a restriction for pictures and some consequences for a theory of depiction

8/7/2019 a restriction for pictures and some consequences for a theory of depiction

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A Restriction for Pictures and Some Consequences for a Theory of Depiction

Author(s): Michael NewallSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 381-394Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559072

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MICHAELNEWALL

A Restrictionfor Picturesand Some Consequencesfora Theoryof Depiction

Pictures regularlydepict other pictures. Paint-ings or drawingsof galleries, studios,andotherinteriors, for instance, often depict pictureshanging on walls or proppedon easels. Likepictures of other subjects, pictures of picturesdepict theirsubjectmatteras having a rangeofvisually discernible features. For example, apicturemay be depictedas framedorunframed,as having a particularconfigurationof shapes,tones, and colors on its surface, as depictingparticularsubject matter,as composed of onemedia or another-canvas, paper, paint, ink,and so on, as being madeaccordingto one tech-nique or another-coarsely or finely brushed,drawn,glazed, and so on.I think,however,thatin certaincircumstancesthere is a restrictionto the featuresthata picturecan be depicted as having. Consider ReneMagritte's painting The Human Condition I(1934) (Figure 1). This picture depicts a land-scape paintingon aneasel, which standsin frontof a window, the easel placed so that the paint-ing occludespreciselythatpartof the view fromthe window that it depicts. Despite its highoverall effect of naturalism,TheHuman Condi-tion I strikingly fails to depict the landscapepaintingas havinga rangeof visuallydiscerniblefeaturesthat, if we were to see such a paintingin life, we would easily visually discern.These featuresinclude thetexture,size, shape,and direction of brushstrokes,evidence of theuse of a particularmedium or a particulartech-nique, the texture of the canvas, and even theflatness of the picture's surface.' I suggest thatthe only physical feature of the painting's sur-face that Magrittedoes depict is its particular

configurationof two-dimensionalshape, tone,and color. Certainly,these are the only physicalfeatures we can definitely attributeto the land-scape painting'ssurfaceby examiningthe areaof The Human Condition I that depicts thepainting'ssurface.2There is an apparentcoincidence here that Iwant to drawattentionto. The featuresthat thelandscape painting is depicted as having-theparticular configuration of two-dimensionalshape,tone, and color-are also amongthe fea-turesof TheHuman ConditionI that bear on itscontent. The Human Condition I uses shape,tone, andcolor to depict its subjectmatter,andthe area of The HumanConditionI thatdepictsthe landscapepaintinguses a particularconfig-uration of shape, tone, and color-a configur-ationthatprovesto be preciselythe same as thatwhich it depicts the landscapeas having.3TheHumanConditionI thus conforms with the fol-lowing restriction,which I shall call "R":A picture,X, whichdepictsa picture,Y,will onlydepictthosephysicalfeaturesof Ys surfacethatareamongX'scontent-bearingfeatures.A rangeof otherpictures,I shall shortlyshow,conform with this restriction.Most of the firstpartof thisessay examines thisrestriction,andIargue that with two qualifications it can beunderstoodas a generalrestriction,applyingtoall pictures that depict pictures. In the secondpartof this essay, I assess the ability of somecurrenttheories of depictionto account for thegeneral restriction. I argue that some theoriesthat propose a resemblance between a picture

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TheJournalof Aesthetics andArtCriticism

FIGUREI. Rene Magritte,The HumanConditionI, oil-oncanvas,1934.PrivateCollection.? ADAGPMagritte,Miro,Chagall.Licensedby Viscopy, Sydney2002.and the subject matter it depicts will success-fully explainit. Such a theoryneednot be a trad-itional resemblance theory, and there are anumberof recenttheoriesthatI thinksatisfythisrequirement.I go on to arguethatconventionalistand "experience-based"theories appearunableto explainthegeneralrestriction.Therestrictionwill thus be shownto supportaccounts of depic-tion that allow for resemblance,over some ofthose thatdo not.

Before going on, it will be helpful to say moreaboutcontent-bearingfeatures,since as well asfiguringin R, they will play a role later in myargument. For the purposes of this essay, Iunderstanda picture'scontent to be the identityof the depictedsubjectmatter,and the featuresthe subjectmatteris depictedas having. A pic-ture's content-bearingfeaturesare the featuresof a picture's surfacethat play a role in deter-miningits content.Changinga picture'scontent-

bearingfeaturesin a visually discriminablewaywill thus change the content of the picture.Forexample,if theconfigurationof two-dimensionalshape,tone, andcolor of TheHumanConditionrs surfacewere alteredin a visually discrimin-ableway, thenthe content of thepaintingwouldbe affected. If the outline of one of the whitishshapes that depict the clouds in The HumanConditionI were altered,so a particularfeatureof the depicted cloud-its shape-would bealtered. If the color used to depict the cloudwere changed-darkened, for instance-so thecloud would be depicted as darker.However,changes to any other features of The HumanConditionrs surface,such as the texture of itsbrushwork, the size, and shape of brush-strokes-so far as they may be varied withoutalteringTheHumanConditionrs configurationof shape,tone, andcolor-and thetextureof thecanvas would not change its content. To takeanotherexample, in a pen and ink drawing,theshapes and areas of tone made by the pen'smarks usually bear on the drawing's content,whereasfeaturessuchas the colorof the ink andthe color andtextureof the paperare not likelyto bearon its content.The color and textureofthe drawing's paper, or the color of the inkused, could be changed without changing thedrawing'scontent,whereasthe configurationofshapesdemarkedon the papercannotchangeina visually discriminableway withoutchangingthe content to some degree. Note too that theshapeof a picture'ssurface is also not typicallya content-bearingfeature.While most pictureshave a flat surface,some pictures,such as thosepainted on church domes, and the panoramaspopularin the eighteenthandnineteenthcentur-ies, do not. If The Human Condition I weretransferredto such a surface, its pictorialcon-tentwouldnot change.

Manyotherpicturesof picturesconformwithR.Other highly naturalisticpictures, such as theself-portraitsof Bartholom6EstebanMurillo(Self-Portrait, c. 1670-1673), Gerard Dou (Self-Portrait,1655),andWilliamHogarth(Self-Portraitwitha Pug, 1745)-all of which actually depictnot the artists themselves, but paintings thatdepict the artists-also conform with R. Much

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Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depiction

FIGUREII. AdamFriedrichOeser, TheSacrificeof Iphigenia, etching, 1755, frontispieceto JohannJoachimWinckelmann,Gedankenuber die Nachahmungder griechischen Werkein der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst,Dresden and Leipzig: ImVerlagder WaltherischenHandlung,1756. BeineckeRare Book andManuscriptLibrary,Yale University.

of what I have said aboutThe Human ConditionI can also be said of thesepaintings.Certainlessnaturalisticpictures-pictures madeusing othermedia,andotherstyles-conform with R too.AdamFriedrichOeser'setchingTheSacrificeoflphigenia (1755), shownin Figure2, andGuyBara's sequence of threepanels from his bookof cartoons,Tomthe Traveller(1957), are exam-ples of such pictures.Oeser's etching does notin factdepictthe sacrificeof Iphegenia,describedby Euripidesin his play Iphigenia in Aulis, butratherdepictsthe ancientGreekpainterTimanthespainting his famous picture of that subject.4Much as in The Human ConditionI, the area ofOeser's etching thatdepicts Timanthes'spaint-ing uses the same configurationof shape andtonethat it depictsthepaintingas having.Oeserdoes not depict the painting'ssurface as havingany otherphysicalfeatures,includingcolor, thetexture of brushstrokes,or traces of the use ofspecific techniques,and so his etchingconformswith R.

Bara'scartoon,reproducedinE. H.Gombrich'sArt and Illusion, depicts a characterpaintingapicture of an angry-looking ape; the painting

appears complete in the second and thirdpanels.5The areas of the panels thatdepict thecompleted painting use precisely the sameconfigurationof shape,tone, andcolor thattheydepictthepaintingashaving.Thecontent-bearingfeatures of Bara'sdrawingsare restrictedto theshapeshe outlines with his pen, and so examin-ing the partsof Bara's drawingsthatdepict thepaintingof the ape, we find that it is only theshapes paintedon the canvas that aredepicted.Featuresincludingtone, color,andtexture,whichare not among the content-bearingfeatures ofBara'sdrawing,arenotdepicted.Bara'ssequencethus conformswith R, too.Many pictures of pictures, however, do notconformwith R. Some pictures,for instance,dodepict textual features of pictures, or depictevidence of a particulartechnique'suse. GlennBrown'spicturesof FrankAuerbach'spaintingsdo both.Brown,a contemporaryEnglishpainter,uses a very meticulous,photorealistictechniqueto great effect in his depictions of Auerbach'sheavily impastedpaintings,such as TheDay theWorld TurnedAuerbach (1992). Brown pain-stakingly depicts the textural qualities of

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TheJournalof Aesthetics and ArtCriticismAuerbach'sindividualbrushstrokesby modelingthem like any other three-dimensionalforms,using tone. The raisedpartsof the brushstroke,whichare moststronglyilluminated,aredepictedusing lightertones, and the less prominentpartsof thebrushstroke,whichfallintorelativeshadow,are depicted using darker tones. Brown thusdepictsphysicalfeaturesof Auerbach'spaintingsthat arenot amongthe content-bearingfeaturesBrown's pictures employ. That is, Browndepicts the textureof Auerbach'spaintings, yetdoes so without using texture himself-as inTheHumanConditionI, Brown uses only shape,tone, and color to depict his subject matter.Brown'spaintingsthus do not accordwith R.

Anotherexample of a picture that does notconform with R is PieterSaenredam'spaintingof a church interior,Interior of the Buurkerk,Utrecht (1644). Saenredam depicts, on thechurch's wall in the foreground, a crudelydrawnchild's graffito.Thegraffitoitself depictsa horse, mounted, comically, by four riders.Saenredam'sdepiction of this graffito fails toaccord with R because it depicts features dis-tinctiveof thegraffito'stechnique.Inparticular,it depicts the thick awkwardlines that are dis-tinctive of the heavy, clumsy movements of thechild who drew it-yet does so using onlyshape,tone, and color.What distinguishespictures of pictures thatdo conform with R from those that do not?Onecriterion, which I think is crucial in the caseconsideredabove, is this: R holds only if,X's content-bearingfeaturesare amongthe typeemployedbythesystemofdepictionusedtomakeY.I will call this condition "Cl." We have seenthat certain features of pictures are content-bearing.C introducesa furtheridea thatneedssome explanation:thatpicturesare made using"systems"of depiction.A system of depiction,for the purposesof this essay, is a practicethatdetermines the features of a picture's surfacethat bear on its content. For instance, one sys-tem may employ only shape as a content-bearingfeature,andpicturesmadeaccordingtothat system use only shape to convey content.Bara's cartoon can be understood as using asystem of this sort. Oeser's etching can thenbe understood as employing a system thatuses shape and tone to convey content, and

The HumanConditionI as employinga systemthat uses shape, tone, and color to conveycontent.A particularsystem of depiction, as I havedefined it, is distinguishedby the type of fea-tures it determines to be content-bearing.Notethat a varietyof "techniques"or "methods"ofpicture-makingmay thus accord with the samesystem, since these different techniques oftenmanipulatethe same type of content-bearingfeaturesto the samedepictiveends. Forinstance,a particularconfigurationof tone, which con-veys a particularcontent,can be generatedandmanipulated using a range of techniques ormethods,includinghatching,cross-hatching,stip-pling, by applying strokes of comparativelydarkoil or acrylicpaintto a picture'ssurface,orby applyinga translucentwash of ink or water-color paintto a picture's surface.Any of thesemethods may be used to render tone. So it istone, ratherthanany other intrinsicfeaturesofcross-hatching,stippling,darkpaint,andso on,that is the content-bearingfeature in this case.Similarly, shapemay be delimitedin a numberof ways-it can be marked out with a line, orby a sharptransitionbetween tones or colors.Particularcolors, too, may be generatedusing arangeof techniques-they maybe madeby mix-ing pigments,by glazing or washing one coloroveranother,by usingpointillist techniquesthatrely on "opticalfusion," or by other methods.Thus it is shapeandcolor,ratherthananyotherintrinsic features of these techniques, that arecontent-bearing.TheHumanConditionI accordswithC1. Thedepicted paintingis made using a system thatemploys shape, tone, and color to depict itssubject matter,and we have alreadyseen thatthe content-bearingfeatures of The HumanCondition I are a particular configurationoftwo-dimensional shape, tone, and color. TheHuman ConditionI's content-bearingfeaturesare thus among the type employed by thesystem of depictionused to make the depictedpainting.6Thesituationin thecase of Oeser's andBara'spictures is similar. Oeser's etching's content-bearing features are a particularconfigurationof shape and tone, which Oeser manipulatesusing techniquesof line drawingandhatching.The painting Oeser depicts is presumablypaintedin color andfinely detailed in a manner

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Newall A Restrictionfor Picturesand Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depictionthe eighteenth century thought appropriatetothe ancient Greeks. The paintingthus is madeaccordingto a system that uses shapeand toneto the same depictiveends as Oeser does in hisetching (albeit using different techniques) andadds to this theuse of color to depictcolorprop-erties, and the use of a finerregisterof tones todepict subtle variations in illumination andtonal values of colored surfaces. The etching'scontent-bearingfeatures are thus among thetype employed by the system of depictionusedto make the depicted painting.Bara'spanelsalso satisfyC1. Barauses a par-ticularconfigurationof two-dimensionalshape,made using a technique of line drawing, todepict the surfaceof the painting.The paintingof the ape too, is clearly made using a systemthatemploys shape to depict its subjectmatter.The content-bearingfeatures of the panels arethus among the type employed by the systemused to make the depicted painting.Note that,like the painting Oeser depicts, the paintingdepicted by Bara may not only use shape toconvey content,butmay well make use of colorand tone too. (The fearful reaction of the car-toon painterin the final panel perhaps implieshis techniquesare rathermore naturalisticthanBara's.)The Human ConditionI, Oeser'setching,andBara's cartoon all accord with Cl. What ofBrown's and Saenredam'spictures, which donot accord with R? These, we shall see, fail tosatisfy Cl, for certain of their content-bearingfeaturesarenotamongthetypeof content-bearingfeaturesusedby thepicturesthey depict.Brown'spictureuses a finer registerof tones and moredetailsof shapeto depictAuerbach'sbrushworkthan Auerbach himself uses. Saenredam'spic-tureuses color, tone, andmanymore featuresofshapethan does the child's drawingit depicts.On thisexamination,C1 providesa serviceablecriterionto distinguishbetween the pictures byMagritte,Oeser, andBara,which conform withR, and the pictures by Brown and Saenredam,which do not.

III

Forbrevity,I shallcall the conjunctionof R andC1, "RI." I have discussed a few examples ofpictures that accord with R1. Now I want to

suggest an argumentto more fully supportthisproposal.I thinkI can best do this by showingthedifficultyof overcomingthisrestriction-thatis, showing the difficulty of making a picturethatwouldprovidea counterexampleto R1.I will beginby consideringhow apaintercouldrefine a picturein a way that would allow himor herto depictphysicalfeaturesof a painting'ssurfacebeyondtwo-dimensionalshape,tone,andcolor-the type of featuresthat bear on manypictures'content. We have seen that painttex-tureis often prominentamongthe non-content-bearingfeaturesof a painting'ssurface,so Iwillfocus on how a paintercould attemptto makeapicturethat could depict the textureof anotherpicture'ssurface,withoutcontraveningC1.Oneway a paintercandepictfine detailssuchas texture is to use a fine technique. Broadbrushstrokeswill typicallynot allow a paintertodepict small features such as the details of tex-ture. For this reason, the characteristicdetailsand textures of wood-grain,fur, hair, and skincan be difficult to depict with a broad brush.Using a finer brush,and applying correspond-ingly finer individualbrushstrokes,these tex-tures are readily depicted. If one uses a fineenough brush, even individual hairs and theporeson skin can be depicted.Brown,as I men-tioned above, uses just such a meticulous tech-niqueto depictthe thickimpastoof Auerbach'spaintings.He depicts the texture of Auerbach'sbrushworkthroughthe use of tone, modelingashe would anyother three-dimensionalform. Wehave just seen that Brown's paintings do notcontravene R1 because they do not satisfy Cl.But could such a strategy,of using finerbrush-strokes to depict smaller features, be used toovercome R1? That is, could a meticulouslydetailedpicturesuccessfully depict the texturalfeaturesof anotherpicture,andsatisfyC1?I do not thinkany such methodcan be devel-oped. Brown's brushstrokesare much smallerthanAuerbach'sand it is this fact thatallowshimto depictthecharacteristicfeaturesof Auerbach'sbrushwork.To depictthe featuresof any one ofAuerbach's brushstrokes-the varying tonesandshapesof the stroke'sshadows,illuminatedareas,andhighlights-Brown needs to apply anumberof brushstrokeshimself. In orderto sat-isfy C1, thecontent-bearingfeaturesof Brown'spaintingwould need to be among the type offeaturesthat bearon the content of Auerbach's

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TheJournalof Aesthetics and Art Criticismpainting.However, this is not the case. WhereAuerbachuses a single broad stroketo delimitashape,Brown uses manysmallerstrokes,andsois able to intentionallyinclude many morepar-ticulardetails,all of which mayconvey content,within a similarshape.Where Auerbachuses asingle broad stroke to lay down an areaof toneorcolor,Brownagainuses manysmallerstrokes,and so is able to manipulatewithin the sameareaa rangeof particulartonal and color vari-ations, which again bear content. Both Brownand Auerbach use shape, tone, and color todepicttheirsubjectmatter;butBrown,in virtueof using finer brushstrokes,is able to manipu-late finervariationsof shape,tone, and color toconvey content than is Auerbach. Brown'ssystem thus makes use of a wider range ofcontent-bearingfeatures thandoes Auerbach's.So in this case C1 is not satisfied: not all thecontent-bearingfeatures of Brown's pictureareamong the type of content-bearingfeaturesemployedby Auerbach'ssystem.But what if Brown were depictinga paintingthat used smallerbrushstrokesthanAuerbach'sto depict its subjectmatter?This will not help.So long as Brown's brushstrokesremainlargerthan those he depicts, the problemremains-Brown will continue to apply a number ofsmallercontent-bearingbrushstrokesin ordertodepicttexturalfeaturesof anyone of Auerbach'sbrushstrokes.What then if Brown depicted apainting that used the same size brushstrokesBrown himself uses? Since Brown needs toapplya numberof variouslytonedbrushstrokeshimself to depict the features of any one of thebrushstrokes he depicts, it follows that thesmaller the brushstrokes Brown depicts, thefewer brushstrokeshe will be able to apply inorderto depictit, andthe fewer featuresof eachbrushstrokehe will be able to depictin thisway.This reaches a necessarylimit when the brush-strokes Brown is depicting are as small asBrown's own. At this point, Brown cannotdepict any of the texturalfeaturesof the brush-strokesusing the shadingtechniquesthat wereso effective in depictingAuerbach'sbrushwork,since for each single brushstrokehe is tryingtodepict, he can use no more than a single brush-stroke to representit. At this point, it will beimpossible to depict the brushstroke'sthree-dimensionalfeaturesusing shadingtechniques,for one needs a minimumof twobrushstrokesto

model a formusinglight and shade-one stroketo denote the lighter, illuminatedarea, and asecond to denote the darker,shaded area. Clmay now be satisfied-the content-bearingfea-tures of Brown's painting may now be amongthe type of content-bearingfeaturesused by thedepicted painting's system. But this comes attheexpenseof conformingwith R-for no painttexture is depicted.So even using a system thatdetermines that the finest variations in shape,tone, and color bear on content, it will not bepossible to depicttexturalpropertiesof a paint-ing if the depictionis to satisfyC1.Perhaps,it mightbe suggested,apaintercoulddevise a differentway of depictingbrushstrokes,which would allow him or her to overcomeR1.Rather than attempting to model the brush-strokeshe or she wishes to depict in light andshade,the paintercould enlist texture itself as acontent-bearingfeature. That is, to depict abrushstrokeof a particulartexture, the paintercouldapplyto the canvas a brushstrokewith thesame texture,recreatingthe texturalfeaturesofthe depictedbrushstroke.A picturethat accordswith this system willonly satisfy C1 if it depicts a picturethatitselfemploys texture to bear content. But considerwhat wouldhappenif this new systemwas itselfused to depict a paintingthat also used textureto bearcontent. The brushstrokesof the result-antpaintingwouldreproducethe texturesof thebrushstrokesof the depicted painting, and sodepictits brushstrokesas havingthose textures.But since the depicted painting also uses thesame content-bearingfeatures, the textures ofits brushstrokeswill also bear content. (Theywill, presumably,reproducethe surfacetexturesof the depictedpainting's subjectmatter.)Thus,althoughthe methoddoes depict the texture ofthe painting's brushstrokes,it will still fail todepict any of the picture'snon-content-bearingfeatures,andso fail to overcome R.7

Finally,consideran evenmoreextremecase-perhapsthe mostextremecase-in whichexacti-tude in depictionmightbe attempted.Considera painting that is presentedas its own depic-tion-as a depiction of itself.8 An artist, forinstance,could exhibit a paintingtitledPictureof a Painting no. 12, and that same paintingcould be listed as no. 12 in the accompanyingcatalogue. Picture of a Painting no. 12 thenmightbe takento depictitself, andsincePicture

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Newall A Restrictionfor Picturesand SomeConsequencesfor a Theoryof Depictionof a Painting no. 12 and painting no. 12 areidentical, Picture of a Painting no. 12 wouldthen function as a scrupulousdepictionof itself,perfectin every respect.Thatis, each feature ofPictureof a Paintingno. 12 would depict paint-ing no. 12 as havingjust that feature.The colorsand details of the paintworkwould depict thepaintwork of painting no. 12 as having justthose features;the tiniestdetail of each individ-ual brushmark,even the textureof the canvasof Picture of a Painting no. 12 would serve todepict paintingno. 12 as havingthose same fea-tures,and so on. In this manner,such a picturemight depict itself as having all the features itdoes in fact have. Such a picturewould satisfyC1-its content-bearingfeaturesmust be amongthe type of content-bearingfeaturesused by thedepictedpicture,forthefeaturesareone and thesame. But would it overcomeR? No. Foreverydetail and feature of a picture-every spot ofpaint, thread of canvas, and so on-to depictitself, it is necessarythateach of these detailsiscontent-bearing.So since, in the case of Pictureof a Paintingno. 12, every featureof thepictureis content-bearing,it follows that there are nonon-content-bearingfeaturesto depict.Even thismost extreme case of pictorialexactitude thusfails to violate R.

IVOn this basis, RI appears a plausible claim.However, a revision is needed, for there arecertaintypes of picturesthat prove exceptionsto R1. I will mention these now, and make aqualificationto R accordingly.(i) Picturesthat depict picturesas viewed underunevenilluminationmayprovidecounterexamplestoR1.Sometimes a pictureis seen in uneven illumin-ation,so that a shadow falls across its surface.Apainter,if he or she is to depict a pictureunderthese conditions, usually uses tone to depictsuch a shadow cast across the picture'ssurface.This can effectively serve to depict the picturesurface on which it falls as being flat. Thisexample contravenesR, since flatness is a fea-ture of the depicted paintingthat does not bearon the depicting picture's content. As tone is

used to depict this shadow,C1 will be satisfiedprovidedthat tone is amongthe type of featuresthat bear on the content of the depictedpicture.Thus, the paintingof the unevenly illuminatedpicturemay give a counterexampleto R1.(ii) Picturesthatdepictpicturesas viewedfromaninappropriatelyobliqueangle may providecoun-terexamplestoR1.Considera picturethat uses a system of depic-tion that accordswithor incorporateslinearper-spective to depict a painting viewed from anoblique angle. Flat surfaces and flat shapes,when viewed obliquely,appearforeshortenedina distinctive way, appearingthinner than theywould from a frontalpoint of view. A picturemade in perspectivedepictsthis foreshortening,and since this type of foreshorteningis distinct-ive of flat surfaces and shapes, it will effect-ively depictan obliquelyviewed pictureas flat.Flatnessis a featureof thedepictingpicturethatdoes not bear on its content, so this examplecontravenes R. C1, too, is readily satisfied bysuch anexample-for supposethat the depictedpaintingis made accordingto the same systemas the picturethatdepicts it. The two pictures,because they are made using the same system,will have the same type of content-bearingfea-tures. Thus, we have anothercounterexampleto R1.(iii) Picturesthatdepict visibly damagedpicturesmayprovidecounterexamplesto R1.Consider a picturethat depicts anotherpicturethat is damaged-its surface, say, has beencrumpledor folded. Supposetoo that both pic-turesaccordwith the same system, which usesshapeand tone to depictthree-dimensionalformandthe effects of illumination.C1 will thereforebe satisfied,since bothpictures'content-bearingfeatures will be of the same type. However,since tonecanbe used to depictshadows castbyfolds and creases in paper, it is a straight-forwardtask using such a system to depict thecreased or crumpledpictureas havinga creasedor crumpled surface. Creases, crumples, andfolds are not among the type of features thatbear on the depicteddrawing'scontent,so sucha picture provides a further counterexampleto R.9

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TheJournalof Aesthetics and ArtCriticismI suggest that each of the counterexamplestoR1 that I have considered involves a real or

apparentdistortionof the content-bearingfea-turesof the depictedpicture.10These particulardistortions are distinctive of flat surfaces thatare subject to uneven lighting, are obliquelyviewed, or have undergone damage includingcrumplingor folding. In the case of the depic-tion of the unevenly illuminatedpicture, areasof the picture's tones are depicted as darkenedin a way distinctiveof a shadowfalling over aflat surface. The obliquely viewed picture isdepictedas a flat surface in virtueof having thetwo-dimensionalshapesof its surfaceforeshort-ened in a way distinctive of a flat surfaceviewed from an oblique angle. The damagedpicture is depicted as having its surface crum-pled or folded into a particularshapein virtue ofhaving the two-dimensional shapes of itssurface depicted as distortedby crumplingorfolding, and the tones of its surfacedepictedaslightenedor darkenedin a way thatis distinct-ive of light falling over a crumpledor foldedsurface. It is in virtue of a picture depicted ashavingitscontent-bearingfeaturesdarkened,fore-shortened,or otherwise distorted in these dis-tinctiveways that we recognizethe pictureas aflat surfacethat is unevenlyilluminated,viewedfrom too obliqueanangle,ordamaged.I suggestthat it is in virtue of content-bearingfeaturesdepictedas distortedin thesedistinctivewaysthatdepictionsof unevenlylit, obliquelyviewed, anddamagedpicturesformcounterexamplesto R1.With this in mind,I will qualifyR1 with thefollowing criterion:R holds if,X depictsYas viewedunderconditionssuchthatnorealorapparentdistortionof Ys content-bearingfea-turesoccurs.lI will call thiscondition"C2."Together,I suggestC1 and C2 form a sufficient condition for R.Thatis:A picture,X, thatdepictsa picture,Y, will depictonlythosephysicalfeaturesof Y's surfacethatareamongX's content-bearingfeaturesif andonly if(i) X's content-bearingfeaturesareamongthetypeemployedbythesystemofdepictionusedto makeY,and(ii)X depictsY asviewedunderconditionssuchthat no real or apparentdistortionof Y's content-bearingfeaturesoccurs.

I will call this proposal"R2."

vIn the following sections, I arguethatR2 sup-portstheoriesof depictionthatproposeor implythatpicturesresembletheirsubjectmatterwithrespectto theircontent-bearingfeatures.I shallshow that such theoriesare able to explainR2,while some other current theories of depic-tion-I look atconventionalistand"experience-based"theories-appear unable to explain therestriction.A broadrange of theories propose or implythatpicturesresembletheirsubjectmatterwithrespect to their content-bearingfeatures. Trad-itionalresemblancetheoriesof depictioncertainlydo; they make the strongerclaim thata picturehas the content it does in virtueof sharingfea-tureswith its subjectmatter.However,since the1960s it has become clear that such a positionisuntenable. Nelson Goodman, in particular,arguedpersuasivelythatresemblanceis never asufficient condition fordepiction.12More recently, other positions have beendeveloped that allow that a picture's surfacedoes resemble its subjectmatterwith respecttotheircontent-bearingfeatures,butavoidmakingresemblance a sufficient condition for depic-tion. FlintSchier,for instance,while eschewingthetraditionalresemblancetheory,claims thatitis a consequence of his "naturalgenerativity"theoryof depictionthatpicturesresembletheirsubjectmatter,and that these respectsof resem-blancebearonpictorialcontent.13DominicLopesmakes a similarclaim for his "aspectrecogni-tion"account,proposingthatalthough"pictorialsimilaritydoes not explaindepiction,""picturesundoubtedlydo preservesecond-orderisomor-phisms. There are always correspondencesbetweenthearticulationof pictures'designprop-erties and the articulationof the visual proper-ties they attribute to their subjects."14Othershave attemptedto be more specific aboutwhatthe respects of pictorial resemblancemay be.John Hyman, for instance,has arguedthatpic-tures resemble their referents with respect totheir"occlusion"shapes, andthat this providesa necessaryconditionfor depiction.15Schier also introduced the idea that theresemblancebetweenpictureandsubjectmatter

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Newall A Restrictionfor Picturesand SomeConsequencesfor a Theoryof Depictionmay be relative to our own recognitionalabili-ties, ratherthanresidingin some intrinsicprop-ertysharedby pictureandsubjectmatter.Schiersuggested that it is the capacityof a picturetoengage the same recognitional abilities as itssubject matter that determines that it depictsthat subject matter. The "resemblance,"then,lies in a capacityfor pictureand subjectmatterto trigger"overlapping"recognitionalresponsesin the viewer. A number of writers have fol-lowed Schier'sproposal.16The following argumentcould be used tosupport any theory that grants that picturesresemble their subject matter with respect totheir content-bearingfeatures. To this end, Iwill now show that R2 is readilyexplained bysuchtheories,and in the following two sections,I argue that in contrast, some other currenttheories of depiction-experience-based andconventionalisttheories-do not appearto beable to explainR2.The recent theories that I groupherestipulateor imply thatthe features a pictureshares withits subjectmattermustbe visuallydistinctive ofthe subject matterin some way-that is, thatthese shared features be features in virtue ofwhich we are able to recognize the subjectmatteror distinguishit fromotherobjects. Toexplain R2, it will be necessary to refine thisidea slightly. Pictures,as I have alreadynoted,do not just depict objects, they also depictobjects as having particular features. For apictureto depict its subjectmatter as having aparticularfeature,I suggest, it is necessarythatpartof it resembles a visuallydistinctivepartofthatfeature. For example, to depict an object'stexturalfeatures, the surface of a picture willusuallyuse a tonalpatternthatis, to us, visuallydistinctive of the textured surface (or lightfalling across such a texturedsurface).To takeanotherexample,to depictanobjectas havingaparticularthree-dimensionalform, the surfaceof a picture will often use a two-dimensionalshape-something approximatingthe shapeof asilhouetteof the depictedobject-which is visu-ally distinctive of its three-dimensionalform.Now, suppose a picture,X, depicts anotherpicture,Y,and Yin turndepictssome nonpictor-ial subjectmatter,S. Accordingto the theories Ihave mentionedin this section,in a resemblancetheory, Yrscontent-bearingfeatures will repro-duce features of S, and X's content-bearing

features, in turn,will reproducefeaturesof Y.Suppose, too, that pictures X and Y conformwith Cl-that is, that the content-bearingfea-tures of X are among the type of featuresthatbear on Y's content. It follows that X's content-bearing features only reproducefeatures fromamongY'scontent-bearingfeatures.Given that X's content-bearingfeaturesonlyreproduce features from among Y's content-bearing features, what content regarding Y'sphysical featuresmay we expect X to convey?Certainly,X's content-bearingfeatures will bedistinctiveof those content-bearingfeaturesofY that are amongthe type of features thatbearon X's content-for they reproduce thosefeatures exactly. The Human ConditionI, forinstance,reproducesthe configurationof shape,tone,and coloron thedepictedcanvas,andin sodoingdepictsthese featuresas well.18Will X's content-bearingfeaturesbe distinct-ive of any other of Y's physical features?Ingeneral, no. In Section I, I showed that a pic-ture'scontent-bearingfeaturesarenot generallydistinctive of a picture's non-content-bearingfeatures,such as theparticularmediuma pictureuses, or the use of particulartechniques.Mostly,particularcontent-bearingfeatures-particularcolorsandshapes,for instance-can be generatedor manipulatedusing a variety of media andtechniques.There are, as was seen in SectionIV, exceptionsto this rule.Some configurationsof content-bearingfeatures-or moreprecisely,distortionsof these features-are distinctiveofparticulartypes of media. They may be dis-torted in a way distinctive of a foreshortenedflat surface, an unevenly lit flat surface, or adamagedsurfacethatmaybe crumpledorfolded,for instance,in a way distinctive of paper.Butthese cases are excluded from considerationhere by C2. C2 stipulatesthat X depicts Y asviewed under conditions such that no real orapparentdistortion of Ys content-bearingfea-tures occurs. As was seen in Section IV, it isthese types of distortionsof a picture'scontent-bearing features that are distinctive of flatsurfaces that are subject to uneven lighting orobliqueviewing orhave undergonedamage.Thus, given C1 and C2, the content-bearingfeaturesof X areonly distinctiveof those phys-ical features of Y's surfacethat are among thetype of featuresthat bearonX's content-in thecaseof TheHumanConditionI, theconfiguration

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TheJournalof Aesthetics and Art Criticismof shape,tone, andcoloron thedepictedcanvas.As I have mentioned,accordingto theoriesI amconsideringhere,for a pictureto depictsits sub-ject matteras having a particularfeature,a partof it must resemblesthat featurein some distinc-tive respect.Fromthis, R follows: X will depictjust those physical features of Ys surface thatareamongthe featuresthatbearon X's content.

VITheories that propose that a picture shares itscontent-bearingfeatures with its subjectmattercan thusexplainR2. I now wantto arguethatofsome othermajoraccountsof depictioncurrentlyavailable to us, only the resemblancetheoryisable to explain R2. To this end I will examinetwo major theories of depiction, arguing thatthey are unable to explain R2. In this section Ishall look at conventionalism,and in the fol-lowing section examine theories I describe as"experience-based," focusing on RichardWollheim's account of depiction in terms of"seeing-in."In general,conventionalisttheories claim thatall representationsrepresentwhattheydo in vir-tue of conventional rules. This view is widelyaccepted in the case of symbols and language,but less so in the case of pictures. The waywords represent provides perhapsthe clearestexample of how conventional representationoperates. In English, the word "chair"repre-sents a chair, but there is no necessaryreasonwhy chairs are known by this name; in otherlanguages they arerepresentedby verydifferentwords. It is only in virtue of a convention,understood and accepted by a community oflanguageusers-English speakers,in thiscase-that the word means what it does. Similarly,conventionalistaccounts of depiction proposethat a picture depictsits subjectmatterin virtueof conventionsthat relatethe pictureto its sub-ject matter, and that are understood andacceptedby a communityof picture-makersandviewers. "Apicture,"writes Goodman,the bestknown proponentof a conventionalist accountof depiction,"torepresentan object, must be asymbolfor it."19I thinka conventionalisttheoryof picturesisunlikelyto explainR2. Conventionalisttheoriesof representationimply that in principle we

need have little troublemaking representationsof anythingor anyfeatureof any thing.To rep-resent an object or feature on a conventionalistaccount, it is enough that a convention existsthat assigns the object or feature a name orsymbol distinguishablefrom other names andsymbols.20Similar statements to R apply tonaturallanguages-for instance, that words orphrasesthat refer to other words or phrasesareunable to representcertain of their features-arethuseasily andregularlyovercome.Naturallanguageshave conventionsthat allow referenceto all features of inscribed or spoken words,includingthose thatdo not bear on content. Forexample, I can talk aboutfeaturesof a printedor spokenword such as its font, the color of theink in which it is printed,the accentin which itis uttered,and so on. It thereforeseems unlikelythat a conventionalistaccountof depictionwillbe able to explain R, for as with language, aconventionalist account seems to imply thatthere ought to be no limit to what features anobject may be depicted as having. All that isneeded for any feature to be depictedis that aconventionexists, or is developed, thatassignsthe feature a pictorial symbol-perhaps someconfigurationof shape,tone, andcolor-distin-guishablefrom other such symbols. In short,ifdepictionwas conventional we could expect itto have theresourcesto overcomeR2; as it can-not, it seems improbablethat a conventionalistaccount can be correct.One objectiona conventionalistmay makeisthat there is a rule-a convention-that iscommon to all the methods of depictionI havelooked at and that governs the depiction ofpictures.The rule would determinethat,underthe conditionsdescribedin R2-C1 andC2-apicture, X, which depicts another picture, Y,which in turndepicts subjectmatter,S, is madesimply by using X's system to depict S, in thatpartof X thatdepictsY's surface.Thus,to depictthe surfaceof anotherpicture,a picture-makersimply lays down the samecontent-bearingfea-tures that he or she would use to depict thatotherpicture'ssubjectmatter.However,there isa problemwith this proposal.Since the Renais-sance,manyEuropeanpaintershave beenfascin-atedby the problemsof depictingtexture.So itseems highly likely that, if it were possible toovercome R2, an alternativeconventionwouldhave been developed at some time that would

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Newall A Restrictionfor Pictures and Some Consequencesfor a Theoryof Depictionhave allowed these artists to depict featuressuch as a painting's surface texture. No suchalternative convention appears to have beendeveloped, so it remains unlikely R2 can beexplainedby conventionalism.21VII

The theoriesof depictionI describeas"experience-based"hold thata picture'scontentis determinedprincipallyby the viewer's visual experienceofit. On these accounts, a picturegives rise to avisual experience in its viewer that is in someway related to the experience of seeing thepicture'sreferent.It is largely in virtueof suchan experience that we are able to identify apicture'ssubject.Among experience-basedaccountsof depic-tion,RichardWollheims'stheoryholds the mostcurrency.22Accordingto Wollheim,understand-ing a picture involves the experience of "see-ing" the picture's referent "in" the picture'ssurface;hence his descriptionof pictorialexper-ience as "seeing-in."23Wollheim stresses thatthere is nothingthat can be said in generalaboutthe physical features of a picture's surface orthe relationof the surfaceto the objectsseen init. He thus denies both resemblance theories,which hold that a picture's surface is related toits subject matterby virtue of convention. "Idoubt,"Wollheimwrites,"thatanythingsignifi-cant can be said about exactly what a surfacemustbe like for it to have this effect [to triggerseeing-in]."24DepictionforWollheimis distinguishedfromothertypes of representationby the experienceof seeing-in. Accordingto Wollheim, seeing-inis an experiencecharacteristicof, althoughnotexclusive to, ourexperienceof pictures.Seeing-in is a typeof visual awarenessdistinguishedbya featureWollheim calls "twofoldness."Whenaviewer sees an object in a surface, the viewerhas a "twofold"visual awareness;thatis, he orshe is simultaneouslyvisuallyawareof both thesurface (as a flat, painted, drawn, or printedthing)and of the objectseen-in the surface.25Can seeing-in explain R2? I do not think so.Pictures have the contentthey do partlyin vir-tue of possessing certain features-which Ihave called content-bearing.As we have seen,R2 limits the features a picturecan be depicted

as having under certain conditions. Thus, anytheorythatproposesto explainR2 will need toprovide some fact that stipulates or limits insome way the features of X that bear contentregardingY. The resemblancetheory I consid-ered in Section V does this by stipulatingthatapicture'scontent-bearingfeaturesbe featuresitshares with its subjectmatter.Can Wollheim's theory do something simi-lar? Itcannot.As we haveseen, Wollheimholdsthatnothing"significant"can be said aboutthefeaturesthatbear on a picture'scontent;accord-ing to his theory it is only the experience thatpicturesoccasion thatis distinctiveof depiction.In characterizingonly this experience,and say-ing nothingof the featuresof a picture'ssurfacethat occasion it, Wollheim's theory lacks theresourcesto explainR2.For the same reason, all experience-basedtheories that deny something general can besaid about the physical features of a picture'ssurface,or aboutthe relation of a picture'ssur-face to its subject matter, will be unable toexplainR2. As I have said, explainingR2 callsforjust such a generalfact limitingX's content-bearingfeatures.Any experience-basedtheorythatdenies that something generalmay be saidaboutwhat features a surface needs in order todepict,will thus be unable to explainR2.Understandably, experience-based accountstend to deny that generalconditions for depic-tion can be given that do not involve experi-ence. If an experience-based theory was toallow thatfacts about the pictureitself, and itsrelationwith the subjectmatter,playeda role indeterminingcontent,it would open up the pos-sibility of providinga further level of explan-ation beyond experience, by explaining theexperiences we have in front of pictures intermsof physicalfacts aboutthepictureandthepicture'srelationwith the subjectmatter.Thus,despitethefact thathis "illusiontheory"andtheresemblancetheoryarenotobviouslyincompat-ible, E. H. Gombrich denies that pictures are"copies" of their subject matter.26Similarly,RobertHopkins,althoughhe acknowledgesthat"how things really are constrainswhat can beexperienced as resembling them," denies thatthe investigationof these "realconstraints"canaddanythingto a theoryof depiction,allocatingit instead to the fields of "the psychologist,physiologistand arthistorian."27

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The Journalof AestheticsandArtCriticismVIII

Experience-basedand conventionalist accountsof depictionthus do not appearto explain R2,while theories that propose a resemblancebetween a picture and its subject matter withrespectto the picture's content-bearingfeaturesare able to provide an elegant explanationofR2. Therefore,R2 can be understood as sup-portinga theoryof depictionthatproposessucha resemblance,in favorof experience-basedandconventionalistaccountsof depiction.I mentioned in Section V that traditionalresemblance theories remain untenable in thewake of the criticisms leveled againstthem byphilosopherssuch as Goodman.Nevertheless,arangeof theoriesof depictionhave been devel-opedmorerecentlythatI thinkareable to satisfythe requirementfor depictionI have proposed.These include the theories of Schier, Lopes,Sartwell,Carroll,Brook,andHyman,mentionedabove. Whether one of these is to be preferredover the rest is a topic beyondthe scope of thisessay.28MICHAELNEWALLDepartmentof PhilosophyFlindersUniversityBedfordPark,SouthAustralia5042AustraliaINTERNET:[email protected]

1. It may be objected that in The Human ConditionI,brushstrokesare depicted on the surface of the depictedpaintingin the following way. Since the partof The HumanConditionI thatdepicts thepainting'ssurface is madeup ofMagritte'sbrushstrokes,these strokes could serve to depictthe brushstrokesof the depictedpainting-attributing to thedepicted brushstrokesthe same size, shape, and texture asthe real brushstrokes. I do not think this objection isconvincing. The real brushstrokescover Magritte's entirepainting,andjust as they have no special significancethere(the textureof the strokeis not used to depict the texture ofany otherdepictedobject)we are not inclined to understandthemas depictingthe brushstrokesof the depicted painting.Note that this is not to say that texturecan never bear onpictorial content, only that it does not in the case of TheHuman ConditionI.2. The only otherthing thatcan be said about the land-scape painting's surfaceis that it has particularcontent-itdepictsa landscape.For thepurposeof this essay, I will nottreat representation as a physical feature of objects;althoughit is clear that a picture's content will be deter-mined, partly at least, by certain of the picture's physical

features.Below, I call these featuresof a pictureits "con-tent-bearing"features. Note, too, that Magritte has con-trived The HumanConditionI in a way that draws attentionto its depictive lacunae. The depicted paintingis positionedso that it occludes precisely thatpartof the view from thewindow thatit depicts.But for the line of barecanvason thedepicted painting'sside, the transitionas one's eye followsthe path from the "real"landscapeacross to the depictedlandscapeof the paintingon the easel would occur seam-lessly. The transitionis unmarkedby any awarenessof the"real"landscape-the air, trees, and earth-giving way tothe textural features of the paint, evidence of a painter'stechnique,or the flatness of the canvas on which the land-scape is depicted.3. Generally,The Human ConditionI uses shape, tone,and color in the following way: it uses two-dimensionalshapes to depict featuresof its subject's three-dimensionalform;it uses variationsin tonal values to depictilluminatedsurfaces, shadows, and the relative lightness and darknessof colored surfaces;and it uses color propertiesto depictlocal color propertiesof its subjectmatterand the effects ofaerialperspective.The portionof The HumanConditionIthat depicts the painting depicts a much smaller range ofproperties-two-dimensional shape serves to depict onlytwo-dimensionalshape, tone depicts only tone, and colordepictsonly local color.4. Oeser'setchingis a detailof thefrontispieceto JohannesJoachim Winckelmann's Gedanken iber die Nachamungder griechischen Werkein der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst(Dresdenand Leipzig:Im Verlagder WaltherischenHand-lung, 1756).5. E. H. Gombrich,Art and Illusion:A Studyin thePsych-ology of Pictorial Representation(London:PhaidonPress,1960), p. 289, fig. 279.6. Note that the landscape painting's system may alsouse types of content-bearingfeaturesthat The Human Con-dition I does not possess. For instance, it could be madeusinga more"photo-realistic"systemthatmakesuse of subtletypesof shape,tone,and colorfeaturesto depictfine "photo-graphic"details of a type thatMagritte'sless refined tech-nique does not depict. Certainly,if Magrittehad intendedTheHumanConditionI to depictsuch a photo-realisticpaint-ing, we would not expect The Human ConditionI to lookany differentto how it now appears,for-in accord withR-The Human ConditionI fails to depict just those detailsthat would distinguishsuch a photo-realisticpicturefromapicturemadeaccordingto the system-that is, usingthetypeof content-bearingfeatures-that Magrittehimself uses.7. Note, too, that the system would fail to recreateanytextural details that would distinguishthe depictedpicturefrom that picture's subject matter,for the method wouldreproduceonly those texturaldetailsthat the depictedpaint-ing in turnreproducedfrom thatsubjectmatter.8. However, doubts exist over whether a picture candepictitself. Platosuggeststhatanexactreplicaof anobjectcannot "exactlyresemble the thing it names,"or it will nolonger representit, but simply be another instance of it(Plato,Cratylus[430-432], trans.C. D. C. Reeve, in Plato,Plato: CompleteWorks,ed. John M. Cooper [Indianapolis:Hackett, 1997], pp. 102-156). Certainly,we are not dis-posed to see a picturein itself.9. I have not consideredripped, torn, burnt,and other-wise damaged pictures here. Although featurestypical of

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Newall A Restrictionfor Picturesand SomeConsequencesfor a Theoryof Depictionsuch damage-tor edges, holes, burs to a picture's sur-face, and so on-are often readily depictedwithoutcontra-vening C1, I suggest thatthese featuresarenot featuresof apicture'ssurface but resultsof the destructionof a picture'ssurface.

10. It may be objectedthat in some cases only a non-content-bearingpartof a picture's surface is damaged(forexample,when only the edge of the paperon which a draw-ing is made is folded or crumpled,leaving the partsof thepaper that have been drawn on undamaged)and that thisdamage can be depicted. In such cases, I suggest it is notreally the depiction that is damaged, only the surface onwhichit is made.11. This supposesthatthere areprescribedconditions for"correctly"perceiving a picture's content-bearingfeatures.Such a correctperceptionoccurs when a pictureis viewedundamaged,withoutglare, evenly illuminated,and front on.These conditionsmightbe thoughtof as set by the picture-maker's intention.Certainly, damage to a picture,when itdoes not result in the picture's complete destruction,is notusually intendedby the picture-maker,but is the result ofaccident, neglect, or vandalism. Similarly, picture-makersgenerallyintendtheir work to be viewed undereven illumin-ation, andusually intend theirpicturesto be viewed from aline of sight (roughly)perpendicularto the picturesurface,ratherthan from oblique angles. (There are some excep-tions. Anamorphic projections only appear as the artistintends when viewed fromsome very oblique angle.)12. Nelson Goodman,Languages ofArt: AnApproachtoa Theoryof Symbols,2nd. ed. (Indianapolis:Hackett,1976),pp. 3-5.13. Flint Schier, Deeper into Pictures (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1986), p. 186. "Thetheoryofnaturalgenerativity... tells us what kind of resemblancebetween S and O is requiredfor S's depictingO" (p. 186).Schier's account seems to imply that the points of resem-blancebearon pictorialcontent;see n. 16, below.14. Dominic Lopes, UnderstandingPictures (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1996), pp. 190 and 188.15. JohnHyman,TheImitationof Nature(Oxford:BasilBlackwell, 1989), chap. 3, and "Pictorial Art and VisualExperience,"The British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (1999):21-45.16. Flint Schier, Deeper into Pictures, particularlypp.49-50; CrispinSartwell,"NaturalGenerativityand Imita-tion,"The BritishJournal of Aesthetics 31 (1991): 58-67,and "What Pictorial Realism Is," The British Journal ofAesthetics 34 (1994): 2-12; Noel Carroll,Philosophy ofArt:A ContemporaryIntroduction(London:Routledge, 1999),pp. 42-49; Donald Brook, "On Non-Verbal Representa-tion,"TheBritishJournalof Aesthetics37 (1997): 232-245.Schier initially speaks against resemblance theories inDeeper into Pictures(pp. 2-9), andpresentshis own theoryinoppositionto them,amongotheraccounts.But inChapter9,titled "Resemblancestrikes back," he argues that resem-blance is a consequence of his own "naturalgenerativity"theory,and states the respectin which he believes a pictureresembles its subjectmatter. "Therespect in which [a pic-ture]S resembles its depictumO is this: there is an overlapbetween the recognitionalabilities triggered by S and 0"(pp. 186-187). A picture thus shares its subject matter'scapacityto triggercertainrecognitionalabilities in a viewer.Note thaton this account,it is a picture'scapacityto trigger

theserecognitionalabilities that determinesits content,so itfollows that a picture resembles its subject matter withrespectto its content-bearingfeatures.CompareLopes, whoclaims that "identifyingwhat a picture representsexploitsperceptualrecognitionskills"(p. 144), and that"thepreciseformstakenby these articulations[theresemblancebetweena pictureand its subjectmatter]I would of course attributeto theprocessesof recognitionunderlyinghow picturesrep-resentin differentsystems" (p. 189).Itshouldbe noted thatBrook's initial formulation of this idea predates Schier'saccount.See, for instance,Brook's "Painting,PhotographyandRepresentation,"TheJournalofAestheticsand ArtCriti-cism 42 (1983): 170-180, in which he groundshis accountof depictionin a "perceptualfailure"of the viewer (p. 176).17. We may presumeall the theories thatgrounddepic-tion in recognitiontake this view, since ourabilityto recog-nize an object dependson the presenceof such distinctivefeatures. Schier, for instance, speaks of a picture sharing"recognitionallyrelevant features" with its subject matter(pp. 121-123). HymanandHopkins,I imagine,wouldgrantthat "occlusion" and "outline"shape are for us distinctivefeaturesof objects.18. Note that these features will also be distinctive ofS-since the content-bearingfeatures of Y reproducefea-tures of S, it follows that the content-bearingfeatures of Xalso indirectlyreproducefeatures of S. Thus in TheHumanConditionI we readily recognize the subjectmatterof thedepictedpainting.19. Goodman,LanguagesofArt, p. 5. Goodmangoes on:"no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish...reference. Nor is resemblance necessary for reference"(originalitalics). This is in clear contradictionto the theo-ries mentionedin theprevioussection.20. In this essay, I have used the term"feature"as a syn-onym for "property"or "quality."As a nominalist,Good-manwould balkat the use of these terms. Insteadof objectshavingparticularpropertiesor features,Goodmanspeaksofobjects exemplifying correspondingpredicates(Goodman,Languages of Art,pp. 52-57). Thereis no deep reasonwhyone could not substituteGoodman'snomenclaturethrough-out this section, as the varying ontologies that underliethisvariation in terms do not bear on the argumentsin thissection.I retain"feature"hereonly for consistency.21. I have not explored the possibility that Goodman'sconventionalismcould explain R2 using the characteristicsof picturesthaton his accountdistinguishthem from othersymbols, such as those of language. These characteristicsare "syntacticdensity"and "semanticrepleteness"(Good-man,Languages ofArt, pp. 225-232). Althoughit is beyondthe scope of this essay to examinethis possibility,I venturethat it is not immediatelyclear how a demonstrationof R2mightbe madeusing Goodman's two characteristics.22. Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1980), supple-mentary essay 5; Painting as an Art (PrincetonUniversityPress, 1987),chap.2. RobertHopkinshasrecentlypresentedan experience-basedtheory, in Picture, Image and Experi-ence: A Philosphical Inquiry (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1998), thatdescribespictorialexperienceas "experienced"or "perceived"resemblance(see particu-larly chap. 4). E. H. Gombrichpresentsanotheraccount ofpictorial experience in Art and Illusion, characterizingpictorialexperiencepartlyin terms of illusion (pp.4-5).

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TheJournalof Aesthetics and ArtCriticism23. Wollheim,Paintingas anArt,pp. 46-51.24. Ibid.,p. 46.25. Ibid.,pp. 46-47.26. Gombrich,Art and Illusion, particularlypp. 93-94.Gombrichwrites,"the[pictorial]representation,then, is not

a replica.Itneed not be like the motif"(p. 94).

27. Hopkins,Picture,Imageand Experience,p. 121.28. I wouldliketo thankGregoryCurrie,GeorgeCouvalis,Chris Mortensen, Alan Lee, Gerard O'Brien, CatharineAbell, and an anonymousreferee for The Journal of Aes-thetics and Art Criticism,who generouslycriticized earlierversionsof thispaper.

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a restriction for pictures and some consequences for a theory of depiction