A Progressive European Global Strategy

7/29/2019 A Progressive European Global Strategy

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N 140 - NOVEMBER 2012

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Giovanni Grevi

A progressiveEuropean global strategy

>> The foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden launchedan informal reflection process on a European Global Strategy(EGS) at the end of July. They entrusted four national think tanks withthe implementation of the initiative. Almost a decade since the adoptionof the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, their purpose is to takea step forward and help define a broader agenda for Europe on the globalstage. The process will entail an inclusive debate leading to the delivery ofa report in May 2013, possibly paving the way for progress at the officiallevel towards the adoption of a new EU strategic document. Thiscontribution argues that the EGS initiative is a timely onenotwithstanding the crisis testing the political resilience of the EuropeanUnion (EU) and can help bolster the response to it with a new statementof purpose for the EU. It also calls for a progressive global strategy that

aims to anticipate and shape change as opposed to resisting it and seekingto preserve the status quo.

THE CASE FOR RESOLVE

The EGS project starts at a time of serious political crisis within and out-side the Union. The latter is facing an existential challenge. Its memberstates are struggling to define a new balance between political legitimacyand effective economic governance by pooling adequate shares of sover-eignty while showing corresponding levels of solidarity. Beyond the EU,geopolitical instability is mounting from the vicinity of the Union to EastAsia, while power grows more diffuse and responsibility for global publicgoods more dispersed. The crisis within the Union has been detractingfocus and resources from pursuing common interests in a changing world.

At a time of political crisis,

the EU needs a statement of

purpose outlining its interests

and priorities in a more

competitive international

environment.

The EU should adopt a

progressive global strategy

aimed at co-shaping changewith other global actors and

avoiding the conflation of

power transitions with power

clashes.

The EU strategic debate

should overcome the sterile

distinction between hard and

soft power since the capacity to

both attract and coerce will be

critical to Europes influence.

HI G HLI G HTS


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A PROGRESSIVEEUROPEAN GLOBAL STRATEGY

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To be sure, a strategic conversation cannot be

extrapolated from the political and institutionalcontext where it takes place. The crisis shows thatthere cannot be a strategic Europe abroad withouta more cohesive Union at home. Politics is indivis-ible and all the more so when the going getsrough. The jury is out as to whether the EU willbe able to overcome its current pains and will doso in one piece. But, faced with the danger of theEU unravelling, most European leaders have stat-ed that failure is not an option. A realistic strategicconversation can and should accompany the ardu-

ous shaping of a new phase of integration.

Current adversities invite resolve. This is not aboutreiterating complacent slogans on Europes pastachievements but about starting a common assess-ment of the Unions purpose today and tomorrow.The political heritage of European integrationholds great potential but it can only be suitablymobilised by setting this distinctive experience inthe global context and looking ahead at upcomingchallenges and opportunities.

The very pertinence and purpose of the EU in apolycentric, competitive international environ-ment is the core question for the pan-Europeanstrategic conversation. The answer is not a given.Both EU citizens and the international partners ofthe Union openly ask what the EU is for andstands for. The EU needs a new statement of pur-pose, which would enable the identification andprioritisation of the common interests of a collec-tive international actor. The Union needs a posi-tive, inspirational message about its objectives on

the global stage and not a reactive or defensiveone. A message that builds on what the Union isand that says what the Union does, and should do.

STRATEGY IN CONTEXT

The question of the EUs pertinence and purpose inthe world can only be addressed by setting strategy-making in context. This is where much discontinu-ity strikes the eye compared to the strategicenvironment of 2003, when the European SecurityStrategy (ESS) was produced. The difference in the

global context suggests new parameters for the

strategic debate and helps to distinguish the ESSexperience from the current process.

The 2003 ESS stood the test of time better thanmany other strategic documents as a list of keythreats and an outline of the preventive, compre-hensive and multilateral approach required toaddress them. While lacking in guidance for itsimplementation, it worked as a broad securityconcept. However, the ESS took the context as agiven: it did not debate the endurance of the

Western-led global order and was in fact largelydirected to confirming Europes usefulness indealing with asymmetric threats therein. Withsome simplification, the ESS was a security strat-egy for a hegemonic world of deliberate threats bynon-state actors.

Ten years on, following the rise of the BRICS andthe global financial crisis, globalisation is frayingunder economic imbalances, resource constraintsand poor governance in fragile states and regions.The emerging world is a polycentric one where

more and more diverse actors matter, and wheredifferent worldviews co-exist and compete. Powershifts present many of these actors with moreoptions to pursue their interests. Conversely,deepening interdependence reinforces constraintson their room for manoeuvre, creating mutualvulnerabilities but also common interests.

The strategic environment is in flux and so are thepower strategies of key actors, within a thick fabricof influential trans-national networks. The EU does

not primarily need a new security strategy but aglobal one for a post-hegemonic world of diffusedrisks and creeping geo-strategic competition.

CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS,

BUILDING DEALS

Strategy-making is set not only in a geo-politicalcontext but also in an intellectual one, which isless explicitly evoked but equally important.Starting a European strategic conversation offersthe opportunity to scope the intellectual land-

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scape as well, and challenge lingering assump-

tions. In particular, strategy-making in Europeshould eschew two questionable assumptions.For one, the rather optimistic expectation thatso-called rising powers would eventually sub-scribe to the liberal global order as we know andquite like it, with relatively minor adjustments,if anything for want of better options. JohnIkenberry is an authoritative proponent of thisposition. For another, the gloomy anticipationthat the growing competition of ideas and inter-ests in a more diverse world would irredeemably

lead to their clash, with ensuing mutual alien-ation, zero-sum calculations or outright conflict.Bob Kagan and Gideon Rachman, among oth-ers, have been warning about this danger.

This synthesis does not do justice to the depth ofthese two theses, but it is in their simplified formthat they permeate the political debate. It isargued here that the space for EU strategy making

and for EU externalaction at large liesprecisely between

these two readingsof ongoing change.In short, the firstorder purpose of theEU strategic debateand of its outcomeshould be to avoidthe conflation ofchange and chaos,

difference and conflict, power transitions and apower clash. In each of these pairs, the former

does not have to entail the latter.

De-linking change from conflict does not amountto denying tensions or neglecting crises but ratheroperating in a number of ways, drawing on the setof instruments available to the Union and itsmember states, to defuse them. Defusingtensions, from territorial disputes in the SouthChina Sea to the Iranian nuclear issue, fromfrictions on exchange rates and capital flows tobarriers to trade and investment, is the conditionfor defining new deals on these and otherchallenges. Seeking new deals does not mean

surrendering the EUs interests but rather seeking

ways to enhancing them in a different world. Thisapproach entails pursuing mutual gains bylocking them in durable arrangements and notscrambling for short-term, relative gains vis--visEuropes partners.

This sets a tall order for Europes global ambi-tions but provides a viable ordering principle forEuropes global action. It responds to the press-ing need for a political posture that does notreject but manages divergence to reduce it and

deliver effective solutions. New deals, whetheron mitigating climate change, managingresources or implementing the responsibility toprotect, will not be achieved overnight and maynot take the form of binding rules of universalapplication, not least given the number of stateand non-state actors involved. But the practiceof dealing with difference and diversity a coredimension of the EUs own political experience requires a clear identification of the EUs inter-ests and of how to leverage the wide array of itstools to pursue them.

A PROGRESSIVE GLOBAL STRATEGY

Drawing up a European global strategy cannotbe about preserving a given global order or sim-ply defending Europes interests therein. Theonly sure thing when looking ahead is that thestatus quo is not an option, whether in terms ofbalance of power or normative paradigms. Liber-al interventionism is hotly contested in the rest

of the world and no longer warmly embraced inthe West either. State-led industrial policiesopenly challenge market-led growth models.Ways of kick-starting domestic growth areregarded by emerging powers as a better optionto promote development than traditional West-ern development aid. A conservative globalstrategy would be outdated before its adoption.The goal is not merely to protect but to defineand enhance the interests of the Union in waysconsistent with a shifting context by assessingand anticipating change. Europe needs a pro-gressive global strategy. >>>>>>

Power isdefined by purpose

and not by the

means by which it

is exercised


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Contrary to what Lord Palmerston said, not all

interests are permanent (aside from broadlydefined ones such as security against aggression orsafe trade routes). Values may well be permanent,or at least are subject to much longer timeframesfor their evolution, but interests can change, ascan their relative ranking on the priority list. Forexample, the US of course has a core interest inthe free flow of energy supplies, including fromthe Gulf region. But if, due to shale gas andtechnological advances, the US was to becomeincreasingly energy self-sufficient, would its

interests in Middle East geopolitical dynamicsand crises remain unaltered, relative for exampleto domestic priorities or investment in East Asiastability? Perhaps not. The interest of China andIndia in the stability of the Gulf region, wheremost of their growing oil imports come from, iscorrespondingly escalating, with politicalimplications that require focus and may holdopportunities for cooperation. To take yetanother example, it was widely (if implicitly)regarded as in the interest of the EU and itsmember states to accept the rule of authoritarian

leaders in the Arab world and do business withthem, not least in managing migration flows andcountering violent Islamic radicalism. Such aninterpretation of Europes interests would be lesspopular today, after the Arab uprisings.

In other words, Europes global strategy should beabout shaping change, and not countering ordenying it, in ways that are consistent withEuropes core values and evolving interests. Thecatchword is therefore not containing

(unadvisable) or driving (unachievable) change,but co-shaping it with other influential state andnon-state actors by seeking new deals, promotingthe reform of the international order andinitiating cooperation on specific issues or crises.

Pursuing a progressive global strategy is verydifficult but not beyond reach. Two macro-factorsseem to offer a window of opportunity. For one,while in relative decline, the EU and the USremain predominant across most dimensions ofpower and have kept the political initiative, forexample in managing the fallout of the financial

crisis or in dealing with Iran. For another, the

heterogeneous constellation of other emerged,emerging, restored or aspiring powers does notadd up to an alternative bloc. Global re-orderingdoes not start from scratch. This decade offers awindow of opportunity for the EU to seeknegotiated solutions to controversial issues from aposition of considerable influence by adjusting,not breaking, the rules of the game.

A LASTING BUT NIMBLE GLOBAL

STRATEGY

As stressed above, the European strategicconversation cannot isolate itself from thepolitical crisis that is shaking the Union but itcannot be entirely subsumed by the crisis either.It needs a sober assessment of what the EU andits member states are willing and able to dotoday but it must outline a purpose that goesbeyond the current difficult conjuncture. Whatis needed is a global strategy of lasting relevancebut nimble application.

The strategic reflection should take a long termlook at current and emerging trends. Foresightshould inform this exercise and provideknowledge on the key factors and actors shapingthe world as it will be tomorrow and not just asit is today. For example, the rise of the BRICS isyesterdays story: what counts for the future aretheir growth patterns, domestic challenges,evolving political culture and consequentpriorities on the international stage. The impact

of the so-called third industrial revolution andof new technologies will be critical to future geo-economic considerations and to shapingrespective growth models, as well as toaddressing the challenges of energy security andclimate change, among others. Upcomingmiddle-powers or swing-states such as Turkey,Egypt, Indonesia and Nigeria can provesignificant partners for engagement in shapingregional dynamics where diplomatic alignmentsare changing, from the Middle East to SouthEast Asia but also sub-Saharan Africa. TheEuropean strategic debate should adequately

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draw from the wealth of foresight studies by the

public and the private sector, in Europe and wellbeyond, to avoid the trap of short-termism.

Any resulting European global strategy shouldbe seen not just as a point of arrival but also as apoint of departure: it should be a livingdocument. Continuity in the broad strategicposture should be reconciled with the capacityto adjust the focus, sense of priority and policymix of EU external action depending on needs.Strategic agility could be supported by

envisaging a regular process of testing andreviewing the global strategy or parts of it, whichcould take the shape of a yearly Strategic Europeassessment.

CONCLUSION:

POWER IS DEFINED BY PURPOSE

This brief has argued that the first-order strategicpurpose and interest of the EU is to avoid theconflation of change and conflict and to co-shape

the ongoing transition of the international systemby seeking new deals with other important actors.Such a purpose would define Europe as a globalpower and also guide how the Union exercises its

power. The strategic debate should overcome the

sterile but widespread distinction between hardand soft power, that is between coercion andattraction, and even more so the mistakenidentification of hard power with military means.Just like trade can be a pretty coercive tool, somilitary assets can provide confidence,reassurance or humanitarian relief.

Power is defined by purpose and not by the meansby which it is exercised. It is self-evident that bothhard and soft power tools and capabilities will be

critical to Europes effort to face global andregional challenges and foster its interests. Whilethe policy mix will change depending on differentissues, no prominent international actor can relysolely on one of these dimensions of power. TheEU will not set an exception to this rule, andshould plan accordingly in shaping the tools forits influence on the global stage.

Giovanni Grevi is acting director of FRIDE.

e-mail: [email protected]

www.fride.org

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A Progressive European Global Strategy