A ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 · Increase power to approximately 12% in preparation for placing the turbine on line. A crew is currently in JITT for rolling the turbine

A ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: North Anna Power Station Scenario No.: (2012) NRC 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 10-8 amps, BOL. Unit was placed in Mode 4 several days ago to repair a turbine governor valve. A unit startup was performed last shift. All equipment is available. Turnover: Shift orders are to continue raising power to 12% in preparation for placing the turbine in service. A crew is currently attending JITT for placing the turbine in service.

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description

1 R (R) (S) N (B)

Raise power to approximately 10-12%.

Control SG levels with the MFRV bypasses in Manual

2 CH1201 I (R) (S) TS (S)

VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high. Causes divert valve to fail open. RO stops divert per AR.

3 C (B) (S) Running BC pump trips and standby pump does not automatically start.

4/4a CH1601 CH2101

C (R) (S) TS (S)

N (R)

Running charging pump trips and check valve sticks open

RO restores letdown to service

5 FW0401 M (All) Running MFP trips and standby pump does not start requiring reactor trip.

6 C (B) (S) RO trip switch does not work. BOP must trip reactor.

7 RC2401 M (All) SGTR occurs once crew transitions to 1-ES-0.1

The scenario can be terminated once an RCS cooldown has been started in 1-E-3.

2012 NRC RUN 1 Page 2 Revision 0

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 1


SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Increase power from 10-8 amps to approximately 12% reactor power BOP controls SG levels in manual using the MFRV bypasses (Normal)

2. VCT level transmitter 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high

3 Running BC pump trips and standby pump fails to auto-start

4/4a. Running charging pump trips and discharge check valve fails open Letdown is returned to service

5. Running feed pump trips and standby pump does not start. Reactor trip is required by AP and RO reactor trip switch does not work.

6. SGTR

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 1 (SGTR)

Total Malfunctions 6 (VCT level transmitter 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high, loss of BC, loss of charging, loss of MFW, failure of RO reactor trip switch, SGTR)

Abnormal Events 3 (Loss of BC, loss of charging, loss of MFW)

Major Transients 21 (Loss of MFW, SGTR)

EOPs Entered 1 (E-3, possibly ES-0.1)

EOP Contingencies 0

Critical Tasks 3

SCENARIO DURATION

120 Minutes


SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY SCENARIO 2012 NRC RUN 1

The scenario begins with the unit at 10-8 amps, BOL. The unit was placed in Mode 4 several days ago to repair a turbine governor valve. A startup was performed last shift. All equipment is available. Shift orders are to raise power to approximately 12% in preparation for placing the main turbine in service. A crew is currently attending JITT for placing the turbine in service.

The first event will be a power increase from 10-8 amps to approximately 12% power in preparation for placing the main turbine in service. This can be pre-briefed. The BOP will control SG levels with the MFRV bypasses in manual (Normal).

Once power increase is complete, VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, will fail high. The VCT divert valve will fail open. The RO will use the annunciator response for VCT hi/lo level (C-A4) to manually close the divert valve. The crew will discuss the loss of auto-swapover to the RWST on low VCT level. Once the valve is closed, VCT level returned to a normal value, if required, and TS have been addressed, the next event can occur.

The "A" bearing cooling pump, 1-BC-P-1A, will trip. The crew should identify the loss of bearing cooling and respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." The crew should determine that the "B" bearing cooling pump did not automatically start and, per the RNO, start 1-BC-P-1B. Once the crew has verified that the BC System has been restored the next event can occur. The running charging pump will trip and its discharge check valve will stick open. Letdown will isolate and the standby charging pump will automatically start, but charging flow will be zero. The crew will enter 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging," and close the discharge valves on the "A" charging pump (CT). Charging header pressure will return to normal and flow will increase. The crew will throttle charging to maintain pressurizer level and return letdown to service (Normal). The US will review TS 3.5.2.

The running MFW pump will begin losing oil pressure. The pump will trip and the standby pump will not auto start. The crew will enter 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and trip the reactor. The reactor trip switch on the RO side will not function; the BOP must turn his switch in order to trip the reactor. When the reactor is tripped a SGTR will occur on "A" SG. The crew will likely transition to 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," and throttle AFW. At this time they will determine that "A" SG level is continuing to increase at an unanticipated rate. The crew will initiate safety injection and return to 1-E-0. The crew will continue through 1-E-0 and transition to 1-E-3, "SGTR." The "A" SG will be isolated (CT). The crew will begin an RCS cooldown (CT). At this time the scenario can be terminated.


SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose: This examination is intended to evaluate the crew’s performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status: Unit 1 is at 10-8 amps. The unit was placed in Mode 4 several days ago to repair a turbine governor valve. A startup was performed last shift. RCS boron is 2058 ppm and core age is 1000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Equipment Status: All equipment is available. The maintenance rule window is green. 2H is the protected train.

Shift Orders: Increase power to approximately 12% in preparation for placing the turbine on line. A crew is currently in JITT for rolling the turbine.


EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at 10-8 amps, the crew will ramp the unit to approximately 12% power per 1-OP-1.2, Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2," and 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Reactor power increases to approximately 12% RO withdraws control rods and establishes

SUR in preparation for reaching the POAH.

RO increases reactor power to < 5% using control rods and stabilizes power.

BOP manually controls SG levels on MFRV bypasses.

Normal

Crew turns off toggle switch on Scaler/Timer drawer.

Crew observes steam dumps for proper operation.

Crew directs opening of MSR 1" warm-up valves.

Crew directs closing of BC valves at Flash Evaporator.

Crew transitions to 1-OP-2.1.

RO raises power to approximately 12% using control rods.

NOTE: The next event can occur once power is stable at approximately 12%.


EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator C-A4 illuminates • 1-CH-LI-1112 will indicate off-scale high • 1-CH-LCV-1112C output will go to zero • VCT level will decrease • "A" Stripper level will increase RO identifies annunciator C-A4, VCT HI-

LO LEVEL L-112.

RO identifies 1-CH-LT-1112 is failed high and VCT is diverting to stripper.

NOTE: The following steps are from the annunciator response for C-A4. (Attached)

US reads note in AR about 1-CH-LT-1112 failing high - loss of auto swapover capability on low VCT level, full divert to stripper.

RO places 1-CH-LCV-1112C in manual and raises output to 100%.

RO verifies VCT level > 5 %.

RO verifies charging flow normal and 1-CH-FCV-1122 is not failed.

RO verifies Letdown flow is normal.

RO verifies VCT makeup is not in progress.

RO verifies 1-CH-LCV-1115A in VCT position.

RO verifies all instrumentation is normal. (NO)

US reviews TRM 3.3.9 for Reg Guide 1.97 instrumentation. (Not Applicable)

Crew evaluates plant parameters to determine if VCT or letdown line leaking or ruptured. (NO)

US reviews TS 3.4.13 (RCS leakage) which applied while letdown was diverting to the stripper.


EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US makes notifications about 1-CH-LT-1112 failure and requests instrument shop assistance along with CR.

NOTE: The next event may occur once VCT level has been stabilized and TS reviewed.


EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators F-F4, and F-E4 illuminate • 1-BC-P-1A has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit) • 1-BC-P-1B does not auto-start BOP identifies annunciator F-F4, BC WTR

PP 1A-1B AUTO TRIP SYS MISALIGNED.

BOP identifies 1-BC-P-1A has tripped.

BOP identifies that 1-BC-P-1B did not automatically start.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-19.

BOP checks status of BC pumps: Checks one BC pump operating (NO)

BOP starts 1-BC-P-1B. IOA

BOP verifies at least one BC pump running normally: Checks pump operating with normal amps.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating tower-to-tower.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating normally: BC system intact BC tower level normal BC tower fans running

Crew monitors main generator temperatures. (Not applicable since generator is offline.)

Crew dispatches operator to check equipment supplied by BC: MFP, Cond pumps, EHC, HPs, LPs. (Most equipment not running due to low power level.)

US reports loss of BC pump and failure of standby pump to auto-start and requests assistance, and CR.

NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that there is an overcurrent trip on the breaker (15B8) for 1-BC-P-1A.


EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has restored BC.


EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • 1-CH-P-1A trips and the discharge check valve sticks open • 1-CH-P-1B automatically starts • Charging pump discharge pressure decreases on 1-CH-PI-1121 • Annunciators C-A5, C-B5, C-C5, and C-G6 illuminate • Charging flow goes to zero on 1-CH-FI-1122 RO identifies the trip of 1-CH-P-1A and

the auto-start of 1-CH-P-1B.

RO identifies annunciator C-B5, CH PP TO REGEN HX LO PRESS, and C-C5, CH PP TO REGEN HX HI-LO FLOW.

Crew identifies loss of charging flow.


Crew checks the charging pump that was started for gas binding. (NO)

Crew identifies that a charging pump manipulation has taken place.

CT1 Crew closes discharge MOVs for the previously running pump ("A"). • 1-CH-MOV-1286A • 1-CH-MOV-1287A

*Before completion of step requiring its performance

RO verifies charging conditions returning to normal: Discharge header pressure Charging flow Motor amps.

RO checks letdown in service. (NO)


EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO restores letdown per RNO of step 6: • Controls 1-CH-FCV-1122 to establish

at least 25 gpm charging flow • Places 1-CH-PCV-1145 in manual and

opens to 100% • Verifies 1-CH-TV-1204A/B and 1-CH-

LCV-1460A/B open • Opens 1-CH-HCV-1200B • Adjusts 1-CH-PCV-1145 to establish

300 psig letdown pressure and puts the valve in auto

• Places 1-CH-FCV-1122 in auto, if desired

• Maintains pressurizer pressure at 2235 by operating pressurizer heaters and spray valves.

Normal

Crew determines that there is no standby charging pump at this time.

US reviews Technical Specification 3.5.2 Condition A for having only one operable HHSI pump. Have 72 hours to restore 2 trains to operable

NOTE: Crew may discuss starting the "C" pump on the 1H bus.

US reports failures and requests CR and management notifications be made.

NOTE: Crew should also discuss an entry into TS 3.0.3, which was applicable from the time the "B" started until the "A" discharge MOVs were closed.

NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech Specs the next event can occur.


EVENT 5: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator E-H5 illuminates • "A" MFP breakers have amber and green lights lit • "B" MFP does not auto-start • RO reactor trip switch does not work BOP identifies annunciator 1E-H5, FW

PUMP 1A LUBE OIL PRESS LOW.

BOP identifies trip of "A" MFP.

BOP informs US of MFP trip.

BOP identifies start failure of "B" MFP.

US direct the BOP to take actions of 1-AP-31.

BOP checks reactor power greater than 70%. (NO)

BOP checks 1 feed pumps running. (NO)

US direct crew to enter 1-E-0.

RO verifies reactor trip: • BOP manually trips reactor (RO switch

will not work.) • RO checks reactor trip and bypass

breakers open • RO checks Rod Bottom lights LIT • RO checks neutron flux decreasing.

BOP verifies turbine trip. • BOP manually depresses turbine trip pb • BOP verifies all stop valves are closed • BOP verifies reheaters reset • BOP verifies G-12 is open

Note that turbine is not in service.

Crew verifies emergency power is available.

Crew verifies SI is neither actuated nor needed.

US directs transition to 1-ES-0.1.


EVENT 5: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew checks RCS temperature trending to desired temperature.

BOP throttles AFW.

NOTE: The next event was initiated on the reactor trip.


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • RCS pressure and level decrease • "A" SG level increases unexpectedly Crew identifies decreasing RCS pressure

and level.

US directs crew to manually initiate SI and re-enter 1-E-0.

RO/BOP manually initiate SI.

RO verifies reactor trip.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

Crew verifies both emergency buses are energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated: • LHSI pumps running • Any SI first out LIT (YES)

RO/BOP verify SI manually intiated.

RO checks CAP items 1-6.

US initiates attachments 4(5) and 8. Attachment 8 is attached

NOTE: Attachment 8 will perform steps to isolate ruptured SG. This CT is included on next page.

Crew verifies SI flow indicated.

NOTE: AFW flow will probably be isolated.

Crew verifies AFW flow: • AFW flow to all SGs indicated • Total AFW flow > 340 GPM.

Crew checks average temperature controlling at desired temperature.

Crew adjusts total AFW flow to maintain > 340 gpm until NR level in at least one SG is greater than 11%.



Crew checks pressurizer PORVs and spray valves: • Pressurizer PORVs closed • Pressurizer spray valves responding to

control pressurizer pressure at 2235 psig or demand at zero with valves closed.

• At least one pressurizer PORV block valve open.

Crew checks RCS subcooling based on CETCs < 25°F. (NO)

Crew checks SG pressures all greater than 80 psig and under control of operator.

Crew checks level in any SG increasing in an uncontrolled manner. (YES)

US directs transition to 1-E-3.

Crew checks RCS subcooling based on CETCs < 25°F. (NO)

Crew identifies ruptured SG due to unexpected level increase. (A)

CT2 Crew isolates flow from ruptured SG: • Crew places ruptured SG PORV

setpoint at 1050 psig • Check ruptured SG PORV closed • 1-E-0 attachment 8 complete • Crew isolates/verifies feedwater flow

to "A" SG when NR level > 11% (from attachment 8)

• Crew dispatches operator to close 1-MS-18 (from attachment 8)

• Crew checks 1-MS-HCV-104 closed • Crew checks "A" SG BD TVs closed • Crew closes "A" MSTV.

*Prior to need to transition to ECA-3.1.

Crew initiates attachment 2 for local turbine building operations.

Crew checks pressurizer PORVs and block valves: • Power available to PORV block valves • Pressurizer PORVs closed • At least one PORV block valve open.



Crew checks intact SG levels: • NR level > 11% • Control AFW flow to maintain NR

level between 23 and 50%.

Crew resets both trains of SI.

Crew manually aligns condenser air ejector discharge to containment: • Remove the condenser AE RM

instrument fuses • Reset both trains of Phase A isolation • Put both COND AIR EJECTOR

DIVERT TO CONT SI RESET switches to RESET

• Verify 1-SV-TV-102-1 open • Verify 1-SV-TV-103 open • Verify 1-SV-TV-102-2 closed • Open AS-FCV-100A/B.

Crew verifies outside IA supplying containment.

Crew verifies flow from ruptured SG isolated: • Procedure step 3 complete • 1-E-0 attachment 8 step 5 complete • Ruptured SG pressure > 350 psig.

Crew determines required core exit temperature based on SG pressure.

Crew blocks SI high steam flow with block switches.



CT3 Crew initiates RCS cooldown: • Crew determines required CETC

temperature • Crew verifies steam dumps are available. • Crew checks P-F3 LIT, if not dump

steam. If P-F3 lit, crew verifies P-F4 LIT. If not then RO momentarily places both steam dump interlock switches to interlock

• BOP dumps steam at maximum controllable rate

• Crew stops cooldown when CETCs less than required temperature

• Crew maintains CETCs.

*When directed by procedure

NOTE: Scenario can be terminated once a cooldown has been established.


REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Operating Procedure 1-OP-1.5, "Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2." 83

Operating Procedure 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." 104

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." 17

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging." 14

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." 17

Emergency Procedure 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." 44

Emergency Procedure 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." 30

Emergency Procedure 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture." 26

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A

Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, "Human Performance." 7

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007


ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3 – SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario)


ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM


SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM 2012 NRC RUN 1 Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 149

2. Ensure Tave (545-555), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Designate 2H as the protected train.

4. Select feedwater Venturi Calorimetric.

5. Set Low Cap blowdown to 30, 30, 30 and high cap to 0.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

Failure of standby BC pump to auto-start

Remote function: BCP_AUTO_DEFEAT

1-CH-P-1A check valve sticks open

Malfunction: CH2101

Failure of "B" MFP to auto-start

Switch override: FWP1B1_ASTOP = OFF FWP1B2_ASTOP = OFF

Failure of auto reactor trip Malfunction: RD32

Failure of RO trip switch Switch override: RX_TRIP_TRIP = OFF

SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Ramp to 12% power NOTE: The turbine building operator will be sent to open the MSR 1" warmup valves. These are on the monitor screen for 2012_NRC_1 in the examiner folder, or can be done on the monitor screen for MSR startup. (1-MS-473, -474, -475, -476) The 2 BC valves (268 and 269) do not exist.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 2) 1-CH-LT-1112 fails high Malfunction:

CH1201, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 10, Severity = 1, Trigger = 2 NOTE: The next event may occur once VCT level has been stabilized and TS reviewed.

3) Loss of BC Remote functions: BCP1A_PROTECT = T, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that there is an overcurrent drop on the breaker (15B8) for "A" BC pump. NOTE: The next event will occur once BC is restored, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

4) 1-CH-P-1A trips (check valve failure is pre-loaded)

Malfunctions: CH1601, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 4 NOTE: If asked to check on 1-CH-P-1B, can report that the pump appears to running satisfactorily, with no seal leakage. NOTE: Once the US has referred to Tech Specs or as directed by the Lead Evaluator, the next event will occur.

5) Trip of "A" MFP Malfunction: FW0401, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 100, Trigger = 5 NOTE: When requested to investigate cause for loss of oil pressure informs US that oil is leaking from a flanged connection on the south end of the MFP. NOTE: The next event will occur when the reactor is tripped.

6) SGTR Malfunction: RC2401, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 50, Trigger = 6 Set up trigger 6 as RD1 on trigger screen. NOTE: When sent to close 1-MS-18 use trigger 15. Remote function: MS_18 = 0, Delay time = 30, Ramp = 30, Trigger = 15 NOTE: Scenario can be terminated once crew has started a cooldown.


ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES


SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially

when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing

and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures. C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.


EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at 10 amps, the crew will ramp the unit to

approximately 12% power per 1-OP-1.2, Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2," and 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."

-8

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R111 Perform a reactor startup form Mode 2 to approximately 3% power.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-

1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: None

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has

tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R522 Stabilize the unit following a loss of bearing cooling water.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running

charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R704 Respond to a loss of normal charging. S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page


CT Statement:

Crew takes action to prevent charging pump run-out due to a stuck open discharge check valve on a non-running charging pump.

Safety Significance:

Failure to prevent charging pump run-out constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

• Indication/annunciation that one charging pump has tripped or been shutdown with a stuck open discharge check valve. • High amps on the running charging pump. • Low/no charging flow or seal injection indicated.

Performance Indicator:

Crew closes charging pump discharge MOVs on the previously running charging pump.

Feedback:

Discharge MOVs for the previously running pump indicate closed and charging and seal injection flow returns to normal.

WOG Reference:

None.

Conditions:

Prior to Safety Injection being required by degraded plant conditions.


EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main

Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond

in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."Error! Bookmark not defined.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R187 Identify and isolate a ruptured steam generator. R759 Cool down the RCS during the response to a steam generator tube rupture.

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages


CT Statement:

Crew isolates affected Steam Generator.


Failure to isolate the affected SG allows the continued contamination of the secondary systems and increases the effects on the environment should a leak in the secondary occur. This constitutes an incorrect performance that "...necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy..."

Cues:

Indication and annunciation of:

• Increasing SG water level and radiation. • Reactor has been tripped.


BOP adjusts "A" SG PORV setpoint at 1050 PSIG BOP verifies/closes "A" SG MSTV and Bypass valve RO/BOP directs an auxiliary operator to locally close 1-MS-18 BOP closes 1-FW-MOV-100D.

Feedback:

Indication of:

• Stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG • Decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate to the ruptured SG.

WOG Reference:

E-3 – Background document

Conditions:

Isolate before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs


CT Statement:

Crew initiates RCS Cooldown.


Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that "...necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy...."

Cues:

Procedurally directed by E-3.


RO/BOP dumps steam

Feedback:

Indication of steam flow rate greater than zero Indication of RCS temperature decreasing OR Indication of RCS temperature less than target temperature

WOG Reference:

E-3 -- B Background

Conditions:

Crew maintains adequate subcooling.

ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

2010 NRC RUN 2 Date _________ Revision 0

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at 10 amps, the crew will ramp the unit to approximately 12% -8

power per 1-OP-1.2, Unit Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2," and 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Reactor power increases to approximately 12% EVENT 2:Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator C-A4 illuminates • 1-CH-LI-1112 will indicate off-scale high • 1-CH-LCV-1112C output will go to zero • VCT level will decrease "A" Stripper level will increaseEVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the "A" bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators F-F4, and F-E4 illuminate • 1-BC-P-1A has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit) • 1-BC-P-1B does not auto-start EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and there is a loss of the running charging pump and a failed open discharge check valve, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • 1-CH-P-1A trips and the discharge check valve sticks open • 1-CH-P-1B automatically starts • Charging pump discharge pressure decreases on 1-CH-PI-1121 • Annunciators C-A5, C-B5, C-C5, and C-G6 illuminate • Charging flow goes to zero on 1-CH-FI-1122


EVENT 5: Given the plant is in Mode 1 with indications of a loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump and a failure of "B" Main Feedwater Pump to automatically start, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator E-H5 illuminates • "A" MFP breakers have amber and green lights lit • "B" MFP does not auto-start • RO reactor trip switch does not work EVENT 6: Given that the unit is tripped and a SGTR occurs, the crew will be respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • RCS pressure and level decrease • "A" SG level increases unexpectedly



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. There is a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG. 1-SI-P-1A was tagged out for motor maintenance 12 hours ago. Maintenance will not be complete until next shift. Turnover: Shift orders are to perform 1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves."

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description

1 N (R) (S) TS (S)

Perform 1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves." 1-RC-MOV-1536 will fail to stroke closed (and open) in the allotted time. The SRO will enter the applicable TS.

2 RD07 C (R) (S) A continuous rod insertion will occur. The rods will stop moving when placed in manual.

3 CN0401 C (B) (S)

1-SD-P-1A trips. Standby condensate pump does not start automatically. BOP must start Condensate pump.

4 RC0702 I (R) (S) 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high. PORV opens. RO closes using switch.

5 C (B) (S) "B" SG PORV will fail open. The BOP will be able to close it using the full station. The crew may or may not need to ramp the turbine down to stabilize the unit.

6 RC32 C (R) (S) TS (S)

1-RC-PCV-1456 begins to leak by. Crew isolates using MOV.

7/7a MS1001 R (R) (S) N (B)

Steam leak develops in the MSVH. The crew ramps the unit down to stabilize reactor power.

8 MS1001 M (All) Steam leak increases to the point where a reactor trip is required. "B" SG is faulted in MSVH between TV and containment.

9 C (All) BIT MOVs do not open automatically. BOP must open them manually.

10 SI1304 C (All) Single train Phase A. Must use switches to isolate valves and equipment on other train.

Scenario is terminated once the BIT has been isolated in 1-ES-1.1.

(Events 9 and 10 occur during event 8. These are numbered only for use on subsequent forms.)

* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor






EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves"

2. Continuous rod insertion

3 1-SD-P-1A trips (with failure of standby condensate pump to start in auto)

4. 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high

5. "B" SG PORV fails open

6. 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by it's seat

7/7a Steam leak develops in MSVH/Power reduction to stabilize reactor power

8. Steam break requiring reactor trip


Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (BIT MOVs do not open automatically, single train Phase A)

Total Malfunctions 9 (Continuous rod insertion, 1-SD-P-1A trips/standby Condensate pump does not start in auto, 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high, "B" SG PORV fails open, 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by its seat, steam leak in MSVH, MSLB, BIT MOVs do not open automatically, single train Phase A)

Abnormal Events 6 (Continuous rod insertion, 1-SD-P-1A trips/standby Condensate pump does not start in auto, 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high, "B" SG PORV fails open, 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by its seat, steam leak in MSVH)

Major Transients 1 MSLB

EOPs Entered 2 (E-2, 1-ES-1.1)

EOP Contingencies 0

Critical Tasks 4

SCENARIO DURATION

95 Minutes



The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power, MOL. There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been inoperable for 12 hours. Maintenance will not be completed by the end of this shift. Shift orders are to perform "1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and to support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

The first event will be a normal evolution of performing time strokes of the PORV block valves by the RO using 1-PT-44.7. This can be pre-briefed so that the crew is prepared to do PT once they take the unit. The second valve tested, 1-RC-MOV-1536, will fail to stroke closed or open in the required time. (The crew may stop the PT with the valve closed.) The SRO will enter action and the crew will place the associated PORV in manual. Once TS have been addressed, the next event can occur.

A continuous rod insertion will occur. The crew will enter 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." The RO will place rods in manual to stop rod motion. The next event can occur any time after rods have been placed in manual and the unit is stabilized. (CT)

High-pressure heater drain pump, 1-SD-P-1A, will trip. The standby condensate pump will not auto-start when required. The crew will enter 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater," and the BOP will manually start the condensate pump and restore MFW suction pressure. The crew may need to reduce turbine power slightly due to the affect of colder feed water on calorimetric power. The next event can occur after the unit has been stabilized.

1-RC-PT-1445, RCS pressure transmitter, fails high. The crew will enter 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." The associated PORV, 1-RC-PCV-1456, opens and must be manually closed. Once the crew has stabilized the unit the next event can occur. (CT) NOTE: When I&C is notified about the PT failure they will at that time relay the information that they found a bad card in the auto rod control circuit. They will report that rods should work in manual. They are pursuing a replacement card. (If the WCC is notified instead of I&C being called directly, the WCC supervisor will give the information.)

The "B" SG PORV, 1-MS-PCV-101B, will fail open. The crew will determine this from either a PCS alarm, or an increase in reactor power. The BOP will place the controller in manual and close the valve using the full station per the immediate operator actions of 1-AP-38, "Excessive load Increase." The crew may or may not need to ramp the turbine down slightly. The next event can occur once the PORV is closed and the unit has been stabilized.

1-PCV-1456 will begin to leak by its seat. The RO will isolate the PORV by closing the associated block valve. The US will consult TS and determine that the PORV is still operable.

At this time a steam leak will occur on the "B" steam line in the MSVH. The crew will re-enter 1-AP-38 and ramp the unit down. After a sufficient ramp has been observed, the steam leak will worsen and require the crew to trip the reactor. The crew will trip the reactor and enter 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." An automatic safety injection will occur. The BIT


MOVs will not open automatically. The crew will use an E-0 attachment to restore charging flow through the BIT (CT). Also, a single train Phase A will occur, the crew will manually operate valves on this train per attachment 5 of 1-E-0. The crew will continue through 1-E-0 and transition to 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." The "B" SG will be isolated (CT). The crew will transition to 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination", and isolate the BIT. At this time the scenario can be terminated.








Unit Status: Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1035 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Equipment Status: There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. T.S. 3.5.2A was entered 12 hours ago. Maintenance on the low head will not be completed by the end of this shift. The maintenance rule window is green. 1J is the protected train.

Shift Orders: Shift orders are to perform "1-PT- 44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and to support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.


EVENT 1: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up tasks. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • 1-RC-MOV-1536 will fail to stroke open or closed in specified time limit Crew will check valve flow lights in

Acoustic Monitoring Panel.

RO will check limit switch indicators on control board to verify they are both indicating the same.

RO will verify that both PORV block valves are open.

RO will record initial valve positions for block valves from Unit 1 PCS.

It will be covered at the brief that all Unit 2 PCS points will be "as expected".

RO requests Unit 2 operator to report valve positions for Unit 1 block valves.

RO closes 1-RC-MOV-1535 and records time.

RO records indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1535 from Unit 1 PCS.

RO requests Unit 2 operator to report indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1535 from Unit 2 PCS.

RO opens 1-RC-MOV-1535 and records opening time.

RO closes 1-RC-MOV-1536 and records time.

NOTE: The RO may stop when the MOV fails to stroke closed in the specified time. The crew may discuss whether to stop the PT and leave the MOV closed. If consulted, management will concur with the decision they make.

RO records indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1536 from Unit 1 PCS.

RO requests Unit 2 operator to report indicated valve position for 1-RC-MOV-1536 from Unit 2 PCS.

RO opens 1-RC-MOV-1536 and records opening time.

RO reports that 1-RC-MOV-1536 failed to stroke closed and open in required time.


EVENT 1: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up tasks. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SRO consults Tech Spec 3.4.11 and declares the valve inoperable per Condition D. The PORV must be placed in manual in closed within 1 hour. The block valve must be restored to operable within 72 hours.

SRO instructs RO to place 1-RC-PCV-1455C in CLOSE.

RO places switch for 1-RC-PCV-1455C to CLOSE.

SRO requests WCC to enter a CR and perform the actions required by VPAP-0805.

RO marks PT as unsat.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has placed the PORV switch in CLOSE.


EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Control rods insert at 72 spm in automatic. • Control rods stop when placed in manual RO identifies control rods inserting in

automatic.

RO/BOP determines that no obvious instrument failure has occurred.

US directs entry into 1-AP-1.1.

CT 1 RO places control rods in manual. Critical Task *Prior to reactor trip on low pressurizer pressure.

RO verifies that rod motion has stopped.

RO verifies that 1-RC-TI-1408A, Median/HI Tavg is normal. (YES)

RO is instructed to maintain the following using control rods and boration: • Rod Bank LO/LO-LO limit

annunciators NOT lit • AFD monitor annunciator A-H7 NOT

lit

RO checks RCS temperature: • Loop average temperature ≥ 541°F • RCS temperature above min and below

max line on attachment 2.

RO checks PRZR pressure stable or tending to 2235 psig.

RO checks PRZR level is stable.

Crew checks controls rods above the low insertion limit.

RO is instructed to maintain stable plant conditions: • RCS Tave • RCS pressure • PRZR level.

US notifies I&C to investigate.


EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US references, or directs WCC to reference, the Reactivity Management Program.

US requests WCC to enter a CR to document the reactivity event.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator F-A6 illuminates • 1-SD-P-1A trips as indicated by amber light lit • Annunciator Q-E3 illuminates (slight delay) • Reactor power increases slightly (delay due to calorimetric) • Main feed pump suction pressure decreases • Standby condensate pump does not auto-start BOP identifies annunciator F-A6, HP

DRAIN PUMP 1A-1B-1C AUTO TRIP.

BOP identifies trip of 1-SD-P-1A.

US directs entry into 1-AP-31.

BOP verifies power > 70%.

BOP verifies 2 main feed pump running.

BOP checks main feed pump suction pressure > 300 psig and stable. (NO)

NOTE: Auto start is defeated for standby condensate pump.

BOP starts "B" condensate pump.

Watchstander is dispatched to investigate cause for trip of "A" HPHDP.

NOTE: Crew may determine the need to enter 1-AP-38 and ramp the unit down slightly due to an increase in calorimetric power. These steps are not included here, but can be found in event 5.

Crew checks for MFW pump evolutions in progress: • Any MFW pump tripped or degraded.

(NO)

Crew evaluates reducing turbine load to <55% - Only one MFW pump running (NO).


EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

BOP stabilizes SG levels: • Verifies feed flow adequate • Verifies SG levels are at or trending to

program.

NOTE: Operator reports an overcurrent drop on breaker for 1-SD-P-1A. (15A9)

BOP verifies acceptable MFW pump performance: • Motors amps < 550 amps • Annunciator F-B5 NOT lit

Crew is instructed to maintain stable plant conditions.

BOP checks HP heater drain pump tripped.

Crew evaluates need to reduce reactor power.

Crew checks if isotopic analysis of RCS is needed. (NO)

US makes, or directs WCC to make, notifications to: • STA • OMOC • System operator • Other as directed by VPAP-2802 • MOC

Crew has operator locally check the Condensate pump that was started.

BOP checks operation of MFW recircs.

Crew directs operator to locally walkdown feed train.

US requests WCC to submit a CR.

US exits 1-AP-31.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the Condensate pump has been started and the unit has been stabilized.


EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators C-D1, B-F7, B-E7, (and possibly B-H6 and B-H2) are illuminated • 1-RC-PCV-1456 indicates open RO identifies annunciator C-D1, PRZR

SAFETY VALVE OR PORV OPEN.

US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-44.

CT 2 Crew stops RCS pressure decrease. • Crew identifies PORV open. • RO performs RNO step and closes 1-

RC-PCV-1456.

*Critical task Before reactor trip on low pressurizer pressure.

RO checks master controller not failed.

RO checks PRZR spray valves closed.

RO verifies all PRZR heaters energized.

RO checks 1-CH-HCV-1311 closed.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and safety valves closed.

RO verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.

RO verifies RCS pressure normal.

US refers to Technical Specifications: 3.4.1A – DNB 2 hours to restore pressure to within COLR limits (>2205 psig) (If applicable.) 3.4.13A (RCS Leakage) – 4 hours to restore leakage to within limits _________________________________ TS 3.4.11. Determines that PORV is operable.

US requests WCC to submit a CR.


EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: At this time, the WCC will report that I&C has reported that the problem with rod control is a bad card in auto rod control. Manual rod control is not affected. I&C is working on getting a replacement card ready to install.

Crew restores any unaffected equipment to normal.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the PORV has been closed and the unit has been stabilized.


EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Reactor power increases slightly • Megawatts decrease • "B" PORV indicates open • PORV closes when taken to manual Crew identifies increasing reactor power

and decreasing megawatts. Will also get a PCS alarm on PORV opening..

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-38: • RO verifies steam dumps are closed • BOP identifies "B" SG PORV is open • BOP takes manual control of "B" SG

PORV and closes it • Crew checks turbine load is normal • Crew verifies reactor power ≤ 100%

and stable. • Crew reduces power using turbine, if

required.

NOTE: Crew may need to reduce power. This will depend on the length of time the PORV was open.

RO uses rods to control RCS Tave within 1.5°F of Tref.

RO energizes additional pressurizer heaters if required to maintain RCS pressure.

NOTE: If crew does not need to ramp they may discuss the necessity of the following steps.

BOP checks turbine load control: • Verifies reactor power reduced to the

power level before the event started • Verifies valve position limit light is

OFF • If not, reduces turbine load until light is

OFF • Verifies turbine load controller is in

IMP IN (NO) • Ensures reference and setter matched

and pushes IMP IN pushbutton. (This may have already been done.)


EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS



lit

Crew checks plant status is stable: • Main generator output is stable • Tave is on program with Tref

BOP checks steam flow channel indications are normal.

BOP checks that turbine control is in operator auto.

Crew checks plant systems: • BOP checks that SG PORVs and safety

valves are closed using SPDS indication.

• Crew dispatches operator to locally check SG PORVs and safeties closed.

• BOP checks MSR inlet FCV operation is normal

• BOP checks that 1-AS-PCV-105 is operating normally

• Crew checks that plant steam systems are intact.

RO checks for RCS dilution: • No improper demin operation • No improper operation of 1-CC-TCV-

106 • No indications of PG water leakby

Crew verifies that cause of load increase is corrected.

RO verifies that steam dumps are NOT in Off/Reset.

US reviews T.S. 3.7.4 and determines that PORV is still operable.

US requests a CR be submitted for the SG PORV.

US exits 1-AP-38.

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has stopped the power increase.



EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a pressurizer PORV begins to leak by, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with the AR for B-H2, or 1-AP-44, and close the associated PORV block valve. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator B-H2 illuminates • RCS pressure slowly decreases • Pressurizer level slowly decreases • Charging flow slowly increases • 1-RC-TI-1463, PORV line temp, increases • PRT pressure and level increase RO identifies annunciator B-H2, PRZ

POWER RELIEF LINE HI TEMP, is illuminated.

AR attached

RO identifies that RCS pressure is slowly decreasing.

NOTE: It is possible that crew will enter 1-AP-16 for RCS leakage.

NOTE: Crew may discuss which block valve to close first (if both open) to determine which PORV is leaking by.

Crew closes 1-RC-MOV-1535 to stop leakby of PORV.

Crew verifies RCS pressure is increasing and tailpipe temperature is decreasing.

US consults TS 3.4.11 and determines that the PORV is still operable.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the block valve is closed and TS have been reviewed.


EVENT 7/7A: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Megawatts decrease • Reactor power increases • Tave decreases • Annunciator D-C8 illuminates (Delayed) Crew identifies increasing reactor power

and decreasing megawatts.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-38: • RO verifies steam dumps are closed • BOP SG PORVs are closed • Crew checks turbine load is normal • Crew verifies reactor power ≤ 100%

and stable.(NO) • Crew reduces power using turbine in

operator auto

RO uses rods to control RCS Tave within 1.5°F of Tref.

RO energizes additional pressurizer heaters if required to maintain RCS pressure.

BOP checks turbine load control: • Verifies reactor power reduced to the

power level before the event started • Verifies valve position limit light is

OFF • Verifies turbine load controller is in

IMP IN • Ensures turbine reference and setter are

matched and presses IMP-IN pushbutton



lit


EVENT 7/7A: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: If operators are dispatched to look for steam leaks, 5 minutes later he will report back that there is steam coming from the upper louvers on the MSVH. He will get a "buddy" and attempt to enter building and determine exact location of the leak. If no one is sent, once crew has commenced ramp a security officer will report that steam is coming from the upper louvers on the Unit 1 MSVH.

Crew checks plant status is stable: • Main generator output is stable • Tave is on program with Tref

BOP checks steam flow channel indications are normal.

BOP checks that turbine control is in operator auto.

NOTE: The next event can occur once a sufficient ramp has been observed.


EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • "B" SG pressure decreases rapidly • RCS pressure decreases rapidly • Pressurizer level decreases rapidly • "J" train phase "A" equipment does not reposition • BIT valves do not automatically open BOP identifies decreasing pressure in "B"

SG.

RO identifies degrading primary plant conditions.

US directs crew to enter 1-E-0.

RO verifies reactor trip: • RO/BOP manually trip reactor • RO checks reactor trip and bypass

breakers open • RO checks Rod Bottom lights LIT (NO) • RO checks neutron flux decreasing.

BOP verifies turbine trip. • BOP manually depresses turbine trip pb • BOP verifies all stop valves are closed • BOP resets reheaters • BOP verifies G-12 is open

Crew verifies emergency busses are energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated: • LHSI pumps running • Any SI first out LIT

Crew manually actuates safety injection.

NOTE: US will read the immediate actions before addressing CAP items.

US directs review of CAP items 1-6. CAP Attached

Crew identifies that BIT is not flowing. CAP 2 SI flow verification

US initiates attachment 6 of 1-E-0. (Manual verification of SI flowpath)

Attached



CT 3 Crew establishes HHSI flow to the RCS: • Crew verifies 1-CH-MOV-1115D open • Crew opens 1-CH-MOV-1115B • Crew verifies 1-CH-MOV-1115E

closed • Crew closes 1-CH-MOV-1115D • Crew verifies 1-CH-MOV-1289A

and/or B is closed • Crew verifies BIT recirc valves, 1-SI-

TV-1884A/C are closed • Crew closes 1-SI-TV-1884B • Crew opens at least one BIT outlet

valve, 1-SI-MOV-1867C or D • Crew opens at least one BIT inlet

valve, 1-SI-MOV-1867A or B • Crew verifies charging pumps running • Crew verifies SI flow is indicated

*Critical task to open one BIT outlet and one BIT inlet before completion of the step requiring its performance.

US initiates attachments 4 – Equipment Verification (Attachment 5 - Verification of SI and Phase A Isolation will be directed by attachment 4) and 7 (Faulted SG Isolation).

NOTE: Attachment 7 will cover CT 4 for isolating feed to the faulted SG. Will also close MSTVs.

Attached

Crew verifies SI flow indicated.

Crew checks RCS pressure < 225 [450] psig. (NO)

NOTE: AFW flow may have already been isolated to the faulted SG.

Crew verifies AFW flow indicated to all SGs.

Crew verifies total AFW flow > 340 gpm.

Crew checks RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 547°F.

Crew adjusts total AFW flow to maintain > 340 gpm until at least one SG NR level is > 11%.



Crew checks pressurizer PORVs closed.

Crew checks pressurizer spray valves responding to control RCS pressure at 2235 psig or closed.

Crew checks at least one pressurizer PORV block valve open (YES)

Crew checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria: • RO checks RCS subcooling < 25°F

[85°F] (NO)

Crew checks SGs not faulted: • All SG pressures > 80 psig and under

control of operator. (NO)

NOTE: Crew will manipulate various valves that didn’t reposition on phase A using attachment 5 of 1-E-0.

Crew transitions to 1-E-2.

NOTE: Crew will have used attachment 7 of 1-E-0, Faulted SG Isolation, to isolate "B" SG.

Crew verifies main steam trip valves and bypass valves are closed.

Crew checks pressure in any SG greater than 80 psig and stable or any SG pressure increasing. (YES)

Crew checks an SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or any SG completely depressurized. (YES, B)

CT 4 Crew isolates the faulted SG. • BOP verifies MFW isolated. • BOP closes 1-FW-MOV-100B. • BOP verifies 1-FW-HCV-100B closed. • BOP verifies "B" SG PORV closed. • BOP verifies all SG blowdown trip

valves closed. • Crew dispatches an operator to locally

close 1-MS-57 (attachment 1) • Crew dispatches an operator to verify

closed 1-MS-58.

Critical Task *Prior to transition out of E-2



BOP checks ECST level > 40%.

BOP verifies outside IA supplying containment.

Crew checks secondary radiation: • RO resets SI, Phase A, and AMSAC • Crew checks last known SG blowdown

radiation • Crew checks last known AE radiation • Crew checks MS line and Terry turbine

radiation.

Crew checks if SI can be terminated: • RCS subcooling based on CETCs >

25°F [75] • Secondary heat sink from either >340

gpm AFW flow OR >11% in at least one intact SG

• RCS pressure stable or increasing • Pressurizer level > 21% [26%]. (YES)

US directs crew to transition to 1-ES-1.1.

RO verifies/resets SI.

RO stops all but one charging pump and places in Auto.

Crew checks RCS pressure stable or increasing.

Crew isolates the BIT: • BOP checks LHSI suctions from

containment sump are closed • RO verifies/opens 1-CH-MOV-1373 • RO verifies/opens CHP recirc valves • BOP closes BIT inlet valves (1-SI-

MOV-1867A and/or B) • BOP closes BIT outlet valves (1-SI-

MOV-1867C and/or D) • BOP verifies 1-SI-MOV-1836 and 1-SI-

MOV-1869A and 1869B are closed.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated after the isolated the BIT, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Operations Periodic Test 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves." 25

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." 9

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater." 10

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase." 17

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure." 19


Emergency Procedure 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." 12

Emergency Procedure 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." 21











1. Recall IC 142


3. Rack out breaker for 1-SI-P-1A. (SIP1A_RACKIN = F)

4. Place red sticker on 1-SI-P-1A.

5. Designate 1J as the protected train. Don't forget to lower sign on Safeguards panel.


"A" SG tube leak Malfunction: RC2401 = .0004

Block valve 1-RC-MOV-1536 fails to stroke in required time

Monitor: RCMOV536_RATE = 250

Auto-start failure of 1-CN-P-1B

Switch override: CNP1B_ASTOP = OFF


CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC. BIT MOVs do not open automatically

Monitor: SIMOV867_RATE(1) = 0 SIMOV867_RATE(2) = 0 SIMOV867_RATE(3) = 0 SIMOV867_RATE(4) = 0 Set up triggers 15 thru 18 on trigger screen as follows to reset rates when open PB is pressed: Trigger = 15 MOV867A_OPEN(1) Set SIMOV867_RATE(1) = 400 Trigger 16 MOV867C_OPEN(1) Set SIMOV867_RATE(3) = 400 Trigger 17 MOV867B_OPEN SET SIMOV867_RATE(2) = 400 Trigger 18 MOV867D_OPEN SET SIMOV867_RATE(4) = 400

Single train phase A Malfunction: SI1304


1) PORV block valve test Preloaded NOTE: When called as Unit 2, report expected valve positions for PORV block valves. NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has placed 1-RC-PCV-1455C in CLOSE.

2) Continuous rod motion Malfunction: RD07, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 2 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 3) 1-SD-P-1A trips Malfunction:

CN0401, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: When sent to check pump/breaker, wait 5 minutes and then report that there was nothing unusual noted at the pump. The pump breaker (15A9) has an overcurrent drop. NOTE: When sent to check "B" Condensate pump, wait 5 minutes and then report that the pump is running normally. If told to get the procedure to align the vent valve, state that you will do that. NOTE: When sent to walk down the feed train, wait at least 5 minutes and report back that the feed train looks good and you will continue to monitor. NOTE: The next event can occur once the Condensate pump has been started and the unit has been stabilized.

4) 1-RC-PT-1445 fails high Malfunction: RC0702, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 30, Severity = 1, Trigger = 4 NOTE: The next event can occur once the PORV has been closed and the unit has been stabilized.

5) "B" SG PORV fails open Controller override: PCVMS101B = 0, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Trigger = 5 NOTE: When sent to locally check SG PORVs and safeties, report that all are closed. NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has stopped the power increase.

6) 1-RC-PCV-1456 leaks by Malfunction: RC32, Delay time = 5, Severity = 5, Ramp = 300, Trigger = 6 NOTE: The next event can occur once the block valve is closed and TS have been reviewed.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 7) Steam leak on "B" Steam line

Malfunction: MS1002, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 600, Severity = 1.5, Trigger = 7 NOTE: If operators are dispatched to look for steam leaks, wait 5 minutes and report back that there is steam coming from the upper louvers on the MSVH. The operator will get a "buddy" and attempt to enter building and determine exact location of the leak. If no one is sent, wait until crew has commenced ramp and then make the report as a security officer that steam is coming from the upper louvers on the Unit 1 MSVH. NOTE: The next event can occur once enough of a ramp has been observed.

8) MSLB Use trigger 8 to increase steam leak to 50% over 30 seconds Set up on trigger screen as follows: Command: MS1002 50 30 NOTE: When sent to close 1-MS-57, use trigger 10. Wait 5 minutes and report that valve is closed. Remote function: MS_57 = 0, Delay time = 30, Ramp = 30, Trigger = 10 NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once the crew has completed 1-E-2 and declared transition to 1-ES-1.1.














EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up

tasks. NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has

resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R475 Perform the immediate operator action in response to a continuous uncontrolled rod motion.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page


CT Statement:

Crew takes action in accordance with AP-1.1, to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.


Core reactivity is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel. "It is expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous conditions during power operation."

Cues:

Continuous inward control rod motion with TAVE and TREF matched.


RO places rod control to manual.

Feedback:

Rod motion stops

WOG Reference:

E-0 Background Document

Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.


EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump

has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R781 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed

high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R634 Respond to a loss of RCS pressure.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page


CT Statement:

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.


Failure to close the PORV under the postulated plant conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release." In this case, the RCS fission-product barrier can be restored to full integrity simply by closing the PORV. Therefore, failure to close the PORV also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

Cues:

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication of PORV open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing.


RO manually closes 1-RC-PCV-1456

Feedback:

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG Reference:

E-0 -- M Background

Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.


EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew

will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a pressurizer PORV begins to leak

by, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with the AR for B-H2, or 1-AP-44, and close the associated PORV block valve.


CRITICAL TASK:

See next page


EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the

MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load.


CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the

MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R185 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection. R730 Verify safety injection flow R727 Perform the Phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation. R183 Identify and isolate a faulted steam generator.

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages


CT Statement:

Crew establishes HHSI flow to the RCS.


Failure to establish HHSI flow constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

Indication/annunciation of: • PRZR level requiring SI • no HHSI flow


BOP manually aligns valves to establish charging pump cold leg injection. • BOP opens 1-SI-MOV-1867C and/or 1867D • BOP opens 1-SI-MOV-1867A and/or 1867B

Feedback:

HHSI flow to the cold legs is indicated.

WOG Reference:

E-0 -- I Background

Conditions:

Prior to completing the step directing its performance.


CT Statement:

Crew isolates faulted Steam Generator.


Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the integrity CSF beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. For the reference plant, neither of these transients (blowdown of a single SG with or without RCPs running) constitutes an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF. However, if the faulted SG is not isolated, the cooldown transient for reactor vessel inlet temperature could result in an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF, especially if RCPs are not running.

Cues:

* "B" SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely depressurized and * Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted SG


BOP closes 1-FW-MOV-100B to secure AFW flow to "B" steam generator.

Feedback:

AFW flow indication to "B" steam generator decreases to zero.

WOG Reference:

E-2 -- A Background

Conditions:

Prior to transitioning out of E-2.




Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Perform 1-PT-44.7, "PORV Block Valves," and required follow-up tasks.

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • 1-RC-MOV-1536 will fail to stroke open or closed in specified time limit EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a failure in the rod control system has resulted in a continuous inward control rod motion, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.1, "Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Control rods insert at 72 spm in automatic. • Control rods stop when placed in manual EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a high-pressure heater drain pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, "Loss of Main Feedwater."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator F-A6 illuminates • 1-SD-P-1A trips as indicated by amber light lit • Annunciator Q-E3 illuminates (slight delay) • Reactor power increases slightly (delay due to calorimetric) • Main feed pump suction pressure decreases • Standby condensate pump does not auto-start EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a RCS pressure transmitter has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators C-D1, B-F7, B-E7, (and possibly B-H6 and B-H2) are illuminated • 1-RC-PCV-1456 indicates open EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Reactor power increases slightly • Megawatts decrease • "B" PORV indicates open • PORV closes when taken to manual


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a pressurizer PORV begins to leak by, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with the AR for B-H2, or 1-AP-44, and close the associated PORV block valve. SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator B-H2 illuminates • RCS pressure slowly decreases • Pressurizer level slowly decreases • Charging flow slowly increases • 1-RC-TI-1463, PORV line temp, increases • PRT pressure and level increase EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline leak occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and reduce turbine load. SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Megawatts decrease • Reactor power increases • Tave decreases • Annunciator D-C8 illuminates (Delayed) EVENT 8: Given that the unit is at power and a main steamline break occurs in the MSVH, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • "B" SG pressure decreases rapidly • RCS pressure decreases rapidly • Pressurizer level decreases rapidly • "J" train phase "A" equipment does not reposition • BIT valves do not automatically open



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 48% power, MOL. The unit was shut down 1 week ago to repair a MSTV air line. Power has been stable at 48% for several days due to a problem with "A" RSST. This problem has been resolved and all paperwork is complete. Xenon is currently stable. There is a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG. The tube leak was stable at this value for several weeks before the unit shutdown. 1-SI-P-1A was tagged out for motor maintenance 12 hours ago. Maintenance will not be complete until next shift. Turnover: Shift orders are to swap charging pumps and then ramp the unit to 100% power.

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description

1 N (R) (S) Swap to 1-CH-P-1B in service. Place 1-CH-P-1A in Auto.

2 R (R) (S) N (B)

Ramp unit up using dilution/turbine.

3 RC4601 C (R) (S) TS (S)

1-RC-PCV-1455A Spray valve fails open. RO must take manual control and close.

4 CC0701 C (B) (S) Seal leak on running CC pump. Swap pumps and isolate leak. Refill CC head tank.

5 CH08 I (R) (S) 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high. Must restore charging flow.

6 FW1205 I (B) (S) TS (S)

"C" SG selected feed flow fails low.

7 RD2142 M (All) Rod ejection occurs. Reactor trip required.

8 TU03 C (B) Turbine does not trip automatically.

9 SI08 C (All) SI does not automatically actuate

The scenario can be terminated once the crew has performed actions in 1-E-1.

(Events 8 and 9 occur during event 7. (These are numbered only for use on subsequent forms.)






EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Swap charging pumps to 1-CH-P-1B and place 1-CH-P-1A in auto

2. Increase reactor power using dilution/turbine

3 1-RC-PCV-14455A Spray valve fails open.

4. Seal leak on running CC pump

5. 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high

6. "C" SG selected feed flow fails low

7. Rod ejection/SBLOCA


Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Turbine does not automatically trip, SI does not automatically actuate)

Total Malfunctions 7 ("A" spray valve fails open, seal leak on running CC pump, 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high, selected feed flow fails low on "C" SG, rod ejection/SBLOCA, turbine does not automatically trip, SI does not automatically actuate)

Abnormal Events 4 ("A" spray valve fails open, seal leak on running CC pump, 1-CH-FT-1122 fails high, selected feed flow fails low on "C" SG)

Major Transients 1 Rod ejection/SBLOCA

EOPs Entered 1 (E-1)

EOP Contingencies 0

Critical Tasks 4

SCENARIO DURATION

Minutes



The scenario begins with the unit at 48% power, MOL. The unit was shut down 1 week ago to repair a MSTV air line. Power has been stable at 48% for several days due to a problem with "A" RSST. This problem has been resolved and all paperwork is complete. Xenon is currently stable. There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately ~4.5 GPD. At this power level the readings on the N-16 for the steam header are high enough to bring in the N-16 alarm. This is expected due to the increased sensitivity of this RM. Chemistry has verified the leakage on "A" SG remains < 5 gpd. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been tagged out for 12 hours. Maintenance will not be completed by the end of this shift. Shift orders are to swap charging pumps to 1-CH-P-1B, and then ramp the unit to 100% power. Support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

The first event will be a normal evolution of swapping charging pumps by the RO using 1-

OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Pumps." This can be pre-briefed so that the crew is prepared to do the swap once they take the unit. Once the charging pumps have been swapped, the next event can occur.

The next event will be a ramp up in power. This event can be pre-briefed. Once enough of a ramp has been seen, the next event can occur.

The "A" pressurizer spray valve, 1-RC-PCV-1455A, will fail open slowly. The crew will enter 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure," and take manual control of the spray valve and close it (CT). Once TS have been reviewed and RCS pressure has stabilized, the next event can occur.

A CC leak will develop on the seal of the running CC pump. CC surge tank level will decrease and AB sump level will increase. Personnel dispatched to the area will identify the leak location. The crew will direct a makeup to the CC surge tank, swap CC pumps, and direct isolation of the affected pump. Once the leak is isolated and head tank level is returned to service, the next event can occur.

The charging flow transmitter will fail high causing charging flow to decrease. Per the AR, the RO will place 1-CH-LCV-1122 in manual and control charging flow. Once charging flow has been restored, the next event can occur.

The selected feed flow transmitter on "C" SG will fail low. The BOP will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation," and place the associated MFRV in manual and restore level. The crew will swap to an operable instrument channel. Once TS have been reviewed and the MFRV is back in auto, the next event can occur.

A control rod will be ejected. Pressurizer level and pressure will begin to decrease. The crew will trip the reactor and enter 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." No automatic turbine trip will occur and the BOP will manually trip the turbine. No automatic safety injection will occur and the crew will have to manually safety inject (CT). The crew will secure RCPs (CT) and close the charging pump recirc valves (CT) in accordance with the CAP. The crew will continue through 1- E-0 and transition to 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." Once


the crew has performed actions in 1-E-1, the scenario can be terminated.








Unit Status: Unit 1 at 48% power. RCS boron is 1228 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. The unit was shut down 1 week ago to repair a MSTV instrument air line. Power has been stable at 48% for several days due to a problem with "A" RSST. This problem has been resolved and all paperwork is complete. Xenon is currently stable. Aux steam is on unit 2. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Equipment Status: There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. The tube leak was stable at this value for several weeks before the unit shutdown. At this power level the readings on the N-16 for the steam header are high enough to bring in the N-16 alarm. This is expected due to the increased sensitivity of this RM. Chemistry has verified the leakage on "A" SG remains < 5 gpd. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been inoperable for 12 hours. Maintenance on the low head will not be completed by the end of this shift. The maintenance rule window is green. 1J is the protected train.

Shift Orders: Shift orders are to start 1-CH-P-1B and place 1-CH-P-1A in auto. Once the charging pumps have been swapped, ramp the unit to 100% power. Support maintenance with work on 1-SI-P-1A.


EVENT 1: Swap charging pumps to 1-CH- P-1B in service per 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Amps increase on "B" charging pump when started • Amps decrease on "A" charging pump when stopped RO places "B" charging pump bearing

temperatures on a short interval trend using PCS.

Normal event

RO verifies with operator in AB that Aux oil pump for 1-CH-P-1B is in auto and running.

RO announces and starts 1-CH-P-1B.

RO verifies that 1-SW-TI-103B is < 128°F.

RO stops 1-CH-P-1A and places in AUTO-AFTER-STOP.

RO continues to monitor bearing temperatures on 1-CH-P-1B until stable, then returns trend interval to normal.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has swapped charging pumps.


EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at approximately 48% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Reactor power increases • Turbine power increases • Tavg/Tref increase • Generator megawatts increase NOTE: The crew may raise primary

temperature prior to ramping the turbine. Turbine operation is done using attachment 8 (Guidance for main turbine operations) of 1-OP-2.1.

Attached

BOP verifies/sets desired ramp rate (0.3% per minute).

BOP adjusts limiter position, as required.

BOP increases turbine setter to desired position.

BOP presses GO on turbine.

BOP monitors turbine ramp.

RO starts a dilution when required using 1-GOP-8.3.1 or 1-GOP-8.3.2.

Attached

RO monitors control rods to maintain Tave within 1.5°F of Tref with rods above insertion limits.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount, or as determined by the lead evaluator.


EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • PRZR spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455A has full open indication • Master pressure controller output decreases • PRZR pressure decreases • Annunciators B-F7 and B-H6 illuminate RO identifies annunciator B-F7, PRZ HI-LO

PRESS and later B-H6, PRZ LO PRESS – BU HTRS ON.

RO identifies RCS pressure decreasing.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-44: • RO checks PRZR PORVs closed (1-RC-

PCV-1455C and 1456) • RO checks master pressure controller not

failed • RO checks spray valves closed (1-RC-

PCV-1455A and 1455B) • RO determines that 1-RC-PCV-1455A is

open.

CT 1 Crew stops RCS pressure decrease: RO manually closes spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455A.

*Prior to reaching an automatic reactor trip on low pressure Immediate action

NOTE: The crew will likely hold the turbine ramp and stop the dilution at this time. They will talk about temperature control as the dilution water continues to affect RCS boron concentration. If management is consulted, they will concur with the crew's decision.

RO verifies all PRZR heaters are energized.

RO checks that 1-CH-HCV-1311, Aux spray valve, is closed.

RO checks PRZR safety valves closed and PORVs closed or isolated.

RO verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.

RO verifies RCS pressure returned to normal.


EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US refers to TS 3.4.1 DNB, Action A (2 hour), if pressure went below 2205 psig. TS 3.4.11 and 3.4.13 are not applicable for this event.

US requests Work Control Center supervisor to inform the OMOC of the failure and initiate WR and CR.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has returned RCS pressure to normal, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.


EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • CC head tank level decreases • Aux building sump level increases • Annunciator G-A1 annunciates at ~20% surge tank level BOP identifies decreasing CC surge tank

level.

BOP identifies increasing AB sump level.

Crew dispatches operator(s) to look for CC leak.

Crew uses either 1-AP-15 or AR for G-A1 for guidance and dispatches operator to make up to CC head tank using attachment of 1-AP-15 or 1-OP-51.1.

AR attached

NOTE: At this time an operator will report that there is a bad seal leak on 1-CC-P-1A.

Crew determines that it is necessary to swap CC pumps in order to isolate leak on 1-CC-P-1A.

NOTE: Depending on current CC head tank level, the crew may swap CC pumps without time to reference 1-OP-51.1.

Crew uses 1-OP-51.1 to start 1-CC-P-1B and stop 1-CC-P-1A.

NOTE: Operator will report when makeup to CC head tank has commenced. Operator should monitor head tank level and adjust make up as necessary.

Crew uses prints or 1-MOP-51.01 to determine that closing 1-CC-16 will isolate the pump suction and 1-CC-25 will isolate the discharge.

Crew directs operator to close 1-CC-16 (and possible 1-CC-25).

Crew notes that CC head tank is no longer decreasing and/or that the AB sump level is no longer increasing.

NOTE: Operator will report that 1-CC-16 is closed and the leak has stopped.


EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew directs WCC to request tags for 1-CC-P-1A and that a CR be submitted.

US reviews TS 3.7.19 and determines that 3 CC subsystems are still operable.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the CC leak has been isolated and CC head tank level has been returned to normal.


EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of charging flow occurs, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C5 and restore charging flow to normal. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator C-C5 illuminates • 1-CH-FCV-1122 output decreases • 1-CH-FI-1122 indication fails high • 1-CH-TI-1123 indication increases • 1-RC-LC-1459G output increases • Pressurizer level will slowly decreases RO identifies annunciator C-C5, CH PP

TO REGEN HX HI-LO FLOW is illuminated.

RO identifies that charging flow indicator 1-CH-FI-1122 indicates high flow and 1-CH-FCV-1122 is closing.

RO uses AR to take manual control of 1-CH-FCV-1122 and restore charging flow.

AR attached RO will have to use alternate indications to verify charging flow is adequate.

RO uses AR to place 1-CH-LC-1459G in manual and reduces output to normal.

US directs WCC to submit CR and inform I&C of failure.

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has restored charging flow to normal.


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators F-D3 illuminates • "C" MFRV ramps open • "C" SG Channel III feed flow is off-scale low BOP identifies annunciator F-F3, SG 1C

LEVEL ERROR.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1-AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP identifies "C" SG feedwater flow channel III has failed low.

BOP takes manual control of "C" SG water level and controls level.

Crew verifies first stage pressure indications normal.

RO verifies pressurizer level indications are normal.

Crew verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal.

Crew verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.

Crew verifies all SGWLC channels selected to an operable channel. (NO)

Crew swaps to operable SGWLC channels. • RO places control rods in manual • RO places steam dumps in either OFF or

steam pressure mode • BOP checks all bypass MRFVs in

manual • BOP places all MFRVs in manual • RO selects channel IV on all steam flow

and feed flow channels and for first-stage pressure

• Crew verifies all SG level channels are operable

• BOP verifies steam generator levels are on program

• BOP places MFRVs in Auto.


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO returns steam dumps to Tave mode: • RO verifies both channels of first stage

pressure are operable • RO verifies/places both interlock

switches OFF/RESET • RO verifies annunciator P-E4 is NOT lit • RO verifies/places mode selector switch

to Tave • RO ensures steam dump demand is zero • RO places bother interlock switches to

ON.

RO matches Tave and Tref and returns rods to auto, as required.

Crew verifies that "C" SG feedwater flow channel III is the only failed channel.

US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.78.

TS US reviews TS 3.3.1 condition E and determines that channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours.

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has identified channel trip requirements and the US has referred to tech specs, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • RCS level and pressure decrease • Rod B-8 indicates >235 steps • Turbine does not automatically trip • SI does not occur automatically RO identifies rapidly decreasing pressurizer

level and pressure.

RO informs the US of RCS conditions. NOTE: Crew may isolate letdown in an effort to assess leak size, before entering 1-E-0.

US directs crew to enter 1-E-0.



BOP manually trips the turbine: • BOP simultaneously presses both

turbine trip pusbuttons • BOP verifies all stop valves are closed • BOP resets reheaters • BOP verifies G-12 is open

Auto turbine trip is blocked

RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated: • LHSI pumps running (NO) • Any SI first out LIT (YES)

(Auto SI is blocked)

CT 2 Crew manually actuates safety injection.

*Before completion of step requiring its performance.

NOTE: The US will read the immediate operator actions before addressing the CAP.

NOTE: Initially RCS subcooling may still be >25°F and decreasing.



RO reviews CAP items 1-6 and determines that item 3(RCP trip criteria) is applicable. Item 4 (Charging pump recirc path criteria) will be applicable once RCPs are secured. Item 1(Adverse containment) will be applicable once containment pressure increases to > 20 psia.)

CAP attached

CT 3 Crew stops all RCPs: • RO checks at least one charging pump

running and flowing to RCS • RO checks RCS subcooling < 25°F

[85°F] • RO stops all RCPs

CAP 3 When directed by procedure

CT 4 Crew takes action to prevent HHSI pump runout by performing the following: • Verifies RCS pressure < 1275 psig

[1475 psig] AND RCPs tripped • RO closes all charging pump recirc

valves.

CAP 4 When all criteria are met OR completion of transfer to recirculation mode, whichever comes first.

US initiates attachment 4 – Equipment Verification (Attachment 5 - Verification of SI and Phase A Isolation will be directed by attachment 4).

Crew verifies SI flow.

Crew verifies AFW flow to all SGs.

RO checks RCS average temperature: • Stable or trending to 547°F if

controlling on steam dumps OR • Stable or trending to 551°F if

controlling on PORVs.

Crew adjusts AFW flow, as required.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria. (RCPS already stopped and CHP recircs closed.)



Crew checks SGs not faulted: All SG pressures > 80 psig and under control of operator. (YES)

Crew checks SGs not ruptured: Any SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner (NO) RMs normal (SG BD, AE, MS, TT) (YES)

Crew checks if RCS is intact inside containment: Containment pressure normal. (NO)

US directs crew to transition to 1-E-1.

STA/crew commences monitoring CSFs.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

Crew checks SGs not faulted.

Crew checks intact SG levels.

Crew checks secondary radiation levels: • RO resets SI, and Phase A • Crew verifies IA trip valves open • RO resets AMSAC • Crew checks SG blowdown, AE, MS,

and terry turbine exhaust RM normal • Crew verifies all SG NR levels >23% and

initiates attachment for aligning BD RMs when level is sat

• Crew opens SG surface sample trip valves

• Crew requests that chemistry sample SGs.

Actions are performed in this step.

RO checks pressurizer PORVs and block valves • Power available to block valves • PORVs closed • At least one block valve open.



Crew checks if SI can be terminated: • RCS subcooling > 25°F • Secondary heat sink with either AFW

flow > 340 gpm or one SG NR > 11% • RCS pressure stable or increasing (NO).

Crew checks if manual CDA required. (NO)

Crew checks QS status.

Crew checks if LHSI pumps should be stopped. (NO)

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated after the crew has performed necessary actions, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Operation Periodic Test 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps." 9

Operating Procedure 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup From Mode 2 to Mode 1." 104

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 25

Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-55.78, "Feed Flow Instrumentation." 7


Emergency Procedure 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." 25











1. Recall MOL 48% IC 143


3. Rack out breaker for 1-SI-P-1A (SIP1A_RACKIN = F)



6. Calorimetric to 0.



Turbine does not automatically trip

Malfunction: TU03

SI does not automatically actuate

Malfunction: SI08


1) Swap charging pumps NOTE: Give all communications required as AB operator for both charging pumps. This can include seal leakage – none, vibrations, etc. NOTE: The next event can occur once charging pumps are swapped.

2) Unit Ramp NOTE: The next event will occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 3) "A" spray valve fails open Malfunction:

RC4601, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: If called to discuss how to control temperature with PG still affecting RCS temperature, ask what they recommend and agree with it. (Rods, turbine) NOTE: The next event can occur once the spray valve is closed and the unit is stable.

4) Seal leak on running CC pump

Malfunction: CC0701, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 40, Trigger = 4 Set up on trigger screen to automatically reduce leak size once Surge tank level has decreased a significant amount. Trigger 15 MCC0701_DEG .GE. 0.4 IMF CC0701 20 30 NOTE: When called to look for CC leaks: Wait 1 minute and report back that there is a bad seal leak on 1-CC-P-1A. NOTE: When called to make up to CC head tank, open CN_41 ~ 75%. NOTE: When told to isolate 1-CC-P-1A, use ExtremeView screen to close valves per crew direction. Should be 1-CC-16 and 1-CC-25. Constant vent valve not modeled. Once closed, report back that leak has stopped. NOTE: The next event can occur once the CC leak has been isolated and CC head tank level has been returned to normal.

5) 1-CH-FT-1122 fails Malfunction: CH08, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Severity = 1, Trigger = 5 NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has restored charging flow.

6) "C" SG channel III feed flow fails low

Malfunction: FW1205, Delay time = 5, Severity = -1, Ramp = 5, Trigger = 6 NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has identified channel trip requirements and the US has referred to tech specs.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 7) Rod ejection/SBLOCA Malfunction:

RD2142, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 7 NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once actions have been performed in 1-E-1 or 1-FR-P.1.














EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Swap charging pumps to 1-CH- P-1B in service per 1-OP-8.9,

"Transferring Running Charging Pumps." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R593 Transfer the running charging pump.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at approximately 48% power and the crew has

been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R705 Dilute the RCS using the blender.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open,

the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."


CRITICAL TASK:

See Next page


CT Statement:

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.


Failure to close the RCS spray valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release." In this case, DNBR is reduced. Therefore, failure to close the spray valve represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

Cues:

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication of RCS spray valve open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing and procedurally directed by 1-AP-44.


RO places controller for associated spray in manual and closes

Feedback:

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG Reference:

N/A

Conditions:

Prior to reaching an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.


EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the

running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R707 Respond to a leak in the Component Cooling Water System.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of charging flow occurs, the crew

will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C5 and restore charging flow to normal.


CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed

low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page


EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break

LOCA to occur, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R185 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages


CT Statement:

Crew manually initiates safety injection.


Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

Indication/annunciation that SI is required, with NO indication that SI has actuated.


RO manually actuates safety injection.

Feedback:

Indication/annunciation that SI has actuated.

WOG Reference:

E-0 D-Background.

Conditions:

Prior to transitioning out of E-0.


CT Statement:

Crew stops Reactor Coolant Pumps.


Tripping RCPS at this time "prevents excessive depletion of RCS water inventory through a small break in the RCS which might lead to severe core uncovery if the RCPs were tripped for some reason later in the accident." The RCPs should be tripped "before RCS inventory is depleted to the point where tripping the pumps would cause the break to immediately uncover."

Cues:

Indication of: • Subcooling less than 25°F [85°F] • At least one charging pump running and flowing to the RCS


RO/BOP places control switch(es) for all running RCPs in STOP.

Feedback:

Indication/annunciation of no RCPs running.

WOG Reference:

RCP Trip/Restart Background Document

Conditions:

Prior to completing the step directing its performance.


CT Statement:

Crew takes action to prevent HHSI pump runout.


Failure to prevent HHSI pump runout constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

*Indication/annunciation that SI is actuated and is required and *Indication of RCS pressure less than 1275 psig [1475 psig] and *RCPs tripped


RO closes charging pump recirc valves. * 1-CH-MOV-1275A * 1-CH-MOV-1275B * 1-CH-MOV-1275C

Feedback:

Charging pump recirc valves indicate closed.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

When all criteria are met OR completion of transfer to recirculation mode, whichever comes first.



Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Swap charging pumps to 1-CH- P-1B in service per 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Amps increase on "B" charging pump when started • Amps decrease on "A" charging pump when stopped EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at approximately 48% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Reactor power increases • Turbine power increases • Tavg/Tref increase • Generator megawatts increase EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • PRZR spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455A has full open indication • Master pressure controller output decreases • PRZR pressure decreases • Annunciators B-F7 and B-H6 illuminate EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a CC leak has developed on the running CC pump, the crew will respond using plant procedures and prints to isolate the leak and restore head tank level.SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • CC head tank level decreases • Aux building sump level increases • Annunciator G-A1 annunciates at ~20% surge tank level EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of charging flow occurs, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C5 and restore charging flow to normal. SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator C-C5 illuminates • 1-CH-FCV-1122 output decreases • 1-CH-FI-1122 indication fails high • 1-CH-TI-1123 indication increases • 1-RC-LC-1459G output increases • Pressurizer level will slowly decreases


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling feed flow channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators F-D3 illuminates • "C" MFRV ramps open • "C" SG Channel III feed flow is off-scale low EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and a rod ejection has caused a small break LOCA to occur, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • RCS level and pressure decrease • Rod B-8 indicates >235 steps • Turbine does not automatically trip • SI does not occur automatically



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. There is a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG. The leak has been stable at this value for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A was tagged out for motor maintenance 12 hours ago. Maintenance will not be complete until next shift. Currently in 0-AP-41,"Severe Weather Conditions," due to the report of severe thunderstorms heading for the area. All anticipatory actions of 0-AP-41 have been completed. Turnover: Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description

1 RC0803 I (R) (S) TS (S)

Selected pressurizer level channel fails low causing a letdown isolation.

1a N(R) (S) Restore letdown.

2 C (B) (S) Instrument air compressor trips and standby compressor does not automatically start. BOP starts standby compressor.

3 RD1618 C (R) (S) TS (S)

Control rod drops into core.

4 Grid voltage begins to swing. System operator requests that North Anna 1 ramp back 100 megawatts.

4a R (R) (S) N (B)

Crew ramps the unit down per system operator.

4b C (B) (S) "A" MFRV fails to manual. Requires BOP to control level in manual during ramp.

5 EL01 M (All) Loss of switchyard (with spurious SI and then a loss of all AC)

6 SI0502 C (All) Spurious SI occurs

7 C (All) 1H EDG output breaker does not close. 1J EDG trips on overspeed. 1H output breaker can be closed manually in 1-ECA-0.0.

The scenario can be terminated once the crew performs actions in 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

(Events 4a and 4b occur during event 4. Events 6, 7 occur during event 5. These are numbered only for use on subsequent forms. Event 4 does not require action other than entering an AP.)







EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Selected pressurizer level channel fails low

1a. Restore letdown

2. Instrument air compressor trips and standby compressor does not automatically start

3. Dropped rod

4. Grid voltage swing

4a/4b. Unit ramp per system operator/"A" MFRV fails to manual

5. Loss of switchyard/Spurious SI/Loss of All AC


Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Spurious SI, 1H EDG output breaker does not close/1J EDG trips on overspeed)

Total Malfunctions 8 (Selected pressurizer level channel fails low, instrument air compressor trips/standby compressor does not automatically start, dropped rod, grid voltage swing, "A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp, loss of switchyard, spurious SI, 1H EDG output breaker does not close/1J EDG trips on overspeed)

Abnormal Events 5 (Selected pressurizer level channel fails low, instrument air compressor trips/standby compressor does not automatically start, dropped rod, grid voltage swing, "A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp)

Major Transients 1 (Loss of switchyard)

EOPs Entered 1 (ES-1.1)

EOP Contingencies 1 (ECA-0.0)

Critical Tasks 3

SCENARIO DURATION

90 Minutes



The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power, MOL. There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. The tube leak has been stable at this value for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been tagged out for 12 hours. Maintenance will not be completed by the end of this shift. 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Conditions," has been entered due to the report of severe thunderstorms approaching the area. All anticipatory actions of the AP have been performed. Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

The first event will be a failure of the selected pressurizer level channel low. The crew will enter 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation," minimize charging and swap to an operable channel(CT). As a normal event, the RO will return letdown to service. Once letdown is in service and Tech Specs have been consulted, the next event can occur.

A loss of instrument air will occur when the running instrument air compressor trips and the standby compressor does not auto-start. The crew will enter 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air," and the BOP will start all available compressors(CT) and this will return instrument air pressure to normal. Once this has happened, the next event can occur.

A control rod will drop into the core. The crew will enter 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod, and place control rods in manual. Once rods are in manual, the next event can occur.

System voltage will begin to swing. The crew will note the swings and leave the voltage regulator in automatic. They will enter 0-AP-8, "Response to Grid Instability," The system operator will be called. He will report problems on the grid and will request that North Anna Unit 1 reduce their megawatt output by 100 MW. Required equipment will be checked and notifications made. This event has no direct actions. The next evaluation will be the ramp.

The crew will ramp the unit back to reduce megawatts. During this ramp the "A" MRFV will fail to manual, forcing the BOP to control "A" SG level in manual during the remainder of the ramp. Once enough of a reactivity event has been seen, the next event can occur.

A loss of the switchyard will occur. The crew will enter 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," at this time there will be a spurious single train SI. 1H EDG output breaker will not close. 1J EDG will trip on overspeed after the spurious SI. The crew will transition to 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and manually close 1H EDG output breaker(CT). The crew will transition back to 1-E-0, terminate SI, and transition to 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." Once the crew has performed actions in 1-ES-1.1, the scenario can be terminated.








Unit Status: Unit 1 at 100% power. RCS boron is 1035 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Equipment Status: There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. The tube leak has been stable at this value for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been inoperable for 12 hours. Maintenance on the low head will not be completed by the end of this shift. 0-AP-41, "Sever Weather Conditions," has been entered due to the report of severe thunderstorms approaching the area. All anticipatory actions of the AP have been performed. The maintenance rule window is green. 1J is the protected train.

Shift Orders: Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.


EVENT 1/1a: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated • 1-RC-LI-1461 fails low • Letdown isolates RO identifies annunciators B-F8, PRZ LO

LEVEL, and B-G7, PRZ LO LEV HTRS OFF – LETDWN ISOL.


RO identifies that the selected pressurizer level channel 1461 has failed low.

Crew verifies redundant instrument channel indication normal.

BOP verifies SG level parameters normal.

BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure indication normal.

NOTE: The critical task (1) covers both of the following RNO actions.

RO verifies pressurizer level indications are normal. (NO)

RO verifies systems affected by pressurizer level channels are normal. (NO)



CT 1 Normal

Crew takes manual control of PZR level, minimizes charging, and restores letdown. • RO places 1122 in manual and

minimizes charging. • RO selects operable channel of

pressurizer level for control (459/460). • RO verifies proper annunciator

configuration • RO verifies emergency backup heater

configuration • RO verifies letdown in service. (NO) • RO restores letdown using attach. 2

Ensures charging flow at least 25 gpm Ensures 1-CH-LCV-1460A/B are open Ensures 1-CH-TV-1204A/B are open Places 1-CH-PCV-1145 in manual & opens Opens 1-CH-HCV-1200B Adjusts 1-CH-PCV-1145 to obtain 300 psig letdown pressure and places in Auto Adjusts charging and letdown to maintain program PRZR level.

CT. First action is an IOA *Prior to a PRZR high level reactor trip Attachment 2 is attached

RO restores pressurizer level to program

RO adjusts 1-RC-LCV-1459G, if required

RO places 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

RO resets PRZR control group heaters.

BOP verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels normal.

BOP verifies operable channels selected for SGWLC.

Crew verifies operation of other vital instrumentation.

Crew refers to 1-MOP-55.72 for placing the failed channel in trip.



TS US refer to TS-3.3.1 Function 9, Condition L and determine that the channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the applicable MOP and pressurizer level control is back in automatic, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power, and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator J-D2 illuminates • Instrument air pressure decreases BOP identifies annunciator 1J-D2, INST

AIR COMPR>/DRYER TROUBLE.

Crew identifies lowering IA pressure.


CT 2 Crew starts all available air compressors. BOP starts all available air compressors.

BOP checks IA pressure < 70 PSIG. (NO)

Crew determines cause of loss of IA to be a failed compressor.

BOP verifies IA pressure > 94 psig or trending to 94 psig..

Crew checks if either 1-IA-TV-102A or 102B is closed. (NO)

Crew returns air compressors to normal.

Crew dispatches operator to ensure 2-IA-TV-211 is closed.

Crew checks letdown in service.

Crew verifies attachment 6 was not initiated.

US directs WCC to submit a CR.

NOTE: The next event can occur once IA is verified to be increasing.


EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators A-G2, A-F1, A-B7, A-C7, A-C8, A-D4 illuminate • IRPI for B-10 indicates 0 steps • Pressurizer pressure and level decrease • RCS temperature and reactor power decrease slightly RO identifies annunciator A-G2, ROD

BOTTOM/ROD DROP.

RO identifies IRPI for rod B-10 in "A" control bank indicates 0 steps, and that the rod bottom light is lit.

RO verifies actual dropped rod drop by noting decrease in reactor power, PRZR level and RCS Tave.

RO notifies US of dropped rod.

US directs entry into 1-AP-1.2.

RO verifies only one control rod dropped.

RO places control rod bank selector switch in MANUAL.

US notifies SM, OMOC, Reactor Engineer and STA.

Crew verifies reactor critical above the POAH.

RO verifies the lowest RCS Tave ≥ 541°F.

Crew verifies rod bank insertion limits not exceeded.

Crew discusses maintaining Tave within 1.5 degrees of Tref by adjusting turbine load.

NOTE: At this time the outsides operator will call and report that the sky is very dark off to the west and it appears that the expected thunderstorms are heading towards the site.

Crew records the time the rod was dropped.


EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO verifies annunciator A-B7, NIS PR CHNL AVE FLUX DEVIATION, not lit. (NO)

Crew initiates 1-PT-23 and enters T.S. 3.2.4. (If a QPTR is done, then power will need to be reduced by ≥3% RTP for each 1% QPTR > 1.00 within 2 hours due to QPTR being not within limits.)

RO verifies dropped rod IRPI = 0 steps.

TS US refers to TS-3.1.4B and directs a SDM be performed and notes that either power must be reduced to<75% within 2 hours, or a flux map must be done within 72 hours.

NOTE: The next event will occur after technical specifications, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


EVENT 4/4a: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Voltages oscillates • MW oscillate • Generator voltage oscillates • Exciter voltage and amperage oscillate • "A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp Crew identifies that grid voltage is not

stable.

US enters 0-AP-8.

Crew determines that no notification of RTCA being inoperable has been received.

Crew verifies that no notification of increased grid vulnerability exploitation has been received.

Crew contacts system operator to determine extent of condition and any required actions.

NOTE: System operator will report that there are instabilities elsewhere on the grid and request that North Anna Unit 1 and Unit 2 reduce their megawatt output by 100 MW each, within the next 20 minutes.

RO initiates RCS boration using either attachment 5 of 1-AP-2.2 or a standard ramp plan and 1-GOP-8.3.4.

Attachment 5 is attached AP-2.2 steps

BOP reduces plant load: Verifies valve position limit light OFF Removes turbine from limiter using attachment 4, as required Verifies turbine load control in IMP-IN Places turbine control in IMP-IN by depressing pushbutton Initiates turbine load reduction using attachment 4.

Attachment 4 is attached

RO verifies rods in automatic. (NO)



NOTE: Rods were placed in manual due to a dropped rod. US may call for guidance on using rods in auto. Booth will ask for his recommendation and agree with what he wants to do.

RO energizes additional pressurizer heaters to maintain RCS pressure, as required.

RO verifies proper rod auto control rod insertion. (NO)

RO inserts control rods to maintain Tavg within 5°F of Tref.

RO monitors steam dumps for proper operation.

RO maintains rod lo/lo-lo limit alarms clear.

RO maintains AFD alarm (A-H7) clear.

US makes appropriate notifications.

US ensures aux steam is sufficient, or directs transfer to MS.

BOP identifies that "A" MFRV has swapped to manual operation.

"A" MFRV fails to manual once power is <95%

US directs BOP to operate "A" MFRV in manual during power decrease.

BOP operates "A" MFRV in manual, as required.

NOTE: The N-16 alarm may annunciate as power is reduced due to the increased sensitivity of the MS header N-16. The crew will discuss/enter 1-AP-5. Steps are not included.

Crew verifies required equipment operable: Terry turbines • All EDGs • SBO • Various diesels • Diesel fire pumps.

More AP-8 steps

US makes notification to operations management.

Crew checks that all station service buses are energized.



Crew checks for low voltage on system.

Crew checks for high voltage on system.

NOTE: The next event can occur once enough of a power decrease has been observed.


EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Loss of switchyard causes loss of all RCPs • Spurious SI signal after reactor trip • 1H EDG output breaker does not close • 1J trips on overspeed Crew identifies that a loss of switchyard

has occurred.



BOP manually trips the turbine: • BOP verifies all stop valves are closed • BOP identifies no power on Reset

button for reheaters • BOP verifies G-12 is open

Crew verifies AC emergency buses energized. (NO)

1H EDG output breaker does not close

Crew identifies that an SI has occurred. Spurious SI - 60 seconds after reactor trip.

Crew manually initiates SI.

Crew identifies that 1J EDG has tripped. 60 seconds after SI.

US directs crew to enter 1-ECA-0.0.

Crew verifies reactor trip.

Crew verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies all RCPs are stopped.

Crew verifies no reports of a fire in emergency switchgear.



CT 3 Crew restores power to an emergency bus: • Crew verifies 1H EDG running • Crew verifies 1H bus energized (NO) • Crew attempts to energize 1H bus

using attachment 5 by doing the following:

• Crew accesses Unit 1 RCP temperatures

• Crew monitors seal water outlet temperature for all RCPs

• Crew verifies all RCP seal water outlet temperatures are ≤235°F

• Crew places synchronizing switch for 15H2 to ON

• Crew verifies incoming voltage is indicated

• Crew closes 15H2 • Crew turns off 15H2 sync switch


Crew verifies RCS isolation. • Verifies/closes letdown valves closed

(1-CH-HCV-1200B and 10CH-LCV-1460A/B)

• Verifies pressurizer PORVs closed • Verifies excess letdown isolation

valves closed (1-CH-HCV-1201 and 1137)

• Closes 1-CH-HCV-1142 • Verifies sample system trip valves

closed (1-SS-100A/B, 101A/B, 102A/B, 103A/B, 106A/B)

• Verifies reactor vent valves closed • Verifies pressurizer vent valves closed.

Crew verifies AFW flow >340 gpm.

Crew verifies power to 1H bus is restored. • EDG running • 1H bus voltage indicated • 1H voltage and frequency normal.

US directs transition to 1-E-0.



NOTE: Due to crew size, US will need to prioritize 0-AP-10 and 1-E-0 attachments until another operator is available.

US initiates 0-AP-10.

US initiates attachment 4 – Equipment Verification (initiates attachment 5 – Verification of SI and Phase A isolation).

Crew verifies SI flow.

Crew verifies AFW flow to all SGs indicated (NO) Crew verifies total AFW flow > 340 GPM.

Crew checks RCS Tavg stable at or trending to desired temperture.

Crew adjusts AFW flow.

Crew checks pressurizer PORVs and spray valves: • Pressurizer PORVs closed • Pressurizer spray valves closed with 0

demand • At least one pressurizer PORV block

open.

Crew checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria: RCS subcooling < 25°F. (NO)

Crew checks SG pressures all greater than 80 psig and under control of operator.

Crew checks SG tubes not ruptured: Level in any SG increasing in an uncontrolled manner SG blowdown, condenser AE, main steam and Terry turbine RM normal (or last known normal).

Crew checks containment pressure, recirc spray sump level, and containment radiation are normal.



Crew checks that vent stack radiation is normal, no safeguard sump level alarms are lit, AB sump alarm not lit, no alarm for high ambient area temperatures.

Crew checks if SI should be reduced: • RCS subcooling > 25 °F • Secondary heat sink available • RCS pressure stable or increasing • Pressurizer level > 21%.

Crew reset SI.

Crew stops all but one charging pump and puts in after stop.

Only "A" is running. "B" got a start signal, may have been red flagged.


Crew isolated BIT: • Verifies 1-CH-MOV-1373 open (last

known) • Verifies CH pump recircs (1275A/B/C)

open • Closes BIT inlet 1-SI-MOV-1867A • Dispatches operator to close 1-SI-

MOV-1867B locally • Closes BIT outlet 1-SI-MOV-1867C. • Verifies 1-SI-MOV-1836, 1-SI-MOV-

1869A/B are closed.

Crew establishes charging: • Places 1-CH-FCV-1122 in manual and

closes. • Verifies 1-CH-FCV-1311 is closed. • Opens 1-CH-HCV-1310, • Opens 1-CH-MOV-1289A • Dispatches operator to locally open 1-

CH-MOV-1289B • Controls charging flow to maintain

pressurizer level.

US directs transition to 1-ES-1.1, step 7.




Crew checks LHSI suctions from containment sump (1-SI-MOV-1860A/B) are closed.

Crew places "B" LHSI pump in AUTO standby.

"A" tagged, "B" had a start signal. May have red-flagged before power lost.

Crew verifies SI flow is not required: • RCS subcooling > 25°F • Pressurizer level >21%.

Crew resets Phase A.

NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once actions have been performed in 1-ES-1.1.


REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." 25

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air." 33

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod." 14

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-8, "Response to Grid Instability." 8

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction." 23

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power." 73


Emergency Procedure 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC." 25

Emergency Procedure 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." 21











1. Recall IC 144

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.






1-IA-C-1 fails to start automatically

Switch override: IAC1_AUTO = OFF

IH EDG output breaker fails to close automatically

Monitor: ED15H2_LO = True


1) Pressurizer level channel fails

Malfunction: RC0803, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 1, Severity = -1, Trigger = 1 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the applicable MOP and pressurizer level control is back in automatic, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 2) Instrument air compressor trips

Remote function: U2_IAC1_FAULT = TRUE, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 2 Malfunction: CA0401 Severity = 5.2, Trigger = 2 Set up Trigger 30 to delete leak when IA compressor started IAC1_HAND DMF CA0401 NOTE: If called to check 2-IA-TV-211 closed, report that red light is NOT lit and dryer appears to be operating normally. NOTE: The next event will occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount.

3) Dropped Rod Malfunction: RD1618, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: During the performance of 1-AP-1.2, the outsides operator will call and report that the sky is very dark off to the west and it appears that the expected thunderstorms are heading towards the site. NOTE: The next event will occur after the US refers to technical specifications, or as directed by the lead evaluator.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 4) Grid disturbance/unit ramp/failure of "A" MFRV

Malfunction: EL1803, Trigger = 4 EL1802, Delay time = 10, Ramp = 30, Severity = 15, Trigger = 4 NOTE: Have to delete EL1803 to get grid back to infinite. After that you can use toggle feature on ExtremeView screen EL11 to toggle between infinite and finite grid. Voltage swings are not noticeable on infinite grid. Controller override: FCV478_MAN = ON when power >95% (RFK200 .le. 95.0), Trigger = 10 NOTE: Make call from system operator on automatic ringdown: Due to problems on the grid, request that North Anna Unit 1 and Unit 2 reduce their megawatt output by 100 MW each, within the next 20 minutes. NOTE: If called about using control rods in auto during ramp: Ask for US recommendation and agree with whatever he wants to do. NOTE: The next event can occur once enough of a power reduction has been observed.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 5) Loss of switchyard/spurious SI/loss of all AC

Malfunction: EL01, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 5 SI0502, Delay time = 65, Trigger = 5 NOTE: Delete SI0502 once it has actuated before they try to reset. Remote functions: EDGJ_OVSPD_TRP = T, Delay time = 125, Trigger = 5 1H EDG output breaker fails to close (Preloaded) NOTE: If sent to look at EDGs: 1H is running fine. If sent to output breaker – no drops. 1J has tripped on overspeed, looks like governor has come apart? NOTE: The following will allow 15H2 to close when switch is turned to CLOSE: Trigger = 15 SUPFD_BUSH_C Set ED15H2_LO = 0 Trigger 16 SUPFD_BUSH_ACLSE Set ED15H2_LO = 0 NOTE: If sent to align SBO to 1J bus, say that you will get procedure and brief in Annex. NOTE: If sent to locally close/throttle 1-FW-MOV-100D, use PNID to do so. 10% open is ~100 gpm. NOTE: If sent to align AFW to "B" SG, get AP and do alignment as directed. NOTE: May be sent to locally close FW MOVs (100s&150s). This would take a while. NOTE: If sent to locally close 1-SI-MOV-1867B, use PNID to ramp closed. NOTE: If sent to locally open 1-CH-MOV-1289B, use PNID to ramp open. NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once actions have been performed in 1-ES-1.1.














EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel

has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R633 Respond to a failure of the controlling pressurizer level channel. S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See Next page


CT Statement:

Crew takes manual control of PRZR level, minimizes charging, and restores letdown.


Failure to take manual control of PRZR level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on high PRZR level.

Cues:

The controlling PRZR level channel is failed low, letdown is isolated.


RO places controller for 1-CH-FCV-1122 in manual and controls PRZR level. RO performs RNO step and selects operable channel. RO restores charging and letdown as directed by the US.

Feedback:

PRZR level does not exceed trip setpoint.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to a PRZR high level reactor trip.


EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and a loss of instrument air has

occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R530 Respond to a loss of instrument air outside of containment.

CRITICAL TASK:

See Next page


CT Statement:

Crew starts all available air compressors.


Failure to start all available air compressors under the postulated plant conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of plant conditions which could result in a unit trip and/or safety injection. In this case, the instrument air pressure can be maintained above the trip set point by starting the air compressors. Therefore, failure to start the air compressors also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

Cues:

Instrument air low pressure alarm. Meter indication of low instrument air pressure.


BOP starts all available air compressors.

Feedback:

Instrument air pressure stabilizes above the trip set point.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to reaching the trip set point of 70 PSIG.


EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core,

the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod." NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: None

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew

will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R706 Borate the RCS using the blender.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then

a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R185 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection. R214 Perform the immediate actions in response to a loss of all AC power.

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages


CT Statement:

Crew restores power to any AC emergency bus.


Failure to energize an AC emergency bus constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded...emergency power capacity." Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of a barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS...capacity" at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress.

Cues:

Indication of loss of both 4160V emergency buses. * No voltage indicated on emergency buses. * Loss of various emergency equipment. * Numerous annunciators.


Backboards manually closes breaker 15H2

Feedback:

Indication of Voltage indicated on the "H" 4160 emergency bus.

WOG Reference:

E-0 -- C Background

Conditions:

To be performed prior to depressurizing all intact SGs.



Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and a selected pressurizer level channel has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators B-F8, B-G7, and B-E2 are illuminated • 1-RC-LI-1461 fails low • Letdown isolates EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power, and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, "Loss of Instrument Air." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator J-D2 illuminates • Instrument air pressure decreases EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a control rod has dropped into the core, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators A-G2, A-F1, A-B7, A-C7, A-C8, A-D4 illuminate • IRPI for B-10 indicates 0 steps • Pressurizer pressure and level decrease • RCS temperature and reactor power decrease slightly EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and grid voltage begins to swing, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-8, "Grid Instability," and 1-AP-2.2, "Fast Load Reduction."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Voltages oscillates • MW oscillate • Generator voltage oscillates • Exciter voltage and amperage oscillate • "A" MFRV fails to manual during ramp EVENT 5: Given that a loss of switchyard occurs, followed by a spurious SI and then a loss of all AC, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and 1-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC," and 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Loss of switchyard causes loss of all RCPs • Spurious SI signal after reactor trip • 1H EDG output breaker does not close • 1J trips on overspeed



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. There is a small tube leak (~4.5 gpd) on "A" SG. The leak has been stable at this value for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A was tagged out for motor maintenance 12 hours ago. Maintenance will not be complete until next shift. Turnover: Shift orders are to maintain current plant and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description

1 SW0104 C (B) (S) TS (S)

Running SW pump trips. BOP must start another SW pump on the same header.

2/2a I (R) (S) TS (S)

N (R) (S)

Selected first stage pressure transmitter fails low

RO swaps steam dumps to steam pressure mode (Normal)

3/3a CN0901 R (R) (S) N (B)

Condenser vacuum degrades due to loss of a condenser loop seal Crew ramps unit back. Once enough of a ramp has been seen, loop seal will be isolated.

4 C (R) (S) 1-CC-TCV-106, CC to Non-regen HX, fails closed. Can be operated in manual.

5 EL09 C (B) (S) Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure

6 CH02 C (R) (S) TS (S)

Letdown leak in Auxiliary Building. Isolable.

7 RC3901 RD32 RD38

M (All) "A" RCP develops high vibrations requiring reactor trip

Reactor does not trip automatically or manually.

8 RD14 C (R) (S) Rods stop stepping in automatic

The scenario can be terminated once the crew has returned to 1-E-0 and transitioned to 1-ES-0.1.

(Event 8 occurs during event 7) (Numbered only for use on subsequent forms)







EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Running SW pump trips

2/2a. Selected first stage pressure fails low/Steam dumps are placed in steam pressure mode

3/3a. Condenser vacuum degrades/Unit is ramped down to stabilize condenser vacuum

4 1-CC-TCV-106 fails closed

5. Main generator voltage regulator failure

6. Letdown leak in AB

7. "A" RCP develops high vibrations/reactor will not trip automatically or manually


Malfunctions after EOP entry 2 (Reactor will not trip automatically or manually, rods stop stepping in auto)

Total Malfunctions 9 (Running SW pump trips, selected first stage pressure fails low, condenser vacuum degrades, 1-CC-TCV-106 fails closed, main generator voltage regulator failure, letdown leak in AB, "A" RCP develops high vibrations, reactor will not trip automatically or manually, rods stop stepping in auto)

Abnormal Events 6 (Running SW pump trips, selected first stage pressure fails low, condenser vacuum degrades, 1-CC-TCV-106 fails closed, main generator voltage regulator failure, letdown leak in AB,)

Major Transients 1 (High vibes on "A" RCP with failure of reactor to trip)

EOPs Entered 1 (ES-0.1)

EOP Contingencies 1 (FR-S.1)

Critical Tasks 3

SCENARIO DURATION

80 Minutes



The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power, MOL. There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. Leakage has been stable here for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been tagged out for 12 hours. Maintenance will not be completed by the end of this shift. Shift orders are to maintain current conditions and assist with maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.

The first event will be trip of a running SW pump. The crew will enter 0-AP-12, "Loss of Service Water," and start another SW pump on the same header. Once the pump is started and Tech Specs have been consulted, the next event can occur. The selected first stage pressure transmitter will fail low causing control rods to insert. The RO must place rods in manual (CT). The crew will enter 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation," and swap channels to channel IV. The RO will place steam dumps in steam pressure mode (Normal evolution). Once TS have been reviewed, the next event can occur.

Condenser vacuum will begin to degrade due to the loss of one of the loop seals to the condenser. The crew will enter 1-AP-14, "Low Condenser Vacuum." The crew will begin to ramp the unit down to stabilize vacuum. Operators will be dispatched to look for the reason for the vacuum loss. When enough of a ramp has been observed the loop seal will be isolated and vacuum will improve. Once the crew has stopped the ramp and stabilized the unit, the next event can occur.

CC to the Non-Regen Heat exchanger, 1-CC-TCV-106, will fail closed. The crew will respond in accordance with annunciator response and take manual control of valve. The next event can occur once CC has been restored to the non-regen HX and the letdown stream has been put back through the IXs. A failure of the voltage regulator high will occur. The crew will enter 1-AP-26, "Failure of Main Generator Voltage Regulator High." The BOP will place the voltage regulator in OFF and use the Base Adjust switch to adjust VARs back to normal range, if required. The system operator will be notified of the failure. At this time the next event can occur.

A letdown leak will develop in the auxiliary building. The crew will enter 1-AP-16, "Primary Plant Leakage," and send an operator to look for the leak. The crew will isolate letdown and prepare to place excess letdown in service. The next event can occur at this time. The "A" RCP will develop high vibrations. The crew will attempt to trip the reactor, but it will not trip automatically or manually. The crew will enter 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," trip the turbine (CT), and dispatch an operator to trip the reactor locally. Rods will step in for a short time, and then stop moving in automatic. The RO will place rods in manual and drive them in manually. The RO will initiate emergency boration (CT). Once the reactor has been tripped locally, the crew will transition back to 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and perform immediate actions. They will then transition to 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," and throttle auxiliary feed flow. The scenario can be terminated at this


time.








Unit Status: Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1035 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Equipment Status: There is an existing tube leak on "A" SG of approximately 4.5 GPD. The tube leak has been stable at this value for several weeks. 1-SI-P-1A, the "A" low head pump, is tagged out for motor maintenance. It has been inoperable for 12 hours. Maintenance on the low head will not be completed by the end of this shift. The maintenance rule window is green. 1J is the protected train.

Shift Orders: Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-1A.


EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and a Service Water pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-12, "Loss of Service Water." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators J-D3 and J-B3 illuminates • 2-SW-P-1A has green and amber lights lit Crew identifies annunciator J-D3, SW PP 1-

P1A, 2-P1A AUTO TRIP.

BOP identifies low flow condition on "B" SW header.

BOP identifies unit-2 "A" SW pump tripped.


US reads Notes that precede action steps.

BOP checks SW reservoir level > 310 feet.

Crew determines no flooding is indicated in AB, chiller room , or turbine building.

Crew verifies SW headers are intact.

BOP verifies at least one SW pump running on each header. (NO)

BOP starts 1-SW-P-1B.

BOP verifies return header flow is indicated.

BOP verifies SW system stable: • Running SW pump amps are stable • SW pump discharge pressure is normal • Both SW supply headers are in service • Both return header flows are normal.

Crew verifies operability of SW pumps, EDGs, SW headers, SW reservoir.

TS US refer to TS-3.7.8 and determine that action "A" applies, which allows 72 hours to verify SW throttled to CCHXs.

Crew checks SW reservoir level between 313 feet and 315 feet.

NOTE: The next event can occur after the US refers to technical specifications.


EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and the selected first stage pressure instrument has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators B-A7, F-G2, F-F1, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate • Status lights/Permissives M-E4, N-E7, N-F7, N-G7, P-G1, (and later) P-H7 illuminate • Status light L-F3 goes out • Control rods step in at maximum speed. • Tref indicates 547°F • MFRVs throttle closed BOP identifies SG level error alarms and

high steam flow alarms.

RO identifies annunciator B-A7, MEDIAN/HI TAVG < > TREF DEVIATION and control rods stepping in.

BOP identifies first stage pressure channel III failing.


Crew verifies redundant instrument channel indication normal

BOP verifies SG level parameters normal.

BOP places MFRVs in manual OR allows SG levels to control at 33% as directed by the US.

BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure indication normal (NO).

CT1 RO places rod control in manual. * Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip signal on low pressure.

RO verifies PRZR level indications normal.

Verify systems affected by pressurizer level channels are normal: • Operable pressurizer level channel

selected • Emergency backup heaters restored • Letdown in service • Pressurizer level control in automatic • Pressurizer control group heaters not

tripped.

BOP verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels normal (NO).



RO transfers condenser steam dumps to steam pressure mode: • Places both steam dump interlock

switches to OFF/RESET • Places steam dump controller to

manual • Places mode selector switch to STEAM

PRESS • Ensures steam dump demand is 0 • Returns steam dump controller to auto • Verifies steam dump demand is 0 • Places both steam dump interlock

switches to ON

Normal

BOP verifies operable channels selected for SGWLC. (NO)

RO/BOP swap SGWLC channels to channel IV: • RO verifies rod control mode selector

switch in manual • RO verifies steam dumps in steam

pressure mode • BOP checks all bypass feed reg valves

are in manual • BOP verifies/places all MFRV in

manual • RO selects channel IV for steam flow,

feed flow and first stage pressure • BOP verifies all SG channel III levels

are operable • BOP verifies SG levels are on program • BOP returns the MFRVs to AUTO

when levels are on program • RO verifies Steam Dumps are available • RO verifies steam dumps are in steam

pressure mode • Crew verifies auto rod control is

desired • RO verifies Tave and Tref are within

1.5°F • RO returns control rods to auto.

Crew verifies proper operation of other instruments.



Crew refers to 1-MOP-55.81 for placing the failed channel in trip.

TS US refer to TS: 3.3.1 – Functions 18b, 18e (Condition R) 3.3.2 – Functions 1f, 1g, 4d, and 4e (Condition D) US determine that trips/permissives must be checked within one hour, and the failed channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours. AMSAC – Info action

Crew does permissive checks per 1-MOP-55.81: • Crew checks reactor power >10% • Crew checks annunciator P-F2 NOT lit • Crew checks that L-F3 or L-F4 is LIT

NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew identifies the applicable MOP and does permissive checks.


EVENT 3/3a: Given that the unit is at power and loss of condenser vacuum is occurring, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-14, "Low Condenser Vacuum." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Condenser vacuum worsens • Megawatts decrease • During ramp: Tavg and Tref decrease NOTE: The following condenser vacuum

limits/setpoints apply: G-F3 (Vacuum pre-trip) < 25"HgV (~5" HgA) A-G1 (Loss of C-9) > 4"HgA E-D2 (Turbine trip) 20"-23"HgV (6.9-9.8"HgA) AND ASO pressure < 45 psig Monitor > 5.5"HgA – Trip reactor

Crew identifies worsening condenser vacuum.


Crew checks G-12 closed.

RO initiates boration using either attachment 4 or standard ramp plan.


BOP removes turbine from valve position limiter, as required.

BOP places turbine control in IMP-IN.

BOP commences turbine load reduction using attachment 3 guidance.


RO verifies rods in automatic.

RO energizes additional pressurizer heaters.

RO verifies proper rod insertion.

*Crew monitors condenser vacuum 3.5" or less.

Crew dispatches watchstander to perform local actions using attachment 2.

Partial attachment 2 is attached



NOTE: Once enough of a ramp has been observed, the field operator will isolate the loop seal per attachment 2 and inform the control room. At this time vacuum will begin to improve.

BOP verifies condenser vacuum breaker (1-AS-MOV-100) closed.

BOP verifies all condenser inlet and outlet valves are full open.

Crew checks running CW pump discharge MOVs are full open.

BOP verifies air ejector lineup: • AS pressure between 180 and 210 psig • 1-AS-FCV-100A/B are open • 1-SV-TV-102-2 open • 1-SV-TV-103 closed • 1-SV-TV-102-1 closed.

BOP verifies gland steam operation: • Gland steam header pressure 120-130

psig • HP TB gland pressure 1.5-15 psig.

Crew checks vacuum stable or improving.

US directs entry into either 1-OP-2.2 or 1-AP-2.2 while continuing with 1-AP-14.

BOP checks condensate system normal: • Hotwell level normal • Condensate pumps running • Operator dispatched to check

Condensate pump operation locally.

Crew checks CW system: • Water boxes primed • Amps on running CW pumps normal.

Crew checks vacuum stable or improving.

Crew verifies main turbine on line

Crew checks cause of vacuum loss identified and repaired.

NOTE: AFD alarm may annunciate. AFD will improve as boron concentration increases.



US makes report to Work Control Center and requests that CR and management notifications be made.

NOTE: Due to the sensitivity of the N-16 on the steam header, it may alarm during or after the ramp. The crew will enter 1-AP-5 and possibly 1-AP-24. Chemistry will be directed to sample the "A" SG and will call back that the results are the same as they have been since the leak started.

I have not included steps from these procedures.

NOTE: Once the crew has stabilized the unit the next event can occur.


EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power, and CC to the Non-Regen HX has failed closed, the crew will respond in accordance with AR for C-C6. TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator C-C6 illuminates • 1-CC-TCV-106 fails to 0% • 1-CH-TI-1143 and 1-CH-TI-1144 indications increase • 1-CH-TCV-1143 bypasses demins • 1-CH-TI-1116 indication slowly increases • Annunciator C-A3 may illuminate if VCT temperature continues to increase RO identifies annunciator C-C6, DEMIN

INLET DIVERT HI TEMP.

RO takes manual control of 1-CC-TCV-106 and opens it to restore temperature.

AR attached

RO monitors reactor power.

RO ensures charging flow is adequate to cool letdown.

RO returns 1-CC-TCV-1143 to IX position when temperature on 1-CH-TI-1143 has decreased to 115°F by holding switch in IX.

RO verifies flow remains through IX when switch is released.

US directs WCC to submit a CR.

NOTE: The next event can occur once letdown cooling has been restored and letdown stream has been returned to IX.


EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power, and the main generator voltage regulator has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-26, "Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators K-C1 and K-B4 illuminate • Generator output voltage increases BOP identifies annunciator K-B4,

EXCITER FIELD FORCING.


BOP identifies generator output voltage and MVARS increasing with MW stable.

BOP places voltage regulator control switch to OFF.

If required, BOP adjusts generator voltage using the VR base adjust switch so that generator output voltage is in the normal range and MVARs are < 100 IN.

Crew notifies system operator that VR is in base control.

Crew maintains 500kv bus voltage schedule.

US requests Work Control Center supervisor to inform the OMOC of the failure and to initiate CR.

US initiates 1-MISC-32, Electrical Disturbance Report.

NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew has stabilized the plant.


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Letdown flow decreases on 1-CH-FI-1150 • VCT level decreases • Auxiliary building sump level increases RO identifies decrease in letdown flow.

BOP identifies increasing AB sump level.

Crew dispatches operator to look for leaks in AB.


Crew verifies unit in mode 1.

*RO verifies primary parameters under operator control: • Pressurizer level • RCS subcooling • VCT level. (YES)

RO checks 1-CH-LCV-1115A not diverted: • In VCT position • In-service gas stripper level stable • In-service gas stripper flow not

indicated. (YES)

NOTE: Several minutes after being dispatched, operator will report that a leak exists on the letdown piping in the Auxiliary Building penetration area.

RO verifies letdown in service with normal indications. (NO)

RO isolates letdown: • Closes 1-CH-HCV-1200B • Closes 1-CH-LCV-1460A/B.

Crew verifies that the leak stopped. NOTE: Crew should pursue placing excess letdown in service using 1-OP-8.5. Not included since the BOP does not need the normal evolution.

US directs WCC to inform OMOC and submit CR.


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

TS US enters T.S. 3.4.13 Condition A for time that leak was indicated.

NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew isolates letdown.


EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and an RCP has developed high vibrations and the reactor will not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Generation/ATSW," and 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators A-E5 illuminates • "A" RCP vibrations increase to trip setpoint • Reactor does not trip automatically or manually • Control rods stop inserting automatically RO identifies annunciator A-E5, RCP 1A

VIBRATION ALERT/DANGER.

Crew verifies that "A" RCP vibrations are > trip setpoint on backboards indication.

US directs crew to manually trip the reactor and secure "A" RCP.

RO/BOP attempt to open reactor trip breakers. (NO)

US directs crew to enter 1-FR-S.1.

RO verifies rods in auto.

CT2 BOP manually trips the turbine: • BOP pushes both turbine trip

pushbuttons • BOP verifies turbine stop valves closed. • BOP resets reheaters • BOP verifies generator output breaker

open

*Within 30 seconds of recognizing ATWS condition exists.



CT3 Crew identifies the reactor did not trip and takes action to bring the reactor subcritical. • RO verifies control rods inserting in auto

at greater than 48 steps per minute (NO) • RO manually inserts control rods • BOP checks AFW pumps running. • RO verifies at least one charging pump

running. • RO places 1-CH-P-2A in FAST. • RO opens 1-CH-MOV-1350. • Crew verifies adequate negative

reactivity insertion by checking emergency boration flow indicated, control rods moving in, and neutron flux decreasing

• RO checks PRZR pressure < 2335 psig. • Crew checks if reactor trip has

occurred. (NO) • Crew dispatches an operator to

locally open the reactor trip breakers

Critical task can be satisfied by one of the following: manually inserting rods, establishing emergency boration flow, or getting the reactor trip breakers opened locally. *Before exiting 1-FR-S.1

NOTE: Reactor trip breakers will be opened locally 3 minutes after operator is dispatched.

Crew checks if turbine trip has occurred.

Crew checks if reactor is subcritical.

NOTE: If reactor is subcritical, then crew will transition to 1-E-0 at this time.

BOP checks SG levels.

RO verifies all dilution paths isolated.

Crew checks for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled RCS cooldown.

RO checks CETCs.

Crew verifies reactor subcritical.

US directs crew to return to 1-E-0.



RO verifies reactor trip.

NOTE: US may direct crew to secure RCP once reactor shutdown and before transition to 1-E-0.

US directs crew to secure "A" RCP. Due to original high vibrations.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.

Crew determines that SI has not occurred.

Crew determines that SI is not required.

US directs crew to transition to 1-ES-0.1.

RO checks RCS average temperature controlling at desired temperature.

BOP throttles AFW to desired flowrates.

BOP checks Feedwater status: • RCS temperature < 554°F • Verify MFRVs closed • Verify AFW pumps running • Verify AFW flow or establish as

necessary.

BOP checks SG levels: • NR level in all SGs > 11% or WR

levels increasing • BOP controls feed flow to maintain NR

levels between 23 and 33%.

RO checks charging in service.

RO checks pressurizer level • Level > 15% • CC system in service • Letdown in service (NO, due to leak) • Level between 20 and 29% or controls

charging and letdown



RO checks pressurizer pressure • Pressure > 1780 psig • Pressure stable at or trending to 2235

psig

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once crew has performed actions in 1-ES-0.1.


REFERENCES

PROCEDURE REV.

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-12, "Loss of Service Water." 38

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-14, "Low Condenser Vacuum." 25

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-26, "Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control." 10


Emergency Procedure 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Generation/ATSW." 16

Emergency Procedure 1-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." 30











1. Recall IC 145

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.






ATWS Malfunctions: RD32, RD38 Remote function: AMSAC_DEFEAT = T


1) Loss of service water Malfunction: SW0104, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 1 NOTE: The next event will occur after the US/STA refers to technical specifications, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

2) Failure of first stage pressure low

Malfunction: MS0201, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Severity = -1, Trigger = 2 NOTE: If permission is requested to pull rods back to 230 steps, tell them you will call them back after talking to the OMOC (or Sam). If Sam is called directly, give permission. NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew identifies the applicable MOP and does permissive checks.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 3) Loop Seal failure/Loss of Condenser Vacuum/Unit ramp

Malfunction: CN0901, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 100, Trigger = 3 NOTE: When sent to perform attachment, verify that enough of a ramp has occurred, then delete malfunction and inform crew that you will reopen in 15 minutes. (If no one dispatched with attachment in hand, than initially report the loop seal is hot and get direction to isolate.) NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has stabilized the unit.

4) 1-CC-TCV-106 fails closed

Controller override: TCVCC106 = 1.0, Ramp = 30, Trigger = 4 NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has stabilized the plant.

5) MG VR Failure Malfunction: EL09, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 45, Severity = 25, Trigger = 5 NOTE: If called, can report that no abnormalities can be seen at the VR panel. NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew stabilizes the plant.


EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS 6) Letdown leak Malfunction:

CH02, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 100, Trigger = 6 NOTE: If letdown has not been isolated, operator will report that a leak exists on the letdown piping in the Auxiliary Building penetration area. Can't get close enough to identify exact location. If letdown has been isolated, operator will report that floor and area around letdown containment trip valve is wet. Can't get into area to identify exact location of leak. NOTE: Crew should pursue placing excess letdown in service. If asked to energize loop drains use HCV1557_energize = T on monitor screen or Extremeview excess letdown screen (CH4). NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew isolates letdown.

7) "A" RCP High vibes/ATWS(preloaded)/ Rods stop moving in auto

Malfunction: RC3901, Ramp = 60, Severity = 40, Trigger = 7 RD14, Trigger = 10 (RX17 – reactor power < 70%) NOTE: Reactor can be tripped using trigger 15. Remote functions: SP_RTA_BKR = F, Delay time = 180, Trigger = 15 SP_RTB_BKR = F, Delay time = 181, Trigger = 15 NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once steps have been performed in 1-ES-0.1.














EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a Service Water pump has tripped,

the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-12, "Loss of Service Water."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R653 Respond to the loss of a service water pump. S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and the selected first stage pressure

instrument has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R719 Respond to a failure of the controlling first-stage pressure channel

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page


CT Statement:

Crew takes action in accordance with AP-3, to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.


Core reactivity is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel. "It is expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous conditions during power operation."

Cues:

Indication of a failed first stage pressure channel. Continuous inward control rod motion with TAVE and TREF matched.


RO places rod control to manual.

Feedback:

Rod motion stops

WOG Reference:

E-0 Background Document

Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip signal on low pressure.


EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and loss of condenser vacuum is occurring,

the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-14, "Low Condenser Vacuum."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R518 Respond to a partial loss of condenser vacuum. R706 Borate the RCS using the blender

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and CC to the Non-Regen HX has failed

closed, the crew will respond in accordance with AR for C-C6. NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: None

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and the main generator voltage regulator

has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-26, "Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R675 Respond to a failure of main generator voltage regulator high.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak

outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R520 Respond to increasing primary plant leakage. S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A


EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and an RCP has developed high

vibrations and the reactor will not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Generation/ATSW," and 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS: R224 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a nuclear power generation/ATWS. R498 Respond to reactor coolant pump vibration

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages


CT Statement:

Crew manually trips the turbine in FR-S.1


Failure to trip the turbine during an ATWS event could lead to violation of the RCS emergency stress limit.

Cues:

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room, and indication that the turbine stop valves are fully open.


BOP simultaneously depresses both turbine trip pushbuttons.

Feedback:

Turbine stop valves closed.

WOG Reference:

FR-S.1 -- A Background

Conditions:

Within 30 seconds of recognizing ATWS condition exists.


CT Statement:

Crew identifies reactor did not trip, transition to 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, and take actions to bring the reactor subcritical.


Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control."

Cues:

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room.


RO manually insert control rods if rod speed decreases to < 72 spm. RO place in-service boric acid transfer pump in fast speed. RO open emergency borate valve 1-CH-MOV-1350 - OR - Crew dispatch operator to locally trip the reactor using attachment #3, Remote Reactor Trip.

Feedback:

• Control rods moving in or fully inserted. • Emergency boration flow indicated. • Neutron flux decreasing. • Pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig.

OR • Rod bottom lights on. • IRPIs indicating zero. • Neutron flux < 5%.

WOG Reference:

FR-S.1 – Background Document

Conditions:

Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.



Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and a Service Water pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-12, "Loss of Service Water." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators J-D3 and J-B3 illuminates • 2-SW-P-1A has green and amber lights lit EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and the selected first stage pressure instrument has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation. SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators B-A7, F-G2, F-F1, F-F2, F-F3 illuminate • Status lights/Permissives M-E4, N-E7, N-F7, N-G7, P-G1, (and later) P-H7 illuminate • Status light L-F3 goes out • Control rods step in at maximum speed. • Tref indicates 547°F • MFRVs throttle closed EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and loss of condenser vacuum is occurring, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-14, "Low Condenser Vacuum." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Condenser vacuum worsens • Megawatts decrease • During ramp: Tavg and Tref decrease EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power, and CC to the Non-Regen HX has failed closed, the crew will respond in accordance with AR for C-C6.SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciator C-C6 illuminates • 1-CC-TCV-106 fails to 0% • 1-CH-TI-1143 and 1-CH-TI-1144 indications increase • 1-CH-TCV-1143 bypasses demins • 1-CH-TI-1116 indication slowly increases • Annunciator C-A3 may illuminate if VCT temperature continues to increase EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power, and the main generator voltage regulator has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-26, "Loss of Main Generator Voltage Control."SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators K-C1 and K-B4 illuminate • Generator output voltage increases


EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Letdown flow decreases on 1-CH-FI-1150 • VCT level decreases • Auxiliary building sump level increases EVENT 7: Given that the unit is at power and an RCP has developed high vibrations and the reactor will not trip automatically or manually, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Generation/ATSW," and 1-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." SPD Verified: __________ (Initials) • Annunciators A-E5 illuminates • "A" RCP vibrations increase to trip setpoint • Reactor does not trip automatically or manually • Control rods stop inserting automatically

Documents

A ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 · Increase power to approximately 12% in preparation for placing the turbine on line. A crew is currently in JITT for rolling the turbine