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Systems and procedures in place for
safe operations
• Systems and procedures should be in place
for protecting the operator and the public
• Results of compliance inspection are
perhaps the best indication of whether such
systems and procedures are in place
• Compliance inspections are performed by
NDT companies and regulatory bodies
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IAEA
Subjects of compliance inspections
Subject Company Regulatory Body
Proper wearing of passive individual dosimeters 95% 98%
Proper wearing and use of active individual dosimeters 93% 90%
Proper use of survey meters 95% 96%
Proper use of collimators 90% 88%
Proper warning system at the work site 93% 98%
Dose rate at the boundary of the work site within the limits set 92% 90%
Proper use of alarm systems 86% 96%
Proper training and qualifications of radiographers 91% 100%
Operator knowledge of procedures 88% 96%
Pre-operation specific equipment checks 82% 86%
Equipment condition 85% 98%
Emergency preparedness 74% 96%
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Most common shortcomings
Company compliance inspections RB compliance inspections
1. No proper use of collimators
2. Dose rate at the boundary of the
work site above limits set
3. No proper use of survey meters
4. No pre-operation specific
equipment checks being
performed
5. Poor operator knowledge of
procedures
1. No proper use of survey meters
2. No proper warning system to
prevent entry to the work site
3. Poor emergency preparedness
4. No proper use of alarm systems
5. Dose rate at the boundary for the
work site not within limits set
18
• Results of the shortcomings perhaps reflect a different focus • Company perhaps focusing on company procedures
• Regulatory body may have a focus on public protection
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Emergency preparedness and response
19
• Radiation sources used for industrial
radiography purposes have high radiation
outputs and are potentially very hazardous
• It is essential that systems are in place for
emergency preparedness and response
• in particular an emergency plan for incidents
with gamma radiography sources
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Implementation of emergency plans
• Almost all regulatory bodies (98%) stated
that they require NDT companies to have an
emergency plan;
• 95% of NDT companies stated that they had
an emergency plan; and
• over 90% of radiographers stated that their
NDT company had an emergency plan for
site radiography
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IAEA
Emergency response equipment
• Only three-quarters of regulatory bodies
required NDT companies to have
emergency equipment
• However 90% of NDT companies stated that
they had emergency equipment for site
radiography
• primarily long tongs, shielding material, and an
emergency or rescue container.
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IAEA
Individual monitoring
• All RBs required personal monitoring with
passive dosimeters
• 80% of RBs also required active dosimeters
• With at least audible alarms
• All Companies provided passive dosimeters
• 94% provided active dosimeters
• Almost all with at least audible alarms
• About two thirds also with visual alarms
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Dose distribution
• The radiographer data are for
234 radiographers, the NDT
company data are for nearly
3500 radiographers, and the
regulatory body data are for
over 16,000 radiographers
• Average dose
• Radiographer data: 3.4 mSv
• RB data: 2.9 mSv
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Dose versus workload
• No correlation found • Radiation protection in industrial
radiography is not being effectively
optimized
• Mean occupational dose per
radiographic exposure • 4.8 ± 2.3 μSv for all operators
• 2.9 ± 1.2 μSv for operators with
workload > 100 exposures
• No effect on dose per exposure
found with: • level of NDT training
• type of sources being used,
• activity of sources,
• use of collimation, or
• incidence of events
• But limited data numbers 24 WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012
IAEA
Conclusions (1 of 3)
• Initial radiation protection training for radiographers is
reasonably well established, but there is room for
improvement especially with respect to refresher training
and practical emergency response training
• The frequency of occurrence of incidents (accidents, near
missed and deviations) is not trivial, and methods such as
better incident reporting, analysis, feedback and sharing
lessons learned need to be better utilized
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Conclusions (2 of 3)
• Collimators and diaphragms are not being used as often as
they should be
• Survey meters are not as widely available as they should be
• Individual monitoring, as reported, is well established, with
passive and, usually, active dosimeters. The establishment
and use of investigation levels needs to be improve
• Warning systems to prevent entry to the work area during
site radiography were not always as effective as desired.
Better communication at the site is indicated
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Conclusions (3 of 3)
• Emergency plans were widely prevalent, but there seemed
to be some issues regarding specific training for
radiographers with respect to emergencies
• Occupational doses received by radiographers varied
considerably, with no correlation with radiographic workload
27
There is considerable scope for
improvement in radiation protection
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Thank you!
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