Policy Studies Review, Autumn 1987, V o l . 7, No. 1 , 217-231

John P . Burke

A PRESCRIPTIVE VIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: WHEN SHOULD BUREAUCRATS EXERCISE DISCRETION?

As each o f the art icles in th is symposium and the numerous works each cites suggests, t h e process o f po l icy implementation has been one of the most extens ive ly s tud ied topics in pub l ic pol icy over the last twenty years. A centra l theme o f th is research is the recognit ion tha t off icials called upon t o implement po l icy o f ten exercise signif icant amounts o f d iscret ion in c a r r y i n g o u t t h e i r tasks. There is now something close t o un iversa l acknowledgement tha t pol icymaking and pol icy implementation are complex, in teract ive processes. Moreover, they are processes in which bureaucrats exercise s ign i f icant amounts of d iscret ion not on ly in carryring ou t pol icy ef fect ive ly but also in establ ishing basic programmatic goals.

T h e notion tha t bureaucrats take an active ro le in the pol icy process sure ly prov ides f u r t h e r evidence against the orthodoxy, once widely p reva len t in pub l ic administration, tha t pol i t ics-- in the sense o f making pol icy--and administrat ion-- in the sense o f c a r r y i n g o u t policy--are d iscrete realms o r wholly separate stages in the pol icy process. B u t that i s no t a l l these analyses o f po l icy implementation suggest. Empirical observations about behavior in the implementation process are signif icant not on ly fo r what they descr ip t ive ly por t ray , they also raise important p rescr ip t i ve questions: How should bureaucrats p roper ly implement pol icy? How should they proper ly conceive o f the i r roles and responsibi l i t ies in the pol icy process? As Palumbo and Calista ask in the i r in t roduct ion to th is symposium, should there b e a "top down" approach w i th "fewer and clearer goals and less complex organizations"? O r should we follow a "bottom up" approach, which recognizes tha t 'Yimplementation takes place in a mult i- organizational network where off icials goals are vague, where each actor i s responsible f o r a number o f programs that may be confl ict ing, and where they are p u r s u i n g d i f fe ren t goals"?

T h e answers t o such prescr ip t i ve questions are obviously important. They bear immediate implications concerning the dut ies and obligations o f pub l i c off icials. They af fect the k i n d s o f treatment cl ients receive from bureaucrats. They can determine the basic goods and services t o which cit izens are ent i t led. Taken t o extremes, they can even redefine the ends and purposes o f pol i t ical au thor i ty . The two broad questions I wish to explore in th is essay follow from these observations: F i rs t , how well have these issues--especially as they per ta in t o the ind iv idual roles and respon- sibi l i t ies of those off icials invo lved in pol icy implementation--been under- stood and resolved in the scholarly l i terature? Secondly, how might we begin t o cons t ruc t a theory regard ing the proper exercise o f d iscret ion w i th in the implementation process?

SOME SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

Descr ip t ive Fact and Prescr ip t ive Conclusions : The Contr ibut ions o f the Empirical L i te ra tu re

One place t o beg in examining these prescr ip t i ve issues is w i th the body o f empirical work o n implementation. Th is may s t r i k e some readers as a bit

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odd, perhaps even unfair, given the absence of explicit normative concern in these studies. But most do draw implicit--even quite explicit in some cases--prescriptive conclusions about bureaucratic behavior and i ts effects upon the policy process and its outcomes.

Although there is no overall consensus about whether bureaucrats a re doing a proper job when they exercise discretion, several s t rands of thought stand out. Some studies a r e optimistic in their assessment of the contribution of bureaucratic discretion to the implementation process (Lindblom, 1959, 1968; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; McLaughlin, 1976; Johnson f, OIConnor, 1979) . Even Pressman and Wildavsky, in what is otherwise a rather strong indictment of the effects of discretion upon the Oakland economic development project they studied, conclude that "Imple- mentation should not be divorced from policy" (1973, p. 143) .

Other studies present a more negative view. Bailey and Mosher's (1968) s tudy of Title I l l of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, Moynihan's (1969) reflections on community action pro- grams of the late 1960s, and Bardach's (1977) discussion of implementation "games"--merely a f e w examples--find significant records of programmatic failure (also see Radin, 1977; Edwards, 1980; Williams, 1980, pp. I, 122) . In some cases, difficulties a r e attr ibuted to program design rather than subsequent implementation ( e .g . , Derthick, 1972; Levitan, 1984) , but in other cases ( e . g . , Bardach, 1977) bureaucratic behavior, especially dis- cretionary behavior, at the implementation stage proved to be problematic.

Still other scholars render a mixed verdict (see, for example, Har- grove, 1975; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1 9 8 0 ) . Lipsky finds, for example, that the working conditions, unrealistic performance expectations, lack of resources, and the personal alienation facing street-level bureaucrats-- e .g . , police on the beat, teachers, case workers in social service delivery programs--forces them to cope with adverse circumstances. As a result, street-level bureaucrats act selectively in their treatment of clients. According to Lipsky, "They believe themselves to be doing the best they can under adverse circumstances.. . .They develop conceptions of their work and of their clients that narrow the gap between their personal and work limitations and the service ideal .I' But Lipsky also recognizes that such coping behavior can "contribute to the perversion of the service ideal or put the worker in the position of manipulating citizens on behalf of the agencies from which citizens seek help" (1980, p. xiii).

Not only i s there disagreement about what general conclusions to draw concerning the effects--positive, negative, o r mixed--of bureaucratic discretion, analysis and discussion of its prescriptive implications have occurred in a somewhat off-handed and rather implicit way. Many analysts would undoubtedly deny that they a re doing anything more than stating facts or tendering solely empirical conclusions. However, most engage in value-laden judgments, either by explicitly drawing conclusions of a normative sort--often in concluding paragraphs o r chapters--or rendering observations about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of what they have observed, hence implicitly offering a prescriptive judgment about what is conducive to obtaining policy goals. These judgments, however, often fail fully to recognize and explore the prescriptive questions they implicitly raise or rigorously analyze and weigh competing claims and arguments.

One exception to this last statement is the work of a group of seminal figures in public administration and political science who have been

Burke: A P r e s c r i p t i v e View of t h e implementation Process 219

at tent ive t o the broader relat ionship o f the administrat ive process a n d democratic pol i t ics. T h e exchange between Fr iedr ich (1940) and F iner (1941) would cer ta in ly fa l l in th is category, as would the work o f Caus (1936), Waldo (1948). Selznick (1949, 1957), Long (1949), Hyneman (19501, Maass (1951), Appleby (1952), Kaufman (1960), Price (1965), Mosher (1968). Sp i ro (1969), and Redford (1969). The problem wi th th is l i terature--at least from the perspect ive o f p rescr ip t i ve counsel about implementation--derives from the v e r y broad set o f questions tha t have concerned most o f these scholars--the relat ion o f the en t i re administrat ive process t o democratic ru le . Furthermore, most predate much of t h e empirical work o n implementation, hence most d o not d i rec t l y address the issues t o which analysis o f the implementation process par t i cu la r ly draws attention.

2

The Cont r ibu t ions of Moral a n d Polit ical Philosophy Given i t s more obvious normative concerns, the work o f moral and

pol i t ical phi losophers would seem t o o f fe r a more satisfactory te r ra in fo r discussion o f p rescr ip t i ve issues about what off icials "should" be doing in as they implement po l icy . B u t most pol i t ical theorists and phi losophers concerned w i t h public af fa i rs- -wi th some exceptions I w i l l mention in a moment--have no t d i rected t h e i r a t tent ion t o the kin s o f questions raised in t h e descr ip t ive l i te ra tu re o n pol icy implementation.

Among the more notable exceptions is Thompson's (1980) discussion o f the problem o f "many hands" in bureaucracy. Thompson grapples w i th the d i f f i c u l t quest ion o f determin ing how evaluation o f the "excuses"--claims o f a vol i t ional and causal s o r t tha t a re important in determining culpabi l i ty-- made by pub l ic off icials f o r the i r questionable actions d i f f e r s from accept- able excuses when ind iv iduals act in more p r i v a t e capacities and roles. Thompson's analysis i s ins t ruc t i ve in analyzing how the par t icu lar charac- t e r o f pol i t ical and bureaucrat ic contexts should enter in to an assessment o f cu lpabi l i ty . However, h e devotes comparably l i t t l e a t tent ion to the problem o f " just i f icat ion"--the analyt ical ly p r i o r stage o f determining what off icials should o r should not d o in the f i r s t place--which is cent ra l t o a n analysis o f the proper exercise o f discret ion.

Rohr's (1978) discussion o f regime values, d rawn from Supreme Cour t decisions, prov ides more d i rec t counsel about what off icials might just i f i - ab ly d o in "hard cases." It i s especially usefu l as a pedagogy fo r a ler t ing off icials t o the substant ive values and pol i t ical and moral import o f the i r act ivi t ies. However, a more ambitious project--such as d e r i v i n g a theory o f bureaucrat ic ethics from the Cour t 's decisions--seems r i s k y . I t may imply more temporal consistency in the Cour t 's ru l ings than even the Cour t i t se l f has envisioned; witness, for example, the Cour t 's sh i f t ing deci- sions--over a re la t ive ly shor t span o f time--as it has considered challenges t o var ious af f i rmat ive action plans (hence, a s h i f t in i t s views about claims o f equal i ty ) . Such an approach also may be over ly generous in d iscern ing phi losophical coherence and the presence o f substantive value judgment in what the C o u r t does, thereby undervalu ing the pol i t ical give-and-take ( ra ther than the "phi losophizing") tha t may u n d e r g i r d the Cour t 's ru l ings (e.g., Murphy, 1964).

Some scholars have offered general moral and philosophical pr inc ip les as guides f o r resolv ing matters o f administrat ive discret ion. Bailey (1965) argues tha t moral qual i t ies o f "optimism," "courage," and "fairness

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tempered by c h a r i t y " a re needed in pub l i c service. D v o r i n and Simmons ho ld tha t bu reauc ra ts should embrace values o f "courage," "humane val- ues," and " i n t e g r i t y " ( 1 9 7 2 ) . Fleishman and Payne (1980, pp. 36-38) emphasize " fa i r procedure,'I "dut ies o f beneficence," a n d "perhaps tha t o f compassion." Moore (1981, pp. 3-31) f i n d s a genera l "obl igation t o p u r s u e t h e public interest," a need fo r "awareness o f the consequences o f one's actions, I' "obl igations t o au tho r i z ing processes and inst i tut ions," as well as t h e obl igatory "dut ies o f beneficence." Warwick (1981, pp. 93-127) states tha t bureaucrats need t o serve t h e pub l i c in terest , unders tand organiza- t ional routines, respect procedures, d ischarge t h e i r du t i es truthfully, and exerc ise res t ra in t in choosing means. In t h e same volume as Moore and Warwick, Yates concludes t h a t bu reauc ra ts a re in a special pos i t ion o f making va luat ive choices, but confesses " I do no t know what substant ive pub l i c ph i losophy i s l i ke l y t o emerge as a resul t " (1981, p. 50) .

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE

Yates' p o i n t about t h e difficulty o f making such va luat ive choices i s well taken (see also Lil la, 1981; Cooper, 1982) ; but h i s subsequent comment about t h e substant ive character o f such a phi losophy i s especially te l l ing. It i s prec ise ly tha t such choices a r e substantive--that is, t ha t t hey em- b o d y pa r t i cu la r phi losophical po in ts o f view o r lead t o the allocation o f po l i t ica l goods a n d services--that make the task o f determin ing bureaucrat - i c responsib i l i t ies for p r o p e r l y exerc is ing d iscret ion so d i f f i c u l t .

It is no t my purpose a t t h i s po in t t o o f f e r a fu l l -b lown theo ry o f re- sponsible bu reauc ra t i c conduct in t h e implementation process; a few pages cannot do just ice t o such a task. Rut , d raw ing o n thoughts about bu- reaucrat ic conduct t h a t I have developed elsewhere (Burke , 1986) , I shall o f fe r some general comments about how I think such a theo ry can b e de r i ved and what i t s cen t ra l tenets are.

T h e approach I shall use bu i l ds upon two observations. F i r s t , we need t o make b e t t e r sense o f what we a l ready know about t h e implementation process. Descr ip t ions about bureaucrat ic behavior in the implementation process v a r y widely, as d o conclusions about whether t h i s behavior, especially t h e exerc ise o f discret ion, serves o r h inde rs t h e attainment o f pot icy goals. T h i s d i v e r s i t y i s perhaps i nhe ren t in a f i e ld wh ich has re l ied so heavi ly on case studies. B u t the quest ion o f p roper and ideal methodology aside, rel iance on pa r t i cu la r case studies forces u s t o look f o r similari t ies and d i f ferences among cases in answering questions about the p r o p e r ro le o f d iscret ion in t h e implementation process. What a t f i rst glance may seem t o b e con t rad i c to ry f i nd ings and conclusions may in fact on l y b e observat ions about v e r y d i f f e r e n t t ypes o f po l icy implementation. A broader system o f classif icat ion i s t h u s needed t o begin t o make p re - sc r i p t i ve sense o f t h e implementation process.

T h e second observat ion follows f rom Yates' po in t concern ing t h e sub- s tan t i ve n a t u r e o f t h e choices made in pol icy implementation. If, in his words, a "pub l i c ph i losophy" is a t stake--and, g i v e n the ab i l i t y o f imple- mentors t o af fect t h e scope and content o f public policy, the re i s v e r y good reason t o think h e is r ight - -we need t o frame p resc r ip t i ve judgments bea r ing in mind t h e implementor's accountabi l i ty for h i s o r h e r actions.

Accountabi l i ty should f i g u r e centra l ly in a p resc r ip t i ve analysis o f t he implementation process because it raises, in a broader theoretical

Burke: A P r e s c r i p t i v e View o f t h e Implementation Process 221

perspective, prec ise ly the prescr ip t i ve issues a t stake when administrators think about exerc is ing d iscret ion: Who possesses au thor i ty in the pol icy process? T o whom d o implementors answer? What are they authorized t o do? For what a re they accountable? As Romzek and Dubnick (1987) have recent ly po inted out, accountabi l i ty does no t jus t mean "answerabil ity," nor need i t s exercise b e confined t o "mere formalistic" responses. Admin- i s t ra t i ve accountabi l i ty more broadly involves how "publ ic agencies and workers manage the d iverse expectations w i th in and outside the organiza- t ion" (1987, p. 2 2 8 ) . Managing d iverse expectations--whether one's own o r those o f o thers- - f igures s t rongly in determining when off icials should exercise d iscret ion. B y approaching implementation from th is perspective, we can beg in t o make be t te r sense o f what is invo lved in the legitimate exercise o f discret ion; t o make sure, in Yates' words, tha t the "substan- t i v e phi losophy" implici t in the exercise o f d iscret ion is a p roper one.

A n emphasis o n "legitimacy" and "accountabi l i ty" need not simply mean, however, tha t t h e pol icy views and posit ions o f those w i th "formal" author- i ty o r those "h igher-up" in the administrat ive chain o f command should always prevai l . As Palumbo and Calista po in t ou t in the i r d i f ferent ia t ion between "top down," "bottom up," a n d "backward mapping" approaches, the debate over accountabi l i ty in the implementation process is complex and mul t is t randed. In fact, i f we turn t o one o f seminal po ints in the or ig ins of the general debate over bureaucrat ic accountabi l i ty--the exchange between Finer (1941) and Fr iedr ich (1940)--we can see, in Professor Fr iedr ich 's position, a nonformalist ic view o f accountabi l i ty that in the last 50 years has gained increasing allegiance.

Dimension I: Source o f Di rect ion We can also find in t h i s ear ly debate the emergence o f two d is t inct

views o f accountabi l i ty tha t are usefu l in d iscr iminat ing among types o f d iscret ion. The f i rs t , fol lowing Finer's lead, occurs when the source o f d i rect ion over po l icy implementation largely l ies in the hands o f inst i tu- t ions, processes, and persons (e.g., h igher pol i t ical author i t ies o r the publ ic ) who are external t o those actual ly engaged in implementing pol icy. The second type, fol lowing from ( b u t no t confined to) Fr iedr ich 's position, arises when the source o f d i rect ion largely originates d i rec t l y from those involved in implementation; in th is case, d i rect ion over pol icy implementa- t ion is internal in character.

Dimension I I : A b i l i t y t o Contro l t h e Exercise o f Discretion In addi t ion t o determining the source o f accountabi l i ty--the implementor

o r some external ent i ty - -we also need t o d is t inguish the ab i l i t y o f d i f fe ren t sources, in Dimension I, t o exercise contro l over the implementation pro- cess. Here we can usefu l ly take a cue from more recent, descr ip t ive studies o f implementation and examine the abi l i ty o f various sources t o exercise contro l over po l icy outcomes. Put most simply, we need to ex- p lo re whether the abi l i ty o f tha t source o f direct ion, external o r internal, i s s t rong o r weak.

T Y POLOCl C A L APPROACH

Together, these two dimensions generate a typology usefu l n d is t in- ir gu ish ing d i f fe ren t si tuations where d iscret ion might be exercised:

2 2 2 Policy Studies Review, Autumn 1987, 7:l

Source o f Di rect ion Over Policy Implementation

Ex te rna l I n te rna l

S t r o n g I I I l e . 9. Formal- Legal] [e.g. Professional]

A b i l i t y t o

Con t ro l Implementation

Process

I l l I V [e.g. Fragmented [e.g. Personal and

Implementation] Moral]

On t h e one hand, t h e t ypo logy allows u s to classify and unders tand tha t t he re a r e o f ten vast d i f terences in situations where the exercise o f dis- c re t i on arises. Fo r example, d iscret ion tha t i s motivated by the need t o follow t h e d ic ta tes of h ighe r au tho r i t y [Cel l I ] ve rsus d iscret ion tha t is based o n t h e i nd i v idua l o f f ic ia ls own moral sense o f right and wrong [Cel l I V ] . Or, t o take t h e two o the r cells, d iscret ion t h a t is g rounded in the exercise o f professional exper t i se ve rsus d iscret ion tha t i s a response t o condi t ions ex i s t i ng in a fragmented implementation process. These d is t inc- t ions a re impor tant because it is o f ten the case in the l i t e ra tu re on pol icy implementation t h a t t he word "d iscret ion" is commonly used t o r e f e r t o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t bu reauc ra t i c act iv i t ies .

More impor tant ly , t he typology enables u s t o beg in to make sense of the p r e s c r i p t i v e implications i nvo l ved in the exercise o f discret ion, especially in answer ing t h e c r i t i ca l quest ion: When should of f ic ia ls exercise discre- t ion? When abi l i t ies t o con t ro l what goes o n in the implementation process a r e strong--i .e. when formal-legal const ra in ts [Cel l I ] o r the dictates o f professional exper t i se [Cel l I I ] p r o v i d e workable gu ides o n t h e act iv i t ies o f po l icy implementors, d iscret ion i s less necessary. When external o r in- ternal sources o f d i rec t i on a r e weak, t he just i f icat ion fo r exerc is ing dis- c re t i on increases--i.e. where pol icy implementation ex i s t s u n d e r condit ions o f f ragmentat ion [Cel l I l l] o r where a n of f ic ia l 's own personal preferences gu ide implementation [Cel l I V ] .

As 1 shall s h o r t l y argue, t he case fo r o r against d iscret ion in each instance i s a bit more complex than th is . B u t by determin ing t h e descrip- tive facts about pa r t i cu la r acts o f implementation and p r o p e r l y c lass i fy ing each case in i t s right cell, we can beg in t o a r r i v e a t some p resc r ip t i ve unders tand ing o f when d iscret ion is o r i s n o t called for . Le t u s consider each cel l in turn.

I. Ex te rna l Di rect ion--St rong Contro l . In t h i s cell, we can locate cases o f po l icy implementation tha t occur when 1) external agents ex is t , and 2 ) are able t o exercise s t r o n g con t ro l ove r t h e pol icy process. These a re s i tuat ions when t h e t yp i ca l formal-legal view o f accountabi l i ty i s a t i t s strongest; s i tuat ions where a respect f o r formal h ie ra rchy w i th in the organization---obedience t o superiors--and deference t o the d ic ta tes o f po l i t ica l author i t ies outs ide the bureaucracy a r e b o t h possible and feasible.

These condi t ions a re l i ke l y t o occur when: (1) policies a re implemented w i t h i n one agency o r depar tment ( t h e organizational "distance" between

Burke: A P r e s c r i p t i v e View o f t h e Implementation Process 223

po l i cy formulation and pol icy implementation is re la t ive ly b r i e f ) ; I 2 1 the organizat ion i t se l f is re la t ive ly uncomplex ( f o r example, t he "span" o f con t ro l by h ighe r -ups i s re la t ive ly sho r t ) ; and (3) po l icy tasks a re rela- t i v e l y simple.

Where h i g h e r author i t ies a re a t ten t i ve t o the implementation process, possess the means t o con t ro l what ind iv iduals f u r t h e r down in the organizat ion and f u r t h e r o n in the implementation process a re doing, and each o f t h e th ree character is t ics conducive t o formal, external cont ro l are a t t h e i r highest, t h e n t h e case against t h e exercise of d iscret ion is genera l ly s t rong. In contrast, as each o f these condit ions lessens, t he need t o exercise d iscret ion r ises. Thus, one p resc r ip t i ve s tandard fo r evaluat ing the exerc ise o f d iscret ion relates t o the ex ten t t o which these condi t ions fo r formal, ex te rna l cont ro l are met. When they a re closely approximated, t hen t h e need f o r exerc is ing d iscret ion weakens; when they a r e not, t h e need f o r d iscret ion is strengthened.

B u t even when ex te rna l author i t ies can exercise contro l and d i rect ion o v e r po l i cy implementation, o the r l imi ts o f formal-legal and re!atec! ap- proaches tha t fit in Cel l I should b e recognized. S ingular rel iance upon t h e d ic ta tes o f formal pol i t ical authorit ies, f o r example, could lead t o an ove r l y s t r i c t adherence to laws, rules, and regulat ions. Taken to the extreme, formal adherence can become formalist ic adherence: off icials lose s igh t o f general po l icy goals and become ove r l y scrupulous in the i n te rp re - ta t ion o f t h e i r a u t h o r i t y and dut ies.

These l imitat ions suggest that, while tak ing external d i rec t i on and con t ro l ser ious ly when the condi t ions o f Cel l 1 exist, we also need t o consider exercises o f d iscret ion tha t fa l l sho r t o f substant ive pol icymaking, but which might make pos i t ive contr ibut ions to t h e pol icy process nonethe- less. Those invo lved in pol icy implementation might, f o r example, exercise d iscret ion in ways tha t faci l i tate the ab i l i t y o f h ighe r author i t ies to make informed, knowledgeable po l icy choices. O r they might exercise d iscret ion in ways tha t encourage the effect iveness o f t h e i r own pol icy tasks, as in L i p s k y ' s discussion (1 980) o f t h e "coping behavior" o f street- level bureau- crats . Thus, a n area for f u r t h e r research when cases o f po l icy implemen- ta t ion fa l l i n t o Cell I i s how d iscret ion might b e exercised in a way tha t enhances the mission and mandate o f external authorit ies, while no t det rac- ting f rom t h e i r ult imate responsib i l i ty f o r de f i n ing tha t mission and de- termin ing i t s mandate.

1 1 . I n te rna l Di rect ion--St rong Contro l . In t h i s cell we can place exer- cises o f d iscret ion tha t occur when t h e source o f d i rec t i on is in ternal - - i t i s genera l ly t h e implementor who i s the source--and the ab i l i t y t o contro l t he process i s s t rong. Such i s t h e case t yp i ca l l y when matters o f technical exper t i se and professional competence call f o r t he exercise o f d iscret ion.

T h e place o f professional exper t ise in the bureaucracy, especially t he ro le o f professional autonomy, raise complex issues tha t have been t h e subject o f extens ive discussion elsewhere (see, f o r e.g., Fr iedr ich, 1940; Price, 1965; Mosher, 1968; Elurke, 1986, pp. 24-37, 142-1601, and cannot b e discussed h e r e w i th the at tent ion they deserve. Bu t , a t least genera l ly speaking, where professionals and other technical exper t s have been g r a n t e d d i sc re t i on or l icense t o act on t he basis o f t h e i r own sk i l l s and judgement, deference t o t h e i r d iscret ion i s obv ious ly in order .

However, as in the case o f formal-legal approaches in Cel l I, the l imits o f professional exper t ise must also b e recognized. The fact t ha t off icials

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possess professional sk i l l s o r knowledge t o which others invo lved in o r a f fected by t h e pol icy process might defer does n o t necessari ly imply, however, t ha t d iscret ion should b e exercised in a l l cases. Professional exper t ise can b e misapplied o r no t b e applicable in some cases. F u r t h e r - more, t h e professional community's own in terests can sometimes predomi- nate, o f ten a t t he expense o f t he publ ic 's in terest . Thus, despi te the need f o r genera l deference t o professional exper t ise in the implementation process, f u r t h e r analysis i s needed about how such deference m igh t b e tempered by a recogni t ion o f t he contestable and o f ten problematic charac- t e r of professional judgment and pract ice.

I l l . Ex te rna l Direction--Weak Control. In t h i s ce l l we find implementa- t i on t a k i n g place in a con tex t where the implementor cannot muster good reasons fo r exerc is ing discret ion, n o r can external author i t ies exercise s t r o n g con t ro l and d i rec t i on ove r t h e implementor's act iv i t ies . Such cases a re l i ke l y t o a r i se when condi t ions f o r s t rong ex te rna l cont ro l out l ined above (Cel l 1) a r e weakest: t he d is tance between pol icy formulation and implementation i s great , t h e implementing organization i s complex, and pol icy tasks a re d i f f i c u l t t o achieve. Here the exercise o f d iscret ion is on weakest grounds-- there a r e no s t r o n g " in ternal " reasons fo r it (e.g. i t i s no t a matter of professional exper t ise) - -yet external d i rec t i on p rov ides no ready subst i tu te . As lanel lo (1987) suggests, po l icy implementation i s fragmented in such cases: "cr i t ica l po l icy i s made a t lower levels.. .w i thout guidance from u p p e r levels.' '

What po l icy implementors m igh t d o in such cases c lear ly cal ls f o r fur- t h e r though t and research. O f a l l o f cases o f po l icy implementation in each o f the f o u r cells, implementation u n d e r the circumstances o f Cell I l l has been re la t i ve l y unexplored.

T h r e e possibi l i t ies, however, do come t o mind. F i r s t , exercises o f d iscret ion u n d e r these circumstances should b e remedial in character . Condit ions o f fragmentation a r e n o t genera l ly ones suitable f o r e f fect ive pol icy implementation. Of f ic ia ls caught in those condit ions should try t o ge t themselves o u t o f them, e i the r by request ing more formal d i rec t i on where possible ( i n effect, approx imat ing the condit ions o f Cell I ) o r devel- op ing t h e i r own exper t i se (moving toward t h e condit ions of Cell 1 1 ) .

Secondly, i f d iscret ion is exercised, i t should b e incremental and prag- matic: moving f o r w a r d in small steps based o n experience and pract ica l resul ts . Pol icy decisions leading to long range commitments and g rounded in rat ional p lann ing seem especially unsui tab le in such circumstances.

Final ly, implementors might t ake a cue f rom cases where pol icy implementation in contexts of decentral ized par t ic ipat ion has been successful. Decentral ized par t ic ipat ion o f ten takes place in situations where pol icy goals a re unc lear and t h e pol i t ical environment f rom which off icials a re expected t o take the i r cue i s fluid and i l l -defined. Exercises o f d iscret ion t h a t have con t r i bu ted t o po l icy outcomes in such situations might y ie ld use fu l lessons f o r implementation tha t takes place u n d e r condi t ions o f more genera l fragmentation.

I V . I n te rna l Direction--Weak Contro l . In th i s cell, we find discret ion exerc ised essential ly on the basis o f t he off icial 's own judgment. One va r ian t o f t h i s approach--the not ion t h a t o f f ic ia ls should d o whatever they feel j us t i f i ed in doing--can, I think, b e dismissed r a t h e r qu i ck l y . To u r g e those invo lved in the implementation process t o exercise d iscret ion in any matter t hey see f i t - -o ther t h i n g s being equal--compromises t h e

Burke: A Prescriptive View of the Implementation Process 225

i n tegr i t y o f a pol icy process a t work w i t h i n a democratic political framework. Elevating personal beliefs to the level of bureaucratic practice compromises the logic and purposes o f democracy : principles basic to democratic government, such as consent, majority rule, and minority r ights, could be violated i f a policy implementor's personal beliefs are transported, without proper justification, into a political context where public policy is direct ly affected. It could, for example, lead to a substantive redefinit ion o f the ends and purposes o f publ ic policy based on the implementor's own preferences and predilections, not those o f broader inst i tut ions and processes.

These problems also arise when the implementor's personal moral views call for the exercise of discretion. Many moral and political philosophers, including most o f those mentioned earlier, would just i fy a morally grounded exercise of discret ion based on the presumed merit o f the moral principles in question. Certainly such a view has the advantage o f encouraging a process of questioning and reasoning about one's conduct. Furthermore, it is tempting to appeal to "duties o f beneficence," "humane values," and I lrestraint on means" and the like.

But save for moral dilemmas that crop up a t the extreme--the kinds o f problems raised in the Nuremberg principles, for example--I would argue that a pure ly moral view is an unwise way o f ascertaining the responsibil- ities o f policy implementors. Again, the reasons for th is are complex and require fu r ther discussion (see Burke, 1986, pp. 100-141, 161-178). Put simply, the problem is that giving personal ethical beliefs such a priv- ileged position in considering how officials ought to consider their conduct runs the r i sk o f arbitrariness; that is, it may impose one's own preter- ences--albeit regarded as "morall'--as binding in a more general political context. Consider, for example, d i f ferent moral views we have about such matters as abortion, r igh ts o f privacy, sexual practices, and other matters of personal conduct.

This is not to suggest that moral reasoning is wholly arbi t rary, but only that i f part icular moral principles o r points o f view are applied in a public context fu r ther justification is necessary. That justification, more- over, would seem to be political in nature; that is, i t would require analy- sis o f the political standing and legitimacy o f moral duties and obligations. In democracies, exercises o f publ ic authority, the discretion o f bureaucrats included, must ultimately stem from the consent o f the governed and the workings o f the inst i tut ions legitimized by that consent, not simply the assertions, however well-meaning, o f moral and political philosophers and those involv d in pol icy implementation who might be inclined to accept their advice.

In contrast to discret ion which has i t s source in personal and moral beliefs, discret ionary action might be permitted i f additional arguments could be made on i t s behalf. That is, it is not only the implementors personal beliefs o r moral views that just i fy the act o f discretion but other reasons can be marshalled as well.

What precisely those other reasons are must remain for fu tu re discus- sions. A t least two, however, are suggested in the cur ren t l i terature and deserve b r ie f mention. The f i r s t can be found in Lipsky's (1980) analysis of street-level bureaucrats. Street-level bureaucrats exercise discretion, in Lipsky's view, in order to cope w i t h the demands o f the job and the limited resources at their disposal. Lipsky's depiction o f the plight of

2

226 Policy S t u d i e s Review, Autumn 1987, 7:1

street- level bureaucrats i s compelling in light o f the circumstances in which they are forced t o operate. B u t the i r d iscret ion seems par t i cu la r ly just i f ied g i v e n t h e i r own personal skil ls, knowledge, and exper t ise in de l i ver ing goods and services t o t h e i r cl ients. In a way, then, while the i r d iscret ion is personal in i t s source--hence in Cell IV-- i t has characterist ics tha t resemble those o f professional exper t ise (Cell 1 1 ) : it is d iscret ion tha t i s job-related a n d based o n knowledge and exper t ise about what i s necessary f o r the ef fect ive de l i very o f goods and services.

James Q. Wilson's analysis o f police behavior prov ides another sugges- t i ve l ine o f argument concerning d iscret ion exercised under condit ions o f Cell IV . In h i s s t u d y o f police departments tha t were characterized by a "service" style, Wilson found sign i f icant amounts o f d iscret ion among police o n the beat. Accord ing t o Wilson, service-style police departments " take seriously a l l requests f o r e i ther law enforcement o r o rder maintenance ... but are less l i ke ly t o respond by making an ar res t o r otherwise imposing formal sanctions.. . . The pol ice in tervene f requent ly but no t formally" (Wil- son, 1968, p. 200) .

Service-style exercises o f police d iscret ion by and large work well when there is a shared consensus in the community suppor t ive o f police act iv i - t ies. Service s ty le police exercise discret ion, but they do so as i f they possessed some mandate f rom "h igher au thor i ty " tha t i s characterist ic o f Cell I (a l though noie tha t instead o f a formal mandate it is a community based consensus o n the need t o exercise d iscret ion) .

Thus, in b o t h L ipsky 's and Wilson's analyses o f bureaucrat ic discret ion, we find off icials exerc is ing d iscret ion on the i r own (hence, Cell IV) , but f o r reasons t h a t resemble the condit ions o f Cell I (Wilson's service-style police operat ing w i t h the perception o f a s t rong pub l ic mandate) o r Cell I I (L ipsky 's street- level bureaucrats act ing as quasi-professionals) . Th is i s ins t ruc t i ve since it suggests more general ru les in resolv ing questions about the proper course of act ion in Cell IV- type situations.

L ipsky and Wilson are also ins t ruc t i ve about the l imits to the exercise o f d iscret ion in the cases they explore. As I noted earl ier, L ipsky admits tha t d iscret ion becomes problematic when it p u t s the street- level bureau- c r a t "in the pos i t ion o f manipulat ing cit izens on behalf o f the agencies from which cit izens seek help" ( 1 9 8 0 , p. x i i i ) . Here, manipulation and bureau- c ra t i c goals have replaced exper t ise and experienced-based de l i very of goods and services, and the exercise o f d iscret ion leads t o less pos i t ive pol i c y consequences.

Wilson's serv ice style, in turn, is l i ke ly t o become problematic when the community's suppor t o f the police and the community's consensus about p roper police a c t i v i t y breaks down. As Wilson notes, a service-style i s most l i ke ly t o b e found in "homogenous, middle class communities... [where] the pol ice see t h e i r ch ie f responsib i l i ty as p ro tec t ing a common def in i t ion of pub l ic o rder against t h e minor and occasional threats posed by unruly teenagers and 'outsiders'" (1968, p. 200) . Where class and racial d i f ferences d iv ide the community o ther pat terns o f police behavior a re called for . Departments can become "legalistic" in the enforcement of the law, in which of f icers exercise v e r y l i t t le discret ion. O r they can become "watchmen," in which they exercise signif icant amounts o f discre- t ion in preserv ing pub l ic order , but of ten a t the expense o f fairness in t h e i r treatment o f minor i ty groups.

Burke: A P resc r ip t i ve View of t he Implementation Process 227

CONCLUSION

These suggestions about ways o f approaching and perhaps even resolv- ing some o f the prescr ip t i ve issues present in pol icy implementation are on ly tentat ive and admittedly incomplete. Not on ly d o we need t o think f u r t h e r about the broad dif ferences d is t inguished in each o f the four cells o f the typology, we also need t o think about d i f ferences in pol icy imple- mentation tha t occur w i th in each cell. A l though tha t takes us beyond the scope o f t h i s essay, it does suggest tha t by systematically understanding the d i f ferences a n d similari t ies among a wide range o f cases o f po l icy implementation, we can begin t o ga in some sense o f when and how those invo lved can make a pos i t ive cont r ibu t ion t o the implementation process.

T h e pol icy process is incremental in character, r idden w i th "bureau- c ra t i c pol i t ics" and other behavior tha t can det ract from the attainment o f po l icy goals. But i t i s also a fluid process, one where the in tent ions and behavior o f ind iv iduals bear pract ica l consequences f o r the k i n d s o f goods and services government del ivers. Thus, i t i s a process tha t can b e changed in more pos i t ive d i rect ions in order be t te r t o a t ta in po l icy goals. Bureaucrat ic discret ion, p r o p e r l y exercised, does not necessarily guarantee ef fect ive and ef f ic ient pub l i c pol icy; it i s only one among a number of strategies tha t are p a r t o f the pro ject o f making bureaucracy ef fect ive and accountable in a pol i t ical democracy. B u t g iven the centra l role o f bu- reaucrat ic actors a n d what they think and d o in at ta in ing pub l ic po l icy goals, speculation about alternative, more responsible courses o f behavior i s l i ke ly t o f i g u r e impor tant ly in tha t e f fo r t .

NOTES

'As Rein and Rabinowitz conclude in a review o f th is l i terature, imple- mentation is genera l ly viewed as a "c i rcu lar o r looping" process in which "no one par t i c ipant in t h e process ever rea l ly i s wi l l ing t o stop in te rven ing in the other p a r t s o f the process jus t because h i s stage has been passed" (Rein & Rabinowitz, 1978, p. 322).

2 0 n e o f the classic pieces in th is ear l ier l i terature, W.A.R. Leys' 1943 ar t ic le in Public Administrution Review o n administrat ive discretion--now f o r t y years o ld but provocat ive nonetheless--exemplifies these d i f f icu l t ies. Leys o f fe rs a use fu l classif icat ion o f types o f administrat ive d iscret ion : actions invo lv ing (1) evaluation o f technical matters, (2) c lar i f icat ion o f vague cr i ter ia , and ( 3 ) resolut ion o f pol i t ical disputes. B u t unfor tunate ly he does no t address the d i f f i c u l t issue o f determining when and what kind of bureaucrat ic la t i tude i s just i f ied in each case, n o r i s the classif icat ion grounded in concrete cases o r examples o f bureaucrat ic discret ion.

'The bulk o f speculation, fo r example, has focused o n areas such as whist le blowing (e.g., Nader, et. al, 1972; Peters & Branch. 1972; Pr i - mack & von Hippel, 1974; Weisband & Franck, 1975; Westin, 1981; Bowman, 1980). cor rup t ion (e.g., Heidenheimer, 1978; Johnston, 1982), a n d the tension between dictates o f o f f ice and the demands o f conscience and personal morality--problems of "dirty hands" (e.g., Walzer, 1973; Kleinig, 1976; Nagel, 1978; Mack, 1980). T h e ethical impor t o f par t i cu la r policies, such as famine re l ie f (e.g., A iken E La Follette, 1977; Brown & Shue,

228 Policy Studies Review, Autumn 1987, 7:l

1977), fo re ign pol icy (e.g.. Beitz. 1979; Shue, 1980), and economic d is t r i - bu t ion (e.g.. A r t h u r & Shaw, 1978; Brown, Johnson & Vernier, 1981). has also received attention, as have questionable practices, such as secrecy and deception, tha t a re endemic t o pol i t ics (e.g., Fr iedr ich, 1972; Bok, 1978, 1982). Each o f these topics raises important ethical and normative questions tha t r e q u i r e resolut ion i f we are t o have an accountable and responsible bureaucracy. B u t they d o no t address the problems o f off icial responsib i l i ty and conduct t o which L ipsky, Wildavsky and Pressman, et al., have d r a w n attention.

4Policy implementors who d o possess au thor i ty to make substant ive pol icy choices--for example, professionals o r those mandated t o make pol icy in concert w i th community g roups in decentral ized pol i t ical settings--would o f course no t fal l u n d e r th is r u b r i c . For f u r t h e r discussion o f th is issue and responsibi l i t ies f o r implementation apply in these settings, see B u r k e (1986, pp. 142-160, 197-215).

'On th is po in t about the l imits o f philosophy's role in a democratic pol i t ical context see Walzer's (1981) more extended discussion.

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