26

..A SAVAGE AND ROMANTIC WAR'sPArN 1833-1840

Part I: The Course of the Fbst Cadist Warby Conrad Caims

PRELIMINARY NOTESThis flrst article isa hislorical introduction, and willbe followedby detailed examinalions oflhe organhation, tactics, uniformsand weapons of boih sides, and, it is hoped, a piece on theOriamendi campaign of 1837 in real life and on the wargames

Some ofthe materialhas appeared before. although in ratherdifferent form, in a senes of atriclesin The Forcign Coftespondpnr (newsletter of the Conrinental Wars Study Group of theV;ctorian Military Society) and in the VHS journal, Soldied o/rr? Oxeer. To those who feel they have seen it before, I wouldsay tbat I hope theywillforgive repetition, and understandthatit was impossible to present the newly produced parts ofthesearticles by themselves in any sensible fashion. Those who wouldlike further details, particularly on uniforms, and fullerreferences, will, I hope, refer to the earlier articles. Abibliography will appear in a forthcoming edition of thispublicalion.

The singularly apt tille is one which I wish I had thought upthe people who did are the staff of the Spanish magazin€

I would like to thank Ron Poulter for drawing the plate thatillustrates this article. and especially Ralph Weaverfor help andsupport throughout on my Carlist researches. and for theillustrations of the warriors ofboth sides.

THE PARTIES

important wings ofthe Cristinos as the Liberales and Moderatos- borh ofrhese titles, unlike "Cnslinos", were what the groupsused to describe themselves at the time. Th€ Liberaleswere. asliberals always have been in spain. very different from theirnam€-sakes in France or Britain, although, as always. Britishliberals made liltle effort to understand the diff€rence. Theirgreat inspiration was the 1812 Constitution. a lengthy workinspired by the Enlightenment, British. American and Frenchrevolutionary ideas, as well as Liberal notions of what waswrong with Spain. It was not in force until 1836, when it waspromulgated by a violent and successful Liberal coup d'etat.The Liberales' hero was General Riego. who had led an earliermilitary take-over in 1820, and ran the govemment until it wascrushed by Louis Xvlll s invasion in 1823i their main politicalaim was to resist royal absolutism and what they saw as theobscurantist power of the Church ovcr all aspects of Spanishlife. Few were real republicansi they lended to be stronger inthe cities than in the counrryside, and were particularlywell-represented in the regular army and, above all, in theNational Militia. Their alliance with the Moderatos. who wereon the whole the personal supportersofCristina and Isabel, wasuneasy: ir could be argued that the only thing that preventedModerrro. al l l ing sr(h rhe Carl i . r r on some occa. ion\.panicularly afier the 1836 revolution. was th€ latter's rigidrefusal to compromise or negotiate.

The Carlisc called rhemselves Realirrdr (royalists), and theircnemies normally spoke of them as the .itaccioror. The wordCarlist cones from their leader. or at least figurehead, Carlos,brother of Ferdinand Vll. (To those who regarded him as theIegitimate monarch he was Charles Vi the Habsburg emperorwe callby that title nasCharles I ofSpain). Whether Charles orlsabel was the legitimate ruler can be argued €ither way.Women monarchs had been an ancient Castillian and Spanishtradition. but duringthe eighteenth ceniurythe Bourbon Kingsintroduced. along with many other French ideas, the so-calledSalic Law. which says that no $,oman can be a queen regnant.whether or noi kabel could succeed Ferdinand depends onwheiher Salic law was in force in 1833. a conslilutional issue Ihave no int€ntion of discussing.

why did it matter? During Fcrdinand's long, generallyr€actionary. and until 1830 childless. reign. the hopes of asignificant group of Spaniards had been linked to the person ofDon Carlos. whose illiberal credentials were impeccable.when. to rheir surprise and horror. Ferdinand produced anheir. their disappointment was bitter. as until thar point $ethrone would have passed to Carlos on Ferdinands death.Faced with the impossibility of obtaining power by peacefulmeans. and worried by Liberal influence in the govemment.they turned to force: as the Cristinos controll€d th€ anny. theyraised their own rivalhosts.

Carlist ideology has changed over the years, but it is almostahlays of a fairly extreme reactionary nature not until the1960\ could anything approaching a left'wing Carlism befound. A Carlists twin aims were to uphold the Monarchy andrhe Church. both in their most iraditional and absolutist forms.(Notably abseni ftom the pantheon of the early Carlists waswhat was later to become the third immutable oblecl of

The First Carlist War was the first of three full-scale civil warsthat Spain suffered in a €entury. and one of the bloodieslepisodes of the factionalism that was the distinguishing featureof political life between rhe restoralion of Ferdifland VII andthe triumph of Franco. Its causes were. to a large extent, alsothe causes of much of the strife of early twenrieth'ceniury Spain.Although in 1840 ir appeared that seven years of struggle hadended in the victory ofone side. Carlism was far from extirpatedand within a decade the army had anorher Carlist revolt on itshands.

The contestants are normally called Cristinos and Carlists.and an examination of these names and their alternatives willserve to introduce some ofthe ideas and prejudicesthal inspiredthe sides.

The supporters ofthe Madrid government. the Cristinos. owetheir name to Maria Cristina. fourth wife of Ferdinand VIl.AfterFerdinand's death in 1833 Cristina became Queen Regenion behalf of th€ infant Isabel II (who gave the party a secondname, lsabelinos). The Cristinos were! as any reader at allfamiliar with twentieth-century Spanish history will have nodifficulty in apprecialing, held together only by determinationto defeat the Carlisis, by a desire to maintai. ihe Queen "for

fear of{inding something worse', and by the circumstance thatthey w€re in €ontrol of all rhe normal machinery of the state.including the army and navy.

As this article isbasicallya look atthe nilitaryside ofthewar,and I willhave to keep the political complexitiesto a minimum,I will grossly over-simplify matters by describing the two most

77

adolation of many Spanish rightists, the army). They werehostiletoliberal modemityin all its forms, which they saw as notonly political incorre€t, but impious as well, and even inspiredby "Lutherans" and Freemasons. This set of mind goes a longway to explain their ;nability to rnodify their demands whencompromise would have benefitted their cause,lheir frequentatrocities (although thoseo{the Cristinos were perhaps at leastas bad), and such pronouncements as the Durango Decree,which said all foreigneN taken in arms against them €ould beexecuted. They were convincedso greatlyof their own rightnessthat theydid not seem to consider the effe€t such de€rees hadonforeign opinion. The general antipathy of the Portuguese,Bri l ish and French govemmenN ro rhe Carl is ls $as nor a majorcause oftheir downfall, but it certainly did them no good.

Duringthe 1820 s traditionalists had enjoyed much influencewith the government, and so were able to organise a largeprivate army of "Royalist Volunteers" all over the countrynaturally, this was of value to the Carlists \rhen they foundthemselves in urgent need of a real army. Despite thenation-wide extent ofthis organhaiion. a.d despite the fact rhatin all parts of Spain people could be found who weresympa$etic to absolutism (although in many cities il was notsafe to air such views). Carlism was not r€ally a nationalmovement. There were two Carlist homelands. each with itsown army, and although othe.r Carlist forces existed, and eventhrived for a while-in La Mancha and Catalonia, for example-once the armies in the north and in Aragon gave up the CarlisiState was no more. It is convenient to treat the stories of theArmiesofthe North and ofthe Centre separately.

THENoRTHERNPRovtNcEs'ffi if

of thousands offirst-class infantry, over a thousand more thanpassable lancers. and a small number of guns full details willappear in a later article. It was originally recruited fromvolunteers from the four provinces, but these were soon joinedby others, notably Castillians, who deserted from the Crislinoarny. marched fuom theirhomelands, orwere picked up by theCarlists on their roving expeditions. Like lhe Basques andNavarrese, the Castillians were excellent soldiers, and came toform one third ro halfthe army.

All rhisis getting ratherahead ofevents. To return to 1833: on51h OctoberDon Carloswas proclaimed King, andarmed bandssprung up ro support him. Carlos appointed a former regulargeneral ,SantosLadr6n,commandeFin-€hief,bulhis ' l l - t rainedforces were defeated at their fint battle, Los Arcos. and he wascaptured and shot. This was not a total disastcrforthe Carlistslfor one thing, it taught them they could not stand in the openagainst trained troops until they became soldiersi for another,Sanlos Ladr6n's successor was Tom6s Zumalacarregui y delmaz (1788-1835), a colonel of regular infantry and one of thegreatest soldiers of his age.

Zumalacdrregui's aim was to produce a complete modernarmy. but without forcing its men to lose their natural militarytalents. He su€ceeded. The Carlists' ability to move rapidly overrhe broken land.cape of much oI the noahem pro! ince5 wasnever equalled by most Cristinos, although the Queen'sinfantry improved greatlyoverthe course ofthe war in its abilityto wage guerrilla warfare. (The Carlists almost always reliedmuch more on in{antrythan on any other arm, but this was not aserious Iimitation as long as one was fighting in the fourCarlisl

The first rask was to build in the new battalions a sDirit ofself-confidence while rraining thern. Zumalacdrregui's answer';ias tostage a series of battles, orambushes, which he knew hismen would win. or at least not lose. Iforessed. he would breakoffand disperse;ifhe won, a regularopponent found escape farmoredifficult. He kept away from plains, especiallyinthe earlymonths. and had a habit ofstarting a fight late in the day so thatthe C.istinos had litde chance to outflan k or surround his forces.He normallycommitted only a minority ofhis troops at the startof an engagement, holding the rest;n reserve in open order.Lack of ammunition was a problem, and one that the Carlistsneversold completely, despite the setting up of manufacturers,so Zunalactlregui enforced a rigorous fire'discipline to preventhis men from using up all the l0 or even 4 rounds that might beavailable per soldier. Carlists often reserved theirfire until therange was veryshort, and r€li€d a lot on the bayonet.

By the auturnn of 1834the Carlist army had wona numberofbaules and. more importantly, had a very formidable infantry,able to fight in line. column, and square, without havingsacrificed its men's abilities to act as guerrilleros. Its strategicachievements were less;mpressive. Many Cristino units,

ZUMALACARREGUI AND THE RISE OFTHEARMY OFTHENORTH, T$3.1835

The first. and untilthe late 1830's most imponant, Carlist regionwas the four provinces ofvhcaya (Biscay). Guipfzcoq, Alava(all Basque provinces) and Navarra. In th€se areas. thebackbone of the Carlist movement was provided by thepeasantry. andwhat made Carlot supporters so loyalwas not somucb the absolutist ideas ofrhe leadership but rhat Carlos wasseen as the protector of local rrelos (rights. laws. privilegetagainst the centralism of Madrid although the strength oftraditional religion in these provinces naturally aho in€lined theinhabitants towards Carlism. Even in the four provinces, th€Carlisi state was not unchall€nged, howev€r. The main citiesB;lbao. San Sebastidn. Pamplona, Vitoria remained ingovernment hands. panly because they were heavily garrisoned. parlly because the Carlists were not very!killed at takinglarge towns. but also becausc the Carlists were not very skilledai taking large lowns, but also because some oftheirinhabitantswere genuine Cristinos. Ir is probably significant that an Englishvisitor remarked that in Santandor rhat the bourgeois wore-English (i.e. modern international) fashions. andthe countrypeople retained 'Spanish dr€ss (Henderson, l, 209).

Not surprisingly. priests tended to be Carlists. and could beseen leadingrttacks in their splendid black garb, waving largecrucifixes, but there were plenty ofclergy who did not supportCarlos- Lawyers were rlso said to be in favour of the Pretender,perhaps because rhey were worried rhat the 1812 Constiturionset up locall',?cer de c""d1ii?.id,, officials whose job was tosettle disputes and so reduce the nurnber of law suils.

Don Carlos was accompanied by a large, s€ruffy, and ralhermobile court. with more than enough of the people one mightexpecttofind courtiers, displaced supporters from other partsof Spain. place'seekers. toad'eaters and politicians generally -but the most important and credirable part of the Carlisl slatewas lhe Army of lbe North. (The Cristinos force facing it borcthesame name. but to avoid confusion I willonlvusethetermtoindicare rhe Cdrl isr arm) ) . Thi\ gre\a f 'om norhing ro:ome ren\

28

particularly in the mounted arm, were in poor shape in 1833, sothe government lost its chance to crush the rebellion in the firstmonths, but it became apparent that the Carlists had limitedDower to influence events outside their four Drovinces. Tacticaldevelopments will be covered in more detaitin the next article,but itis well to point out herethatas Carlists leamtthe virtues ofregular training, sothe Liberales, rather more slowly,leamt orre-leamt the methods of guerdlla warfare that had been soeffective in g nding down the invaders two decades before. TheSpanish soldier is one of the toughest on earth - which was justas well, conside ng the privations both sides had to endure -and the Liberales' determination to put down the dsing h tooeasy to underestimate, The same stubbomness, and refusal togive up after defeats, which eventuallydid forNapoleon's arny,in the end also crushed the Carlists.

The govemment strategy was to €ontain the Carlist "state",

and to holdonto the main townsevenin Carlist areas. which wasundoubtedly a wise one. (Its frittering away of forces in holdinga multitude of lesser places, which could be, and often were,taken, was probably less sensible)- But although this gave theCristinos suitable bases to launch offensives to endicate therevolt, this second stage proved far more difficult. Onehandicap, especially in ihe early years, was the fact that theterain worked to the Carlhts' advantage; another was that ittook the Cristinos some time to produce leaders with thenecessary qualities. The govenment had, moreover, theunfo(unate habit of sacking generals frequently - one,Zumalacdrregui\ old commander Quesada, only lasted ftomFebruary to July 1834. In early 1835 the command of thenorthem army passed to Francis€o Espoz y Mina, the legendaryleaderin the War oflndependence and a strongLiberal. As anex-guer llero he was well aware of the virtue of light troops,and did all he could toraise them. but he was lesssuccesstulas afield commander. In March 1835 he launched a maiorattack. intreezr ng wearhe | . from Pamplona. ro try and destroy pan of rheCarlist army *hile Zumalacaregui, with the bulkofhis forces,was absent. Hisplan fa;led,largely because ofthe extraordinarymobility ofthe Carlist army, and Mina was nearly suffoundedand destroyed. Although he extricated his army without veryheavy losses (partly by forging Zumalacerregui's signature onan order which he contrived to pass to anotherenemy g€neral),and although some of his forces fought very well, Mina\reputation suffered irreparable harm. He was replaced byVald€s in April1835.

The early summer of that year brought yet more victories tothe Carlists, not only in the field but againsl minor Cristinogarrisons. It may have been these successes that led thePretender to his first great error, to attack Bilbao against theadvi€e of Zumalac6rregui. Maite^were also not h€lped at thisjuncture by the fact that courtiers' back-biting at the man who

Th'o sh'ords of types used by the British Autiliary Legion. Thetwo Lancet rcgimentr would have prcbabry canied the 1822patten light cavaby sv'otd. (The specinen shoh'n is atooper's; officets' were rery similar). Inlanty officets cafiedthe 1822 pattem "Gothk Hilt" , somelimes in a sleel scabbard asherc, mote olten in a black leathet one with brass mountt. TheSpanish anls would haw appeared on the hik, ratrcr thanthose of the East India Company on this specimen. The "pipe

back" was an ingeniour featurc to stfun the blade lot the

gave hope to their political ambitions had disgusted Zumalaqir-regui so much that he had tried to resign command of the Armyof the North. Carlos did not ac.ept, but it appean that, after hhresignation, he no longer felt so r€sponsible for strategicdecisions, sowentalongwith the siege, which he conducted with14battalions and 10 guns. The garrison,5,000 men and 30 guns,won the greatest Cristino victory to date, resisting the siege andkilling Zumalacdrregui, who died on 24th June. Never again didthe Carlists acquire a leader*ith such a combination oftactical,inspirational and organisational ability. His successor, TenienteGeneral Gonz6lez Moreno, faced up to the Cristino field armyon 16th July (now under C6rdova), at Mendigorria, and wasbadly beaten. Had not C6rdova failed to lauoch tb€ necessarycavalry charge at the end ofbattle, the Carlists wouldhave been

TIIE CARLIST EXPEDITIONS, 1836-1837The Bilbaoaffairshowed very clearlysomeof the weaknessesofthe Carlists. They lacked the poliorcetic expertise to take evenso mediocre a fortress, and the army had been forced into thesiege by non-military considerations. To have held Bilbaowould have allowed the court to settle down in something likecomfort. and would also. it was calculated, have enhanced thePretender's chances of receiving aid from foreign monarchssympathetic to the cause ofreaction - those ofPrussia, Russia

Zumalacerregui hadwanted to attack Viloria, as a first step toan offensive against Madrid. By 1836 it was obvious thatalthough the Crhtinos might not be able to crush the Army ofthe Nonh by main force, Don Carlos *ould lose by default ifhecouldnot spread the fightiflgbeyond the northern provinces. AsPretender Carlos had to take the throie to win the warl asQueen Regent, all Cristina had lo do was prevent him. TheQueen's armies were gaining in proficiency all the time, and in1835 had been reinforced by lhiee substantial foreign legions,French, Portuguese, and British. (The Carlists enjoyed thesupport only of individual aliens. molivated by politics oradventure.) There were Carlisl movements in other parts ofSpain, and the Carlists in Aragon were building up a fomidablearmy of their own. but the country as a whole remainedCristino- ln January 1836 the Queen\ chief minister, Mendi-zdbel, won avote of€onfidence in the Cortes, and itwashopedhe would be able to turn his considerable talentsto reinforcins

Two Spsni:h knives of tlpes that would have seen service in the1830's. The plug bayonet had sutvived as a huntsmsn's tool,but the othet specimen, the navaja, k specifrca y fot fighting.The vicious, stabbing blade (herc shotrn held in its openpo'ition by asptind fold: up into the handle. The knife couldbe wo st'tck into a sash with only the end of the hih shoh'ing.

29

the army. C6rdova built for.ified lines around tbe ArnyoftheNorth's territory, with the aim ofcutting it off from the rest ofSpain, or{orcing itontothe plainsofCastille, where he hoped todestroy 't. Although C6rdova's winter offensive at Arlaben,which was supponed by the British Auxiliary Legion, was lessthan totally successful, in March 1836 Banolomeo Espartero.the rising Cristino star, won an elegant viclory on the plains ofOrduna.

The Carlists attempted to break oul of this siruation bysending 'Expeditions" all over Spain, to '\how the flag" and.they hoped, lead and inspire their sympathisers, who, theybelieved, would rise up and form armies and governments oftheir own once the Liberal army and militia were driven away.This was not to be. Whetherbecause more Spaniardsthan theyrealised were hostile or apathetic to their cause, or whetherbecause once one ofthe powerful expeditions had passed on itsway any partizans who "came out" would be left either to bestamped upon by the government or reduced to a life ofbanditry, they set up no major bodies of active Carlists.Although the nilitary success of the expeditions mor€ thanalarmed thc Cristinos. not even the fact that Madrid and othercities underwent a violenl Liberal revolulion in the summer of1836gave any real advantage to the Carlists.

Neverthe less, the expeditions were very impressive exanplesof the military an. The greatest was that of Miguel G6mezDamas, which set out on 3rd June with 5 battalions, twosquadrons and two guns. and returned, (rather stronger due tolocal recruiting), on 20th December, to find the main armyengaged in its second attempt on Bilbao - another failure. Hisoriginal mission was to raise insurrection in Asturias andGalicia, but from Santiago de Composlella he marched throughLeon and Castille to Aragon. At Bujalero on 30th August hefought and capturcd two battalions of Royal Guards. Despitebeingrouted and mauled at Villarrobledo a month later, he wasstrong enough to take C6rdoba city on lst October. In all,G6mez covered about 2.800 miles in six months, training hisrecruits as he marched.

By the beginning of 1837 both northem armies were led by.iore than competent generals. Espartero having taken over

cOMEz's MARCH -1836

Thk diagrltm shows, in sinplified fom, the llryout of requtarinla try colours (the Prcvincial rcgiments and Gua s oftenhad differcnt flogr. This was the la war in which SpanLthrcgula\ fouBht undet the rasged .nss of Bursundr, rcd on

In the comer o|als, which were sutrounded by baped fkgs orlaurel Meaths, were the arms oJ the regiment - for exanple 3ye otr flew-de-lys on bLue for Borbon. The clov'ns were soldand red, t|ith nulti colourcd jewels. The fiilt battalion ofeachregi e t borc the ColoneL's cotour, vhich had superinposedon the abo|e an e[aborate, crcwned. anrs ol Spain, ofEnsnrrcunded by orderc on chains.The oldest reginent in the atny, El Rey, had a uniquedistinction - the backqround b its flags was not h'hite, but

from C6rdoba (a far from despicable commander himsel0 andthe Infante Don Sebasti6n, nephew to Don Carlos, being incharge ofthe Carlist forces. In March the Cristinos attempted agrand three-pronged attack: theBritish general De Lacy Evans\{as to advance from the fortress of San Sebastidn, by now asemi-permanent home to the British Auxiliary Legion, Espar-tero fiom Bilbao, and SaNfield, whose forces included theFrench Foreign Legion, from Vitoria. The plan was over'ambitious, and relied on the enemy being unable to co-ordinatea de[ence again5l rhree column\ - a foolish assumption giventhat the Carlists were operating on interior lines, and theirrvonderfu | speed of movement, both strategically and tactically.A full desciption ofthe campaign must await a fu(her article,but suffice it to say that Sarsfield let himselfbe defeated by theweather. and EsDanero retired when he heard of the disasterthat befell Evans on the heights of Oriamendi, outside SanSebasti:in.

Almost at once Carlos launched his maior offensive of thewar. The Pretender himself accompanied rhe RoyalExpeditionof16 battalions. almost all the cavalry (a dozen sq uadrons), andsome gunners without pieces. There is some uncertainty aboutthe precisc purposcsofthis expedition, about from the obviousones of "reinforcing succest'and giving the inhabitants oftheCarlisl provinces a break frorn supplying so large an army. butclearly Carlos was making a serious bid for power. If ever theCarlists were to take Madrid by for€e, this was the time.especially when the Army of the No h joined wilh theAragonese Arny of thc Centre. Thcy may also have beenhopingto capjtalise on desertionsin the Cristino ranksfollowingthe 1836 revolution -would a display of Carlist power persuade

30

happy retreat; indeed, ir probably ma.ked the start of anirrevenible decline. Like all volunteers, the men of the AJmy ofthe Northhad a tendencyto dip away home when there did notseem to be any prospect oI success, although thistendency wasnodilied by severe discipline and a willingness of soldiers toretum tothe colours when they saw some point in fighting. Thefailure ofthe Royal Expedition was a severe blow to the beliefthat Don Carlos would ever be a real king, and thewar-weariness that was to bring peace at last dates from theauturnn of 1837. The ordinary Carlist soldier had turned in hisusual excellent performance, but casuakies had been heavy,€specially in the cavalry. Norcould the soldiers have been muchedified by the dissent in the high connand, panicularly tharbetween the generals. and Carlos and his civilian advisors.Worst of all, this disseflt continued afler the Army's relum tothe four nonhern provinces, with manyofficers willing to iry acompromhepeace. Sebastidn wassacked; although hiseventualsuccessor, Rafael Maroto, the last commander ofthe Armv o{the NorLh. was a good enough generdl. he was Lo pur oiherthings before hisloyalty to the cause.

THE DIID OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH,1838-r$9

The resl oflhe war in the north was not unmarked by incidenr,but can be related fairly briefly. A final large expedition, withthe same aim as thoseof 1836, set out in March 1838, undertheCount of Negri. It consisted o{ 9 battalions, all Castillian. twomountain gunsj and four full squadrons wirh cadres for twomore. The strong reliance on Castillians mayhave been becausethe Basques and Navarrese on the Royal Expedition hadcomplained about beingawayfrom rheil homeland for so long.Negri took Segovia. but his expediiion, lacking food andfoolwear. then fellback in a miserable rerreat- EsDarterocaushti l on 27lh Apri l . rhe Crr l isr toot formed square, bur could iorf i reontheCrist inocavahyasitspowdeiwassoaked byrain,andthe army surrendered en rnasse. Only Negri and the cavalryescaped. On 22nd June Espanero deleated lhe main Carlistarmy, leading to the fall of the nearby Carlist rown ofPe6acerrada. and ihe replaceme.l of the then commander-in-chief by the above,mentioned Maroto.

Marolo\ aim was to rebuild rhe army, and especially itsmounted arm, into a force that could defeat Espartero in a

A rcpresentative Carld infantrynan and lancer,.biwn bf RonPoulter. The cawlrynan sflanboyant haiis typiLot. White theo inatj Spania was fat fton clop-headed, Ca bts had areputation for haniness. Zunalacliffegui, it is said, hadbatbers accompan! his amy so the solrliers did no! hove tocatt s hdv ing-e q ui p nent.

some Modeldror to forsake the Liberal administration for theabsolutists?

After two victories at Huesca and Barbastro. ferocious affairseven by the standards of this war, and a defeat at Orr. theExpedition passed through parts of Catalonia held by localCarlists, and headed south io join the Army of the Centre.Another defeat at Chiya denied the Carlhrs an opportunity torecuperate in the fertile area around Valencia. and thecombined Carlist forces. perhaps 16.000 foot and 2,000 horse,advanced 10 within a few miles o{Madrid. Carlos neverorderedthe assault despite urging from Sebastidn and frorn Ram6nCabrera, the leader ofthe Aragonese. Never a decisive man, hehadon thisoccasion plenty ofreasons forcaution. The advancehad been so slow rhat lhe government forces had had ampletime to prepare the capiral for artack. Carlos was no doubtunwilling to r'sk what was perhaps the greatest field army hecould gather in a type of warfare at which ir was not eiperti hewas no lover of bloodshed; h€ would have been disaDpointedlhat \o iew ot his people had raken up arm' ro 'uppon rneExpedition; and, while during earlier stages of his journey hehadbeen in secret communication with Cristina with a view to anegotiated peace, all such correspondence had €eased by rhis

After some hesiration. and because a large force underEspartero was bearing down on rhem, the Carlists retreared -Cabrera to Aragon, th€ Army of the North to irs home. beingpursued by Espartero who beat it at Reiuerta- It was nor a

This sketch nnp shows the sinkttion in the s nner of 1837,with the route of the Rolal Eryedition. Dotled arcos wercunder Carlist cotlrol. (Bilbao, Vibtia, San Sebostidn andPamplona wele Oisino). The hatched arca is the pa

of LaMancha i fested bj Ca ist iteg la^.

31

The National Militia had alrcady adopted the rc.land gol.I flagthat w..t to become the standatul rceinental flag of Ihe rcgularsin the 1840 s. This example i,as caftied by the 2nd baialion ofZaragoza. The lette6 arc ye otr, the paln and laurel h,rcathgreen, the ams those of Casnle and Aragon vrith a rc.jinscurheon bearing a ye ow Iion rampant. Red and goldbannen also flen' orer government-held posts and forts.

de€isive baltle. bul. desDite some Carlist successes and the lackof pay. c lorhing. foorqedr and tood in the governmenr arm). i lwas too lale. That rarest ofbattles in thiswar. a cavalry action,tookplace at the end of 1838 at Los Arcos orSesma, where therenowned Cristi.o horse general Diego Leon proved Maroto'snew cavalrv was no match for the solendid Liberal borsemen. Asimilarresuh occured al Allo in June 1839. But bv then variousCarlist battalions had been won over by the hope ofpeace. anddisputes in the command were chronic, the worsr beingbetweenMaroto and Carlos.

The final disasler was that Carlos openly called his general atraitor: Maroto, and th€ bulkoftheArmyofthe North. made anarmistice at Vergara on 24th August 1839- The symbolic"Embrace of Vergara", celebrated in numerous pictures and adiorama in the Madrid Army Museum, left the Carlist officersrelatively happy their terms of surrender were very generous -Carlos in flighl to France with a few troopers, and Espanero.without doubt the most powerful man in Spain. free to put anend to the Araeonese Carlisrs.

CABRERA AND THE ARMY OF THE CENTREI will cover the Army of the Centre. as it was ratheroptinistically titled, much more quickly than I did the Aimyofthe North. and other relativ€ly minor Carlist forces. such asthose in Caialonia and La Mancha, hardly at all. Like the mainarmy. lhat of the Centre was the creation of one man. Ram6nCabr€ra (1806-77), who sta.ted hisadult li{e as aseminarian andended it as an English country gentleman - he is buried inVirginia Water. He was a sincere enough Carlist, but for him,and for manv ot his men. Carlism had as much to do with lheadvancementof asemi independentsrateinAragonaswiththefortunes of the Pretender. His army was at aimes an €ffectivefighring force. although discipline was not one of its strongpoints, but it was never as formidable as the Army ofrhe Nonh.It did co-operate with northern troops. mosl notably during theRoyalExpedit ion and Gomez smarch.but i t nornal ly operatedand was or-qanned as an independenr entiiy.

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The Cristinos employed their best troops against the northernCarlists. ln the nonh, the National Militia was used normallytogarrison towns and villages, but in Aragon militia units oftenformed part offield forces, nor alwayswith happy results.

Cabrera started in the ranks ofthe Aragonese Carlist army,but ir wasnot untilhe achieved eminen€e. in 1834, that this forcefound ils great organiser. Its growth was slower than that ofZumalacnrregui's army. and it was most unfortunate for theCarlists as a whole thatthe Armyofthe Centre only achieved itsgreatest strength in 1838. when the Army of the Noah hadalreadv started to decline. Like the other Carlist force,Cabrera's arrny enjoyed the advantage of being based ininaccessible and rugged terrain, in its case the Maestrazgo ofAragon, which made Cnsdno atlacks on its heartland difficultrosay the least. and the war in this areainvolved atleastasrnuchweary marching and counter-marching by both sides Olherfactors made iteven more unpleasant. Because Cabrera\ arrnyand civil organisation was nothinglike aswell-run as that in thenorth. and beca'rse the Cristino supply sysrem here was, ifanything, worse than its counterpart in lhe north of the country.both sides suffered from lack of food and clothing. The conductof the war was more barbarous. with {requent massacres ofprisoners and c;vilians - the most famous victim was Cabrera'smother, shot by way of reprisal. (Her son more than repaid inkind.) The freouent use of National Militia increased thebitternessas th€ Carlists. not withoutreason, sawthisbody as atef.wing organisation. more politically suspect than theReg'rlars. (That one ofthe Militia's chieftasks was also to keepdown conservative op;nion and g€nerally persecute Carlists, orsuspected Carlists.;n government held areas did litde to endearit to the trooDs of the Pretender.) On oc€asions, therefore,while captur€d regular officers and sergeants were shot, therank and file were spared or forced to join the captors, butNational Militia taken with themwere killed regardless of rank.

Apart from tyingdown Cristino units which could have beenused against the Army of the Nonh, perhaps the greatest

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contibution the Army ofthe Centre could have made towardsCarlistvictory was to co,operate with the Royal Expedition. Aswe have seen, Cabrera and some of his men did join theexpedition, and the Aragonese €hieftain was one of those whourged an assaulton Madrid. He seemsto have been disgusted byCarlos's refusal to risk an attack, for he then retired to theMaestrazgo, and thereafter took a line even more independentfrom the Court. A surprise assault on the night of 2 5126 January1838 by a Catalan lieutenant and 75 men rook Morella, whichCabrera had been besieging for two monrhs. Morella was, andis. a wonderfully rugg€d and spectacular castellared city,although by no means a modern fortress in the 1830t, andCabrera tumed it into the capital of his virtually autonomousviceroyalty,. the head of a widely-spread civil and military

The Cristinos could do little to stop the establishment ofthisramshackle Carlht state: their forces were over-stretched as itwas, havingto deal notonly withverywidespread banditryfrornwellarmed and nominally Carlist horsemen in La Mancha, but.more seriously, the Iise ofanoth€r, snaller, semi-independentCarlist area in Catalonia. (The army of rhe Catalan Carljsts wasbeing disciplined for rhe filst time by the brutal but efficientex-regular general, the Conde de Espafra, and it was fortunatefor the Liberales ihat the Conde was assassinated befote hisforces could become a serious threat.) Nor did it help theCristinos that they had to defend and garrison so nany townsand places against the ever-mobile units ofCabrera's army. Inthe late summerof 1838 the Cristino general Marcellino Orra,anotherex-guerrillerowho had served underMina in the War ofIndependence, assembled 22 battalions and perhaps 25 guns totake Morella. Although Oriiawasin some ways an able soldier,the siege was marked by the incompetence of the Cdstinoadllery, supply. and command- Oda's army was lucky toescape without losses more serious than those it receiv€d. Justover a month later, on 1st October 1838. Cabrera inflicted aserious defeat in the field at Maella.

1839 saw Cabr€ra trying to prot€ct his 'kingdom' by buildingfixed fortifications, which would also serve as bases out of whichto raid Cdstino areas, while simultaneously reducing Liberalstrongpoints in what he regarded as his own territory. It isremarkable that as Carlos's own forces were disintegrating, hislieutenant should have been constructing forts more fomidablethan the fieldvorks, barricades, and trenches so popular withthe Army of the North, and apparently intending to defy therest of Spain..He could not really have betieved that with his16,000 foot,2,000 horse and r08 guns he could resist not onlythe Cristinos who had been facing hirn for years, but also, afterAugust 1839, Espartero's a.my. The latter 34 battalions infour divisions, six battedes and 3,000 cavalry were victorious,confi dent, high-class troops.

As inthe north, the final campaignin Aragon wasone-sided.The LiberaleslookCabrera'sfortsand beat his men in the fieldlin May lS40Moreliafell after a feeble defence. The last battle ofthewar. Berga, on4th July 1840, was a rout, and two dayslaterCabrera qas one ot rhou.ands ot retugee. who crossed theborder into France. Cabrera would retum to SDain. but that isanotherstory, and another war.

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