A proposal for innovative future research - doc.anet.be DISCUSSION PAPER / 2015.05 The frontiers of the debate on Payments for Ecosystem Services. A proposal for innovative future

DISCUSSION PAPER / 2015.05 ISSN 2294-8651

The frontiers of the de-bate on Payments for Ecosystem ServicesA proposal for innovative future research

Gert Van HeckenJohan BastiaensenCatherine Windey

Comments on this Discussion Paper are invited.Please contact the authors at: [email protected] the Discussion Papers are peer-reviewed, they do not constitute publication and do not limit publication elsewhere. Copyright remains with the authors.

Instituut voor Ontwikkelingsbeleid en -BeheerInstitute of Development Policy and ManagementInstitut de Politique et de Gestion du DéveloppementInstituto de Política y Gestión del Desarrollo

Postal address: Visiting address:Prinsstraat 13 Lange Sint-Annastraat 7B-2000 Antwerpen B-2000 AntwerpenBelgium Belgium

Tel: +32 (0)3 265 57 70Fax: +32 (0)3 265 57 71e-mail: [email protected]://www.uantwerp.be/iob

DISCUSSION PAPER / 2015.05

The frontiers of the debate on Payments for Ecosystem Services. A proposal for innovative future research

Gert Van Hecken1,4

Johan Bastiaensen2,4

Catherine Windey3

August 2015

1 Post-doctoralResearcher (FWO–FlemishFund forScientificResearch), InstituteofDevelopmentPolicy andManagement(IOB),UniversityofAntwerp,Belgium2 Professor,InstituteofDevelopmentPolicyandManagement(IOB),UniversityofAntwerp,Belgium3 DoctoralResearcher,InstituteofDevelopmentPolicyandManagement(IOB),UniversityofAntwerp, Belgium4 AssociateResearcher,InstitutoNitlapan-UniversidadCentroamericana(UCA),Nicaragua

Table of conTenTs

absTracT 5

Keywords 5

acKnowledgemenTs 5

1. InTroducTIon 6

2. capTurIng dIfferenT perspecTIves In The pes debaTe – a lITeraTure revIew 10

2.1. maInsTream or envIronmenTal economIcs/coasean approach To pes 10

2.2. a reconcepTualIzaTIon of pes: beTween sKepTIcIsm and pragmaTIsm 12

2.2.1. Green neoliberalism and its discontents: critiques from Pes scePtics 14

2.2.2. beyond market rhetoric: Pes as a neoliberal trojan horse or as a vulnerable straw man? 16

2.2.3. beyond efficiency: the ecoloGical economics aPProach to Pes 18

3. QualIfyIng common assumpTIons underlyIng currenT pes approaches 22

3.1. socIal-ecologIcal sysTems and The IllusIve QuesT for InsTITuTIonal ‘fIT’ 23

3.2. Knowledge, framIng and power: dIscursIve baTTles aT The human-envIronmenT nexus 25

3.3. romanTIcIzIng resIsTance: agency and The socIal embeddedness of ‘neolIberalIsm’ 29

4. engagIng wITh socIal dIversITy and localIzed encounTers: Towards a socIally-Informed and power-sensITIve analysIs of pes 31

4.1. capTurIng power and InsTITuTIonal change Through ‘socIal capITal’? 31

4.2. undersTandIng pes Through an ‘InsTITuTIonal brIcolage’ lens 33

5. conclusIons: recasTIng The pes research agenda 37

references 39

the frontiers of the debate on Payments for ecosystem services IOB Discussion Paper 2015-05•5

absTracT

ThispaperoffersareviewandanalysisofthekeyissuesanddifferentperspectivesinthePaymentsforEcosystemServices(PES)debate.Wediscusshowthecurrentdebatehastoacertaindegreemovedbeyond‘neoliberal’vs.‘non-neoliberal’discussions,insteadrecog-nizingthevariegatedwaysinwhichthispolicytoolplaysoutinthefield.Weargue,however,thatdespitethisprogressPESresearchremainsweaklytheorizedinsocialandpoliticalterms,resulting inonly superficialunderstandingof the roleof culture,agency, socialdiversityandpowerrelationsintheshapingofPESinstitutionsandtheiroutcomes.Buildingoninsightsfromotherfieldsanddisciplinesinthesocialsciences–inparticularcritical institutionalism,socialanthropologyandpoliticalecology-,wesubjectsomeofthecommonassumptionsunderlyingmainstreamandalternativeconceptualizationsofPESandidentifythemainissuesthat,webe-lieve,deservemoreattentioninfutureresearch.Morespecifically,weexplorethreekeychal-lenges incurrentPESresearchrelatedtothetendency (1) toassumethat institutionscanbedesignedinordertomakethem‘fit’specifichuman-natureproblems;(2)tooversimplifycultureandsocialdiversitythroughtheapoliticalconceptof‘socialcapital’;and(3)toconceptualizehu-managency,collectiveaction,andinstitutionalchangethrougheitheroverly-rationaloroverly-structuralistmodels.Wearguethatanexpandedactor-oriented,socially-informedandpower-sensitiveconceptualizationofPEScanhelpgeneratenovelinsightsinthepowergeographiesunderlyinginstitutionallogics,andthusthecomplexwaysinwhichPESpoliciesareshapedandexperiencedinthefield.

Keywords

PaymentsforEcosystemServices(PES),neoliberalconservation,power,criticalin-stitutionalism,institutionalbricolage,agency,environmentalgovernance.

acKnowledgemenTs

ThisresearchwasfundedbyapostdoctoralgrantoftheFlemishFundforScientificResearch (FWO). We thank Jennifer Casolo, Oscar Coppieters, Frédéric Huybrechs, VijayKolinjivadi,PierreMerlet,JeanCarloRodríguez-de-Francisco,SamWong,andtwoanonymousreviewersforveryusefulcommentsonearlierdraftsofthisdocument.Theresponsibilityforthepositionsexpressedaswellasanyremainingerrorsisexclusivelyours.


1. InTroducTIon

Currentconservationstrategiesareincreasinglydrawingoneconomicmetaphorsinordertocommunicateenvironmentalconcernstosociety.Inparticularthemetaphorofeco-system stocks as the producers of environmental or ecosystem services (ES) (Costanza andDaly,1992;Daily,1997;MEA,2005)hasproventobeaverypowerfulone1.Itseemsprettyobvi-ous:humanbeingshaveademandforcleanair,water,andotherservicessuppliedbynature,butatthesametimetheyaredestroyingtheresourcebasesthatareresponsibleforsupplyingtheseservices.Infact,themetaphorissopowerfulthatithasstarteddevelopingalifeof itsown,makingitincreasinglydifficulttodisentangletheecological,socio-politicalandeconomicargumentsunderlying current environmental policies (Norgaard, 2010;Raymondet al., 2013;Winthrop,2014).Moreover,ithasexceededitsoriginalaimofevokingpublicinterestinenviron-mentalproblems,andisnowwidelyusedastheunderlyingframeworkforpolicyinstrumentsthataimtoofferfinancialincentivesfortheprovisionofecosystemservices(FisherandBrown,2014;Gómez-Baggethunetal.,2010).Theseinstrumentsarefoundedonthebeliefthatenviron-mentaldegradationismainlycausedbyageneralfailureofconventionalmarketstoaccountforthemanypublicgoodsorpositiveexternalitiesthatecosystemsprovidetosociety.Fromthisperspective,theideaof‘PaymentsforEcosystem(orEnvironmental)Services’(PES)isoneofthepolicytoolsthathasattractedgrowingattentionamongawideaudienceofscholarsaswellasconservation and development practitioners2.

ThecoreideaofPESisthatlandusers,whotendtobepoorly,ifatall,motivatedtoprotect‘nature’ontheirland,canbeencouragedtodosothroughdirecteconomicincentivesfrom ecosystem service beneficiaries in return for adopting environmentally-sound land usepracticesthatsecureecosystemconservationand/orrestoration(Engeletal.,2008;Wunder,2005).PESschemesarethusgenerallyconsideredasnovelinstitutionalarrangementsattempt-ingtocompensatethosewhoproducepositiveexternalities.Theapproachhasmainlyemergedfrom a general dissatisfactionwith traditional governmental regulatory approaches ormorecommunity-basedintegratedconservationanddevelopmentprojects(ICDPs),whichareoftendeemedtobeineffectiveinhaltingfurtherdegradation(Ferraro,2001;FerraroandKiss,2002;Pagiolaetal.,2002).Ratherthanineffectivesanctioningof‘badbehavior’throughpunitiveap-proachesorpromoting‘conservationbydistraction’byredirectinglocallivelihoodsawayfromactivitiesthatdegradeecosystems,thePESapproachseekstoreconcileenvironmentalandde-velopmental trade-offs throughdirectandconditionalpayments (Wunder,2005).PES theorythusgenerallybuildsonamarket-governancemodel,asitaimstochangeindividualdecisionmakingbymeansofprice incentives3.Moreover, it isheldthatdirect incentivesthroughcon-

[1] Foranexcellentcriticaloverviewoftheevolutionandvariantsoftheecosystemservicesframework,pleaserefertoLele(2013)[2] TheliteratureonPESreferstobothpaymentsfor‘ecosystem’servicesandpaymentsfor‘environmental’servic-es.Althoughsomeauthorsmakeacleardistinctionbetween‘environmental’and‘ecosystem’services—theformeremphasisingtheenhancementof‘nature’services,whilethelatteralsoencompassamenitiesprovidedbythe‘built’or‘actively-managed’environment(Bulteetal.,2008;Muradianetal.,2010;Wunder,2015)—wewillinthisworkusebothtermsinterchangeably.[3] Inthisworkwewillusetheterms‘market-based’and‘market-governance’modelstoindicateagovernancemodelthatmainlybuildsuponthebeliefthatcomplianceandindividualorcollectiveactionshouldbeaccomplishedthroughtheuseofdecentralisedandindividualpriceincentives.Morespecifically,theuseoftheterminologyisbasedupon Uphoff (1993), who distinguishes between threemain governancemodels (bureaucratic or command-and-controlmodels,market-basedmodels,andcommunity-basedorvoluntaryactionmodels),whicheachusedifferentinstrumentsandunderlyingphilosophiestostimulatecomplianceandcollectiveaction.AsnotedbyUphoff(1993):inthemarket-basedmodel‘decisionsarelefttoindividualstocalculateprivateadvantagewithoutreferencetobroaderinterestsofthepublicgood’(ibid:610).Itisimportanttonotethatmarket-basedmodelsdonotnecessarilyrequirethepresenceofafunctioningmarket.Nevertheless,mainstreamPESadvocatesoftenrefertothemarketastheidealscenarioinwhichPESwouldflourish(e.g.Wunderetal.,2008),andtheygenerallyusethemarket(andtherelated


ditionalcontractswillnotonlyleadtoexpandedopportunitiesforprivateconservationfund-ing,butwillalsoleadtothemostefficientallocationofscarceconservationfunds(FerraroandSimpson,2002,PagiolaandPlatais,2007;Pattanayaketal.,2010;Wunder,2013).Thisparadigmshiftisincreasinglyreflectedinglobaldebatesonclimatechange,forexamplethroughtheideaofconditionalpaymentstoforestusersfor‘ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradation’(REDD+)(Corbera,2012),andhasledtogrowingresearchandimplementationofPESinitiativesinthefield.

Thehugepopularityofthissimpleideaandthemushroomingofnewinitiativesallovertheglobeillustratethatalargepartofthescientificandpoliticalcommunityhasbeengrad-uallyembracingandadoptingPESasapromisingwayforward,especiallyforhaltingfurtherag-riculturallandexpansionandpromotingrestorationthroughagroforestryandeco-agricultureinthedevelopingworld,wheremostoftheworld’sremainingbiodiversityislocated.Severalmul-tilateralorganizations,suchastheWorldBankandtheGlobalEnvironmentFacility(GEF),andglobalconservationNGOs,suchastheInternationalUnionforConservationofNature(IUCN)andtheWorldWildlifeFund(WWF)areperceivedasbeingthemaindrivingforcesbehindthecurrentglobaldiscourseofsubstitutingunattractiveandstate-regulatedconservationprojectsforPES-inspiredprogrammes(Ervine,2010;McAfee, 1999;2012).ThepresumedsuperiorityofPESoverotherconservationmechanismsis,however,notunequivocal,tosaytheleast.Whileempiricalcaseresearchisgrowing(seee.g.SchomersandMatzdorf,2013forarecentoverview),evidencefromongoingPESprojectsoftenpointstodoubtfulresultsbothintermsofenviron-mentalanddevelopmentoutcomes(e.g.AdhikariandAgrawal,2013;Pattanayaketal.,2010).Moreover,inmanycasesthepromisedefficiencygainsofPEShavebeenprovenhardtodemon-strate(Muradianetal.,2010).Theratheruncriticalpromotionoftheconceptmakesonesuspectthatitspopularityismainlybasedonideologicalgrounds,ratherthanonpracticalexperiences(e.g.Büscher,2012).RedfordandAdams(2009),forexample,notehowtheseductiveideaofPESis‘beingadoptedwithgreatspeed,andoftenwithoutmuchcriticaldiscussion,acrossthespec-trumofconservationpolicydebateanddevelopingalifeofitsownindependentofitspromulga-tors’(ibid:785).Muradianetal.(2010)andBüscher(2014),inturn,arguethatalargepartoftheexistingPESliteratureiswrittenbymarketinstrumentproponentswhooftentakethecreationof markets as desirable in itself.

Aswewillargueinsection2ofthispaper,alargepartofPESresearchhasindeedbeenguidedbyarathernarrowand‘managerial’researchagenda,mainlydefinedbyenviron-mentaleconomists,whofocusonthepotentialefficiencygainsthatcanbeobtainedbyharness-ingmarket forcesandoffering individualprice incentives.Thisperspectivemainly refers toaspecificinterpretationoftheCoasetheorem(Coase,1960),whichholdsthat‘sociallysuboptimalsituations(e.g.,toolittleprovisionofenvironmentalservices)canberesolvedthroughvolun-tarymarket-liketransactions,providedthattransactioncostsarelowandpropertyrightsareclearlydefinedandenforced’(Pattanayaketal.,2010:256).ThisdominantperspectiveonPEShasresultedinavastbodyoffairlytechnical-managerialstudiesonoptimizationmodelsrelatedto‘efficiency-enhancing’institutionaldesignofso-called‘Coasean’PESschemes(e.g.Engeletal.,2008),withonlylimitedreflectiononculturalandsocio-politicalissuessurroundingthesepolicyinstruments.

TheCoaseanapproachtoPESandtheassociatedresearchagendahas,however,beenincreasinglycriticizedduringthepastfewyears.Aswewilldiscussinsection2,somecriti-

efficiencycriterion)asthemodellegitimisingPES(Vatn,2010;2014),apointwhichwillbefurtherdiscussedinsection2.2.2 of this paper.


cal scholarsareeither largely rejectingPESas improperneoliberal commoditizationprojects(e.g. Büscher, 2012;McAfee, 1999; Robertson, 2004), while others rather call for conceptualmodificationsofthemainstreamPESapproach,mainlybyadoptingabroaderandmorehybridinstitutionalor‘ecologicaleconomics’governanceperspectivetoPES(e.g.FarleyandCostanza,2010;Muradianetal.,2010;Tacconi,2012).Indeed,fromthislatterperspectiveitishopedthatabroaderandmoresocially-attunedconceptualframeworkcouldpossiblyinformscientistsandpolicy-makersonhowtobuildappropriateinstitutionalarrangementsthatcouldclosethe‘ma-jorgapsbetweenthepredictionsmadebytheoristsofPESandtheoutcomesthatPESprojectsgenerate’(AdhikariandAgrawal,2013:372).

Whilethe‘PESsceptics’positionhasdrawnattentiontocrucialquestionsrelatedtopower,inequalityandcommodificationissuessurroundingPESprojects,inthispaperwear-guethatthewidespread/predominanttendencytoadoptaratherconceptually inflexible,es-sentialist stance has somewhat foreclosed a more constructive debate on the potential of some underlyingideasofPES.Morespecifically,wearguethatthebroad-brushabstractionofPESasaninherentlyneoliberalhegemonicprojectlargelyoverlookstheagency-ortheexistingmarginsofmanoeuver-of‘subordinated’groups,whicharetooreadilyconsideredtobeeitherpassive‘victims’or‘fierceresistants’oftheseneoliberalideologies(Castree,2007;Higginsetal.,2008).Such an abstraction leaves only limited space for contestation, resistance and developmentofalternatives(Benediktsson,2014),andrisksoverlookingthemanydivergentways inwhichneoliberalprojectsarelocallyreshaped,reworkedoradaptedthroughcomplexmicro-scaleandplace-specificdynamics(Hart,2006;Katz,2005;Sparke,2008).Indeed,thiskindofapproachlargelydisregardshow localactorsvalueoropportunistically reshapecertainunderlyingele-mentsofthePESidea,andhowthesepoliciescaninsomecaseseven‘openupnewspacesforparticipationandnegotiationoverrights’(McElweeetal.,2014:436;seealsoShapiro-Garza,2013a,Higginsetal.,2012).

The‘ecologicaleconomics’approachtoPES,ontheotherhand,appliesasomewhatmorepragmatic,thoughstillcriticalposition.ItcallsforanexpandedPESresearchagenda,onethat broadens the narrow focus on efficiency to encompassing other criteria such as equity,justiceandecologicalsustainability,andonethatismoresensitivetotheinevitablechallengeto socially embedandanalyzePESwithin thedifferent institutional contexts inwhich theseschemesareimplemented(FarleyandCostanza,2010;Muradianetal.,2010).However,andaswewillargueinsection3,thelatterapproach–whileraisingveryrelevantandstimulatingre-searchquestions-isfacedwithimportantconceptualandepistemologicalchallenges.WhiletheecologicaleconomicsapproachtoPEScoversamultitudeof(multidisciplinaryandstillevolving)perspectives,wearguethatitremainsratherweaklytheorizedinsocialandpoliticalterms.Its(implicit)beliefininstitutionaldesignprinciplesandthefrequentrecurrenceto‘socialcapital’asanapoliticalapproachtoexplainingagency,resultinonlysuperficialunderstandingoftheroleofculture,socialdiversityandpowerrelationsintheshapingofinstitutions.Theselimitations,weargue,provideuswithonlylimitedexplanatorypowerfordisentanglingthecomplexsocio-politicalandsocio-ecologicalchallengesoccurringinthe‘messy’reality.

Building on the strengths and limitations of these alternative perspectives to ana-lyzingPESanddrawingoninsightsfromdifferentfieldsinthesocialsciences,insection3weseek toconstructamoresocially-informed,actor-orientedandpolitically-sensitiveapproachtoanalyzingPES.To thisend,westartwithabrief reflectionon the fundamental epistemo-logical challenges involved in responding to our increasing awareness of the interrelation be-tweensocialandecologicalproblems.Ashasbeenextensivelyarguedbyscholarsfromdifferent


disciplines this cannotbedonebyattributinganontological ‘real’ status to theproblemsofnatureas if theycouldbeseparatedfromparticularsocio-culturalhumanframings,andas ifthedictatesofthisexogenous‘realityofnature’wouldallowustoobjectivelydefineobjectivesthatwouldguideourdesignofinstitutionalarrangementstoachieve‘institutionalfit’(Young,2002a).Consequently, this implies theneedofananalytical shift insocial-ecological studiesfromaratherapoliticalandahistoricalmanagerialfocuson‘peelingtheonion,oranalyzingtheenvironmentbypeelingoffsuccessivelayersofcausation’to‘whoisholdingtheknife’(Blaikie,1999).Inotherwords,thepowerprocessessurroundingthesocialconstructionanddominationofparticularnarrativesthatframeenvironmentalproblemsandsolutions(suchasPES)inpar-ticularwaysdeservemuchcloserattention(Adgeretal.,2001;Blaikie,1999;Leachetal.,2010).

Inourcallforamoreexplicitfocusonpowerweshould,however,beawarethatcontestationsanddiscursivestrugglesoccuratallscales, ‘fromdisputeswithinandbetweenhouseholdsandcommunitiestothosebetweenlocal,nationalandglobalpriorities’(Leachetal.,2010:43).Amorebalancedfocusonthedynamicinterplaybetweenagencyandstructure,whichrecognizesthe‘diversityinsocialphenomena,thepotentiallycreativeeffectsofindividu-alagencyandhighlightstheenduringinfluenceofsocialstructuresinshapingindividualbehav-iourandinthepatterningofoutcomes’(Cleaver,2012:13),incitesustobesufficientlysensitiveto socialdiversityandcultural styles,and to thevisibleand invisibleworkingsofpower.Weshowhowinsightsfrom‘criticalinstitutionalist’scholarshiponnaturalresourcemanagement(e.g.Cleaver,2012;Halletal.,2014)areparticularlyrelevanttounderstandingthemultiplewaysinwhichPESinterventionsarelocallyadapted,re-crafted,andembeddedineverydaysocialandculturalpractices.WebelievetheseideascanhelpusrecastthePESresearchagendatowardsdevelopingmorereflexive,historicalandadaptiveapproachesforexploringandexplainingthedynamic social and political processes surrounding individual and collective action (Cleaver,2012;Halletal.,2014;Leachetal., 1999;2010).Anexplicit focusonpower,closely relatedtoknowledge,meaningandinequality,-wehope-willallowtode-fetishizeandre-politicizePES,andallowforamoremeaningfulunderstandingandnegotiationofhowdesignedpolicyinter-ventionsarelocallyadapted,andthereforeoftenturnoutinunexpectedandvariegatedways.


2. capTurIng dIfferenT perspecTIves In The pes debaTe – a lITeraTure revIew

TheacademicliteratureonPaymentsforEcosystemServiceshasboomedduringthepastdecade(SchomersandMatzdorf,2013;Wunder,2015).Inordertocapturetheemer-genceofandmaincurrentsofthinkingaroundPES,inthissectionweofferasimplifiedtypologyofthemaintheoreticalperspectivestoPESanddiscussthekeypointsofdiscussionbetweenthem.WestartwithashortreviewofthemaintheoreticalunderpinningsofPESasconceptual-izedbytheenvironmentaleconomicsor ‘Coasean’approach(Coase,1960).Wethenfocusonsomeofthecritiquesthismainstreamperspectivehasreceivedfromcriticalscholarspertainingtothe‘PESsceptics’perspective.Finally,wediscussthe‘ecologicaleconomics’approachtoPES,whichadoptsapragmatic,thoughstillcriticalposition.

2.1. Mainstream or environmental economics/Coasean approach to PESThe‘mainstream’approachtoPES,canbetracedbacktoWunder’s(2005)influen-

tialCIFORpaperinwhichheprovidesafirstdefinitionofPESas‘avoluntarytransactionwhereawell-definedES(oralanduselikelytosecurethatservice)isbeing“bought”bya(minimumone)ESbuyerfroma(minimumone)ESproviderifandonlyiftheESprovidersecuresESprovi-sion(conditionality)’(ibid:3).Thisdefinitionandthecorrespondingframeworkofanalysisarelargelybasedonanenvironmentaleconomicsapproach(seee.g.Engeletal.,2008;Pagiolaetal.,2002;Pattanayaketal.,2010;Wunder,2005),whichisrootedintheoreticaleconomicper-spectivesthataremainlyconcernedwiththepotentialefficiencygainsthatcanbeobtainedbyharnessing market forces and offering individual price incentives4.Themainunderlying logicusuallygoesas follows:Sinceecosystemservices suchas carbon sequestration,biodiversityconservationorwatershedprotectionaremostlypublicorclubgoods,i.e.externalitiesorun-intendedby-productsofeconomicactivityforwhichthereisusuallynomarket,sothatbenefi-ciariesonlyrarelypay,societyissystematicallyunderprovidedwiththeseservices(Engeletal.,2008;Pagiolaetal.,2002;Pattanayaketal.,2010).However,thecostsof‘environmentally-bad’practices imposedonpotentialESbeneficiariescanbehigher thanthe landusers’conserva-tionopportunitycost.Shouldthisbethecase,paymentsbytheserviceuserscanbetherightincentiveformakingconservationthemoreattractiveoptionforpotentialproviders(Engeletal.,2008).

Inthisphilosophy,PEScan-undercertaincircumstances-createparallelmarketswhereserviceproviderscouldsellthepositiveexternalitiesofmanagingtheirland‘adequately’.Assuch,thePESapproachmovesbeyondthePigouvianphilosophyoftaxingnegativeorsubsi-disingpositiveexternalitieswithinexistingcommoditymarkets(VanHeckenandBastiaensen,2010a).IntheoryitcreatesnewtransactionmechanismsthatpayseparatelyfortheprovisionofpositiveES.ItattemptstoputinpracticetheCoasetheorem,whichassertsthatonthecondi-tionofsufficientlylowtransactioncostsandclearlydefinedandenforcedpropertyrights,theproblemsofexternaleffectscanbeovercomethroughprivatenegotiationbetweenaffectedpar-ties(Coase,1960,ascitedbyEngeletal.,2008).AsWunder(2015)notes,conditionality‘isthesinglemostimportantPESfeature’(ibid:242)andmakesPES‘thefrontrunnerofanewpara-digmofcontractualconservation’(ibid:241).Inotherwords,fromthisperspectiveenvironmen-talgovernancemainlyisamatterofcorrectingforenvironmentalexternalitiesby‘gettingthe

[4] Theaimofthissection,however,isnottotrytoneatlyclassifyPESasbelongingtooneclearly-definedschoolofthought.PEShavegrownoutofvariousotherconceptualapproaches,suchasnewinstitutionaleconomics(North,1990),free-marketeconomics(AndersonandLeal,2001)andcontracttheory(BoltonandDewatripont,2005).Yet,mostofthemainstreamliteratureonPESusesaCoaseanframeworktoexplainandlegitimisePES.


pricesright’(McAfeeandShapiro,2010;Muradianetal.,2010;Wunder,2015).

The explicit focus on positive externalities results in a shift from the commonlyapplied ‘PolluterPaysPrinciple’ (PPP)toa ‘BeneficiaryPaysPrinciple’ (BPP)or ‘ProviderGetsPrinciple’ (PGP) (Mauerhofer et al., 2013; Pagiola et al., 2002; VanHecken and Bastiaensen,2010a).Landusersarenowseennotaspolluters,butaspotentialserviceproviderswhoarepre-sentedwithanopportunitytoaddanEStotheirproductionportfolio.Furthermore,relianceondirectpaymentsshouldsecurethebasiceconomicpremiseofefficiencyoptimizationofscarceconservationfunds(Ferraro,2001;FerraroandSimpson,2002),bytakingadvantageofthelandusers’knowledgeofthecostofESprovisionandseekingoutthelow-costprovidersorconcen-tratingonthehigher-benefitcases(Engeletal.,2008;Pagiolaetal.,2005;Wunder,2013).

Fromthismainstreamperspective,povertyalleviationisnotconsideredasthemainobjectiveofPESschemes(Wunder,2007;2013;2015).ThisfollowsfromtheCoaseanapproach,whichmaintainsthatParetoefficiencyrequiresdeterminingwhichpartycouldchangebehaviormostcheaply(VatnandBromley,1997).Assuch,‘whatreallymattersistheaggregategainsandlossesbydifferenteconomicagentsandnothowtheyaredistributedinsociety’(Pascualetal.,2010:1237).Nevertheless,therevenueflowmadepossiblebysellingESisbelievedtocontributetolocaldevelopmentandthuspovertyalleviation,promptingsomeresearcherstodevotemoreattentiontothepotential‘pro-poorside-effects’ofPES(Bulteetal.,2008;Milderetal.,2010;Pagiolaetal.,2005,Wunder,2008a;2013).Thepurportedpro-poorpotentialsmakePESanat-tractivewayofachievingadoubledividend,meetingbothsocialandenvironmentalobjectives,makingitincreasinglypopularamonginternationalaidagenciesandprivatedonors(Bulteetal.,2008;Muradianetal.,2013),butalsowithnationalgovernmentswhooftenneedtojustifygov-ernmentexpenditureonenvironmentalprogrammesineconomicandsocialterms(Chisholm,2010;Shapiro-Garza,2013a).Empiricalassessmentofpovertyalleviation,however,stillremainsvery limited,butmostof theavailablestudiessuggestthatPESprogrammesareusuallynotcapable of simultaneously addressing both poverty and environmental issues (Adhikari andAgrawal,2013;Pattanayaketal.,2010;Wunder,2008a;Zilbermanetal.,2008).

ItisimportanttostressthatmainstreamPESscholarsclearlyhaveindicatedthepotential limitationsoftheirproposed instrument.TheystressthatthescopeforapplicationofPES is ‘toanarrowsetofproblems: those inwhichecosystemsaremismanagedbecausemanyoftheirbenefitsareexternalitiesfromtheperspectiveofecosystemmanagers’(PagiolaandPlatais,2007,ascitedbyEngeletal.,2008:665).Thismeansthatinthecaseofprivately-beneficialinternalizationsofexternalities,inwhichlandmanagersthemselvesreapthebene-fits,PESarenotanadequatepolicytool(WunderandWertz-Kanounnikoff,2009;Wunder,2015).Moreover,‘amongthethreatenedexternalities,therewillonlybepaymentsforthosethataremostvaluable,withtheconditionthatESbuyers’willingnesstopayhastoexceedESsellers’willingnesstoaccept’(ibid:578).Wunder(2008b;2013)mentionsothernecessarypreconditionsforthefunctioningofPESschemes,mostlyrelatedto‘socialcapital’conditions,suchascultural(e.g.socialappropriatenessofcashorin-kindpayments),institutional(e.g.existenceoftrustbetweenserviceusersandproviders),andinformationalcharacteristics(e.g.transactioncostsshouldbemanageable).Inordertofulfilitspromisesofsuperiorityoverotherinstruments,PESshouldalsodemonstratecompliancewithvariousgenerally-accepted(efficiency-related)prin-ciples,suchasadditionality (i.e.paymentsshouldonlybemadeforactivitiesthatwouldnothaveoccurredotherwise),conditionality(i.e.paymentsshouldonlybemadeontheconditionof‘contract’fulfilment),andnon-leakage(i.e.paymentsforactivitiesinaspecificareashouldnotleadtotheshiftingofenvironmentally-damagingactivitiestoelsewhereinspace)(Engeletal.,


2008;Wunder,2005;2015).

Fromthisperspective,PESresearchhasbeenlargelyguidedbymanagerialplan-ningapproacheswithastrongprescriptiveemphasisonefficiencygainsthatcanbeenhancedthrough transaction costs-reducing institutional design, often by employing or designing arangeoftechnical-managerialoptimizationinstruments(seealsoKolinjivadietal.,2014).Thisfocusmainlytranslatesintoresearchonoptimizationmodelsforcontractandpaymentsdesign(e.g.Ajayietal.,2012;CranfordandMourato,2014;Ferraro,2008;Kroeger,2013;PerssonandAlpízar,2013);ESmapping(e.g.Dailyetal.,2009;ZhangandPagiola,2011);specificpropertyrightstructures(e.g.Bremeretal.,2014;EngelandPalmer,2008;Landell-Mills,2002);spatialtargeting for the selectionof ESproviders (Alix-Garcia et al., 2008; Engel andPalmer, 2008;Schomersetal.,2015;Wünscheretal.,2008);cross-farmcooperationincentivesamongESpro-viders(Horanetal.,2008;ParkhurstandShogren,2007);andinstitutionaldesignfocusedonstimulatingpro-poorside-effectsamongESproviders(AntleandStoorvogel,2008;Pagiolaetal.,2005;Zilbermanetal.,2008).Nevertheless,theempiricalbasisforattributingenvironmen-talimpactstoPESprogrammesremainsratherlimited(Mitevaetal.,2012).Furthermore,thisapolitical and managerial focus overviews a range of crucial issues important to environmental governance,acritiquetowhichweturnnow.

2.2. A reconceptualization of PES: Between skepticism and pragmatismForsometimenow,themainstreamconceptofCoaseanPESschemeshasbeenthe

subjectofcriticismfromvariousangles.Someauthorseither largelyrejectPES(e.g.Büscher,2012;2014;Büscheretal.,2012;KosoyandCorbera,2010;McAfee,1999;2012;McCauley,2006;Robertson, 2004),while others ratherdrawattention to someof its limitations and concep-tualflaws,andthereforeadvocateconceptualmodificationstothemainstreamPESapproach(e.g.Corberaetal.,2009;FarleyandCostanza,2010;MuradianandGómez-Baggethun,2013;Muradianetal.,2010;2013;Tacconi,2012;Vatn,2010).ThesedifferentviewsareprobablybestunderstoodiftheyareframedinthreebroadapproachestoanalyzingPES.Withtheriskofover-simplification,Table1sketchesasimplifiedanddescriptivetypologyofdifferentconceptualap-proachestoPES.WedepartfromearlierexercisesaimedatcategorizingperspectivestoPESun-dertakenbyFarleyandCostanza(2010)andTacconi(2012),butcomplementthesebyqualifyingandexpandingsomeofthemainunderlyingassumptionsineachapproach.Thisexerciseshouldnot be interpreted as an attempt at an all-encompassing format of the different perspectives in thePESdebate,butratherasatoolforpositioningandhighlightingthemainpointsofdiver-genceandconvergencewithintheongoingacademicdebatesonPES.

Table 1. Typology of PES approaches1

PES-scepticism perspective Ecological economics (EE) perspectiveEnvironmental economics/

Coasean perspective

Main research focus

- PESandESconceptascommodityfetish-ismand‘greenneoliberalism’

- PESasinappropriateecologicalfixofex-tractivecapitalistexpansion

- PESnotrestrictedtomarkets

- PESaspartofhybridgovernanceinbroad-erruraldevelopmentstrategy

- Critical role of institutions that enhance equityandecologicalsustainabilityinde-veloping incentives for collective action

- PESasefficientsolutiontomissingmar-kets or market failure

- EmphasisoneconomicvalueofES,asnon-accountedforeconomicexternalities

- FocusonCoaseannegotiationbetweenESprovidersandbeneficiaries

Main underlying concep-tual framework

- (Neo-)Marxism

- Politicalecology

- Ecologicaleconomics

- (New)institutionaleconomics

- Institutional ecological economics

- Environmentaleconomics

- Transaction cost economics

Principal assumptions human behaviour

- Structuralistperspective:humanagencyrestrictedbystructuralconditions(capi-talism)

- Institutional design has no meaning if cap-italistsuperstructureisnotquestioned

- Boundedrationalitymodelofhumanagen-cy(peoplenotonlydrivenbyself-interestandprofit-maximization)

- Institutions mediate human actions and motivations for collective action

- Economicrationalitymodelofhumanagency(peopleasprofit-maximizingac-tors,primarilydrivenbyself-interest)

- Institutions mediate human actions through minimization of transaction costs

Principal assumptions social-ecological sys-tems

- Capitalism has deep-rooted ecological contradictionsthatmaketheminherentlyanti-ecological and anti-social

- ‘Gettingtheinstitutionsright’

- DesignofinstitutionalarrangementsthatleadtooptimalESprovisionandenhancedsocialequitythroughhybridgovernancemodels

- ‘Gettingthepricesright’

- Ecosystemsshouldbemanagedthroughthe provision of economic incentives

- Socialdimensionsnotpriority(potentialside-effect)

Key references

- Büscher,2012

- Büscheretal.,2012

- Kosoy&Corbera,2010

- McAfee,1999

- McAfee,2012

- Corberaetal.,2009

- Farley&Costanza,2010

- Muradianetal.,2010

- Tacconi,2012

- Vatn,2010

- Engeletal.,2008

- Ferraro&Simpson,2002

- Pagiolaetal.,2005

- Wunder,2005

- Wunder,2015

[1] Weareawarethatthisschematictypologyisoverlysimplisticandthatinpracticemanyauthorsrecombinedifferentideasfromthethree‘types’ofPES-approachinvariegatedways.Therefore,wedonotpresentthistableasanexhaustivecategorization,butratherasageneralheuristictoolthatcapturesframingsandkeyideas.


2.2.1. Green neoliberalism and its discontents: Critiques from PES scepticsAttheright-handsideofTable1,wefindtheenvironmentaleconomicsorCoasean

perspective,whichcouldbeconsideredthemainstreamapproachtoPES.Asalreadyindicatedintheprevioussection,itislargelyfromthisperspectivethatthePESideaandlogicemerged.Theapproachprioritizeseconomicefficiencywithinapositiveexternalityframework,andmainlyfo-cusesonCoasean-inspiredprinciplesandconditionsfortheinstitutionaldesignofPES(clear-ly-definedpropertyrights,lowtransactioncosts,andprivatenegotiations,leadingtoPareto-efficiency). It largelydoessoby forcing (orat least theoretically conceptualizing)ecosystemservicesintotheutilitarianeconomicmodel(FarleyandCostanza,2010),andthereforeassumesthat individual price signals are the most appropriate incentive to induce pro-environmental be-havioralchange.ItalsodevotesincreasingattentiontothepotentialofPESforpovertyallevia-tion,thoughoftenonlyonconditionthatinclusionofthepoordoesnotimplyefficiencylosses(Bulteetal.,2008;Engeletal.,2008;Pagiolaetal.,2005;Wunder,2013).

AttheoppositesidearethePESsceptics,wholargelyrejectPES,andeventheno-tionofecosystemservices,asimpropercommodificationprocessesthatattempttocashecosys-temservicesonnewmarkets.ThisPES-skepticalapproachismainlyrootedinastill-expandingbodyofcriticalliteratureconcernedwith‘neoliberalconservation’or‘greenneoliberalism’(e.g.Bakker,2005;Büscher,2010;Castree,2003;McAfee,1999),anddescribesPESandtheconceptofESasphenomenathatarefirmlywithintheneoliberalprojectofcapitalistsocieties.Althoughthere isnoclearandcoherentconsensusof theexactmeaningof ‘neoliberalism’ inthiscon-text,andwhetheritisindeedtheappropriateterminologytodescribetheongoingprocessesofconservation(Bakker,2010;Benediktsson,2014;Castree,2006),theconceptisbroadlyunder-stoodasanideologythat‘largelydiscountsthestateasaviableenvironmentaladministrator’(McCarthy,2005:1007)andthataimstoreconfigurepolitical,socialandecologicalgovernanceto‘self-regulating’capitalistmarketdynamics(Büscher,2008;Büscheretal.,2012;McCarthy,2005).ThisperspectiveassociatesthegrowingpopularityofPESwiththeriseofneoliberaldis-courseinsupranationalenvironmentalpolicy-makinginstitutions,andsomeofthemostinflu-entialconservationNGOs(Ervine,2010;McAfee,1999;2012).Throughtheelaborationofinflu-entialmanagerialdiscourses(Adgeretal.,2001;VanHeckenetal.,2015)andaone-size-fits-alluniversalblueprint,whichaprioridefinesthecausesofbiodiversitylossinmarket-relatednar-ratives,theseinstitutionsarebelievedtopeddlemarket-basedapproachesasuniversalsolu-tionstoenvironmentalproblems(Büscher,2014;Büscheretal.,2012;Ervine,2010;Leachetal.,2010;Matulis,2013;McAfee,2012).

Some authors (e.g. Brockington et al., 2008;McCarthy, 2005; Tickell and Peck,2003),however,qualifythisratherbroad‘neoliberalization’processbyreferringtotheshiftfrom‘rollback’neoliberalismofthe1980s,whichwascharacterizedby‘undisguisedhostilitytowardsthestateandeffortstorollitbackinvariouswaysduringneoliberalism’sfirstcontroloverstateapparatusesduringthe1980s’ (McCarthy,2005:998), toahybrid ‘rollout’neoliberalismfromthemid-1990sonwards.Thelatterrecognizestheneedforthestateinordertorebalance‘un-fetteredmarkets’with‘society’,butinmoreneoliberalformsbyturning‘Polanyi’scriticismofneoclassicaleconomicsonitsheadasit isbasedontheneedtoembedsocietyandtheenvi-ronmentintotheeconomy,intobusinesspriorities’(DeAngelis,2007:98).Thishasresultedinanewgovernancediscourseabout‘public-privatepartnershipsorganizedaccordingtomarketmodels,adiscursivefocusonempoweringlocalgovernmentsratherthanonslashingthecentralgovernment,andreformsframedastechnocraticsearchesforbestpracticesratherthanastheenactmentofrigidideologicalprinciples’(McCarthy,2005:998).Fromthisperspective,thePES


conceptalsoperfectlytiesinwiththerulingdevelopmentparadigms,whichemphasizemarketprinciplesbesidesprocessesofdecentralization,capacity-buildingandcommunityempower-mentasthenewguidingprinciplesindevelopmentpolicy.McCarthy(2005)andErvine(2010),forexample,illustratehowdifferentactorsperceivePESasanewopportunitytopromotede-centralizedenvironmentalgovernanceandcreate‘marketcitizenship’,byassertingacloseco-operativerelationshipbetweenmarketsandcivilsocietiesorcommunities,whichareboth‘theaggregateresultsoffreeindividualsvoluntarilyenteringintocontractsandassociationallife,freeofcoercionfromthesovereign’(McCarthy,2005:999).Thisapproachclearlygoesbeyondthetraditional ‘stateversusmarket’dichotomyanddrawsattentiontothefactthatanyrealworldneoliberalprojectalwaysneedstobeembeddedinlocalsocietiesandpoliticalsystems(Benediktsson,2014).

Themaincritiquesthatemanate fromthisskepticalapproachtoPEScanbeen-capsulatedinthreemajorpoints.First,PESinstrumentsareperceivedtobeinappropriateandevenperverseastheypurporttopresentamarket-basedsolutiontoenvironmentalproblemswhich-ironically-theverysamemechanismofmarketcapitalismhasplayedaroleincreating(Bakker,2010;Brockingtonetal.,2008;Büscheretal.,2012;McAfee, 1999).Itpurposelyusespopularwin-windiscoursesonthecompatibilityofeconomicgrowthandenvironmentalprotec-tionandtherebycreatesthebeliefthattheunderlyingecologicalcontradictionofcapitalismcanberesolvedthroughthesamemodeofoperationthatproduceditinthefirstplace(Büscheretal.,2012).Inthisway,PESarethusnotsomuchaboutsavingnature,butratheraboutfindingnewarenasformarketstooperatein(ibid).Itholdsthatwecanreachasustainableeconomythrough marginal ‘quick ecological fixes’ without major structural change (Lohmann, 2009;Norgaard,2010).Theuseofeconomiclanguageandmarket-basedblueprintsstimulatetheim-agethatpoliticalandmoraldecision-makingcanbeguidedbysimpleeconomictrade-offs intheformofstandardcost-benefitanalyses(Büscheretal.,2012;VanHeckenandBastiaensen,2010a).Clements(2010)andRedfordandAdams(2009)underlinetheriskthatasingleeconomicjustificationforactinguponenvironmentalconcernsmayoutweighnon-economicjustificationsandthuscanmakenaturevulnerabletoconversiontoothermoreprofitableland-uses,changesincarbonpricesorinternationalpolitics.Inthisway,commodificationandmonetarycompen-sations entail the risk of eroding the socio-cultural basis for alternative human-nature relation-ships(HeymanandAriely,2004;Martinetal.,2008;Muradianetal.,2013).

Secondly, the anthropocentric ecosystem services approach and the associatedcommodificationofnature (McCauley, 2006)disguise the inherent complexnatureof social-ecologicalsystems,whichcontainsanumberofsocial-politicalandecologicalrisks(Norgaard,2010). The utilitarian framing of ecosystems as producers of marketable benefits to humansociety implicitly ignores the existence value of nature, as it requires that a single and uni-formexchangevalueisadoptedformakingnature’svalueexplicittohumanbeings(Castree,2003;KosoyandCorbera,2010).The impression isthencreatedthatecosystemprotection isonly important in as far as it directly sustains human economic development (Swart, 2003).Furthermore,the‘itemization’(Vatn,2005a),‘iconification’(Brockingtonetal.,2008)or‘cuttingup’ofconnectionsandrelationshipswithinandbetweenecosystems,inordertoproduce,sellandconsumetheirconstituentelementsintheformofES,createstheillusionthat,insteadofbeingcomplexflowsofinformation,ecosystemsandtheirESareeasilyconvertibleintoseparateentities(Brockingtonetal.,2008;Büscheretal.,2012,Robertson,2006).Indeed,thefragmentedfocusonsingle-serviceprovisionhasalreadyledtothecreationofnovelecosystemsconceivedfordeliveringspecificcriticalservices(suchascarbonsequestration),attimeseventothedet-


rimentofadditionalservices(suchasbiodiversityandwatershedprotection)(Caparrósetal.,2010;Chisholm,2010;Germanetal.,2009;Kareivaetal.,2007;Lohman,2006).Büscher(2010)goesevenfurtherandreferstotheconceptof‘derivativenature’,wherebynatureand‘thepoor’aretheunderlyingassetsuponwhichmarketableimagesandperceptionsarebuiltinordertoattractinterestedbuyers5.Theimplicationisthat‘localisedrealitiesofnatureandpovertyareallowedtobealienatedandforgottenascomplexandcontradictoryspacesthatdeserveactuallong-termengagement,humaninteractionandcriticalunderstanding’(ibid:272).

Thisleadsustothethirdmajorcritique,whichrelatestotheunequalsocialconse-quencesofPESmechanisms.KosoyandCorbera(2010)explainthisbyreferringtoMarx’con-ceptof‘commodityfetishism’,whichtheyunderstandas‘themaskingofthesocialrelationshipsunderlyingtheprocessofproduction’(KosoyandCorbera,2010:1229).Ratherthandeliveringonitspro-pooror‘nosocialharm’promises(e.g.Pagiolaetal.,2005;Wunder,2013),thefetishistcharacterofPESconcealsunderlyingpowerasymmetriesmaskingimportantissuesconcerningglobalenvironmentaljusticelikelytocontributetothereproductionofexistinginequalitiesintheaccesstonaturalresources(KosoyandCorbera,2010;Martinetal.,2014;SikorandNewell,2013;VanHeckenandBastiaensen,2010a).Atthelocallevel,thiscanresultinincreasedcompe-titionforcontrolovervaluableflowsofservicesandtheecosystemsthatprovidethem(RedfordandAdams, 2009).Ashasbeenarguedby various authors,market creationwill favor thosewitheconomicandsocialpower(McAfee,1999;O’Neill,2001;Vatn,2010)andharmthepoor,asthelatterareinadisadvantagedpositionbecauseaccesstotheseservicesislargelymediatedthroughpropertyrightsandotherinstitutionalmeans(KosoyandCorbera,2010).Thisstrength-ens the fearamongsomeauthors thatPEScouldeventually lead toa ‘tragedyofenclosure’(Ervine,2010;Petersonetal.,2010;Rodriguez-de-Franciscoetal.,2013) throughprocessesof‘greengrabbing’(Fairheadetal.,2012),andfurtherdispossessionofpoorcommunities(HallandLovera,2009).ThefetishistcharacterofPESalsodisguisesglobalstructuralpovertyissues,asthe‘lowercostofconservation’economicargumentofferstheopportunitytobuyconservationatabargainpriceindevelopingcountries,wherelocalpopulationsarecompensatedaccordingtotheircurrentpovertylevel(Karsenty,2007).Paymentsfor‘renouncingdevelopment’among‘thepoorwhosellcheap’(Martínez-Alier,2004)raiseimportantfundamentalethicalquestionsthatcompromisepotentialwin-winsynergiesofPESatbothsocialandecologicalgrounds.

2.2.2. Beyond market rhetoric: PES as a neoliberal Trojan horse or as a vulnerable straw man?

DiscoursesamongPESscepticsoftenboildowntoonecentral recurringtheme-thatoftheperverseconsequencesofapplyinganeoliberalmarketphilosophytoenvironmentalanddevelopmentproblems.ThetensionbetweenboththeCoaseanandsceptics’perspectivesmaythusgivetheimpressionthatdebatesonPESaremainlyrestrictedtoargumentsinfavororagainstmarketsandcommodification,withlittleroomforsynergies.ManyscepticstendtodemonizethemainstreamapproachbydepictingPESasacapitaliststoogeinthehandsoftheneoliberaldemonwhousesthePESinstrumentasaTrojanhorsetotakecapitalistideastonewniches.ThisradicalcharacterizationisfurthernourishedbythediscursiveclaimsofsomePESadvocates that unattractive regulated nature conservation should be converted into alluring businesstransactions(e.g.WunderandWertz-Kanounnikoff,2009).

[5] Lohmann(2010)exemplifiesthisbyreferringtocarbonoff-setmarkets,whichsoonbecame‘playgroundsforspeculativeinvestment’,mainlybydisembeddingclimatechangeproblemsfromtheirhistoricallyandpoliticalcon-text,and‘re-embedding’theminneoclassicaleconomicsandpropertylaw(forasimilarargument,seeRobertson,2006).


Byusing theneoliberal andmarket framingof PESas aparadigmatic reference,scepticshaveputforwardmanycrucialpointsthatdoubtlesslydeservefurtherdiscussion,andhave cautioned us against the potential detrimental societal and ecological outcomes of mar-ket-basedconservationapproaches.Atthesametime,however,thecommonessentialist(of-tenimplicit)abstractionofneoliberalismandhegemonicpower(Benediktsson,2014)withinthecapitalistsystemleaveslittlespacetoconstructivelyandadequatelyengagewithmostoftheeverydaystrugglesaroundPES6.Aswewillarguebelow,thispositionparadoxicallyentailsan(implicit)recurrenceto‘populist’discourses(Adgeretal.,2001),inwhichlocalfarmercommuni-tiesareoftenportrayedaseitherpassivevictimsoforfierceinsurgentsagainstgreenneoliberalprojects.Neitheroneoftheseportraitssufficientlydealswiththecomplexandvariegatedwaysinwhichthesepolicyinterventionsarelocally(re)shapedandtakeforminrealworldpracticalstruggles(Castree,2007;2008;Higginsetal.,2008;2012;PotterandWolf,2014).Indeed,vari-ousrecentstudies(e.g.Higginsetal.,2012;McElwee,2012;McElweeetal.,2014;Muradianetal.,2010;Shapiro-Garza,2013a)showhowlocalactors‘negotiatelivelihoodsandmarketswhenadjustingtoconservationpressures’inducedbyPESprojects(RothandDressler,2012:363;seealsosection3).PESsceptics,arguingthat‘theseinstrumentsaretheexpressionof“neoliberal”conservation’,maythenbe‘shootingastrawmanbymissingthepointthatinfactmostofthemareveryfarfromfollowingmarketrationales,andhaveanhybridnaturethatcanhardlybela-beledas“neoliberal”’(MuradianandGómez-Baggethun,2013:1119-20).

Moreover,onecouldevenarguethatinacertainwaytheratherideologically-mo-tivatedcritiquesofPESasaneoliberalhegemonicsweep,downplayorat leastover-general-ize–quiteparadoxically-thevoiceand‘agency’oftheruralactorsinvolvedintheseprocesses(McElwee,2012;VanHeckenetal.,2015).Higginsetal.(2012)aptlycapturethisbystatingthat‘attemptstoneo-liberalisenaturearecontingentontheexistingvaluesandpracticesofthosewhoaretheultimatetargetsofgoverning’(ibid:384),whichimpliesthatsimilarPESapproacheswillresultindifferentdegreesof‘neoliberalization’indistinctivecontexts.Aconstructivede-bateonthepotentialandappropriatenessof(certainelementsof)PESis,therefore,onlypos-sible if one manages to steer clear of some of the caricatured representations of mainstream PEStheory.Thismaynotbeeasy,astheunderlyingconceptualunderpinningsofPESareoftenframedinmanydifferentways,dependingonthecontextandtheaudience(e.g.WunderandVargas,2005).

AlthoughtheunderlyingCoaseandiscoursemayseemtosuggesttheopposite,inpractice,mostPESprogrammesarenotconfinedto freemarketswherenatureorecosystemservicesareconsecutively‘commoditized’,pricedandtradedaccordingtotherulesofdemandand supply (Pirard, 2012; Sandbrook et al., 2013; Vatn, 2010; 2014;Wunder, 2013).Wunder’s(2005)mainstream PES definition, for example, is clearly based onmarket principles, refer-ring,asitdoes,to‘suppliers’,‘buyers’,‘services’,‘transactions’and‘conditionality’.Yet,inotherpublicationsthesameWunderassertsthat‘afrequentmisunderstandingisthatPESrequires“markets”to function’,while in fact ‘marketsandcompetitionareneithernecessarynorsuf-ficientpreconditionsforPES’(Wunder,2008b:3-4;seealsoWunder,2015).PES,therefore,donotnecessarilydependonthecreationofmarkets,yetitisoftenframedinmarkettermsasitmakestheconceptmoreattractivetomarketenthusiastsandthusis‘afashionabletermthathelps“sell”programs’(Engeletal.,2008:664;seealsoFletcherandBreitling,2012).Onother

[6] Wunder(2013)formulateshiscritiqueonthisdiscursiveframingofPESbyscepticsasfollows:“…onceacon-venientstrawmanofPEShasbeenbuilt,onecanscornitandshootitdown–insomecases,apparentlyagainandagain.Buttotheextentthatthestrawmanconsistentlydivergesfromtheoriginal,thecriticismriskslookinglikearebellionwithoutacause”(ibid:235).


occasions,whenthemarketdiscourseislikelytoinvokeideologicalresistanceratherthansup-port,PESmightbemade‘politicallypalatable’byusingnon-marketsemantics,suchas‘com-pensations’or‘rewards’insteadof‘payments’forES(Swallowetal.,2009;WunderandVargas,2005).Inotherwords,theuseofthePESterminologywithinoroutsideamarketnarrativeisoftenastrategicorpragmaticchoiceandnotnecessarilyrootedinastrongbeliefinfreemarketenvironmentalism(seealsoSandbrooketal.,2013orShapiro-Garza,2013a).Yet,eventhoughthedominantPESliteraturedoesnotconsidermarketsandprivatepropertyrightsasstrictlynecessaryconditions(Wunder,2005),itoftendepictsthem-atleasttheoretically-astheidealscenarioinwhichPESwouldflourish(Gómez-Baggethunetal.,2010;Wunderetal.,2008),anditgenerallyusesthemarketasthemodellegitimizingPES(Vatn,2010)7.

TheconceptualandpracticalconfusioncreatedbythisambiguousstancetoPEShasbeen increasingly criticized in the literature (HiedanpääandBromley, 2014; Pirard, 2012;PirardandLapeyre,2014;Sandbrooketal.,2013;Vatn,2014).Agrowingnumberofscholarsac-knowledgesomeofthepotentialstrengthsof(certainelementsof)PES,buttheysimultane-ouslystresstheneedtoaddressmanypointsraisedbyPESsceptics(e.g.FarleyandCostanza,2010;Muradianetal.,2010;2013;Tacconi,2012;Vatn,2010).Furthermore,theypointoutthattheCoaseanconceptualizationlargelyfallsshortofexplainingmanydynamicsandhybridoutcomesinthefield.Howcanit,forexample,explaintheparticipationofESsuppliers,eventhoughmostpaymentsinexistingschemesdonotcoverlandusers’opportunitycostandmightthusbecon-sideredeconomically inefficient froman individualpointofview(Kosoyetal.,2007;Kroeger,2013)?OrwhyarePESmechanismsdefinedasvoluntarytransactions,whileinfactmanyPESschemesclearlylackthiscondition(MilneandAdams,2012;Sommervilleetal.,2009)?8 Or how can itexplaintheverydifferentoutcomesofPES implementation inthefield, inwhichsocialconcernssuchasjusticeandequity,oftendominatethedesignedefficiencyobjectives(Martinet al., 2014;McAfeeandShapiro, 2010;McElwee, 2012;McElweeet al., 2014; Shapiro-Garza,2013a)?TheintegrationoftheseandothercritiquesintoPESresearchrequiresabroaderframe-workthanthecurrentlynarrowCoaseanconceptualization(Muradianetal.,2010;FarleyandCostanza,2010;Tacconi,2012).Theseconcernsarepartlydealtwithinanalternativeperspec-tivetoPES,whichhasbeenmainlyinspiredbyinsightsfromnewinstitutionaleconomics(NIE)andecologicaleconomics(EE),asschematizedinthemiddlecolumnofTable1,andtowhichweturn now.

2.2.3. Beyond efficiency: the ecological economics approach to PESGenerallyspeaking,theecologicaleconomics(EE)approachtoPESaimstobroad-

enthesimplisticmanagerialandnarroweconomicframeworkusedbyCoaseanPESscholars.ItlooksforcommongroundinthePESdebatebyrecognizingthatPESarenotnecessarilycon-finedtothefunctioningofmarketsandthestrictcommodificationofnature,butthatinpracticePESreflectsocially-constructedsituationsinwhichgovernmentsaswellassocialorganizationsandinstitutionsmoregenerallyplayanintermediaryrole(Corberaetal.,2007b).Thisrelatestomoregeneralcritiquesonenvironmentaleconomists’neglectofthesociallyconstructednatureoftheeconomyandmoregenerally(economic)institutionsassocialconstructs(Gendron,2014).[7] Yet,evenifPESwereanattempttoestablishnewmarkets,itsimplementationinpracticeresultsinaninevita-blestruggleoveritsconcreteinstitutionalizationandrationale,leadingtothekindofpower-ladenhybridizedformsthatdefineallrealworldmarketsandexchangesystems(seealsoBenediktsson,2014).[8] Typicalexamplesincludepaymentsforwatershedservicesinlocalcommunities,wherewaterusersaregener-allynotevenawareofthehigherwaterfeesforPESthattheyarechargedbytheintermediarywaterutility(Kosoyetal.,2007).Neitherdoserviceprovidersnecessarilyhavethechoicewhetherornottoprovidetheservice,forexamplewhenthreatenedthattheirlandwillbeincorporatedintoprotectedareasiftheydonotparticipateinaPESscheme(Kosoyetal.,2007;seealsoMilneandAdams,2012;Rodriguez-de-Franciscoetal.,2013;Sommervilleetal.,2009).


Assuch,theEEperspectivefocusesmoreexplicitlyonthewaysPEScouldplayacomplementaryroleinabroaderpolicymixorhybridgovernancestructure(MuradianandGómez-Baggethun,2013),andhighlightsthatPESarenotnecessarilyaboutshiftingpublicpoliciestomarketalloca-tions,but‘moreaboutareconfigurationofstate-market-communityrelationships’(Vatn,2010:1251).Furthermore,itcriticizestheenvironmentaleconomicsapproachforbeingoverlyrestric-tiveandalienated fromsocial reality, for itsnormativeprioritizationofefficiencyoverequityconsiderationsanditsimplicitadherencetoweakinsteadofstrongsustainability9(FarleyandCostanza,2010;Muradianetal.,2010;Pascualetal.,2010;2014).

WhiletheEEapproachtoPESencompassesamultitudeofdisciplinesandperspec-tives10,manyofitsargumentsandconceptscanbetracedbackto(newandold)‘institutionaleconomics’and‘institutionalecologicaleconomics’(IEE).Thelattercanbeconsideredthesyn-thesisbetweenecologicalandinstitutionaleconomics(PaavolaandAdger,2005).Theconceptof‘institutions’shouldthenbeunderstoodasthe‘rulesofthegame’inasociety,consistingofboth the formal and informal human-devised constraints that govern individual behavior and structuresocialinteractions(seee.g.North,1990).Insteadoftakinginstitutionsasanexoge-nousvariable,ecologicalinstitutionaleconomistsexplicitlyacknowledgethatinstitutionsplayacentralroleinarticulatingvaluesandinformingpreferences,andthusregulatethewayinwhichhumansinteractwiththeirenvironment(Dietzetal.,2003;Spash,2011;Vatn,2005a).Assuch,theyfocusontheroleofinstitutionsinexplaininghumanbehaviorandcollectiveactioninthecontextofenvironmentalgovernance(PaavolaandAdger,2005).Theybuildonconceptssuchasvalueandmotivationalpluralism,whichrefertothemultipleandoftenincommensurableval-uesthatinformagents’preferencesinachoicesituation(ibid).Considerationsofpluralismandfairnessalso implythatmoreattentionshouldbegivento ‘participatory’or ‘communicative’processesandprocedures inenvironmentaldecisionmaking, insteadof limitingpolicyanaly-sis to individualcost-benefitanalyses (Paavola,2007,PaavolaandAdger,2005;Vatn,2005a,2009).Moreover,inacknowledgingthateconomictransactionsaresocialrelationsofaspecifickind,theIEEapproachhighlightshowtrust,engagement,culture,beliefsandotherformsofso-calledcollective‘socialcapital’influencetheeffectivenessofgovernancesolutions(PaavolaandAdger,2005;Gendron,2014).Insum,economictransactionsarealways‘embeddedinculturalandsocialcontextsfromwhichtheyderivetheirsignificance,aswellasinthelegalinstitutionswhichenablethem’(Gendron,2014:245).

Corbera and Brown (2008) and Corbera et al. (2009) -partly inspired by Young(2002a,2002b)-explainhowamoreexplicitinstitutionalapproachtoPEScancontributetoun-derstandabroadrangeofimportantissuesthattheCoaseanliteraturehaslargelyoverlookedorfailedtoexplain.Byreferringtotheanalyticaldomainsofinstitutionaldesign,performanceandinterplay,andtothecrosscuttingdimensionsofcapacityandscale,theyarguethataninsti-tutionalapproachcancontribute‘torevealthetensionsbetweenPESdesignrulesandresourcemanagers’practices,anylikelycontroversiesoverwhoownsandshouldbenefitfrompayments,anditcanemphasizethewayinwhichPESschemesattributeavaluetoESandplantomonitortheiroutcomes’(Corberaetal.,2009:744).Aninstitutionalapproachmayalsobeabletoshedmorelightonpluralnotionsofjusticeandequity,anissuethathaslargelybeenneglectedintheCoasean-inspiredliterature(seee.g.Corbera,2015;Farrell,2014;McDermottetal.,2013).

[9] Proponentsofweaksustainabilitybelievethathuman-madeandnaturalcapitalaresubstitutableinthelongtermwhilstfollowersofstrongsustainabilitybelievetheyarenot(Neumayer,2003).[10] ThisisnotonlysofortheEEapproachtoPES,butmoregenerallyfor‘ecologicaleconomics’asaninterdis-ciplinaryapproach(seeforexamplePlumecocq,2014).See,however,recentcallsforaneedformoreclarityontheontologicalandepistemologicalfoundationsoftheecologicaleconomicsapproach(E.g.Spash,2012;Gendron,2014).


Therecognitionthat institutionalsettingsofPES implementation inpracticearecharacterizedbyhighlevelsofuncertainty,imperfectandasymmetricinformation,andthereforehightransactioncosts(Muradianetal.,2010),inspiredEEscholarstoabandonWunder’s(2005)restrictiveandnormativedefinition,andtoproposeanewdefinitionforPES,whichadherestotheideathatPEScanbeappliedinawidevarietyofcomplexinstitutionalcontexts(Sommervilleetal.,2009).Muradianetal.(2010)haveproposedtomorebroadlydefine‘PESasatransferofresourcesbetweensocialactors,whichaimstocreateincentivestoalignindividualand/orcol-lectivelandusedecisionswiththesocialinterestinthemanagementofnaturalresources’(ibid:1205).ThismorehybridclassificationofPES recognizes the institutional complexity inwhichPESschemesoperate,andthevariousdegreesofEScommodificationandrelianceonmarkets.Itopensanewresearchagendawhichaimstomoreexplicitlyaddressandunderstandsomeofthekeyissuesraisedintheformersections.

ItisimportanttonotehowthisEEfocusdiffersfromtheCoaseanapproachtoPES.Coase’stheorywithitsexplicitfocusontransactioncosts,infact,isoftenconsideredasoneofthefoundingblocksofnewinstitutionaleconomics(North,1990;Williamson,1985)andmuchoftheCoasean-inspiredPESresearchhasexplicitlydedicatedattentiontothedesignofefficien-cy-enhancinginstitutionalarrangements(e.g.Wunderetal.,2008).Fromthisperspective,thelimitationsofmostexistingPESschemesareoftenexplainedbyreferringto‘institutionaldesignfailures’(e.g.lackofpropertyrights,lackofadequatespatialtargetmechanisms,lackofeffi-cientpaymentsdesign).However,ratherthantryingtoadapttherealworldtoaCoaseanworldofzerotransactioncostsandclearly-definedpropertyrights,theEEapproachexplicitlyrecog-nizeshowPESsystemsarenotcreatedinaninstitutionalvacuum(Vatn,2010)andhowtheiroutcomesarenotpredictableastheyresult‘fromacombinationofinstitutionalfactors,someofwhichareextrinsictoinstitutionaldesign’(Corberaetal.,2009).Moreover,itadvocatesadapt-inginstitutionstothebiophysicalcharacteristicsandthesocio-environmentitisdealingwith,andnottheotherwayaround(FarleyandCostanza,2010;Vatn,2009).Indeed,theservicesthatPESaredealingwithareoftenconsideredtobepublicgoods,andthisusuallyimpliesthattheirprovisionentailsthesolutiontoaproblemofcollectiveaction(orsocialrationality),ratherthantoadilemmaofindividualrationalchoice.Itis,therefore,‘problematictousemethodsbasedonindividualrationalityfordecisionconcerningcommongoods’(Vatn,2009:2210).Sinceaccordingtothisview,theroleofinstitutionsistosignalwhichrationalityisexpected(ibid),itmaythus‘makemoresenseforcollective institutionstotakethelead,supplementedbymoremarket-basedapproacheswherepossible’(FarleyandCostanza,2010:2065).

Assuch, theEEperspectiveargues thatPESshouldbeexplicitlyconsideredandcraftedaspartofan‘equity-conscious’, integratedandmulti-purposeruralgovernancestrat-egy,whichcannotsimplybereducedtoan‘isolated’efficiencyproblem(Muradianetal.,2010;Pascualetal.,2014).Itisarguedthen,thattheemphasisofPESshouldmovefromthe‘inter-nalizationofexternalities’ to thedesignof ‘incentives for collectiveaction’ (Muradianetal.,2010;Muradian,2013;MuradianandRival,2012).Povertyandequity,apartfrombeinganethi-calconcerninitself,arealsoincreasinglyrecognizedasplayinganinstrumentalroleinshapingenvironmentaloutcomes(Pascualetal.,2014).Indeed,asisevidentintheliteratureonSocialEcologicalSystems(SES)(BerkesandFolke,1998;Ostrom,2010),thisfollowsfromtheintrinsicconnectionsbetweenbothecologicalandsocialsubsystems(Hirschetal.,2010;Pascualetal.,2014).Inotherwords,‘divorcingequityconsiderationsfromPESriskstheoversimplificationofconservationchallenges’(Pascualetal.,2014:1029).


ThisbroaderperspectiveonPEShasalreadysparkednewresearchinitiativesthataimtoclarifysomeoftheidentifiedanalyticalandempiricalgaps.Forexample,variousstud-ieshighlight the roleof thesocio-institutional context indetermining theprevailing fairnessand/orefficiencycriteriainPESschemes,andcallforfurtherin-depthresearchonjusticeandpowerrelationshipsbetweenthedifferentactorsinvolvedinPESschemes(Corberaetal.2007a;Martinetal.,2014;McDermottetal.,2013;Pascualetal.,2010;2014;Sommervilleetal.,2010;VanHeckenetal., 2012).Other studies showhow farmers’willingness toparticipate inpay-mentschemes isnotonlydependentoneconomic incentives,but ishighly influencedbydif-ferentaspectsoftrustand‘socialcapital’(BlackmanandWoodward,2010;Bremeretal.,2014;HendricksonandCorbera,2015;Kosoyetal.,2007;2008;Mirandaetal.,2007;Zanellaetal.,2014).Theroleofintermediaryagentsistherebyincreasinglyrecognized(seealsoBosselmannandLund,2013;Hayesetal.,2015;andPhametal.,2010;Schomersetal.,2015).Someauthorsevencautionthatmonetarycompensationsmay‘crowdout’non-profit-basedmotivationsforenvironmentalgovernance(Bowles,2008;Muradianetal.,2013;Rodeetal.,2014;VanHeckenandBastiaensen,2010b;Vatn,2010).Thisfollowsfromthemanycontextualfactorsthatinflu-encetheoutcomesofPESschemes,includinglocalnotionsoffairnessandjustice,andthepsy-chological,cultural,andsocialembeddednessofthedesiredbehavior(Muradianetal.,2013).Inshort,mostofthesestudiescallforfurthermultidisciplinaryresearchonthesocialembed-dednessofPESandthesocio-politicalandenvironmentaltransformationsthisinstrumentmaytrigger.FurtherresearchonPESshouldthenhelptoformulatepolicyinterventionsanddesignhybridinstitutionalarrangementsthatleadtothestrengtheningofcooperativewillandthein-ducementofacommitmenttolong-termconservation(seee.g.Kolinjivadietal.,2014).


3. QualIfyIng common assumpTIons underlyIng currenT pes approaches

The former sections discussed themain perspectives in the current PES debateandhighlightedhowtheEEapproachadvocatesforintegratingequityandsustainability,whileavoidingoverlyessentialistanalysesof‘neoliberalnatures’(McElweeetal.,2014).TheEEap-proach acknowledges that PES schemes interplay with everyday cultural, institutional, andpolitical realities and that social-ecological outcomes are therefore shaped by place-specificideasandsocialnorms,andaredeeply influencedbypower relations (Muradianetal., 2013;Pascualetal.,2014).Theseconsiderationshaveencouragedsomescholarstoenrichinstitution-alframeworksbyintegratingcomplementaryconceptualtools,suchasacapitalassetframe-work(Hejnowiczetal.,2014),acapabilityapproach(Kolinjivadietal.,2014)ormultidimensionalequityconsiderations(McDermottetal.,2013)intonewconceptualmodelsforPESdesignandanalysis.TheseareclearattemptstoconstructalternativewaystoanalyseandconceptualizePESinotherwaysthan‘neoliberal’ornot,‘market-based’ornot,or‘genuine’ornot(McElweeetal.,2014;Vatn,2014).

But in spite of these efforts there seems to remain a certain frustration stemming fromtheunpredictable,messyandcomplexoutcomesthatPESprojectsgenerate inpractice(AdhikariandAgrawal,2013;HendricksonandCorbera,2015;MuradianandGómez-Baggethun,2013).Thekeychallenge forecologicaleconomists thereforeappears to lie infinding theap-propriate(hybrid,context-dependentandadaptive)institutionalarrangementsthatcanensure-or incentivize-optimalresourceuse,beneficialcollectiveactionandhencemoreequitableandecologically-sustainable governance (see e.g. Muradian et al., 2010; Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun,2013;Kolinjivadietal.,2014).Inthissense,theEEapproach‘developsanormativeanalysis suggestinghowthese institutionsshouldbe rebuilt’ (Gendron,2014:244).Or in thewordsofSlavikováetal. (2010: 1368): ‘The changeof institutionsor thedesignofnew insti-tutionsmustbedoneafter carefulmappingofaparticular situation (especially knowing theecological,economicandsocialcharacteristicsoftheproblem)andwiththeuseofopensocialdialog(Vatn,2005a;2005b)’.Thisnormativestanceis largely inlinewithmainstream‘collec-tiveaction’schoolsofthought(e.g.Ostrom,1990;1992),inwhichinstitutionsarebelievedtobeamenabletodesign,andcanthenbecraftedorshapedindesirabledirections(Halletal.,2014:72-73;Young,2002a,b).AsconvincinglyarguedbyCleaver(2002)andothercriticalscholars,thisnormativepostureisquiteproblematic,inthatitis‘basedonconceptswhichareinadequatelysociallyinformedandwhichill-reflectthecomplexity,diversityandad hoc nature of institutional formation’(ibid:11).

Assuch,webelievetheEEapproachhasdefinitelysucceededinadvancingahighly-relevantandmoreconstructiveresearchagendaforguidingfuturePESresearch,butwearguethatitsontologicalandepistemologicalassumptions,aswellasseveralofitskeyconceptsanditscontinuingbelief inthenecessityandpossibilityof institutionaldesignrequiremorecare-fulscrutiny.Ifnot, furtherfrustration inacademics’andpractitioners’attemptstograspandinterveneinthecomplexsocial-ecologicaldynamicsoccurringinthefieldcanbeexpected.Inthefaceofthesechallenges,wearguethatunderstandingPESpracticesandoutcomesrequiresanacknowledgementof the fundamental limitationsofanyknowledge, science included.Associal-ecologicalsystemsarecomplexandcharacterizedbyhighlevelsofuncertaintyandun-predictabilitythisalsoimpliestheneedforamoreexplicitandempirically-groundedfocusontheroleofpower/politicsinthecontextofenvironmentalgovernanceandrelatedinstitutionalchanges(Blaikie,1999;Cleaver,2012;Leachetal.,2010).Inthesameveinasrecentsociological


critiquesonsocial-ecologicalsystems(SES)scholarship,wethinkitiscrucialforfuturePESre-searchtocriticallyandseriouslyengagewiththeinsightsfromthesocialsciencesaboutagency,powerandknowledge(CoteandNightingale,2012;seealsoFabinyietal.,2014).Insightsfromotherfieldsanddisciplines–inparticularcriticalinstitutionalism,socialanthropologyandpo-liticalecology-,canhelpussubjectsomeofthecommonassumptionsunderlyingmainstreamandalternativeconceptualizationsofPESandidentifythemainissuesthatwebelievedeservemoreattentioninfutureresearch.Morespecifically,inthenextsubsectionswebuildoncriticalsociological insights to discuss the tendencies:

1. toassumethatinstitutionscanbedesignedinordertomakethem‘fit’specifichuman-environmentproblems;

2. tooversimplifysocialandculturaldiversitythroughtheapoliticalconceptof‘socialcapital’;and

3. to conceptualize human agency, collective action, and institutional changethrougheitheroverly-rational/functionaloroverly-structuralistmodels.

We hope a critical discussion of these issues can help pave the way towards better socially-in-formed frameworks for analysing PES as part of broader social-ecological systems (SES), in which power and politics are treated as ‘(…) crucial drivers of social-ecological outcomes rather than ‘inconvenient’ politics that can be simply sorted out through institutional design’ (Cote and Nightingale, 2012: 484). The discussion also helps us understand why designed PES arrange-ments mostly turn out in unexpected ways.

3.1. Social-Ecological Systems and the illusive quest for institutional ‘fit’As discussed above, the EE perspective questions a blueprint approach to PES

baseduponareductionistexternality-marketimperfectionmodel,andconvincinglyarguesforabroadersocio-institutionalapproach that includesattention tosocial relations,valuesandperceptionsinenvironmentalgovernance.AsindicatedbyVatnandVedeld(2012),thiscreatesaneedforontologicalandepistemologicalclarification inordertocreate ‘firmer foundationsoftheinterdependenciesofinstitutionsandhumanactions’(ibid:7)andtheirinteractionwithnature.Theseconcerns relate toongoingdebateson ‘institutionalfit’asproposedbyYoung(2002a).AtfirstsightandinlinewiththebasictenetofYoung’sproposal,thechallengeofen-vironmentalgovernancewouldseemtoberelativelystraightforward.Itwouldconsistof theneedtodesigninstitutionalarrangements(PESincluded,ifdeemedappropriateandaspartofabroaderinstitutionalset-up) inviewoftheobjectivestateoftheecologicalsysteminordertoallowforsustainableflowsofESthatwillcontributetopresentandfuturehumanwell-be-ing.Theontologicalandepistemologicalfoundationsofthiswidelyadoptedvieware,however,quiteproblematicandultimatelyimpossibletomaintain.Ontologicallyitmustassumethattheecologicalsystem,‘naturean sich’existsindependentlyfromourhumanperceptionsandappro-priations.Epistemologicallyitfollowsthatwecanobtain‘objectiveknowledge’ofthatnaturalreality,ifnotperfect,atleastincreasinglyscientificallyreliable.Thisgrowingknowledgethenshould allow us to inform how we need to design and adapt our human institutions in order to ensureresilienceand‘equilibrium’ofthenaturalsystems(e.g.OstromandCox,2010).

Ataveryfundamentallevel,ourevolvingrealityishoweveraco-evolutionaryso-cial-ecologicalsystem(SES) inwhichhumanandnaturalaspectsaredeeply intertwinedandincontinuousinteraction(e.g.BerkesandFolke,1998;Folkeetal.,2005),andnotaseparatedecologicalsystemwithasuperimposedsocialsystemtobeadaptedtotheformer(Leachetal.,


1999).Evidently,andindeedtoaproblematicextentinthisanthropocentricage,humansandhumanactivitiesasshapedbytheirinterrelatedperceptions,motivationsandsocialinstitutionsareacrucialconstituentpartof‘nature’,andnotexternaltoordominantoverit(Fabinyietal.,2014). In otherwords, ontologically there is no ‘pure’, socio-politically and culturally uncon-taminated‘natureout there’towhichwecouldobjectivelyadaptourinstitutionalarrangementsandhumanbehaviour.Neitherisitpossibletoobtainvalue-neutralscientificknowledgeaboutthis‘human-naturereality’(e.g.Litfin,1994);itwillinevitablybecolouredbyparticularsocio-politicalandculturalframingsthroughwhichwetrytounderstandandmakesenseofwhatweperceiveasthe‘naturalreality’(seealsoLeachetal.,2010)11.

Itfollowsfromtheabove,thattheclassicalargumentforaninstitutional‘fit’ap-proachbecomesrecursiveandimpracticable,sinceinstitutions,socialstructureandperceptionsarenotexogenous,butendogenoustotheevolutionofthesocial-ecologicalsystem.Indeed,Bromley(2012)aptlycapturesthissocio-constructivistideabystatingthat:

‘IntermsofmanagementandtheideaofFIT,theimplicationhereseemstobethatwhatYoungcalls

“nature”(theecosystem)doesnotandcannotexistindependentlyofus.Wehavecreateditboth

ontologicallyviaouraprioricolonizationofit,andideationallythroughourmentalimpositionsupon

it(seeNorgaard,1984).’(ibid:4).

Thenaturalsciencescanthusnotbeattributedwiththeroleoftheobjective,apolit-icalsupremejudgecapableofidentifyinganddictatingwhatmustbedoneinorderto‘preserve’,‘rationallyexploit’or‘manage’nature.Norcanweacceptpossiblepretencesinthisdirection.Thisviewdoesnotnecessarilyimplythatthereisnorealitytoecologicalprocesses,orforthatmatternoroleforscientificknowledge:thehumanmindcanindeedconstructmany(andonly)modelsofnature,andinspiredbytheseactuponnature,butthisdoesnotprecludethat‘naturewilltalkback’toourconceptionsofit.Wheneverconfrontedwiththelimitationsofaspecificmodel,humanbeingscan‘updatetheirbeliefsaboutnature’(Bromley,2012)andcomeupwithanewadjustedmodelof‘nature’andwaystoaddresstheperceivedhuman-natureinterrelations.Thisnewmodel,inevitablyemergingoutoftheprevailinghuman-natureconstellation,doesnotnecessarilyrepresentatruerstoryofnaturalrealityhowever.AsdescribedbyKatz(1998),newmodelscan,forexample,contributetotransform‘nature’fromaninfinitesourceintoalimited,newandinvestablecapitalassetinconsonancewithdominantcapitalistpractices,ideas,struc-turesandrules,evenallowingfornewavenuesofaccumulationbydispossession.Important,however,isthatthiscontinuingupdating-adaptationprocessisneverpurely‘scientific’,butal-waysinevitablysocio-culturalandpolitical,involvingmultipleperceptions,valuesandinterests(seealsoRobertson,2006).

FollowingHukkinen(2014:101),itthus‘appearsadvisablefrombothscientificandpolicyperspectivestocontemplatemoreintegrativetheoreticalframeworkswithwhichtocon-ceptualizeSESs’.HethereforeproposestoconsiderSESasautopoeticsystems, i.e.asystemwhichevolves,reproducesandregeneratesitselfsolelyandexclusivelyfromwithinthedynam-icsofthatsystemitself.Inthelanguageofcomplexitytheory,onecouldsaythatthegovernanceandthegovernanceoutcomesofanySESareanemergentresultofthedynamic interactionsbetweenhuman(withcognitive,motivational,socialandinstitutionaldimensions)andnatural(dependentuponecosystemdynamics)processes.Itistherefore:

[11] Or,inthewordsofBromley(2012:2):‘Themindisnotamirrorofnature(Rorty,1979).Rather,themindcreatesitsown“nature”inthelightofcurrentembeddednessinparticularsocialandeconomicandculturalsettingsandcircumstances’.


‘(…)notjustthephysicalcharacteristicsofanecosystemthataredeterminativeoftheappropri-

atemanagementarrangementsthatwillbebroughttobearonthatsystem.Rather,itisthesocial

constructionofthatecosystem—itssharedmentalobjectification—thatwillbedecisiveintermsof

institutionalarrangementsforaddressingissuesofglobalgovernance’(Bromley,2012:6).

Itfollowsthattheidentificationandrecognitionofenvironmentalproblems(andnewlyperceivedchallengesofenvironmentalgovernance)willinevitablybeendogenoustotheprevailingsystemandemergeoutof thecomplex interactionsof ideas,knowledges,motiva-tionsandinterestsreproducedandreworkedbytheagencyofdifferentgroupsenabledandcon-strainedby theevolving institutionalarrangements (socialnetworks,and rulesof thegame)withintheSES(Hukkinen,2014;seealsoBlaikie,1999).Inotherwords,itisimpertinenttotakethenaturalprocessesforseparateanalysis inorderto informsocialprocesses,politicaldeci-sion-makingorculturalperceptions;theyareinevitablyandintrinsicallyintertwined.

At the same time, it isnotpossible foranyactor tounderstandand control theentirelogicofthesystemasawhole.ThechangestheSESundergoesaretheaggregateresultof interrelatedmicro-dynamics that result inat leastapartially spontaneousself-organizingprocesswithoutacentralizeddirection.Thisrenderstheeffectsofanyconsciousplanningordesign effort unpredictable.However, this does notmean that the socio-ecological systemsfunctionwithout intentionality, consciousgovernanceor influenceofpower. It rathermeansthatnoactorwillatanypointbeabletocontrolandguidetheentiredynamicofthesystemasawhole(Bastiaensenetal.,2015a,b).Althoughweclearlyacknowledgetheinevitableandcentralrole of power in the emerging processes (of dominant ideas and networks with made-to-order rules),wefollowtheargumentofGermansociologistNorbertElias,analysedbyMowlesetal.(2008:812),whoholdsthat‘mostsignificantchangeisunplannedandunforeseen,andistheresultofawebofinterdependentactionsinformedbypastactions’.Obviouslythefactthatnoactorcancontroltheentireprocessdoesnotmeanthattheactorsareplayingonalevelfield.Nonetheless,thefinalresultoftheprocesswillalwaysbetheconsequenceoftheinteractionamongthem,withthedominantonestryingtoimposeandmaintainwhilethosedominatedtrytoresistandchange(Scott,1990).

3.2. Knowledge, framing and power: discursive battles at the human-environment nexus

Thepreviousreflectionsalsoleadustoacknowledgethat‘truths’abouttheenvi-ronmentareinevitably‘shapedbytherelationshipbetweenthesubjectandobjectofresearch,suchthatdifferentactors,suchasscientists,orothers,mayconstructthesameenvironmentinverydifferentways’(Blaikie,1999:134).Themanagerialandapoliticalfocusoninstitutional‘fit’,then,inessencedisguiseshowsocial-ecologicalsystemsareinfactopentomultiple–andoftencontested- framings12,i.e.differentwaysofunderstandingorrepresentingspecificproblemsandcorrespondingsetsofsolutions(Leachetal.,2010;seealsoMitchell,2002).Social-ecologicalsystems,thus,are‘notinthemselvesontologicalentitiesbutratherareparticularframingsofrealitythatincludesomethingsandleaveothersout’(Westetal.,2014:5,referringtoLeachetal.,2010).Indeed,asarguedbyJasanoff:

[12] Leachetal.(2010:4)explain‘framing’asthe‘particularcontextualassumptions,methods,formsofinterpretationandvaluesthatdifferentgroupsmightbringtoaproblem,shapinghowitisboundedandunderstood’(ibid:4).


‘Scientificknowledge,inparticular,isnotatranscendentmirrorofreality.Itbothembedsandisem-

beddedinsocialpractices,identities,norms,conventions,discourses,instruments,andinstitutions

–inshort,inallthebuildingblocksofwhatwetermthesocial.’(2004:3,emphasisintheoriginal).

Inotherwords,epistemologiesdeeplyinfluencegovernanceprocesses13 (Leach et al.,2010;Flyvbjerg,2001;Cleaver,2012;Mosse,1997).Inthefaceofthe‘unknowability’oftheSES,thewidelydivergentinterestsofdifferentstakeholdersaswellasthehugepracticalchal-lengestocooperateandcoordinateactions,thereisstrongfragmentationaswellasdiscursiveand practical struggles over knowledge and action14.Environmentalgovernanceisthenessen-tially‘avalue-ladenexercisethatiscontestedbygroupswithdifferentialpower,whoemployarangeofstrategiesthatincludedebatingandnegotiatingtheverywaysinwhichenvironmentalissuesarecommonlyunderstoodandrepresented’(Fabinyietal.,2014:6).Thepluralityofper-ceptionsontheenvironment, theways inwhichcertaindiscoursescometodominateworld-viewsandeventually translate intomaterialprocesses,are then crucialpointsofanalysis insocial-ecologicalchange.OrinthewordsofCoteandNightingale(2012:475):‘theroleofknowl-edgeattheintersectionsbetweensocialandenvironmentaldynamicshelps(…)tocapturehowpowerandcompetingvaluesystemsarenotexternalto,butratherintegraltothedevelopmentandfunctionofSES’.

Thefocusonpowerrelationsatthehuman-environmentnexus isoneofthekeysubjectsofthebroadandinterdisciplinaryfieldofpoliticalecology.Politicalecologistsprovideusefulframeworkstocriticallyanalysehowenvironmentalknowledgeisproduced,representedandcontested(Adgeretal.,2001;Blaikie,1999;Bryant,1998;PeetandWatts,1996).EspeciallytheworkthathasbeeninfluencedbyFoucault’s(1972;1980)conceptualizationsofpower,knowl-edgeanddiscourse (e.g.Blaikie, 1999;Escobar, 1996),provides crucial insights into thewaysinwhichknowledgeandpowerinterrelateandmediatepolitical-ecologicaloutcomes(Bryant,1998:82).Thisworkdemonstratesthatsocial-ecologicalconflictsarebothstrugglesovermean-ingandbattlesovermaterialpractices(ibid).Inotherwords:

‘Practicalstrugglesarealwayssimultaneouslystrugglesfor“truth”andmeaning–strugglesthat

happeninimaginationandrepresentationatthesametimeastheyareconductedinthematerial

world(PeetandWatts2002:37)’(Fabinyietal.,2014:6).

Thefocusonpower,knowledgeandstrugglesformeaninghavespurredpoliticalecologiststoturntodiscourse(e.g.Hajer,1995;PeetandWatts,1996),ortheanalysisofparticu-larnarrativesthatarepromotedby,andbecomeinterlockedwith,governanceprocesses(Leachetal.,2010:76;Adgeretal.,2001).Thisemphasison(multipleandoftenopposing)narrativesasparticularwaysof framingproblemsandsolutions, isheldtopromoteashift fromsimpledescriptivetomorecriticalandreflexivemodesofexplanationand‘helpilluminatehowknowl-edgeclaimsderivedfromparticularinstancesandsitesarespreadandconsolidatedbyenrollingotheractorsandinstitutionsintoknowledge/powernetworks’(Leachetal.,2010:74).

[13] OrinthewordsofCleaver(2012:155):‘Policy(…)isnotjustrationallycrafted,guidedbyevidence,butalsoisshapedbyunderlyingworldviewswhichoftenreflectstructuralallocationsofpowerandresourcesinsociety’.[14] Asarguedbefore,currentenvironmentalproblemsaretruly‘wickedproblems’,characterizedbylargedegreesofinterrelateduncertainty,knowledgegapsanddivergentstakeholderinterests(Leachetal.,2010).Effectiveactionthenrequiresthecombinationof‘puzzling’(i.e.jointlymakingsenseandagreeing[sufficiently]aboutgoals,underly-ingcausalprocessesandadequateactionsandinstitutionalframeworks)andsubsequent‘organizing’(i.e.creatinglegitimateandsufficientlypowerfulinstitutionalarrangements[socialstructuresandrulesofthegame](Vinketal.,2013),capabletogeneratenewevolutionarypathwaysoftheautopoeticSES.


ThedebateaboutPES testifiesprecisely to this required focuson thepoliticsofknowledgeand theneed to scrutinize supposedly ‘value-neutral’ narratives.As explained insection2,PESnarrativesasadvocatedbyenvironmentaleconomists,areoftenconstructedandframedfromwithinmanagerialpositivist-orientedepistemologies,whichreducetheanalysisof inherent complex social-environmental problems to simple techno-economic and mostlyapolitical diagnoses. Complex problems are straight-jacketed into ‘externalities’, ‘ecosystemservices’,and‘ESbuyers’,‘users’,‘sellers’or‘providers’,andtheneedtoeconomicallyvaluatecertainESinordertomakesocialtransactionspossible(VanHeckenetal.,2015).OrinthewordsofLele(2013):

‘(…)inpractice,theentirefocusoftheecosystemservicesliteraturehasbeenonidentifying,quanti-

fyingandrepresentingineconomictermsthelinksbetweenecosystemsandhumanwell-being.The

question“whyecosystemsdegrade”israrelyaskedandansweredexplicitly.Implicitly,theansweris

asimpletechno-economicone:thatecosystemsdegradebecausesociety(primarilypolicy-makers)

knowsneitherthe“trueextent”ofthesebenefits(becausesomeofthemareindirectandthus

ignored)northeir“truevalue”(becausesomeofthemarenotpricedcorrectly).Thewaytoincorpo-

ratethesevaluesistocarryoutanextendedcost-benefitanalysis,whichwillleadtomorerational

decisions’(ibid:125).

Inthisway,narrativesoftenboildowntowhatIoris(2014:6)hascalledthe‘imposi-tionofahegemonicrationalityofeconomicgrowthandprivateaccumulationoverbothsocietyandtherestofnature’,inwhichthechallengeisreducedtocreatingtheappropriateinstitution-alsettingandfindingthe‘right’exchangepricesforaPESmechanismtowork(seealsoMatulis,2014andMcAfeeandShapiro,2010)15.Asdiscussedelsewhere(e.g.Büscher,2014;Ervine,2010),thisspecificframingoftheproblemintermsofecosystemservicesguidesinterventionstowardsparticularblueprintsolutions,withapracticalapplicationthatisblindtothesocial-ecologicalcontext,ensuingfromandsimultaneouslyleadingtoPESfetishism.Assuch,thisparticularfram-ing‘de-historicizes’and‘de-ecologizes’debatesoncomplexhuman-environmentrelationships(Ernstson and Sörlin, 2013), and neglects that ‘ecosystem services’ are inherently normativeanddiscursiveconstructsorimaginaries(Westetal.,2014;Lele,2013;McCarthyandPrudham,2004).Inthesamevein,McAfeeandShapiro(2010)concludethata‘neoliberal’PESnarrative

‘(…)privilegesanabstractversionofconservation,inwhichnatureismeasuredbydesocialized

scienceandgivenvaluethroughthelogicofsupplyanddemand.Itthenseekspoliciesthatwill

maximizeenvironmental-marketefficiencyandthusyieldthegreatestconservationgainattheleast

costforabstract“society.”Actualsociety,withitsplace-specificcomplexitiesandunrulyactors,is

setaside.’(ibid:17).

ItisthencrucialtoconsidertheglobalcontextinwhichPESnarrativeshavebeendeveloping,and linkthis totheways inwhichhuman-ecological interactionsandsocial-eco-nomicrelationsarebeingrestructuredandinwhoseinterest(Fairheadetal.,2012:242).Variousstudieshavealreadyindicatedhowdiscoursesandcorrespondingpoliciespromotedbyparticu-[15] Inanattempttoredefinean‘idealPEStype’,Wunder(2015)advocatesthat‘PESdefinitionsshouldfocusondescribingafunctionaltool,ratherthannormatively integratingdesirablePESoutcomes’(ibid:234).Hethereforeproposestofocusonnon-normativefeatures,andhere-definesPESas‘voluntarytransactionsbetweenserviceusersand service providers that are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management for generating offsite ser-vices’(ibid:241).However,anddespiteWunder’sclaims,thisdefinition(andinfactthewholeideaofPES)isobviouslyfarfrombeingnon-normative.Itsexplicitreferenceto‘serviceusers’and‘providers’,forexample,isinevitably–andasarguedinthissection-not‘value-neutral’andavalue-ladennarrative(oneamongmanyotherpossible)initself;itimposesaspecific(economics-inspired)worldviewrootedinamodernistandWesternepistemologicalframework,whichisnotnecessarilycompatiblewithalternativeworldviews.


lar globalgovernance institutionsare increasingly inspiredbyneoliberal ideas inwhich con-servationeffortsaregovernedbymarketprinciples(e.g.Blaikie,2006;BrockingtonandDuffy,2010;Büscheretal., 2012;Fairheadetal., 2012;McAfee, 1999).Thediscursivepowerconcen-tratedaroundtheseinstitutionsenablesPEStobepromotedasapromisingconservationanddevelopmenttool(McAfee,2012).InthisprocesstheproliferationofPESheavilydependsontheactiveconstructionofPES‘successstories’bylike-mindedexpertsbelongingtospecific‘epis-temiccommunities’.Büscher(2012,2014)andErvine(2010), forexample,showhowtheseex-perts(consistingofconsultants,governmentofficials,NGOs,etc.)workhardtoassurethattheirproposedprojectsaresufficientlyinlinewiththosepreferredbyglobalfundinginstitutions.Itbecomesaself-congratulatingcircleofknowledgeandexperiencegeneration.Uncriticalsup-portbecomesinstitutionalizedwithintheworkingsandlogicoffundingandthe‘bon ton’ofthelarge conventions and international organizations regarding sustainable development (Büscher etal.,2012;VanHeckenetal.,2015).

Thesereflectionsunderlinethecrucialimportanceofscrutinizingglobalneoliberalormarket-baseddiscoursesaspurportedbyPESadvocatesandtheirepistemiccommunities.Butacrucialquestion remains:howdotheseglobaldiscoursesand ideologies translate intolocalpractices?Dotheyreallyresultinsweepingneoliberalizationprocesses,benefittingpow-erfuleconomicactorstothedetrimentofthepoor?Ifso,inwhichways?Webelieveananalysisof these importantquestionsfirst requiresanacknowledgementthatpoliciesarealwaysne-gotiatedandco-producedthroughcomplexinteractionsbetweenglobalactors,nationalgov-ernmentsandamultitudeofotheractorsatdifferentscales(BlaikieandMuldavin,2014).Thisobviouslymeansthat‘theshapeofpoliciesonthegroundcandiffersignificantlyfromtheshapetheyshouldtakebasedontheoreticalconsiderations’(MuradianandGómez-Baggethun,2013:1117),andthatmechanismsofneoliberalruledonotnecessarilyproduceuniformlyneoliberalef-fects(Higginsetal.,2008:1783).TheincreasinginterestinPESpoliciesaroundtheworldcouldthenbemorethanamatterof‘hegemonicimposition’ofaneoliberalprojectbysomepowerfulcapitalist actors.

Indeed,PESschemescaninsomecasesalsocreatenewopportunitiesfornegotiat-ingexistingpracticesensuingfromspecificpowerrelations(e.g.Higginsetal.,2012;McElweeetal.,2014:;McAfeeandShapiro,2010;Shapiro-Garza,2013a).Insomecontextstheyhavebeenrecognizedasmeanstorealizesocialjustice,orevenaswaystochallenge neoliberal conserva-tionpolicies(Corbera,2015;McElweeetal.,2014;McAfeeandShapiro,2010;seealsoRobertson,2007andMansfield,2007).VariousstudiesreporthowfarmermovementsinMexicoandCentralAmerica, for example, perceive PES schemes as an opportunity to revalue themarginalizedcountryside(McAfeeandShapiro,2010;Shapiro-Garza,2013a),andthusasauseful‘surfaceofengagement’(Shapiro-Garza,2013b).ProjectsbasedonanunderlyingPESlogiccould,assuch,inducechangesinlocalperceptions,valuesandnormsconcerning‘accepted’and‘desirable’ag-riculturalpractices,andbreakawayfromstrictconservationistapproaches,whicharemostlyinsensitivetothesocietaldependenceofruralfarmersonresource-extractiveactivities(WellsandBrandon,1992).ThelocaladoptionofPESdiscoursescouldthenevenbeframedwithinaprocessofnewstrategiesofpeasantresistanceto(neo)coloniallegaciesofresourcealienationinthenameoftheenvironment,inwhichpeasantsareoftendiscursivelyconstructedasenvi-ronmentaldestroyers(e.g.Adgeretal.,2001;Fairheadetal.,2012;McElweeetal.,2014).Insum,it isthuscrucialtoavoidgrandgeneralizationsaboutPES(Corbera,2015),andtodeepenourunderstandingofthevariegatedwaysinwhichPEScansimultaneouslyevoke‘resistance’and‘support’atdifferentscales,andthe(micro)politicalandsocio-culturaldynamicsthatmediatethese processes.


3.3. Romanticizing resistance: agency and the social embeddedness of ‘neoliberalism’

PESscepticshaveconvincinglywarnedusforthepotentialperversesocial-ecolog-icaldetrimentaleffectsofsocially-agnosticinterventionsthattakeforgrantedthe‘historicallycontingent,unequaldistributionofeconomicpowerandpropertyrights inthemarketworld’(McAfeeandShapiro,2010:17).Asalternativeframingsofhuman-natureproblemsarenotnec-essarily ‘truer’ thandominant representations, it followsweshould,however,besufficientlyreflexiveandcriticalabouttheemergence/creationofparticularcounter-narratives.Aswehavearguedinsection2.2.2,intheacademicPESdebatethe‘radical’counter-narrativeaspurport-edbymanyPESsceptics,arguablyfitsthedescriptionofwhatAdgeretal.(2001)earlierhavecalled‘populist’discourses,inwhichlocalactorsareportrayedasvictimsofexternalinterven-tions(seealsoCastree,2007).Indeed,presentingPESasadichotomouscontradictionbetweenadominant ‘capitalist’or ‘neoliberal’ systemanddominatedandsuppressed ‘non-capitalist’(peasant,workerorindigenous)alternativesocieties,isinitselfaparticularframing,subjecttocontestation.Indeed,ontologically,weneedtoacknowledgethatalmostallsocietieshavebeenincorporatedtoacertaindegreeintotheglobaleconomy.Yet,globalizationprocessesarethenoftenmisunderstoodastheresultofamerepenetrationoftheglobalcapitalistsystemintopas-sive pre-modern societies. Alternative conceptualizations acknowledge that these processes should ratherbeunderstoodasmultiple (often violent) global-to-local-to-global encountersthat transform both the local and the global (in the sense that the globalized local becomes a constituentpartoftheglobaleconomyandsociety)(Hart,2006).

Thisapproach is in linewithPolanyi’s ideasthatanyeconomicsystemisalwaysinevitablysociallyembedded intoabroadersociety (Dale,2010: 199),whichwill thustendtoexertpressureandresistanceincaseswhereitsconstitutingprinciples(ideas,values,interests,organizationalnetworks,rules,etc.)areviolatedbythefunctioningoftheeconomy.However,itisimportantnottoconsiderthecapitalistmarketeconomyanditscurrent‘neoliberalforms’asadisembeddedsystem,butratherastheoutcomeof–obviouslyveryunequal-encountersofthedominanteconomywithevolvingsocieties.AsDeAngelis(2007)hasargued,onecouldactuallycharacterizecurrent‘roll-outneoliberalism’asanattempttoapplyakindof‘invertedPolanyi’principle,i.e.anattempttoadjustbroadersocietytothestrategicprojectofneoliber-alism(ibid:98).Strugglesarethereforelargelyoverthewayinwhichthisispreciselyandcon-cretelyachieved,according towhose ideas, valuesand interests (Dale, 2010: 200-2; seealsoBrennerandTheodore,2002),andnotaboutamassivedichotomousresistanceof‘society’(ofnon-capitalistsocieties)againstthe‘market’(ofthecapitalistneoliberaleconomy).

Itiscrucialthereforetoturnourattentiontowhatactuallyoccursintherelevantencountersontheground.Forthisreason,GillianHartarguesfortheneedtoelaboratedetailedaccountsofthesituated‘glocalization’processesthrough‘criticalethnographies’:

‘Suchethnographiesarenotaccountsof“local”variationsorinstancesofa“global”process.Nor

aretheycasestudiesoftheimpactofglobalization,imperialism,oranyothersetofinexorable,pre-

givenforces.Nordotheysimplyrepresentmethodsforthedetailedproductionofareaknowledge.

Instead,criticalethnographiesoffervantagepointsforgeneratingnewunderstandingsbyilluminat-

ingpower-ladenprocessesofconstitution,connection,anddisconnection,alongwithslippages,

openings,andcontradictions,andpossibilitiesforalliancewithinandacrossdifferentspatialscales’

(Hart,2006:981-982).


Inthisway,Hartlocateslocalresistancetodominantcapitalistinterestssquarelywithin the struggle for the constitution and redirection of the globalization process from within thatprocessitself,notassomethingthatcomesfromtheoutsideoraimstorejectthe‘evilofthesystem’.Inthesamevein,Sparke(2008)drawsourattentiontothedangerofromanticiz-ingresistance,sinceaccordingtohimtherhetoricofresistanceoftenbecomesahindrancetoathoroughempiricalunderstandingofthenatureandreachoftheagencyofresistance.

‘Whilethebasicideaofresistancerestsonnotionsofpeople“pushingback”,theallureofther-word

itselfcan(…)ironicallybecomearegulative“pull”thatdisciplinescritics:apull,inotherwords,

awayfromexaminingthemessymiddlegroundswherecontrolandopposition,structureandagen-

cy,hegemonyandcounter-hegemonicaction,areallvariouslymediated.Thisproblemofpullcanbe

usefullyascribedtotheromanceofresistance.Itisaromancethatisinitiatedbyassumptionsabout

autonomousactionandanimatedbydiverseformsofidealism;aromancethatultimatelyimagines

agencyintheexistentialandageographicaltermsofsomeseminalandheroicallyuniversalizedhu-

manspirit,andthusaromancethatalsotendstopre-emptempiricalresearchwithmetaphorical

movesthatmakeprescriptionsofsocio-economicforces,racialandsexualsubjectification,oreven

justeverydaylifeseemsomehowbesidethepoint(…)’(Sparke,2008:423,emphasisintheoriginal).

Fromthisperspective,poweranalysis–andthusalsotheanalysisof‘resistance’-shouldthenmoreexplicitlyfocusonthewaysinwhichdifferentiallypositionedgroupscontest,rework,adapt,co-optideas,valuesandassociatedinstitutionalarrangementsimposedthroughdominantstructuresanddiscourses.Indeed,asnotedbyHigginsetal.(2012:384),‘attemptstoneoliberalisenaturearecontingentontheexistingvaluesandpracticesofthosewhoaretheultimatetargetsofgoverning’.Yet,howenvironmentalpolicyinstrumentsthatutiliseneolib-eraltechniquesaretakenup–ornot-bylocalactorsinpracticeismostlyoverlookedincurrentresearch(ibid:377).Thisrequiresaprofoundempiricalanalysisofhowlocalactorsattempttorework,toadjustinordertoincreasetheirresilienceand/ortoconfrontandchallengetheim-posedideasandarrangements(Katz,2005;seealsoBenediktsson,2014andRobertson,2007).Understandingsuchprocessesof reworking,resilienceandresistance isequivalenttounder-standing the emergence of institutional evolution as the outcome of power-laden territorial col-lectiveactionbyinteractinggroupsofactorsinmultipleorganizationsandsocialnetworks.Hereprecisely,alsoliesthewayforwardtounderstandingthe‘negotiated’emergenceofpathwaysofchangewiththepotentialofadjustingenvironmentalgovernancethroughmutualreworking-adjustment-resistance(seesection4.2.forexamplesandfurtherreflectiononthis).


4. engagIng wITh socIal dIversITy and localIzed encounTers: Towards a socIally-Informed and power-sensITIve analysIs of pes

Theformersectionsalreadyunderlinedtheimportanceofunderstandingthepoli-ticsofknowledgeinassessingsocial-ecologicalchangesandtheunfoldingofPESschemesinparticular.Theyalsoemphasizedthatanabstract,structuralistinterpretationofpowertendstodownplaythescopeofagencyofordinarypeopleonwhichPESis‘imposed’fromtheoutside.Thesediscussionsclearlyrelatetobroaderstructure/agencydebates(e.g.Giddens,1984;Long,1992),andareinlinewithevolutionsinthefieldofpoliticalecology.Indeed,thelattergenerallyhasevolvedfromaNeo-Marxistinspiredstructuralanalysisexplainingenvironmentalconflictsmainlyintermsofclassrelationsandglobalcapitalistsystems,towardsstudies‘whichsoughttodemonstrateamorecomplexunderstandingofhowpowerrelationsmediatehuman-envi-ronmentalinteraction(…)’(Bryant,1998:81-82;seealsoBlaikieandBrookfield,1987).Thisana-lyticalshift,however,doesnotmeanthatinteractionsatthelocallevelcanonlybeexplainedthroughtheanalysesof local-levelphenomena.It is importanttoacknowledgethatall localinteractionsareco-producedwithinthecontextofwidersocialandpoliticaldynamics(AgrawalandGibson,1999),athoughtwhichisalsocapturedthroughthetermof ‘progressivecontex-tualization’(Vayda,1983).Movingbeyonddualistunderstandingsofagencyandstructure,webelieveinsightsfrom‘criticalinstitutionalist’scholarshiponnaturalresourcemanagement(e.g.Cleaver,2012;Halletal.,2014)canpartlyrecastandfurtheradvancethePESresearchagenda.Theycanhelpus recognizeandconceptualizethe (albeitpossibly limited)agencyor ‘marginofmanoeuver’oflocalactorsinthecontextofPESprogrammes,andthusthemultiplewaysinwhich interventionsare locallyadapted,re-crafted,andembeddedineverydaypractices.Butbeforeweturntotheseusefulinsights,itisworthtobrieflydiscussthewayinwhichthebulkofcurrentPESliteratureengageswiththe‘social’,andthe‘local’inthecontextoftheseencoun-ters.

4.1. Capturing power and institutional change through ‘social capital’?Asmentionedearlier,thefocusonlocalencountersandtherecognitionofsocial

andinstitutionalfactorsintheshapingandanalysisofPEShasbeenakeyconcernforecologicaleconomists.ThisisalsoreflectedinrecentPESliterature,whichdedicatesincreasingattentionto thecritical roleof ‘social capital’ and the ‘empowermentof local institutions’ for thesuc-cessful implementationandoutcomesofPES interventions (e.g.AdhikariandAgrawal,2013;Clementsetal.,2010).Indeed,therecognitionthateconomicincentivesarenottheonlymoti-vationalfactorssteering‘pro-environmentalbehaviour’(e.g.Muradianetal.,2010;VanHeckenandBastiaensen,2010b),andthatlevelsoftrustandcommunityorganizationinfluencepartici-pationinandoutcomesofPES,hasledtoanincreasinginterestin‘socialcapital’asakeyvari-ableinPESstudies(e.g.BosselmannandLund,2013;Bremeretal.,2014;Gongetal.,2010;Phametal.,2010;Schomersetal.,2015;Zanellaetal.,2014).

However, inmostof these studies social capital isonly vaguelydefined;usuallyintermsofthestrengthordensityof‘socialnetworks’and‘communityorganizations’,andtheroleof‘trust’and‘institutionalizedaccesstoinformation’forimprovingparticipationandequalaccesstoPESschemes(e.g.Bremeretal.,2014).Largelyinlinewiththeconceptsusedbynewinstitutional economics, and the ensuing collective action school (e.g. Ostrom, 1990), socialrelationshipsarethenconceptualizedasassetsinwhichindividualsrationallyinvestinantici-patingreciprocityandeconomicbenefits(Cleaver,2002;2005;2012);socialcapitalisperceivedassomethingthatcanbe‘built’or‘substituted’forothermissingassetsinlocalcommunities.


Cleaver(2002)summarizesthisviewasfollows:

‘Weakinstitutionscanbetransformedintostrongonesbyresourceusersandpolicy-makersthrough

anactiveprocessofinstitutionaldesignandcrafting(Ostrom,1990:60).Ostromseescraftingasa

continuousevolutionaryprocessofdevelopingtheoptimalinstitutionforthejobinhand.Culture

andsocialstructurethenbecomesanotherrawmaterial,partoftheinstitutionalresourcebankfrom

whicharrangements(especiallydistributionalnormsandrelationsoftrust)canbedrawnwhich

reducethe“socialoverheadcosts”ofco-operation.Increasinglysuchresourcesarereferredtoas

“socialcapital”butasOstromherselfadmitsthereisgenerallyalackofunderstandingabouthowto

“create,maintainandusesocialcapital”(Ostrom,1992:23).(Cleaver,2002:14).

The notion of social capital is closely related to other common-made assump-tionsaboutthe‘local’inenvironmentalgovernanceliterature.Theconceptof‘community’and‘community-basedgovernance’conveyedbymuchoftheworkonPES(andhuman-naturestud-iesmorebroadly)buildsona legacy thatportrays localpopulationsas relativelyhomogene-ous,static,andholisticentitieswithsharednorms16(AgrawalandGibson,1999;Brosiusetal.,2005;Leachetal.,1999;MilneandAdams,2012;Mosse,1997;Mosse,2006).Itfollowsthaten-vironmentalgovernancethenseemstobemainlyamatteroflocalinvestmentsinsocialcapitalthrough ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ (Mosse, 2006;Cleaver, 2002) enabling thealign-mentof‘incentivesforcollectiveaction’atthecommunitylevel(Muradian,2013).

Whileweapplaudeconomists’attemptsto ‘unshackletheeconomytosomeex-tent’(OlivierdeSardan,2013),and‘makingleapstowardsamoresociologicalunderstandingofinstitutions’(Halletal.,2014:80),weconcurwithmanyanthropologiststhattheconceptofsocialcapitalandthe(implicit)assumptionsrelatedtothe‘mythofcommunity’(Brockington,2004)andthe‘empowermentoflocalinstitutions’leadstoablack-boxingofsocialandculturalfactors,precludingadeeperunderstandingofthemultiplicity,themobility,andtheambiguityofculturalandsocialdynamics (HibouandBanégas,2000:40).In fact, theseconceptualiza-tionstoalargeextentmaskthepoliticalrelationsorinternaldifferencesandprocessesensuingfromthemultipleinterestsandactorswithincommunities(AgrawalandGibson,1999:630;seealsoCleaver,2002;2005;MilneandAdams,2012;Mosse,1997),andneglect‘theverydifferentmeaningsthatdifferentinstitutionsmaycarryfordifferentactors’(Leachetal.,1999:238).Itisimportant to acknowledge that most communities are indeed heterogeneous groups made up of‘complexmosaicsofculturalgroupsandsocialclasses’withvariousandsometimesopposedinterestsandstrategiesregardingresources(Halletal.,2014;Leachetal.,1999;Li,1996:508).Social capital is thus:

‘(…)notautomaticallycreatedfromassociation,trustdoes notmagicallyemergefromrepeatedin-

teraction,andrepresentationofthepoorestisdifficulttosecureeventhroughdecentralizedinstitu-

tionalstructures.’(Cleaver,2005:904,emphasisintheoriginal)

Indeed,ashasbeenemphasised increasinglybypoliticalandsocialanthropolo-gists:

‘Theactualmechanismsforcoordinatingactionstodelivercollectiveorpublicgoodsare,inreality,

verydifferentfromtheverygeneralandrelativelysimplisticmodelsproposedbynew-institutional

[16] AsnotedbyLeachetal.(1999:228):‘Sometimessocialdifferencewithincommunitiesisacknowledged,andex-pliciteffortsaremade,usingparticipatoryruralappraisalmethods,forexample,tospecifytheimplicationsforprojectinterventions.Butalltoooftenitisimpliedthatthepublicairingofconflictissufficient,andthatsocialconsensusandsolidaritywillnecessarilyresult.’


economists.Empiricalandcontextualisedanalysisofdeliveryarrangementsandcoordination

mechanismsshouldprecedeabstracttheorizingratherthantheotherwayround.Littleprogress,

however,hasbeenmadeinthisdirectionbyeconomists’.(OlivierdeSardan,2013:288).

Inorder to capture the socialdiversitywithin communities,andaccount for thecomplexitiesofhowactualcommunitieswork,we ratherneed toground institutionalanaly-sis inatheoryofpowerandexplore institutionalchangeinapoliticalandhistoricalperspec-tive(Blaikie,2006;Cleaver,2002;Cleaver,2012;Halletal.,2014;Leachetal.,1999;Mosse,1997;OlivierdeSardan,2013).

4.2. Understanding PES through an ‘institutional bricolage’ lensAsarguedbefore, an inquiry into thedifferentways that PES arrangements are

shapedinpracticeandthemultiplesocial-environmentaloutcomestheygenerate,requiresanapproachthatissufficientlysensitivetolocalparticularitiesandthesocialinteractionsamongindividuals(Cleaver,2012;Horowitz,2008).Insteadofconceptualisingsocialrelationsascon-textorinstrumentalassets,weshouldthereforeacknowledgethedynamicinterplaybetweenagencyandstructure,inwhich‘emergentpoliticalprocessesreflectboththeagencyofcurrentactorsandtheinfluenceofhistoricallyembeddedstructures,practicesandlegacies’(Leachetal., 2010: 73).This requiresa critical reflectionon the central roleand functioningof institu-tions,whichcanbeconceptualizedasthe‘arrangementsbetweenpeoplewhicharereproducedandregularizedacrosstimeandspaceandwhicharesubjecttoconstantprocessesofevolutionandchange’(Cleaver,2012:8).Inthisregard,wethinkinsightsfrom‘criticalinstitutionalism’inhuman-environmentscholarshipareparticularlyuseful.

Critical institutionalism –while not wholly antagonistic to mainstream thinkingoninstitutionalism-questionssomeofthekeyassumptionsunderlyingmainstream‘commonproperty’or ‘collectiveaction’ institutionalscholarship (e.g.Ostrom,1990).The lattermainlyfocusesonthegenerationofapredictivetheoryofcollectiveactionforsustainablegovernanceofSES,islargelyrootedin(bounded)rationalchoiceassumptionsabouthumanbehaviour,andassumesthatinstitutionsarefunctionalconstructsinthattheycanbepurposefullycraftedinordertoachievesustainableresourcemanagement(Halletal.,2014).Criticalinstitutionalistsinsteadacknowledgethe‘messiness’anddynamiccharacteristicsintheshapingofinstitutions(Cleaver,2012;Leachetal.,1999)andemphasisehowprocessesofinstitutionalevolution‘(…)aremoreadhoc,approximateandshapedbysociallifeandculturethanisimpliedbyconceptsofdesignandcrafting’ (Cleaver, 2002: 15).Strikingabalancebetweenagencyandstructuralconstraint(e.g.Long,2001;Giddens,1984),theyreconceptualiseindividualsas‘consciousandunconscioussocialagents,deeplyembeddedintheirculturalmilieubutnonethelesscapableofanalysingandactinguponthecircumstancesthatconfrontthem’(Cleaver,2002:16).Thisalsoimpliestheadoptionofa‘thicker’ormore‘contextualized’modelofagencyandmotivations,inwhich

‘(…)strategiclivelihoodchoices(abouttheuseofresources)arecriticallyinfluencedbysocialcon-

cerns(suchastheneedtoliveinpeacewithneighbours),bypsychologicalpreferences(forexample

forcooperationoverconfrontation)andbyculturallyandhistoricallyshapedideasaboutthe“right

wayofdoingthings”’(Cleaver,2012:15).

Fromthisperspective,institutionalemergenceandevolutionisthusnotsomuch‘theprocessofconsciousselectionofmechanismsfitforthecollectiveactiontask(…)butratheramessierprocessofpiecingtogethershapedbyindividualsactingwithintheboundsofcircum-


stantialconstraint’(Cleaver,2002:17).ThisideaisaptlycapturedbyCleaver’sconceptof‘insti-tutionalbricolage’,whichsheunderstandsas:

‘(…)aprocessinwhichpeopleconsciouslyandnon-consciouslydrawonexistingformulae(stylesof

thinking,modelsofcauseandeffect,socialnormsandsanctionedsocialrolesandrelationships)to

patch or piece together institutions in response to changing situations. These institutions are nei-

thercompletelynewnorcompletelytraditionalbutratheradynamichybridcombiningelementsof

“modern”,“traditional”andthe“formal”and“informal”.Theinstitutionsproducedthroughbrico-

lageareinevitablyuneveninfunctioningandimpact,andareoftenfuzzyassemblagesofmeaningful

practices,whichoverlapandservemultiplepurposes.’(Cleaver,2012:45).

Thisalsoexplainsecologicalanthropologists’findingsthatinstitutionsresponsibleformanaginghuman-environmentrelationshavehistoricallynotnecessarilyevolved infunc-tionalorpurposefulways17(Leachetal.1999,Cleaver2002,Fabinyietal.2014).Norwillinstitu-tionalarrangementsintendedforenvironmentalmanagementonlyservethesepurposes–eveniftheywereconsciouslyandpurposefullycraftedtotheseends(e.g.Vedeld2000,Cleaver2002,Neves-Graça2004); theyalsohaveother functionsandcapacitieswithin their social context(Halletal.,2014:81,Cleaver2000,2002),whileothergenericorpurposefulinstitutionswillalsoaffectenvironmentalgovernanceissueswithoutexplicitlyhavingthismandate.Asinstitutionsarenot‘things’buttheresultsofwhatpeopledo-theyareanimatedand(re)shapedthroughthepractices,normsandrelationshipsofeverydaylife-(Cleaver2012), it followsthat ‘thedi-rectionsinwhichinstitutionaloutcomesinlocalspaceswillunfoldcannotbeplottedprecisely,theycanonlyberoughlyassessed’(AgrawalandGibson1999:640).Institutions,therefore,arenotamenabletodesign,andtheiroutcomesarehighlyunpredictable.Assuch,the‘bricolage’lenscanhelpusexplainhowPESinterventionsthathavebeendesignedtoenhanceefficientenvironmentalresourcemanagement,canturnoutverydifferentlyontheground,andare–infact-inthecontinuousprocessof‘becoming’;thearrangementsunderlyingtheinterventionare(consciouslyandnon-consciously)deconstructedandpatchedbacktogetherinwaysthatmakethemcognitivelyandpolitically‘fit’withpeople’sworldviewsanddiverseobjectives(Hart2006,Cleaver2012).

Fromthisperspective,wecan(re)interpretrecentstudiesthatreporthowPESin-terventionshavebeenstrategicallyadapted-throughencounterswithgroundedsocialrealitiesatdifferentscalesandinvolvingvariousactors-astoachievemultiplesocialgoals.Vatn(2010),forexample,highlightshow‘peopleholdinglandincommonhaveinvolvedthemselvesinPESprojectsasawayalsotostrengthentheirrightstotheland’(ibid:1247;seealsoBremeretal.,2014andLawloretal.,2013).Similarly,Osborne(2011)explainshowparticipationofsmallfarm-ers incarbonPESprojects inMexicohasbeenmainlydrivenby farmers’needtosecure landtenure‘inthewakeofneoliberalagrarianpoliciesthatthreatentodisplacethem’(ibid:860).Shapiro-Garza (2013a)andMcAfeeandShapiro (2010)demonstratehowtheoriginalconcep-tualizationof‘market-efficientenvironmentalpolicy’intheMexicannationalPESprogramhasbeencontestedandreworkedatdifferentscales(fromfederalpoliticstotheeverydaygroundedpracticesofruralparticipants)as‘tomorecloselyfitnationalinterests,ruralrealitiesandalter-nativeconceptionsofthe“value”ofsocionature’(Shapiro-Garza,2013a:6).TheyexplainhowthePESprogrammeasconceivedby itspromulgators ‘hasbeenhybridized throughmultiplesitesofarticulationandcontestationtobecomeafederalsubsidyforruralpovertyalleviation’[17] This critique is also captured through the term ‘ecological reductionism’ (Sahlins, 1978),which implies theassumption that the social organizationand cultureof ‘communities’ aremainlydeterminedby theenvironment(Fabinyietal.,2014:4).


(ibid:5).Theproject’sframingofnature’sservicesascommoditieshasbeenhardlyadoptedbylocalactors;people’s ‘epistemologicalplacementof“nature”and itsvaluehasbeenlittleal-tered’throughthePESprogram’(ibid: 11).Inthesamevein,McElwee(2012)andMcElweeetal.(2014)showhowPESpoliciesinVietnamhavebeenreshapedbyruralactorstomakethembetterreflect localnotionsofequityandjustice,whicharetheproductofdeep-rootedplace-specificsocialandculturalnorms(seealsoHeandSikor,2015;Martinetal.,2014;McDermottetal.,2013).Localnormsunderlining‘equalbenefitsharing’or‘effort-basedcompensations’thenoftenmaychallengeandultimatelyreplacecommonly-usedoutput-basedPESrules(McElwee,2012).Inshort,theseexamplesclearlyshowhowPESinstitutionsareadaptedandusedformul-tiplepurposes,howpeoplegivealternativemeaningstothem,andtheyhighlighttheinfluenceof local actors in these transformations.

At the same time,however,we shouldbewareof over-romanticizing thepoten-tialbeneficialoutcomesoftheselocalnegotiationandadaptionprocesses,astheydonotmi-raculouslyleadtodecreasedinequalityandinclusionofmorevulnerableactorsatthelocalorcommunitylevel(Cleaver,2005;MilneandAdams,2012).Indeed,manyinstitutionsemergeorchangeinwaysthatmaintainparticularpowerbalancesratherthantomanageorconservere-sources(Fabinyietal.,2014:2;Leachetal.,1999;Cleaver,2012).Institutionsasembodimentsof‘the“rightways”ofsocializing,associating,andparticipatinginpublicaregenerallythosethatconfirmdominantworldviews,whichreinforceexistingrelationsofauthorityandwhichchan-nelroutinizedandhabitualeverydayactionstoreproducesuchsocialstructures’(Cleaver,2005:895).Rodríguez-de-Franciscoetal.(2013),Boelensetal.(2014)andRodriguez-de-FranciscoandBudds(2015),forexample,showhowcommunity-basedPESschemesinEcuadorandColombiahavereinforcedexistingsocialdifferencesamongactorswithinthecommunity,stemmingfrompre-existingunequaldistributionoflandandpowerbetweenfarmercommunitymembers(seealsoHendricksonandCorbera,2015andMilneandAdams,2012). In thisway, ‘PEShave thepotentialtoproduceaparticularsetofsocialrelationsthatenablethecontinuityofaccumu-lation processes in the era of conservation, leading to contradictory andunequal outcomes’(Rodriguez-de-FranciscoandBudds,2015:301).Alternatively,PESmayjustbe‘anewnameforanapproachthatisnotsubstantiallydifferentfrompastones’(McElwee,2012:419).Asanyin-stitutionalarrangementwill inevitablybepartofbroaderhistoricalspace-timedynamics,ex-aminationofPESaspoliticizedphenomenashouldthenmovebeyondafocusonthediscursivestrugglesbetweenglobal‘governors’andlocal‘targetsofgoverning’(Higginsetal.,2012:379),toincludingthepoliticalwaystheseschemesareconstructedandnegotiated‘fromwithinthecommunitiesthemselves’(Rodriguez-de-Franciscoetal.,2013:1230;seealsoMilneandAdams,2012).ItisalsoclearthatdifferentstakeholdersmightfullyorpartiallyadoptelementsofthePESproposals inducedfromtheoutside,andintroducethemwithvariousdegreesofsuccesstolocalinstitutionalarenassothatsomeoftheseelementsbecomepartandparcelofahybrid‘glocalized’institutionalevolution.ProcessesofbricolagemaythusalsoimplythatnewwaysofdoingthingsintroducedthroughaPESprojectbecomeinstitutionalised,evenwhendisguisedinorblendedwiththelanguage/appearanceoftraditionoracceptedarrangements18.

Understandingtheevolutionof institutionsandtheiroutcomesthenrequiresanin-depth focusonhowpeople attachmeaningandpurpose to everydaypractices and socialrelationshipsandadeeperunderstandingofthewaysinwhichtheseprocessesaremediatedthroughbothpublicauthoritativeandeveryday ‘invisible’dynamicsofpower (Cleaver,2002;2012;Halletal.,2014;Ribot,2001;Ribotetal.,2008).Thismeanswealsoneedtoengagewith

[18] Wearegratefultooneoftheanonymousreviewersforthisremark.


intra-community dynamics from an actor-oriented (Long, 2001) and ‘micro-political ecology’perspective(Horowitz,2008)allowingus‘tohoneinonlocalparticularitiesandtheimportanceof interactions among individuals in influencing environmental [and social] outcomes’ (ibid:260;seealsoLeachetal., 1999).Deeperknowledgeontheway inwhichPESare framedandalignedwithspecificinterests,beliefsandobjectivesbyparticularsocialgroups,requiresafocuson how divergent interests and constructed narratives around conservation and development create‘hybridregimesoftruth’(Higginsetal.,2012:379),whichinturnshapethedesign,imple-mentationandoutcomesofsuchprojects(Rodriguez-de-Franciscoetal.,2013).Therefore,criti-cal research on the discursive struggles around the attached meanings and distinct conceptual-izationsattributedtotheseparticularinstitutionalarrangements,andthewaysinwhichthesedivergentframeworkscollideandmaterializethrougheverydaypracticesoflocalactors-meritmore support and attention.


5. conclusIons: recasTIng The pes research agenda

Aswehavearguedthroughoutthispaper,understandingtheways inwhichPESislocallyshaped,resisted,reworkedoradjustedessentiallyboilsdowntoanalysingissuesofwhoisabletoframetheproblemsandsettherules,howtheydosoandtowhatend,andwhyit ispossible for themtodoso (Adgeretal., 2001;Blaikie, 1999;Halletal., 2014;Rodriguez-de-Franciscoetal.,2013).Any (purposefully-crafted) intervention is thentobe recognizedasapoliticizedphenomenonthat is intrinsically interwovenwith localandsupra-local relationsofpowerandrelateddiscourses(Blaikie,1999;Fairheadetal.,2012;NygrenandRikoon,2008).RatherthanfocusingonwhetherornotPESarrangementsworkforenvironmentalgovernance,weshouldthenshiftourfocustopoliticalandethicalquestionsof‘how,andtowhatends,alter-nativenaturesmightbeproduced’(Smith,1996:50,ascitedbyBüscheretal.,2012).WethereforeagreewithMcElwee(2012)whoconcludesthat‘whilebothproponentsanddetractorspresentPESasanovelapproachthateitherencompassesthebestorworstofneoliberalism(…),bothcampsfailtorecognizethatinmanywaysPESmaysimplyreplicatealreadyexistingpatternsofinstitutionalizedmanagementoflandandcommodities’(ibid:413).Indeed,‘thesignificanceofthePESpolicymodelliesinthepoliticalandsocialeffectsofitsdesignandimplementation,notinitsfunctioningasamarketperse’(MilneandAdams,2012:136).Anapproachwhichisblindtotheexistinghistoricalcontexts,socialrelations,formsoforganizationandmultipleculturalvalues,isunlikelytochallengetherootcausesofinequalitiesinlandtenureandresourcealloca-tion(McAfeeandShapiro,2010;Rodriguez-de-Franciscoetal.,2013).Thismeansthat

‘(…)achallengeaheadforscholarshipofmarket-basedconservationisdevelopingsolidarguments

which,groundedonrobustdata,provideinsightsonwhethertheecologicalandsocialpitfallsof

marketsforecosystemservicesaredistinctivelydifferentthanthoseofotherapparentlysimilarbut

well-intentionalandnon-speculativeconservationinstruments.Suchargumentsarerequiredtobe

abletoinformbothpublicdebatesandpolicy-makingabouttheethicalimplicationsofvaluing,pay-

ingforandexchangingecosystemservicesatdifferentscales.(Corbera,2015:156)

Confronted with these challenges, we believe future research on PES (and anyotherenvironmentalgovernanceinstrument)couldbenefitfrom(i)conceptualisinganyinstitu-tional arrangement as a local political arena, i.e.anetworkofactorsinteractingaround(partially)commonordivergentstakes;(ii)enlighteninghowsocialrelationslinktothefunctioningofin-stitutions;and(iii)focussingonhowtheseinterventionsareshapedbyandproducesocialandculturalnormswhichresult in institutionalexclusionand inclusion (Bastiaensenetal.,2005;Cleaver,2005;OlivierdeSardan,2013).ThisalsomeansconsideringPES interventionsas in-tercultural confrontationswheremultipleandcontrastingsystemsofnormsandvalues,andculturalandsociallogicsinteractatdifferentlevels(Li,2007;OlivierdeSardan,2001).Weareconvincedthatamoreexplicitfocusontheseissuescanhelpusgeneratenewinsightsinthepowergeographiesunderlyingcertaininstitutional logicsandorganisationalformsinthehu-manterritoryconcerned,whichdefinethedifferentwaysinwhichPESisdesigned,analysedandpracticed/experiencedinthefield.

Aframeworkbasedona‘thickmodel’ofagency,which‘(…)leavesscopefortheagencyof actors, theirmanoeuvring roomand their strategies,whether theyare calculatingandopportunisticornot’(OlivierdeSardan,2013:291),canhelpusbetteracknowledgeandun-derstandtheinfluenceoflocalactors,whooftenhavebeensuccessfulinre-crafting‘imposed’PESprojectstobetterreflectequity,justiceandfairnessvalues,andthusincreatingspacesforcontestationof‘neoliberalprocesses’(Higginsetal.,2012;McElweeetal.,2014;Shapiro-Garza,


2013a).Inthissense,webelievethe‘institutionalbricolage’lenscanserveasavaluableconcep-tualguidingprincipletofuturePESscholarship;ithelpsusredirectingourattentiontothewaysinwhichPESinterventionsarelocallyadaptedthroughtheexerciseofbothvisibleandinvisiblepower,andtohowthisshapingisalwayssociallylocatedand‘shapedintheinterplaybetweendeliberatedesign,everydaypracticesandrelationshipsandsocietalprocesses’(Cleaver,2012:171).

Fromamethodological perspective, these challenges imply a need formulti-di-mensionallong-termempiricalstudiesintothecomplexandplace-basedworkingsofpower(re-latedtomeaningandrepresentation),andintothewaysinwhichideologies,beliefsandnormsshapedecision-making(Osei-Kufuor,2010,ascitedbyCleaver,2012:22).Asarguedthroughoutthispaper,thesekeyissuescanonlybemeaningfullyaddressedifwemanagetomoreactivelyengagecriticalsocialscientistsinsocio-environmentalresearch,andmanagetointegrate‘an-thropological-stylelocalresearchwithpolitical-economicstructuralanalysis’(Bryant,1998:81;seealsoHorowitz,2008;Leachetal.,1999;Li,1996).Thismeansweshouldseriouslychallengetheadoptionofoverlyeconomicsinspired‘ecosystemsystem’frameworksthat‘involvemajorsimplificationsandomissionsthatthenmakethemhighly inadequaterepresentationsof theenvironment-societyrelationshipforanalyticalpurposes’(Lele,2013:134).Weshouldratherfo-cusonhowPESinterventionsarelocallyframedandinterpreted,andworktowardsinterven-tionsthatare‘(…)basedonanunderstandingofthecontent,theunderlyingprinciplesandso-cialeffectsofinstitutions,notmerelyontheirvisibleform’(Cleaver,2012:106).Indeed,asOlivierdeSardanhasrecentlyargued,

‘(…)ifonewishestostepoffthewell-troddenpathofeconomics,itisbettertoarmoneselfwith

othertoolsbesidesthetheoreticalandmethodologicaltoolsofeconomists,otherconcepts,other

modesofintelligibility,andabandon,atleastforawhile,thelanguageofformalvariables,abstract

models,deductivetypologies,one-size-fits-allinterpretiveframeworks’(OlivierdeSardan,2013:

289).

Wetherefore fullyendorse recentcalls formoresystematic interdisciplinarydia-loguewithanthropologists,politicalecologists,andothercriticalsocialandpoliticalscientistsinaddressingtheseissues(seee.g.Barnesetal.,2013;Castreeetal.,2014;Fabinyietal.,2014;Lele,2013;OlivierdeSardan,2013).Thisalsomeansembracingethnographicandotherquali-tative empirical approaches that combine in-depth studies on the cultural values and political relations at the local level (leading to a better understanding of how institutions are shaped throughgroundedpractices),withthepoliticsofdecision-makingatthegloballevel(allowingbetterinsightsintothewayepistemiccommunitiesframeunderstandings,circulateknowledge,andlegitimizeparticularpolicyinterventionsthroughglobalgovernanceinstitutions)(Barnesetal.,2013;BrosiusandCampbell,2010;Higginsetal.,2012;Leachetal.,2010).WebelievetheseinsightscanprovokefurthercriticalreflectiononhowPESinterventionsareintrinsicallyshapedbypoliticalrelations,powerdynamics,socialstatusandculturalvalues(Barnesetal.,2013:542).ThecontributionofPESscholars,practitionersorotherexperts inenvironment-developmentinterventionsshouldthenshiftfroman(illusive)focusonprovidingtotalpredictabilityonthebasisofpre-definedframingsofissuesandsolutions,tosupportingajointlearning,‘sense-mak-ing’andnegotiationprocessamongdifferentactorsandinfeedingthisprocesswithrelevantinformation(e.g.Vinketal.,2013).


references

Adger,W.N.,Benjaminsen,T.A.,Brown,K.andSvarstad,H.(2001)AdvancingaPoliticalEcologyofGlobalEnvironmentalDiscourses,Development and Change32:681-715.

Adhikari,B.andAgrawal,A.(2013)UnderstandingthesocialandecologicaloutcomesofPESprojects:areviewandananalysis,Conservation and Society11:359-374.

Agrawal,A.andGibson,C.C.(1999)EnchantmentandDisenchantment:TheRoleofCommunityinNaturalResourceConservation,World Development27(4),629-649.

Ajayi,O.C.,Jack,B.K.andLeimona,B.(2012)AuctionDesignforthePrivateProvisionofPublicGoodsinDevelopingCountries:LessonsfromPaymentsforEnvironmentalServicesinMalawiandIndonesia,World Development40(6):1213-1223.

Alix-Garcia,J.,DeJanvry,A.andSadoulet,E.(2008)Theroleofdeforestationriskand calibrated compensation in designing paymentsforenvironmentalservices,Environment and Development Economics 13: 375-394.

Antle,J.M.andStoorvogel,J.J.(2008)AgriculturalCarbonSequestration,PovertyandSustainability,Environment and Development Economics13:327-352.

Bakker,K.(2005)Neoliberalizingnature?MarketenvironmentalisminwatersupplyinEnglandandWales,Annals of the Association of American Geographers95(3):542–565.

Bakker,K.(2010)Thelimitsof‘neoliberalnatures’:Debatinggreenneoliberalism,Progress in Human Geography34(6):715-735.

Barnes,J.,Dove,M.,Lahsen,M.,Mathews,A.,McElwee,P.,McIntosh,R.,Moore,F.,O’Reilly,J.,Orlove,B.,Puri,R.,Weiss,H.andYager,K.(2013)Contributionofanthropologytothestudyofclimatechange.Nature Climate Change 3: 541–544.

Bastiaensen,J.,DeHerdt,T.andD’Exelle,

B.(2005)PovertyReductionasaLocalInstitutionalProcess,World Development 33(6):979-993.

Bastiaensen,J.,Merlet,P.,Craps,M.,DeHerdt,T.,Flores,S.,Huybrechs,F.,Mendoza,R.,Steel,G.andVanHecken,G.(2015a)Agencia en territorios humanos rurales: unaperspectivasocio-constructivista,in:Bastiaensen,J.,P.Merlet,andS.Flores(eds.)Rutas de desarrollo en territorios humanos: Las dinámicas de la Via Láctea en Nicaragua,UCAPublicaciones,Managua,pp.21-64.

Bastiaensen,J.,Merlet,P.,Craps,M.,DeHerdt,T.,Flores,S.,Huybrechs,F.,Mendoza,R.,Steel,G.andVanHecken,G.(2015b)Makingsenseofterritorialpathwaystoruraldevelopment: a proposal for a normative andanalyticalframework.DiscussionPaper2015:04.InstituteofDevelopmentPolicyandManagement(IOB),UniversityofAntwerp,Antwerp.

Benediktsson,K.(2014)Natureinthe‘neoliberallaboratory’,Dialogues in Human Geography4(2):141-146.

Berkes,F.andFolke,C.(1998)Linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,UK.

Blackman,A.andWoodward,R.T.(2010)Userfinancinginanationalpaymentsforenvironmental services program: Costa Rican hydropower,Ecological Economics 69: 1626-1638.

Blaikie,P.(1999)AReviewofPoliticalEcology.Issues,EpistemologyandAnalyticalNarratives,Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie 43(3-4):131-147.

Blaikie,P.(2006)IsSmallReallyBeautiful?Community-basedNaturalResourceManagementinMalawiandBotswana,World Development34(11):1942-1957.

Blaikie,P.andBrookfield,H.(1987)Land Degradation and Society,Methuen,London,UK.

Blaikie,P.andMuldavin,J.(2014)


Environmentaljustice?Thestoryoftwoprojects,Geoforum 54: 226-229.

Boelens,R.,Hoogesteger,J.andRodríguezdeFrancisco,J.C.(2014)Commoditizingwater territories: the clash between Andean waterrightsculturesandpaymentforenvironmentalservicespolicies,Capitalism Nature Socialism25(3):84-102.

Bolton,P.andDewatripont,M.(2005)Contract Theory,Cambridge,Massachusetts:MIT Press.

Bosselmann,A.S.andLund,J.F.(2013)DointermediaryinstitutionspromoteinclusivenessinPESprograms?ThecaseofCostaRica,Geoforum 49: 50-60.

Bowles,S.(2008)Policiesdesignedforself-interestedcitizensmayundermine‘themoralsentiments’:evidencefromeconomicexperiments,Science 320: 1605-1609.

Bremer,L.L.,Farley,K.A.andLópez-Carr,D.(2014)Whatfactorsinfluenceparticipationinpaymentforecosystemservicesprograms?AnevaluationofEcuador’sSocioParamoprogram,Land Use Policy 36: 122-133.

Brenner,N.andTheodore,N.(2002)Citiesandthegeographiesof‘actuallyexistingneoliberalism’,Antipode34(3):349–379.

Brockington,D.(2004)Communityconservation,inequalityandjustice:Mythsofpowerinprotectedareamanagement,Conservation and Society2(2):411.

Brockington,D.andDuffy,R.(2010)Capitalism and conservation. The production andreproductionofbiodiversityconservation,Antipode42(3):469–484.

Brockington,D.,Duffy,D.andIgoe,J.(2008)Nature Unbound. Conservation, Capitalism and the Future of Protected Areas,Earthscan,London,UK.

Bromley,D.W.(2012)EnvironmentalGovernanceasStochasticBeliefUpdating:CraftingRulestoLiveby,Ecology and Society 17(3):14.

Brosius,J.P.andCampbell,L.M.(2010)

CollaborativeEventEthnography:Conservation and development trade-offs atthefourthworldconservationcongress,Conservation and Society8(4):245-255.

Brosius,J.P.,Tsing,A.andZerner,C.(2005)Communities and conservation: Histories and politics of community-based natural resource management,AltamiraPress,WalnutCreek,CA.

Bryant,R.L.(1998)Power,knowledgeandpoliticalecologyinthethirdworld:areview,Progress in Physical Geography22(1):79-94.

Bulte,E.H.,Lipper,L.,Stringer,R.andZilberman,D.(2008)Paymentsforecosystemservicesandpovertyreduction:concepts,issuesandempiricalperspectives,Environment and Development Economics 13: 245-254.

Büscher,B.(2008)Conservation,Neoliberalism,andSocialScience:aCriticalReflectionontheSCB2007AnnualMeetinginSouthAfrica,Conservation Biology22(2):229-231.

Büscher,B.(2010)DerivativeNature:interrogating the value of conservation in ‘BoundlessSouthernAfrica’,Third World Quarterly31(2):259-276.

Büscher,B.(2012)Paymentsforecosystemservices as neoliberal conservation: (Reinterpreting)evidencefromtheMaloti-Drakensberg,SouthAfrica,Conservation and Society10(1):29-41.

Büscher,B.(2014)SellingSuccess:ConstructingValueinConservationandDevelopment,World Development57:79-90.

Büscher,B.,Sullivan,S.,Neves,K.,Igoe,J.andBrockington,D.(2012)Towardsasynthesizedcritiqueofneoliberalbiodiversityconservation,Capitalism Nature Socialism23(2):4-30.

Caparrós,A.,Cerdá,E.,Ovando,P.andCampos,P.(2010)CarbonSequestrationwithReforestationsandBiodiversity-scenicValues,Environmental and Resource Economics 45:49-72.


Castree,N.(2003)Commodifyingwhatnature?,Progress in Human Geography27(3):273–297.

Castree,N.(2006)Fromneoliberalismtoneoliberalization:Consolations,confusions,andnecessaryillusions,Environment and Planning A38(1):1-6.

Castree,N.(2007)NeoliberalEnvironments:AFrameworkforAnalysis.ManchesterPapersinPoliticalEconomy,Centre for the Study of Political Economy Working Paper No. 04/07,UniversityofManchester,UK.

Castree,N.(2008)Neoliberalisingnature:thelogicsofderegulationandreregulation,Environment and Planning A 40: 141–152.

Castree,N.Adams,W.M.,Barry,J.,Brockington,D.,Büscher,B.,Corbera,E.,Demeritt,D.,Duffy,R.,Felt,U.,Neves,K.,Newell,P.,Pellizzoni,L.,Rigby,K.,Robbins,P.,Robin,L.,Rose,D.B.,Ross,A.,Schlosberg,D.,Sörlin,S.,West,P.,Whitehead,M.andWynne,B.(2014)Challengingtheintellectualclimate,Nature Climate Change4(9):763-768.

Chisholm,R.A.(2010)Trade-offsbetweenecosystemservices:Waterandcarboninabiodiversityhotspot,Ecological Economics 69: 1973-1987.

Cleaver,F.(2002)ReinventingInstitutionsandtheSocialEmbeddednessofNaturalResourceManagement,European Journal of Development Research14(2):11-30.

Cleaver,F.(2005)TheInequalityofSocialCapital and the Reproduction of Chronic Poverty.World Development33(6):893-906.

Cleaver,F.(2012)Development through bricolage: rethinking institutions for natural resource management,Routledge,Abingdon,Oxon.

Clements,T.(2010)ReducedExpectations:the political and institutional challenges of REDD+,Oryx44(3):309-310.

Clements,T.,John,A.,Nielsen,K.,Dara,A.,Setha,T.andMilner-Gulland,E.J.(2010)Paymentsforbiodiversityconservationinthe

contextofweakinstitutions:ComparisonofthreeprogramsfromCambodia,Ecological Economics69(6):1283–1291.

Coase,R.H.(1960)Theproblemofsocialcost,Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44.

Corbera,E.(2012)ProblematizingREDD+asanexperimentinpaymentsforecosystemservices,Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability4:1877-3435.

Corbera,E.(2015)Valuingnature,payingforecosystemservicesandrealizingsocialjustice:AresponsetoMatulis(2014),Ecological Economics110:154-157.

Corbera,E.andBrown,K.(2008)BuildingInstitutionstoTradeEcosystemServices:MarketingForestCarboninMexico,World Development36(10):1956-1979.

Corbera,E.,Brown,K.andAdger,W.N.(2007a)Theequityandlegitimacyofmarketsforecosystemservices,Development and Change38(4):587-613.

Corbera,E.,Kosoy,N.andMartínezTuna,M.(2007b)Equityimplicationsofmarketingecosystemservicesinprotectedareasandrural communities: Case studies from Meso-America,Global Environmental Change17(3-4):365-380.

Corbera,E.,GonzálezSoberanis,C.andBrown,K.(2009)Institutionaldimensionsofpaymentsforecosystemservices.AnanalysisofMexico’scarbonforestryprogramme,Ecological Economics68:743–761.

Costanza,R.andDaly,H.E.(1992)NaturalCapitalandSustainableDevelopment,Conservation Biology6:37-46.

Cote,M.andNightingale,A.J.(2012)Resiliencethinkingmeetssocialtheory:situating social change in socio-ecological systems(SES)research,Progress in Human Geography36(4):475–489.

Cranford,M.andMourato,S.(2014)Credit-BasedPaymentsforEcosystemServices:EvidencefromaChoiceExperimentinEcuador,World Development 64: 503-520.


Daily,G.C.(1997)Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems,IslandPress,Washington,D.C.

Daily,G.C.,Polasky,S.,Goldstein,J.,Kareiva,P.M.,Mooney,H.A.,Pejchar,L.,Ricketts,T.H.,Salzman,J.andShallenberger,R.(2009)Ecosystemservicesindecisionmaking:timetodeliver,Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment7(1):21-28.

Dale,G.(2010)Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market,PolityPress,Cambridge.

DeAngelis,M.(2007)The Beginning of History. Value Struggles and Global Capital,PlutoPress,London,AnnArbor,MI.

Dietz,T.,Ostrom,E.andStern,P.C.(2003)TheStruggletoGoverntheCommons,Science 302,1907-1912.

Engel,S.andPalmer,C.(2008)Paymentsforenvironmental services as an alternative to loggingunderweakpropertyrights:thecaseofIndonesia,Ecological Economics65:799-809.

Engel,S.,Pagiola,S.andWunder,S.(2008)Designingpaymentsforenvironmentalservicesintheoryandpractice:anoverviewoftheissues,Ecological Economics65:663–675.

Ernstson,H.andSörlin,S.(2013)Ecosystemservicesastechnologyofglobalization:Onarticulatingvaluesinurbannature,Ecological Economics86:274-284.

Ervine,K.(2010)Participationdenied:theGlobalEnvironmentFacility,itsuniversalblueprint,andtheMexico-MesoamericanbiologicalcorridorinChiapas,Third World Quarterly 31(5):773-790.

Escobar,A.(1996)Constructingnature:elements for a poststructural political ecology,in:Peet,R.andM.Watts(eds)Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements,Routledge,London,pp.46–68.

Fabinyi,M.,Evans,L.andFoale,S.J.(2014)Social-ecologicalsystems,socialdiversity,andpower:insightsfromanthropologyandpoliticalecology,Ecology and Society19(4):28.

Fairhead,J.,Leach,M.andScoones,I.(2012)Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature?The Journal of Peasant Studies39(2):237-261.

Farley,J.andCostanza,R.(2010)Paymentsforecosystemservices:fromlocaltoglobal.Ecological Economics 69: 2060-2068.

Farrell,K.(2014)Intellectualmercantilismandfranchiseequity:Acriticalstudyoftheecologicalpoliticaleconomyofinternationalpaymentsforecosystemservices,Ecological Economics102:137-146.

Ferraro,P.J.(2001)GlobalHabitatProtection:LimitationsofDevelopmentInterventionsand a Role for Conservation Performance Payments,Conservation Biology15(4):1-12.

Ferraro,P.J.(2008)Asymmetricinformationandcontractdesignforpaymentsforenvironmentalservices,Ecological Economics 65(4):810-821.

Ferraro,P.J.andKiss,A.(2002)Directpaymentsforbiodiversityconservation,Science298:1718-1719.

Ferraro,P.J.andSimpson,R.D.(2002)Thecost-effectivenessofconservationpayments,Land Economics 78(3):339-353.

Fisher,J.A.andBrown,K.(2014)Ecosystemservices concepts and approaches in conservation:Justarhetoricaltool?Ecological Economics108:257-265.

Fletcher,R.andBreitling,J.(2012)Marketmechanismorsubsidyindisguise?GoverningpaymentforenvironmentalservicesinCostaRica,Geoforum43(3):402-411.

Flyvbjerg,B.(2001)Making social science matter: why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,UK.

Folke,C.,Hahn,T.,Olsson,P.andNorberg,J.(2005)Adaptivegovernanceofsocial-ecologicalsystems,Annual Review of Environment and Resources3:441–473.

Foucault,M.(1972)Archaeology of knowledge,Tavistock,London,UK.


Foucault,M.(1980)Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977,Vintage,London,UK.

Gendron,C.(2014)Beyondenvironmentaland ecological economics: Proposal for an economicsociologyoftheenvironment,Ecological Economics 105: 240-253.

German,L.,Villamor,G.,Twine,E.,Velarde,S.J.andKidane,B.(2009)EnvironmentalServicesandthePrecautionaryPrinciple:UsingScenariostoReconcileConservationandLivelihoodObjectivesinUpperCatchments,Journal of Sustainable Forestry 28: 368-394.

Giddens,A.(1984)The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration,PolityPress,Cambridge.

Gómez-Baggethun,E.,deGroot,R.,Lomas,P.L.andMontes,C.(2010)Thehistoryofecosystemservicesineconomictheoryandpractice:fromearlynotionstomarketsandpaymentschemes,Ecological Economics69(6):1209-1218.

Gong,Y.,Bull,G.andBaylis,K.(2010)Participationintheworld’sfirstcleandevelopmentmechanismforestproject:theroleofpropertyrights,socialcapitalandcontractual rules. Ecological Economics 69: 1292–1302.

Hajer,M.A.(1995)The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process,ClarendonPress,Oxford.

Hall,R.andLovera,S.(2009)REDD Realities: How strategies to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation could impact on biodiversity and Indigenous Peoples in developing countries,GlobalForestCoalition,Asunción,Paraguay.

Hall,K.,Cleaver,F.,Franks,T.andMaganga,F.(2014)CapturingCriticalInstitutionalism:ASynthesisofKeyThemesandDebates,European Journal of Development Research26(1):71-86.

Hart,G.(2006)Denaturalizingdispossession:criticalethnographyintheageofresurgent

imperialism,Antipode 38:975–1001.

Hayes,T.,Murtinho,F.,CárdenasCamacho,L.M.,Crespo,P.,McHugh,S.andSalmerón,D.(2015)CanConservationContractsCo-existwithChange?PaymentforEcosystemServicesintheContextofAdaptiveDecision-MakingandSustainability,Environmental Management55(1):69-85.

He,J.andSikor,T.(2015)Notionsofjusticeinpaymentsforecosystemservices:InsightsfromChina’sSlopingLandConversionPrograminYunnanProvince,Land Use Policy 43:207–216.

Hejnowicz,A.P.,Raffaelli,D.G.,Rudd,M.A.andWhite,P.C.L.(2014)Evaluatingtheoutcomesofpaymentsforecosystemservicesprogrammesusingacapitalassetframework,Ecosystem Services9:83–97.

Hendrickson,C.Y.andCorbera,E.(2015)ParticipationdynamicsandinstitutionalchangeintheScolelTécarbonforestryproject,Chiapas,Mexico,Geoforum59:63-72.

Heyman,J.andAriely,D.(2004)Effortforpayment:ataleoftwomarkets,Psychological Science15(11):787-793.

HibouB.andBanegas,R.(2000)CivilsocietyandthepublicspaceinAfrica,Codesria Bulletin 1: 39–45.

Hiedanpää,J.andBromley,D.W.(2014)Paymentsforecosystemservices:durablehabits,dubiousnudges,anddoubtfulefficacy,Journal of Institutional Economics10(2):175–195.

Higgins,V.,Dibden,J.andCocklin,C.(2008)Neoliberalismandnaturalresourcemanagement: agri-environmental standards andthegoverningoffarmingpractices,Geoforum39:1776–1785.

Higgins,V.,Dibden,J.andCocklin,C.(2012)Market instruments and the neoliberalization oflandmanagementinruralAustralia,Geoforum43:377-386.

Hirsch,P.D.,Adams,W.M.,Brosius,J.P.,Zia,A.,Bariola,N.andDammert,J.L.(2010)


Acknowledging conservation trade-offs and embracingcomplexity,Conservation Biology 25: 259–264.

Horan,R.D.,Shogren,J.F.andGramig,B.M.(2008)Wildlifeconservationpaymentstoaddress habitat fragmentation and disease risks,Environment and Development Economics 13: 415-439.

Horowitz,L.S.(2008)“It’suptotheclantoprotect”:CulturalheritageandthemicropoliticalecologyofconservationinNewCaledonia,The Social Science Journal 45: 258-278.

Hukkinen,J.I.(2014)Modelofthesocial-ecologicalsystemdependsonmodelofthemind: Contrasting information-processing andembodiedviewsofcognition,Ecological Economics 99: 100-109.

Ioris,A.A.R.(2014)Theparadoxofpovertyinrichecosystems:impoverishmentanddevelopment in the Amazon of Brazil and Bolivia,The Geographical Journal,doi:10.1111/geoj.12124.

Jasanoff,S.(ed.)(2004)States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and the Social Order,Routledge,NewYork.

Kareiva,P.,Watts,S.,McDonald,R.andBoucher,T.(2007)DomesticatedNature:ShapingLandscapesandEcosystemsforHumanWelfare,Science 316: 1866-1869.

Karsenty,A.(2007)Questioningrentfordevelopment swaps: new market-based instrumentsforbiodiversityacquisitionandthe land-use issue in tropical countries. International Forestry Review9(1):503-513.

Katz,C.(1998)Whosenature,whoseculture?,in:Braun,B.andCastree,N.(eds.)Remaking reality,Routledge,London,pp.46–63.

Katz,C.(2005)Partnersincrime?Neoliberalism and the production of new politicalsubjectivities,Antipode 37:623–31.

Kolinjivadi,V.,Adamowski,J.andKosoy,N.(2014)Recastingpaymentsforecosystemservices(PES)inwaterresourcemanagement:

Anovelinstitutionalapproach,Ecosystem Services 10: 144-154.

Kosoy,N.andCorbera,E.(2010)Paymentsforecosystemservicesascommodityfetishism,Ecological Economics69(6):1228-1236.

Kosoy,N.,Martinez-Tuna,M.,Muradian,R.andMartinez-Alier,J.(2007)Paymentsfor environmental services in watersheds: InsightsfromacomparativestudyofthreecasesinCentralAmerica,Ecological Economics 61: 446-455.

Kosoy,N.,Corbera,E.andBrown,K.(2008)Participationinpaymentsforecosystemservices:CasestudiesfromtheLacandónrainforest,Mexico,Geoforum39:2073-2083.

Kroeger,T.(2013)Thequestforthe“optimal”paymentforenvironmentalservicesprogram:ambitionmeetsreality,withusefullessons,Forest Policy and Economics37:65–74.

Landell-Mills,N.(2002)Developingmarkets for forest environmental services: anopportunityforpromotingequitywhilesecuringefficiency?,Philosophical transactions – Royal Society London A360:1817-1825.

Lawlor,K.,Madeira,E.,Blockhus,J.andGanz,D.(2013)CommunityparticipationandbenefitsinREDD+:areviewofinitialoutcomesandlessons,Forests 4: 296-318.

Leach,M.,Mearns,R.andScoones,I.(1999)Environmentalentitlements:Dynamicsandinstitutionsincommunity-basednaturalresourcemanagement,World Development 27(2):225–247.

Leach,M.,Scoones,I.andStirling,A.(2010)Dynamic Sustainabilities. Technology, Environment, Social Justice,Earthscan,LondonandWashingtonD.C.

Lele,S.(2013)Environmentalisms,justicesandthelimitsofEcosystemServices,in:Sikor,T.(ed.)The Justices and Injustices of Ecosystems Services,Earthscan/Routledge,Abingdon,pp.119-139.

Li,T.M.(1996)ImagesofCommunity:DiscourseandStrategyinPropertyRelations.


Development and Change27(3):501-527.

Li,T.M.(2007)The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics,DukeUniversityPress,London.

Litfin,K.T.(1994)Ozone discourses: Science and politics in global environmental change,ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork.

Lohman,L.(Ed.)(2006)Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and Power.DagHammarskjöldFoundation-DurbanGroupforClimateJusticeandtheCornerHouse,Uppsala,Sweden.

Lohmann,L.(2009)Climateasinvestment,Development and Change40(6):1063-1083.

Lohmann,L.(2010)Uncertaintymarketsandcarbonmarkets:variationsonpolanyianthemes,New Political Economy15(2):225-254.

Long,A.(1992)FromParadigmLosttoParadigmRegained?TheCaseforanActorOrientedSociologyofDevelopment,in:LongN.andLong,A.(eds.)Battlefields of knowledge: the interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development.Routledge,London,pp. 16-43.

Long,N.(2001)Development Sociology: actor perspectives,Routledge,London.

Mansfield,B.(2007)Property,markets,and dispossession: the Western Alaska communitydevelopmentquotaasneoliberalism,socialjustice,both,andneither,Antipode39(3):480–499.

Martin,A.,Blowers,A.andBoersema,J.(2008)Payingforenvironmentalservices:can we afford to lose a cultural basis for conservation?,Environmental Sciences5(1):1-5.

Martin,A.,Gross-Camp,N.,Kebede,B.,McGuire,S.andMunyarukaza,J.(2014)Whoseenvironmentaljustice?ExploringlocalandglobalperspectivesinapaymentsforecosystemservicesschemeinRwanda,Geoforum54:167-177.

Martínez-Alier,J.(2004)The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and

Valuation, OxfordUniversityPress,NewDelhi.

Matulis,B.S.(2013)Thenarrowinggapbetweenvisionandexecution:neoliberalizationofPESinCostaRica,Geoforum 44: 253–260.

Matulis,B.S.(2014)Theeconomicvaluationofnature:aquestionofjustice?Ecological Economics104:155–157.

Mauerhofer,V.,Hubacek,K.andColeby,A.(2013)Frompolluterpaystoprovidergets: distribution of rights and costs under paymentsforecosystemservices,Ecology and Society18(4):41.

McAfee,K.(1999)Sellingnaturetosaveit?Biodiversityandgreendevelopmentalism,Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 17(2):133–154.

McAfee,K.(2012)TheContradictoryLogicofGlobalEcosystemServicesMarkets,Development and Change 43: 105–131.

McAfee,K.andShapiro,E.N.(2010)PaymentforEnvironmentalServicesinMexico:Neoliberalism,SocialMovements,andtheState,Annals of the Association of American Geographers100(3):579-599.

McCarthy,J.(2005)Devolutioninthewoods:Communityforestryashybridneoliberalism,Environment and Planning A37(6):995-1014.

McCarthy,J.andPrudham,S.(2004)Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism,Geoforum35(3):275–283.

McCauley,D.J.(2006)Sellingoutonnature,Nature443:27-28.

McDermott,M.H.,Mahanty,S.andSchreckenberg,K.(2013)Examiningequity:a multidimensional framework for assessing equityinpaymentsforecosystemservices,Environmental Science and Policy33:416-427.

McElwee,P.D.(2012)Paymentsforenvironmental services as neoliberal market-basedforestconservationinVietnam:panaceaorproblem?Geoforum 43: 412-426.

McElwee,P.,Nghiem,T.,Le,H.,Vu,H.andTran,N.(2014)Paymentsforenvironmental


services and contested neoliberalisation indevelopingcountries:AcasestudyfromVietnam,Journal of Rural Studies 36: 423-440.

MillenniumEcosystemAssessment(MEA)(2005)Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Ecosystems and Human Well-being,IslandPress,Washington,D.C.

Milder,J.,Scherr,S.J.andBracer,C.(2010)Trendsandfuturepotentialofpaymentforecosystemservicestoalleviateruralpovertyindevelopingcountries,Ecology & Society 15.

Milne,S.andAdams,W.M.(2012)Marketmasquerades:uncoveringthepoliticsofcommunity-levelpaymentsforenvironmentalservicesinCambodia,Development and Change 43: 133-158.

Miranda,M.,Dieperink,C.andGlasbergen,P.(2007)VoluntaryagreementsinwatershedprotectioninCostaRica,Environment, Development and Sustainability 9: 1-19.

Mitchell,R.B.(2002)Internationalenvironment,in:Risse,T.,Simmons,B.andCarlsnaesW.(eds.)Handbook of International Relations,SagePublications,London,pp.500-516.

Miteva,D.A.,Pattanayak,S.K.andFerraro,P.J.(2012)Evaluationofbiodiversitypolicyinstruments:whatworksandwhatdoesn’t?Oxford Review of Economic Policy28(1):69–92.

Mosse,D.(1997)TheSymbolicMakingofaCommonPropertyResource:History,EcologyandLocalityinaTank-irrigatedLandscapeinSouthIndia,Development and Change28:467-504.

Mosse,D.(2006)CollectiveAction,CommonProperty,andSocialCapitalinSouthIndia:AnAnthropologicalCommentary.Economic Development and Cultural Change54(3):695-724.

Mowles,C.,Stacey,R.andGriffin,D.(2008).What Contribution can Insights from the ComplexitySciencesmaketotheTheoryandPracticeofDevelopmentManagement?Journal of International Development 20: 804–820.

Muradian,R.(2013)PaymentsforEcosystemServices as Incentives for Collective Action. Society & Natural Resources26(10):1155-1169.

Muradian,R.andGómez-Baggethun,E.(2013)TheInstitutionalDimensionof“Market-BasedInstruments”forGoverningEcosystemServices:IntroductiontotheSpecialIssue,Society & Natural Resources26(10):1113-1121.

Muradian,R.andRival,L.(2012)Betweenmarkets and hierarchies: The challenge of governingecosystemservices,Ecosystem Services 1: 93–100.

Muradian,R.,Corbera,E.,Pascual,U.,Kosoy,N.andMay,P.(2010)Reconcilingtheoryand practice: An alternative conceptual frameworkforunderstandingpaymentsforenvironmentalservices,Ecological Economics 69(6):1202–1208.

Muradian,R.,Arsel,M.,Pellegrini,L.,Adaman,F.,Aguilar,B.,Agarwal,B.,Corbera,E.,deBlas,D.E.,Farley,J.,Froger,G.,Garcia-Frapolli,E.,Gómez-Baggethun,E.,Gowdy,J.,Kosoy,N.,LeCoq,J.f.,Leroy,P.,May,P.,Méral,P.,Mibielli,P.,Norgaard,R.,Ozkaynak,B.,Pascual,U.,Pengue,W.,Perez,M.,Pesche,D.,Pirard,R.,Ramos-Martin,J.,Rival,L.,Saenz,F.,VanHecken,G.,Vatn,A.,Vira,B.andUrama,K.(2013),PaymentsforEcosystemServicesandthefatalattractionofwin-winsolutions,Conservation Letters6(4):274-279.

Neumayer,E.(2003)Weak versus strong sustainability: Exploring the limits of two opposing paradigms,EdwardElgarPublishing,Cheltenham.

Neves-Graça,K.(2004)RevisitingtheTragedyoftheCommons:EcologicalDilemmasofWhaleWatchingintheAzores,Human Organization63(3):289-300.

Norgaard,R.B.(1984)Coevolutionarydevelopmentpotential,Land Economics60(2):160–173.

Norgaard,R.(2010)Ecosystemservices:Fromeye-openingmetaphortocomplexityblinder,Ecological Economics69(6):1219–1227.


North,D.C.(1990)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork.

Nygren,A.andRikoon,S.(2008)Politicalecologyrevisited:integrationofpoliticsandecologydoesmatter,Society and Natural Resources21:767–782.

O’Neill,J.(2001)Property,care,andenvironment,Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy19:695–711.

OlivierdeSardan,J.-P.(2001)Lestrois approches en anthropologie du développement,Tiers-Monde:729-754.

OlivierdeSardan,J.P.(2013)Embeddednessand informal norms: Institutionalisms and anthropology,Critique of Anthropology33(3):280-299.

Osborne,T.(2011)CarbonForestryandAgrarian Change: Access and Land Control inaMexicanRainforest,Journal of Peasant Studies 38(4):859–883.

Osei-Kufuor,P.(2010)Does Institutionalising Decentralisation Work? Rethinking Agency, Institutions and Authority in Local Governance: A Case Study Ntonaboma in Kwahu-North Distict, Ghana,UnpublishedPhDThesis,UniversityofBradford.

Ostrom,E.(1990)Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork.

Ostrom,E.(1992)Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems,ICSPress,SanFrancisco.

Ostrom,E.(2010),Alongpolycentricjourney,Annual Review of Political Science 13: 1–23.

Ostrom,E.andCox,M.(2010)Movingbeyondpanaceas: a multi-tiered diagnostic approach forsocial-ecologicalanalysis,Environmental Conservation37(4):151-163.

Paavola,J.(2007)Institutionsand environmental governance: a reconceptualization,Ecological Economics 63: 93-103.

Paavola,J.andAdger,N.W.(2005)

Institutionalecologicaleconomics,Ecological Economics 53: 353-368.

Pagiola,S.andPlatais,G.(2007)Payments for Environmental Services: From Theory to Practice,WorldBank,WashingtonD.C.

Pagiola,S.,Bishop,J.andLandell-Mills,N.(2002)Selling Forest Environmental Services. Market-based Mechanisms for Conservation and Development,Earthscan,London.

Pagiola,S.,Arcenas,A.andPlatais,G.(2005)Canpaymentsforenvironmentalserviceshelpreducepoverty?Anexplorationoftheissuesandtheevidencetodate,World Development33(2):237-253.

Parkhurst,G.M.andShogren,J.F.(2007)Spatial incentives to coordinate contiguous habitat,Ecological Economics 64: 344-355.

Pascual,U.,Muradian,R.,Rodríguez,L.C.andDuraiappah,A.(2010)Exploringthelinksbetweenequityandefficiencyinpaymentsfor environmental services: a conceptual approach. Ecological Economics69:1237-1244.

Pascual,U.,Phelps,J.,Garmendia,E.,Brown,K.,Corbera,E.Martin,A.,Gómez-Baggethun,E.andMuradian,R.(2014)SocialEquityMattersinPaymentsforEcosystemServices,BioScience64(11):1027-1036.

Pattanayak,S.K.,Wunder,S.andFerraro,P.J.(2010)Showmethemoney:dopaymentssupplyenvironmentalservicesindevelopingcountries?Review of Environmental Economics and Policy4(2):254-274.

Peet,R.andWatts,M.(1996)Liberation ecologies: environment, development, social movements,Routledge,London.

Peet,R.,andWatts,M.(eds)(2002)Liberation ecologies: environment, development, social movements,Routledge,London,UK.

Persson,U.M.,andAlpízar,F.(2013)ConditionalCashTransfersandPaymentsforEnvironmentalServices—AConceptualFrameworkforExplainingandJudgingDifferencesinOutcomes,World Development 43:124-137.


Peterson,M.J.,Hall,D.M.,Feldpausch-Parker,A.M.andPeterson,T.R.(2010)ObscuringEcosystemFunctionwithApplicationoftheEcosystemServicesConcept,Conservation Biology 24(1):113-119.

Pham,T.T.,Campbell,B.M.,Garnett,S.,Aslin,H.andHoang,M.H.(2010)ImportanceandimpactsofintermediaryboundaryorganizationsinfacilitatingpaymentforenvironmentalservicesinVietnam,Environmental Conservation37:64-72.

Pirard,R.(2012)Market-basedinstrumentsforbiodiversityandecosystemservices:Alexicon,Environmental science & policy 19-20: 59-68.

Pirard,R.andLapeyre,R.(2014)Classifyingmarket-basedinstrumentsforecosystemservices:Aguidetotheliteraturejungle,Ecosystem Services 9: 106-114.

Plumecocq,G.(2014)Thesecondgenerationofecologicaleconomics:Howfarhastheapplefallenfromthetree?Ecological Economics107:457-468.

Potter,C.A.andWolf,S.A.(2014)PaymentsforecosystemservicesinrelationtoUSandUKagri-environmentalpolicy:disruptiveneoliberalinnovationorhybridpolicyadaptation?,Agriculture and Human Values 31: 397–408.

Raymond,C.M.,Singh,G.G.,Benessaiah,K.,Bernhardt,J.R.,Levine,J.,Nelson,H.,Turner,N.J.,Norton,B.,Tam,J.andChan,K.M.A.(2013)EcosystemServicesandBeyond:UsingMultipleMetaphorstoUnderstandHuman–EnvironmentRelationships,BioScience63(7):536-546.

Redford,K.H.andAdams,W.M.(2009)PaymentsforEcosystemservicesandtheChallengeofSavingNature,Conservation Biology23:785-787.

Ribot,J.(2001)Integrallocaldevelopment:‘Accommodatingmultipleinterests’throughentrustment and accountable representation. International Journal of Agricultural Resources,Governance and Ecology1(3):1–21.

Ribot,J.,Chhatre,A.andLankina,T.(2008)Introduction:Institutionalchoiceand recognition in the formation and consolidationoflocaldemocracy,Conservation and Society6(1):1–11.

Robertson,M.M.(2004)Theneoliberalizationofecosystemservices:wetlandmitigationbanking and problems in environmental governance,Geoforum35:371-373.

Robertson,M.M.(2006)Thenaturethatcapitalcansee:science,state,andmarketinthecommodificationofecosystemservices,Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24:367-387.

Robertson,M.(2007)Discoveringpriceinallthewrongplaces:theworkofcommoditydefinitionandpriceunderneoliberalenvironmentalpolicy,Antipode 39(3):500–526.

Rode,J.,Gómez-Baggethun,E.andKrause,T.(2014)Motivationcrowdingbyeconomicincentivesinconservationpolicy:Areviewoftheempiricalevidence,Ecological Economics 109: 80–92.

Rodríguez-de-Francisco,J.C.andBudds,J.(2015)Paymentsforenvironmentalservicesand control over conservation of natural resources: The role of public and private sectors in the conservation of the Nima watershed,Colombia,Ecological Economics117:295-302.

Rodríguez-de-Francisco,J.C.,Budds,J.andBoelens,R.(2013)PaymentsforenvironmentalservicesandunequalresourcecontrolinPimampiro,Ecuador,Society & Natural Resources26(10),1217-1233.

Rorty,R.(1979)Philosophy and the mirror of nature,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,NewJersey,USA.

Roth,R.J.andDressler,W.(2012)Market-oriented conservation governance: The particularitiesofplace,Geoforum 43: 363-366.

Sahlins,M.(1978)Cultureasproteinandprofit,New York Review of Books25(18):45–53.


Sandbrook,C.,Fisher,J.andVira,B.(2013)What do conservationists think about markets?Geoforum 50: 232-240.

Schomers,S.andMatzdorf,B.(2013)Paymentsforecosystemservices:areview and comparison of developing and industrialisedcountries,Ecosystem Services 6: 16–30.

Schomers,S.,Sattles,C.andMatzdorf,B.(2015)Ananalyticalframeworkforassessingthe potential of intermediaries to improve theperformanceofpaymentsforecosystemservices,Land Use Policy4:58-70.

Scott,J.(1990)Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts,YaleUniversityPress.

Shapiro-Garza,E.(2013a)Contestingthemarket-basednatureofMexico’snationalpaymentsforecosystemservicesprograms:foursitesofarticulationandhybridization,Geoforum 46: 5–15.

Shapiro-Garza,E.(2013b)Contestingmarket-basedconservation:paymentsforecosystemservices as a surface of engagement for ruralsocialmovementsinMexico,Human Geography 6: 134-150.

Sikor,T.andNewell,P.(2014)GlobalizingEnvironmentalJustice?Geoforum54:151–157.

Slavíková,L.,Kluvánková-Oravská,T.andJílková,J.(2010)Bridgingtheoriesonenvironmental governance: Insights from free-market approaches and institutional ecologicaleconomicsperspectives,Ecological Economics69:1368-1372.

Smith,N.(1996)Theproductionofnature,in:Robertson,G.M.Mash,L.Tickner,J.Bird,B.Curtis,andT.Putnam(eds.)Future Natural: Nature, science, culture.Routledge,London,pp. 35-54.

Sommerville,M.,Jones,J.P.G.andMilner-Gulland,E.J.(2009)ARevisedConceptualFrameworkforPaymentsforEnvironmentalServices,Ecology and Society14(2):34.

Sommerville,M.,Jones,J.P.G.,Rahajaharison,

M.andMilner-Gulland,E.J.(2010)Theroleoffairnessandbenefitdistributionincommunity-basedPaymentforEnvironmentalServicesinterventions:AcasestudyfromMenabe,Madagascar,Ecological Economics 69(6):1262–1271.

Sparke,M.(2008)Politicalgeography–political geographies of globalization III: resistance,Progress in Human Geography32(3):423-440.

Spash,C.L.(2011)SocialEcologicalEconomics:Understandingthepasttoseethefuture,American Journal of Economics and Sociology70(2):340-375.

Spash,C.L.(2012)Newfoundationsforecologicaleconomics,Ecological Economics77:36-47.

Swallow,B.M.,Kallesoe,M.F.,Iftikhar,U.A.,vanNoordwijk,M.,Bracer,K.,Scherr,S.J.,Raju,K.V.,Poats,S.V.,Duraiappah,A.K.,Ochieng,B.O.,Mallee,H.andRumley,R.(2009)CompensationandRewardsforEnvironmentalServicesintheDevelopingWorld:FramingPan-TropicalAnalysisandComparison,Ecology and Society14(2):26.

Swart,J.A.A.(2003)Willdirectpaymentshelpbiodiversity?, Science 299: 1981.

Tacconi,L.(2012)Redefiningpaymentsforenvironmentalservices,Ecological Economics 73:29-36.

Tickell,A.andPeck,J.(2003)Makingglobalrules:globalizationorneoliberalization?,in:Peck,J.andYeung,H.(eds.),Remaking the Global Economy: Economic-Geographical Perspectives,Sage,London,pp.163-181.

Uphoff,N.(1993)GrassrootsOrganizationsandNGOsinRuralDevelopment:OpportunitieswithDiminishingStatesandExpandingMarkets,World Development21(4):607-622.

VanHecken,G.andBastiaensen,J.(2010a)PaymentsforecosystemservicesinNicaragua: do market-based approaches work?,Development and Change 41: 421–444.


VanHecken,G.andBastiaensen,J.(2010b)Paymentsforecosystemservices:justifiedornot?Apoliticalview,Environmental Science & Policy13(8):785-792.

VanHecken,G.,Bastiaensen,J.andVásquez,W.F.(2012)TheViabilityofLocalPaymentsforWatershedServices:EmpiricalEvidencefromMatiguás,Nicaragua,Ecological Economics74:169-176.

VanHecken,G.,Bastiaensen,J.andHuybrechs,F.(2015)What’sinaname?EpistemicperspectivesandPaymentsforEcosystemServicespoliciesinNicaragua,Geoforum 63: 55-66.

Vatn,A.(2005a)Rationality,institutionsandenvironmentalpolicy,Ecological Economics 55: 203-217.

Vatn,A.(2005b)Institutions and the Environment,EdwardElgar:Cheltenham.

Vatn,A.(2009)Aninstitutionalanalysisofmethodsforenvironmentalappraisal,Ecological Economics68:2207-2215.

Vatn,A.(2010)Aninstitutionalanalysisofpaymentsforenvironmentalservices,Ecological Economics69(6):1245–1252.

Vatn,A.(2014)Marketsinenvironmentalgovernance–Fromtheorytopractice,Ecological Economics 105:97-105.

Vatn,A.andBromley,D.W.(1997)Externalities-Amarketmodelfailure,Environmental and Resource Economics 9: 135-151.

Vatn,A.andVedeld,P.(2012)Fit,Interplay,andScale:ADiagnosis,Ecology and Society 17(4),12.

Vayda,A.P.(1983)Progressivecontextualization:methodsforresearchinhumanecology,Human Ecology 11: 265-281.

Vedeld,T.(2000)Villagepolitics:heterogeneity,leadershipandcollectiveaction,Journal of Development Studies36(5):105–134.

Vink,M.J.,Boezeman,D.,Dewulf,A.andTermeer,C.(2013)Changingclimate,changingframes:Dutchwaterpolicyframe

developmentsinthecontextofariseandfallofattentiontoclimatechange,Environmental Science & Policy 30: 90–101.

Wells,M.andBrandon,K.(1992)People and Parks: Linking Protected Area Management with Local Communities,TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBank,Washington,D.C.

West,S.,Haider,J.,Sinare,H.andKarpouzoglou,T.(2014)BeyondDivides:Prospectsforsynergybetweenresilienceandpathwaysapproachestosustainability,STEPS Working Paper 65,STEPSCentre,Brighton,UK.

Williamson,O.E.(1985)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,FreePress,NewYork.

Winthrop,R.H.(2014)Thestrangecaseofculturalservices:Limitsoftheecosystemservicesparadigm,Ecological Economics 108: 208-214.

Wunder,S.(2005)Paymentsforenvironmentalservices:somenutsandbolts,CIFOR Occasional Paper 42,CIFOR,Jakarta,Indonesia.

Wunder,S.(2007)TheefficiencyofPaymentsforEnvironmentalServicesinTropicalconservation,Conservation Biology21(1):48-58.

Wunder,S.(2008a)Paymentsforenvironmental services and the poor: conceptsandpreliminaryevidence,Environment and Development Economics 13: 279-297.

Wunder,S.(2008b)Necessary Conditions for Ecosystem Service Payments,PaperpresentedattheWorkshoponEconomicsandConservationintheTropics:aStrategyDialogue,SanFrancisco,USA,31January–1February,2008.

Wunder,S.(2013)Whenpaymentsforenvironmental services will work for conservation,Conservation Letters6:230–237.

Wunder,S.(2015)Revisitingtheconceptofpaymentsforenvironmentalservices,Ecological Economics 117:234-243.


Wunder,S.andVargas,M.T.(2005)Beyond“markets”:whyterminologymatters,in:Bayon,R.,Nathaniel,C.andHawn,A.(eds.),The tale of two continents – Ecosystem services in Latin America and East and Southern Africa,EcosystemMarketplace.

Wunder,S.andWertz-Kanounnikoff,S.(2009)Paymentsforecosystemservices:anewwayofconservingbiodiversityinforests,Journal of Sustainable Forestry28:576-596.

Wunder,S.,Engel,S.andPagiola,S.(2008)Takingstock:Acomparativeanalysisofpaymentsforenvironmentalservicesprograms in developed and developing countries,Ecological Economics 65: 834-852.

Wünscher,T.,Engel,S.andWunder,S.(2008)Spatialtargetingofpaymentsforenvironmental services: a tool for boosting conservationbenefits,Ecological Economics 65: 822-833.

Young,O.R.(2002a)The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay and Scale,MITPress,London.

Young,O.R.(2002b)InstitutionalInterplay:TheEnvironmentalConsequencesofCross-scaleInteractions,in:Ostrom,E.,Dietz,T.,Dolsak,N.,Stern,P.C.,Stonich,S.andWeber,E.U.(Eds.)The Drama of the Commons,NationalAcademyPress,WashingtonD.C.

Zanella,M.A.,Schleyer,C.andSpeelman,S.(2014)WhydofarmersjoinPaymentsforEcosystemServices(PES)schemes?AnAssessmentofPESwaterschemeparticipationinBrazil,Ecological Economics 105:166-176.

Zhang,W.,Pagiola,S.(2011)Assessingthepotentialforsynergiesintheimplementationofpaymentsforenvironmentalservicesprogrammes:anempiricalanalysisofCostaRica,Environmental Conservation38(4):406–416.

Zilberman,D.,Lipper,L.andMcCarthy,N.(2008)Whencouldpaymentsforenvironmentalservicesbenefitthepoor?,Environment and Development Economics13(3):

255-278.


Documents

A proposal for innovative future research - doc.anet.be DISCUSSION PAPER / 2015.05 The frontiers of the debate on Payments for Ecosystem Services. A proposal for innovative future