A review of aspects of the marine transport of radioactive ... · PDF fileA review of aspects of the marine transport of radioactive materials A REPORT TO GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL

A review of aspects of the marine

transport of radioactive materials

A REPORT TO GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL

Tim Deere-Jones BSc.Hons Maritime Studies, University of Wales, Cardiff

Marine Environment & Pollution Consultant

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A review of aspects of the marine

transport of radioactive materials

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF

THE PACIFIC NUCLEAR TRANSPORT LIMITED [PNTL] FLEET

2 | A N A S S E S S M E N T O F T H E M A R I N E T R A N S P O R T O F R A D I O A C T I V E M AT E R I A L S

C O N T E N T S

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MARINE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALSExecutive Summary .......................................................................................................................31. The Irradiated Nuclear Fuel (INF) Code ...............................................................................52. The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code..............................................83. The World INF (Class 3) Fleet.................................................................................................94. Causes of Casualties at Sea ....................................................................................................105. Sea Routes used by PNTL Vessels ..........................................................................................106. Marine High Risk Areas...........................................................................................................117. En-route weather conditions ..................................................................................................118. Canals ........................................................................................................................................129. Capes .........................................................................................................................................1210. Straits and other congested waters .....................................................................................1311. Double Hulls ...........................................................................................................................1412. Possibility of flooding of a PNTL vessel...............................................................................1713. The “design collision vessel” .................................................................................................1714. World merchant fleet casualty statistics .............................................................................1915. Double hulled vessel casualty statistics..............................................................................1916. Collision avoidance plans......................................................................................................2017. Anti-Collision Radar Systems ...............................................................................................2018. Other “advanced safety features” of the PNTL ships .........................................................2119. Additional fire detection and fire fighting systems............................................................2120. The PNTL transport effort in the context of the world fleet ............................................2221. Documented accidents involving INF Class 3 carriers......................................................2222. Incidents involving INF Class 1& 2 and IMDG Class 7 materials ....................................23Summary of Review Findings......................................................................................................25References.....................................................................................................................................28

A REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AT-SEA EMERGENCIES INVOLVINGIRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUEL (INF) CARGO1. The IMO Shipboard Emergency Plans (SEPs).....................................................................302. Responsibilities for Action on SEPs.......................................................................................313. Devolution of Responsibilities from Coastal States .............................................................314. Essential Provisions of SEPs...................................................................................................325. Shipboard Emergency Plans ...................................................................................................326. Cargo Transfer..........................................................................................................................347. Training .....................................................................................................................................348. Exercises ...................................................................................................................................359. Salvage ......................................................................................................................................3610. The nature of the IMO decision making process ...............................................................3611. Published BNFL/PNTL Emergency Response Arrangements ...........................................3612. BNFL/PNTL reasons for Emergency response....................................................................3613. BNFL/PNTL Emergency Communications ..........................................................................3714. BNFL/PNTL Emergency teams.............................................................................................3815. BNFL/PNTL Emergency Exercises.......................................................................................3916. BNFL/PNTL Salvage ..............................................................................................................4017. Factors affecting salvage.......................................................................................................4018. Salvage equipment, techniques and special demonstrations...........................................4119. BNFL/PNTL Underwater detection system.........................................................................4220. Deep Ocean Salvage ..............................................................................................................4221. Australian Emergency Response Plans ...............................................................................4322. The National Plan ..................................................................................................................4423. Australian Maritime Safety Agency......................................................................................4524. Australian Radiation Protection & Nuclear Safety Agency...............................................4525. Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation ...............................................4626. Commonwealth Disaster Plan (COMDISPLAN).................................................................4627. Comparison between COMDISPLAN & the oil/chemical plans ........................................4728. Other planning matters which may be relevant.................................................................4829. Spill response equipment and training ...............................................................................49Summary of Review Findings......................................................................................................50References.....................................................................................................................................54

In the 30 years since the nuclear industrystarted shipping highly radioactivematerials around the globe, no detailed,comprehensive critique of the hazards orrisks of this trade has been published. Thisdocument seeks to rectify that situation.

For the first time all the relevant informationconcerning the ships used in transporting nuclearcargoes, the routes used, weather patterns of theoceans travelled and the international planningarrangements have been brought together in onedocument.

This report sets out the background to theinternational regulatory framework that theInternational Maritime Organisation (IMO) uses todirect the sea transport of irradiated nuclear fuel(INF), plutonium and high-level nuclear wastes.

Those shipments, intensely radioactive spentnuclear fuel and high level wastes and long-livedradio-toxic mixed oxide fuel (MOX), present uniquerisks to the marine environments they travel through -and to the countries whose shores they pass.

Evidence presented demonstrates that theassurances on safety given by the companies involvedin the shipment of nuclear materials, most notablyPacific Nuclear Transport LTD (PNTL), the UK stateowned British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, and the French statecompany COGEMA, are underestimating the real risks.COGEMA, the company that transports spent nuclearfuel from Australia to France uses the same approachto hazard analysis as PNTL.

This report has found that: • PNTL’s vessels are not among the top ranked vessels

in the world merchant fleet that carry hazardousmaterials - those carriers are fully double hulled.PNTL’s claim that its Pacific Fleet is made up ofdouble hulled vessels is quite inaccurate becausethe double hulling feature only extends around thecargo hold, leaving the fore and aft sections of thevessels with only a single skin. PNTL vessels arestructurally inferior to many hazardous cargocarriers and as such are as vulnerable in accidentsituations;

• PNTL routinely routes its Pacific fleet through anumber of regions classed by Lloyds of London as“Marine High Risk Areas”. Those Marine High RiskAreas have weather conditions, sea states, vesselnumbers and route congestion which give rise tohigh shipping casualty numbers;

• British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, one of the main ownersof PNTL, has written a set of “SpecialArrangements” for responding to at sea emergenciesinvolving INF Code materials. A small number ofsenior executives of national maritime agencies,senior civil servants and senior governmentministers are permitted access to these SpecialArrangements, which are “commercial inconfidence”, the sole property of BNFL and notavailable to members of the public or their electedrepresentatives;

• BNFL’s statement that an emergency team is onstandby “at all times” and on a “24 hour emergencystandby system” should be of significant concern toAustralia as this report has revealed the optimum“window of opportunity” for incident management

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Executive Summary

and control occurs within the first 24 hours. IfBNFL emergency teams cannot arrive on scenewithin the first 24 hours the possibility of theemergency escalating to very significant or totalcasualty status (with attendant escalatingradiological emergency) increases;

• PNTL’s submission to the IMO claims that theemergency team is a “fully trained and equippedteam of marine and nuclear experts.” However,other documents explain that such a team actuallyconsists of one marine expert, four nuclear experts,two head office staff and one public relationsofficer;

• Statements by BNFL that there “would be noreason for concern and no consequences whichcould significantly affect persons or theenvironment” in the transport of nuclear materialsare not referenced or substantiated by empiricalevidence that might support such a claim;

• Australia has acknowledged its rights andresponsibilities under international conventions inrespect of marine pollution incidents involving oiland chemicals. Australia has not done so in respectof radioactive materials classified by the IMO asIMDG Class 7 materials or as INF Class 1, 2 and 3materials. These categories include shipments ofplutonium (MOX) fuel, spent nuclear fuel and highlevel waste;

• The Australian Commonwealth Disaster Plan(COMDISPLAN), although it covers a range ofemergencies, does not fully provide for mounting aneffective and rapid response to an emergencyinvolving the maritime transport of nuclearmaterials. It is unclear what jurisdiction andresponsibility the COMDISPLAN has over the watersof the territorial sea, the EEZ and the adjacent HighSeas.

• In contrast to Australia’s detailed and subjectspecific maritime oil and chemical spill plans,COMDISPLAN contains no detailed, subject specificarrangements and plan for at sea spills ofradioactive materials. COMDISPLAN does notidentify either players or resources specificallyrelevant to a response to spills of radioactivematerials at sea;

• Within the COMDISPLAN there is no clear divisionof responsibilities and jurisdiction between Stateand Commonwealth Agencies. Up to eight differentagencies could be involved in any emergencyresponse. These are the Australian RadiationProtection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA),the Australian Nuclear Science and TechnologyOrganisation (ANSTO), Dept of Science &Resources, Dept of Defence, Australian MaritimeServices Agency (AMSA), Emergency ManagementAustralia (EMA), Dept of Foreign Affairs, and therelevant State Emergency Services.PNTL, COGEMA and other nuclear industryagencies deny that there is any serious risk of abreach of containment of INF flasks and packages.Surprisingly, a number of government agencies haveuncritically accepted this denial. This review warnsthat the repeated downplaying of the likelihood ofan INF Cargo means that there is a risk thatresources, energy and funding directed towardsresponse planning have been reduced because it isperceived as a minimal threat. This is a dangerous

approach to adopt in the face of a mounting numberof shipments through this region.Authorities of en-route states need to fully examinethe claims of the industry over the safety of nucleartransport.Nuclear accidents pose a threat not only to the wellbeing of people and the environment. They alsopose significant risk to economies. Beyond thedirect impact of contamination, even if a nuclearcontainer is not breached and no radioactivematerial is released, the economic effect anddamage to reputation of fisheries and coastalrecreation and tourism is likely to be enormous.


1. The Irradiated Nuclear Fuel (INF) Code

1:1 INTRODUCTIONThe maritime transport of high level nuclear wastesand irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) began in the 1960s.At this time there were no specific internationalrequirements for the safety or security of INF carriedat sea under the 1974 International Convention ofSafety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) which regulatedactivities likely to cause damage or harm or loss of lifeas a result of shipping accidents.

It was not until 1985 that Italy raised the issue ofthe safe carriage of INF by sea at the 52nd session ofthe Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of theInternational Maritime Organisation (IMO). TheItalian concerns centred on the adequacy of fireprotection of the cargo holds used for INF transportand for the adequate damage stability of the shipscarrying INF. These concerns were particularly strongin the case of vessels which were not purpose built,but which could be freely used to carry any type orquantity of radioactive material (subject to the IMO’sIMDG Code class 7 and the IAEA regulations: seebelow). These concerns were intensified by theanticipated growth in the frequency and volume of INFtransport.

1:2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE INF CODEa. The concerns raised by the Italians were considered

by various sub-committees of the IMO. By this timethere were a number of purpose built INF vessels inexistence, so it was decided to widen the scope ofthe discussions and include vessels (both purposebuilt and non-purpose built) as well as cargo spaceand INF cooling, ventilation and radiationprotection.

b. The IMO sub-committee on ship design andequipment (DE) was requested to develop what wasto become the INF Code. The IMO sub-committeeon the carriage of dangerous goods (CDG), whichhad produced the IMDG class 7 code, provided adefinition of the quantities of INF which could becarried on various types of vessel. By 1990 the sub-committee had arrived at a division of three types ofINF and relevant classes of ship to carry it.

1:3 IAEA INVOLVEMENTa. The IAEA became aware of the IMO work during the

later phase of the evolution of the INF code.b. The IAEA had always been primarily concerned with

the safety and integrity of the packaging ofradioactive material. The IAEA position was, and is,that because their regulation and design ofpackaging provides for adequate safety in transport,there is no need, on safety grounds, to design orprovide purpose built ship designs or fire protectionequipment for the maritime carriage of INF.

c. The Director of the IAEA rapidly invited the IMO’sMarine Safety Committee to establish a JointIAEA/IMO Working group on the Safe Carriage ofINF by sea. At a later date the United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP), with a specificinterest in certain sea areas, joined the workinggroup.

1:4 THE JOINT IAEA/IMO/UNEP WORKING GROUP.a. The Joint Working Group met in December 1992

(IMO HQ: London) and April 1993 (IAEA HQ: Vienna). A major decision of thefirst meeting was to include nuclear materials ofsimilar potential hazard to INF (including Plutoniumand High Level Radioactive wastes) in the Code.

b. As a result of the meetings of the Joint WorkingGroup a draft INF Code was drawn up. This draftcode was subsequently approved by the IMO’sMarine Safety Committee (MSC) and MarineEnvironment Protection Committee (MEPC). The decisions were taken by a strong majority ofeach Committee. Only three of 64 governmentspresent at the MSC reserved their position andeight of 53 governments present at the MEPCreserved their position.

c. In 1993 the IMO’s draft INF Code was subsequentlyformally adopted by resolution A.748 at the 18thAssembly of the IMO and became part of the SOLASConvention by amendment. The relevant meetingwas attended by 131 Member and two AssociateMember delegations of which only seven membersreserved their position until the INF Code had beenaugmented and improved.

1:5 SUBSEQUENT AUGMENTATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE INF CODEa. Having adopted the INF Code the IMO concluded it

should be the subject of continuing review andamended as necessary. The Code, as originallyconceived, dealt principally with matters of vesseldesign, construction and equipment. During it’slater stages of development, especially during thetwo sessions of the Joint IAEA/IMO/UNEP WorkingGroup (December 1992, IMO HQ: London and April1993, IAEA HQ: Vienna), some member states of theIMO and Observer Organisations raised issues whichwere complementary but not originally scheduledfor inclusion in the Code. These included:• preparation of a Voyage Plan which should

include specific packaging information; • emergency response plan for packages, and

emergency response plans for INF vessels;• the notification of en-route coastal states and

specific routing for ships carrying INF,Plutonium and High Level Waste (HLW);

• positive tracking and equipment of transportcontainers for INF 2 and 3 materials withdevices assisting their location and recovery iflost at sea;

• liability issues.b. The IMO’s MSC and MEPC, and their subsidiary

bodies, commenced work on these and other issuescomplementary to the INF Code. A progress reportwas submitted to the IMO’s 19th Assembly whichrequested the committees to continue their work,endorsed a proposal for a Special ConsultativeMeeting and identified a number of specific issuesto be addressed at that meeting.

1:6 SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE MEETINGa. An IMO Special Consultative Meeting of bodies

involved/concerned with the maritime transport ofINF materials was held (in consultation with theIAEA and UNEP) over a three day period in March1996. The meeting was attended by representativesfrom 34 member Nations, two UN agencies and fournon-government organisations (NGOs).

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A summary of the meeting’s outcome was submittedto the IMO’s MSC and MEPC.b. As a result of the 1996 Special Consultative

Meeting, the 66th sitting of the IMO’s MSC agreedthe following specific issues should be considered:• specific hazards associated with the marine

transportation of INF flasks, and theconsequences of severe accident scenarios (byIMO committees and also the IAEA);

• ship structural design requirements for securingflasks to the vessel in order to avoid separationfrom the ship in an accident (by IMOcommittee);

• the adequacy of arrangements for marking,labelling and placarding the transport flasks (byIMO committee);

• route planning, notification of coastal statesand availability of information on the type ofcargo being carried and its hazards (IMOcommittee);

• restriction or exclusion of INF carriers fromparticularly sensitive sea areas (by IMOcommittee);

• adequacy of existing emergency responsearrangements (by IMO committee);

• measures to locate, identify and salvage asunken ship or lost flasks (by IMOcommittee);*

• tracking of INF carriers throughout the voyage,by a shore based authority (by IMO committee);

• adequacy of existing liability regimes coveringaccidents with INF materials. (This subject hadbeen considered by the 1996 Hazardous andNoxious Substances Conference, which resolvedthat radioactive materials should not be dealtwith by the HNS Convention: also to beconsidered by the IAEA.);

• environmental impact of accidents involvingINF (by IMO committee, the GESAMP EHSWorking Group and UNEP);

• materials being transported under the INF Code(by IMO committee);

• mandatory application of the INF Code (by IMOcommittee);*

• adequacy of flask design and testing (by theIAEA).

• MSC decided to invite member governments tosubmit proposals to the 67th meeting forconsideration.

The 66th meeting of the IMO’s MSC noted that nofurther action was required in regard to thenotification of en-route States because existingreporting requirements under the SOLASConvention and the MARPOL Convention wereadequate.

c. Noting that the mandatory application of the INFCode might have difficulty because there was adifference of opinion about what a mandatory Codeshould contain, the MSC decided that futurediscussion of this matter should address whichitems might be clarified as mandatory.

d. The MSC agreed to include and retain in the workof its sub-committees an item labeled “Developmentof measures complementary to the INF Code” with atarget completion date of 1997, and instructed thesub-committees to deal with the remaining issueson the list above. In the event this work was delayed

and further amendments to the INF Code were notcompleted until 1999.

e. The most recent version of the International Codefor the Safe Carriage of packaged IrradiatedNuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High LevelRadioactive Wastes on board Ships (INF Code) wasfinally agreed and published in May 1999.

1:7 THE INF CODE DEFINITIONSThe majority of the text of the 1999 INF Code does

not differ from the 1993 version. Chapter 1 concernsitself with definitions, the most important of whichare:

• INF Cargo means packaged irradiated nuclearfuel, plutonium and high level radioactivewastes: (irradiated nuclear fuel is defined asmaterial containing uranium, thorium and/orplutonium isotopes which has been used tomaintain a self-sustaining nuclear chainreaction);

• Plutonium means the resultant mixture ofisotopes of that material extracted fromirradiated nuclear fuel from reprocessing;

• High level radioactive wastes means liquidwastes resulting from the operation of the firststage extraction system or the concentratedwastes from subsequent extraction stages, in afacility for reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel,or solids into which such liquid wastes havebeen converted.

1:8 SHIPS CARRYING INF CARGO ARE ASSIGNED TO THREE CLASSES,DEPENDING ON THE TOTAL ACTIVITY OF THE INF CARGO CARRIED ABOARD:

• Class 1 INF Ships are certified to carry INFcargo with an aggregate activity of less than4,000 TBq (Class 1 INF material is generallycarried on normal merchant vessels such ascargo ships/freighters, Ro/Ro and passengerferries);

• Class 2 INF Ships are certified to carryirradiated nuclear fuel or high level radioactivewastes with an aggregate activity less than 2 X106 TBq or ships carrying plutonium with anaggregate activity of less than 2 X 105

TBq.(Class 2 INF material is generally carriedon normal merchant vessels such as cargoships/freighters, Ro/Ro and passenger ferries.)

• Class 3 INF Ships are certified to carry INF, orhigh level radioactive wastes and ships whichare certified to carry plutonium with norestriction of the maximum aggregate activity.(INF Cargo required to be carried on Class 3INF ships shall not be allowed on passengerships.)

1:9 SURVEY OF VESSELSChapter 1 of the INF Code also lays out

requirements for the survey of all vessels intended forthe carriage of INF cargo. This survey is to be carriedout before the carriage of INF cargo takes place. Sucha survey shall include a complete examination of thevessel’s structure, equipment, fittings, arrangementsand material “in so far as the ship is covered by thisCode” (i.e. it shall be inspected to check that it fulfilsthe conditions of the INF Code). If the vessel passesthis survey it shall be issued with an InternationalCertificate of Fitness for the Carriage of INF Cargo.


The International Certificate of Fitness for theCarriage of INF Cargo ceases to be valid if the relevantsurveys are not carried out, or if the vessel fails tocomply with Code survey requirements.

1:10 DAMAGE STABILITY Chapter 2 deals with damage stability(or accident

resistance/survivability) and stipulates:a. “the damage stability of a Class 1 INF ship shall be

to the satisfaction of the administration” (i.e.national government of the state where the vessel isregistered);

b. A Class 2 INF ship must comply with the samestandards (for passenger or cargo vessels) as thoseapplying to another vessel of that type under theSOLAS Convention regulations;

c. A Class 3 INF ship must comply with the damagestability requirements for Type 1 ship survivalcapability and location of cargo as set out in theInternational Code for the Construction andEquipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicalsin Bulk. (The IBC Code applies only to ChemicalCarriers built after June 1986)Furthermore, regardless of its length, an INF Class 3ship must comply with the damage stabilityrequirements in part B-1, Chapter 11-1 of theSOLAS Convention.

1:11 FIRE SAFETY MEASURESChapter 3 deals with fire safety measures and

stipulates:a. for a Class 1 INF ship, such measures shall be to the

satisfaction of the national administration;b. Class 2 & 3 INF ships of any size must be fitted with

a water fire extinguishing system, fixed fireextinguishing arrangements in important machineryspaces; a fixed fire detection and alarm system inmachinery spaces, accommodation and servicespaces; and fixed cargo space cooling arrangements.All of these features must comply with SOLASConvention regulations;

c. In addition Chapter 3 stipulates that in a Class 3INF ship, accommodation spaces, service spaces,control stations and important machinery spacesshall be fitted either forward or aft of the INF cargospaces.

1:12 TEMPERATURE CONTROLChapter 4 deals in greater depth with the issue of

temperature control of the cargo spaces andstipulates:a. in all classes of INF ships ventilation or

refrigeration of enclosed cargo spaces must be suchthat the average temperature within the space doesnot rise beyond 55C at any time;

b. such ventilation/refrigeration systems shall beindependent of those serving other areas/spaces ofthe vessel;

c. essential operational items like fans, compressors,heat exchangers, cooling water supplies, shall beprovided in duplicate for each cargo space andspare parts shall be available (to the satisfaction ofthe administration).

1:13 STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONSChapter 5 deals with structural considerations and

stipulates:

a. The structural strength of deck areas and supportarrangements shall be sufficient to withstand theload which is to be sustained. (N.B. There is nostipulation under the INF Code for any form ordegree of double hulling or collision reinforcementin any class of INF ship.)

1:14 SECURING INF CARGOChapter 6 deals with the arrangements for securing

INF cargo and stipulates:a. such devices shall prevent movement of the

“packages” within the cargo spaces. Whenpermanent devices are designed due considerationmust be given to the orientation of the packagesand to ship acceleration levels;

b. where packages are carried on open or vehicledecks they should be secured in accordance withsafe stowage principles already in place for rolling(unitised and wheel-based) cargo which are basedon guidelines developed by the IMO and approvedby the national administration;

c. any collision chocks used shall not interfere orprevent the flow of cooling/ventilation air.

1:15 ELECTRICAL POWER Chapter 7 deals with the supply of electrical power

and stipulates:a. electrical power supplies in a Class 1 INF ship shall

be to the satisfaction of the administration;b. in Class 2 & 3 INF ships there must be alternative

power supplies which comply with internationalstandards acceptable to the IMO and which canoperate even when the vessel’s main supply isdamaged;

c. alternative power source(s) must be sufficient tosupply all flooding and cooling systems and allemergency systems for at least 36 hours;

d. in a Class 3 INF ship such alternative sources mustbe located outside the extent of any damageenvisaged under Chapter 2.

1:16 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTIONChapter 8 deals with radiological protection and

stipulates that, if necessary, radiological protectioncommensurate with the characteristics of the INFcargo and the design of the ship must be provided tothe satisfaction of the administration.

1:17 MANAGEMENT AND TRAININGChapter 9 deals with management and training and

stipulates that management and training for a shipcarrying INF cargo shall be to the satisfaction of theAdministration and must take into account anydevelopments in the IMO.

1:18 SHIPBOARD EMERGENCY PLANS (SEPs)Chapter 10 deals with Shipboard emergency plans

and stipulates:a. every ship carrying INF cargo shall carry on board a

shipboard emergency plan that is based on theguidelines developed by the IMO and as a minimum must consist of:• procedures to be followed by the master, or

other person in charge, to report any incidentinvolving the INF cargo;

• a list of the authorities and/or other persons tobe contacted in the event of such an incident;

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• a detailed description of the immediate actionto be taken by persons on board to prevent,reduce or control the release, and mitigate theconsequences of the loss, of INF cargo followingan incident;

• a detailed description of the procedures andpoints of contact on the ship for coordinatingshipboard action with national and localauthorities.

1:19 REPORTING INCINDENTSChapter 11 deals with procedures for the

notification in the event of an incident involving INFcargo and stipulates:a. reporting requirements of the SOLAS Convention

apply to the loss, or likely loss, of INF cargooverboard and to any other incident involving arelease or probable release of INF cargo, whateverthe reason (including for the purpose of securingthe safety of the ship or saving life at sea).

b. reporting requirements of the SOLAS Conventionalso apply to any damage, failure or breakdown of aship carrying INF cargo which affects the safety ofthe ship (including but not limited to: collision,grounding, fire, explosion, structural failure,flooding and cargo shifting) or results in theimpairment of navigational safety (including butnot limited to: failure of steering gear, propulsionsystem, electrical generating system and essentialnavigation aids).

2. The International Maritime DangerousGoods (IMDG) Code for Class 7 substances

2:1 The IMDG Code defines Class 7 radioactivematerials as those with a specific activity greater than70 Bq/Kg and states that such material must bedeclared as radioactive material. The 1994 version ofthe code provides a list of such materials. This list isnot exclusive but currently consists of the following:

• radioactive materials in instruments or articles;• articles manufactured from natural Uranium,

depleted Uranium or natural Thorium;• ores containing natural Uranium, Thorium or

concentrates thereof;• tritiated water, uranium hexafluoride;• surface contaminated objects (beta, gamma,

low alpha);• uranium and thorium metals liable to

spontaneous ignition;• fissile materials: including Uranium

hexafluoride containing more than 1% U235,and U233, U235, Pu238, Pu239, Pu241 or anycombination of the foregoing likely to undergocriticality.

2:2 IMDG Class 7 materials must be carried in one oftwo types of packaging which fulfil the IAEAregulations on transport packaging for radioactivematerials:

• TYPE A packaging is designed with a highprobability that if any material was released, orshielding efficiency lost, the packaging wouldprevent the occurrence of so much radiologicalhazard as to hamper fire fighting or rescueoperations. (TYPE A packages must maintaintheir integrity after being drop, compression

and penetration tested and then sprayed withwater for at least one hour).

• TYPE B packaging is designed to be strongenough to withstand severe accidents withoutsignificant loss of contents or dangerous loss ofradiation shielding. (TYPE B packages are drop,penetration, fire and immersion tested).

2:3 IMDG Class 7 materials may be carried on any typeof cargo, passenger or other vessel. Vessels carryingIMDG Class 7 materials must have a ShipboardEmergency Plan (SEP) concerned principally withprevention, reduction, control and mitigation of theimpacts of on-board incidents.

2:4 The IMDG Code for Class 7 radioactive substancesalso carries detailed instructions in similar areas tothose of the INF Code, although the requirements areless strict.

INF and IMDG Codes - Summary

The Chapter 2 damage stability required for INFClass 1 and Class 2 is no more than that required forstandard passenger or cargo vessels and the damagestability required for INF Class 3 does not exceed thatrequired for vessels carrying dangerous chemicals inbulk. No reference is made in the printed version ofthe Code, or in any associated documents, to any riskanalysis or design accident studies which havecompared a cargo of “dangerous chemicals in bulk” toa full cargo of Class 3 INF/Pu/HLRW (IrradiatedNuclear Fuel/Plutonium/High Level RadioactiveWaste) in order to reach the judgement that vesseldamage stability requirements are the same for bothcargoes.

Similarly the fire safety and temperature controlmeasures set out in the INF and IMDG Class 7 Codesrefer back to the SOLAS Convention and there is nosuggestion that they have been designed specificallyfor use in ships carrying materials covered by eitherCode. The duplication of systems stipulated by theCodes may be found on a number of modern passengerships, ferries, tankers and chemical carriers.

Similarly, the structural considerations and cargosecuring arrangements are fairly general and might beexpected to be applied to a number of vessel types.

Chapters 7 to 11 contain material that is plainlymore specific to ships carrying relevant materials.

INF and IMDG Codes — Conclusion

The INF and the IMDG Class 7 Codes set out anumber of requirements for vessel design, cargomanagement and emergency plans.

Much of that material refers back to the 1974SOLAS Convention and some of its subsequentamendments. The majority of that material applies tothe generality of the world merchant fleet. Only aminority of that material is specific to vessels carryinghazardous and noxious cargo.

The IMO can be commended for drawing up theCodes, and it is recognised that every chapter of theCodes is of assistance in maintaining a good standardof vessel design, cargo management and emergencyplanning. However, there is relatively little in theCodes to justify claims from the owners of INF Class 3


ships (eg the PNTL fleet) that the IMO’s 1993 INFCode had “introduced stringent requirements forensuring the safety of vessels carrying radioactivematerials, covering the design specifications of thevessels concerned”. [This statement was made in a1996 submission to the IMO from the owners of thePNTL fleet: see later text.]

Some sections of the Codes do contain material thatis specific only to INF and IMDG Class 7 ships.However the Codes stipulate very little which is notcurrently found on many types of well appointed,properly maintained, efficient merchant vessels whichhave been inspected, flagged and insured byresponsible and reputable companies, agencies andadministrations.

3. The World INF (Class 3) Fleet

3:1 The first contract for the maritime transport ofnuclear waste from Anzio (Italy) to Barrow (Cumbria)was awarded to the UK company James Fisher andSons in 1964. The first voyage was carried out in 1965and used the freighter Stream Fisher, which wasmodified for the purpose. The modifications consistedof the fitting of a lead lining between the hold and thecrew quarters and the installation of refrigeration fortemperature control. Subsequently the company usedthe Pool Fisher and the Stream Fisher to carry spentfuel to Barrow from a number of European ports.However, it appears that both vessels retained a dualpurpose capability and frequently carried non-nuclearcargoes. [Ref 1]

3:2 The Pool Fisher sank in the English Channel (6November 1979) while carrying a cargo of potash fromHamburg to Runcorn. Thirteen hands and passengerswere lost and two survived. The cause of the accidentis given as a failure to secure the cargo hatchescorrectly, causing the vessel to take in water, flood andsink. [Ref 1].

3:3 The first contract to carry Japanese spent nuclearfuel was awarded to James Fisher and Sons in 1968.The company made use of the Leven Fisher, modifiedfor the purpose. (This vessel was later sold to Syrianinterests in 1982). Growing trade led to the purchaseof an additional vessel the Jopulp which wasconverted and re-named the Pacific Fisher. [Ref 1]

3:4 Shipments of used, and subsequently reprocessed,nuclear fuel between Europe (UK and France) andJapan commenced in 1969. The shippers state thatthese shipments always conformed to IAEA transportregulations (in respect of the packaging). However,there were no international standards applied to thetype of ships employed in this trade until 1993. Duringthe late 1970s those engaged in this trade decided toset about the construction of vessels speciallydesigned to carry INF Class 3 materials.

3:5 Although the voyages mentioned above have thehighest public profile in Europe, it is evident thatmaritime transport of irradiated nuclear wastes iscarried out by other states and in other sea areas.Data obtained from the Lloyd’s Register of Shippingshows that, to date, 14 vessels have been built andregistered as dedicated Irradiated Nuclear Fuel

Carriers, and flagged to five different sovereign states.[Ref 2]

• Lepse (1961), Serebryanka (1974) andImandra (1980) were built and flagged inRussia between 1961 and 1980. Their registeredowner is Murmansk Shipping. Given the currentparlous state of the Russian economy and theapparent decline of the Russian military andcivil nuclear power programme and naval andcivil fleets there are reasonable grounds forconcern about the status and workload of thesevessels. (N.B. Two of these vessels weredesigned and constructed prior to the late 70sdesign effort mentioned in para 3:1 above. Theircompliance with current INF standards may notbe satisfactory.)

• Seiei Maru (1991) and Rokuei Maru (1996)were built and flagged in Japan. Theirregistered owner is Nuclear Fuel Transport Ltd(NTL).

• Tien Kuang No 1 (1991) was built and flaggedin Taiwan and the registered owner is TaiwanPower.

• Sigyn (1982) was built in France and flagged inSweden, the registered owner is SwedishNuclear Fuel and she is managed by Gotland.

• European Shearwater (1981) was built andflagged in the UK. The registered owner isBritish Nuclear Transport Ltd and she ismanaged by Fisher & Sons.

• Pacific Fisher (1970) was built in the GermanDemocratic Republic and flagged in the UK.Lloyds describe this vessel as having been“broken up” in November 1985. Lloyds do notname the registered owner nor the managementcompany. (N.B. This vessel was also designedand constructed prior to the late 70s designeffort mentioned in para 3:1 above. Hercompliance with past and current INFstandards may not be satisfactory.)

The remaining five vessels are flagged in the UK,their registered owner is Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd(PNTL) and they are managed by Fisher & Sons. PNTLis jointly owned by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL),Cogema and the ORC (representing the JapaneseNuclear Utilities). Construction of the PNTL fleetbegan in the late 1970s following consultations withLloyds of London, the UK Salvage Association andleading salvage companies and in line with standardsdeveloped in Japan.

The PNTL fleet has been designated “Pacific Class”,and has been constructed to approximately the samebasic design and dimension.

Length approximately 104 metres; beamapproximately 16 metres; dead wt tonnage between3,702 and 3,865 tonnes; power source 2 X 1,900 hpdiesel engines; load capacity: spent fuel casks (TN12)max. 17; load capacity: returnable waste casks (TN28VT) max. 14.

The UK registered Pacific Class PNTL fleet consistsof the following vessels :

Pacific Swan built 1979 UKPacific Crane built 1980 UKPacific Teal built 1982 UKPacific Sandpiper built 1985 UKPacific Pintail built 1987 JAPAN[Ref 2]

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Although all of the above have been approved forthe carriage of most INF Class 3 materials, it appearsthat the Pacific Crane has not been approved for thetransport of vitrified wastes. [Ref 3]

Despite the fact that all five of the UK registeredPNTL vessels were designed and built well before theintroduction of the 1993 INF Code, it is claimed thatthe PNTL fleet has always operated to INF Codestandards and that extra equipment has been added inline with technological developments and operatingexperience to maintain high standards of operationalsafety. [Ref 4]

3:6 Indeed it is remarkable to note that the 1993 INFCode stipulates most of the features designed by thePNTL designers in the late 1970s and that there is noevidence that any major modification of the PNTLvessels has occurred since they were completed. Threeimplications may be drawn:

• the PNTL design was remarkably far sighted;• the IM0 (with little previous expertise in this

specific subject area) may have been stronglyreliant upon the advice of nuclear carriers indrawing up the INF Code recommendationsregarding vessel design, and thus based theirship design stipulations on the PNTLparameters;

• the IMO standard is not as “stringent” as thePNTL owners have claimed.

3:7 It is relevant to note that the IMO is essentially aconsensual organisation which operates by committee.Special subject committees are composed ofrepresentatives sent by interested/concerned membergovernments, these representatives are generally civilservants from relevant ministries or departments likeTransport or Shipping. Observer status may be appliedfor by relevant Industries and non-governmentorganisations (NGOs) and granted (or denied) by themembers of any specific committee. [Ref 5]

There is (as is always the case with the consensualcommittee) a strong possibility that decisions orrecommendations arrived at and promulgated by anyIMO committee may not be a reflection of the latestscientific or technical understanding but the productof a good deal of horse-trading and political activity.

3:8 In the case of the early IMO committeerecommendations on INF ships there are no indicatorsthat the bureaucrats representing those governmentsalready involved in the maritime transport ofirradiated nuclear fuels were expert in generalnuclear issues or the specifics of maritime nucleartransport. It is highly likely they were given detailedbriefings by nuclear industry representatives and thatthere were few committee members able to bringindependent expertise and analysis to bear upon thesubjects under discussion.

4. Causes of Casualties at Sea

4:1 There is a consensus that smaller vessels are morelikely to suffer major problems as a result of marineaccidents than larger vessels. In terms of the sizestatistics of the world merchant fleets, the PNTLvessels are relatively small.

4:2 There is a consensus that the four major causes of“total loss” shipping casualties at sea (in order ofimportance) are:

• Foundering (sinking): as a result of severeweather and/or heavy seas. Secondarycontributory factors are structural weaknessesand incidents of cargo shifting;

• Wrecking/stranding: usually in coastal areaswith a high density of shipping traffic, often theresult of mechanical failure, bad weather,navigational or other human error. Humanfailures are a significant contributory factor;

• Fire/explosion: a major hazard where flammableor explosive materials are carried, andespecially so where the vessel receives noassistance from the shore;

• Collision: between two (or more) vessels,especially in coastal and inland waters and busyshipping lanes. Collisions are particularlyassociated with human error, various forms ofmechanical failure and the mis-interpretation ofinformation. [Ref 6 : pps 164&165]

5. Sea Routes used by PNTL Vessels

5:1 Under the heading “Routing, Physical Protectionand Safeguards” the PNTL ownership states that thesea routes used by their vessels “are carefully plannedin advance of shipments”. No supporting information isprovided. [Ref 4: p18]

The IAEA supports the PNTL position and statesthat PNTL ships “have an important range of safetyfeatures, in agreement with (and in some casesexceeding) the code adopted by the InternationalMaritime Organisation” and goes on to say thesefeatures include “deliberate route selection andplanning”. As with the PNTL statement no furtherdetails are given. [Ref 8: p5]

(N.B. The IAEA is mistaken. No chapter of the INFor IMDG Class 7 Codes stipulate “deliberate routeselection and planning”.)

5:2 There is nothing unique in these statements, theonly surprising feature is the apparent implicationthat such a planning process is unusual. Almost everysea passage carried out by contemporary merchantvessels is similarly “carefully planned”. In particularroute plans for all vessels seek to minimisemileage/fuel consumption costs, delays caused byextreme weather or military/political events and therisk of loss or damage to vessel, crew and cargo.

In the absence of any further detail the PNTLstatement indicates nothing specific which might setit apart from, or above, any of the route planningcarried out by other fleet owners, shippers etc.

5:3 In fact any concern about the possibility of risk ofloss of PNTL ships and/or their INF cargoes isexacerbated by the available details about routing. Forsecurity reasons, details of the voyages of the PNTLships are deliberately kept to a minimum. However, itis evident from the sparse available information thatthree routes have been used to-date and that theseroutes necessitate traversing a number of areas whereweather, sea states, shipping density and other factorscombine to give high casualty figures. [Ref 6: pps 160to 165]


5:4 Route 1: This route begins at the Ports ofCherbourg (France) or Barrow (Cumbria, UK) andpasses through the Irish Sea or the English Channel,passes through the eastern side of the north and southAtlantic, rounds the Cape of Good Hope (SouthAfrica), passes to the south of Australia and NewZealand and then east of New Zealand and north toJapan where it concludes at the Port of Mutsu-Ogawara (northern Japan).

A variation routes vessels through the Tasman Sea,between Australia and New Zealand and thennorthward through the South Pacific past pacificisland states like New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Fiji and theSolomon Islands.

(Opposition to the passage of INF Code maritimetransports from the powerful nation states ofIndonesia and Singapore has ruled out the use of thenorthern sea route past Australia.)

5:5 Route 2: This route begins at Barrow or Cherbourg,passes through the Irish Sea or English Channel,traverses the Atlantic, rounds Cape Horn(Argentina/Chile) and then traverses the Pacific(central east to north west) to Mutsu-Ogawara.

5:6 Route 3: This route begins at Barrow or Cherbourg,passes through the English Channel/Irish Sea,traverses the North Atlantic, enters the Caribbean(through the Mona Passage), transits the PanamaCanal and crosses the Pacific (central east to northwest) to Mutsu-Ogawara.

5:7 All routes could be navigated in the reversedirection when INF cargoes need to be transportedfrom Japan to Europe but the preferred route remainsvia the Panama Canal.

6. Marine High Risk Areas

6:1 The definition of Marine High Risk Areas is basedon the analysis of shipping casualty statistics takenfrom Lloyds of London and plotted according to theLloyd’s in-house system which uses Marsden squaresto divide the oceans by longitude and latitude into 10degree units.

6:2 All routes commence or culminate in the coastalwaters of the north east Atlantic. These waters aredefined as one of eight global High Risk Areas forshipping. The major cause of total loss in this sea areais given as “foundering” (179 “founderings” between1975 and 1980). The major causes of serious casualty inthis sea area are given as “stranding/wrecking” (148“wreckings” between 1975 and 1980) or “miscellaneous”which includes weather damage and ships founddrifting or abandoned. Collisions, leading to seriouscasualty or total loss, are also a high frequency event inthis sea area (61 between 1975 and 1980).

6:3 All routes culminate or commence in the coastal watersof north west Japan. These waters are also defined as oneof eight global High Risk Areas for shipping. The majorcause of total loss in this sea area is given as “foundering”(147 between 1975 and 1980). The major causes of seriouscasualty are given as “stranding/wrecking” (113“wreckings” between 1975 and 1980) or “collision” (65collisions between 1975 and 1980).

6:4 One route involves rounding the Cape of GoodHope, which is also defined as one of eight global HighRisk Areas for shipping, where a mixture of extremeweather and sea conditions, coupled with a relativelyhigh density of shipping give rise to high accidentpotential. (Full statistics not available).

6:5 The Caribbean sea area and the approaches to thePanama Canal are defined as a Moderate Risk Areawhere the major cause of total loss is “foundering” insevere weather or heavy seas, sometimes from shiftingcargo. The major cause of serious casualty in this seaarea is stranding or wrecking, usually in coastal areaswhere shipping density is high and often the result ofmechanical failure, bad weather or navigational error.Fire/explosion, hull/machinery damage and collision inbusy narrow seaways and straits (particularly as aresult of human error) are also significant causes ofserious casualty in this area. [Ref 6: pps 162 &163]

7. En-Route Weather Conditions

7:1 Route 1 includes the waters of the North EastAtlantic, where wind and sea states of Force 7, orabove, occur for 20 to 30% of the year. This route alsorequires a north/south traverse of the eastern Atlanticthrough waters noted for more than 100 tropicalthunderstorm days per year (off the west Africancoast). And the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope, asea area where gales in excess of Force 7 occur forbetween 20% – 40% of the year and close to thenorthern limit of the Antarctic iceberg drift and theRoaring Forties.

7:2 Route 1 stipulates passage to the south of Australiaand New Zealand through an area adjacent to thenorthern extreme of the Roaring Forties and thenorthern limit of Antarctic iceberg drift. In thissection of the route winter wind and sea states ofForce 7, or above, occur for between 20% – 40% of theyear and tropical storms and cyclones occur betweenNovember and March.

7:3 Route 1 travels to the east, or west, of New Zealandand north to Japan through sea areas where thecyclone season extends from December to March (inNew Zealand waters and the Tasman Sea) and thetyphoon season from May to December (in south eastAsian and Japanese waters). The waters to the east ofJapan are also noted for their high frequency of windand sea states exceeding Beaufort Force 7 and for arelatively high occurrence of sea fogs. [Ref 6:pps 160and 161]

7:4 Route 2 includes the waters of the North EastAtlantic, where wind and sea states of Force 7, orabove, occur for 20 – 30% of the year. This route alsoincludes a north east to south west Atlantic crossingthrough sea areas which may include areas with a highoccurrence of tropical thunderstorms and a June toNovember hurricane season.

7:5 Route 2 rounds Cape Horn at the southernmostextreme of South America. This route passes throughwaters that are within the northernmost extent ofAntarctic iceberg drift and within the Roaring Forties witha very high incidence of extreme wind and sea states.

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7:6 Route 2 then traverses the Pacific from the southeast to the north west, through waters where wintergales (in the south east) may exceed Force 7 forbetween 20% and 30% of the year and where thetropical storm/cyclone and fog frequency is similar tothat described in para 7:3 above. [Ref 6: pps 160 and161]

7:7 Route 3 includes the waters of the North EastAtlantic, where wind and sea states of Force 7, orabove, occur for 20 to 30% of the year. This route alsoincludes a crossing of the central-west Atlantic andthe Caribbean hurricane zone (season June toNovember).

7:8 Route 3 also includes a passage through thePanama Canal zone, where there are over 100 tropicalthunderstorm days a year, followed by a passage acrossthe central-east and north-west Pacific where tropicalstorms occur between June and October.

7:9 Route 3 includes the waters east of Japan which arealso noted for their high frequency of wind and seastates exceeding Beaufort Force 7 (20 to 40% of theyear) and for a relatively high occurrence of sea fogsfrom June to August. Japanese territorial waters,including those in the approaches to Mutsu-Ogarawa arealso located in the south and east Asian typhoon zone(season May to December). [Ref 6: pps 160 and 161]

7:10 It can be seen from the above that no matter whatroute is taken, and no matter what time of the year avoyage is undertaken, the likelihood of meetingadverse en-route weather conditions is relatively high.

8. Canals

8:1 Canals, capes and straits are areas where shippingtraffic is particularly dense due to route convergence,they are notable for their high frequency of maritimeaccidents. Many of these areas are situated whereambient weather and sea conditions may beparticularly unfavourable. The major factors dictatingthe choice of routes and decisions over which canals,capes and straits to use are cost (distance/timeratios), military, weather routing and the politicalaspects of INF transport.

8:2 INF Carriers have used the Panama Canal. Thefavourable indicator for the use of the Panama Canalis a significant reduction of voyage time and distancebetween the Atlantic and the Pacific. This waterway is43.5 nautical miles (nms) long (80.5 kms) and israised and lowered by 12 locks to a maximum height of25.9 metres above sea level. The locks are 305 metreslong and 33.5 metres wide. The maximum permittedvessel dimensions are 274.3 metres length and 32.3metres beam. Transit time through the canal isnormally eight to 10 hours.

8:3 Over the last 20 years the average number of vesseltransits through the Canal has exceeded 11,000 perannum. As a result of this high density of traffic theCanal has become so seriously congested that therehave been proposals to establish a second canal routeacross the Panama isthmus. The current level ofcongestion has driven a perceptible increase in the

volume of traffic passing through the Straits ofMagellan (Cape Horn) during recent years.

8:4 The historical record shows that Total Losses andSerious Casualties are relatively high in the PanamaCanal waterway, with an average of two such incidents(per 80.5 kms) occurring per year. In addition theapproaches to the Canal through the Caribbean arehighly congested and the accident statistics are high.[Ref 6: pps 164 and 165]

8:5 The Suez Canal has not yet been used for themaritime transport of INF wastes. However, this canaloffers significant time/distance advantages overalternative routes, especially those requiring the roundingof Capes Horn or Good Hope, reducing the distancebetween North West Europe and Japan by approximately4,000 miles. There can be no doubt that if conditions weredeemed appropriate this would be considered a highlyfavourable optional route for INF carriers.

8:6 The Suez Canal is twice as long as the Panama(165.8 kms) and is entirely a sea level passage (nolocks). Passage through the canal takes about 24hours. The Suez is an extremely busy waterway withannual transits averaging between 18,000 and 22,000vessels per annum, except in times of conflict in theMiddle East.

8:7 Various regional conflicts have led to militaryaction within the Suez Canal zone, leading to theoutright closure of the Canal as a result of the sinkingof vessels in the Canal due to artillery fire andbombing. Areas adjacent to the Canal Zone and it’sapproaches (the Horn of Africa, Persian Gulf States,Israel/Palestine) are also conflict “hot spots” with ahigh potential for sovereign state military action orterrorist action. Middle-eastern waters have thehighest frequency of “war loss” recorded for merchantvessels.

8:8 Use of the Suez Canal would also demand routingthrough the Mediterranean, defined as a ModerateRisk Area where wrecks, founderings and collisions arefrequent (112 wrecks, 101 founderings and 41collisions between 1975 to 1980). [Ref 6: page 162]

8:9 Use of the Suez Canal would also require routingthrough the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea and the Gulf ofAden, where serious casualty and total loss figures arelocally high (64 over a two year period). Moreaccidents occur at the northern and southernapproaches to the Canal, within the waterway itselfand in the Bab el Mandab (the narrow straits betweenthe Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden). [Ref 6: p 165]

9. Capes

9:1 Capes are characterised by an exposed position inregard to weather and sea states. The speed andvolume of tidal and residual currents may rise aroundcapes and traffic density increases around them whena number of sea routes converge. The availableevidence demonstrates that capes are high risk areaswhere shipping casualty figures rise. The routes usedto date by the INF carriers include the rounding of twomajor capes: Good Hope and Horn.


9:2 The Cape of Good Hope is defined as one of eightglobal High Risk Areas where seasonally extremeweather and sea conditions (see sections 6 and 7above) combine with density of traffic to give a highrelative frequency of shipping casualties. Sixteen totallosses or serious casualties occurred in the twoMarsden Squares (see 6:1 above) covering the Cape ofGood Hope area in two years. [Ref 6: pps 164 & 165]

9:3 Maritime traffic converges on the Cape of GoodHope from both the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic.The annual traffic averages about 200 large vessels perday, with the majority of voyages starting from thePersian Gulf, Iran, East Africa, South East Asia andAustralia. This route is particularly used by Very Largeand Ultra Large Crude (Oil) Carriers at all times(thus avoiding the relatively high Suez Canal tolls),and other vessels during periods of elevatedtension/conflict in the Middle East.

9:4 Cape Horn, being even further south and closer tothe Roaring Forties and Antarctica, has more extremeweather and sea conditions than the Cape of GoodHope. However the relative scarcity of maritime trafficmeans a low number of marine accidents and thus thearea has not been defined as a High Risk Area.

(N.B. Increasing congestion of the Panama Canalhas increased traffic using the Cape Horn routes.Density of traffic in this area has increased and mayincrease further in response to changing managementstrategies of the Panama Canal: increased tolls,further delays and failure to build a second route.)

10. Straits and other congested waters

10:1 Available evidence proves straits and other narrowwaterways are high risk areas for shipping. Theprincipal causes of shipping casualties in these areasare the density of vessel traffic and the narrowness ofthe waterways. Important secondary factorscontributing to the high casualty risk are extremeweather and sea conditions, the intensification of tidaland residual currents in narrow waters and humanerror.

10:2 Japanese Straits. a. As Japan and its far eastern neighbours are highly

industrialised and strongly reliant on maritimetrade and fishing, the density of shipping inJapanese and adjacent waters is very high. Many ofthese vessels are under 100 grt and their fate istherefore not recorded by Lloyds, however itestimated that well over 1,000 vessels per year arelost in Japanese waters.

b. For vessels approaching Japanese waters after aneast-west Pacific crossing, the most favourablewaterway permitting access to the port of MutsuOgarwara would be the Strait of Tsugaru-Kaikyobetween the islands of Honshu and Hokaido. Thiswaterway is only 10 nautical miles wide at itsnarrowest point. Lloyds of London records show thatthere were five total losses or serious casualties inthe vicinity of this Strait in the period over a twoyear period, and that all of these casualtiesoccurred in the Pacific approaches to the waterway.[Ref 6: p 164]

10:3 Korean Straits. a. For vessels seeking access to Mutsu Ogarwara after

a south-north transit of the western Pacific(commencing in Australian or New Zealandwaters), the most favourable waterway might wellbe the Korean Straits lying between southern Japanand Korea. The Korean Straits offer a significantreduction in route distance and protection from theopen north Pacific. Although the Korean Straits areover 50 miles wide at their narrowest point,navigation is complicated by the presence of anumber of large and small islands lying within thewaterway.

b. Lloyds data shows there have been 27 total losses orserious casualties in the Korean Straits over a twoyear period and that these casualties areparticularly concentrated in the East China Seaapproaches to the Straits. [Ref 6: p 164]

10:4 Caribbean Straitsa. Any route utilising the Panama Canal will require

passage through one of 15 straits that pass throughthe Island groups of the outer Caribbean.Navigation in the Caribbean is complicated bylocally dense concentrations of vessels, many ofwhich are under 100 grt, this density of traffic isparticularly acute in the various straits which attheir narrowest range from a width of 82 nauticalmiles to 13 nautical miles. Additionally the wholesea area is characterised by seasonally severeweather and sea conditions.

b. The Mona Passage provides one of the shortest UK -Panama sea routes and the record shows that theINF transport route using the Panama Canal hasinvolved transit through the Mona Passage whichlies between Puerto Rico and the DominicanRepublic. The Mona Passage is 31 nautical mileswide at its narrowest point and navigation iscomplicated by the presence of islands in theapproaches to the strait. The Passage is listed as the11th most important strait in the world. [Ref 6: p150]

c. The Caribbean is defined as a Moderate Risk Area[Ref 6: p 162] where severe weather, high density ofshipping and narrow waterways are a contributingfactor to the accident statistics. Lloyds statistics,based on Marsden Square plotting, show thatshipping accidents in the Caribbean areconcentrated where shipping densities are highestand that straits are high casualty areas. Lloyds datashows that there were three total losses or seriouscasualties, over a two year period, in the MonaPassage and its approaches. Other straits andpassages in the sea area also have an elevatedfrequency of accidents.

10:5 Cape Horn Straitsa. The records show that at least one INF route

involves rounding Cape Horn. Although details ofthe precise route taken have not been madeavailable it is possible that such a route could makeuse of one of the three Straits which avoid an actualrounding of the Cape itself. Use of these straits bothreduces the exposure to the full severity of weatherand open sea conditions which might beexperienced off the Cape itself and reduces thejourney time.

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b. The most landward of these passages, the MagellanStraits offers the shortest route and the possibilityof greatest shelter. However, it is a difficult water tonavigate, with a tortuous channel and many islandsand is only two nautical miles wide at its narrowestpoint. The more seaward passage involves transitthrough the Estrecho de Le Maire (20 nm wide) andthe Beagle Channel (1nm wide at it’s narrowest)navigation through these waters is also complicatedby the presence of numerous islands and (in thecase of the Beagle Channel) winding, narrowchannels.

c. As stated in previous paragraphs the Cape Horn Seaarea is notorious for its extreme weather and seaconditions. Despite the congestion of the PanamaCanal and subsequent increased use of the Horn asan access route between the Atlantic and Pacific,traffic density remains relatively low. However theLloyds data, based on the Marsden Square analysis,indicates there were two total losses or seriouscasualties in the waters adjacent to these straitsover a two year period. However this data is for theyears 1978-79.

10:6 OTHER STRAITS AND NARROW CONGESTED WATERWAYS.a. It is highly probable that INF carriers using the

route through the Tasman Sea or to the east of NewZealand and en-route for Japan must strike norththrough Micronesia or Western Polynesia. Undercertain conditions, passage through these regionsmay require transit through one of a great numberof straits, some of which are narrow and all of whichare located in sea areas where seasonal weather andsea conditions can be extreme (see section 7above).

b. In some of these island groups traffic may belocally dense and Lloyds data (based on theMarsden Square analysis) shows that casualties maybe locally high. The Marsden Square includingFijian waters had six total loses or seriouscasualties in a two year period. [Ref 6: p165]

c. If INF Vessels were to use the Suez Canal, passagethrough the Bab el Mandeb straits at the southernend of the Red Sea would be necessary. This is oneof the most important straits in the world in termsof the concentration of vessels. Attempts to managethe waterway have been in place for some time anda traffic separation scheme is in existence.

d. Despite these management efforts, casualtiesremain high in the general area with a casualty “hotspot” centred on the Bab el Mandeb. Lloyds data,based on the Marsden Square plotting system,indicates that there were at least 25 total losses orserious casualties in the square covering the straits,in a two year period. [Ref 6: p165]

11. Double Hulls

11:1 The owners of the PNTL fleet have stated that allfive Pacific Class ships in the PNTL fleet have “doublehulls”. [Ref 4: p 10] However, there is evidentlyconsiderable confusion about the meaning of thewords “double hull” and there is a significant disparitybetween the descriptions of this feature given byvarious relevant parties.

11:2 The consensual understanding of the phrase

“double hull” is that the vessel in question has doubleskinned sides and a double skinned bottom whichextend the entire length of the vessel. This is preciselywhat the Marine Accident Investigation Branch of theUK DETR displays in its discussion and diagrams ofvarious types of protected tanker types. [Ref 7: Figure8]

11:3 The PNTL owners claim that the basic design ofthe PNTL fleet is “a double hull configuration withimpact resistant structures between the hulls”. [Ref 3:p.38]

Elsewhere the PNTL owners state that the PacificClass PNTL fleet has “double hulls to withstanddamage”. [Ref 4 : p 10] The IAEA support these claimsand state that the PNTL fleet “is constructed with adouble hull and double bottom structure”. [Ref 8: p 5]

11:4 However, assuming that this means the PNTL fleetis really “double hulled” is inaccurate and deeplymisleading, because the various texts in support of theinitial claims of double hulling make it clear thatdouble hulling only extends “over two fifths of thevessel’s width”. [Ref 4: Page 10]

In fact the PNTL fleet can only be accuratelydescribed as “partially double hulled”.

11:5 Because it suffers from a lack of precise detailsand dimensions regarding the double hulling andcollision reinforcement, the quality of the technicalinformation provided by PNTL owners in theirsubmissions to the IMO [Ref 4] is very poor. It is notpossible to verify the accuracy of the statementsquoted above.

11:6 Diagrams in those documents are barely adequateand contain no scale or dimensions for the variousdouble hulling and collision reinforcement featuresdescribed above. Similarly the language is far fromclear. The statement that “the double hull structureextends for over two-fifths of the width of the vessel”does not specify the length of the double hulling ordefine which sectors (of the width of the vessel) aredouble hulled.

11:7 Study of the available “drawing of a PNTL purposebuilt ship” contained in References 3 & 4 do notprovide further clarification of which sections of thehull are doubled.

Accompanying notes state that the cargo holdsection of the PNTL fleet is protected by doublehulling. The drawings appear to show that the holdextends for approximately 60% of the length of thevessel. If protective double hulling has been installedover all of this area including the sides and the bottomof the vessel, then this exceeds the described “twofifths of the width of the vessel”.

11:8 If the statement that the double hulled sectionprovides protection to the cargo hold area is valid,then approximately 40% of a PNTL vessel has onlysiingle skinned sides. Single hulled sections of thePNTL fleet would appear to include the bow section(containing the forward generating room andemergency generators, the bow thruster and itsassociated engines, the main salvage towing bracketsand the primary collision bulkhead) and the stern


section (containing crew accommodation, allcommunication and navigation equipment, the twomain engines, the main generators, primary steeringgear etc.).

11:9 Thus while the radioactive materials arepositioned inside the reinforced, double hulled twofifths of the vessel’s width, the “vital services” (power,navigation, communications etc.) are not so protectedand are as vulnerable to collision and groundingimpact (and subsequent disablement) as any othervessel. The PNTL ownership has provided no evidenceto support any hypothesis that grounding, wrecking orcollision impacts occur only in the cargohold/midships area of merchant vessels. Nor has mysearch of various reports of shipping accidentssuggested that a clear majority of collision impactsoccur in the cargo hold/midship area.

11:10 It may therefore be concluded that the absence ofdouble hulling to the vital service areas of the PNTLfleet makes it as susceptible to potentiallycatastrophic grounding, wrecking or collision impactsand subsequent disablement as most other vessels.

11:11 The design purpose of double hulled vessels. a. There has been a distinct tendency for hazardous

cargo carriers to allow, or indeed encourage, thepublic to perceive double hulls as the ultimatesafety feature, which will prevent or minimise theloss of hazardous materials. This has beenespecially the case since the Exxon Valdez oil spillin 1989, when the US Government took unilateralaction to introduce double hulling for oil tankers byway of the US OPA90 regulations. However, in amore academic theatre regulators, ship owners andhazardous cargo carriers present a somewhatdifferent picture of the design purpose of doublehulled vessels.

b. Following the Sea Empress spill the subject ofdouble hulling received considerable attention atindustrial and academic fora in the UK. At aseminar in 1996 , a representative of the BP TankerFleet stated that as a result of the US OPA90regulations “the issue of the protection of the cargospace was taken even further by the advent ofdouble-hull or double-skin designs”. There was noattempt to claim that floatability or accidentsurvival was imparted by double hulling. [Ref 9]

c. In 1997 the UK Marine Accident InvestigationBranch of the UK Coastguard Agency and the DETRpublished it’s Report into the Sea Empress wreck.One chapter of this document considered aspects ofsafety and salvage and discussed double hulledvessels. Although focused on double hulling for oiltankers it provides a useful summary of theattempts to find a vessel design offering the mosteffective protection against pollution in the event ofgrounding or collision incidents. [Ref 7]The MAIB Report stated that several authoritativestudies had been carried out into the problem andwhile there is: “almost unanimous agreement that no one designproduces the best results in all the possiblegrounding or collision scenarios which can beenvisaged. There is also a general agreement on thefollowing broad conclusions, namely that :

• double hull vessels in low energy (typically lowvelocity) accidents should not pollute;

• vessels which carry cargo in contact with asingle skin (with sea on the other side) willcause some pollution in any accident where acargo tank is penetrated.

However, certain design alternatives will minimisethe amount of pollution in some specified scenarios:• high energy accidents nearly always result in

pollution. The relative advantages of variousdesign alternatives in reducing pollution fromparticular scenarios are highly dependent onthe assumptions made in the scenarios.”

11:12 There are a number of important points here.a. The discussion is based upon “scenarios”, i.e.

modelling of hypothetical incidents and noreference is made to any empirical trials.

b. The emphasis is firmly on the avoidance ofpollution caused by breach of the inner hull and thesubsequent release of a hazardous liquid cargo andnot on the avoidance or reduction of sinking or lossof the vessel.

c. Only in low energy, low velocity accidents can adouble hull be expected to not pollute: i.e. notsuffer penetrating or breaching damage to the innerhull.

d. High energy accidents nearly always result inpollution (i.e. cause penetrating or breachingdamage of the inner hull).

11:13 The Design Purpose of the PNTL double hull.a. There is a consensus among both those who carry

hazardous cargoes at sea and those responsible forthe regulation of that trade, that both complete andpartial double hulling is designed as a measure toprotect the cargo space. It is also a measure toprevent or minimise the release or loss of hazardouscargoes in the event of low energy collision orgrounding incidents.

b. However, in the case of the PNTL fleet, there aresignificant differences in the various reasons givenby relevant parties for the use of partial doublehulled sections, and it remains unclear whethertheir principal design priority and justification laywith protecting the cargo or maintaining the vessel’sflotation.

11:14 In 1996 the PNTL owners stated that the vesselshave “double hulls to withstand damage and remainafloat” and add that this effectively creates “a shipwithin a ship” (which appears to support the claim forfloatability). [Ref 4: p 10] The IAEA state that theship is “constructed with a double hull and doublebottom structure to protect the transport packaging inthe event of collision or grounding” but do not mentionthe issue of floatability or accident survival. [Ref 8: p5] In 1999 the PNTL owners additionally stated thatthe double hull configuration contributes to “highreliability and accident survivability”. [Ref 3: p.38]

11:15 While PNTL owners should be commended fortheir early use of partial double hulling as a cargoprotection feature they should be censured for makingthe unjustified claim that the feature creates “a shipwithin a ship” or permits the vessel to “remain afloat”.

No other user of double hulling has made this claim

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and there is no feature of the PNTL system that makesit superior to other double hull designs in this respect.In fact, because the PNTL fleet is only partially doublehulled it is not among the top rank of double hulledvessels.

11:16 In December 1985, by resolution MEPC.19 (22),the International Maritime Organisations’ MarineEnvironmental Protection Committee adopted theInternational Code for the Construction andEquipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals inBulk (IBC Code). The IBC Code applies to ships builtafter 1 July 1986, and (in order to minimise the risksto ships involved in the carriage of dangerouschemicals) it prescribes the design and constructionstandards of ships and the equipment they shouldcarry.

Chemical tankers and other vessels under this codemust be built to conform to internationally agreeddesign and construction standards which varyaccording to the type of vessel and cargo.

11:17 Under the Code there are three classes ofchemical. Type 1 is “very hazardous,” Type 2 is“appreciably hazardous” and Type 3 is “hazardous”. Atypical example of the Type 2 chemical tanker was theIevoli Sun which sank in the English Channel on 31October 2000. Apart from a small section at the bow,this ship was double hulled throughout, representingover 95% of the vessel’s length.

11:18 Built in 1989, the Ievoli Sun was similar in size tothe PNTL vessels (115 metres long). Despite thestringent IBC design (which includes featuresdesigned to help the vessel survive the normal effectsof flooding and to keep unsymmetrical flooding to aminimum consistent with safety of the vessel) thevessel took on water during a heavy storm, the forwardcargo compartments flooded, the vessel became bow-heavy and lost manoeuvrability, was taken under towby a rescue tug but eventually sank. [Ref 20]

11:19 It should be noted that only one of the PNTLvessels (Pacific Pintail) was built after the adoptionof the IBC Code.

The documentary submission by the PNTL ownersto the IMO [Ref 4} that claim enhanced floatability ofthe PNTL fleet, “ship within a ship” or accidentsurvivability contain no description of any relevantempirical experience, reference accident or adescription of the analytical techniques which havebeen used to deduce the claimed outcomes.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary it mustbe concluded that such claims are assumptions, thatthey lack scientific and technical rigour and have nocredibility. Furthermore, it is evident that in terms ofthe design of their double hulling features, the PNTLvessels are inferior to many others.

11:20 IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES OF DOUBLE HULLED VESSELS.During the 1990s a number of studies reviewed the

status of the then current designs of double hulledvessels. In what appears to be a generally heldposition, a representative of BP Shipping expressedconcern about a range of real and potential problemsaffecting the long term integrity of double hulledvessels. These problems included :

• leakage of hydrocarbon products into thedouble hull “void space”, with the subsequentrisk of gas build up (with a subsequentpotential risk of fire/explosion);

• moisture build up between the hulls;• the difficulty in venting the hull space of gas

and moisture;• difficulty in inspecting the internal spaces of

double hulls;• the potential for corrosion and repair problems.

[Ref 9]

11:21 In 1996 the BP fleet representative stated thatthere “are still problems with double-hull ships” anddescribed a proposed major fleet rebuild with a secondgeneration of re-designed double hulls. BP’s proposednew “enhanced double hull design” had a number ofinnovations including :a. an additional stringer (structural member) to

provide greater strength in those areas of the hullwhere fatigue loads are higher;

b. strengthening of key areas to give a greater marginif corrosion does occur within the hull space;

c. use of grade D steel which is tougher and morecrack resistant than the normal A grade steel;

d. gas detection points fitted throughout the hullspace (this is relevant to INF carriers because theycarry engine and generator fuel and lubricantswhich could leak into the bilge/double hull spacesand gasify);

e. provision to vent (de-gasify) the double hull space;f. provision to fill the hull space with an explosion

resistance inert gas. [Ref 9]There is no evidence that such issues have been of

concern to PNTL fleet owners and operators.

11:22 In the context of these 1996 “re-thinks” on thesubject of double hulls, it is possible that the late1970s PNTL partial double hulling design did not takeaccount of these design problems (which are notunique to hydrocarbon carriers). It may be that thePNTL fleet suffers from some of these design faults.

11:23 Regrettably the design details provided to theIMO by PNTL owners are of such a poor standard thatthey do not answer any relevant questions. Publicaccess to the full design plans of the PNTL fleet wouldclarify the situation in regard to assessing:a. the ability to inspect the interior of the PNTL

double hull void spaces;b. the potential for gasification of the void space to

occur as a result of ingress of engine and generatorfuel and lubrication spills;

c. the ability to de-gasify the void space;d. the grade and quality of the steel used in the vessel

construction;e. the degree of corrosion on the interior faces of the

void space.

11:24 In this context it is relevant to note that all fiveships in the PNTL fleet are now “mature” (respectively22, 21, 19, 16, and 14 years old). Publication of the fullsurvey history of each PNTL vessel would provideanswers to some of these concerns and enable anassessment of their current safety and efficiency.

11:25 In addition to the above, it is self evident that


double hull and collision resistant features fittedbetween the double hulls also pose a number ofpotential complications in the event of any vessel orcargo salvage action following the loss, by wrecking orsinking, of the PNTL ships.

12. Possibility of flooding of a PNTL vessel

12:1 According to the fleet owners’description, PNTLships are not double hulled throughout their entirelength and beam. It is therefore possible that anincident of less kinetic energy than the “designcollision” would have sufficient velocity to penetratethe hull in the single skin sections of the vessel. Oneof the effects of such an incident would be to causesome degree of flooding of the single hulled section.

12:2 PNTL owners appear to accept the basic premisethat an incident involving some degree of floodingcould occur. In the course of arguing that their vesselscould experience a flooding event without sinking,they suggest that “holds or machinery spaces could becompletely flooded”. [Ref 4: p 10]

12:3 PNTL owners have also stated that because theirvessels are “subdivided into numerous watertightcompartments” and the “sub-division of the hull ispreserved by the use of watertight doors” the vesselscould survive the flooding of a “number” of such holdsand machinery spaces. [Ref 4: pps 10&11] Moreprecise details of the relevant design features and theprecise number of holds or machinery spaces, thatcould be so flooded, are not given and therefore it isregrettably not possible to attempt any analysis of sucha scenario.

However, it is important to note that PNTL ownersdo not claim the vessel could survive flooding of “all”or “most” of such compartments.

12:4 One effect of the penetration of the single hullsection of a PNTL ship (or of the outer hull of thedouble hulled section) could include flooding ofparticularly important sections of the vessel includingareas containing the vital primary and secondary(backup) systems like the engine room, generatorroom etc. (see section 11:9 above). There is plainly apotential for the failure of both primary and supportsystems in such an event.

A rudimentary reading of Lloyds List casualtyreports demonstrates that disablement of primary andsecondary (backup) systems is a major factor in arange of maritime accident scenarios includingcollisions, groundings, wreckings and founderings. It ismost surprising that PNTL owners have failed todiscuss this serious threat to the integrity of theirvessels.

12:5 Another effect of such a flooding incident wouldbe to increase the weight and draught of the PNTLvessel, secondary effects could include a reduction inthe manoeuvrability of the vessel and a reduction inits “sea-kindliness” and the ability to “ride” heavy seas.In such an event a number of potentially seriousoutcomes could be expected, not least foundering andsinking. This is exactly what happened to the superiordesign, double-hulled chemical tanker Ievoli Sun.

A brief study of Lloyds casualty reports reveals this

is a factor in many vessel losses. It is surprising PNTLowners have failed to discuss this possible seriousoutcome of the partial flooding that they concedemight occur under certain scenarios involving a PNTLvessel.

The tone of the statement made by PNTL ownersand the IAEA is reminiscent of the positive pre-launchpropaganda about the Titanic which, with its 15transverse watertight bulkheads, was also expected toremain afloat with a number of main compartmentsflooded.

12:6 No details of the reference incident, simulations,trials, tests or hypothetical calculations, upon whichthe claim for PNTL flooding survival is based, aregiven. There is no discussion of the performance of thevessel, thus flooded, in different types of weather andsea states.

This lack of precise detail prevents any seriousanalysis of the subject matter and means thestatement is scientifically and technically unjustifiedand must therefore be regarded as an unsupported,hypothetical assumption.

12:7 In the context of the sinking of the Type 1chemical tanker Ievoli Sun, built to the superiordesign standards of the 1986 IBC Code, the claims forthe PNTL fleet’s unproved ability to survive floodingincidents have little credibility.

13. The Design Collision Vessel

13:1 PNTL owners make much of the enhanced safetyimparted to the PNTL fleet by the addition of specialreinforcement. They state that those sections of thevessels which are double hulled are afforded extrastrength by being reinforced, between the side hull“wing tanks” with 20mm (0.8 inch) thick, high-strength horizontal steel plates for added protection tothe length of the cargo hold area. [Ref 4: p 10] Sinceneither the poor quality drawings or the text indicatethis reinforcement is added to the double bottomsection of the vessels, it must be assumed that thisfeature is part of the design which is intended tosurvive collision impact but not grounding impact.

13:2 In 1996, Lyman postulated the PNTL fleet hadbeen designed to withstand a collision with a vessel of24,000 ton displacement travelling at 15 knots. In sucha scenario it was anticipated that the cargo area wouldnot be penetrated because of its double hulling andcollision reinforcement features. [Ref 10]

(N.B. Displacement tonnage is a definition normallyapplied to warships.)

Although taking issue with related matters the IAEAresponse to Lyman’s paper did not debate this specificpoint. It may thus be assumed that the design collisionclaimed by Lyman is correct. [Ref 8: p 5]

13:3 In the above referenced PNTL owners and IAEAdocuments the design collision appears only to refer tothe double hulled section of the PNTL vessels. Nodiscussion is undertaken of the survivability of the singlehulled bow and stern sections of the vessels. These arethe sections containing the vital navigation,communication and service equipment (generators etc.).

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13:4 This is not reassuring. When the design for thePacific Class PNTL fleet was drawn up in the 1970s, arevolution in merchant shipping construction (begunin the 1960s) was underway. The major feature of thisrevolution was a significant increase in the size andspeed of merchant vessels. As a result of thisrevolution there are now many vessels (both merchantand military) which are far larger and faster than thatproposed for the PNTL design collision. Bycontemporary standards the PNTL vessels are smallships which are actually smaller than a number ofvessels engaged in the fishing trade.

13:5 Despite the difficulty of comparing the designcollision vessel’s 24,000 ton displacement (a standardnormally used to describe warships) with the dwt(dead-weight tonnage) or grt (gross registeredtonnage) usually used for merchant vessels, it is plainthat many modern merchant ships are also larger thanthe design collision vessel.

The Times Atlas and Encyclopaedia of the Seadescribes the 14 most important types of merchantvessel design in the late 1980s and early 1990s. All arelarger than both the PNTL vessels and the designcollision vessel. [Ref 6: pps 138/139]

13:6 Of particular concern are the Very Large Crude OilCarriers(VLCCs), Very Large Ore Carriers (VLOCs)and Gas Carriers (liquefied natural and petroleumgas) exceeding 100,000 tonnes dwt, which nowrepresent a significant proportion of the worldmerchant fleet. In the case of some VLCCs, dwt is ashigh as 550,000 tonnes. In dwt terms, VLCCs arebetween eight and 45 times larger than the designcollision vessel and between 26 and 145 times largerthan the PNTL vessels. [Ref 6 : pps 138/139]

13:7 Of the 14 main types of modern merchant shipsdescribed, all (except Tramp Ships) are faster thanthe design collision vessel. VLCCs and VLOCs havedesign cruising speeds of approximately 16 knots.Many types of merchant vessels have speeds that aresignificantly greater than that of the design collisionvessel’s 15 knots:

• Gas Carriers and Car Carriers = 20 knots;• Barge Carriers = 21 knots;• Container Ships = 23 knots;• Ro/Ro Container Ships = 24 knots.

Many contemporary surface war ships have speedsin excess of 30 knots.

(N.B. Tankers and bulk carriers make up roughly60% to 65% of the world merchant fleet.) [Ref 6 : pps138/139]

13:8 In the context of the facts set out in the precedingparagraphs, it must be concluded that the designcollision vessel proposed in the collision resistanceplanning for the PNTL fleet is now thoroughlyoutmoded and redundant.

Given that the trend in merchant shipping throughthe 1970s PNTL design phase suggested this, it may beargued that the PNTL design team demonstrated alack of foresight.

13:9 To further contextualise the PNTL design collisionvessel, both Lyman’s 1996 paper and the IAEA’sresponse to it refer to a 1988 study by the OECD,

containing a section on collision resistant vessels.Collision resistant design was examined and it wasconcluded that it would be possible to design a vesselwith holds that could not be penetrated by a ship ofany displacement or mass, travelling at speeds up to24 knots. [Ref 11]

Plainly such a design would have been moreappropriate to the conditions found along the world’smaritime trade routes in the decades following thePNTL design effort.

13:10 Therefore the claims of the PNTL owners that thelate 1970s, PNTL partial double hull design provides:

• the ability to “withstand damage and remainafloat”;

• “high reliability and accident survivability”; and• “ship within a ship” features;

lack contemporary scientific and technical rigour andcredibility.

13:11 It is also true that, in their submission to theIMO, PNTL’s description of the PNTL “design collisionvessel” fails to discuss the nature of any cargo thatsuch a vessel may carry. This review shows that, as ofthe 1980s, tankers and bulk carriers comprisedroughly 60% to 65% of the world merchant fleet. Theseare plainly vessels carrying potentially high-riskcargoes with the ability to impart significantfire/explosion impacts on the outcome of any designcollision.

The failure to discuss this aspect of any designcollision vessel or design collision incident is a furthermajor weakness in the consideration of such matters.

13:12 In the context of the information set out above itis evident the “design collision” vessel described byLyman (and not refuted by PNTL owners or the IAEA)no longer represents a credible reference incidentbecause the number of vessels greatly exceeding theassumed relevant parameters (speed, tonnage,displacement) is now far greater than it was duringthe design process.

13:13 It may prove a useful exercise to test (bymathematical calculation and modelling) the designvessel postulated in the OECD report against thePNTL design to assess their relative integrity in avariety of scenarios including foundering,fire/explosion, wrecking/stranding and collision.

Since PNTL owners place so much emphasis ontheir collision resistant features as a protective devicefor the cargo and an aid to enhanced accident survivaland floatability for their vessels, it may also beproposed that both designs be tested in a re-worked“design collision” scenario employing vesselparameters more representative of the merchant fleetof the 21st Century.

Following the completion of such work it wouldthen be appropriate to:a. rigorously review the status and relevance of the

PNTL fleet; andb. investigate the desirability of designing a new

generation of INF Class 3 vessels.


14. World Merchant Fleet Casualty Statistics

14:1 Statistical work on the world merchant fleet iscomplicated by a number of factors limiting theintegrity of the baseline data. Only vessels over 100grtare registered and reported, and additionally the totalsfor all type and size bands of vessels are oftenincomplete. The number of vessels in commissionvaries from year to year, but there is an overall trendfor growth despite occasional “slow downs” duringshipping recessions.

Thus in 1977 there were approximately 67,945 shipsover 100 grt and in 1987 there were 75,240. [Ref 6 : p141] By 1999 the world fleet had grown toapproximately 87,000. [Ref 12]

14:2 Lloyds of London total world merchant fleetcasualty data (all types of vessels) reveals 2,915 Totalor Constructive Losses of registered merchant vessels(over 100 grt) over a 10 year period (01/01/1990 -31/12/1999), an average of 291.5 per year. [Ref 13]

14:3 Analysis of the data reveals causes of thecasualties were as follows:

• Foundering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40%• Wrecking/Stranding . . . . . . . . . . . 22.5%• Fire/Explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17%• Collision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11%• Hull/Machinery damage . . . . . . . . . 4%• Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4%• War/Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3%• Missing/Unexplained . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8%

14:4 In the context of the very high profile given (byBNFL, IAEA and others) to the claimed collisionresistance of the PNTL vessels, it is highly relevant tonote that, taken as a percentage cause of total worldfleet losses, collision is a relatively insignificant factor.

In fact collision comes fourth (of eight causes) inthe rating, with 79.5% of losses being caused by threemore significant factors. (Nearly four times morevessels are lost by foundering, twice as many lost as aresult of wreck/stranding and 50% more vessels lost tofire/explosion.)

14:5 Of the 75,240 vessels registered in the worldmerchant fleet in 1987, 219 ships (over 100 grt) werelost [Ref 6 : p164]. Thus in that year the number ofships lost represented 0.30% of the total fleet.

14:6 The number of vessels in the world merchant fleetgrew from 75,240 in 1987 to 87,000 in 1999 (an averagegrowth rate of 980 vessels per year) which supports anestimation that the average number of vessels in thefleet through the period 1990 to 1999 was 83,000.Through the 1990s the average number of ships lostwas 291.5 per year. [Ref 13].

14:7 Based on the above, it may be calculated that theloss rate over the decade (1990 - 1999) wasapproximately 0.35% of the total fleet per year. Overthe past 23 years the average loss rate to the worldmerchant fleet (all types of vessels) has remainedremarkably constant within the 0.30% to 0.35%.

15. Double Hulled Vessel casualty statistics

15:1 The IMO has drawn up a report which cataloguesthe world tanker fleet, categorises vessels as oiltankers,ore/bulk/oil carriers, ore/oil carriers andchemical tankers and classifies them into a number ofsub-types including double bottomed and/or doublesided vessels.

This document makes it quite clear that there arecertain difficulties with regard to such statistical workon the double hull fleet. In particular, vesselcategorisation is not done in a uniform way indifferent data bases and there is a lack of suitable dataon vessels built before 1983. [Ref 14]

15:2 The IMO data reveals that by the year 2000approximately 1,878 vessels with doublebottom/double side hulls had been delivered into theworld merchant marine fleet. It has not been possibleto obtain statistics detailing the losses of doublehulled vessels up to the year 1990. [Ref 14]

15:3 However, further analysis of the Lloyds data [Ref13] reveals that during the 10 year period (1990 -1999) 21 double bottom/hull vessels were listed asTotal or Constructive losses. These vessels were allengaged in the transport of hazardous materials(crude oil, oil products, liquefied gas and chemicals).

The causes of the casualties are given as follows:• Fire/explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48%• Foundering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38%• Wrecking/stranding. . . . . . . . . . . . 10%• Hull & Machinery damage . . . . . . . 4%Thus 96% of casualties are due to three factors.

Apart from the absence of collision from the list, it isbroadly in accord with the statistics for world fleetcasualties where 79.5% of losses were recorded asbeing caused by the same three factors (in a modifiedorder of significance).

15:4 Note that fire/explosion is a significant cause ofloss to the total world fleet but that it is not confinedto hazardous cargo carriers. In fact the Lloyds datareveals only approximately 12% of fire/explosion Totalor Constructive Losses are tankers or hazardousmaterial carriers. Even if the PNTL fleet’s armamentswere claimed to be fire/explosion proofed in some way,this would not eliminate the fact that 88% offire/explosion losses occur to vessels carrying non-explosive cargoes. It may be concluded that the PNTLfleet is as susceptible to fire/explosion hazard as anyother vessel.

15:5 It is relevant to note that none of the doublebottom/hull casualties recorded by Lloyds during the10 year period were caused by collision. In the contextof the demonstrated relative insignificance of collisionas a cause of Total or Constructive Loss to the worldmerchant fleet this is not surprising.

However it is somewhat surprising that, in thiscontext, the owners of the PNTL fleet and the IAEAhave exercised so much effort in both attempting tocollision proof the PNTL fleet and in publicising theirunjustified claims about the success of that designeffort. [Ref 12]

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15:6 In a number of documents (referenced above) thePNTL ownership has claimed that double hullingimparts the ability to “withstand damage and remainafloat” and provides “high reliability and accidentsurvivability”. However, the available statistics do notsupport such claims.

15:7 From the figures given above it may be calculatedthat the average loss of double hulled vessels over the10 year period is 2.1 vessels per year or 0.11% of thedouble hulled fleet.

15:8 This figure is approximately 1/3rd of the loss rate ofsingle hulled vessels. A superficial interpretation of thefigure might suggest that vessels with double hull featuresare three times safer than single hulls. Such aninterpretation should be treated with considerable caution.

A specific problem is that the number of doublesided/hulled vessels is such a small fraction of thetotal world merchant fleet (roughly 2%). Thus theirdistribution over the world oceans is relatively verythin and their percentage risk of involvement inmaritime accidents is very much lower than that forsingle hulled vessels.

The approximate percentage loss outcome fordouble hulled vessels, quoted above, should not betaken as an accurate reflection of the safety andaccident resistance of double hulled vessels. Moreintense mathematical analysis of this subject area isstrongly recommended.

15:9 Various recent United States, IMO and otherregulations driving the increased construction and useof double hulled vessels must be expected to have asignificant effect on the percentage ratio of doublehulls relative to single hulls. Under these regulationsan increasing percentage of single hull hazardousmaterials carriers will be phased out and replaced bydouble hulls. In response to this the percentage ofdouble hull vessels in the world fleet will rise steeply.Casualty figures to vessels of this type must beexpected to rise commensurately.

16. Collision Avoidance Plans.

16:1 Despite their strong emphasis on the collisionresistant features of the PNTL vessels, both the fleetowners and the IAEA insist that collision is a highlyunlikely occurrence.

16:2 The PNTL owners report that the vessels haveduplicated navigation systems and satellite navigationand tracking systems. [Ref 4: p 10]

16:3 The IAEA states that “the probability of a collisionis extremely low and is lower than for conventionalships”. This is the case because

“The ships under discussion, carrying nuclearmaterials, have an important range of safetyfeatures, in agreement with (and in some casesexceeding) the code adopted by the InternationalMaritime Organisation (IMO):• installation of automatic radar plotting and

collision avoidance systems;• enhanced operational procedures and

additional manning of the vessel;• deliberate route selection and planning”. [Ref 8]

17. Anti-Collision (AC) Radar Systems [Ref 15]

17:1 A large number of vessels carry AC Radar systems, whichhave now been in widespread use for at least a decade.

AC Radar systems track and compute the courseand speed of selected targets and display thisinformation to the Navigating Officer. The usefulinformation for AC purposes is CPA (Closest Point ofApproach) and TCPA (Time to Closest Point ofApproach). The radar display can be fed with theship’s own course and speed and can then perform a“Trial Manoeuvre” which will show what would happenif the Navigating Officer were to alter course.

17:2 A typical AC Radar system has the ability toacquire and track more than 20 targets at once. Inpractice, however, more than 20 targets on screenmakes the radar screen “busy”, presents an overload ofdata to the Officer on watch and mitigates againsteffective data processing.

However setting preset alarms to sound if any CPAwere to be less than a prescribed distance (eg twonautical miles) would reduce this problem. This onlyapplies to acquired targets.

17:3 AC Radar systems usually have two differentoperating modes:

• Automatic acquisition, most commonly used inopen sea conditions where “guard rings” are setat prescribed distances. If any target crosses the“guard rings”, when approaching, then an alarmis sounded and the target is automaticallyacquired and tracked. Automatic acquisition isnot used in congested waters because the ACRadar system would fill up with information andpresent a confusing jumble of data;

• Manual acquisition requires the Officer onwatch to manually place a cursor over anidentified target. The system then works out thespeed and direction of that target to determinewhether it represents a collision risk. Thisoperating mode is commonly used in congestedwaters, where there are many targets, most ofwhich are harmless.

17:4 The effectiveness of AC Radar systems is limitedby a number of technical difficulties. Marine radarsare particularly poor at spotting ice, especially lowlevel bergs and “growlers”. Marine radars will notdetect anything below the surface such as reefs,wrecks or submarines.

17:5 In common with all radar, AC systems suffer from“Sea Clutter” caused by radar echoes from wave crests.All radar systems have means to reduce these effectsbut it is still possible to lose genuine targets in thistype of interference. Low targets like barges can easilybe lost in such clutter.

17:6 “Rain Clutter” is caused by radar echoes from rainshowers. AC Radar systems have confused a genuinetarget with a rain shower to such an extent that whenthe shower passed over the target, the AC systemcontinued to track the rain shower rather than thetarget ship that it had been previously tracking, thusleaving the ship unprotected. In such a situation theAC Radar system would not alert the Officer on watchthat anything had changed.


17:7 Marine radar systems fall into two differentfrequency bands: 3cms and 10 cms. Ten centimetreradars are generally regarded as better at dealing withclutter and fog, and 3 cms radars are regarded asproviding superior definition. The vast majority ofvessels have 3cms radars with 10 cms as a secondarysystem. Very few, if any, have 10cms installations only.

Most installations allow the AC Radar display toswitch from the 3cms Transceiver to the 10cmsTransceiver and modern vessels may have two ACRadar displays on the bridge.

17:8 While radar systems generally function well in fog,very dense fog has been known to reduce theamplitude of the radar signal to an unusually greatextent so that only very large and close targets can beseen. In such situations 10 cms radar systems aredeclared “faulty”. As soon as the vessel emerges fromthe fog the signal returns to normal strength and“target” vessels become visible on the screen again.Such an occurrence is unusual but it has been knownto occur in busy shipping lanes in temperate latitudes.

17:9 Radar systems are the subject of annualinspections and performance checks. Failure to meetthese checks can result in the ship being preventedfrom sailing depending on which authority isresponsible for providing certification.

However, AC Radar systems are complexelectronic systems and therefore subject toreliability issues. While specific mean-time-between-failures statistics are available from manufacturers,there is a consensus in the industry that thereliability of AC Radar systems is generally about asgood as a domestic light-bulb, (but harder to putright!)

There is, as yet, no system of inspection which canfully forecast the on-voyage reliability, orsusceptibility to breakdown, of any AC Radar system.

17:10 Anti Collision Radar Systems in summary :• AC Radar systems are only a navigational aid.

They cannot prevent a collision or groundingincident. They can only advise the Officer onthe Bridge;

• An AC Radar system can not take into accounthuman error, take remedial action or allow forthe unpredictable behaviour of other vessels;

• Targets can be lost in Rain or Sea cluttermaking the AC Radar system ineffective;

• Dense fog can reduce the performance;• The reliability of such complex electronic

equipment means that at some stage equipmentfailure is inevitable.

17:11 Finally it should be noted there is a wellrecognised category of marine shipping accidentknown as “Radar Assisted Collisions” which continueto occur despite frequent revision of the relevantcodes of conduct. [Ref 6: pps 166 &167]

18. Other “advanced safety features” of thePNTL ships

18:1 In addition to the double hulling and collisionresistant features and the AC radar systems discussedabove, PNTL owners also list twin props and engines

and bow thrusters as part of the advanced safetyfeatures of their ships.

18:2 Twin props and engines are undoubtedly a usefulfeature for any seagoing vessel and will greatly assist thereduction of vessel loss arising from mechanical breakdown.

However, reference back to Sections 14 and 15shows the total loss rate (as a result of a combinationof machinery and hull damage), of vessels is a low, butremarkably consistent, 4% of vessels from both thesingle hulled and the double hulled fleet.

18:3 The PNTL owners may be commended for fittingdouble engines and props to their vessels (on the basisthat every small contribution helps). However thesefeatures were never likely to exercise a significantlimiting factor over the major causes of loss to bothsingle and double hulled vessels, eg fire and explosion,foundering and wrecking and stranding.

18:4 In the case of the casualty type defined as“fire/explosion” the records show that many firesoriginate in the engine rooms of the stricken vessels,quickly become major shipboard incidents leading toloss of control over the engine(s) or engine failure andrequire evacuation of the engine room. A frequentoutcome of such fires is a total loss of power.

Typical of such a scenario was the incidentinvolving the 103m long chemical tanker MultitankAscania which experienced an engine room fire in midMarch (1999). This fire quickly becameuncontrollable, necessitating evacuation and sealingof the engine room prior to a fire fighting response. Inthe event the fire burned for approximately five days,while the engines and the engine room wereunapproachable and the vessel drifted out of controloff northern Scotland, with a highly toxic andexplosive cargo aboard. [Ref 16]

Since the PNTL vessels are not provided withseparate, protected engine rooms for each mainengine, there remains a high risk that a severe fireinvolving one engine would disable both engines andrequire evacuation of the engine room.

18:5 Similarly the fitting of bow thrusters does indeedprovide greater manoeuvrability at low speeds and thisis especially useful while manoeuvring in port andapproaching the dockside. However the generally lowspeeds and low kinetic energy involved in anypotential accidental contact/collision incident meansthat the risk of serious damage to a PNTL vessel insuch circumstances was never particularly significant.

18:6 As is the case with the double engines/propsfeature the fitting of bow thrusters to the PNTLvessels was never likely to exercise a significantlimiting factor over the three major causes of loss tosingle and double hulled vessels.

19. Additional Fire Detection and FireFighting Systems

19:1 PNTL Vessels are fitted with “extensive firedetection and fire fighting systems” which cover everyspace on the ship and much of the equipment isduplicated. At the time when the PNTL vessels werebuilt these features were quite advanced. However

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several classes of vessels (including gas, oil, productsand chemical tankers and passenger vessels) are nowfitted with “extensive fire detection and fire fightingsystems” similar to those on the PNTL fleet.

19:2 It is relevant to note that, as with other hazardousmaterials carriers, the PNTL fleet’s fire detection andfire fighting systems are based on the need to fight fireoriginating within the vessel’s cargo holds andmachinery spaces.

Thus response to fires originating from anothervessel (ie during a collision incident) is not a designpriority of the PNTL vessel. Given that oil, oil product,gas and chemical tankers now represent a significantpercentage of the world merchant fleet, the fact thatthe PNTL fleet carries such systems is no guarantee ofsurvival of fire incidents involving external fire sources.

19:3 In response to the design priority fire originatingwithin the vessel, the PNTL fleet has been fitted witha system which has the “ability to flood the holds andmachinery spaces with fire suppressant gases”.However, although such systems may well “improvethe odds of survival” they cannot guarantee it.

19:4 In the Multitank Ascania case mentioned aboveonce the engine room fire got out of control the engineroom was sealed and the ships advanced “carbondioxide smothering system” was released into theengine room. However this did not extinguish the firewhich burned for approximately five more days beforeit was extinguished and the engine room could bereopened and accessed. Only then, following decisiveaction by the on-scene salvage master, was it possibleto take the vessel into a well sheltered site where itsdangerous cargo could be safely transferred to anothervessel. [Ref 16]

20. The PNTL transport effort in the contextof the world fleet’s transport effort

20:1 Throughout the 1990s the nuclear transportindustry and its clients have made highly positivestatements about the proven safety of the maritimetransport of nuclear materials. The PNTL fleet’sowners state that as of January 1999, the PNTL ships“with more than 4.5 million miles covered without asingle incident resulting in the release of radioactivity,have a safety record second to none. With over 20years experience, PNTL has transported more than4,000 casks in over 160 shipments”. [Ref 3 : p 9]

20:2 Such statements are not particularly reassuringwhen analysed against global maritime trade andaccident statistics. The main problem is that both theactual transport volume of VHLW (in terms of cargo-miles) and the number of voyages present a statisticalsample which is so small as to be meaningless.

20:3 The widely differing capacity of the various flaskdesigns and the lack of detailed information about thenumber of each flask type carried on each PNTLvoyage rule out consideration of a tonne-mile figurefor INF transport. However, from the scantinformation which is available it may be calculatedthat the 30 year (1969 to 1999) total transport of INFis approximately 4,000 flasks (varying designs) or an

annual transport average of 133 flasks. Similarly the30 year total mileage covered is approximately 4.5million, giving an annual average of 150,000 miles.[Ref 3]

Thus the average annual seaborne movement of INFcasks may be expressed as approximately 20 million“flask miles” while the 30 year total seabornemovement of casks is approximately 18 billion “flaskmiles”.

20:4 By comparison, the transport statistics for theworld oil tanker fleet demonstrate that the PNTLtransport effort has been positively minute andstatistically insignificant.

Data drawn up by The International Tanker OwnersPollution Federation shows the 1998 total seaborne oiltrade was calculated at approximately 10,000 billiontonne-miles, and that the release of intermediate andlarge oil spills occurred on approximately 27 occasionsin that year. Thus it may be calculated that in 1998one intermediate to large oil spill occurred for every370 billion tonne-miles of oil carried at sea. [Ref 17]

Outside the oil tanker transport industry few wouldclaim that the international tanker owners had anexemplary safety record in terms of vessels lost,cargoes lost or environmental impacts caused.

20:5 Set in this statistical context the PNTLownership’s claim that they “have a safety recordsecond to none”, is insupportable because it is basedon too small a statistical sample to provide anymeaningful evidence. Even the PNTL fleet’s total 30year flask mileage (18 billion flask-miles) is minutewhen compared to the one year transport effort toaccident ratio of the oil tanker fleet (one intermediateor large spill per 370 billion tonne-miles of oil).

Put simply, the PNTL fleet just hasn’t completedenough flask-miles to start accruing significantaccident statistics.

21. Documented Accidents involving INFClass 3 carriers

21:1 I have contacted a number of sources to accessthe world wide statistics of accidents involving vesselscarrying nuclear cargoes. Regrettably it has not provedpossible to find a historically or geographicallycomplete list of such incidents. However, the MAIBhave provided a list of incidents involving INF carriers(from the world fleet: not PNTL alone) for the periodsince the computerised recording of such incidentsbegan in 1991.

In the period 1991 to 1998 (inclusive) there were 15incidents involving maritime INF carriers. Nine ofthese occurred in United Kingdom (UK) waters andsix outside UK waters. [Ref 18]

21:2 These incidents are listed in accordance with theMerchant shipping notice (M Notice) which definesincidents in terms of seriousness, as follows :

• Hazardous incident - near miss events includingnear collisions;

• Dangerous occurrence - machinery damage,failure/ fires etc;

• Accident – more serious with threat of damageto, or loss of, vessel.

In the case of the INF fleet the MAIB do not release


details such as name of vessel, type of cargo, volume ofcargo, source or destination of cargo to the public.

21:3 Of the nine UK incidents, three were potentiallyserious. One was a hazardous incident in 1997 whenan INF carrier had a near miss collision incident, inclear visibility, passing within four cables length (4 x608 ft) of a Ro/Ro ferry while both vessels weremanoeuvring at sea.

21:4 Two incidents were contact collisions. The firstoccurred in 1994 and was defined as an accident. Itoccurred as a result of the ship’s engine failure whileunder way in a UK port. Control over vessel was lostand she suffered collision with a bridge.

(N.B. Dual engines, dual propellers and bowthrusters did not prevent the occurrence of thisincident.) Vessel arrested by Admiralty Marshall inrespect of alleged damage.

The second occurred in 1998 as the result of anaccident when a barge broke her moorings in badweather and collided with an INF vessel in port. Bothvessels damaged.

21:5 The remaining incidents consisted of thefollowing:

• UK ports or coastal waters - February 1996Dangerous Occurrence (corroded pipe burstand released hot oil), January 1998 DangerousOccurrence (mechanical failure of hoist wire onstores crane), April 1998 Dangerous Occurrence(mechanical failure : human error);

• High Seas - February 1991 Accident(machinery), January 1995 DangerousOccurrence (minor fire), November 1995Dangerous Occurrence (fuel oil pipe detachedand fuel oil sprayed over engine), August 1998Dangerous Occurrence (lube oil pipe sheared);

• Foreign port or waters - September 1996Hazardous Incident (mooring line accident toseaman), June 1997 Dangerous Occurrence(minor fire in hold during testing procedure);

• Site and accident details not given - January1991 Hazardous Incident, December 1991Dangerous Occurrence, December 1991Accidents to personnel.

21:6 More recent information for the period 01/01/99to22/12/2000 has also been obtained from the MAIB.[Ref 19]

This shows that the following incidents have alsooccurred :

• UK ports and coastal waters - June 1999Dangerous Occurrences (two engine roomfires), September 1999 Accident (engine roomfire: minor), August 2000 Hazardous Incident(electrical failure: component over-heating);

• High Seas - February 1999 DangerousOccurrence (mechanical failure: high pressureair hose).

21:7 A total of 19 incidents occurring to INF vessels hasbeen recorded by the MAIB in the period 1991 to 2000.All of these were relatively minor in terms of theireventual outcome, but plainly demonstrate that theINF vessels and their crew are susceptible to a rangeof incident types.

Of the 19 incidents reported, over 25% (four) weregiven the most serious status - accident. There were atleast five actual fires and at least three incidents withfire potential (oil leaks etc.). There were two actualcollisions and one near miss

22. Incidents involving INF Class 1& 2 &IMDG Code Class 7 materials

22:1 IMDG Class 7 and INF Class 1 & 2 materials maybe carried on standard passenger or freight carriersand thus there is no rapid process for identifying anyvessel casualty which may have been carrying suchcargo at the time of the incident. However as a resultof media cover or previous work the followingincidents have been recorded.

22:2 SS ARDLOUGH 1986/87. General cargo vessel: losta deck consignment of radioactive Californium 252(alpha/gamma emitter) overboard in storm conditionswhile on passage from Liverpool to the Irish Republic.Consignment lost approximately south of the Isle ofMan between Holyhead and Dublin and neverrecovered.

22:3 My subsequent cross examination of Dept ofTransport representatives at the Hinkley CPWR PublicInquiry demonstrated that the UK Dept of Transportadmitted lead authority in relevant matters andconfirmed that they:

• were uncertain whether the consignment wouldfloat or sink;

• were uncertain how long consignment mightstay afloat or stay sunk;

• were uncertain of the integrity of Type A orType B packages in marine environments duringstorm conditions;

• had no method for tracking or locating (nonINF Class 3) nuclear consignments lost at sea;

• had no method for predicting the eventualdestination/fate of nuclear consignments lost atsea.

22:4 The MV MONT LOUIS in the mid 1980s was ageneral cargo vessel that ran aground and sank inshallow water in the Franco/Belgian sector of theNorth Sea. Its cargo included 60 casks of UraniumHexafluoride (U HEX). Weather remained calm,salvage response and equipment centres were nearby.Casks spilled from the vessel and spread over adjacentseabed: salvage work to recover U HEX was relativelyprolonged but eventually all casks were recovered.Some casks were reported damaged, but “nosignificant release of radioactivity” reported.

22:5 The MV CITY OF MANCHESTER in May 1999 was asmall container vessel that caught fire and drifted.Built 1979, length 104 ft : gross tonnage 4,000 :ownersAndrew Weir Shipping (regular carriers of IMDG code7 materials), Isle of Man flagged. Cargo 10 tonnes ofUranium Dioxide (UO2) powder in two consignments :one on deck and one below.

Cargo had been refined at BNF Springfield nuclearfuel manufacturing plant and was en-route to Salamanca(Spain). UO2 powder is fissile (enriched with U235) andis made into fuel pellets for AGR and PWR reactors (it isboth radio-toxic and chemically toxic).

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22:6 An engine room fire occurred aboard the vessel onthe night of the 9th May 1999, 30 miles south, south-west of the Pembrokeshire coast, the fire wasextinguished but the vessel lost power and began todrift in light to moderate winds. Assistance wasrequested and a tug was despatched from the nearest“safe haven”, the “nuclear free” Port of Milford Haven,Pembrokeshire .

The vessel remained in port for some days whileengine repairs were completed and then continued onher journey.

22:7 The incident was characterised by the extremedifficulty experienced in attempting to obtain acoherent picture of the unfolding event and the natureof the cargo.

BBC Wales TV on the 9th May reported that thevessel had “broken down” and was carrying low-graderadioactive wastes and/or contaminated materials forBNFL.

On the 10th of May the Milford Haven Coastguardreported the vessel was carrying a package of low-grade radioactive material, but reported the incident(fire) scenario accurately.

National Coastguard: Southampton 10th Mayreported the vessel carried two packages of “not veryactive material” but also reported the incidentscenario accurately.

Andrew Weir shipping 11th May would not discussthe incident and stated the vessel had been carryingtwo packages of regularly used material comparable tothose radioactive materials used in hospitals.

BNFL press office gave the final official version ofthe story as used above on May 12th.


1. The INF & IMDG (Class 7) Codes

a. The INF and the IMDG Class 7 Codes set out anumber of requirements for vessel design, cargomanagement and emergency plans. Much of thatmaterial refers back to the 1974 SOLAS Conventionand some of its subsequent amendments. Themajority of that material now applies to thegenerality of the world merchant fleet. Only aminority of that material is specific to vesselscarrying hazardous and noxious cargo.

b. The IMO can be commended for drawing up theCodes, and it is recognised that the Codes are ofassistance in maintaining a good general standardof vessel design, cargo management and emergencyplanning. However there is relatively little in theCodes to justify claims from the owners of INF Class3 ships (eg the PNTL fleet) that the IMO’s 1993 INFCode had “introduced stringent requirements forensuring the safety of vessels carrying radioactivematerials, covering the design specifications of thevessels concerned”.

c. The simple truth is that while some sections of theCodes contain material which is specific only to INFand IMDG Class 7 ships, it is also true that theCodes stipulate very little which is not currentlyfound on many contemporary types of wellappointed, properly maintained, efficient merchantvessels which have been inspected, flagged andinsured by responsible and reputable companies,agencies and administrations.

2. The World INF (Class 3) Fleet

a. The 1993 INF Code stipulates most of the featuresdesigned by the PNTL designers in the late 1970sand there is no evidence that any majormodification of the PNTL vessels has occurred sincethey were completed.

b. Three implications may be drawn:• the PNTL design was remarkably far sighted;• the IM0 (with little previous expertise in this

specific subject area) may have been stronglyreliant upon the advice of nuclear carriers indrawing up the INF Code recommendationsregarding vessel design, and thus based theirship design stipulations on the PNTLparameters;

• the IMO standard is not as “stringent” as thePNTL owners have claimed.

c. Many of the vessels in the world INF fleet are nowaging. Particular concern may be attached to twoRussian vessels, the Lepse (built 1961) and theSerebryanka (built 1974). In this context it isrelevant to note that all of the five strong PNTLfleet are now also aging (respectively 22, 21, 19, 16,and 14 years old).

3. Sea routes used by the PNTL fleet

a. There is no evidence to justify the PNTL ownership’sclaims, supported by the IAEA, that extra safety isimparted to the PNTL ships by careful routeplanning. On the contrary, the vast majority of allmerchant vessel movements are regularly subject tosuch planning in order to avoid excessive cost,delays or risk to vessel, crew and cargo.

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Summaryof review

findings

b. Although the PNTL ownership has not providedprecise route details, an in-depth analysis of thebroad scale routes used to date by the PNTL fleetdemonstrates that they involve passage through anumber of “Marine High Risk Areas” (Lloyds ofLondon definition) where weather conditions, seastates, vessel numbers and route congestion giverise to high shipping casualty numbers.

4. Double hulls

a. In submissions to the International MaritimeOrganisation, the PNTL ownership has failed toprovide precise details of the double hullingfeatures incorporated into the vessel design andconstruction. However, despite PNTL claims thatthe vessels have “double hulls”, it is evident thatthey should properly be described as “only partiallydouble hulled”, because the double hulling featureonly extends around the cargo hold, leaving the foreand aft sections of the vessels with only a singleskin.In this respect the PNTL fleet is not among the toprank of double hulled vessels in the world fleet ofhazardous materials carriers which are fully doublehulled. It is, in fact, inferior to many.

b. The PNTL ownership has made a number of claimsthat, because the double hulled design of theirvessels provides the ability to “withstand damageand remain afloat”, they are therefore effectively “aship within a ship” and have “high reliability andaccident survivability”.

c. However, evidence from government agencies andother major shippers of hazardous materials makesit quite plain that the double hull design is intendedspecifically, and only, to protect the cargo and thatthis task can only be guaranteed in the event of lowimpact collision or grounding events.

d. Thus the PNTL statements are mistaken andmisleading in two respects. Firstly, the double hull design is only intended toprotect the cargo space, not prevent the sinking ofthe vessel. Secondly, the double hull design will notprotect the cargo space in anything other than a lowenergy impact event.

5. Identified weaknesses of double hullfeatures

a. Since the design programme for the PNTL fleet(1970s) industrial bodies and government agencieshave concluded that there have been a number ofweaknesses inherent to the first generation ofdouble hull vessels.These include the potential for gas and moisturebuild up between the hulls, difficulty in venting thatgas and moisture, difficulty inspecting the doublehull void space, an enhanced potential for corrosionin the hull space, potential difficulties with repairin the double hull void space and the fact thatdouble hull features are thought to only offerprotection in low impact scenarios.

b. In response to these problems at least one majorhazardous materials carrier (BP Tanker Fleet) hasset about a re-design exercise and commenced theconstruction of a series of “enhanced” double hulledtankers in the mid 1990s.

Enhanced double hull tankers include innovationssuch as: extra structural members to providegreater strength in areas of the hulls where fatigueloads are highest, strengthening of key areas to givea greater margin of resistance against corrosion ofthe hull void space, use of “Grade D” steel instead ofthe more usually used “Grade A” steel, gas detectionpoints fitted in the hull void space, ventingprovisions fitted in the hull space and provision tofill the hull space with explosion/fire resistant inertgases.

c. In addition to the above, it is also self evident thatdouble hulling and associated collision resistantfeatures would potentially complicate any attemptsto salvage the vessel or their cargo.

6. The possibility of flooding of the PNTL fleet

a. In its submissions to the IMO, PNTL claims thateven if holed during a collision “holds andmachinery spaces could be completely flooded”while the ships could survive without sinking.In its submission to the IMO this PNTL claim is notsupported by any technical data or precise details.This means that the claim is scientifically andtechnically unjustified and should be regarded as anunsupported, hypothetical assumption.

b. The PNTL claim fails to discuss the impact ofsecondary effects of flooding such as: the potentialdecommissioning of vital primary systems andbackup systems (engines, generators, navigatingequipment etc.) and the subsequent loss ofmaneuverability, sea-kindliness and the ability toride heavy seas.All of these are major contributing factors to manyvessel losses, especially as a result of founderingand sinking.

c. No detail of any reference accident, simulationexercises, trials, tests or any hypotheticalcalculations are given in the PNTL submissions tothe IMO. Nor are there any discussions of theperformance of the PNTL vessels thus flooded, indifferent types of weather and sea states. Thismeans that the PNTL claim is scientifically andtechnically unjustified and should be regarded as anunsupported, hypothetical assumption.

7. The Design Collision Vessel

a. PNTL and the IAEA have not refuted suggestionsthat a specific “design collision vessel” has beenapplied to discussions of PNTL vessel safety. Theparameters of that “design collision vessel” are nowshown to have been significantly inappropriatethroughout the entire lifespan of the PNTL fleet.Specifically, the “design collision vessel” is shown tohave been smaller and slower than most merchantvessels in the world fleet during the constructionphase of the oldest PNTL. That position hascontinued to develop since then.

b. The details and description of the PNTL “designcollision vessel” also fail to discuss the nature of anycargo that vessel may carry. This review shows that,as of the 1980s, tankers and bulk carriers comprisedroughly 60% to 65% of the world merchant fleet andthat such vessels plainly pose a potential high risk


collision scenario with associated fire/explosionrisks. These parameters are not discussed withreference to any “design collision vessel”.

c. In the context of the information set out above it isevident that the “design collision vessel” no longerrepresents a credible reference incident becausethe number of vessels greatly exceeding theassumed relevant parameters (speed, tonnage,displacement) is now far greater than it was duringthe design process and that the design processmakes no reference to the extra risks posed byhazardous cargoes carried by other vessels whichmight be involved in collision scenarios.

8. Casualty statistics

a. PNTL have given collision avoidance a very highprofile in their publicity and their submissions tothe IMO.However 10 year casualty data from Lloyds ofLondon reveals 79.5% of total losses to the totalworld fleet (singe & double hulls) were caused byfoundering, wrecking/stranding and fire/explosion:in that order of importance. Collisions accountedfor only 11% of total losses.

b. 10 year data obtained from Lloyds of London reveals96% of the total loss casualties to the world doublehull feature fleet are due (in descending order ofimportance) to fire/explosion, foundering andwrecking/stranding and that collision did notaccount for any total losses.Thus it is evident that PNTL’s emphasis on collisionprevention was never the priority area for enhancedsafety features at the design and construction stage.

c. Under recent regulations an increasing percentageof single hull hazardous materials carriers will bephased out and replaced by double hulls. Casualtyfigures to vessels of this type must be expected torise commensurately.

9. Collision Avoidance Radar

a. PNTL and the IAEA argue that the use of CollisionAvoidance Radar systems renders the likelihood ofcollision extremely low.

b. However such systems are only navigational aids,which can only advise the crew, on their own theycannot prevent collision or grounding. They cannotaccount for human error, take remedial action orallow for the unpredictable behaviour of othervessels.

c. Such systems may not pick up low reefs, lowicebergs or low vessels such as barges. Targets canbe lost in certain rain or sea conditions, dense fogreduces the performance of such systems. Thereliability of such complex equipment means that atsome stage equipment failure is inevitable.

d. Despite the use of such systems and regular revisionof relevant codes of conduct and ever improvedstandards of radar training, there is a continuingphenomenon known as the “radar assisted collision”which arises as a result of human error.

10. Other advanced safety features of the PNTL fleet

a. PNTL have fitted duplicate engines and props to

their vessels. While acknowledging that this is auseful safety feature, this review notes that totallosses due to mechanical breakdown represent only4% of both the single and double hull fleet losses,and that the feature was never likely to exercise asignificant limiting factor over the major causes ofvessel loss (fire/explosion, foundering,wrecking/stranding).

b. Similarly the fitting of bow thrusters isacknowledged as a useful step. However, this technology is of little or no use inopen sea and high-speed scenarios. It is intendedfor use while maneuvering in port in low energy/lowimpact scenarios with very little risk of total loss ofthe vessel. Bow thrusters are most unlikely toexercise a significant limiting factor over the majorcauses of vessel loss.

c. Similarly it is acknowledged that the fire fightingand fire detection systems fitted to the PNTL fleetare of considerable value in combating the risk offires originating from within the vessel. However,there are recent examples where an onboard fireoriginating in the engine room, has disabled thevessel and very nearly caused total loss, despite thefitting of modern fire-fighting equipment such asthat fitted to the PNTL fleet.

d. It is also noted that the design priority for the fireresponse systems in the PNTL ships was a responseto on-board incidents with specific reference to fireswhich might affect the cargo. This review points outthat roughly 60% to 65% of the world merchant fleetconsists of tankers and bulk carriers and that, incollision scenarios, these vessels pose a vastlyincreased potential “outboard” originating fire riskwhich has not been specifically addressed in thedesign of the fire response systems.

11. The PNTL transport effort in the contextof the world fleet

a. PNTL owners claim an exemplary safety record inregard to their maritime transport of INF materials.This review demonstrates that the PNTL transporteffort is insignificant relative to that of otherhazardous materials carriers.The annual average movement of INF cargo by seamay be expressed as 20 million flask/miles.By comparison it can be calculated that in 1998there was one intermediate or large oil spill forevery 370 billion tonne/miles of oil carried by sea. Few commentators, even those within the industry,attempt to claim that this represents an exemplarystandard.

b. Set in this context, PNTL’s claims that they “have asafety record second to none” is meaninglessbecause it is based on a statistical sample too smallto provide any useful evidence. Put simply the PNTLfleet just hasn’t completed sufficient cargo/miles tostart accruing significant accident statistics.

12. Accidents involving INF Class 3 carriers

a. Although there have been no major losses to theINF fleet, the available evidence shows thatincidents of varying severity are a regularoccurrence aboard INF ships.Although it has not proved possible to access

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complete data on such events it can be shown that,for the period 1991 to mid 2000, there were 19incidents including at least five actual fires, at leastthree potential fires (oil leaks etc), two collisionsand one near miss collision. Over 25% of theincidents were given the most serious status“accident”.

b. Despite the fact that reporting of incidents withspecific reference to such cargoes is not mandatory,this review has also identified a number of seriousincidents involving IMDG (Class 7) radioactivematerials. These include the sinking of a vesselcarrying drums of such material, the loss of a deckcargo of such material overboard in a storm and adisabling fire aboard a vessel carrying fissile nuclearfuel.

R E F E R E N C E S1 Personal Communication from Martin Forward. CORE. Barrow in

Fureness. Cumbria. Dec 14th. 2000.2 Lloyd’s Register “Statistical Enquiry No 00389”. Nov’ 2000. Maritime

Information Publication Group. Lloyds Register of Shipping.London EC3M 4BS.

3 “Return shipment of vitrified residues from France to Japan”.Information File. January 1999. BNFL, COGEMA, ORC. (executivesummary : technical aspects).

4 “Information paper submitted to the special consultative meetingof the IMO by BNFL, COGEMA & FPC” . 1996.

5 “International Maritime Organisation : What it is, What it does,How it works” pps 29 and 30. IMO. Albert Embankment. LondonSE1 7SR

6 “The Times Atlas & Encyclopaedia of the Sea”. Ed Prof AliastairCouper. 2nd Edition. 1989. Times Books. London.

7 “Report of the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents into theGrounding & Subsequent Salvage of the Tanker Sea Empress atMilford Haven between 15 & 21 Feb 1996” pps 84-93. MAIB.Southampton. UK. July 1997. ISBN: 011551 8908

8 “Comments on MEPC 39/INF 15.” p.5. Undated. Submitted by theIAEA.

9 “Reduction of Pollution from Shipping.” pps 9 - 14. Seminar Report.Irish Sea Forum. University of Liverpool. ISSN 1360-4082

10 “The Sea Transport of Vitrified High Level Radioactive Wastes ;Unresolved Safety Issues” E.S. Lyman. Nuclear Control Institute.Washington DC. Dec 1996.

11 “Feasibility of Disposal of High Level Radioactive Waste into theSeabed. Volume 2 : Radiological Assessment” p114. OECD. Paris1988

12 Personal Communication. Fax message. 06/10/2000. LloydsMaritime Information Services. London.

13 “Data on Losses to Double Bottom/Hull Vessels”. Job No F96320.Lloyds Maritime Information Services. Lloyds of London. LondonEC2A 4LQ.

14 “Tanker Statistics”. Annex 2. Proceedings of MEPC 45/INF 29. IMO.London.

15 “Anti Collision radar - Navigation Aid”. Technical Briefing suppliedby P. Williams. California Farm. Swanage. Dorset. UK. (MarineElectronics Consultant.Holder of Krupp Atlas TechnicalMaintenance Certification for ARPA Anti-Collision Radar. MarineElectronics Officer (Retd after 15 years at sea, 10 on the QUE2.)

16 “Quick-think salvor keeps acid carrier off the rocks”. page 5.International Tug & Salvage. March/April 1999.

17 “Ocean Orbit”. Nov. 1999. page 6. ITOPF Newsletter. InternationalTanker Owners Pollution federation. London.

18 Personal Communication. Faxed Response to Query. 23/6/99. MAIB,Southampton. UK.

19 Personal Communication. Faxed Response to Query. 22/12/00.MAIB. Southampton. UK.

20 Personal Communication. Telephone call 26/02/01. Andrew Healey.Senior Counter Pollution Officer. UK Maritime and CoastguardAgency, Southampton, UK.


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A review of contingency planning forat sea emerencies involving

irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) cargo

1. The IMO’s Shipboard Emergency Plans(SEPs)

1:1 During the work on this report, a feature ofdiscussions with Government Agencies throughout theworld has been the repeated mantra that the variousflasks used in the maritime transport of INF Codematerials have been designed to such a high standardthat any loss of radioactivity, as a result of anyconceivable maritime accident, is not credible.

1:2 This confidence can be traced back to the IAEAwho have been regulating the design of such transportpackages for many years, have carried out a series oftests to demonstrate the accident survivability oftransport flasks in a series of specific accidentscenarios (few of which have a purely maritimenature) and regularly promulgate highly positivestatements about the safety and viability of theirapproved design packages including the range of INF,High Level Waste (HLW) and Vitrified Waste casks.

In this context it is worth noting that the IAEA is anorganisation with relatively little involvement andexperience in maritime transport matters.

By way of their publications the PNTL owners havealso contributed to the proposition that a loss of INFCode materials as a result of any conceivable maritimeaccident, is not credible.

1:3 However, the IMO (with a vast experience ofmaritime transport matters) has demonstrated itsevident acceptance that accidents leading to a loss, orpotential loss, of radioactivity are indeed a credibleoccurrence by incorporating into the INF Code a seriesof recommendations which provide guidance and/oradvice on procedures which might be followed in suchan eventuality.

1:4 Chapter 10 of the 1999 version of the IMO’s INFCode stipulates that “every ship carrying INF cargoshall carry on board a shipboard emergency plan”, thatsuch a plan should be approved by the Administration(of the vessel’s flag state) and that as a minimum theplan should consist of the following :

• the procedure to be followed by the master orother persons having charge of the ship toreport an incident involving INF cargo;

• the list of authorities or persons to be contactedin the event of an incident involving INF cargo;

• a detailed description of the action to be takenimmediately by persons on board to prevent,reduce or control the release, and mitigate theconsequences of the loss, of INF cargo followingthe incident (my emphasis);

• the procedures and points of contacts on theship for co-ordinating shipboard action withnational and local authorities”.

The 1999 version of the INF Code provides nofurther detail of Shipboard Emergency Plans. [Ref 1]

1:5 However the Shipboard Emergency Plans section ofthe 1993 version of the IMO’s INF Code [Ref 2] issupported by an 18 page appendix “Guidelines forDeveloping Shipboard Emergency Plans for ShipsCarrying Materials Subject to the INF CODE” preparedby the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committeeof the IMO and adopted in November 1997. [Ref 3]

1:6 This document covers all categories of INF Codematerials and the vessels used to carry those materialsincluding the following:

• Class 1 INF Ships: certified to carry INF cargowith an aggregate activity of less than 4,000TBq. (Class 1 INF material may be transportedon merchant vessels such as cargo ships/freighters, Ro/Ro and passenger ferries.)

• Class 2 INF Ships: certified to carry irradiatednuclear fuel or high level radioactive wasteswith an aggregate activity less than 2 X 106 TBqor ships carrying plutonium with an aggregateactivity of less than 2 X 105 TBq. (Class 2 INFmaterial may be transported on merchantvessels such as cargo ships/freighters, Ro/Roand passenger ferries.)

• Class 3 INF Ships: certified to carry INF, or highlevel radioactive wastes or plutonium with norestriction of the maximum aggregate activity.(INF Cargo required to be carried on Class 3INF ships shall not be allowed on passengerships and is generally carried on purpose builtvessels like those of the PNTL fleet.)

1:7 The foreword to the Guidelines states the mainobjectives are:

• “to assist ship owners in preparingcomprehensive shipboard emergency plans forships carrying INF Code materials: and

• to assist in responding to shipboardemergencies involving INF Code materials andin providing information in accordance withinternational law to authorities involved inassisting or handling incidents at sea involvingINF Code materials”.

1:8 Section 1 of the Guidelines defines the relevantterms :

• An “incident” is defined as any occurrence, orseries of occurrences (including the loss ofcontainer integrity) having the same originwhich results or may result in a release orprobable release of INF Code materials;

• “Release” is defined as either the escape of INFCode material from its containment system orthe loss of an INF Code package;

• “Shipboard Emergency Plan” (SEP) is definedas a document that is tailored to a particularship carrying INF Code materials and containsthe procedures to be followed in order to ensureshipboard preparedness for responding toemergencies.

1:9 Section 1 of the Guidelines also warns SEP writersthat the SEPs should be prepared on a ship by shipbasis and that they should make provision for themany variables (including the type and size of theship, category of the INF materials and their physicalproperties, nature of the intended route and anyrelevant shore-based management structures, thenature of the packaging and the potentialconsequences of related transport incidents).

1:10 Planners are warned that “for a SEP to beeffective, it should be carefully tailored to theparticular ship for which it is intended”. This point isre-emphasised when the planners are warned that

30 | A REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AT-SEA EMERGENCIES INVOLVING IRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUEL (INF) CARGO

while “a shipowner or operator with multiple shipsmay prepare one plan” for the whole fleet, thereshould be “a separate ship-specific annex for each shipcovered by the Plan”.

1:11 Section 1 of the Guidelines states that the Plan“should provide for small or routine emergencies.However, it should also include guidance to assist themaster in meeting the demands of a large scaleincident, should the ship become involved in one.”

It also repeats that the Plan is intended to “assistpersonnel in avoiding the further escalation of anincident and in dealing with an actual or potentialrelease of INF Code materials. Its primary purpose isto set in motion the necessary actions to avoid orminimise a release and to mitigate its effects”.

2. Responsibilities for Action on SEPs

2:1 Sections 1:14 to 1:21 of the INF Code’s Guidelinesfor SEPs define the various responsibilities forpreparing and dealing with a marine transportincident involving INF Code materials. Specificallythese sections define the diverse duties of theconsignor or shipper (BFL/Cogema etc.) and thecarriers (PNTL).

2:2 The consignor or shipper is responsible forensuring that before an INF cargo sails, the carrier is“made fully aware of the procedures to be followed,both on board the ship and by shore-basedorganisations, in the event of an incident involvingsuch materials.”

2:3 The consignor or shipper also has the responsibilityto know and comply with all the “applicableinternational, national, state or local regulations orguidelines pertaining to the shipment of INF Codematerials” and to understand “how to deal with all thepotential difficulties anticipated when shipping bysea”.

In addition the consignor should make available tothe carrier the appropriate technical information,emergency instructions and notification information.

2:4 Generally the consignor “should be prepared toassist in an emergency response to an incidentinvolving any INF Code materials by providing timelyand detailed information about shipments and to sendimmediately emergency response/support assets to anincident site, if required. The planning for suchassistance should be complementary to the Plan.”

2:5 The carrier also has responsibility both for “safetyduring transport and in the event of an incident. Ingeneral, both the carrier and the consignor should beprepared to respond immediately to an incidentinvolving INF Code materials.”

The carrier also has the responsibility of“facilitating a prompt response by the consignor/shipper and crew in the event of an incident”.

2:6 The carrier is also responsible for knowing andcomplying with all applicable regulations pertaining tothe carriage of INF Code materials, including thedifferent response procedures in all areas along theroute; ensuring that any incident is properly and

quickly assessed by people who are knowledgeable inresponding to INF incidents, ensuring that properemergency instructions are carried on each ship,ensuring that all required notifications areaccomplished in an expeditious manner and ensuringthat the nearest coastal State, the consignor, andother appropriate authorities are immediatelyinformed.

2:7 A major outcome of the division of duties andresponsibility laid out in the IMO’s INF Code isexpressed in paras 2:4 and 2:5 above. From these parasit is evident that the IMO expect the consignor(BNFL/Cogema/others in the case of the PNTL fleet)and the carrier (PNTL) to take a major part in anyresponse action in the event of an incident.

However, it should be noted that the Guidelinesstate that the consignor “should be prepared to assist”and to send “response/support assets....if required”.The use of such language demonstrates that IMOneither expect, nor recommend, that either theconsignor or the carrier take lead responsibility inresponse action.

2:8 The Guidelines also state that, without interferingwith the ship owners liability, and under entitlementenshrined in both the 1969 Convention onIntervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollutionand the 1973 Protocol relating to Intervention on theHigh Seas in Cases of Pollution by substances otherthan Oil, “some coastal States consider that it is theirresponsibility to define techniques and means to betaken against a marine pollution incident and approvesuch operations which might cause further pollution.”

In this context it is therefore surprising to note thata number of statements from some major coastalStates imply that first and prime responsibility forresponse in the event of an incident has been devolvedto the consignor and/or the shipper.

3. Devolution of responsibility from coastalStates to the consignor or carrier

3:1 Thus the UK’s recently re-written, 140 page,“National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution fromShipping and Offshore Installations” covers the “UKpollution control zone” which extends out 200 milesfrom the baseline (or to the nearest median line). ThePlan deals mainly with the response to oil spills butdoes contain a four page section headed “OtherHazardous Substances”.

3:2 In that section three sentences are devoted to thesubject of maritime accidents involving radioactivecargo materials. It is stated that, in the case of anincident involving a ship “operated by British NuclearFuels Limited or by its subsidiary, Pacific NuclearTransport Limited”, a set of “special arrangementsagreed between the MCA and those companies apply”.[Ref 4]

3:3 Further communication with the MCA has revealedthat the MCA is the junior partner in this agreement.The “Special Arrangements” are not the property ofthe MCA, the MCA has no rights or authority overthem and the MCA has no right to release any detailsof them. Furthermore, the Special Arrangements are

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“commercial-in-confidence and also under theownership and authorship of another Authority”, andthey “are the property of, and under the editorship of,British Nuclear Fuels Limited”. [Ref 5]

3:4 From the above it may be deduced that BNFL havewritten the relevant response plans, have retained theresponsibility for editing them, retain all rights ofownership, publication and operation of them and thatthe MCA (although the UK Agency with leadresponsibility for national maritime pollutionresponse) is superseded by BNFL and PNTL in respectof response to at-sea radioactive pollution from BNFLor PNTL ships.

These are matters which appear to be “outwith” thecontrol of the UK Government.

3:5 A similar situation appears to be in place inAustralia. On 10 September 1999, the AustralianMinister for Foreign Affairs answered a series ofquestions arising from a medical evacuation followingan incident aboard a PNTL ship.

Among the questions was a request for details aboutthe kind of accident that would trigger theinvolvement of a BNFL emergency team and a requestfor details of the criteria which might govern BNFLinvolvement. The Australian Minister could not, orwould not, answer this question and stated that itshould be “referred to BNFL”. [Ref 6]

3:6 Although no reason was given for this answer, itmay be deduced that, as is the case in the UK, thefinal operational decision making responsibility lies inthe hands of the PNTL owners and that these arematters which are also “outwith” the control of theAustralian government.

3:7 Given that both UK and Australia are developednations with a domestic nuclear industry and a body oftechnical experience, equipment and personnel it issurprising they should wish to devolve the right totake on the “responsibility to define techniques andmeans to be taken against a marine pollution incidentand approve such operations which might causefurther pollution,” bestowed upon them by variousinternational agreements.

To date neither government has advanced anexplanation to justify this position.

3:8 Such an action appears especiallyincomprehensible in the case of the Australiangovernment which has no other discernible influenceover the INF consignors (BNFL etc.) or the carriers(PNTL). By contrast, the UK government (as principalowner/shareholder of BNFL) has a significantpotential degree of influence over the action of bothconsignors and shippers.

4. Essential Provisions of SEPs

4:1 The Guidelines stipulate that SEPs should containthe following:a. the procedure to be followed in reporting an

incident and a list of those to whom such a reportshould be made;

b. a detailed description of the action to be taken toprevent, reduce or control the release and mitigate

the consequences of the loss of INF Code material;c. the procedures for co-ordinating shipboard action

with national and local authorities;d. the provision of specific information regarding the

ship;e. guidance on reporting to the nearest coastal States

(such a report is required whenever there is anactual, or probable, release, and in the event of anydamage, failure or breakdown of a ship carrying INFCode materials which effects the safety of the ship:these to include, collision, grounding, fire,explosion, structural failure, flooding, cargo shifting,impairment of navigational safety, failure orbreakdown of steering gear, propulsion systems,electrical generating system and navigational aids).

f. initial reporting should include answers to thefollowing questions: are there any injuries on board,is there/was there a fire near the INF Codematerials, what kind of radiological/chemicalhazards exist, what are the meteorologicalconditions and wind direction.

4:2 The SEPs should facilitate rapid and efficientreporting. To that end it should contain a detailed listof persons, agencies and organisations to be contactedand take into account the need for 24 hour contactand to provide alternatives to the primary designatedcontact.

4:3 The Plan should include a list of agencies/officialsof the administration of the nearest Coastal State, whohave the responsibility for receiving and processingreports of incidents involving INF Cargoes. For shipsin port, a similar list of relevant port officials shouldbe available.

In addition there should also be a list of all partieswith an interest in the ship and the cargo.

4:4 The SEP should also identify points of contact forspecialised radiological monitoring and assessmentteams on a 24 hour basis so that they can be “notifiedexpeditiously” when their assistance is required.

5. Shipboard Emergency Procedures

5:1 Commenting that the ship personnel will almostalways be in the best position to take quick, primaryaction to prevent, reduce or control the release of INFCode materials from the ship, the Guidelines stipulatea series of shipboard procedures, which “as aminimum” should provide the ship’s personnel withthe ability to counter actual or potential emergenciesinvolving INF Code materials.

The Guidelines are at pains to point out that suchprocedures will vary widely from ship to ship and thateven features like different routes may result inshifting emphasis being placed on various aspects ofplanned emergency procedures.

5:2 The Guidelines stipulate that various checklists,flow charts and other means which will ensure themaster considers all appropriate casualty factors andparameters are incorporated into the SEP.

These should include consideration of the followingscenarios : grounding/ stranding, fire/explosion;collision; hull failure; serious structural failure;flooding; heavy weather damage and icing; excessive


list; equipment failure (eg main propulsion or steeringgear); containment system failure (eg release of INFCode material, contamination, or loss of cargo);security threats; submergence; foundering andwrecking.

While there is no doubt that a range of generalprinciples are applicable to such scenarios, theGuidelines do not point out the fact that any one ofthe scenario types includes an open ended range andnumber of events and that no one event covered by adefined “scenario type” is the same as any other.

5:3 The Guidelines state that “procedures for dealingwith the following incidents should be developed andpractised:a. abnormal radiation levels detected by remote

monitoring instruments;b. discovery of abnormal contamination on clothing,

shoes or in spaces outside of the cargo hold;c. flask coolant loss or leak;d. movement or a shifting of a flask from its transport

position;e. unexpected temperature rise at the flask surface;f. dropping a flask during loading or unloading.”

5:4 The Guidelines state that prior to considering anyremedial actions the master will need to obtaindetailed information on the damage sustained by theship and the INF Code material containers. TheGuidelines stipulate that “a visual inspection shouldbe carried out when it is safe to do so” and thatadequate personnel should be on board to assess threebasic issues by means of standard equipment andradiological assessment procedures. (These basicissues are: confirming the quantity and type of INFCode materials involved, ascertaining whether the INFcontainers or packages have been breached andassessing the existing radiological hazards.)

5:5 While “standard equipment and radiologicalassessment procedures” will provide usefulinformation on the actual loss of INF Code materials,they cannot provide information relevant to assessingthe future potential for such loss.

It would thus appear that the IMO accept there issole reliance on visual observation of the post-incidentcondition of both the vessel and the INF containers inorder to assess their physical condition and thepotential for breaching of container integrity and theloss of INF Code materials.

The Guidelines fail to note that visual inspectionmight not be possible in certain incident scenarios andfail to provide guidance on the action to be taken if avisual inspection cannot be carried out.

5:6 The Guidelines also stipulate the master’s priorityis to ensure the safety of personnel and the ship andto take action to prevent escalation of the incident.Thus in casualty situations involving a release of INFCode materials the Guidelines describe measuresaimed at preventing contamination of personnel:

• altering course so that the ship is upwind of thereleased or lost cargo;

• shutting down non-essential air intakes;• using protective clothing etc.

The Guidelines offer no supporting advice orcomment relevant to the case of “altering course”

which requires the use of functioning engines (one ofthe casualty scenarios listed in 5:2 above is loss ofpropulsion) and is a manoeuvre which may not bepossible in moderate to severe sea and weatherconditions.

5:7 It is also stated that “when it is possible tomanoeuvre, the master, in conjunction with theappropriate shore authorities, may consider movingthe ship to a more suitable location to facilitateemergency repair work, cargo transfer operations, orto reduce the threat posed to any particular sensitiveocean or shoreline areas.”

It is noted that “Such manoeuvring should be co-ordinated with the coastal State.” (This is a furtherindicator of the need for joint and co-ordinatedexercises between the INF Ship and the shore basedauthorities).

5:8 As paragraph 5:5 (above) shows, the IMOGuidelines have concentrated on the safety of crewand vessel. This is appropriate in the context ofemergency activities and emergency advice that theIMO might usually be expected to comment on and isalso in accord with a wide range of Internationalagreements which are based on the obvious historicalrisks and impacts to vessels and personnel.

5:9 However, in the case of a range of more recenthazardous cargoes, especially certain chemical andINF cargoes, it is evident that there is also a potentialrisk of major public health impacts to personnel onadjacent vessels and populations in adjacent coastalStates. There is also a powerful potential risk of majorenvironmental and commercial impacts to theimmediate and adjacent sea areas and the terrestrialand intertidal environments of adjacent coastal States.

5:10 The IMO Guidelines have failed to offer any adviceon measures aimed at preventing contamination ofpersonnel and populations and marine, intertidal andterrestrial environments by INF materials which havebreached their containment and escaped into theenvironment.

5:11 This is a subject area of deep complexity whichrequires prompt attention by the IMO and others. Thisreview advises that the IMO should give considerationto the weighting of impact risks to the INF vessel andpersonnel compared to those of personnel or public onadjacent vessels. Similar consideration should begiven the weighting of impact risks to the INF vesseland personnel compared to those of aquatic orterrestrial environments.

5:12 This review recommends that the IMO shouldadvise that, in circumstances involving loss or release(or potential loss or release) of INF material, an INFcarrier should alter course in order to achieve thefollowing:a. personnel on adjacent ships, populations in

adjacent coastal States and marine, intertidal andterrestrial environments in immediate or adjacentcoastal States are placed “upwind of the released orlost cargo”;

b. sufficient distance is put between those personnel,populations and environments and the “released or

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lost cargo” as to permit dilution and dispersion ofreleased or lost materials to such a level that nopublic or environmental health impact will arise.

6. Cargo Transfer

6:1 The Guidelines also state that SEPs should provideguidance on the procedures to be followed for ship-to-ship transfer of INF Code materials and for the saferemoval from the ship of INF Code materials orpackages that may have been damaged during loadingor unloading.

The Guidelines assume that there will be pre-existing company plans for such procedures (ship-to-ship transfers) and stipulate that these should be keptwith the main SEP.

6:2 It is stipulated that SEPs should address the needfor co-ordinating this activity with the coastal State,because such operations may be subject to itsjurisdiction. This implies the need for joint and co-ordinated exercises with the coastal State authorities.

6:3 Despite the potential complexity of the ship-to-shiptransfer and the wide variety of scenarios in which theprocess might be necessary, the IMO’s discussion ofship-to-ship cargo transfer is brief and imprecise.

6:4 When offering guidance on planning for anemergency which may affect the safe operation of theship and/or cause potential or actual loss ofcontainment of INF Code materials, the Guidelines list14 examples (some of them multi-factoral) of incidenttypes which should be considered.

Since ship-to-ship transfer is unlikely to beconsidered unless the transport vessel was damagedand unable to proceed, or was deemed unsafe for someother reason (i.e. keeping the INF Code materialonboard might lead to breach of containment,escape/loss of INF Code material) it would appearlogical to use the same incident type list. That is:grounding/stranding, fire/explosion, collision, hullfailure, serious structural failure, flooding, heavyweather damage and icing, excessive list, equipmentfailure (eg main propulsion or steering gear),containment system failure (eg release of INF Codematerial, contamination, or loss of cargo), securitythreats, submergence, foundering and wrecking.

No such list of incident types informs the IMO’sconsideration of ship-to-ship transfer and it remainsunclear whether the IMO are referring to at-seaoperations or dock/port ship-to ship operations.

6:5 A study of submissions made by the PNTLownership to both the IMO and other end users,reveals that there is considerable experience of in-portshore-to-ship and ship-to-shore transfer of INF Codematerials with the vessels securely attached to thedock side and using both shore based and floatingcranes. [Refs. 7 & 8]

6:6 Given the hazardous nature of the INF Codematerials, and taking into account the relative verticaland horizontal movement of both vessels (while underway or moored/anchored), it is to be expected that theship-to-ship transfer of such cargoes in a port, dock,harbour or sheltered coastal environment will be a

matter of additional technical complexity relative toship-to-shore operations.

In order to carry through such operations with anydegree of success it is to be expected that the processwould be the subject of regular exercises in ports,harbours and sheltered waters.

However, during the course of this study I havefound no reference to any such exercises in the PNTLliterature nor have I found any examples of ship-to-ship transfers which have taken place in such waters.

6:7 In the open sea environment the ship-to shiptransfer of large and heavy items (while stationary orunderway) is widely understood to be a matter ofconsiderable complexity. This complexity can begreatly increased by a range of unpredictable andunstable ambient weather and sea conditions which,at their more severe, may make the relative verticaland horizontal movements of the vessels so extreme asto preclude any attempts at ship-to-ship transfer.

Although naval and maritime rescue personnelregularly undergo at-sea transfer and re-fuellingexercises involving vessels under way in open seaenvironments, I have found no reference to suchexercises in any PNTL literature, nor have I foundreference to any occasions when such transfer hasbeen completed or attempted in such environmentsand conditions.

6:8 It should be noted that neither the PNTL owner’s1996 submissions to the IMO [Ref 7] or the PNTLowner’s public information file of 1999 [Ref 8], whichrespectively pre-date and post-date the IMO’sGuidelines (adopted 1997), contain any reference toship-to-ship transfer of INF Code materials. It isparticularly noticeable that such material is notincluded in either document’s discussion of“Emergency Planning” or “Emergency ResponseArrangements”.

6:9 Ship-to-ship transfer of INF Code cargo may benecessary or advantageous if a PNTL vessel waswrecked, stranded or sunk. Plainly these are theevents were the complexity of such operations isgreatly increased by unpredictable and unstableambient conditions including , sea and weather state,depth at which vessel/cargo are lying, ambient tidesand currents.

There is no reference, in the PNTL documentationquoted above, to any training, exercises, drills or otherconsideration or study of the environmentalparameters and problems associated with ship-to-shiptransfer of INF Code materials in these situations.

6:10 Given the obvious complexity of ship-to-shiptransfer operations in the wide range of conditions inwhich it might be deemed necessary, it is regrettableto note that the IMO Guidelines for SEPs have alsofailed to address the subject of environmentalparameters and their likely effect on ship-to-shiptransfer operations.

7. Training

7:1 The IMO Guidelines also provide guidance ontraining procedures. However it is noticeable that theIMO is less prescriptive on this matter than it is on


others. Whereas the IMO Guidelines uses phrases suchas “the Plan should” in respect of other guidance, inthe case of training the IMO Guidelines say “the Planmay”.

It is stated that training will ensure that the SEPfunctions as expected and that the specified contactsand communications are accurate. It is stated thatsuch training may be held in conjunction with othershipboard training programmes.

7:2 Both consignors and carriers involved in thetransport of INF Code materials should providetraining on their emergency instructions and thehazards of the materials involved. Training should berole specific and provisions should be made for“refresher” training and for the review of incidentexperience and practical problems.

7:3 Ship’s crew should all receive training sufficient toprovide them with basic information on relevantsubjects including the fundamentals of: first aid,radiological hazards, protective measures, transportregulations and radiation protection and control.

7:4 The IMO Guidelines recommend that “a moreextensive training programme is necessary to maintainthe skills of the master and ship’s officers”.

The minimum training for these personnel shouldinclude incident assessment techniques usingradiological monitoring instruments, theimplementation of protective measures, use ofprotective clothing and equipment, and furtherdetailed instructions on the transport regulations andpackaging of radioactive materials.

7:5 Although having an extensive and internationallyrecognised education scheme offering training formariners and others in many aspects of at-sea andcoastal response to oil spills and chemical spills, theIMO has no training scheme offering any education forresponding to emergencies involving the maritimetransport of any class of radioactive materials.

8. Exercises

8:1 The IMO Guidelines also provide guidance onexercise and drill procedures. However it is noticeablethat the IMO is also less prescriptive on this matterthan it is on others. Whereas the IMO Guidelines usesphrases such as “the Plan should” in respect of otherguidance, in the case of exercise and drill proceduresthe IMO Guidelines say “the Plan may”.

8:2 The Guidelines say that the SEPs may address theexercise and drill programmes to be carried out by theowner or operator of the vessel in order to maintainthe appropriate level of preparedness. Exercisescenarios could be developed and used to test theresponse capabilities and skill of the officers and crew.

8:3 It is suggested that “exercises could be based uponrealistic accident exercise scenarios designed to testall major aspects of the plans” including theeffectiveness of communication links and themobilisation of emergency resources and specialisedteams. The IMO have not specified whether theguidance is referring to on-vessel or off-vessel

“emergency resources and specialised teams”.

8:4 It should be noted that statements from somecoastal States have implied that first and primeresponsibility for response in the event of an incidenthas been devolved to the consignor and/or the shipper,and that the response will be managed according toplans, strategies and technology described in theconfidential BNFL/PNTL “Special Arrangements”.

In this context it is surprising that the IMO offersno specific or detailed advice or guidance for off-vesselexercises. Nor does the IMO offer any advice orguidance on the subject of expediting the despatch,transport and transfer of off-vessel emergencyresources and specialised teams to the INF carriereither in port or at sea.

8:5 The IMO Guidelines also suggest that exercisesshould aim to test the co-operation between agenciesand services involved. In order to fulfil this particularbrief it would appear necessary to undertake jointexercises with shore based agencies and authorities inrelevant coastal States. However, the IMO offers noadvice or guidelines on how such exercises should beconducted.

8:6 In respect of both exercises and actual incidents,this is a subject area of some complexity, particularlyin matters of international and maritime law.

As stated above (Chap 3) coastal States areentitled, under international agreements, to definetechniques and means to be taken against a marinepollution incident and to approve such operationswhich might cause further pollution. There is also thematter of maritime territorial rights and the right of anon-national to intervene in incidents taking placewithin the coastal States jurisdiction.

8:7 The IMO, with its broad base of delegates frommaritime and coastal States and its consensualmethod of working, would appear to be well placed tooffer guidance in such matters and to work towardsachieving some form of international consensus tofacilitate and expedite the response to incidentsinvolving INF carriers.

However, the IMO Guidelines on SEPs make nomention of such a consensus and offer no advice orguidance on how to achieve consensual workingpractices in the event of exercises or actual incidents.

8:8 The IMO Guidelines also state that “anotherobjective of the exercises is to strengthen theconfidence of the personnel that they can adequatelyhandle an incident.”

Up to a point this may be a beneficial outcome ofexercises, however there is a danger of generating anexcess of unjustified confidence, particularly in theupper echelons of INF shipping management.

8:9 The Guidelines also suggest that drills designed todevelop, test and maintain special skills may becarried out either as subsets of exercises orindependent of them.

The Guidelines also suggest that provision “may” bemade for the critique of drills and exercises byqualified observers. The IMO does not define therelevant qualifications or indicate whether there is a

35 |

pool of suitably qualified (INF experienced)independent observers not attached to the nuclearindustry.

9. Salvage

9:1 The IMO Guidelines on SEPs also state that SEPsshould contain information on the crew’sresponsibilities, in an incident where the ship ispartially or fully disabled, and what constitutesdangerous conditions. There should be a decisionmaking process in place to assist the master indetermining when salvage assistance should beobtained. The decision making process should include,at the least, the following details:

• nearest land or hazard to navigation;• ship’s set or drift;• location and time of impact (with land or

hazard) based on the ship’s set and drift;• estimated time of incident repair;• determination of nearest capable assistance and

the response time (in the case of tug assistance,the time it will take for the tug to arrive onscene and secure the tow).

9:2 Noting that in any such incident there will be a“window of opportunity” for response time, theGuidelines advise “it would not be prudent to hesitatein calling for assistance when the time needed to carryout repairs goes beyond the window of opportunity”.

9:3 Salvage is a large and complex subject areainvolving much more than calling for assistance from atug and waiting for it to arrive on scene and securethe tow.

The IMO Guidelines on salvage matters are bothbrief and imprecise and fail to address a wide range ofsubject areas including the wide range of factorswhich complicate tug towage procedures (eg weatherand sea states or the nature of the damage to the INFcarrier), what to do if the “window of opportunity” isexceeded, the provision of off-vessel fire fightingfacilities and a range of actions which might be takenin order to facilitate any post-incident salvageattempts (eg running the vessel aground in shallowwaters were salvage/recovery operations would beeasier).

10. The Nature of the IMO decision-makingprocess

10:1 It should be noted that the IMO is a consensualorganisation which cannot impose its advice, guidanceor recommendations on states or organisations whohave not agreed to them.

10:2 Consequently the final draft of the IMO Guidelineson SEPs is the product of a consensual processoperating by committee and that special subjectcommittees are in general composed ofrepresentatives sent by interested/concerned membergovernments. These representatives are generally civilservants from relevant ministries or departments suchas Transport or Shipping. Observer status is generallygranted to relevant industrial bodies.

10:3 There is (as is always the case with consensual

decisions) a strong possibility that decisions orrecommendations arrived at and promulgated by IMOcommittees may not be a reflection of the latesttechnical understanding or emergency experience, butthe product of a process involving both bargaining andpolitical lobbying.

11. Published PNTL/BNFL EmergencyResponse Arrangements

11:1 As identified above (Chapter 3) there are a set of“Special Arrangements” for response to emergenciesinvolving vessels carrying INF Code materials. Thesearrangements are written and edited by BNFL,commercially confidential and not available to anymembers of the public or the majority of their electedrepresentatives.

It appears that these “Special Arrangements”constitute a full range of at sea emergency responseactions to be taken aboard an INF maritime transportin the event of any emergency. As such it appears thatthey represent the only response in many sea areas.Certainly this appears to be the case in both UKterritorial waters [Ref 4 ] and Australian territorialwaters. [Ref 6 ]

11:2 However, three other documents which makereference to BNFL and PNTL emergency arrangementsfor vessel incidents have been reviewed.

Some details of the emergency responsearrangements for the PNTL vessels are provided in anInformation File published by the PNTL owners in1999. [Ref 8]

Very similar details are given in a publisheddocument submitted by the PNTL owners to the IMOin 1996. [Ref 7] It is evident that this 1996 publicationis the source of the material in the 1999 publication.

It is evident that the source of the material in the 1996submission to the IMO is a verbal presentation made byBNFL’s head of Transport Operations to the SpecialConsultative Meeting on INF Transport at the IMO in1996 which contains very similar material. [Ref 9]

11:3 Study of these three documents shows there havebeen no significant changes in the emergencyresponse arrangements between March 1996 andJanuary 1999.

12. BNFL/PNTL reasons for drawing up ERAs

12:1 The transcript of the verbal presentation made byBNFL’s head of Transport Operations to the IMO statesthat:

“Whilst BNFL know that with respect to theseshipments there would be no reason for concernand no consequences which could significantlyaffect persons or the environment, it is necessary toprovide a rapid and effective response in order toprovide reassurance,”because it is “recognised by BNFL that in the event of anincident involving an INF shipment there would begenuine concern by members of the public,particularly in countries not familiar with ouroperations.”

12:2 The BNFL presentation gave no references ordetails about the empirical science which formed the


basis of the claimed knowledge that “there would beno reason for concern and no consequences” from anemergency. Thus it would appear that, in respect ofvessel + INF cargo emergencies, this is a claim withno basis in empirical science.

Since the PNTL fleet’s total cargo/miles transportstatistic is so minute that it is statisticallyinsignificant and since the PNTL fleet has noexperience, to date, of major accidents this is astatement that, in respect of vessel + INF cargoemergencies, has no basis in practical experience.

Furthermore it ignores the consensual maritime andengineering experience that although it is possible toplan for, and reduce the threat of, the knownproblems, there are always a range of technical,management and human error problems as yet un-identified and unforeseen.

12:3 It is evident that, when addressed directly to theIMO, the BNFL/PNTL response plans andarrangements are based on the twin beliefs that : a. there is no reason for concern about the INF

shipments, but : b. it is necessary to provide reassurance to the public.

Since a shipment is usually defined as “aconsignment of goods or cargo, or an act or instance ofshipping goods or cargo” it is unclear whether BNFLwere referring to the INF cargo, the INF ships or bothin this context.

12:4 It may also be argued that BNFL havemisunderstood the nature of the genuine publicconcerns centred around INF shipments when theyindicate their belief that the concern would beparticularly significant in countries not familiar withtheir operations.

The record of public comment and activism relatedto BNFL activities suggests it is likely public concernabout maritime transport of INF Code materials is atleast as great in countries with a long experience ofBNFL (the UK and Ireland for example) as it is incountries where BNFL operations are unfamiliar.

12:5 The 1996 publication of the PNTL ownerssubmission to the IMO says that:

“PNTL has extensive emergency responsearrangements and salvage plans because it recognisesthat there are hazards in marine activities which couldendanger the ships and its crew”.

Thus, for public consumption, BNFL and the otherowners of PNTL have :a. modified their interpretation of the need for

emergency response arrangements; b. deleted any reference to the necessity “to provide

reassurance” to the public; c. recognised that there are hazards in marine

activities which could endanger the ship and crewbut

d. made no mention of INF Code materials and evadeddiscussion of any potential impact on, or fate of, theINF Code materials and their containers.

13. BNFL/PNTL Emergency ResponseCommunications

13:1 There is a Report Centre, at Barrow in the UK,

with suitably qualified staff to provide expert advice tothe ships’ masters on a 24 hour a day basis.

All vessels are fitted with an automatic voyagemonitoring system which transmits details of thevessel’s position, speed and heading to the ReportCentre every two hours. These transmissions areperformed automatically and without any interventionfrom the crew. If a message was not received by theReport Centre at the allotted time the EmergencyResponse System would be activated.

13:2 It is stated that in order to ensure goodcommunications all BNFL and PNTL vessels are fittedwith satellite communications, telex over radio,wireless telegraphy and radio telephone systems whichprovide sufficient secondary communication systems.This is good sense because each of these systems maybe subject to breakdown or damage during anemergency situation.

13:3 However, in respect of the communicationssystems the BNFL/PNTL information is brief andimprecise. None of the BNFL/PNTL presentationsand/or submissions to the IMO provide any furtherdetails of the transmission system, nor have theyoffered an analysis or discussion of any potentialproblems with that system.

13:4 It is probable that such a system is some form ofSCADA (Self Contained Automatic Data Acquisition)system, which is relayed, by satellite transmission, tothe Report Centre at Barrow.

It is probable that the transmission system would bebased on, or similar to, the widely used INMARSAT Ccommunication system which uses geo-stationarysatellites positioned over the equator to receive andtransmit the data.

13:5 This is a system with a generally good record ofperformance but, in certain specific sea areas, theremay be operational problems arising from the fact thatthe geo-stationary satellites are positioned over theequator. In particular, this means that if a vessel issteaming in far northerly or far southerly latitudes, thesatellites are fairly low down on the horizon.

In such a situation the proximity of high land (lyingbetween the vessel and the satellite) has been knownto prevent transmission. Such an effect is observed incertain Norwegian fjords.

13:6 Although full voyage details for INF Class 3shipments are not released, it is understood that someof the PNTL transports have been routed round CapeHorn. It may have been, or may in the future be, thatsuch voyages were routed through the shorter andmore sheltered waters of the Straits of Magellanand/or the Beagle Channel where casualty risks areelevated, high mountains lie between the waterwayand equatorial geo-stationary satellites and there is apotential to lose contact with the geo-satellites’transmitters. There may be other points on the variousroutes used by PNTL where similar conditions occur.

In such a situation recourse could be had to voicecommunications, but these are also largely satellitetransmitted, and in such situations would be similarlyaffected. Short wave radio communication would thenbe necessary. Thus there is a potential for even multi-

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system and duplicated communication arrays to bereduced to a reliance on a single system, which in itsturn is potentially susceptible to maintenanceproblems and operational malfunction.

13:7 The available details of the design of the PNTLvessels [Refs. 7 & 8] appear to show that all thecommunications systems terminals are located in theaft section of the vessels. If this is the case, the vesselsare particularly susceptible to a completecommunications blackout caused by a severe collisionor fire in this sector of the vessel, which is notprotected by any double hulling or collisionreinforcement features.

13:8 The BNFL/PNTL submissions and publications failto address these concerns and there is no evidencethat the IMO has asked for clarification of thesematters.

13:9 If an emergency incident were to occur the vesselconcerned is expected to transmit a request forassistance to the Barrow Report Centre and to theauthorities in the nearest coastal State. Upon receiptof such a message the Report Centre would beupgraded to an Emergency Control Centre.

None of the BNFL or PNTL presentations orsubmissions to the IMO provide details of what suchan “upgrade” would entail or require and how longsuch an upgrade would take.

14. BNFL/PNTL Emergency Response Teams

14:1 The three documents reviewed [Refs. 7, 8 and 9]state that an emergency response team is “on standbyat all times” on a “24 hour emergency standby system”.

The 1996 PNTL published submission to the IMOclaims such a team would be despatched “in the eventof a serious fire or collision”, other scenarios are notmentioned. The transcript of the 1996 BNFL verbalpresentation to the IMO does not define whichemergency scenarios would require the despatch ofthe emergency team.

14:2 Precise definitions for “standby” and “24 houremergency standby” are not given. It remains unclearwhether it is being claimed that the emergency teamswill be ready for departure to the emergency scenewithin 24 hours of initial notification, or whether it isbeing claimed that they will arrive at the emergencyscene within 24 hours of initial notification.

14:2 The latter option seems highly unlikely andoptimistic in the context of some sectors of thesuggested routes for INF vessels and no evidence isoffered to support any suggestion that such a proposalcould be achieved.

Even if it was possible to reach an INF emergencyscene within 24 hours the available historical evidenceshows that the crucial and optimum emergencyincident management and control “window ofopportunity” for many casualties occurs within thefirst 24 hours and that for many emergencies the“window” is even shorter.

(eg On Sunday 12 December 2000, between 4.30 amand 5 am, the tanker MV ERIKA made a series ofMayday calls which reported loud noises from the hull

and superstructure and cracks appearing in the hulland requested immediate assistance. By 5.30 am thevessel had broken in half.)

14:3 If, as appears far more likely, the BNFL/PNTLstatement actually means the emergency team couldbe ready for departure within 24 hours of initialnotification, it must be accepted that in some sectorsof the INF vessels’ route the emergency teams will beunlikely to arrive within 48 hours of the start of theemergency.

If this is the case it is evident that the possibility ofthe emergency escalating to very significant or totalcasualty status (with attendant escalating radiologicalemergency) increases.

14:4 The PNTL owners’ 1996 written submission to theIMO (issued as a public document) states that theemergency team is a “fully trained and equipped teamof marine and nuclear experts” [Ref 7 : p 20] Howeverthis document gives no further detail of thecomposition, numbers and expertise of the team.

14:5 The transcript of BNFL’s 1996 verbal submission tothe IMO is more forthcoming and explains theemergency team which would travel to the scenewould consist of eight persons. It is interesting tolearn that the “expertise” of the team is given asfollows (and in the order listed by BNFL):

• “Two Head Office staff “ (with undefinedexpertise, but possibly some previous relevantexperience. Their otherwise undefined statussuggests that they are managers who may wellbe principally representing BNFL interests);

• “One Public Relations Officer” (with undefinedexpertise in marine and/or nuclear matters);

• “Two Health Physics Officers;• “Two Package Engineers;• “One Marine Superintendent.”

14:6 The team described in the verbal presentation tothe IMO thus falls somewhat short of the publishedclaim of a “fully trained ... team of marine and nuclearexperts”.

The emergency team should more accurately bedescribed as “a team containing one fully trainedmarine expert, four fully trained nuclear experts andthree others with no defined marine or nucleartraining or role”

14:7 The transcript of BNFL’s verbal submission to theIMO explains that emergency equipment for dealingwith a radiological incident involving a “package”(presumably “packages” include flask and casks) isstored in two separate locations aboard each vessel.This review assumes this means that there areduplicate sets of the equipment. The transcriptexplains that the equipment consists of radiationmonitoring and engineering equipment.

14:8 The transcript explains that a full set of the sameequipment is carried by the emergency team to theemergency scene but gives no further details of theequipment. In order to assess the ease of deploymentof this equipment onto the vessel, by the emergencyteam, information about its size, weight, protectivepackaging and sensitivity to breakage (in the case of


radiation monitoring equipment) is required. No such details are provided by BNFL or the PNTL

owners. No such details appear to have beenrequested or supplied by the IMO or any of its memberStates.

14:9 In order to assess the ease or difficulty ofdeployment onto the vessel, details are required of theintended method of transport and transfer of both thespecialised equipment and the emergency team onto avessel potentially in an extreme emergency scenario,extreme sea and weather conditions and many milesfrom land.

No such details are provided by BNFL or PNTL. Nosuch details appear to have been requested orsupplied by the IMO or any of its member states.

15. BNFL/PNTL Emergency Exercises

15:1 The transcript of BNFL’s 1996 verbal presentationto the IMO [Ref 9] says that the emergencyequipment and techniques have been “developed fromregular realistic emergency exercises” and states thatBNFL believe that regular exercises are an importantpart of emergency response planning.

15:2 The transcript states that every year at least twofull scale sea transport emergency exercises are heldin order to test the communication system, theexpertise of the team members and the ships’ crewsand the performance of the emergency equipment.

The exercises simulate a radiological incident andare carried out in a fully realistic manner. Desk topexercises and communication system tests are alsocarried out periodically each year.

15:3 The PNTL owners’ 1996 published submission tothe IMO [Ref 7] gives slightly more detail of theemergency exercises and states that BNFL holds oneland based and two ship based emergency exercisesevery year, while the Japanese emergency responsecontractor also holds exercises per year (but fails todefine whether these are ship or land based).

15:4 The Information File published by the PNTLowners in 1999 [Ref 8] provides additional details andconfirms that there are indeed two UK based shipexercises each year and explains that only one ofthese is an at-sea exercise and that the other is an in-port exercise.

15:5 The 1999 Information File refers to two Japaneseship exercises but does not explain whether these areport or sea based. In light of the nature of the UKexercises it seems likely that the Japanese exercisesalso consist of one in-port and one at-sea exercise.

The Information File also explains that in additionto the ship-based exercises there are four annual fireexercises and one annual desk top communicationsexercise (UK and Japan).

15:6 The 1999 Information File states that all transportemergency exercises involve the call out of suitablytrained and qualified personnel, their transport to theincident scene, and the necessary remedial actions toresolve a simulated radiological cask incident.

15:7 However, the information given by BNFL andPNTL is both brief and imprecise.

This review notes that it is specifically stated thatthe exercises simulate a radiological incident, but thatin regard to the two at-sea exercises no details havebeen given about the weather and sea states underwhich those exercises have been carried out.

15:8 In order to adequately test and improve theexpertise of the emergency teams it would beadvantageous to carry out exercises in the most severeweather and sea states, provided that personnel orvessels are not put at unnecessary risk.

If the weather and sea states are never severe whenthe exercises are carried out, there is a stronglikelihood that a false exercise outcome will result,technical difficulties likely to be met in real timeemergencies will not be evaluated and personnel willbe insufficiently experienced and tested.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary itmay be assumed that neither the IMO nor any of thecoastal States, nor any of the States where INFcarriers are flagged or registered have demanded thatthe details of weather and sea states during theexercises are supplied.

15:9 One interpretation of the available information isthat the at-sea exercises are conducted from, oradjacent to, a Japanese and UK shore base.

In order to fully evaluate the true technicaldifficulties attendant upon emergency response itwould be advantageous to carry out exercises at aconsiderable distance from the shore and fromfavourable shore-side infrastructure.

15:10 In the case of emergency responses overseas(non-UK) transport infrastructure will be expected tofeature significantly. Delivery of emergency teams andtheir specialised equipment, to the emergency site,will inevitably become more complicated and delayedthe more distant the emergency site is from majorports or airports.

Similarly, the more basic the airport or harbour/portfacilities (cargo handling, personnel and cargoprocessing) the slower the throughput of teampersonnel and emergency equipment will be.

15:11 If the exercises are not carried out at sitesdistant from major transport centres and welldeveloped transport facilities there is a stronglikelihood that a false exercise outcome will result,technical difficulties likely to be met in real timeemergencies will not be evaluated and personnel willbe insufficiently experienced and tested.

15:12 In the context of the preceding paragraphs it isimportant to note that the transcript of the BNFLpresentations claims that the “the exercises simulate aradiological incident” and makes no mention of amaritime casualty incident.

15:13 This review notes that any attempt to respond toan at-sea, ship-based radiological emergency wouldtake place in the context of the marine environmentand, almost inevitably, in the context of a majormarine casualty scenario.

Such a response will have to overcome a wide range

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of potential variables including weather and seaconditions, distance from shore and shore basedinfrastructure and support facilities and one (ormore) of the 14 casualty types listed in the IMOGuidelines for SEPs and discussed in Chapter 6(above).

15:14 There is no indication that any such parametershave been factored into the emergency exercises. Inthe absence of evidence to the contrary it may beassumed that neither the IMO nor any of the coastalStates, nor any of the States where INF carriers areflagged or registered have demanded that such detailsof the exercises be supplied, or urged that suchparameters should be included in emergencyscenarios.

15:15 This review concludes that, if this is the case, itrepresents a serious failure in the planning ofemergency response operations and exercises since itis highly likely that a radiological emergency will becaused by one, or a combination, of those parameters

15:16 This review concludes that the available datadoes not demonstrate that the emergency exercisesdescribed in the BNFL and PNTL documents (Refs. 7,8 & 9) have achieved the necessary stringency. Theywill neither build up nor test the expertise ofemergency team members, or the deployment ofemergency equipment, in the full range of potential at-sea casualty scenarios.

16. BNFL/PNTL Salvage

16:1 The 1996 BNFL and PNTL submissions to the IMOsay that the full world-wide Emergency ResponseArrangements include: rapid response world-widesalvage cover, equipment and techniques developedfrom specialised demonstrations including sea-bedrecovery of a spent fuel package and a salvage locationand a telemetry system which assists in vessel locationand provides information to the salvage teamregarding the condition of the ship and cargo. [Refs. 7& 9]

16:2 Worldwide salvage cover is provided by way of acontractual agreement between BNFL and SmitInternational Salvage. Under this agreement Smitprovides advice in procedures and equipment whichfacilitate salvage assistance and continuously reviewsthe latest applicable technology. A joint committee ofthe two companies meets twice a year to discussrelevant matters.

16:3 A number of arrangements have been madefollowing this liaison between BNFL and Smit Salvage.These are laid out below:

• The Barrow Report Centre has 24 hour contactarrangements with Smit Salvage;

• Smit towing brackets and chain have beenfitted to the fore and aft ends of all PBTL/BNFLvessels;

• At-sea and in-port exercises are conducted topractice making tow connections to the vessels;

• Hand operated emergency lifting gear is fittedto the vessels to enable heavy salvageequipment to be lifted aboard if the vessels

have lost all power;• Brackets which can be welded to the vessel’s

hull to assist righting have been pre-designedfor each ship;

• Salvage inspection tours are made periodicallyby a BNFL/SMIT team to renew contacts andinvestigate the availability of equipment alongthe routes taken by the BNFL/PNTL vessels;

• BNFL has also arranged to receive monthlyupdates on the availability and disposition of alltypes of salvage equipment worldwide. [Ref 9]

These are all useful arrangements which mayprevent an emergency from worsening. However themajority of these arrangements are not relevant to therecovery/salvage of INF Code material in the event of aloss of the INF vessel.

16:4 In addition, the PNTL owners’ Public InformationFile [Ref 8] says that all the PNTL vessels are fittedwith an underwater detection system which enablesthe vessel to be located in water depths over 6,000metres at a range of 20 km. (Note: the BNFL vesselsare not mentioned in this context.)

This system can relay information to the surfaceand provide details on the following: depth and angleof vessel on the bottom; whether the vessel is intact ordistorted; whether the hatch covers are in place; whatthe radiation level is in each of the cargo holds andthe temperature inside the vessel. The equipment ispowered by high-grade lithium batteries with anexpected life span of over seven years.

17. Factors affecting the claimedrapidity/immediacy of the BNFL/PNTLSalvage Cover

17:1 In the matter of the “rapid response” worldwidesalvage cover, which BNFL and the PNTL owners haveclaimed is provided by way of their contractualagreements with Smit International Salvage, none ofthe reviewed documents [Ref 7, 8 and 9] have offereda definition of the claimed “rapid response”.

The PNTL owners’ 1996 submission to the IMO [Ref7] states that “immediate arrangements can be put inhand to salvage the ship or cargo where required inthe event of a vessel sinking.” No definition orsupporting detail for any of these claims is offered inany of the documents.

17:2 The truth is, that while Smit International iscertainly among the leaders in global salvage(particularly in respect of size, geographical coverageand successful experience) the “rapidity” or“immediacy” of any emergency response the companycould mount would depend upon a number of factorsincluding the nature of the required response, thenature of the contractual agreement relative to thecurrent work priorities of the Smit organisation, thelocation of the emergency relative to the distributionof Smit equipment and the ambient weather and seastates.

THE NATURE OF THE REQUIRED RESPONSE17:3 As regards the nature of any required response:maritime salvage companies have an excellent recordof putting to sea and making valiant efforts to save lifein very difficult conditions, where there is a possibility


of achieving something useful. Thus if a PNTL vesselwere to be in need of assistance it is highly likely thatSmit would undertake an attempt to assist as soon aspossible and in all but the most severe sea conditions.

If on the other hand a PNTL vessel had sunk and itwas deemed necessary to make an attempt to recoverthe INF Code cargo it is highly unlikely that such anoperation would be undertaken with any rapidity orimmediacy because it would not be possible inanything other than relatively calm conditions.

17:4 Thus, even with a relatively straightforwardoperation such as the recovery of heavy fuel oil fromthe relatively shallow wreck of the tanker Erika (lessthan 200 metres) using the well tried “Hot-taptechnology”, it was deemed necessary to wait for sevenmonths before commencing the recovery of the Erika’scargo in order to maximise the chances of an extendedand suitable weather “window of opportunity”. Thefinal chronology was as follows: vessel sunk 12December 1999, cargo recovery commenced 3 July2000, cargo recovery completed September 2000.

It is to be expected that the salvage of INF Codematerials (secured to permanent devices within thecargo holds, which are themselves situated inside thedouble hulled section of a PNTL vessel and inside thecollision reinforcement plating) would be at least ascomplicated as the Erika salvage, require a similar“window” of suitable weather and sea conditions andthus not fulfil any definition of rapidity or immediacy.

THE NATURE OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS17:5 Unless the BNFL/PNTL contractual agreementwith Smit International is based on a pre-agreed “dropevery other job” clause it is likely that Smit’s othercontractual arrangements will demand that anyresponse to a BNFL/PNTL emergency will have to takeits place in a priority queue and thus the claimedrapidity and immediacy will not be fulfilled.

The failure of BNFL and the PNTL ownership toprovide the relevant detail in any of the two 1996submissions to the IMO or the 1999 Public InformationFile (Refs. 7, 8 & 9) means that no justification existsfor the claim of rapidity and immediacy.

LOCATION OF THE EMERGENCY RELATIVE TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF SMIT EQUIPMENT17:6 A study of Smit International’s publicity material[Ref 10] shows that the company does indeed haveworldwide representation grouped into fourgeographic zones (Africa, Americas, Europe and FarEast) with 21 regional offices/depots. As might beexpected the regional offices/depots are centred onthe major shipping lanes, maritime “choke points” andport areas.

Smit International has four salvage logistics centresin Cape Town, Houston, Rotterdam and Singapore. Acomprehensive range of specialist salvage equipmentis held at instant readiness at these centres. Smitstates that “the equipment is air-mobile and heldready for immediate despatch anywhere in the world.”

17:7 Smit International has a large fleet of rescue andsalvage vessels and at any one time simple economicsdictate that the company will be seeking to have themajority of those vessels engaged in gainfulemployment or travelling between tasks. Thus a

number of those vessels will be distributed across theworld’s maritime trade routes.

However as with the offices and depots it is to beexpected that such vessels will be concentrated on thebusy sea areas.

17:8 Thus some sea areas have a far lower “cover” thanother areas. A number of sections of the routes used todate by the PNTL fleet are very poorly covered by thedistribution of offices, depots and salvage logisticscentres. These sectors include the mid ocean areas,the South Atlantic, the South Indian Ocean, Australianwaters and the South Pacific.

If a PNTL vessel were to require salvage/assistancewithin the southern areas of the Australian 200 mileEEZ, or adjacent waters, the nearest salvageequipment logistics centre is at Cape Town and thenearest regional offices/depots are in Malaysia andIndonesia to the north and Cape Town to the west.

While it might be appropriate to air transportrelevant salvage equipment into Australia, it will stillhave to be transferred to a suitable vessel in anAustralian port and then taken, by sea, to theemergency site.

None of the BNFL, PNTL or Smit documentationoffers any data which might clarify the time scales ofavailability of the range of salvage equipment neededto respond to an emergency involving a PNTL vesselcarrying INF Code materials in a variety of differentsea areas along the routes used by the PNTL vessels.

Unless permanently escorted by a full timerescue/salvage vessel, it is evident that during anyvoyage between Europe and Japan a PNTL vessel willinevitably be isolated from sources of assistance andsources of salvage for considerable periods of time.

17:9 The history of events surrounding maritimeemergencies is not encouraging in respect of theavailability and deployment of emergencyresponse/salvage equipment.

For example, when fire broke out aboard thecontainer ship Ever Decent (after she collided withthe cruise liner Norwegian Dream in calm, clearconditions on 24 August 1999 in the English Channel)the fire burnt for several days although three firefighting tugs did eventually reach the scene.Commentators believe the situation would have beenmuch improved and the fire less severe if the UK’sdedicated, powerful Straits of Dover fire fighting andemergency towing vessel had been available. Thisvessel was undergoing a refit in Norway at the time ofthe incident. [Ref 11]

This incident demonstrates that even in a very busysea lane provided with some of the best emergencycover in the world, occasions occur when it is notpossible to respond rapidly to an emergency with themost appropriate response vessel.

18. Salvage equipment and techniquesdeveloped from “specialiseddemonstrations”

18:1 The transcript of the 1996 BNFL verbal submissionto the IMO [Ref 9] states that the emergency responsesystem includes the use of equipment and techniquesdeveloped from “specialised demonstrations includingsea-bed recovery of a spent fuel package”.

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The PNTL owners’ 1996 submission to the IMO [Ref7] reiterates the point and says that “exercises arealso undertaken with PNTL’s salvage contractors todemonstrate the recovery of flasks from the sea bed”.It makes no reference to any other form ofdemonstration or exercise in the context of salvage.

No further details are given about these “specialiseddemonstrations” or “exercises”.

18:2 In the context of the language used (“recovery offlasks from the sea-bed” etc.) and the absence of anyevidence to the contrary, it may be assumed that theexercises and special demonstrations have notinvolved recovering the flasks or packages from withina sunken INF vessel or a replica of a sunken vessel onthe seabed.

18:3 If this is the case the exercises anddemonstrations have been virtually pointless, since(unless the INF vessel was subjected to either amassive at-sea explosion or a failed at-sea ship-to-shiptransfer) it is only in the most favourable conditions(i.e. in-port or dock-side) that a flask or package islikely to end up on the seabed without being attachedto the interior of the vessel. Such a scenario wouldoccur as a result of a flask or package being droppedduring ship-to-shore or shore-to-ship transferoperations.

18:4 No details have been given of a wide range ofadditional exercise/demonstration parametersincluding:a. the nature of the seabed (topography, sediments,

depth, visibility) from which the flask/package wasrecovered;

b. the nature of ambient bottom water conditions(visibility, currents, wave effects) at the recovery site;

c. the nature of the surface water conditions duringthe exercise (sea states, weather conditions,surface traffic density);

d. distance from any necessary back-up facilities;e. type and description of the flasks/packages

recovered; f. other details of the salvage working platform

(vessel, dockside);g. time scale of the operation;h. whether or not the exercise involved the simulated

release of radioactivity to test the ability of salvorsto operate without contamination ofpersonnel/equipment.

18:5 All these parameters can exert major complicatingand/or limiting stresses on any salvage attempts. Theabsence of such details renders serious discussion andassessment of these “exercises” and “specialiseddemonstrations” impossible.

Given the potential importance of therecovery/salvage of INF Code materials it isremarkable that such a superficial, brief andimprecise description of the demonstrations (in twoversions: Refs. 7 & 9) has been accepted by the IMOwithout any evidence that the organisation hasrequested further details of the exercises orspecialised demonstrations.

It is similarly remarkable that none of the coastalStates along the various sea routes taken by PNTLvessels have requested further details of these

exercises or specialised demonstrations.

19. The BNFL/PNTL Underwater Detection System

19:1 The PNTL owners’ 1996 written submission to theIMO describes the sonar location system “capable ofoperation in waters over 6,000 metres deep”. Thetranscript of the 1996 BNFL verbal submission to theIMO makes the same claim. Unfortunately the phraseused is infinitely open ended and no attempt is madeto define the maximum working depth of the system.

This is an unfortunate oversight because there arerelevant areas of the ocean which are over 6,000metres deep and the maximum ocean depth charted todate is 11,035 metres.

19:2 In the North Atlantic there are three areas ofseabed below the 6,000 metre depth. Two lie betweenWest Africa and the Caribbean. It is conceivable thatthe PNTL vessel routes could involve sailing overthese areas. The third such area is the Puerto RicoTrench and this must be crossed in any route via theMona Passage, a route that the PNTL vessels havetaken in the past.

There are areas of similar depth in the SouthAtlantic which might be crossed during the course ofany passage round Cape Horn.

19:3 The Pacific Ocean has a number of deep oceantrenches which exceed 6,000 metres depth. TheKermadec Trench, the Tonga Trench, The Solomonand New Hebrides Trench System, The MarianaTrench and the various Japanese Trenches all lieacross one or more of the three routes from Japan toEurope. In addition the north west and central Pacificcontains a number of Basin areas which also exceedthe 6,000 metre depth.

19:4 A number of these deep ocean areas lie close toen-route coastal States, however because of the briefand imprecise information provided by BNFL andPNTL owners it remains unclear whether the sonarlocation system would operate in such depths.

20. Deep Ocean Salvage

20:1 At a conference in 1996 the director of Deep WaterRecovery and Exploration Ltd, a leading independentsalvage company responsible for significant deepwater salvage technical development and holders ofthe record maximum depth for the salvage ofcommercial cargo (1,250 metres), described some ofthe technical difficulties involved in the work on thatparticular salvage.

20:2 These included the angle of list of the wreck,extensive debris which restricted access to the vessel’sholds, the nature of the seabed materials andtopography which made anchoring and mooring thesalvage vessel difficult and hazardous. The greatesttechnical problems arose from the nature of seasurface conditions which meant that the currentdesign of standard monohull salvage vessel is unableto work in sea state conditions exceeding BeaufortForce 5. [Ref 12]


20:3 Recent discussions with Deep Water Recovery Ltdreveal the company is engaged in salvage work on avessel at 3,000 metres depth and have completed thedevelopment of a system theoretically capable ofworking to full ocean depth: i.e. 11,000 metres.

It is reported that surface conditions remain themajor problem but that, other than this, there are nomajor technical obstructions to full ocean depthsalvage and recovery of cargo. However, the companysaid such an operation would require close co-operation with other marine industries (hydrocarbonsand surveying) and possibly government agencies,with deep water expertise and technologies and thatany successful salvage at such depths would be a veryhigh cost operation. [Ref 13]

20:4 This review has found no evidence in thecompanies’ submissions to the IMO, that BNFL’sdiscussions, meetings and contractual agreementswith Smit International have examined any potentialagreement with other deep sea operators in respect ofthe salvage of INF Code materials.

If such discussions have not taken place this reviewrecommends they be prioritised in order to identifyrelevant players and to put in place the baseline forany financial and legal agreement which may berequired in the event of full ocean depth, INF Codematerial capable, salvage work.

20:5 This review has found no evidence in the BNFLand the PNTL owners’ submissions to the IMO thatthey have offered any analysis of the full financialimplications of salvage and recovery of INF Codematerials from within a sunken INF carrier located incontinental shelf waters, continental slope/rise watersor deep ocean waters.

20:6 This review has also found no evidence in theBNFL/PNTL submissions to the IMO that they havemade an open ended commitment to recover lost INFCode material from any marine environmentregardless of the cost.

It might be expected that, in light of the longstanding international rejection of sea bed dumping or“emplacement” of nuclear wastes (otherwise INF Codematerials) that pressure for such a commitment wouldbe readily forthcoming.

20:7 Accordingly this review recommends BNFL andPNTL be pressed for such a financial analysis and foran open ended commitment to recover INF Codematerials from wherever they are lost in the marineenvironment.

21. Australian Emergency Response Plans

21:1 As a coastal State, Australia has the right underinternational agreements to exercise its “responsibilityto define techniques and means to be taken against amarine pollution incident and approve suchoperations which might cause further pollution”.

In nearly every respect Australia has accepted thisresponsibility. Australia is a long standing member ofthe IMO and is a party to the five IMO Conventionsaddressing ship based pollution which it implementsby way of a package of national legislation, some ofwhich is set out below.

21:2 Jurisdiction over Australian waters was agreedfollowing discussion between the Commonwealth andthe States/Northern Territory (NT), which culminatedin an agreement known as the Offshore ConstitutionalSettlement (OCS). The OCS gave jurisdiction over theTerritorial Seas to the States/NT while jurisdictionover the High Seas was given to the Commonwealth.

21:3 However, it was recognised that it was necessaryto find a mechanism which enabled Australia tobecome a party to important international maritimeconventions without the need for separate legislationin every jurisdiction. Under the OCS it was agreed thatCommonwealth law would apply to all jurisdictionswith regard to recognising the Conventions, but thatCommonwealth law would “step back” if/when aState/NT enacted the provisions on its own behalf.Thus the States/NT are given time to enact parallellegislation, or to choose not to.

21:4 Under the UN Law of the Sea Convention(UNCLOS) which Australia has acceded to, theCommonwealth’s jurisdiction extends to both the 12mile wide Territorial Sea and the 200 mile wideExclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, theStates/NT refused to accept the extension of theirjurisdiction beyond the pre-UNCLOS Territorial Sealimit of three nautical miles.

21:5 Australian national legislation has implementedthe provisions of the following internationalconventions:

a. 1969 International Convention Relating toIntervention on the High Seas in Cases of OilPollution Casualties;

b. the 1973 Protocol to that Convention (relatingto Intervention on the High Seas in Cases ofPollution by substances other than Oil);

c. 1969 International Convention on Civil Liabilityfor Oil Pollution Damage;

d. 1971 International Convention on theEstablishment of an International Fund forCompensation for Oil Pollution Damage;

e. 1973/78 International Convention forPrevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL);

f. 1990 International Convention on Oil PollutionPreparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990.

21:6 The 1990 Australian Maritime Safety Authority Actsets out the duties and responsibilities of theAustralian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), amongwhich was the “combating of pollution in the marineenvironment.” It also stipulates that AMSA mustperform its functions in “a manner consistent with theobligations of Australia, under any agreement betweenAustralia and another country”.

21:7 In order to ensure that Australia has the ability torespond to ship sourced pollution incidents theNational Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oilwas first implemented in October 1973.

21:8 Unless very carefully defined, the division ofresponsibility for action may be complicated by thesubject of jurisdiction. It may also be similarlycomplicated by the fact that, in addition to thenational legislation described above, each of the

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States/NT have legislation which covers their ownrequirements and responsibilities in relation topollution in their own areas of jurisdiction.

22. The National Plan

22:1 In fulfilment of the duties accepted by Australia asa party to the 1990 International Convention on OilPollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation,Australia has reviewed the original oil spill plan andestablished the National Plan to Combat Pollution ofthe Sea by Oil and other Noxious and HazardousSubstances (the National Plan).

The National Plan combines the resources of theCommonwealth of Australia, the States/NTGovernments and the relevant industries and shippinginterests in order to provide a combined responseeffort to the threats to coastal environments andpopulations by spills from ships and other offshoreinstallations.

22:2 The preamble to the National Plan states that“measures to prevent pollution, combined with pre-planned clean up strategies, are essential for theprotection of the marine environment”.

The stated aim of the National Plan is “to protectthe natural and built environments of Australia’smarine and foreshore zones from the adverse effect ofoil and other noxious and hazardous substances. Italso aims to minimise those effects where protection isnot possible”.

The National Plan states that it “provides a nationalframework for responding promptly and efficiently tomarine pollution incidents by designating competentnational and local authorities”.

22:3 The National Plan states that “a fundamental pre-requisite” for the successful management of at-seaspill incidents in Australia, is a clear definition of theresponsibilities of the Commonwealth, the States/NTand the relevant industries.

In fulfilment of this pre-requisite, the National Plandescribes the geographical coverage of the response,the divisions of responsibility, the response structuresand working hierarchies, details the policies, plans,operations and procedures, and describes thecontingency plan support. These matters are describedclearly and in considerable depth and detail.

22:4 The National Plan is complemented by appropriateState/NT contingency plans and there is also adedicated plan for the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park(REEFPLAN).

In 1998, the Federal and State/NT TransportMinisters adopted the “Commonwealth/State/TerritoryAdministrative Arrangements Applicable to Action toPrevent and Clean Up Spills of Hazardous or NoxiousSubstances from Ships”.

22:5 These Arrangements were based on the premisethat the existing National Plan to Combat Pollution ofthe Sea by Oil provided the best basic framework forresponse arrangements to all spills of hazardous andnoxious substances.

It was therefore agreed that the most effectiveresponse system involved the integration of theexisting marine oil spill plan and the land based

chemical and hazardous materials responsecapabilities of agencies such as the Fire Service,government bodies and industrial bodies.

22:6 Despite the nature of the language used in theNational Plan and the various agreements describedabove, no definition of “other noxious and hazardoussubstances” has been found.

22:7 Since its adoption in 1973, the National Plan hasbeen principally concerned with the threat of oil spills.However, since 1998, there have been two segments tothe National Plan, a National Maritime Oil SpillContingency Plan [Ref 14] and a National MaritimeChemical Spill Contingency Plan [Ref 15].

There is no dedicated National MaritimeContingency Plan for responding to a spill ofradioactive materials.

22:8 The National Maritime Chemical Spill ContingencyPlan provides details of chemical relevantinternational codes and guidelines which refer tovarious IMO Codes including the InternationalMaritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) and itsvarious supplements including the InternationalNuclear Fuels Code. Other than this there is nofurther discussion of nuclear or radioactive materials.

A review of both the oil spill plan and the chemicalspill plan reveals that there is no sub-component (ofeither plan) which deals with the issue of radioactivematerials.

22:9 Thus, despite the National Plan’s missionstatements that:a. “Measures to prevent pollution, combined with pre-

planned clean up strategies, are essential for theprotection of the marine environment;

b. the aim of the National Plan is “to protect thenatural and built environments of Australia’s marineand foreshore zones from the adverse effect of oiland other noxious and hazardous substances”, andto minimise those effects where protection is notpossible;

c. “provides a national framework for respondingpromptly and efficiently to marine pollutionincidents by designating competent national andlocal authorities”.None of this has been applied, in the National Plan,

with respect to the potential for ship based pollutionby radioactive materials.

22:10 The lack of a formal INF Code materials maritimetransport response plan is remarkable given thatAustralia :a. regularly imports and exports by sea a range of

radioactive materials including both radioactivematerials that fall under the IMDG Code Class 7definition, and reactor waste (within the definitionof INF Class 2) from the Lucas Heights facility and

b. is on one of the regularly used routes for the INFCode Class 3 (unlimited radioactivity) shipmentsbetween Japan and Europe.


23. The Australian Maritime Safety Agency(AMSA)

23:1 Under the 1990 Australian Maritime SafetyAuthority Act much of the initial responsibility formarine issues falls on the Australian Maritime SafetyAgency which is the competent authority for dealingwith Search and Rescue matters and ship basedmarine pollution issues.

23:2 AMSA has a duty to set the standards forcontingency planning and to review selected regionaland local contingency plans on a quality assurancebasis. AMSA also has a co-ordinating role and the dutyto provide technical advice, logistic and maintenancesupport, training, materials and equipment.

23:3 All of the AMSA duties and roles in regard to theoil and chemical spill components of the National Planare very clearly explained. Similarly all of the rolesand duties of other Commonwealth and State/NTgovernment agencies and industrial bodies are veryclearly explained.

23:4 However, it is evident that, in the absence of aNational Plan component for radioactive pollutionfrom shipping, AMSA has no direct responsibility forINF cargoes. Various AMSA sources have confirmedthis fact.

23:5 “AMSA is the competent authority for dealing withSearch and Rescue matters, as well as spills of oil andchemicals other than INF cargoes.” [Ref 16]

Despite having no competence or authority to dealwith INF Cargo emergencies, as the competentauthority dealing with Search and Rescue matters itseems probable that AMSA would be among thoseagencies which the IMO Guidelines for SEPs haveadvised should be contacted in the event of anemergency.

As such, AMSA is likely to be among the firstAustralian authorities to receive notification of suchan incident and their task would be to pass thatnotification on to other agencies. However it remainsunclear precisely which Australian agencies are solisted and where AMSA’s place on such a list would be.

23:6 AMSA has stated that “in the event of an incidentinvolving radioactive and nuclear material comprisingan INF cargo, the Australian Nuclear Science andTechnology Organisation (ANSTO) and the AustralianRadiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency(ARPANSA), in liaison with the shipper, would beresponsible for co-ordinating the response to deal withthe particular circumstances at the time.” [Ref 16]

23:7 AMSA has also stated that Australia hasarrangements and processes in place to manage anincident involving an INF vessel. “Australia’sCommonwealth Government Disaster Response Plan(COMDISPLAN) would be activated to bring togetherexpertise and contingency plans of a number ofspecialised Commonwealth and State agencies toaddress the specific issues of the incident concerned”.[Ref 17]

24. Australian Radiation Protection andNuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA)

24:1 ARPANSA was established in 1999 and is theFederal Government agency with responsibility forregulating the Commonwealth’s use of radioactivematerials, protecting public health and theenvironment from ionising and non-ionising radiation.ARPANSA was formed by amalgamation of theAustralian Radiation Laboratories and the NuclearSafety Bureau. ARPANSA has also assumed theresponsibilities of the National Health and MedicalResearch Council (NH&MRC) regarding radiation andhealth matters. ARPANSA is responsible for providingadvice to State Emergency Services (SES) and ANSTOin the event of off site contamination from LucasHeights.

24:2 ARPANSA has specific responsibility for:a. promoting radiation protection and nuclear safety

policy and practices throughout Australia; b. advising the Commonwealth Government and the

community on radiation protection and nuclearsafety;

c. undertaking research and providing services inradiation protection, nuclear safety and medicalexposure to radiation and;

d. regulating all Commonwealth departments,Agencies, and Bodies involved in irradiation ornuclear activities.

24:3 ARPANSA has a scientific unit in Melbourne and aregulatory unit in Sydney. Radiation EmergencyPlanning is co-ordinated by the Health Physics Sectionof the Environmental and Radiation Health Branch ofthe Melbourne unit.

24:4 “In the remote event of a large scale radiologicalincident ARPANSA’s role would be to assist in theintermediate to longer phase post accident recovery.”[Ref 18]

24:5 In order to carry out this role ARPANSA maintains:• a team of senior health physicists able to

provide expert radiation protection advice; • a number of Radiation Emergency response

Teams;• specialised radiation monitoring resources and

emergency response kits;• a nation wide network of radiation fallout

monitoring stations and• a 24 hour contact number for the radiation

emergency preparedness Duty Co-ordinator.[Ref 18]

24:6 Having taken over the responsibilities of theNational Health and Medical Research Council(NH&MRC) in regard to radiation and health matters,ARPANSA has assumed the NH&MRC responsibilitiesfor radiation monitoring arrangements in the event ofvisits from nuclear powered warships. ARPANSA alsohas a formal role in the event of satellite/space debrislandings involving radioactive material.

ARPANSA, in conjunction with a Melbournehospital, is World Health Organisation (WHO)Collaborating Centre for Radiation Protection andRadiation Emergency Medical Centre. The centre

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would play a role in advising and helping withaccidents involving nuclear materials in Australia, andin offering assistance to neighbouring countries insuch an event. It is not clear however if this centrehas any capacity to provide assistance in the event ofan accident at sea involving nuclear materials. Nodocumentary evidence has been found to indicate thatARPANSA has a formal role in the event of an at-seaINF Code materials emergency.

24:7 In informal discussions with various ARPANSA,staff have indicated the following: a. ARPANSA’s principal role is the provision of advice

on plans for emergencies occurring at Australia’snuclear sites rather than in the case of transportaccidents. (Off site emergency response comesunder the remit of the relevant State emergencyservices);

b. ARPANSA’s duties include the provision of advice onland transport and satellite issues, but not maritimeemergency issues;

c. if an INF Code material maritime transport wasinside territorial waters (i.e. within the three milelimit: see Chapter 21 above) it would be therelevant State Emergency Service that would be thefirst point of call, they would then call EmergencyManagement Australia, who would call the Dept ofDefence, ANSTO and others (but not in the firstinstant ARPANSA);

d. ARPANSA does not have a formal role in respondingto maritime INF emergencies, but in light of itsexpertise and resources may be called upon in theevent of a significant incident.However, to date this material has not been

officially confirmed by ARPANSA.This Review recommends that such issues should be

clarified by way of direct information requests toARPANSA.

25. Australian Nuclear Science andTechnology Organisation (ANSTO)

25:1 ANSTO is an agency of the Dept of Industry,Science and Tourism and is based at the LucasHeights facility. ANSTO has nuclear analyticallaboratories with a wide range of monitoring andanalysis capabilities. ANSTO has a range ofresponsibilities in regard to radiological accidents andis staffed by over nine health physicists and 12 healthphysics technicians. [Ref 19]

25:2 The ANSTO Emergency Plan contains proceduresfor responding to an off-site accident at the LucasHeights facility (on site response is covered in theLucas Heights Emergency Plan).

25:3 In the case of accidents involving radio-pharmaceuticals the primary response responsibilitylies with the appropriate Health Authorities, butspecial agreements exist for ANSTO staff from LucasHeights to provide assistance if and when required.

25:4 While it is reported that ANSTO may contribute tothe Shipboard Emergency Plans for the vesselscarrying reactor waste products sourced from LucasHeights to Europe, no documentary evidence has beenfound to indicate that ANSTO has a formal role in

responding to maritime transport incidents involvingINF Code materials not sourced from Australianfacilities.

However, it is confirmed that in the event of amaritime transport of INF Code materials entering adesignated Australian port for conventional emergencyrepairs to the vessel plans similar for those intendedfor visiting Nuclear Powered Warships “could beinvoked” through Emergency Management Australiaand ANSTO as appropriate. [Ref 16]

25:5 Division of responsibilities between ARPANSA andANSTO is not clear. When ARPANSA was establishedin 1999, as the Federal Government agency withresponsibility for protecting public health and theenvironment from ionising and non-ionising radiation,it not only took over the role of the NHRMC reradiation and health matters but also some of ANSTO’srole in emergency response procedures.

It is reported (but not confirmed) that the divisionof responsibilities between the two bodies has still notbeen clarified or formalised. This Review recommendsthat such issues should be clarified by way of directinformation requests to ANSTO.

26. The Commonwealth Disaster Plan(COMDISPLAN) [Ref 20]

26:1 The COMDISPLAN is issued by EmergencyManagement Australia (EMA), an agency of the Deptof Defence. The EMA is the agency responsible forplanning and co-ordinating Commonwealth physicalassistance arising from any type of disaster oremergency. The EMA does not appear to have aseagoing capability and in general appears to defer to,or rely on, AMSA in this regard.

The current version of the COMDISPLAN was issuedin December 1997 and is currently undergoing a majorreview. A revised edition is expected to be issued inJune 2001.

26:2 The preamble to the COMDISPLAN explains thatwhen the total resources (government, communityand commercial) of the State or Territory areinsufficient to mount a suitable response, the State orTerritory is empowered to seek assistance from theCommonwealth government, which accepts thatresponsibility and has prepared plans for such aneventuality.

26:3 State and Territory authorities have theconstitutional responsibility to plan and co-ordinatethe response to disaster and civil emergency withintheir territorial jurisdiction. As has been shownelsewhere this will apply to the three mile wide“territorial waters”.

26:4 While it is clear that the COMDISPLAN applies toall the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth memberStates and Territories, its application to the remainingnine miles of the “territorial waters” and the 200 milesof the EEZ has not been made clear in the 1997edition of the plan. Hopefully these issues will beaddressed through the current revision process andthe 2001 edition of COMDISPLAN will define theapplicability of the COMDISPLAN to Australia’smaritime jurisdiction including the adjacent High


Seas.

26:5 AMSA has stated that, in the event of anemergency involving the maritime transport of INFCode materials, “Australia’s CommonwealthGovernment Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN)would be activated to bring together expertise andcontingency plans of a number of specialisedCommonwealth and State agencies to address thespecific issues of the incident concerned”. [Ref 17]

AMSA has also claimed that in the event of amaritime transport of INF Code materials entering anAustralian port for emergency repairs, plans “could beinvoked” through Emergency Management Australia.[Ref 16]

26:6 Despite AMSA’s statement, an analysis of theCOMDISPLAN shows there is little which has directrelevance to accidents involving INF Code materials.The most closely relevant material is found in a seriesof “Attachments” to the COMDISPLAN which provideplanning information for specific disaster scenarioswhich might require special arrangements.Attachment 7 provides “Additional PlanningInformation - Radiological Accidents/Incidents”.

26:7 Attachment 7 states that “A number of standingarrangements are in place to cope with situationswhich have a potential for, or result in, a release ofradioactive material.” The listed standingarrangements are those for:a. Safety Procedures for Nuclear Powered Warships;b. Accidents involving Radiopharmaceuticals;c. ANSTO Lucas Heights Research Labs;d. Radioactive Space Re-Entry Debris.

26:8 Only example a) appears likely to have anyrelevance to maritime transport accidents involvingINF Code material. However this is strictly limitedbecause the arrangements concern only vesselsvisiting a few specific Australian ports, while they arein port, and contain no arrangements for dealing witha vessel at sea.

The COMDISPLAN does give informationconcerning the seven person team called the ChemicalRadiological Response Team (CRRT). This team ispart of the Defence Forces. It has a capability ofdealing with chemical and radiological incidents andretains limited capacity to deal with biologicalwarfare. The team is capable of leak, seal and packageoperations for chemical and radiological agents andisotopes. Exactly what materials CRRT couldeffectively deal with is not clear.

CRRT can utilise equipment for measuring radiationand has ‘radiation suits’ with separate air supplies.How the team would cope with highly radioactivematerial without appropriate shielding is notexplained.

CRRT monitoring and personnel protectionequipment is transportable by air or road transport.However, it is not clear if it could be easily moved andoperated at sea.

26:9 Attachment 7 also briefly addresses “OtherCircumstances” which might have the potential for, orresult in, a release of radioactive material and saysthat if Commonwealth assistance is required to deal

with the release of radioactive material incircumstances not covered by the above standingarrangements, the provisions of COMDISPLAN apply.

26:10 Thus the contents of the COMDISPLAN confirmthe earlier observation that there is no plan forresponding to ship based radioactive pollution eitherfrom IMDG Class 7 materials or INF Code materialsClasses 1, 2 and 3.

26:11 The COMDISPLAN describes the arrangementswhich are in place to centrally co-ordinate thedeployment of Commonwealth resources and lists (inAnnexes A & B) those resources and the agencies thatmay be called upon to provide them. These listsinclude the following INF relevant resources:

• “ Nuclear radiation monitoring teams for lowlevel leaks.” Four teams in total. Available fromANSTO and ARL (Australian RadiationLaboratories).

and the following INF relevant advisory, analysisand liaison services:

• “Australian Radiation Laboratories (ARL):Capability to conduct radio analysis ofenvironmental and other samples... whole bodymonitoring...fallout monitoringstations...computer models...”.

(As stated elsewhere the ARL no longer exists andhas been subsumed into ARPANSA. It is presumablythe latter who would now perform the ARL functions.)

“ANSTO : Nuclear analytical laboratories with awide range of monitoring and analysis capabilitiesincluding whole body monitoring and chemicalradiation analysis”. [Ref 20 : pps 11 to 18].

27. Comparison between the COMDISPLANand the Oil and Chemical Plans.

27:1 All three plans explain their scope, identify therelevant priority emergency tasks and identify therelevant players (agencies, departments, industrialbodies etc.). They also identify appropriatemanagement priorities and procedures,communications procedures and review and trainingsystems.

Allowing for the nature and specificity of the plans,these tasks have been completed to a high standard.However, these tasks are primarily concerned withmatters of management infrastructure, bureaucracyand organisation.

27:2 It is self-evident that the Oil and Chemical spillcomponents of the National (Marine Pollution) Planare subject specific and thus the focus of the work canbe both close and precise. As a result, very preciseidentification of relevant major players and necessaryresponse strategies has been possible.

Additionally the identification and stockpiling of allconceivably necessary emergency response equipmentand facilities has been possible, with regard tonational/internal resources and additional resourceslocated in neighbouring states.

27:3 A study of the available plans demonstrates that,in the case of a response to oil or chemical spills atsea, a well structured, well trained and appropriatelyequipped response can be mounted.

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This review finds that the oil and chemical plansare of as high a standard as those of any developednation and that the response to such pollution hasappropriate management procedures in place fordealing with the at-sea response and also intertidaland shoreline clean-up and the safe disposal ofrecovered contaminated materials.

27:4 The National Plan (for response to oil andchemical pollution) makes the following statement :

“Measures to prevent pollution, combined with pre-planned clean up strategies, are essential for theprotection of the marine environment.”

The National Plan also states that “a fundamentalpre-requisite” for the successful management of at-seaspill incidents in Australia, is a clear definition of theresponsibilities of the Commonwealth, the States/NTand the relevant industries.

27:5 By contrast the 1997 COMDISPLAN is not subjectspecific and its focus is inevitably more broad. Forsome specific potential emergency scenarios preciseidentification of players, equipment and facilities isnot possible. Emergencies affecting maritimetransports of INF Code materials are one of thosepotential emergency scenarios.

27:6 Because it does not have a specific marinepollution focus, COMDISPLAN contains none of theplanned “Measures to prevent pollution, combinedwith pre-planned clean up strategies” which, as themarine pollution National Plans advise, “are essentialfor the protection of the marine environment.”

27:7 While COMDISPLAN contains components ofrelevance to certain radioactive materialsemergencies, there is nothing in the plan (or itsattachments and appendices) dealing specifically withemergencies affecting maritime transports of any classof radioactive materials.

Thus there has been no identification of players,resources, equipment and facilities relevant toemergencies involving INF maritime transports.

27:8 In light of the matters discussed in Chapters 26and 27 this review concludes that the COMDISPLAN isincapable of mounting a rapid and effective responseto an at-sea emergency involving INF Code materials.

28. Other planning matters which may berelevant

28:1 There are a number of other plans which may bethought to have some relevance to an emergencyinvolving the maritime transport of INF Codematerials.

28:2 It should be noted that the COMDISPLAN andvarious State/NT contingency plans have been usefullyactivated on a number of occasions in order to dealwith a range of disaster/emergency scenariosincluding cyclones and the re-entry of space debris.

In addition AMSA and various State/NT contingencyplans have been usefully activated to respond tomaritime incidents including a number of ship basedmarine pollution incidents.

28:3 This review concludes that the COMDISPLAN andthe AMSA and state/NT plans have a proven trackrecord with regard to the construction of effectivemanagement infrastructures which have been testedin genuine emergency situations. It may thus beconcluded that, although there is no standingarrangement/plan for INF marine transportemergencies, there is a possibility that such a plan orarrangement could eventually be constructed inresponse to such an incident.

28:4 However, there is no doubt that such a processwould be time consuming and, if rushed, wouldinevitably contain a greater number of flaws andweaknesses than one conducted thoroughly, slowlyand with great care.

Such a process could not possibly respond aseffectively as a well constructed, pre-arrangedresponse plan for at sea emergencies involving INFCode materials.

28:5 As Attachment 7 to the COMDISPLAN hasindicated, there are standing arrangements/plans forSafety Procedures for Visiting Nuclear PoweredWarships.

However those arrangements/plans are of onlyminimal relevance because they deal exclusively withvisits of such ships to ports, berths and anchoragesthat have been specifically designated after beingassessed against strict radiological criteria andapproved by a special panel. They have no applicabilityto vessels at-sea in the territorial waters or EEZ.

28:6 Furthermore, the strict Conditions of Entry fornuclear powered warships to Australian Ports appearto rule out the use of even the specifically designatedports, berths and anchorages by INF transports evenin the case of their requiring “safe haven” for eitherconventional repairs or repairs or response actioninvolving the INF packages/flasks.

Some of the relevant Conditions of Entry aresummarised below:a. visits will not be for the purpose of nuclear fuel

handling or repairs to reactor plant (necessitatingbreach of containment);

b. visits will be subject to satisfactory arrangementsconcerning liability and indemnity;

c. there must be a capability to move the vessel, eitherunder its own power or under tow, to a safeanchorage or a safe distance to sea if an incidentshould occur.

28:7 From the above it would appear that in anyemergency involving a maritime transport of INF, theopportunity to make use of an Australian port, harbouror anchorage for “safe haven” would be severelyrestricted and would probably be refused if there wasany breach of containment, unsatisfactory insurancearrangements or the vessel were unable to be movedto a safe position.

28:8 There is a further area of confusion here, becausedespite the apparent restrictiveness of the clauses, anAMSA source has advised that, in such an event thecarriage of INF cargo “would not necessarily precludea ship from entering a designated Australian port forconventional emergency repairs”. (my italics)


In such a situation plans (to deal with cargo relatedissues) which are similar to those used for visitingnuclear powered warships could be invoked throughEMA, the local port authorities and ANSTO as mightbe considered appropriate. [Ref 16]

29. Spill response equipment and training

29:1 All industrially developed coastal nations and mostless developed coastal nations have identified andstockpiled a range of equipment to be used for responseto oil spills. Less common, but growing in frequency anddistribution is the stockpiling of a range of equipmentthat can be used for chemical spill response.

Such stockpiles consist of equipment that can beused in the open sea, enclosed coastal waters and onthe coastline

29:2 A vital component of such equipment is thepersonal protective equipment to be used by personnelemployed in response, clean up and disposal work.This typically consists of :

• protective (barrier) clothing, footwear andgloves;

• breathing apparatus (including compressed airand back-up refill equipment);

• first aid and medical emergency equipment. Provision of protection to response personnel and thepublic should also include identification of the nearestfacilities capable of providing the appropriate medicaltreatment to response personnel or the public whohave been exposed to the spilled substance.

It is always necessary to reliably estimate thenumber of personnel required for the largestconceivable response action in order to makeappropriate provision of personal protectiveequipment.

29:3 Also of major importance is the sampling andmonitoring capability (in terms of both the equipmentand the laboratory space) required in order to gatherthe appropriate data and check:

• the health of response workers and the generalpublic;

• the impact on (and distribution through) theaqueous, terrestrial and atmosphericenvironments;

• and the contamination of any foodstuffs ordrinking water.

Again it is always necessary to reliably estimate therequired equipment and the numbers of necessaryoperator personnel required for the maximum credibleaccident.

29:4 The third vital component of such an equipmentstockpile is the actual response equipment requiredfor dealing with the specific material which has beenspilled. This includes:

• the necessary land, air and sea transportequipment;

• physical containment equipment such as booms,drums, tanks, sorbents and the relevanthandling machinery for such equipment;

• the various chemical response agents such asdispersants, chemical sorbents, retardents,neutralisers, dilutants, foams, inert gasgenerators;

• facilities for maintenance, repair,decontamination and re-calibration of responsemonitoring and analytical equipment.

29:5 Any shoreline clean-up and decontaminationprocess following at-sea spills generates enormousquantities of contaminated wastes. Thus the ERIKA oilspill (France: Dec. 1999) actually spilled about 18,000tonnes of oil, not all of which came ashore. Howeverby June 2000 the clean up operation (not yetcompleted) had generated approximately 180,000tonnes of oily waste and an estimated 9,000 HGVmovements.

Thus any shoreline clean up and decontaminationresponse requires:

• a good transport plan;• a fully authorised waste storage and disposal

plan; • sufficient licensed, appropriately protected,

sealed and isolated disposal sites to service themaximum credible clean-up anddecontamination response.

29:6 None of this is in place in Australia (or indeed inany other nation) in regard to a response to anemergency affecting either an IMDG Class 7 or an INFCode maritime transport.

29:7 Oil, chemical and hazardous spill response is thesubject of specific and intensive training in respect ofboth at-sea and shoreline operations.

Thus for all of the above categories of spills thereare national training schemes for all levels and gradesof mariners, response personnel and government andlocal authority personnel. Since many of these areinternationally recognised, nations lacking therelevant training facilities can send personneloverseas for such training. In addition the IMO alsohas similar training courses and facilities and aninternational training accreditation scheme.

29:8 This review has found no evidence of the existenceof any such training schemes in regard to at-sea, shipbased spills of IMDG Class 7 radioactive materials orINF Code materials. The only such training that existsis that carried out by the national radiologicalprotection authorities and nuclear site managers. InAustralia this is ARPANSA and ANSTO.

29:9 This review notes that the COMDISPLAN says thatthose Australian organisations will be expected tohave a field capability of. four teams (number of teammembers not given) with the ability to monitor only“low level leaks” of radiation (see Chapter 26 above).

This review concludes that such a capability will notbe adequate to the task of responding (in terms of anynecessary clean up and decontamination) to anemergency involving INF Code materials maritimetransport.

29:10 This review recommends that in order to respondappropriately to a maritime emergency involving INFCode materials suitable training schemes should beinitiated. Such schemes should provide training inbasic radiological response and handling skills forfront line response workers and more detailed trainingto identified management, control and executive staff.

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1. International Maritime Organisation(IMO) Shipboard Emergency Plans

1:1 The IMO recognises that an incident involving theactual or potential at-sea loss of Irradiated NuclearFuel (INF) Code materials is a credible occurrence.As a result of that recognition the IMO has produced“Guidelines for Developing Shipboard EmergencyPlans for Ships Carrying Materials Subject to the INFCode”.

1:2 The Guidelines identify 15 types of casualtyscenario giving rise to an actual or potential breach ofINF package containment and loss of INF Codematerials.

1:3 The IMO Guidelines lay out the division of dutiesand responsibilities and express the IMO’s expectationthat the Consignor and the Carrier of INF Codematerials should take a major part in any responseaction in the event of an incident.

1:4 This review notes that under internationalagreements coastal States have the legal right to takeresponsibility for defining the means and techniquesfor responding to marine pollution incidents and toapprove any operations that might cause furtherpollution.

1:5 This review notes some developed coastal States(including the UK and Australia) with a domesticnuclear industry and appropriate technicalexperience, equipment and personnel appear to havedevolved their responsibilities to BNFL and PNTL.

1:6 The Guidelines appear to accept that in certainsituations visual inspection may be the only means toassess the condition of the vessel and the INFcontainers. The Guidelines provide no advice relevantto situations where such visual inspection may not bepossible or safe.

1:7 The Guidelines provide advice and guidance onensuring the safety of the vessel and her crew areprioritised and that escalation of the incident isminimised. However, the Guidelines fail to provideadvice and guidance on ensuring the safety ofpersonnel on adjacent vessels, populations in adjacentcoastal States and the safety of marine, intertidal andcoastal zone terrestrial environments.

1:8 The Guidelines recommend Shipboard EmergencyPlans (SEPs) should provide guidance on ship-to-shiptransfer operations but their discussion of the subjectis brief and imprecise. They offer no details ofscenarios in which such transfer may be necessary, noguidance on sea or weather states where such transfermay not be advisable, no details of any exercises,training or drill which may be carried out to improveor check the relevant techniques.

1:9 The Guidelines offer advice and guidance ontraining, exercise and drill programmes coveringtechniques required in the event of an emergency.However, the Guidelines offer no guidance or adviceon training etc. for the deployment and use of off-vessel emergency resources and specialised teams.


Summary of review

findings

The Guidelines offer no advice or guidance on jointexercises with shore based agencies and authorities incoastal States.

1:10 The Guidelines also suggest exercises and drillsmay be observed by independent observers, but fail todefine the relevant qualifications for such observers orto identify where a pool of suitably qualified and trulyindependent observers might be found.

1:11 Finally the Guidelines’ advice on salvage mattersis both brief and imprecise and is confined to verysimplistic comments concerning towage tugs andwindows of opportunity. The guidance on salvageoffers no advice on a number of very important salvagerelated issues.

2. British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL)/PacificNuclear Transport Ltd (PNTL) EmergencyResponse Arrangements

2:1 This review concludes the BNFL and PNTLemergency plans and arrangements encapsulate theonly response to an emergency involving the maritimetransport of INF Code materials, because both the UKand Australia appear to have handed over totalresponsibility for such response actions in theirmaritime jurisdiction to BNFL and PNTL.

2:2 BNFL has a set of “Special Arrangements” forresponding to at sea emergencies involving INF Codematerials. These arrangements appear to be designedfor use by BNFL/PNTL alone. A small number of seniorexecutives of national maritime agencies, senior civilservants and senior government ministers arepermitted access to these Special Arrangements,which are “commercial in confidence”, the soleproperty of BNFL and not available to members of thepublic or their elected representatives.

2:3 Because access to the “Special Arrangements” hasnot been possible, this review has studied safety plansand arrangements outlined in two documentssubmitted to the IMO by BNFL and PNTL and onedocument issued as a public information file by PNTL.

2:4 A BNFL submission to the IMO states theproduction of the publicly accessible safety plans isbased solely on the need to “provide reassurance” tothe public, because there “would be no reason forconcern and no consequences which couldsignificantly affect persons or the environment”. Thisreview notes that no reference or details of theempirical science which might support such a claimhave been given, and that BNFL and PNTL’s maritimetransport experience and statistical base are so smallthat their operating experience is relatively negligibleand does not provide an adequate basis for makingsuch claims.

2:5 There is a potential for a failure of some of thePNTL vessels’ communications equipment in certainvery specific geographical locations. While rare andunusual, such a failure could be problematical. Theissue has not been addressed by BNFL/PNTL.

2:6 From the available details of the design of the

PNTL vessels it appears that their communicationssystems are located in the aft/bridge section of thevessel. This makes them susceptible to a completecommunication failure in the event of a number ofsevere casualty situations, especially those involvingcollision or fire.

2:7 The reviewed documents state that a BNFLemergency team is on standby “at all times” and on a“24 hour emergency standby system”. However thesephrases are not defined and it is unclear whether it isbeing claimed that the teams can be ready to leavewithin 24 hours of initial notification or that they canarrive on the emergency scene within 24 hours.

2:8 This review notes that maritime emergencies canescalate rapidly and that the optimum “window ofopportunity” for incident management and controloccurs within the first 24 hours.

This review concludes that if the BNFL emergencyteams cannot arrive on the scene within the first 24hours the possibility of the emergency escalating tovery significant or total casualty status (withattendant escalating radiological emergency)increases.

2:9 PNTL’s submission to the IMO claims theemergency team is a “fully trained and equipped teamof marine and nuclear experts”. However, otherdocuments explain that such a team actually consistsof one marine expert, four nuclear experts, two headoffice staff and one public relations officer.

2:10 BNFL’s submission to the IMO refers to theradiation monitoring and equipment accompanyingthe emergency teams. No details of the size, bulk andsensitivity to breakage of that equipment are given.

No details are given about the proposed methods oftransporting the team and the equipment from majortransport centres (ports and airfields) to theemergency, nor about the proposed method oftransferring the emergency teams and equipment tothe vessel.

2:11 This review concludes the assessment of the easeor difficulty of deployment depends upon full details ofthe intended methods of transport and deployment.Especially in the context of the parameters likely to befound in an extreme at-sea emergency scenario,extreme sea and weather conditions and many milesfrom land. No such details are provided by BNFL andPNTL and no such details appear to have beenrequested by the IMO or the coastal States.

2:12 BNFL and PNTL refer to emergency equipmentand techniques which have been “developed fromregular realistic emergency exercises”. However theyhave failed to describe the weather and sea states orthe distance from shore during those exercises. Theabsence of such information means it is impossible toassess the adequacy of the exercises and theirinfluence on the expertise of the emergency teams,techniques and equipment. There is no evidence thatthe IMO or the coastal States have requested thatinformation.

2:13 There is no indication that a wide range of

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significant parameters like weather and sea states,distance from shore and shore based facilities, thestate of the vessel and the nature of the emergencyhave been factored into ship based exercises.

This review concludes that if this is the case itrepresents a serious failure in the planning ofemergency exercises and response operations becausea radiological emergency will probably have beencaused by one or a combination of these parameters.

2:14 This review concludes that the available datapresented in the reviewed documents does notdemonstrate that the emergency exercises carried outby BNFL and PNTL have achieved the necessarystringency and will neither build up nor test theexpertise of emergency team members and thedeployment of emergency equipment in the full rangeof potential at-sea INF casualty scenarios.

2:15 BNFL and PNTL submissions to the IMO haveclaimed that there is a full “rapid response world-widesalvage cover” and that “immediate arrangements canbe put in hand to salvage the ship or cargo”.

This review concludes such claims lack precisionand definition. In terms of the start of actual salvageactivity the response is not likely to be rapid orimmediate. The timing of the start would depend on anumber of factors including the nature of the requiredsalvage effort, the nature of the contractualagreements relative to the current work priorities ofthe salvage company, the location of the emergencyrelative to the distribution of salvage equipment andthe ambient weather and sea states.

2:16 This review concludes that, unless permanentlyescorted by a salvage/rescue vessel, it is evident thatduring any voyage between Europe and Japan an INFmaritime transport will inevitably be isolated fromsources of assistance and salvage for considerableperiods of time.

2:17 BNFL’s submission to the IMO states thatemergency response systems equipment andtechnologies have been developed from “specialiseddemonstrations including sea-bed recovery of a spentfuel package”.

2:18 This review concludes that, in the absence ofevidence to the contrary, it may be assumedspecialised demonstrations have not involved recoveryof flasks and packages from inside a sunken INFcarrier on the seabed, nor in a variety of parameterswhich can exert major complicating and limitingfactors on any salvage attempts.

2:19 This review concludes that if this is the case thedemonstrations have been virtually pointless, fail totest the salvage procedures with the necessary rigourand will not adequately prepare personnel, techniquesor equipment for a relevant salvage response.

2:20 This review concludes that, given the potentialimportance of the recovery/salvage of INF Codematerials, it is remarkable that the IMO and thecoastal States accepted such a superficial andimprecise description of the demonstration. There isno evidence that further details were demanded.

2:21 BNFL and PNTL have installed sonar locationdevices on the INF vessels. This device can work atdepths in excess of 6,000 metres. Noting that there area number of sea areas on the PNTL routes wheredepths exceed this limit and that the maximum depthsin such areas may be 11,000 metres, this reviewconcludes that it is unclear whether the sonar devicewill operate in such depths.

2:22 This review reports that deep ocean salvage of INFmaterial, while theoretically possible, has never beencompleted and that the current maximum workingdepth is approximately 3,000 metres, while the currentrecord for the maximum depth from which acommercial cargo has been salvaged is 1,259 metres.

2:23 This review notes that a leading expert in the fieldbelieves that full ocean depth (11,000 metres) salvageis theoretically possible, but that it would be timeconsuming, beset by various technical difficulties andvery expensive. Expert opinion believes that such anoperation would currently require the co-operation ofa wide range of bodies and agencies including deepwater hydrocarbon and surveying industries andpossibly government agencies.

2:24 This review notes that BNFL and PNTL have notmade an open ended commitment to recover lost INFCode material, from any marine environmentregardless of the cost in terms of resources andfinance.

3. Australian Emergency ResponseArrangements

3:1 This review notes that Australia has rights underinternational agreements to exercise its “responsibilityto define techniques and means to be taken against amarine pollution incident and approve suchoperations which might cause further pollution”.

3:2 This review notes that while it has fully acceptedand acted upon these rights and responsibilities inrespect of marine pollution incidents involving oil andchemicals, Australia has not done so in respect ofradioactive materials classified by the IMO as IMDGClass 7 materials or as INF Class 1, 2 and 3 materials.

3:3 However, this review has found there are nospecific plans for response to at sea incidentsinvolving radioactive cargoes. In addition there are nosub-sectors of any other plans that address the subjectof radioactive cargoes. A number of sources haveindicated that a response to such an incident could belaunched under the Commonwealth Disaster Plan(COMDISPLAN).

3:4 Accordingly the COMDISPLAN has been reviewed.This review concludes that although theCOMDISPLAN has a proven record of response to arange of emergencies it is incapable of mounting aneffective and rapid response to an emergency involvingthe maritime transport of IMDG Class 7 and INF Codematerials because :

• it is unclear what jurisdiction and responsibility theCOMDISPLAN has over the waters of the territorialsea, the EEZ and the adjacent High Seas;


• in contrast to Australia’s detailed and subjectspecific maritime oil and chemical spill plans,COMDISPLAN contains no detailed, subjectspecific arrangements or plans for at sea spillsof radioactive materials;

• COMDISPLAN does not identify either playersor resources relevant to a response to spills ofradioactive materials at sea.

3:5 This review finds that a further indicator of theCOMDISPLAN’s inability to respond to an emergency,is that, in contrast to the stockpiles of equipment andfacilities used in the Australian response to oil andchemical spills, there is no stockpile of equipmentsuitable for responding to an at-sea spill of radioactivematerials.

Specifically this applies to the personal protectionequipment for response workers and the public andany necessary medical facilities; the monitoring andanalytical equipment required for dealing withradioactive materials and radioactively contaminatedmaterials; the facilities and equipment required forhandling, transporting, storing and disposing ofradioactively contaminated materials arising as aresult of clean up and decontamination procedures.

3:6 This review notes there are a wide range andnumber of industry and government based nationaland international training schemes providing trainingon all aspects of response to oil and chemical spills(both at sea and on the shoreline), and that in bothAustralia and the UK there are hundreds, possiblythousands, of people who have undergone suchtraining.

3:7 This review notes that there is no evidence thatsimilar training schemes exist in respect of a responseto radioactive spills. This review notes that thetraining effort and equipment supply in Australia is sosmall that in the event of any radiological incident itwould only be possible to field four teams (number ofteam members not given) and that those teams wouldonly have the equipment capability to monitor “lowlevel” radioactivity.

3:8 The Australian National Contingency Plans for oiland chemical spills says that “measures to preventpollution, combined with pre-planned clean-upstrategies are essential for the protection of themarine environment”.

This review finds Australia has comprehensivelyfailed to operate such a policy in respect of spills ofradioactive materials into the marine environment.

4. Other related matters.

4.1 Within the COMDISPLAN structure there are manyareas of potential confusion over who leads and howvarious responsibilities are allocated in regard topotential emergencies involving the maritime issuesbecause:

• There is an unclear division ofresponsibility/jurisdiction between State andCommonwealth Agencies;

• The relative roles of ARPANSA and ANSTO arestill unclear in some circumstances;

• Eight different agencies could be involved in

any emergency response (ARPANSA, ANSTO,Dept of Science & Industry, Dept of Defence,AMSA, EMA, Dept of Foreign Affairs, StateEmergency Services).

4.2 It is not surprising that BNFL, PNTL and othernuclear industry bodies and agencies deny there is anyserious risk of a breach of containment of INF flasksand packages.

More surprising is the fact that a number ofgovernment agencies in developed industrial nationshave uncritically accepted this denial.

4.3 This review warns the repeated downplaying of thelikelihood of an INF Cargo means there is a risk thatresources, energy and funding directed towardsresponse planning can be reduced because it isperceived as a minimal threat. Similarly there is noneed to push ahead with the development of relevantresponse equipment.

4.4 This review notes that the majority of thediscussion of the potential effects of a loss of INFmaterial focuses on the potential human healthimpacts of an incident.

4.5 This review points out that it is equally importantto discuss the environmental and economic impacts.In the event of the loss of a flask/package, even if it isnot breached and no INF material leaches/escapes,the economic effect on fisheries and marine andcoastal recreation and tourism is likely to beenormous.

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R E F E R E N C E S1. International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated

Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes onBoard Ships (INF CODE). 1999. International MaritimeOrganisation. London UK.

2. Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutoniumand High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (INFCODE). 1993 International Maritime Organisation. London UK.

3. Guidelines for Developing Shipboard Emergency Plans for ShipsCarrying Materials Subject to the INF CODE. November 1997.International Maritime Organisation. London UK.

4. National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping andOffshore Installations. January 2000. Maritime and CoastguardAgency. Southampton. UK

5. Pers. Comm. Series of Letters (MCA Ref No 1/1/22) from JohnAstbury: Director of Maritime Operations/Chief Coastguard. UKMaritime and Coastguard Agency. Southampton. UK. August andSeptember 2000

6. Australian National Government : Parliamentary Question No.1426. Answered by Senator Hill on behalf of The Minister forForeign Affairs : 10th September 1999

7. “Information paper submitted to the special consultative meetingof the IMO by BNFL, COGEMA and FEPC” 1996.

8. “Return shipment of vitrified residues from France to Japan”Information File. BNFL, COGEMA, ORC. January 1999.

9. “Emergency Response and Salvage Issues”. Captain MalcolmMiller, Head of Operations, Transport Division, BNFL plc.Transcript of a verbal presentation made to the SpecialConsultative Meeting on Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Transport,International Maritime Organisation. March 1996.

10. “Global Salvage Services : Any job, any sea”. SMIT TAK Publicitymaterial : year 2000. Smit International. Smit Tak. PO Box 1042.3000 BA Rotterdam. Netherlands.

11. “Comment : A Dangerous False Economy”. International Tug andSalvage. Volume 4. No 5. September/October 1999

12. “Cargo Recovery - Present and Future” Moya Crawford, Deep WaterRecovery and Exploration Ltd. Proceedings of 14th InternationalTug and Salvage Convention, Seattle. USA. Sept. 1996. pps 51 -54.

13.Pers. Comm. Telephone conversation with Moya Crawford. Friday16th Feb. 2001

14.National Maritime Oil Spill Contingency Plan. Maritime Safety andEnvironmental Strategy. AMSA. GPO BOX 2181. Canberra City. ACT260

15.National Maritime Chemical Spill Contingency Plan. MaritimeSafety and Environmental Strategy. AMSA. GPO BOX 2181.Canberra City. ACT 260

16. Pers. Comm. : Fax from Paul Nelson. Principal Policy Advisor.Environment Protection Standards. AMSA. 28/12/2000.

17.Pers. Comm. : Fax from Annaliese Caston. Advisor - Policy andregulatory. Environment Protection Standards. AMSA. October 31st2000.

18.ARPANSA Publicity material. ARPANSA. YALLAMBIE. VIC 308519.ANSTO web site : www.ansto.gov.au20.Commonwealth Government Disaster Response Plan

(COMDISPLAN). Issued by Direction of the Director General,Emergency Management Australia, Dept of Defence. PO BOX 1020.Dickson ACT 2602. Australia.


Documents

A review of aspects of the marine transport of radioactive ... · PDF fileA review of aspects of the marine transport of radioactive materials A REPORT TO GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL