A Regional Perspective the Globalization Processkida.re.kr/data/kjda/RKJD_A_9464558_O.pdf · The globalization process is one that transcends relations between states. Globalization

366 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

A Regional Perspective on the Globalization Process

Michael Sheehan

Globalization is a much used, but underdefined term. The use of the term implies that something profound is happening to the internationa1 system. It suggests that the international realm is increasingly demonstrating borderless qualities as the autonomy of states is steadily undercut by the expansion of global companies, global communications flows, the international financial networks, cultural homogenization by the global media and so on.

The crucial aspect of the concept of globalization, which dis- tinguishes it from other concepts such as Westernization, interdependence or internationalization, is its implications for the central role of the state as the dominant actor in international relations. The globalization process is one that transcends relations between states. Globalization is a complex dialectic process that operates at differing strengths on different states. It has accelerated linkages between the states of the developed ‘north’ while helping to widen the gap between the developed and developing states.

It is also a contested process which has generated protective reactions in defense of national identities and cultures. Much of the violence that has been a feature of international relations since the end of the Cold War can be attributed to the revival of ethnic and national ideologies which are to an extent a reaction against the homogenizing pressures of globalization. This phenomenon can also be recognized in the revival of religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world. Globalization can be seen as a process in which a complex mix of interrelated forces are at work, some of which pull in different directions, as with the simultaneous pressures towards both cultural convergence at some

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levels and increased group assertiveness and intergroup differentiation on the other.

The growth of identity politics as a reaction to globalization is one of the key factors that explains the security paradox of the era. The past few decades have seen a marked fall in the level of interstate violence, but most wars fought since 1945 have not been of this type. They have been intra-state or civil wars, often with external intervention. Global- ization has seen a reduction in the occurrence of interstate war, but an increase in intrastate and transboundary conflicts based upon the assertion of communal identities. Economic globalization has also had the effect in many states of producing rapid social change and increasing economic inequality which has the potential to increase social divisions and generate armed conflict. This raises important questions about the sources and solutions to armed conflict, which cannot be accommodated within traditional realist analysis.

For these reasons, globalization has played a part in the growth of regionalization in the past twenty years. Yet, regionalization itself is to an extent a feature of globalization and the same data can be used in support of the existence of both processes. For many observers, i t is regionalization and not globalization that explains the move beyond interdependence in the past half-century. Many of the features associated with globalization do not operate uniformly across the globe, but are predominant in a limited number of regions.

To the extent that globalization is a reality it produces both positive and negative effects. Regionalism can be seen as a defensive reaction to the loss of political and economic autonomy and influence which globalization seems to imply. But regionalization offers a compromise between globalization and the ethnic and national hatred threatened by the identity politics which globalization has helped to encourage. How- ever, the emergence of mutually distinct and hostile giant regional blocs would be an unhealthy political development. The growth of multiple memberships in regional organizations may play an important part in stabilizing the increasingly globalized world order of the next century.

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A Regional Perspective on the Globalization Process

Michael Sheehan

Globalization and regionalism are important features of the international system as we approach the century’s end. At one level these two processes would appear to be in opposition, but in important ways they are interrelated and for European states the way these two forces play themselves out is of vital importance. Their interplay is perhaps most obvious to a British observer, for Britain has historically been a maritime trading nation open to and supportive of globalizing develop- ments, and has traditionally been skeptical, even hostile, towards efforts at European regional integration.

Globalization itself is a concept that raises profound questions for both the study and practice of international relations. Openness to the concept implies a holistic world-view and a rejection of the traditional realist paradigm. A globalist perspective embraces a much wider range of important international actors than realism does and addresses a much broader range of issues, as well as expanding the definition of existing concepts such as security.

Nevertheless globalization is itself a highly problematic concept, and one whose validity is still contested within the discipline of international relations. As a concept i t is not well-defined. This has enabled it to acquire a number of not-entirely compatible meanings which in turn

54 THE KOREAN J O U R N A L OF D E F E N S E ANALYSIS

makes it difficult either to completely accept or completely dismiss it.’ Many authors in this area fail to make clear what they see as the crucial distinctions between global politics and international politics, or between globalization and complex interdependence.

The use of the term “globalization” suggests that something profound is happening to the international system. It is, or should be, something far more significant than simply the spread of Westernization. In addition it must represent more than merely a measurable increase in cross-border trade flows or degrees of interconnectedness in certain areas. No matter how much greater these interactions have become, it is not the aggregate level of international interaction that is significant, but rather the quality and significance of the patterns which are thereby revealed. In terms of the globalization process one can distinguish between aspects that represent the spread or extension of the phenomenon and those which represent an intensification or deepening of such processes.2

“Globalization” implies that the terms by which we traditionally conceptualize the world have become redundant, that the central concepts of realist international relations-sovereignty, international anar- chy, the state-are losing their meaning and their political centrality. It suggests that the international realm is increasingly demonstrating borderless qualities as the autonomy of states is steadily undercut by the expansion of global companies, global communications flows, the international financial networks, cultural homogenization by the global media and so on.

Definitions

Globalization can be seen as undefined, or overdefined according to taste. There is certainly nothing approaching a generally agreed defini-

1 Colin Parkins, “North-South Relations and Globalisation after the Cold War,” in C. Bretherton and Ponton, eds., Global Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 72.

A. McGrew, “Conceptualising Global Politics,” in A. McGrew and P. Lewis, Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 23.

2

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tion of the concept.’ It can be defined in varying ways depending upon the perspective from which the analyst is approaching the subject, for example economic, sociological or political. One problem with the concept is that if i t is defined too broadly it can become vague and synonymous with general concepts such as Westernization. Yet if it is defined too narrowly it loses the holistic sense that gives it power as an image.

Most definitions of the concept focus upon the economic dimension, where the supportive empirical data is strongest. It is seen as being more than mere interdependence and sees corporations acting on the basis of a worldwide strategy rather than one that is simply multi-state. The vision is of an emerging interlinked economy at the global level. Yet this can still produce definitions that reveal little, if anything, of the essence of globalization. The OECD for example defines globalization as “widening and deepening of the operation of firms to produce and sell goods and services in more market^,"^ a definition that completely fails to convey any sense of globalization as a profound or historically novel phenomenon.

The crucial aspect of the concept of globalization, which differenti- ates it from other concepts such as internationalization, or interdependence, is its implications for the central role of the state as the dominant actor in international relations. Like interdependence, it suggests a growing interconnectedness in human social relations. It also clearly has a holistic basis, a perception of social relations and social change that works at the global level. It requires a willingness to move beyond the national level in identifying the agents, structures and processes that operate within international relations.

Where the concept of globalization appears to offer something new, something qualitatively different from the mere internationalization described above, is in its implications for the future of the state.

3 H. Hveem, Regionalisation: Political Response to Economic Globalisation (Ber- lin: IPSA, 1994).

OECD, Science, Technology, Industry, STl Review, Vol. 7, 1993. 4


Globalization processes imply “a corresponding diminution in the significance of territorial boundaries and state structure^."^ This is not to say that the state becomes redundant through the globalizing process. Much of the literature on the subject continues to accept the state system as the basis for theorizing about international relations. Nevertheless the globalization process is seen as a movement that transcends relations between states.6 A weakness within the globalization literature is that it is not always obvious whether the term globalization is being used in order to describe a condition that already exists or simply to identify a movement towards the transcendence of the state system which is underway, but is still far from complete.

Estimating Its Extent

Most studies of the globalization phenomenon see it as a complex of processes that are crucially interconnected. However, for analytical purposes it is convenient to separate the most significant. Three obvious such categories are the factors related to the impact of technological change; the emergence of a global economy in certain domains, most notably financial flows; and the global spread of Western ideas and cultural values. To these might be added the rather less advanced process of “political gl~balization.”~

Technological advance has played a crucial enabling role in the globalization process. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this has been the revolution in communication technologies since the advent of the space age in 1957. The ability to place communications satellites in the Clarke orbit (geo-stationary earth orbit) has made possible the creation of global communications networks using instantaneous (real- time) reception. The result of this revolution in communications technology has been a massive increase in the volume of international communications and the “time-space compression” which is a pivotal

5 C. Bretherton, “Introduction,” in C. Bretherton and Ponton, eds., Global Politics, p. 3.

6

7 C. Bretherton, p. 3.

K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 213.

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aspect of the globalization thesis.8 This development has made possible the development of globally integrated financial markets and production strategies, as well as the communication of ideas and political values.

In this, as in other aspects of globalization, a reservation over the extent of the process exists because it has been, and is, an uneven process, accelerating linkages in the developed “North” even as it helps to amplify the gap between North and South. Thus, while the new communications technologies have had a global impact, they have not had a uniform one and in telecommunications there is a marked gap between the states of the developed and developing worlds.’ Given the centrality of communications technology to the globalization thesis, this communications gap has in turn contributed hugely to the North-South gap in terms of participation in the other key features of the globalization process.

It is in the area of economic globalization that the effects of the communications revolution have been most marked. Economic globalization implies “the existence of a unified global economy which has a dynamic beyond the interaction of separate domestic economies.”” It is in this category that the empirical evidence for the globalization thesis is most convincing. In terms of foreign direct investment for example, such investment grew at twice the rate of Gross National Product for the OECD countries during the 1960s. During the 1980s it grew at four times the speed of GNP growth.” More than half of the world’s goods and services are now produced as a result of commercial firms operating on a global scale.I2

8

9

10

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12

Bretherton, p. 4.

E. Clegg and M. Sheehan, “Space as an Engine of Development: India’s Space Programme,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 3 , 1994, pp. 25-35.

Bretherton, p. 6 .

J. Howells and M. Wood, “The Global Dynamics of Production and Technology: New Challenges,” in U. Muldur and R. Petrella, eds., The European Community and the Globalisation of Technology and the Economy: Final Report, EUR 15150 EN (Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 194). p. 4.

J. Stopford and S . Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 4.


In some sectors globalization is clearly underway, financial transac- tions being the most striking example. But economic “globalization” requires more evidence than simply the newly global reach of capital. It requires the emergence of a truly global economy superseding a system based upon the interaction of national economies. O’Brien has argued that this situation already exists with regard to the financial sector and asserts the “end of geography”-the end of a system based upon the territorial state.13 The empirical data does not support such an assertion however. The impact of financial globalization is highly variable from state to state and from region to region. Europe and the developing world demonstrate different aspects of this variability.

The image of the economic globalization process is of multinational corporations that have become placeless networks of economic power. MNCs are seen as being able to hold governments to ransom through their ability to move capital easily between regions and base activities where labor and infrastructure costs are lowest. To the extent that this phenomenon is a reality, European states are particularly vulnerable to such processes. European governments have promoted the ideal of the borderless market within Europe and the European project has itself encouraged a deeper “philosophy of transnationality” than is the case with comparable Japanese and American corporation^.'^ Nevertheless, the image of globalization affecting all areas of economic activity is an illusion. Certainly for a limited number of major companies there are elements of their economic activity that are significantly globalized, for example product design, finance and advertising. Production itself however is still largely national or regional.

For advanced areas such as Europe, the globalization process can cut across political and economic loyalties at various levels. Thus it has been noted that while the location of a Japanese firm within Europe might represent a threat to goals associated with economic autonomy at the national and European Union level, such a firm might be perceived as “local” by the region in which it is located. If there is no “national”

13 R. O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1992).

14 Howells and Wood, p. 4.

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company of this type located in the region, the Japanese firm effectively becomes the “regional champion” for an economic sector in that EU region.I5

In the developing world the questions raised about the scale and meaning of economic globalization are quite different. Rather than benefiting, many Third World states have been impoverished by becoming part of the global economy. In this respect from a Third World perspective, globalization does not appear to be very new, rather it seems like a new terminology to describe some fairly well-known themes-little more in fact than economic neo-colonialism. The pene- tration of national economies by powerful outside forces is hardly a novel experience for Third World states, however new it might appear to states in the developed world where the myths of nation-state sovereignty and the relative solidity of national cultures have historically been easier to sustain.16 This reservation notwithstanding, much of the developing world has in any case still to experience many of the novelties associated with globalization.

Globalization is an overwhelmingly urban phenomenon and its impact is correspondingly less in regions of the world where urbanization is less advanced, notably in Africa and parts of Asia. Many of the technology-driven symptoms of globalization, such as the reliance upon novel electronic communication through electronic mail and the inter- net, are also less evident in the Third World.

Even in the developed world the record is mixed. Multinational corporations have not broken with their national roots entirely, the influence of historical affiliations remains extremely important. Only around two percent of the membership of the boards of major American corporations are not citizens of the United States.” While production is managed on a global scale by some corporations, this remains the

15 J. Howells and M. Wood, The Globalisation of Production and Technology (London: Belhaven Press, 1993), p. 156.

16 C. Parkins, “North-South Relations and Globalization after the Cold War,” in Bretherton and Ponton, p. 71.

17 M. Svetlicic, “Challenges of Globalisation and Regionalisation in the World Economy,” Global Society, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1996, p. 11 1.


exception. For most economic indicators, the origins remain national rather than global.”

What is happening in the developed world is a more complex process in which the “globalization” of economic activity is in fact the result of a reorganization of activity that is as marked at the national and regional level as it is at the global. Japanese commentators have referred to this process as “glocalization,” a mixture of global and local. An equally inelegant term “triadization” is used to refer to the reality that globalization is overwhelmingly a process of accelerating trade and integration between three key regions-North America, Northeast Asia and Western Europe. I9

Political and Cultural Globalization

Globalization can be seen as a process by which the human race is progressively incorporated into a single global society. It thus refers also to cultural and political interconnectedness. It is in this area that there is a marked similarity between ideas of globalization and of Western- ization. In this regard globalization can be seen in terms of modernity, as an aspect of the breakdown of traditional societies and the spread of key western cultural concepts and forms of political organization.

In the period after 1945 the international system of nation-states expanded to become a truly global system. The concepts of citizenship, loyalty and political obligation became uniformly centered upon the ‘nation’-state. The pressures towards uniformity of organ’ization accelerated from the 1980s onwards. The collapse of the European communist governments opened up the Soviet bloc to the globalizing pressures of contemporary capitalism. Most of the states in the region willingly embraced the democratic-capitalist model. In doing so they experienced many of the economic and social pressures earlier experienced by Third

18 W. Hutton, “Markets Threaten Life and Soul of the Party,” Guardian, 4/1/94.

19 R. Petralla, “A New World in the Making,” in U. Muldur and R. Petrella, eds., The European Community and the Economy (Brussels: European Commission, 1994), pp. x-xi, See also K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York: Harper Collins, 1994).

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World states. Western governments and international organizations used economic pressures related to debt relief and trade agreements as a political-economic tool in the 1980s and 1990s. Conditionality clauses in the agreements with Third World states obliged them to adopt liberal political and economic systems.

The experience of the 1990s, however, has shown that the spread of liberal democracy is a process subject to national and regional variety. What liberal democracy actually means is open to interpretation. In both Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, the forms of democracy and of capitalism that have emerged have often been significantly different from the models adopted in Western Europe and North America. In general the pattern has been less laissez-faire, with economies that are more dirigiste, employing a greater degree of government intervention and with political systems that have been slower to move away from traditionally authoritarian systems of government. This has been the case for example in Taiwan and South Korea which have evolved slowly away from authoritarian systems, and in Romania, Russia and Slovakia which have maintained many of the political habits of their authoritarian communist history. Thus while liberal democracy in a sense has become globalized, it has at the same time mutated into a wide variety of forms. These forms, which accommodate local and regional traditions and norms meet the criteria of liberal democracy, yet are clearly not a straightforward example of Westernization.20

Liberal democracy and capitalism are examples of a more general phenomenon, the globalization of ideas. This can be seen for example in Marxist views that globalization represents the hegemonic domina- tion of transnational capitalism. However there is another aspect of globalization which relates to the increasing tendency for issues to be perceived as being global in scope and of therefore requiring policy responses that act at the global level. In the latter category can be placed issues such as the environmental effects of global warming, and the management of regimes that form part of the “global commons” such as the deep oceans and outer space. There is also a cluster of issues

20 M. Sheehan, “The Politics of Democratisation: Generalising East Asian Experi- ences,” International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4, 1995, p. 908.


which, while not global in the same sense as the above, are nevertheless transboundary in their effects and which require international responses operating at a global rather than a regional level. Issues that fall into this category include the control of certain pandemic diseases such as AIDS, large-scale pollution problems such as those caused by acid rain, and the buildup of atmospheric CFCs.

Again, the caveat about how far globalization is a reality arises because the agenda for such globalized issues is set by the leading states of the developed world. It is not the case that certain issue-areas are inherently global per se and recognized as such, rather that the international community chooses to identify certain issues in such terms. Similarly other issues do not form part of the global agenda in the same way. This can be seen in terms of the attention paid to certain areas such as environmental concern, where the interests of the developed world are engaged. It can also be seen in the slow international response on the question of debt relief, where the developing world has a crucial stake arising in part from the effects of globalization, but the developed world does not see it as a priority for effective and radical action at the global level. The question here is not so much “is there a global economy, as whose global economy?’2’

Some of the senses in which globalization is asserted are simply misleading. In the realm of the environmental debate for example, the argument is put in terms of the common fate of mankind. All human societies share the same fragile planet and thus are all vulnerable to the effects of a damaged planetary ecosystem and all share a common responsibility to protect the biosphere which sustains life on Earth. This is a politically simplistic conception. While the dangers to the ecosystem are real enough, the notion of shared dangers and shared responsibility is not. Overwhelmingly the responsibility for the damage being done to the ecosystem lies with the states of the developed North. It is the processes of industrialization which they pioneered and monopo- lized for a century that have generated the dramatic rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide and damaged the ozone layer. This damage continues to

21 C. Mulhearn, “Change and Development in the Global Economy,” in Bretherton and Ponton, p. 172.

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occur because it is the price paid for the advanced lifestyles enjoyed by populations in the developed world. Moreover it can be argued that it is sustained by a global economic structure that institutionalizes a sharp division between the comfortable lifestyle of the developed world and the desperate poverty of the Third World.

The Globalization of Ideas and International Conflict

A great deal of writing about globalization assumes that there is an inevitability about the process, that the economic pressures for interdependence and integration are essentially irresistible, part of the inevitable flow of history. This positivist “Whig” interpretation of history is no longer fashionable among historians but is still an underlying as- sumption of many if not most social scientists. The credulity with which Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis was originally received is testament to the ahistorical basis of much social science research.

A more nuanced view of the process would see historical processes such as globalization as the result not of the inevitable working out of inexorable historical forces in an almost deterministic manner, but rather as an historically specific phenomenon, uneven in its effects, reversible in many respects, resulting from specific human decisions and choices, and crucially contested. The economic and political order existing at any particular time is contested terrain. It is shaped by a complex pattern of wholly or partially shared values, interpretations and expectations. It is reflected in specific institutions that evolve over time. Ultimately it is capable of being altered by the interplay of political forces. Thus for example the Keynesian consensus that prevailed in the Western world during the 1940s through to the 1960s gave way to the Chicago school laissez-faire paradigm that dominated the 1980s and 1990s.

There is no shortage of evidence suggesting that the effects of globalization have not gone unopposed. Indeed much of the violence that has scarred international relations in Europe since the end of the Cold War can be put down to the revival of ethnic and national “ideologies” which are to an extent a reaction against the homogenizing pressures of globalization. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Georgia have fragmented since 1989, all but Czechoslo- vakia doing so violently. This suggests that local identities retain a


powerful loyalty that has not as yet been smothered by globalization, and indeed may be reinvigorated by it.

Globalization has not brought about the end of cultural diversity. India’s film industry remains completely dominant on the sub-continent despite the alleged globalizing influence of Hollywood. National liter- atures and cultures continue to differ. Surveys of news coverage continue to demonstrate that despite the globalization suggested by the success of companies like CNN, most states and regions remain overwhelmingly obsessed with their own news, and to the extent that foreign news is of interest it is only where a connection can be made with the national or In many countries the cultural assault that globalization is deemed to represent has triggered defensive assertions of cultural specificity and distinctiveness.

This phenomenon can be recognized also in the revival of religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world. The mere spread or dissemination of ideas is not synonymous with their acceptance. Ayatollah Khomeini’s overthrow of the Shah’s regime in Iran in 1979 was very much founded upon a rejection of the Westernization that his regime was seen to represent, and a vigorous reassertion of the values and historical project of Islam. This explosive energy produced a shift in the regional balance of power during the 1980s as the United States, in concert with conservative Gulf states, moved to contain the Iranian ideological challenge by building up Iraq as a neighboring balance. Globalization can thus be seen as a process in which a complex mix of interrelated forces are at work, some of which pull in different directions, as with the simultaneous pressures towards both cultural convergence at some levels and increased group assertiveness and intergroup differentiation on the other.

The growth of identity politics as a reaction to globalization is one of the key factors that explain the security paradox of the era. The past few decades have seen a marked fall in the incidence of interstate violence. The traditional focus of attention in international relations, the aspect that gave birth to the university discipline of international

22 G. Chapman, “TV: The World Next Door,” Intermedia, Vol. 20, No. I , 1992, p. 33.

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relations in the 1920s, was the central problem of war-war between legally-constituted state actors in the international system.

Since 1945, however, most of the wars fought have not been of this type. Rather they have been intra-state or civil wars, often with external intervention. To a significant extent this was a straightforward by- product of the process of decolonization and the struggle for superpower hegemony in the Third World which marked the period of the Cold War. But decolonization itself was both an outcome and an engine of globalization. It was an outcome in the sense that it was triggered in part by the diffusion of ideas of statehood and national self-determination. It was an engine in that each newly independent state reinforced the acceptance of the national state as the basic actor in international relations.

National self-determination however emphasized the idea of group membership being centered around cultural criteria such as language, ethnicity or religion. It triggered conflict as “nations” sought independence from imperial powers. But many of the new states so formed made little sense themselves in terms of the cultural criteria that formed the original basis for political independence based upon national self- determination. To that extent, i t was just a question of time before some of them imploded under the weight of their determining logics. This pattern can be seen in the fates of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Globalization has thus seen a reduction in the occurrence of interstate war, but an increase in intrastate and transboundary conflicts based upon the assertion of communal identities. For scholars of international relations this raises urgent questions relating to the sources and solutions to armed conflict, which cannot be accommodated within traditional realist and neo-realist analysis.

It is not simply the threatened subversion of cultural identity that can make globalization a factor for increased, rather than reduced, violence in the international system or for the disintegration of some of the component actors. Because of the particular form it has taken, economic globalization has produced rapid social change and social dislocation. And while overall standards of living have risen in many areas, this has been accompanied by growing economic inequality and injustice, which has exacerbated social instability and provides a seed-bed for armed conflict. Moreover, as globalization encourages the emergence of com-


panies that are placeless networks of economic power, the size of political units becomes far less significant as a determinant of economic growth. This has made it easier for nationalist leaders from Lithuania to Scotland to argue that a small national territory or population is no barrier to economic success and therefore, national independence. It can be argued that while the focus of attention has been upon ethnic, religious and political explanations for the disintegration of states since 1990, it is also true that the costs of independence have been significantly reduced by mundane factors such as the liberalization of international trade under GATT and WTO and by falling transportation and communication costs.23 As with the political fragmentation produced by the assertion of cultural identity, the reduction in political scale caused by economic globalization need not necessarily halt at the level of the small nation-state. The reorganization of the globalizing economy may only stabilize at the level of the city or ~ity-region.’~

The Globalization of Democracy

The key determinant in the examples of democratization in the past quarter of a century has been the external dimension. While some of this may be seen in terms of political pressure from interested powers, it is also the result of technological advances that facilitate the global dissemination of ideas. Clearly, internal factors are important, but a central part of the explanation for the variations in the pattern of democratic transition in areas such as Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, lies in the different contexts and conditionalities which have been imposed by the external players in the drama. Democratization has been helped in many cases by external factors such as the human rights conditions attached to offers of aid by developed democratic states.25

23 G. Becker, “Why So Many Mice Are Roaring,” Business Week, November 7 , 1994, p. 11.

24 R. Petrela, “A New World in the Making,” in Muldur and Petrella, eds., p. xiii.

25 W. 0. Oyugi et al., eds., Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa (London: Curry, 1988).

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However, the political pressures produced by economic globalization do not operate in a single direction. The structural adjustment policies which Western-dominated international economic institutions have imposed upon many states in the post-Communist and developing states (the former ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds) have put enormous strains upon processes of democratic transition and consolidation. In states such as Russia, the West has accepted reversals of democratic progress in the hope that a more authoritarian democracy will survive the unpopularity produced by a painful economic transition to late twentieth-century capitalism. In doing so the West has accepted that while democracy may be triumphant worldwide, it can take many different forms.

For proponents of the “global civil society” thesis, this is not enough. Focusing upon the concept of governance it is argued that international society is fast acquiring a universally accepted set of norms.26 It is seen to have a coherent set of Western values at its core based upon individualist liberalism. These norms place “economic man” at the center of the universe.

However, if global governance is indeed emerging in this way, then it raises some fundamental questions. The “marketization of governance” is an essentially antidemocratic project. The emerging infrastructure of global institutions is not subject to meaningful democratic controls, nor is the pattern of technopolitics seen in institutions such as the UN and IMF conducive to democratic scrutiny. Where they have come into conflict, value concerns such as justice and human rights have not been privileged over the maintenance of profit margins and balanced accounts. To the extent that true globalization is a reality, it has tended to reduce democratic control in the sense that the processes and “flows” characteristic of globalization are not themselves subject to effective democratic control.

26 “Governance” here is as defined by Rosenau. “It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal non-governmental mechanisms. . . [it is] a system of rule that is as dependant on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters.” See James N. Rosenau, “Governance, Order and Change in World Politics,” in James N. Rosenau, and E. 0. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 4.


Regionalization

Regionalization is somewhat easier to define than globalization, though there is something of a tendency in the literature to assume that the idea is so self-evident that it does not need to be defined. It can be defined in a minimalist way simply as preferential trade agreements between a group of states from a specific region.27 This can be broad- ened to include other forms of economic cooperation between the same states.

The above definition fails to capture the nature of the regionalism represented by the European Union or ASEAN which see themselves as having a rather more significant agenda than simply promoting trade agreements. In practice, while regionalization may be a widespread phenomenon, the forms i t takes are highly varied in terms of the rate of growth of economic interdependence, the extent to which the enter- prise is underpinned by a shared culture or history, the degree to which formal institutions are created and the extent to which the regional entity seeks to act as a single player on the international stage. Regions will also vary in terms of how far the integration process is part of-a political project driven by governments and how large a part economic actors

Hurrell suggests that regionalism can take five principle forms. It can be seen as a process in which informal linkages and transaction networks are steadily developed, mainly in the economic realm, but with some political interconnectedness. Secondly, it can emerge from a clear sense of regional identity. A common historical experience and a similarity of cultural and social traditions can lead to a common perception of belonging to a cultural community.

Alternatively, the integration may be driven by political commit- ments. Governments may act in concert with other regional states to address issues and problems of common concern, without necessarily sharing a perception of belonging in a cultural community. In the fourth variant, states may limit their integration activities to the economic field, with the objective of promoting trade liberalization and economic

Play-

27 Svetlicic, p. 113.

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growth. Finally, if the states in a region have been pursuing a combina- tion of the first four processes, with varying degrees of energy, the grouping may begin to consolidate into a highly cohesive political unit .28

Regionalization is driven by many of the same forces that have contributed to globalization, but there are important differences. Whereas at the global level there is an argument that globalization acts to blur the differences between cultures, at the regional level cultural and historical specificity play an important part in explaining why regionalization is much more advanced in some parts of the world than in others. Common historical and political experiences, a closer affinity between the cultures in the region and the existence of regional infra- structures mean that integrating forces can advance faster at the regional than the global level under the appropriate conditions.

These conditions relate to the existence of a conscious political will by regional governments, interest groups and opinion-leaders to advance the project of regional integration. This represents a fundamental differ- ence from the globalization process which is not consciously directed to that end by individuals or organizations. With regionalization in contrast the project itself is identified as an important political process and goal and an institutional superstructure is created to direct and sustain the integrationalist objective. The most obvious, and to date most successful example of this is the European Union.

For many observers it is regionalization and not globalization that explains the move beyond simple economic interdependence in the last half-century. Many of the features associated with globalization do not operate uniformly across the globe, but are predominant in a limited number of regions. In addition, as noted earlier, the economic features most characteristic of globalization are actually concentrated within regions. Just as one can produce data on, for example, financial flows that seem to vindicate the globalization thesis, so also one can identify data that pointing to the increasing regionalization of the world economy. Thus, for example intra-regional trade rose from 40.6 percent of

28 A. Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1995, pp. 334-38.


the global total in 1958 to 50.4 percent in 1993.29 Foreign direct investment, which is most frequently cited to support the globalization thesis, occurs overwhelmingly at the regional level.

Regionalization is often portrayed as a clear alternative to globalization. It can be seen as a defensive reaction to the loss of political and economic autonomy and influence which globalization seems to imply. This can be seen in the idea of the European Union asfestung Europa, fortress Europe creating a secure haven for its peoples and protecting its economies from the unfair rivalry of external political and economic actors.

It can also be seen as an intermediate position which offers a compromise between globalization and the ethnic and national hatred threatened by the identity politics which globalization has helped to encourage. This can be seen in the way in which the European Union has offered a vision of transcontinental cooperation and integration to the newly independent states of central and eastern Europe, and in the way the EU has imposed political and human rights conditionalities on those states before signing trade agreements or initiating talks on future EU membership. Seen from this perspective regionalization can be seen as complementing the process of globalization, in that it ameliorates many of its negative effects.”’

The construction of regional groupings is a notable feature of international relations since 1945.3’ The western hemisphere has seen the development of the Central American Common Market (CACM), Ca- ribbean Common Market (CARICOM), Andean Group, Common Mar- ket of the South (MERCOSUR-which includes Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay)32 and the North American Free Trade Agree-

29 Svetlicic, p. 115.

30 A good survey of globalization and regionalization is P. Knox and J. Agnew, The Geography of the World Economy, 2nd edition (London: Edward Arnold, 1994).

3 1 A good overview of the regionalization process during the 1960s can be found in R. Falk and S. Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973).

32 See P. Calvert, The International Politics of Latin America (Manchester: Man- Chester University Press, 1994) and G. Pope Atkins, Latin America and the

MICHAEL SHEEHAN 71

ment (NAFTA). Southeast Asia has produced the Association of South- east Asian Nations (ASEAN),” and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Africa has the Economic Community of West Afiican States (ECOWAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) and the South African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC).34

The most advanced example of the regionalization process has oc- curred in Europe, with the European Union (EU). However, one should not overlook the importance of earlier integrationalist efforts such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the Nordic Council. Outside the EU, Europe currently has several organizations fostering cooperation and a degree of integration, including the Commonwealth of Indepen- dent States (CIS), the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Hung- ary and Slovakia) and the Central European Initiative (CEI).

In addition there are the broader organizations of regional cooperation such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and the Council of Europe.

Regionalism and integration efforts are thus not novel aspects of global politics. Rather they have been a widespread and recurring feature of international politics since 1945. It is thus simplistic to suggest that they represent an institutionalized reaction to the forces represented by globalization. However, it can be argued that in a world economy that is becoming increasingly globalized, regional trade blocs may represent the only real alternative to a hegemonic vacuum, if there

International Political System, 2nd edition (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995).

33 K. S. Sandhu et al, eds., The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).

34 See J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges, 2nd edition (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995) and B. Kotschwar, “South-South Economic Cooperation: Regional Trade Agreements Among Devel- oping Countries,” Cooperation South (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1995), pp. 11-14.


is no economic and political superpower able and willing to ensure compliance with global rules.35

Moreover although regionalism may not have been caused by globalization, nevertheless regional integration may be supported and fos- tered by a perception that it can defend and enrich local culture, identity and values. However, it should also be noted that many regions of the world are characterized by multiple organizations with cross-cutting memberships. The Visegrad States also belong to the CEI and wish to join the EU. Mexico belongs to both CACM and NAFTA. Zambia belongs to both PTA and SADCC. Such overlapping memberships may reduce the threat of trade wars between distinct, self-contained blocs.

Indeed Cerny has argued that from a world-order perspective, the complexity and decentralization characteristic of the international system will produce more rather than less stability, by making the world order more flexible and adaptable.36 Regionalization may thus be an important mechanism for stabilizing the post-Cold War political and economic order, a world order that is not so much anarchic as “pol yarchic.””

Conclusions

In attempting to assess the significance of regionalization, what stands out is that these processes are far more complex than is often assumed. Globalization has not brought about the end of geography; location and distance are still critical in explaining international relations. But it has made geography a more complex notion.

It is also true that globalization is not the result of a single pressure called “Westernization.” Nor is it an inevitable end result of the evolu- tion of industrialization and capitalism, though it incorporates elements of all these processes.

35 R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

36 P. Cerny, “Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post-Cold War World Order,” Millennium, Vol. 22, 1993, p. 49.

37 C. E. Lindblom, PoliticsandMarkets (New York, Basic Books, 1977), pp. 131-57.

MICHAEL SHEEHAN 73

Globalization is the result of a complex mixture of pressures, some of which are in opposition to one another. Moreover, its results and implications are equally varied. Different states and population groups have experienced the influence of globalizing forces differently. For some it has contributed towards emancipation, for others it has simply reinforced an economic neo-colonialism. These effects in themselves vary in the intensity with which they affect various groups.

In a general sense it can be said that globalization has not advanced as far as many imagine. But to the extent that it has advanced, its implications are profound. The technological advances that have facili- tated globalization have had the effect of encouraging perceptions of planetary unity-for example in the way that remote-sensing satellites have emphasized the transboundary effects of pollution and climatic change. They have contributed also to the emergence of groups with world wide links, who while still comparatively weak, nevertheless pose a challenge to state sovereignty. Moreover, the opening up of new realms by technology, such as outer space and the ocean floors, together with the emergence of global political activities, presents new problems of global governance. In assessing the overall importance of globalizing forces, the question as Jones put it is “whether the simultaneous growth of a number of these patterns of association and influence has a significance that is greater than the mere sum of the growth of each, viewed ~epara te ly .”~~

Globalization is not, as more optimistic Kantians hope, leading through a process of historical determinism towards a unified world state. Economically and politically, the key actors within the present world system remain strongly rooted in national loyalties. To some extent indeed globalist pressures toward cultured homogenization have helped foster national and ethnic particularisms. Globalization is a dialectical process in that i t helps to encourage forces opposed to the process of globalization itself.39

38 R. J. Barry Jones, “Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy,” (London: Pinter, 1995). p. 12.

39 A. McGrew, “Global Politics in a Transitional Era,” in McGrew and Lewis, p. 320.


To some extent the growth of regionalism is part of this dialectic. Regional loyalties are reinforced as a defensive response to the loss of identity which cultural globalization threatens. Regionalism is also a political and economic response to the loss of autonomy threatened by globalizing forces. However, regionalism pre-dated globalization in its modern form, though both processes may be interacting in a manner in which each reinforces the other. Much of the data put forward to support the globalization is in fact a measurement of regional, not global processes.

From a British or European perspective regionalization is both to be welcomed and feared. Welcomed because it allows the defense of a distinctive regional cultural grouping and offers a prospect of economic and political cooperation that can only be welcomed in the light of Europe’s often dark history. Feared because it could encourage the emergence of hostile “fortress blocs” in various regions. To avoid this, the emerging practice in which states identify with more than one region, while it may be geographically inelegant, is politically welcome.

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A Regional Perspective the Globalization Processkida.re.kr/data/kjda/RKJD_A_9464558_O.pdf · The globalization process is one that transcends relations between states. Globalization