A Practical Security Handbook for Activists and Campaigns v2.5 (Booklet)

8/3/2019 A Practical Security Handbook for Activists and Campaigns v2.5 (Booklet)

1/24

Dont hesitate to get rid of a mobile if it is star ting tocome too hot. If a phone has been a central point ofcontact during a campaign or a period of action, get ridof it at the end.Consider using your personal phones as a potential alibi get friends to use them at your home, etc, so creating theillusion that you were using them at the time.

There are many reasons why you might want to make anony-mous phone calls to people, both allies and targets. Follow theabove guidelines to keep yourself safe from being traced back.If you are targeting someone, dont respond to any calls theymake back to you, as tempting as it is to hear their reaction.

A common tactic, which is also relatively cheap, is to ring anumber, allow the bell to ring once and ring off, repeating end-lessly. Using repeat dial this can be done for some time, ef-

fectively blocking the other persons phone line without havingto pay for the costs of the call. However, this form of phoneblockading may actually be illegal as it could be considered toamount to harassment.

As IMEI numbers are now associated with phone calls, it is nolonger sufficient to remove the SIM card to hide your trace. Itis important now to get rid of the phone itself as well. Whengetting ride of a phone that poses a security risk to be caughtwith, it is recommended the SIM card is removed and melted,and phone itself is thoroughly destroyed. Phone with less ofa risk can be sold on the second hand market, though it ispreferable to separate out the SIM card and sell it separately.

14.5 purchaSIngmobIleSanonymouSly

To ensure anonymity take the following precautions when buy-ing a mobile phone:

Make your purchase in a shop away from where you live.Try if possible to avoid town centres where there is agreater likelihood that you will be on CCTV. Many small orsecond hand shops do not have cameras and those thatdo are unlikely to retain tapes for longer than a week ifat all. High street shops & supermarkets will keep CCTVfootage for much longer. Follow the general guidelines forpurchasing equipment (see previous section).Do not give real details if asked. Many shops do ask forpersonal information, but do not require proof of ID. Incountries such as the UK this is not actually required asyet, and is done under the guise of marketing or for anti-theft purposes, but you are entitled to refuse. However, inorder to draw less attention it is probably better to givefalse information.Go for simple phones without all the extra features nowbeing made available.Pay with cash.Do not register the phone if you do not have to, or elsegive fake/alternative details, preferably the same ones youhave given the retailer.

Burn all packaging. Most packaging carries various bar

codes that permit a particular phone to be associatedwith it and thus where it has been sold, etc.

Topping up credit

When setting up the mobile, use pay-as-you-go options wherepossible; this is a more expensive solution, but is much betterfor anonymity. As with any purchase, this can be used to linkyou to the purchase and thus to the phone, so follow the sameguidelines for other equipment avoid CCTV, wear nondescript

clothes, baseball caps, etc and pick smaller shops. Use cashto purchase top-up vouchers rather than credit cards / ATMmachines to top-up swipe cards. Burn or otherwise securelydispose of any top-up vouchers, etc.

15. concluSIonRemember, security is about empowering yourself to take ac-tion in todays repressive society. If you are not taking action,then your opponents have won. There is no such thing as afoolproof system, and there will be an element of risk to every-thing you do, but do not be put off by this.

At the end of the day we are all motivated by a desire tochange the world for the better and that is something thattakes courage to do in the first place. You have already made

the important steps, so please take away from this ar ticle theknowledge to keep making those steps towards your goal. Beempowered, keep fighting and stay free.

If you dont understand some points or need further help,always ask. It is better to be safe than sorry.

The authors have kept themselves active and free for manyyears now, so there is no reason why you cannot do the same,without making their mistakes.

16. FInal note, dISclaImerandcontact detaIlSWe have written this article based on personal experience,discussing techniques which have kept us active and out oftrouble with the law. It is not perfect, and no doubt there areparts you disagree with, we have got wrong or simply missedout. If you have any constructive criticism or suggestions oftechniques to add in, please do not hesitate to get in touch. Ifwe agree, we will include them in the next version.

Nothing in this article should be taken as encouragement tocommit illegal acts within the jurisdiction you live in. Some ofthe things discussed may be illegal in one jurisdiction, but notin others. Everything presented in this article is for informa-tional purposes, and the authors and publishers are at painsto note that people should not break the law, no matter howmuch an ass it is or it protects the interests of capitalists overthe interests of the planet and its inhabitants. We accept noliability for the accuracy of the material in this booklet or ifyou get it wrong. Sorry.

Written October, 2004. Last update: May

2007. Anti-copyright, 2004 - 2007. Not

to be included in any commercial publica-

tion, electronic or otherwise, without the

expressed permission of the authors.

Contact us [email protected] are that we are too busybeing out on actions to reply toevery email, but corrections andsuggestions are always welcome.

v

A Practical Security Handbofor Activists and Campaign

from http://activistsecurity.org


2/24

..::www. A c t i v i s t S e c u r i t y .org::..

A Practical Security Handbookfor Activists and Campaigns

version 2.5

Authored in the UKby activistsecurity.org

PDF and US distribution byQuiver distro - Santa Cruz, CA

2009

This guide is dedicated to all those who

have died for freedom. Many have been

honoured; many, many more have no one

to recall their sacrifice. It does not take

much to be a hero, just to stand up inthe face of injustice, when the odds are

overwhelming, and stand firm for what you

believe in. Let them not have died in vain.

14.3 networKanalySIS

There is a third class of risk associated with mobile phonesand that is analysis of patterns associated with their use. Thiscan be done to a limited extent with land lines, such as whomdo you phone the most and when, but with mobile phonesthere is a greater scope due to the changing geographical fac-tor. In particular, this allows a phone to be associated with ahousehold or individual, even if that phone has been registeredas pay-as-you-go. Other information such analysis will provideincludes the particular network of contacts associated withthat phone and thus its owner.

Once a phone is used it hooks into the network. So if you useyour new mobile to call the land line or mobile of a knownactivist, your phone is marked for attention. The more it isused in such a fashion the more that phone is compromised

and linked into the network. Thus once the phone is used inthis fashion then it should be considered compromised, evenif youve taken care not to have your name associated with it.

Where and when phones are turned off is also telling. If every-one goes to a meeting place then turns off their phone that isa clear signal that something is up in that area. Likewise, ifone person is being tracked to a meeting place, those monitor-ing them can see if other phones in that cell are switched offat the same time, thus giving them insight into the potentialnetwork of individuals associated with their target. Similarly ata meeting, knowing the phones there can be use identify theindividuals present. It does not even have to be a meeting itcan be the fact that youve visited someones house so makinga connection between the two of you.

From another angle, if a selection of known phones appearsin the same cell or nearby cells and then get turned off it is anindication that something is taking place.

The best solution if you dont want to be associated with ameeting is to leave your phones at home (switched on), or turnthem off some time before you get to the designated area.

14.4 mobIlephoneSandactIvISm

The above sounds somewhat frightening, and it is meant tobe. In our view, mobiles phones pose a considerable risk andfacilitate state monitoring of us. They are also a nuisance towatch out for. It is easy for someone to slip into a public meet-ing and use their mobile as a recording device or for takingphotographs. This is on top of the sheer nuisance value ofpeoples phones ringing during meetings and people actuallyanswering them. If someone took out a microphone and videocamera, we would not hesitate to challenge them: there is noreason to treat mobile phones any differently when they supplythe same functions. People come up with all sorts of excusesnot to be separated from their mobiles, such as denying thethreat, or saying theyre expecting important calls, but wevesurvived well enough without them, so we can do so again for

several hours.

As with all security, one has to analyze the risk - but when theexecutives of large corporations are wary of them for securityreasons then we should treat them with the same caution.

To help defeat the various risks associated with networkanalysis change your phone number and phone on a regularbasis. Purchase pay-as-you-go phones in a secure manner (seebelow), and avoid registering them in your name. Governmentsare in the process of trying to phase out pay-as-you-go phones

so all mobile phones will be registered to indcountry requires a phone to be registered, codresses of friends/squats and false names; swfriends on a regular basis as well.

If you are arrested with a phone you can be suthe police will forever associate that number wwill go through the information on it, includingrecent made/received calls, and address boduring the time of the action will clearly placethe picture and if the police can put names tthose other phones then it puts them in the fiThus if an action is going wrong, get rid of soon as possible, preferably securely. What yois ring a land line to say that you are in troublfree of fingerprints and dump it first.

14.4.1 Meetings

Depending on your required security we recolowing list of action to be taken, graded in terrisk

Turn off all phones.a)Place in a box in another room.b)Remove batteries.c)Turn off before well before getting d)place.Leave at home altogether.e)

Give to someone else to take elsewhef)

14.4.2 Covert Action

For all our negative opinion on phones, we do play a valuable role in activism in terms of kegroups in contact or for use on actions.

The trick is to create a network of phones tha

into any other networks. This is known as closhas been used very effectively by different groIf the risk associated with being caught is greainvesting in a set of phones to create a closefor that action and following the guidelines se

Follow the guidelines for purchasing mobEnsure that none of the phones in the netwring any of your friends or contacts, or inoutside of the network. Once this happshould be considered compromised adisposed of (sold on/trashed).Keep the battery out when the phone is use.Keep the SIM card out when the phone is sin a separate place from the rest of the pin case there is a raid.Never turn the phone on in your house, meeting places as it will immediately bethat place, especially if it is the first locat

If you suspect your car is under surveilusing the phone in or near it.Avoid patterns of phone use for exampthe same area and/or time to make the pWhen making phone calls avoid areas wheconsider a bike ride into the countryside, eenclosed bus-shelter.Avoid spending longer than 30 minutes iusing the phone. Make use of the fact allows you to be mobile.


3/24

43of 45

Some are, however, understood somewhat better. One such fea-ture of various Nokia phones is that they are easily adapted tobe turned on remotely without alert ing anyone. These modelsare still being sold in various shops specializing in surveillanceequipment, and have the advantage of been very common.They are generally sold along the lines of people leaving meet-ings to go to the toilet, leaving their phone behind in the room.They ring the phone remotely, it turns on and the phone ownercan hear what is being said in the room. It is not a great leapfrom there to getting someone elses phone and turning it onremotely to hear what is being said nearby.

As phone software develops it becomes increasingly open tobeing hacked in much the same way as computers. Softwaretechnologies exist which can scan phones in a room and identi-fy their various makes/models. With this information, carefullytailored signals can be sent to particular phones, prompting

the owner to apply security patches, updates, etc, but whichactually install malicious software [malware] instead, thusputting the phone under the control of a third party. A simplebit of malware is one that monitors the phones address book,providing the interloper with its details and then notify whenit has been updated. For ordinary mobile phones with basicfunctions, this is not a significant problem; for more sophisti-cated phones that permit access to emails and internet it is amuch greater risk.

Different phones offer other features which can be used againstthe campaigner a good example is GPS systems which allowaccurate positioning of phones and thus their users/owners.

The software poses other simple hacks for unsuspecting users,which again depend on networks and models. In a recent casea UK reporter was able to access the messaging services ofthe mobiles of various prominent people because they had notchanged the default passwords on their phones.

14.2 maKIng

a

phone

call

The mobile phone network is actually a series of phone mastsand various exchanges dotted around the country. Each phonemast is at the heart of a cell, a space that it serves. For aphone to receive a message or call it needs to let a mast knowthat it is in its cell. It will send out a broadcast signal andselect the strongest reply as the nearest mast to communicatewith. This location is logged so when there is a message orphone call for that number, the network can route it directly toyou. A mobile phone on your cars dashboard may cause yourradio speakers to emit a hissing sound as it sends its locationto nearby masts as it changes from one cell to another.

Locating a phone in a particular cell gives the network a roughgeographical location of the phones position. If there areseveral masts in an area and they all pick up a signal from amobile phone, then triangulation techniques can be used topinpoint the location of the mobile phone more accurately. Thehigher the density of masts the easier it becomes, so in a citythis technique is far more accurate than in the countryside.

A good place to make locating the phone more difficulty ison a motorway were the cells tend to be in long lines whichmakes triangulation difficult. Another place which confusesthe system is to be directly underneath a phone mast whichalso confuses the process by removing helpful data from othermasts.

This exchange of communication is going on all the time andis what turns a mobile phone into a tracking device. In the UK

all these exchanges are being logged by the various networksat the request of the government and by law. In the US, en-hanced 911 features are required by law to allow emergencyservices to trace the location of a mobile phone, though ofcourse this is open to abuse by others.

This feature is being turned into a commercial application.There are firms which actively track mobile phones of em-ployees on behalf of their bosses to ensure the employeesare where they say they are. It is also marketed to parentsas location devices for their children. In theory this is donewith the consent of the phone holder/owner as they have tosend back a text acknowledging the service. However, this issimple enough to circumvent if they are not in possession ofthe phone for the length of time required for consent. See thefollowing website for an account of a reporter successfully do-ing this to a friend: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/

click_online/4747142.stm. Examples of companies offeringthis service are www.world-tracker.com, www.verilocation.comand www.tracemobile.com

However, location is not the only information being logged bythe networks; with each phone call they will be recording theSIM and IMEI numbers associated with the phone, the phonesmake & model, the location triad, time and duration of thecall, the phone number called, and the contents of any textmessages. If there are any other features enabled, such asaddress book back-ups, then they are also recorded.

UK legislation, in particular the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crimeand Security Act, demands that networks keep logs of variousbits of this information. Time, duration and numbers calledare kept anyway for billing purposes (BT keeps all such in-formation for 6 years); texts are kept for 6 months (and inthe UK are admissible in court whereas actual phone calls arenot) and URLs for 4 days. The particulars of other informationto be stored are currently under negotiation with the variouscompanies involved. Of course all such stored information isopen to the police and other security services to access. TheEU is also looking at bringing in similar legislation, thoughthere are data retention issues. In the USA, there is no dataretention issue and corporations can keep information for aslong as they like, and often do.

As with landlines, the technology to listen in to mobile phones isreadily available to the state, and governments are increasinglytapping activists in countries as well other than their own. Inthe UK and elsewhere the networks have implemented variousprotocols in their systems that actively facilitate governmentagencies to listen in on phonecalls. The basic advice is to treatmobile phones with all the circumspection you would land-lines. You wouldnt say anything incriminating over your homeor office phone, so dont start doing it with mobiles either.

There is another threat with mobile phones, albeit rarer. It ispossible to step in between a phone and a mast by using anappropriately set up computer as a relaying station, whichemulates being a mast. If it is close enough to the target

mobile phone, the phone will route its communications withthe network through it without realizing anything is amiss. Theperson in control of the router then has access to everythingbeen sent, including the conversation and numbers. Thismeans that agencies other than the state can also tap mobilephones if so desire.

1 IntroductIon

1.1 Why security is important1.2 What is security?1.3 Setting up the security process

2 SecurIty For campaIgnS

2.1 Basic campaign securityMedia strategyYour addressAnswering emails, letters & phone callsWebsites

Keep files encryptedNeed to knowOffice security

2.2 Advanced campaign securityBurning rubbishPaper trailsSourcesBackupsTamperingAutonomous structuringCommunications

2.3 Meetings (Basics)2.4 Meetings (High Security)2.5 Secure information transfer2.6 Gossiping2.7 Being monitored

3 dealIngwIthInFIltratorS & graSSeS

3.1 New People

3.2 Do you have an infiltrator3.3 Initial action & gathering evidence3.4 Exposing the infiltrator3.5 Dealing with the fallout3.6 Gatherings3.7 Grasses after arrest3.8 Other infiltration methods3.9 Private Investigators & Police

4 SecurIty For actIonS

4.1 Choosing people4.2 Scouting out the area4.3 Planning4.4 Communications4.5 Acquiring equipment4.6 Clothing & other traceables4.7 Disposing of equipment/clothes4.8 Communiqus & photos4.9 Mobile phones

4.10 Phone boxes4.11 CCTVw4.12 Travelling4.13 Being Chased4.14 Evidence gathering tools4.15 Debriefing4.16 Shitting in your backyard4.17 Conclusion

5 SecurItyFor demonStratIonS

5.1 General Rules5.2 Evidence Gatherers & FIT5.3 Cameras5.4 Travelling to demonstrations5.5 Debriefing5.6 First Aid5.7 Dealing with Provocateurs

6 perSonal SecurIty

6.1 Dealing with the police6.2 At Home6.2.1 Control the information in your house6.2.1.1 Preparing for a raid6.2.2 Phones, computers & emails6.2.3 Mail6.2.4 Being aware of intruders6.2.5 Being bugged6.3 Your area and neighbours6.4 Your car6.5 Self-defence

7 SurveIllance

7.1 Preparation for surveillance detection7.2 Vehicles7.3 On foot7.4 Rural surveillance7.5 Counter-surveillance7.6 Blatant surveillance

8 computer SecurIty & Internet prIvacy

8.1 Security8.2 Internet Privacy

9 uK legal ISSueS

9.1 Regulation of Internet Powers Act

10 talKIngtootherSaboutSecurIty

11 FutureShocKS

12 cloSed culturevS. open culture

13 wrItIng letterS

14 mobIle

phoneS

15 concluSIon

16 FInalnote, contactdetaIlS & dISclaIm

TABLE OF CONTENTS


4/24

1of 45

1. IntroductIonThis booklet is an introduction to Security for action and activ-ists. Its purpose is to provide you with the information youneed to take action and to campaign. Our desire is that youlearn from this book and are empowered to take direct actionand/or campaign effectively despite state oppression.

The authors are activists who have been taking direct actionand campaigning on a variety of issues for a lot of years. Inthat time they have encountered the state and various oppo-nents on a number of different levels and survived to tell thetale (for the most part). It is a summation of our experience inthe hope that it helps you avoid some of our mistakes.

Much of the material in this booklet is common sense. There isa lot of information contained here but it should be fairly obvi-ous for the most part. You will not need all of it, but our hopeis that you find the information to deal with any situation youare in or planning for. In places we have been a little repetitiousso that each chapter is able to stand on its own.

The approach we recommend is to work out what sort of threatyou feel you are facing and learn accordingly. If you do not needto worry about stuff because you are not active in a particulardirection, then do not stress about it. It is better to be clearabout what you are doing than trying to be everything.

If you have new information or we have made mistakes thenplease contact us.

1.1 whySecurItyISImportant

Security is important as we live in a world where upsettingthe status quo to change the world for the better is generallymet by a backlash. Governments, law enforcement agenciesand corporations all have vested interests in criminalizing,

disrupting and suppressing activist groups of all persuasions.Security is needed to ensure our continued success. We alsohave a basic right to protect your privacy and anonymity fromunwarranted intrusion.

For those who say that we shouldnt have anything to hide orshould make a principled stand on it, well we live in a worldwhere democracy is subverted daily and the people doing itthe most are t hose in power. As long as governments and theirsupporting apparatus permit corruption through their closedand secretive natures then we need to respond in kind for ourown protection.

Threats do not just come from the state. There are situationswere media organisations with their own agenda will attemptto target campaign groups. Private investigators also need tobe factored in as threats. Both have distinct issues which alsoneed to be dealt with to ensure your message successfully getsto the public without being intercepted or disrupted.

1.2 whatISSecurIty?Everybody has their own ideas of what security is, and in-deed security is a very individual issue. Different people havedifferent needs, and no one solution fits all. What works forsomeone else may not work for you. However, there are certainfundamentals that apply to all situations.

Security is a processthat protects you in some fashion, whetherin the run up to, during or after the event(s) you are involved

in. This means, that security is there to facilitate the smoothoperation of your action, campaign, etc. and help keep every-one safe.

A common mistake is equating paranoia with security. Para-noia is often used as an excuse not to take action throughfear of what can go wrong normally by over-stating the om-nipotence of opponents. In our experience paranoid peoplehave little to fear as they are too nervous to do anything thatwould actually put them at risk. Indeed, few even have securitymeasures put in place. This sort of fear means you effectivelydefeat yourself.

There is no such thing as a 100% fail-safe system, and notdoing actions because you cannot reach that level of securityis not an excuse for copping out. There is always some risk;and security processes help reduce that risk to an acceptable

level. It is up to you to define what the acceptable level of riskis and how best you can deal with it. Sometimes you just haveto take a chance.

Security is not a single thing; it is a process and a state of mind.You cannot put down and pick up security at whim. For secu-rity to be effective and worth the time and effort put into it, ithas to be built into your life. Ideally, it becomes second nature;that is, you automatically go through the processes that keepyou secure. This creates a mindset that helps you avoid errorsof judgement you may regret later. There are objects and soft-ware that will aid your security, but simply having them is notsecurity in itself; they need to be are part of an active securityprocess. For example, there is no point having a bug scanner ifyou dont use it on a regular basis. Likewise anti-virus softwarewill not protect your computer unless it updated regularly.

There are many levels to security, but it needs to be built intoyour life/campaign/action right from the start. Picking itup half way through or after an action is generally too late.Hence, when you start planning, think about the situation and

the threats that may arise, so you are incorporating featuresthat protect your security as you go along. It makes protect-ing yourself far easier and means you are less likely to makemistakes.

The most important lesson when it comes to security is theequation:

Security = Time + Effort

You cannot get around this basic fact; every security measurewill have some sort of impact on your life, including work.Security requires you to be pro-active and to put the effortin. And you need to be prepared for this. Once you have de-cided on the appropriate security process, there is no roomfor shortcuts. Shortcuts are gaping holes in your plan that endup compromising you. Yes, there are times when you are justtoo tired to encrypt all your sensitive files, but what is that onehalf hour compared to the prison sentence which may awaityou should you get raided the following morning?

Finally, if you are part of a group, security is not just aboutyourself, but about everyone you are involved with. Slacknesson your part means are you compromising them, and you dohave a responsibility to them. If you are making mistakes whichallow your opponents to find out crucial and sensitive data onyour colleagues then you are effectively betraying them. Not acomfortable thought, but an important one.

text editors this means that you can avoid leaving traces on thecomputer, as the text will only be held in the working memory.

If you do save the file, never simply delete it as this does notactually remove it from your computer. Instead use a dedicatedwipe programme such as PGP Wipe or Clean Disk Security toremove it fully from the hard drive. Better still, if saving it, do soto a floppy disk that can be burnt if necessary. Make sure thatthe number of wipes is set to at least 8 or 9.

Finally, if writing something of a particularly sensitive naturethen use the free space wipe options in the above software tobe on the safe side. It is good practice to run free space wipesregularly to make sure that there is nothing awkward left behindon your computer disk. Though be aware it will shorten the lifeof your computers hard drive.

Alternatively, if the environment is safe enough, then use a uni-versity or library computer, so there is no connection to yourown computer.

13.2.2 Printing

Printer and especially typewriters have their own fingerprints.This means if they suspect you wrote a letter and they get holdof your printer/typewriter forensics can match the two up.

There are several ways around this. One is to use a printer sharedby a large number of people. These are much harder to traceand then far harder to connect you with them. You can type theletter up at home, and bring it in on a floppy disk.

Some problems with this are people looking over your shoulderso check out your situation. It is good to have several windowsopen on your screen, so you can quickly bring another to thefront, hiding what you have been typing.

Secondly, when you are printing out you do not want to touchthe actual letter or have others see it. To avoid the obvious wear-

ing of gloves, if the printer is relatively quite, what you shoulddo is do a print run of a couple of things at the same time withyour letter in the middle of it. This means there are pages aboveand below it that you can catch it in between with, so you canavoid actually touching the letter itself.

Alternatively, if the printer is busy, put in a page or two of gar-bage text at the beginning and end of your letter to achieve thesame effect.

13.2.3 Photocopiers

Finally, once you have your letter printed off, a very good tech-nique to adopt is to photocopy it. This will help avoid telltaleprinter marks by obscuring them with the photocopiers own fin-gerprints. To enhance this, put the page on the printer at a slightangle, alter the contrast a little and maybe put the photocopiedversion through again to increase the blurring effect even fur-ther. Remember to burn the originals when you are finished withthem (do not simply put them in the nearest bin). If possible,

go to a neighbouring town to do the printing and photocopying.

14 uSIng mobIle phoneSActivists have conflicting opinions on the risks mobile phones, ranging from considering the sthem to be negligible, to keeping them at armsas possible. The lack of solid information abouhas bred a variety of myths, easily dismissed bto be concerned about. We, however, recommecautious side as can be seen from the informatthis section.

In November 2006 one of our collective attenworkshop on mobile phone security with specactivists. Among the key speakers was a mobilexpert who works with a wide range of corporthe police. His advice was that for all our worr

have about mobile phones - its worse than we comes to activism and mobile phones, leave yoconsider that good advice. Like everything therebut with mobile phones good practice is to treutmost suspicion from the start.

14.1 Inside a mobile phone.

A mobile phone is a complicated beast, and is gso as technologies converge. From a hardware pis

a) the batteryb) the SIM cardc) the phone itself

The batteryis the main power supply for the phorecommend removing it so the phone will not wnecessarily the case. Some models carry secobatteries to keep some functions going. How efat maintaining the phone as a listening / trac

matter for debate, but again the advice from this that taking out a battery is not good enoughincreasing miniaturization of bugs in general ius that even a small secondary battery could allthe mobile phone as a listening device.

The SIM card is a small chip which carries vaparticular the phone number itself. It is a relativcircuitry easily removed from the back of most

The phone is a complex bit of electronic gadgetmany functions, but includes microphones avices in their most basic forms. More modern camera features and amount to small computright. Each phone carries its own serial numbenumber. This can be changed, but in the UK thaillegal in an effort to deter phone thieves.

The other aspect to a phone is the software. Sinof phones, various manufacturers and networksoftware in addition to the advertised feature

small computer, and the more they develop tsophistication has grown, so that more and mbe added. Each model is different, and nobodis exactly on a phone, as the manufacturer (egtorola), the Network (eg o2, T-mobile, Vodaphovendors all apply their own software, and that tmodel to model, and from country to country. Ba lot going on in a phone that we might not hav


5/24

41of 45

practical for security agencies to use them for a startthey were more easily picked up by the activists. This ischanging.

However, there is hope and it comes in the form of budgets.The promise of hi-tech equipment and techniques is as muchabout saving costs as it is about effectiveness. As security agen-cies come to rely on them, they will rely less on low-tech andmanpower intensive techniques (such as active surveillance).

The result is that low-tech security precautions can actuallybecome more effective bugs only work if they can be placedsomewhere you are going to be talking; using ATM machinesand credit cards to tag you cease to work if you pay only incash. This is why we are confident that activists will continueto be a thorn in the side of the status quo despite constantoppression from state and corporations.

12. cloSed culturevS.open cultureWhat we have written in this booklet is very much for an activ-ist culture quite closed in nature. Other groups prefer to go fora completely open approach, not hiding what it is they do. Weare not opposed to this, and on some levels it is an advanta-geous route to go down.

Where the open culture works best is on the legal and large-scale approaches. On smaller scales and for covert actionsproblems will arise. It is a particular risk, when everyone at-tending an overt action does not have the same agenda, andsomeone may do something (eg a brick through a window)which leaves others in trouble they were not prepared for orhad not signed up to. Of course, by having a large meeting, itis much easier to get everyone singing from the same sheet, soto speak, but this is not guaranteed.

Larger meetings make it harder for infiltrators to be pickedout as well and on the organisational front are a nightmare tokeep quiet this means that they tend not to stay secret forvery long. The basic rules should be that all mobiles will beswitched off and that journalists are asked to leave.

It is important to be inclusive, but at some point it will becomea risk; having as many people as possible at an action is nothelpful when this approach means that the action is effectivelyscuppered by your opponents.

The more successful you are as a campaign or activist group,the more this will be come a problem. Where larger meetingsare fine for overall strategy, tactics for individual actions arebest left to smaller groups working away quietly and outsideof any public glare.

13. wrItIngletterSEven writing letters can get you in trouble these days if youare not careful, especially when companies and the like canafford their own DIY DNA-testing kits and the like. There arequite a number of things you can do, all legal, which will helpmaintain your privacy. Below is an account of how one personwrites letters to ensure complete anonymity. Not everythingthey do is necessary - play it to your own needs and situation.

13.1 wrItIngletterSathome

Preparation is everything. It comes in two stages: acquiringthe materials, and preparing the writing room.

I tend to purchase my material out of town from well-knownshops, buying the most popular brands, in particular genericshop brands. Nothing fancy. Make sure everything is in plasticwrappers so you dont touch them. When you get home, keepthem separate and burn the receipt.

At home, I set one room aside for the purpose and give it athorough clean to remove as much stray hair, dandruff, skincells, etc. The table is washed down and disinfected (cheapvodka or white spirits will do); the floors hovered and the wallsdusted. Any animals are kept out.

I then have a shower, and put on freshly washed clothes. Wearlong sleeves, and give you hair a good brush, tying it back ifnecessary.

When writing, I put on a new pair of washing up gloves beforeI do anything else, such as opening the pens and paper. Allwrappers are kept in the shopping bag for disposal of later.Paper is very good at catching fingerprints, so you want tokeep your skin away from the paper.

When writing, dont lean over the paper, breathing on it. Formthe letters carefully taking your time over them if necessary.The faster you write the more likely it will look like your naturalhandwriting. Watch out for examples in your letters that act astell tale markers, like how you form your Gs.

Dont be afraid to start over again. If you sneeze or cough,scrap the letter and wipe the table down again, as it will spraythe area with your DNA. Dont forget to burn the discardedletter later.

Likewise when addressing the envelopes. For sealing them,many envelopes nowadays are self-seal. If not, then use a wettissue to glue the envelope shut. Put the envelopes into a cleanplastic bag for posting, as soon as you have finished them(so if you sneeze or do something like that, then these willnot have to be scrapped). As with envelopes, use self-adhesivestamps, buying a new lot in book form.

Post out of town, trying to use a different postbox each time,preferably ones not in town centres where there are CCTV cam-eras. Countryside ones are good. To avoid getting fingerprintson the envelopes as you post them, use the plastic bag todump them in the post box (doesnt look as obvious as glovesin warm weather).

13.2 computerS, prInterS & photocopIerS

13.2.1 Computers

On the computer, use simple text editors such as NotePad

on Windows, SimpleText on Macs or emacs/vi on Linux. Bigprogrammes such as Microsoft Word, Lotus Notes, etc oftenstore backups of your text, and have a variety of issues thatyou would probably want to avoid, as if your computer shouldbe stolen, others may find it easier to locate the letters youhave created. In fact, we would recommend that you avoidMicro$oft Word altogether.

Where possible, do not save the file; some systems will allowyou to print off a file without saving it first. With the simple

1.3 SettIngupthe SecurIty proceSS

We noted above that security is a process to be built in fromthe start. The best approach is to decide what it is you wantto achieve, make plans and then identify the points where youcould be compromised. Once you have done this, work outsecurity tactics to stop those potential compromises frombecoming unacceptable risks.

As a simple example, writing an anonymous letter you dontwant to leave fingerprints on it, so the security process is towear gloves when ever handling the paper and envelope. Youare not making yourself paranoid over the fact that they mightfind your fingerprint on the letter so not writing the letter in thefirst place, but you are setting up a process which facilitatesyour action of writing the letter securely.

Using gloves to write a letter is clumsy and awkward so slowsthe whole process; however if you do not put in this extra timeand effort then it is possible the letter could be traced back toyou, and depending on the contents it could mean you losinga lot more time

On a practical level for campaigners and activists most se-curity processes are essentially about controlling the flow ofinformation about yourself and your plans, whether electronic,personal data, paper trails or physical evidence which con-nects you to the action. Later we will discuss the specificsof what these can be and what to do about them. When youunderstand where there are potentially betraying informationleaks out, you arrange to have the security techniques andprocesses to stem that flow, or at least make it very difficultfor it to be traced.

A security process is either a course of action or a tech-nique adapted to your needs and situation.

Keep in mind that the state/corporations are not all powerfulthough it may appear so (they encourage this belief them-selves). They are restricted by budgets and simple manpower,or even infighting. They also have poor understanding abouthow activist groups work, and just because one part of theorganisation has a good picture of your set-up or access to thelatest equipment, it does not mean that it is true of the rest.

There are a number of groups that have managed to be veryactive and sustained that level of activity in the face of intensepressure. They have achieved this by having security built intoeverything they do, possibly to a higher level of security thanactually needed. This has the advantage that it makes it muchharder for them to be penetrated, and any mistakes which oc-cur do not have the drastic impact they could otherwise. Theirlevel of security is not going to suit everyone; many campaign-ers will not have the same sort of pressure and unless youare ready to deal with the sort of effort which accompaniesit, it may not aid you at all. It is better to find a level you arecomfortable with and able to work with in than strive to bemore secure than is necessary so end up squandering yourresources on security at the expense of being active.

Although it is better to overestimate than underestimate thosewe are taking on, do not fall into the trap of believing theirhype. It is a common trick to send out disinformation aboutthe technological and resources at their disposal. The realityis a lot of the hype fails to materialise or the techniques areeasily defeated. Another tactic is to make out they have infiltra-tors and grasses when they dont. Bear all this in mind whenworking out your security needs; some of the threats will be

real, but not every one. At the end of t he daimportant is what the state and others use onin day-to-day work and not so much the theavailable to them.

A common mistake activists make is to believare being investigated it is to catch them for often not the case. People come under scrutetc. like to build up pictures of who is networwith whom. This is actually planning their bewhen something does happen they have bettto go looking. These information networks aretelligence and profiling, and the easily built upthings as who is phoning who.

Fortunately for us, their resources are rarely ucursory work unless a political decision is ma group in particular. The less you can show ythe parapet and attract attention to yourselexample of this which we will cover later is all ing at demos they are not taking photos of yare talking to or have travelled with.

Mistakes happen, even to experienced activislife, especially when doing actions under streThis is why it is best not to do sensitive stumistake is not an excuse to down tools. If yocess is set up right, it should be able to tolerawork around them. This is not to say that themistakes that can completely jeopardise an every mistake is in this category, and you shoudifference.

If someone makes a mistake, let them knowthem as a pariah on the basis of one; the tcerned is when mistakes are being made repeare not making an effort to learn from them,pointed out.

Finally, sit down and take time to plan your sechow they will impact on your life and your acwillingness to take the time and effort to achiegood planning is the other key feature. It goehelp you implement a secure system as well aand (more importantly) dealing with the risks better.

As we have noted several times, security is thyour campaign or action. It is not an end in itsenot to loose sight of who you are. Plan your your campaigning needs, integrating both, ansecurity define what you do or who you are.

2. SecurItyFor campaIgnThe fact you are involved in a campaign wchange the status quo in some fashion means

to someone in some fashion. There is no telliposition will react, and some do out of all prit is you are actually trying to do. Security fonot just about protecting the campaigners frbut also protecting the campaign tactics and pcampaigns and disruption.

When thinking about the security processes yfor your campaign, draw up a list of all threaface: state, private investigators, media, your onal issues and what they can do against you. O


6/24

3of 45

to focus just on the threat from a politically motivated police,but these are not just the only risks (think media exposes,etc.). However, most of the techniques dealing with the variousthreats are complementary.

That the principle threat is often the state has lead peopleto focus on the criminal law side of things; but this is onlypart of the picture. Other tactics used against campaignsare civil injunctions and disruption, and what feeds these isinformation about internal structure and problems. If theopposition can draw up a detailed picture of who does whatand how each individual relates to each other then it make itmuch easier for the campaign to be infiltrated and disrupted.Resources will then be directed at your mist vulnerable pointsand key personnel, Disruption can either be anticipating yourcampaigns tactics so effectively countering them and undoingall your hard work, or else causing splits within the group. It

can also involve the arrests of key activists, theft/damage ofequipment and smear campaigns.

The ultimate goal is not necessarily to shut you down but tomake you ineffective.

2.1 baSIccampaIgnSecurIty

Basic security is thinking about where you are leaking informa-tion. This is where you let out information about yourself tothe public, the media and to other activists, all of which canbe used to build a picture about you.

Below are suggestions on what you can do as a campaign toprotect yourself. Security is not just about protecting your peo-ple or information, but also the campaigns reputation as thatis also targeted. It is much harder to promote your message ifyou have been successfully discredited or been pre-empted.

As a campaign, you need to discuss security in a dedicatedmeeting and reach a consensus on it. Dictating security only

breeds an attitude whereby people not happy with the personmaking the requests and end up not fully complying with thedemands. All campaigners in the group need to understandthat there is a need for security measures even if they do nothave access to all t he information why. Open discussion helpsbrings up issues, misunderstandings and also build trust.People who feel included in the process are more likely to stickto it and no amount of formal polices will not protect youfrom fellow campaigners feeling at odds with them.

It is also important to ensure new or temporary volunteers arealso brought up too speed, before they start working for you,not half way through. Never be patronizing about security; ex-plain why it is needed practical examples always work well.Show people that security can be part of the empowermentprocess and not just a meaningless chore they are being forcedto go through. Cooperation is t he keyword here.

Media Strategy:A.

It is best to have an experienced person dedicated toa. handling the media. They will have a better sense ifthe call is genuine and will be better able to deal withthe tricks of an interviewer with an agenda which maycatch out an inexperienced person or someone new toa campaign.

Have a pseudonym ready to use. You are not requiredb.to give your own name. However, it is better to be readyfor this and prepare a name so it is on the tip of your

tongue when the media ring up. If you suddenly decideto use a false name then the chances are you will endup stumbling over it, so sounding suspicious. Use thefalse name for a while and then change it. It is a goodidea to change both fist and second names otherwiseyou just end up being known by the pseudonym, whichdefeats its purpose.

If asked where an old pseudonym has gone, saythat theyve left for another campaign, or out of theoffice.

Press releases can be treated the same way. Considersowing disinformation by using false names andpositions.

Be ready for contentious issues. Watch out for barbedc.questions in the middle of long interviews especially

on the background of individuals or direct action. Nomatter how fluffy you portray yourself as, journalistswill always dig for juicier bits of information. Beprepared so you will not be caught out and end upsaying things you will regret later. You also comeacross as being professional.

Do not meet press at your office or home there is nod.need for them to get a feel for your campaign in thisfashion, as you actions and statements should speakfor themselves.

Be wary of requests to meet other campaigners,e.especially direct activists; say you need to consultwith them first and will get back to them on that point,but dont make promises. The media are interested ina juicy story and you cannot trust their promises offair reporting or of putting your side of t he story. Donot follow the medias agenda stick your own.

The media is a classic method of infiltration. If youf. are approached by a media organisation asking formore than a straight forward interview, find out all youcan about them first. Check out their existence andwhat other projects they have been involved in, or getthe details of other people they have worked with.

In one case, an activist was approached to bei.interview in a film at home by some journalists whogave good credentials. However, on ask around anddoing an investigation of the other they claimedto have been involved in it was discovered thatthey were right-wingers with a history of fitting upactivists.

In a more extreme case, a film company ap-ii.proached a campaign wanting to do a documentaryon its activists. The campaign was naturally cageybut saw the benefits of such a documentary. Theymet a few times with the journalist, even allowingfor the fact that the he seemed to be conveniently

on the way elsewhere so him turning up in the townwhere the office was based did seem to check out.An activist did agree to meet with him in Londonwhere the journalist was based, getting as far asthe door to the Oxford Street building where thecompany was alleged to be based (and there wasindeed the correct company above the bell).

Suspicions were raised over the professionalismand camera work of the journalist and contact was

In practice it is quite unworkable and rarely used, as it is hardfor them to prove that you have not actually forgotten it:

through the lapse in time since you last used it;it is quite fiendish so hard to remember in the first place;from the trauma of the raid when your computers wereseized.

10. talKIngtootherSaboutSecurItyIt is important to discuss security in your group. You needto make sure that your affinity group or organisation can betrusted to look after itself, and that weaknesses are minimisedaccording to the threat you are likely to face. However, there

are several pitfalls here you need to watch out for.If you go over the top, then you risk putting people off,scaring them or otherwise disempowering them. Encouragepeople in your group, especially those less experiencedthan yourself, to think about their security needs, and howlapses in security can affect other people but dont enforcewithout explanation. Be wary of letting a more-secure-than-thou competitive attitude develop as in a group asthat is very off-putting; likewise with installing a paranoidmindset rather than an active one.

As you develop the security mindset, it is easy to lose un-derstanding about how people who are new to the scenethink. Do not oppress them for getting things wrong, butdo suggest where they can make changes. Explain to themwhy you carry out certain processes, and encourage themto ask questions otherwise theyll never learn and youcould be jeopardising yourself. Dont panic if new peoplestart asking about security and other issues; its howpeople learn and develop. If you are not going to provide

an answer, explain why without being condescending.

If you see a security lapse in someone else, there areseveral ways of dealing with it:

Bring it up as a general point at a meeting in aosensitive manner without particularly naming andshaming. This has the advantage of reminding oth-ers of their responsibilities as well. Shouting andranting is not beneficial to anyone.

Take the person aside and explain your concerns,oexplaining that you feel uncomfortable and why.In particular, say that it is you who feels at risk.If they do not sympathize with you they are lesslikely to pay heed to your request that they improvetheir security so let them know that you will haveproblems with working with them in the future. Youcan also ask others whom they may have higherrespect for to also approach them.

Dont boast about your own security precautions. Security

by obscurity is not a sensible approach; however, usingobscure ideas to improve on your security is a usefultechnique, but only works as long as it remains obscure.

Beware of your own ego on this one. You can suggesttechniques in general, but the actual bit of cleverness,keep that to yourself. For example, if you use Finnish foryour password, you can maybe say that you use a difficultforeign language; just dont say which one.

Dont give bad advice, or make things up raignorant. Security can change quite rapidlscary developments like RFID chips, imptechniques, etc, so if you dont know the abetter to say so, than to lead someone inof security.

Watch out for people who are not acting asclaim to be; the question then is if they arover one bit of security, then what else ato lapse. Give them a chance to change, bthen take precautions to ensure that thecompromising you.

All this aside, just because someone is not security it does not mean you should never tmay not know all the ins and outs yet. An actlow-level one, can be an ideal time to teach bycoming activists what they need to be doing, wtime actually doing something to justify it all.

11. FutureShocKSAs technology develops, there will be advanceods of forensics, of biometric identification of in tracking devices. These are the three main have in terms of security. However, there arhere, and dont believe the hype.

Biometric recognition techniques such as ftechnology - are proving not to be as good aface recognition, the problem is that there arepositives, that is, too many people are beinpossible suspects compared to the actual numthere is. This somewhat contradictory situatioas much is gained from this technology as hoit have to spend as much time dealing with th

as following up on the genuine leads.

Saying that, CCTV is improving widely in qudistribution.

The police do not have all the technology thhave. In the UK, technology comes through a called the PITO (Police Information Technologwww.pito.org.uk), which evaluates and buys infor the police to use. So when it is trumpetedhave a new technology, what it really means have got it, and not necessarily individual pohave budgets to adhere to, so try to buy in tally need, meaning a lot of the fancy hi-tech ignored by the majority of forces.

The main changes of relevance to activists are

Improved forensics catching traces that wmissed on materials, etc previously.

Improved data exchange between police obetween the police and various other keeinformation such as banks. This also incprocessing and cross-referencing of inforthe risk of compulsory ID cards).

Increasing sophistication of listening and tin particular in transmission range and inof them (eg RFID tags). Though the technaround for some considerable time, it


7/24

39of 45

Deleting a file does not remove it from your hard drive, etc.In order to do this it needs to be properly wiped, using aprogramme dedicated to doing this. Recommended onesare Clean Disk Security and PGP.

Encrypt any sensitive files on your computer, CDs orfloppy disks using a programme such as PGP (or GPG).Ideally, you will stuff all files in to one big archive (e.g.using WinZip or StuffIt) and encrypt that. This means thateven the file names are hidden. Wipe the original files. Thisshould be done every night when youve finished using thecomputer. Alternatively use disk encryption

Chose passwords that are effective, Password protectedcomputers are not secure to the prepared infiltrator soencryption of anything sensitive is a must.

Do not base them on the names of family, pets oro

dates of birth.Include non-dictionary words or sequences of let-oters/numbers which are essentially random.Really sensitive material should be protected withopassphrases of a minimum of 16 characters fromthe entire range available including upper andlower cases, numbers and any permitted symbols.Change them on a regular basis.oDo not write them down and stick them under yourochair or desk these are the first places that anintruder will look.

Back up your computer in case it is stolen but keep theback-ups secure somewhere else.

Consider switching away from Windows to other operationsystems such as Linux or Mac which have better securityfeatures.

Avoid wireless keyboards as they transmit quite a distanceas well as to your computer.

Keep important/sensitive data and PGP keys on removablemedia such as memory sticks.

There are devices available which can be attached to yourcomputer and will record everything you type, including pass-words. The chances are that you will not be able to find them.However, they are unlikely to use these except in major cases.If you suspect that you are going to attract this sort of atten-tion, then you need to strongly reconsider if you should beusing your computer at all, or have a set-up that the computeris never left unattended at any time.

8.2 Internet prIvacy

Emails are not secure, and very easy to monitor. To keepthem private, use PGP encryption (www.pgpi.com). Dontsay anything in an email you would not be prepared tojustify in court.

If you want to contact another person without those

watching you knowing who it is you are in contact withset up fake email accounts on free webmail sites and usethem instead. Consider using it as a mail drop system.

You can also look into using remailers.

Be aware of spam unsolicited emails, even if they lookgenuine, such as from a bank. Never buy anything, or evenclick on the links to websites contained in unsolicited

emails. Messages from banks, eBay, PayPal, even warningyou that you have a virus are all fakes. If in doubt asksomeone who knows about computers, but err on the sideof caution.

If someone sends you an attachment you are notexpecting, do not open it, even if you know and trust thatperson. Email the person, asking if they really did sendthe attachment to check it is not a virus.

Avoid using Outlook or Outlook Express for your emails.Consider using an alternative such as Thunderbird(recommended), Eudora or Pegasus. Outlook is notoriouslybuggy and a significant agent of virus transmission.

Avoid using Internet Explorer to surf the internet usean alternative such as Firefox. If you cannot avoid usingInternet Explorer, switch off Java and ActiveX.

Every time you access the internet you leave a trace thatcan be used to tie back to you. If visiting a website youdont want people to know you are interested in, use ananonymizer website or an internet caf. If you suspect youare being monitored, do not do anything sensitive fromyour home computer. Watch out for CCTV in internet cafesso pick small, obscure ones.

Avoid using details that can be traced back to you. Usepseudonyms and email addresses with fake details werepossible, when posting messages, etc. Do not try to beironic by using something that ties back to you, evenindirectly.

9. uK legal ISSueSThe first important thing to remember is that it is not illegalto protect your privacy or your security. A court or police may

draw their own conclusions on your behaviour, but there is nolaw to stop you taking preventative measures.

Likewise, it is not illegal to keep your actions anonymous,whether sending letters or emails, or attending protests. Whatcould be illegal are the contents and intention of the mes-sage/protest.

Know your law it will keep you from getting arrested andby knowing your rights you can protect yourself much bet-ter when you are approached by the police, or being searched(both personally & at home). For up-to-date information onthe state of play with law in England and Wales visit www.freebeagles.org or www.activistslegalproject.org.uk. If you arebased in Scotland then the law is different check out http://g8legalsupport.info/2005/03/08/an-activists-guide-to-scots-law and www.tridentploughshares.org.uk

Keep an eye on forensic issues & standards of evidence incourt. This can be picked up from news stories of high profileconvictions and also websites. Knowing this will inform how

you decide when balancing up risks.

9.1 regulatIonoF Internet powerS (rIp) act

The main issue for campaigners here is that if they seize yourcomputers, then they have the powers to demand you sur-render the passwords to your computer and any encryptiontechniques you are using. Failure to do so in theory can resultin a two-year prison sentence.

severed politely. However, on checking it turnedout that no such company existed, or were thereany other media companies at that address, andno reports in the journalists name came to light,including searches in specialist publications.

Much of this could have been avoided by demandingmore details up front and checking them out, notjust going on the numbers or claims the journalistprovided. It probably would have ended soonerif the activist in London had insisted on actuallyvisiting the office itself instead of waiting outside.

Note that suspicions were raised for other reasonsnot mentioned here, and this is not a tale forsuspecting all journalists. However, when dealingwith requests to meet frontline activists ormeetings in your office it pays to do at least a littleresearch.

Your address:B.

Why make it easy to find you when you can get a PO Box.Not so well known is that anyone can ring up the post of-fice and find to whom it is registered, including addresses.A stronger, if more expensive solution, is to get a maildrop box. There are several firms which offer such servicesand who will not give the information out unless there isa warrant. The one we recommend for the UK is BritishMonomarks (www.britishmonomarks.co.uk) who have abetter reputation for protecting their customers privacyand dealing with activist groups in general.

Answering emails, letters and phone calls:C.

As with the media, why use your real name? Letters andemails can all be stored, and phone calls taped by thoseon the other end, though in theory they should informyou.

When answering the phone give the group name asoppose to you personal name.

If you are posting on newsgroups, writing letters, etcuse a generic email account that is not traceable toanyone in particular, or else an account that gives afake name.

Create a fake persona to go with the fake name, incase people ring up asking for them. However, it isbest to change the name every few months.

Ideally, though it can get confusing, considerusing different names for different functions, egmerchandizing, webmasters, etc.

Do not give out the names of co-workers, rather referthem to by position/title.

On no account should you give out home or mobile

numbers of someone else without their expresspermission. We would similarly advise you do thesame for yourself.

If you are suspicious of a caller ask them for a name,company, department and a number or email you canring them back on. This will deal with most bogus callers.Pretences you can use are

You are just a secretary so do not have access to thatinformation

The information is not to hand and yoto another room

The relevant person with the knowledgaround.

Ask them to put the questions in writi(also gives you address/email detaiused to confirm authenticity of the caare that urgent that they cannot wait to do this, and on closer inspectioare not the sort that are absolutely journalists story to be printed.

You can also search to check if they comand that the number matches up. Some details from real companies to give autis why you should also ring the company

check that they are genuine employees through to their office, as opposed to askinthey actually work there. One advantage hegive you a chance to listen to their voicematheir voices do actually match up.

This also applies to dealing with media recalls from other activist organisations. Doif someone doesnt trust you straight way

it is a basic and important security prito say you are actually who you claim to b

Questions to be immediately wary of are organisational or structural details. Oftenous details they are looking for, buried questions so you do not realise what theyengineers who specialise in this sort of innever ask for the details they are interestebut work the conversation so that you volown accord. For example, they may assumquestion, appearing more knowledgeablso when answering the question you are infirming the fact, the real target of their inworth reading to see practical exampleengineers and private investigators use inabout the organisation to find more sensis The Art of Deception by Kevin D Mitn

All this is irrelevant if your volunteers areon organisation policy, so this is a very imcover with them. It is a mistake to think tor senior people in an organisation are target of social engineering attacks; rapeople are just as likely to be targeted aappreciate the full value of the informatioout, or the same instinctive feeling for a s

If you take one point away from this subsdoubt, verify and always ask for the full detdont recognize when they start asking queorganisation.

WebsitesD.

Websites are a mine of information for A WHOIS search can track down who owbut you are able to register it to a PO Boxcontact names.

Information on the website can be usedinitial impression on the nature and struganisation. The main risk here is people


8/24

5of 45

names and descriptions of roles. However, also considerhow what you put on it may be used in civil injunctionswhere the level of acceptable evidence is much lower.

Keep files encrypted.E.

As a very simple precaution any sensitive files you haveshould be kept encrypted on your computer using PGPlevel encryption or disk encryption.

Need to know.F.

In some cases this should be the guiding principal of howyou work. Having meetings that define overall strategiesor set campaign guidelines are a good idea, but when itcomes to implementing the tactics to meet that strategy,working on a need to know basis is best, especially whenthere is a degree of covertness to be hand or your op-ponents are regularly involved in dirty tricks against you.As a rule of thumb, the more covert your actions and deci-sions need to be then the more you should be working ona need to know basis.

This is probably one of the more contentious points ofsecurity and can be hard t o get right, especially in cultureswhich are quite open. Giving people a good understandingwhy not every fact should be public is the best way of deal-ing with this thorny problem in our experience. There issome evidence that both extremes, from complete open-ness to an entirely covert nature, can work for groups inthe face of heavy state oppression; the difficulties comewith mixing the two and is outside the scope of this book-let.

Information ManagementG.

This includes what is said in communications, but isextended to deal with other situations where informationmay be leaking out, especially if not everyone visiting youroffice is completely trustworthy.

Have polices in place to manage any sensitiveinformation you may have; this should include whereit is stored, who has access rights, rules on not leavingit lying around (in particularly if is letters from otherpeople), etc.

Do you have backups in case it is all lost or stolen,with the backup stored off-site?

Do you have a system ready in case you need to get allsensitive information out of the office in a hurry?

Office securityH.

When you move into a new space, secure it. Change allthe locks if possible. Break-ins can and still occur with avariety of purposes. Likewise you need also to be aware ofwhat sort of information casual visitor may also be able toobtain from your office:

To plant listening/video devices so scan regularly

and never say anything in an office you would not sayto your opponents, including arranging meetings. Ifyou have to make a sensitive phone call, do not do itfrom near your house/office either as these are just aslikely to be bugged.

To examine your papers never leave stuff lyingaround, especially sensitive material that casualvisitors could see.

Obvious searches can be to create paranoia and fearin your group as well as to look for information; ifyou office has been visibly broken into keep this inmind. If your security measures are in place, thenthis should not be that effective from their point ofview when it comes to gathering information. Partof their disruption techniques is to steal or breakimportant equipment, so keep backups of materialelsewhere and also physically securing your computerequipment with chains, etc. If possible set up anequipment replacement fund.

Ideally you will only let people you know well know whereyour office is and have access to it. If you must let relativestrangers in, dont leave them by themselves. Keep sen-sitive material out of sight, and preferably encrypted onyour computer. Things to watch out for in particular are

Membership listsInfo from confidential sourcesCampaign tactics.Personal stuff which point to your peoples homeaddresses, etcPhone billsMinutes of meetings and up coming meetings writtenon wall calendarsTo Do lists

Locks we have been recommended as being generally thebest are 5 lever multistead deadlocks. As well as doorsyou should also lock windows, or put an iron bar acrossthem so people cannot squeeze through. The state andprofessionals will have little problems with most locks soit is important to ensure that security does not simplystop at the door.

2.2 advancedcampaIgnSecurIty

If you are under active surveillance, there are many waysthey can gather info about you. Below are some techniquesto adopt:

Burn your rubbisha) ; it is environmental to recycle, but it isnot safe. By rubbish we mean all paper work, envelopes,communications, printouts, etc and anything with hand-writing or fingerprints on them even old toner cartridges.Rubbish bins are a mine of information for the investiga-tor.

When burning paper, do so until it is white and then scatterthe ashes. One trick for burning stuff in most weather isto create a small furnace out of a tin can. Put eight holesabout 1cm up from the bottom of the can, and use fournails in alternative holes. Rest the lid of the can on thenails and burn the paper in the can. To produce a faster,hotter burn, blow in the holes at the bottom.

Never trust this job to an outsider or temporary volunteers,

and do it on a regular schedule.

Paper trailsb) ; watch out for leaving paper trails when or-dering your literature & merchandise. If your literaturebecomes a point of contention or you would rather itremained anonymous in relation to your campaign, workout techniques that either stop them locating your printerwho can in turn point to you, or else keep your printersat arms length. That is, do not use your phones, personalmobiles or campaign addresses were possible. Collect in

if they are innocent and will pretty much react in the samestartled way, thinking you are a mugger. However, you canget up close and ask for directions, a cigarette light, etcwhich will put the suspect tail on the spot and give you agood chance to look at them, something they will reallynot like.

Taking blind turns at night forces the surveillance teamto react more aggressively, so again forcing their hand ifyou are ready for it. However, given the darkness there isa possibility they will react more confidently if they thinkthey have the upper hand.

Tip: Because it is much quieter at night it you become far moreaware of sounds that occur naturally and it is easy to suspectevery sound. In this sort of situation wait until you have actualvisual confirmation rather than suspecting just noises.

7.3 rural SurveIllance

This is significantly harder to detect as the surveillance teamwill in general further away and there is much greater scope tohide, especially if there are thick woods nearby. A surveillanceteam will

Wear adaptive camouflage.Be prepared for a long stay if necessary.Use infra-red and long range binoculars and scopes.Put motion-detector cameras in junk, trees and nearbystructures.Take measures to hide the fact they were there such asdealing with bent grass and depressions.

Things to check for are

Repeated glints off binoculars from woods or copses.Abandoned buildings where they are using to hidevehicles.

Transmissions from cameras.

Flattened grass and depressions; also vehicle tracks wherethey shouldnt be.Identify potential observation points from your location andregularly check them it may discourage the surveillanceteam from using them or getting too close.Walk in an ever widening circle, looking for places ofconcealment focusing on places such as tree-lines,copses, thick bushes/hedges which have a view of thetarget area.

Having dogs around the place are particularly effective, and toa lesser degree motion-detector lights, though this depends onhow covert the operation is.

7.4 counter-SurveIllance

This is a phrase often used in the wrong context. It actuallymeans using another team to monitor a target with the aimof detecting whether there is a surveillance team on them or

not. A second group of people is much more effective than thetarget at spotting surveillance teams as they will have betterlines of vision.

The trick to this is to set up a check route, also known as asurveillance detection route. In this the target and the counter-surveillance team plan out a route with gives the counter-surveillance team to set up in advance and able to watch forthe surveillance team following the target. It is best done onfoot routes as t here are better opportunities for monitoring.

It is a simple idea but it requires considerabe properly effective as there are a number oactivist:

The surveillance team may be aware of ware so will be able to recognize their facethis sort of operation, consider some soyour normal appearance or disguise.The security around the set-up needs to byou are meeting up to plan it, the meettight so that the surveillance team doesnidea so be prepared.The counter-surveillance team needs to swiftly and discretely; this includes hand not too quick so others can pick them up (hands as opposed to a quick scratch of t

However, it is important that this is not donalerts the surveillance team that there is a seworking. If the surveillance team thinks that itlance the chances are that they will discretecome back another day instead.

In theory there will be no contact between thcounter-surveillance team; however, having ayou and stopping to have a quick chat offers friend to scan the surrounding area for suspe

7.5 blatantSurveIllance

Much of what has been said also applies toWhere it does not apply to when being followrather obviously primarily to intimidate or mficult as in mass public actions. In this case to give them the slip. Be unpredictable, use and some times just run (that is not illegal so to stop you, though that may not bother theon the situations, whether you publicly burn around you, or discretely lose them.

The other approach is to be completely innhaving a coffee or a pint or simply shopping. Haround the female underwear section of a people off especially if and do something yoin a socially embarrassing way.

8. computer SecurIty& Internet prIvacyWe will not go into much detail on computersto cover the basics. There are a number of sitewhich go into computer security and protectonline in more dept. However, as a bare minimbe doing the following:

8.1. SecurIty

Install and regularly update anti-virusoftware. Free programmes such as AVcom) and ZoneAlarm (www.zonealarm.cofor Windows. The important feature is thactivated so they are continually up-to-da

Install spyware detector programmes suwhich is free from www.lavasoft.de.


9/24

37of 45

next to exit and watch for people following you be-ing startled by you waiting for them in turn) andanti-surveillance as it gets you out of sight longenough to get away. This works best with shops youdont go into, or if you do, you always use the sameentrance and exit.Elevators that take you to other floors with exitsoare good; remember thought that the surveillanceteam will leave someone at the ground floor in caseyou return there.Places where there are security checks can work inoyour favour, especially where there are multiple ex-its, as surveillance teams will be reluctant to set offalarms with their communications gear. The delaysfor stop and search also play into your hands.

At night be prepared for the increased used of technology suchas infra-red to monitor you.

Tip: Having traveled somewhere and then moved to being onfoot, the surveillance team will also have one member watch-ing your vehicle in case you return to it.

Remember, one or two coincidences are not proof you havea tail. You are looking for a whole series of them. Practisingcounter-surveillance techniques and developing your instinctswill help considerably.

Public transport

Public transport offers a variety of opportunities for detectingand evading surveillance and makes life much harder for thesurveillance team.

A professional surveillance team will attempt your destinationand route, and monitor both as well as having someone on thesame bus or train. This means, that depending on numbersthey will seek to reach possible exit points to watch for you. Ifit is a public transport route that you use frequently, then will

either follow the bus (something you can watch out for) or bewaiting to pick you up at your destination.

However, if you use public transport regularly with establishedgetting on and off points, then this can be turned into activedetection or anti-surveillance techniques by getting off earlieror later and checking for reactions to make sure you have giventhem the slip. If the surveillance team has enough people thenthey will actually get off at earlier or later stops to avoid sus-picion.

Jumping off at the last moment is a useful anti-surveillancetechnique as it forces them to lose you or expose themselvesby reacting as well.

Beware of chance encounters with strangers, especially thosewho appear to have something in common with you, wheresome sort of rapport is attempted. Public transport is quitegood for one-off encounters like this which allow them to getto know you better and evaluate your mannerisms. There isnothing to stop you lying about what you do, who you are, etc.If you have coincidental meetings again in the future it isworth being suspicious.

As you get off public transport or out of a terminal are theresigns of surveillance vehicles waiting to pick you up.

Buses

If they do get on the bus then they will go as far to the back aspossible so you will be kept in sight. A possible active detec-

tion technique is to stay on after the last stop and see who elseis doing it will only work if they are not familiar with the routeotherwise they will not make this mistake.

Trains

Given the nature of trains then you are more likely to havea number of surveillance operatives get on and off thetrain at the same time as you.

The more you change trains the more it erodes theintegrity of the surveillance team. Add to this by going tothe barriers as if leaving then turning around and gettingback on another train.

There are a number of exits for stations which you can useto your advantage, depending on crowd density and howwell you can push through them.

A good feature of train stations (though it works well inother high density areas of pedestrians) is that thereare strong flows of people in one direction. If you moveagainst this flow, watch out for others doing likewise andstruggling to keep you in sight. As you have to look as youdo this, it is an active detection technique.

Night surveillance while on foot

This is a much different situation from day time foot surveil-lance. A professional team will be ready for it. Amateurs willnot. At night when out an about, you are more likely to encoun-ter a greater use of technology, for example night-sights. Thefact that it is darker and quieter works in your favour since theyneed to get closer to keep you in sight and you can use yourhearing more effectively. At night they are far more likely to usevehicles, especially when the weather is cold loitering aroundoutside when it is freezing is much more obvious to spot.

The best way to spot surveillance at night is to monitor for

vehicles showing some of the following traits

Driving without lightsLights going on and off in stationary carsThe sound of radio transmissionsDoors slamming shut as you approachVehicles parked in unusual locations.Couples sitting in cars, staring straight ahead rather thanengaging with each other.Sitting for prolonged times with the engine running.

Surveillance teams have been known to use taxis and policecars in this situation. If you know your area well then you canspot them by being parked in places not normally used bythem. For instance, police cars do not normally hang out inwell-to-do estates. Taxis do not wait on poor and out of theway estates. People waiting on friends at nearby houses tendto park in the light and on the main road and not in out-of-theway places offering concealment.

Some tactics that work better at night are as follows:

If you think that someone is following you listen outcarefully for the sound of their pace. It will be done tomatch yours, so as you speed up and slow down, then itwill change to match. This is something you can activelyhear.

You have more opportunities to conceal yourself and watchthe reactions of suspect tails as they realize that you arenot in sight. Remember, that if you confront someone then

person and pay in cash (which may get you discounts aswell). Destroy receipts as well where possible.

Sourcesc) are a vital resource to most campaign, and avery easy point to discredit you on if it can be shown thatyou let those details slip. Knowing who your sources areis valuable information your opponents would dearly liketo have, so make sure it is kept very safe and minimiseas much direct contact with the campaign as possible.Meetings should be secure (see below) and use dedicatedmobiles for communication with them.

Be very careful of how you record them. Dont hold meet-ings in your office or at any of your usual haunts. Pickanonymous places away from your office and homes.Burn notes as soon as they are typed up (and encrypted),and stash dictaphone tapes elsewhere. When referring tosources use a codename and keep their real identities as

secret as much as possible. Work on a need to know basisand discuss their existence as little as possible. Dont pub-lish their work without their consent first.

Remember, companies you are targeting can be extremelyparanoid about moles and infiltrators so you may needto give your source some security training so they do notimplicate themselves.

Back-upsd) of your information and material are vital tokeep your campaign alive. If you were to lose your mem-bership list or research for whatever reason, accidentalor maliciously, then it is potentially a crippling set back.Keep this sort of information backed up and your back upsomewhere safe, such as the house of someone with out adirect connection with the campaign.

Tamperinge) ; to detect signs of tampering, paint screws,locks etc with a UV pen, which leaves a mark invisible ex-cept under UV lights. If the markings are scratched then itindicates that they have been tampered with. These mark-

ings need to be checked periodically or there is no pointdoing this in the first place. Do it in a large cross, markingthe surrounding material.

Autonomous structuringf) . No one person needs to knoweverything and it is best that no one is put in this posi-tion anyway. The more a group can split into autonomousgroupings working independently of each other the better.A network can consistently come together and break awayinto small groups and still be very effective. Perceivedleaders will become the focus of attention and are morelikely to be taken out.

New People.g) Volunteers, new campaigners and temporarystaff are all potential threats. This does not mean thatyou should automatically mistrust everyone who comesin that is just as detrimental. Use common sense and trythem out before letting them know too much. With a bitof thought this can be done in a way that empowers themwithout making them feeling excluded. If they dont needto know sensitive details, then why tell them, or at least

wait until they have proved themselves sufficiently to tellthem. For example, do not give new people access to themembership list, keys or talk about inside sources.

When someone leaves, it is just as important to deal withthe gap they leave behind. Delete computer accounts, tidyout desks and ensure that all responsibilities they held arecovered or transferred. If in doubt renew security mea-sures such as changing locks, etc.

Your communicationsh) may be tapped, anstate. Dont say anything on the phone, oror letters which could compromise you ois certainly not a good idea to discuss cor name people as carrying out specific certainly not real names anyway.

Be prepared to purchase mobiles that aretasks such as sources and do not use thempaign purposes or ringing friends.

Tip: if they are going to bug your phonehome, the chances are they will also tap close you your home. Finding remoter phnoying, but it will also make life a lot mthose monitoring you, but avoid favouring

2.3 meetIngS (open/campaIgnmeetIn

If you are having a meeting gather up anleft lying around at the end.

Depending on the venue and the politicamay be worth booking them in the name othat sounds fluffier, and does not arousecion.

Where contact lists are being passed arsure they are not left lying around. The psuch a list has a responsibility for their fategold mine to investigators.

Not everyone making notes is a spy, bplace check to see if they are using shorthaist would use. If there is a policy on this announced clearly at the start.

Be friendly with the owners of a meetingyour

Documents

A Practical Security Handbook for Activists and Campaigns v2.5 (Booklet)