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A Positive Aspect to the Tragedy ofLebanon: The Convergence of
US,Syrian and Israeli Interests at theOutset of Lebanon's Civil
WarMichael KerrPublished online: 18 Sep 2009.
To cite this article: Michael Kerr (2009) A Positive Aspect to
the Tragedy of Lebanon: TheConvergence of US, Syrian and Israeli
Interests at the Outset of Lebanon's Civil War, Israel
Affairs,15:4, 355-371, DOI: 10.1080/13537120903198621
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A Positive Aspect to the Tragedy ofLebanon: The Convergence of
US,Syrian and Israeli Interests at theOutset of Lebanons Civil
War
MICHAEL KERR
The centrifugal forces are too strong, the passions too intense,
theopportunities and incidents too numerous, and the meddlers
bothinternal and foreign too readily at hand to be contained by
anything butunrelenting political process.1
Jimmy Carters narrow victory over Gerald Ford in the US
presidentialelections, on 2 November 1976, had brought US Secretary
of StateHenry Kissingers masterful command over American foreign
policy toan untimely and inconclusive end. It also marked a cooling
off of USSyrian relations following Kissingers attempts to draw
President Hafezal-Asad of Syria into a comprehensive Middle East
peace process. Beforeclearing his desk at the end of 1976,
Kissinger had promised Asad thathe would personally inform the new
administration of Syrias centralityto any future US-led efforts to
achieve a just and comprehensivesettlement to the ArabIsraeli
conflict. More than that, on the eve of hisdeparture, Kissinger
wrote a long and thoughtful message to Asad,reiterating his belief
that there should be no boundaries to thecooperation between the US
and Syria as they sought renewed progressin the peace process.2
From Asads perspective, the reconciliation thathad occurred between
the US and Syria following the outbreak of civilwar in Lebanon, in
1975, had been both fortuitous and expedient. Thisallowed him to
advance considerably Syrias irredentist claim to Lebanonby
establishing a military foothold in the country without
provokinganother war with Israel.
By brokering the Sinai II interim agreement between Egypt and
Israelin 1975, Kissinger had excluded Syria and the Palestine
Liberation
Israel Affairs, Vol.15, No.4, October 2009, pp.355371ISSN
1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online
DOI: 10.1080/13537120903198621 q 2009 Taylor & Francis
Dr Michael Kerr is lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies in the
Middle East and MediterraneanStudies Programme and director of the
Centre for the Study of Divided Societies at Kings
CollegeLondon.
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Organization (PLO) from the Middle East peace process. Through
hisfamous shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger had begun a step-by-step
approach tofinding a settlement to the ArabIsraeli conflict, which
reduced the SovietUnions influence and consolidated USEgyptian
relations. He was alsoseeking to strengthen US relations with
Israel and the wider Arab world,avoid another Arab oil embargo and
isolate the PLO.3 Sinai II had caused amajor split between the
regions dominant Arab leaders, Asad andEgyptian President Anwar
Sadat. Concluding that Syria had nothing togain from this
IsraeliEgyptian rapprochement, Asad responded byestablishing a
hostile anti-Israeli Arab front, drawing Jordan, Lebanon andthe
Palestinians under his leadership.
On the surface, civil war in Lebanon had the potential to spark
anothermajor confrontation between Israel and Syria. Furthermore,
it threatened USinterests in the Middle East, as Kissingers
priority was to move Egypt andIsrael beyond the Sinai II
non-belligerency accords.4 His desire to curtailthe PLO in Lebanon,
however, saw him embark on a new initiative. Heattempted to bring
Syria into the Middle East peace process and, like Egyptbefore it,
into the US Governments sphere of influence. The Lebanese
crisis,Kissinger told US President Gerald Ford, could open a unique
peacewindow through which their efforts in the Middle East might
yield rewards.5
This tactical shift occurred due to a convergence of Israeli,
Syrian andUS interests in Lebanon. When the PLO and its
revolutionary allies inLebanon attempted to assert their control
over the disintegrating state,Kissinger facilitated a limited
Syrian military intervention, as a means ofimposing a political
settlement on its warring factions and reducing thepower-base of
PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Furthermore, the possibility ofweakening
SyrianSoviet ties by bringing Asad in from the cold made thispolicy
doubly attractive to the US. But by the summer of 1976,
Kissingersmediation had failed to reduce the violence in Lebanon,
12,000 Syriantroops were occupying the country and the Soviet Union
had risked a clashwith the US in defence of its embattled PLO ally.
This article examines howKissinger came to view a Syrian solution
to the war for Lebanon as a priceworth paying for limiting Soviet
influence in the Middle East and drawingAsad into an Arab-Israeli
peace process, which tied Egypt to the US at atime when both Israel
and Syria were acting in concert to break the PLOspower base in
Lebanon.
A UNIQUE PEACE WINDOW FOR KISSINGER
On 13 April 1975, armed conflict erupted between Maronite
Christian andPalestinian militias in Lebanon.6 These clashes marked
the beginning of afifteen year long civil war, which destroyed the
country and drew in regionalactorsprincipally Egypt, Israel, Iran,
Iraq and Syria, alongside the worldstwo superpowers, the US and the
Soviet Union. Since independence,
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Lebanon had been governed under a power-sharing arrangement
betweenits Christian and Muslim communities, known as the 1943
National Pact.7
When it collapsed in 1975, Lebanese National Movement (LNM)
leader,Kamal Jumblatt, pressed for the deconfessionalization of
Lebanons politicalsystem. Under its power-sharing arrangements, the
offices of president,prime minister and parliamentary speaker were
reserved for the Maronite,Sunni and Shia communities respectively,
which institutionally deniedJumblattwho was a Druze tribal
leaderthe access to high office hedesired. Under Arafats
leadership, the PLO had made Lebanon a base fromwhich to attack
Israel and maintain a degree of independence from Asadfollowing the
groups expulsion from Jordan in 197071. When Arafatjoined forces
with Jumblatt, in his opportunistic attempt to radicallytransform
the state, the strength of their alliance made some form of
Syrianmilitary intervention inevitable.
By the end of 1975 Lebanon was effectively partitioned, the
PLOLNM alliance controlled the country south and east of Beirut and
theChristians maintained their mountainous hinterland north of the
dividedcapital. Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias vastly
outnumbered the frailmulti-confessional Lebanese army. The Lebanese
Front, a coalition ofMaronite militias incorporating Pierre
Gemayels Phalange and CamilleChamouns National Liberal Party,
successfully held their positions in theChristian heartlands. Asad
pursued a policy of maintaining a balance offorces between the
warring factions in Lebanon and in January, 1976, heactually
intervened to save Jumblatt and the Palestinians from
militarydefeat. Under the watchful eye of the Israelis, Syrian-led
forces had enteredLebanon in the form of two brigades of the
Palestinian Liberation Army(PLA),8 the Palestinian branch of the
Syrian army, which joined up with2,000 members of Saiqa, the
Palestinian Baathist faction, which Asad usedto counter Arafats
anti-Syrian Fatah movement.
By this point, Kissinger was convinced that a favourable outcome
to thecrisis could only be achieved if Syria imposed a political
solution onLebanons warring factions and the Palestinians:
The civil war in Lebanon added a new dimension to
ArabIsraelidiplomacy. Its potential for transforming itself into a
general Middle Eastwar made progress toward an overall settlement
more urgent. But it alsoproduced an odd reversal of fronts. Sadat
was indispensable for ouroverall strategy but, in Lebanon, Egyptian
support for the PLOstrengthened the radicals. Asad was the most
difficult interlocutor for thegeneral negotiations but, in Lebanon,
his distrust of a radical outcomecoincided with our interests.9
Kissinger hoped that by bringing Asad into the negotiating
process hecould broker a comprehensive Middle East settlement in
the course of1977. The civil war offered a potential next step in
which the US might
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initiate negotiations between Israel and Syria, as both states,
albeit for verydifferent reasons, sought to reduce the PLOs
autonomy in Lebanon.Failing that, Kissinger believed that as long
as Asad was at loggerheadswith the Soviet Union and preoccupied in
Lebanon, the intensity withwhich he would be able to oppose further
agreements between Egypt andIsrael would be sharply reduced.10 With
this probable moderateoutcome, he told Ford, the US was in a good
position for peace in theMiddle East. Moreover, if they could keep
all the radicals from uniting, orall the Arabs, Kissinger believed
there could be a positive aspect to thetragedy of Lebanon.11
Relations between the US and Syria had warmed since the US
voted, on30 November 1975, in favour of the unanimously adopted UN
SecurityCouncil Resolution 381. Calling for the discussion of the
Middle Eastproblemincluding the Palestinian problemit thereby
established alinkage between these processes, greatly pleasing
Asad, who viewed theresolution as recognition that the Palestinian
issue would be central to anyfuture US-led peace initiative in the
region. He also viewed it as a moveaway from the bilateral
IsraeliEgyptian process, which was detrimentalto Syrian interests.
Warming to Kissingers overtures, Asad told him thatwhile Syria was
eager to maintain good relations with the US in its searchfor
peace, to preserve and develop those relations depends much more
onthe US than it does on Syria.12
Israel was perturbed by the newfound cordiality in USSyrian
relationsand condemning the resolution, its ambassador to the UN,
Chaim Hertzog,described it as the result of Syrian blackmail and
Soviet dictates.13 On 28January 1976, Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin warned Ford that ifSyrian army units followed
Palestinian irregulars into Lebanon, then theIsraeli Defence Forces
(IDF), would occupy the country twenty miles northof the border to
the Litani River.14 Kissinger, intent on preventing Israelfrom
responding to Asads tentative movement in Lebanon, told Rabin
thatif his government denied Syria a role in resolving the Lebanese
crisis, itwould effectively be providing cover for the PLO.
Allowing Arafat toconsolidate his position in Lebanon, he argued,
was more detrimental toIsraeli interests than allowing Syria to
both restrict his room for manoeuvreand re-establish a moderate
ChristianMuslim government in Beirut. Theinterests of the Israelis,
the Syrians and the US Government overlapped inthis respectthey all
wished to avoid the emergence of a radical pro-Sovietstate in the
Middle East and the extension of the PLOs freedom ofaction
there.
It is here that Syrian interests in Lebanon were momentarily
alignedwith those of the US and Israel. However, Asads long-term
strategyremained fundamentally opposed to Kissingers vision for a
settlement inthe Middle East. Asad viewed Lebanon as an integral
part of Syria, whichshould never have become an independent state.
In geo-strategic terms,
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Lebanon was pivotal to Asads strategy of confronting Israel with
a hostilepan-Arab coalition under his leadership.15 Syrias foreign
minister, AbdelHalim Khaddam, offered a characteristically blunt
delineation of Syriasattitude towards its disintegrating neighbour.
Lebanon used to be part ofSyria, he said, and rather than tolerate
an extension of the PLOs authorityon its border, Syria would take
it back at the first serious attempts atpartition.16 Asad was more
diplomatic. If Lebanese President SuleimanFrangieh was willing to
ask for Syrian forces, he said, these would be athis disposal and
would act under his orders as president of an
independentstate.17
Having been isolated by Kissingers step-by-step
EgyptianIsraelidetente, the crisis presented Asad with a golden
opportunity to furtherSyrias irredentist claim to Lebanon. And
despite domestic, regional andinternational opposition to such a
move, military intervention offered Asadthe possibility of reigning
in the PLO and strengthening Syrias position inthe ArabIsraeli
conflict, following what he viewed as Sadats betrayalof the
pan-Arab cause. Kissinger emphasized to Asad that the USGovernment
was serious in its determination to bring about negotiationsbetween
Syria and Israel.18 He had considered opening preliminary talkswith
Syria in Geneva, but the Israelis indicated that they would boycott
aconference if the PLO was invited.19 Asad wanted the United
NationsSecurity Council to become the forum for advancing
Kissingers peaceprocess to its next phase. Only at the UN, he said,
could the PLO be fullyinvolved as a party to the negotiations,
without US invitation and alongsidethe Soviet Union, in a setting
where Zionist pressures would pose less of adistraction. By
elevating the debate to the UN, Syrias position in the Arabworld
would be strengthened at the expense of Egypt and it would
enableAsad to refocus the process on Syrian objectivesexercising
completecontrol over the PLO, regaining the Golan Heights from
Israel andestablishing his pre-eminence in the Arab world.
The Israeli Government, however, was unconvinced of the
benevolentnature of the Syrian regimes offer to come to Frangiehs
aid and viewedKissingers eagerness to bring Asad to the negotiating
table as anunwelcome development. Jerusalem signalled that if
Syrian troopsintervened in Lebanon, it would treat this action as
an invasion andRabin warned that Israel would not stand aside if
Asad pursued such apolicy.20 The Israelis were advancing their
interests in Lebanon by armingthe Christian militias and whilst the
US supported this policy, Rabin, whohad clashed repeatedly with
Kissinger in the context of the Sinai process,remained suspicious
of Kissingers intentions. He believed Asad wouldresume his support
for the PLOs campaign of violence against Israel assoon as the
balance of power in Lebanon was altered and their interests
nolonger coincided.
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Israel was not the only regional opponent of Asads plan to
extend hisinfluence in Lebanon. Hostile to his Arab leadership, the
Egyptian, Iraqiand Libyan regimes were all attempting to limit
Asads influence bysupporting the PLOLNM alliance. Asad had
previously backed theradicals, but then switched sides to maintain
a balance of forces by helpingthe Christians to avoid a complete
collapse. As the crisis worsened, thisposition placed him
increasingly at odds with his Soviet allies and providedKissinger
with a further opportunity to strengthen USSyrian relations.
Hebelieved that if Asad could successfully split the PLO from
Jumblatt, then abalance of forces might be found in Lebanon that
would allow him toadvance a comprehensive Middle East peace process
and compound theisolation of the Soviet Union, something which had
been his originalpreference for the region. To Kissinger this was
almost a caricature ofclassic balance-of-power diplomacy, with the
US in the driving seat asnone of the parties could actively achieve
their objectives without itssupport:
Israel wanted us to restrain Syria; Syria was seeking our
support inpreventing an Israeli move into Lebanon. Egypt knew that
we were thekey to rapid progress when the peace process resumed.
The Soviet Unionwas paralyzed by its perplexities. We emerged as
the indispensablebalance wheel of diplomacy in Lebanon because all
the players had astake in good relations with us.21
This led Kissinger to gain tacit Israeli approval for a limited
Syrian militaryintervention. And fearing that they were being
squeezed out, the SovietUnions response was to increase its support
for Jumblatt and the PLO. Butthe outcome of this was not a clash
between Israel and Syria, whoseinterests remained in alignment
throughout the summer of 1976, but rathera standoff between the US
and the Soviets as the Israeli-backed Christianmilitias linked up
with Syrian forces against the PLO in Lebanon, seriouslythreatening
Moscows position in the region.
KISSINGER SUPPORTS A SYRIAN SOLUTION
On 22 January 1976, a political solutionknown as the
ConstitutionalDocumentwas agreed between Syria, the Lebanese and
the Palestinians,with a ceasefire announced the following day.22
Under amendments to theNational Pact, the role of Lebanons
president would be weakened, theprime ministers influence would be
extended and the distribution of seatsin parliament would be
reallocated on a fiftyfifty ChristianMuslimbasis.23 Implicit in
this deal was a Syrian commitment to contain the PLO,end Jumblatts
gambit to overthrow the government and prevent theMaronites from
making political concessions that significantly erodedthe Christian
position in Lebanon and the Middle East. Lacking any
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mechanism that would enable Jumblatt to fulfil his political
ambitions, herejected the agreement. The reforms remained
unimplemented, theLebanese army disintegrated, and it became
increasingly apparent thatfurther Syrian military intervention
would be necessary to prevent thePLOLNM alliance from defeating the
Christians. Syria was not quick toact. Asad failed to support a new
presidential candidate and prevent theformation of a Lebanese Arab
Army (LAA) from the Muslim fragments ofthe old Lebanese army.
By mid-March 1976, the conflict in Lebanon had
escalateddramatically, the LAA joining forces with the PLOLNM
alliance,which was preparing for a major offensive against
Christian strongholds.24
Jumblatt appeared more determined then ever to end the political
pre-eminence of the Maronite community in Lebanon. The PLO,
however, wasdivided over the wisdom of pursuing this course.
Jumblatts ultimateobjective was to overthrow what remained of the
old Lebanese state, butArafat was aware that Asad would not
tolerate a total Christian defeat.However, the Fatah leader could
not easily abandon his most effectiveLebanese ally; therefore
Jumblatts intransigence looked set to provide thepretext for a
major Syrian military intervention. This act would define
theremainder of Lebanons civil war and strengthen Asad far more
thanKissinger had originally envisaged. Asad was equally resolute
in hisdetermination to ensure that any regulation of Lebanons
conflict wouldprimarily serve Syrian interests. In Jumblatts
intransigence, he saw anhistoric opportunity to win over the
Maronites for Syria, by letting themunderstand that their salvation
no longer lay with France or the West, butwith the Arabs, by which
of course, he meant Syria.25
Kissinger believed that if a limited Syrian intervention could
be achievedwithout provoking a disproportionate Israeli reaction,
Asad might beforced to crush the PLO, as King Hussein of Jordan had
done in response toFatahs attempt to overthrow his state in
197071.26 Asad did not,however, keep the US informed as to how he
intended to approach theescalating crisis in Lebanon. This prompted
a warning from Kissinger, thatto deploy regular Syrian troops into
Lebanon would carry the most seriousrisks of war with Israel.27 The
Syrian presidents response was blunt. TheLebanese crisis was a
purely internal Arab problem, he said, and one thatIsrael would
only respond to by occupying part of Lebanon if it wasinspired by,
and had the green light from, the US to do so.28
On 23 March, Khaddam informed the US that Asad was ready
todeploy troops to Lebanon as the Christian position became more
and moreprecarious. PLOLNM forces were besieging Christian
districts in Beirutand villages in the mountains. Lebanon, Khaddam
said, was on the verge ofbecoming a new Angola. And so desperate
was the situation that Frangiehhad called three times that day,
personally requesting intervention bySyria.29 Kissinger reacted
instantly, cautioning that the dangers inherent in
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such action were extremely real. In his independent judgement,
andalthough he was strongly urging restraint on the Israelis,
Kissinger toldAsad that, as a minimum, they would occupy
substantial parts ofsouthern Lebanon and perhaps elsewhere should
he overstep the mark.30
But Asad had no intention of agreeing to a political compromise
inLebanon that would allow Jumblatt to emerge victorious or limit
his ownambitions there.
As a means of preventing a major Syrian military intervention,
Kissingerbegan to consider the formation of an inter-Arab police
force for Lebanon.But King Hussein of Jordan, who was busy
promoting Asads Lebanonpolicy in Washington, argued that such a
force might actually escalate thecrisis, as most of the other Arab
regimes were actively supporting oneLebanese faction or another
against Syria. Illustrating this point, Arafathad been attempting,
unsuccessfully, to bring about Iraqi militaryintervention to
prevent a Syrian offensive against the PLO, and rumoursabounded
that a group of Alawite officers in the Syrian army, whichincluded
Asads brother Rifat, were plotting a palace coup against him.31
The Syrian president paid lip service to Kissingers warnings,
confirmingthat his troops would only be deployed in Beirut, the
mountain areas whereChristian villages were under attack and in the
Bekka Vally. He restatedthat the principal objective behind Syrias
intervention was to preserve andguarantee Lebanons independence.
His forces would withdraw oncesecurity was restored throughout the
country and the Lebanese had electeda new president. Kissinger
again warned Asad that the Israelis would likelyuse his
intervention as an excuse to eliminate [the] PLO presence
insouthern Lebanon if he did not stick to the letter of these
commitments.Nevertheless, Kissinger remained robust in his support
for Asad,confirming that the US had made it clear to the Israelis
in the mostforceful terms that any unilateral move into southern
Lebanon wouldencounter massive US opposition. He advised Asad that
an unannouncedintervention would lessen the chances of an Israeli
reprisal and mixingSyrian forces with local or Palestinian forces
would, in turn, further lessenthe danger of war between the two
states. He warned, however, that shouldSyrian forces advance south
of the BeirutDamascus axis, and should thetotal number of Syrian
military personnel in Lebanon (including thosealready there) exceed
the size of a brigade (or approximately 3,000 men),or employ heavy
weaponry, then this could make it impossible for [the] USto
restrain the Israelis.32
On 27 March, Jumblatt met with Asad in Damascus in an
encounterwhich, by all accounts, sealed the Druze leaders political
and personalfate.33 In the Syrian presidents eyes, the visit
represented an opportunityfor Jumblatt to make a sober reassessment
of what the LNM couldconceivably achieve in Lebanon and,
essentially, accept his will. Driven bythe once in a lifetime
opportunity that Lebanons civil war represented,
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Jumblatt petulantly rejected Asads verdict that the conflict
would besettled on Syrian terms. Upon his return to Beirut,
Jumblatt complainedbitterly to US charge daffaires, George
Lambrakis, of Syrian vassaliza-tion in Lebanon and Asads
determination to select its next president.Lambrakis emphasized
that time was running short if the country was toavoid partition.
But Jumblatt intimated that this prospect did not troublehim, as
partition, he said, would be a consequence of Lebanons past.34
Unwilling to embrace Asads way of thinking, Jumblatts position
in facthardened following his trip to Damascus. He believed that
the Syrianleader would shy away from overt military intervention,
given the domesticand regional difficulties such action would
provoke. Undoubtedly, sidingwith the Christians against the PLO in
Lebanon placed Asad in a veryuncomfortable position. His regime was
explicitly on the same side asthe Israeli Government, which was
busy arming the Maronites againstArafat and Jumblatt, as their
interest in weakening the PLO coincidedwith Asads.
With such a united front facing him Arafat had also been to
Damascusfor a hearing with Asad, but unlike his Druze ally he took
a more realisticview of the Lebanese crisis. The outcome of their
meeting was a split in theLNMPLO alliance. Arafat agreed that he
would no longer fully supportJumblatt if he continued to reject a
ceasefire on the basis of theConstitutional Document. Kissinger was
hopeful that if Frangiehimmediately resigned and if Arafat and
Lebanons moderate Muslimleaders were successful in convincing
Jumblatt to back down, Syrianintervention might be avoided.
BROWN OF PALESTINE
Seeking to prevent a massive Syrian military intervention, on 30
MarchKissinger dispatched US Special Envoy L. Dean Brown to
Lebanon. Brown,who had previously been appointed US ambassador to
Jordan inSeptember 1970, was briefed to make all efforts to avoid a
completeSyrian takeover and to ensure that Jumblatt understood
Kissingersmessage that he would be defeated should he continue to
reject a ceasefire.Asad viewed Browns intervention as a most
unwelcome development, asKissinger had instructed him to broker an
agreement that would split thePLO from Jumblatt and limit Syrias
ambitions. Asads preferredintermediary, King Hussein, notified Ford
of his growing concerns. TheFrench Government had informed Asad
that Kissinger was now openlyopposed to his involvement in Lebanon.
Muddying the waters further,Jumblatt had boasted to Asad that the
Americans were actuallyencouraging him to press ahead and resist a
ceasefire in Lebanon.
This was completely untrue and Kissinger was furious. He had
openedcontacts with Jumblatt and, controversially, the PLO, with
the explicit
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purpose of getting the message across to Arafat that the PLO
would bedestroyed if there is no ceasefire. He sent Asad a message
through KingHussein, telling him to ignore Jumblatts psychological
warfare and torest assured that the US was totally behind an
immediate ceasefire . . . andbehind him also in his position with
Jumblatt.35 Taking no chances, heinstructed US Ambassador to Syria
Richard Murphy to inform him thatJumblatts machinations were a
malicious, cynical lie . . . designed to sowseeds of discord
between the US and Syria.36
At the beginning of April, Arafats reconciliation with Asad bore
fruit.A renewed ceasefire was announced and the Syrian president
pulled backfrom the brink of fully occupying Lebanon. The
Christians now soughtclarification from Damascus as to how the PLO
could be brought to abideby the 1969 Cairo Agreement.37
Furthermore, Frangieh reneged on hisearlier commitment to sign a
constitutional amendment which wouldallow for the election of a new
president. Only days into his new role,Brown told Kissinger that it
was now Christian intransigence thatthreatened to derail the Syrian
political solution, which in his view was stilla possibility. But
if Frangieh was not pushed from office and a presidentinstalled who
was acceptable to all parties, an escalation of the civil warwas
inevitable and a large-scale Syrian military intervention would
follow.
The PLO ceasefire had changed the balance of forces. The
Christianmilitias, buoyed by both Browns arrival and generous
Israeli armsshipments, felt they could hold out against the LNM
provided that thePalestinians refrained from joining the fray. So
confident had they becomethat Chamoun echoed Winston Churchills
famous Second World Warplea, telling Brown give us the tools and we
will do the job.38 Browncontinued his appeals to Jumblatt for
moderation, whilst Ford raised Sovietconcerns by deploying the US
Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean.Nevertheless, Jumblatt
rejected these overtures and continued to hold outfor radical
political reform. But Brown was hopeful that he could beconvinced,
as the Druze veto was not just Jumblatts trump card, it was hisonly
card. He informed Kissinger that today he relies on the
Palestiniansupport, but tomorrow he could be pro-Syrian.39 Lebanese
PrimeMinister Rashid Karame disagreed. In his view, Jumblatt no
longerenvisioned a no victor no vanquished solution to the Lebanese
crisis.It was a question of military victory or nothing.40
The Christian leaders told Brown that if the election of a
presidentialcandidate was imposed by either Syria or the
Palestinians, then therevolution will change sides and partition
will follow. Chamoun warnedhim that Asads real intention was to
build a state in Lebanon that was 200per cent hostile to Israel.41
This was a view shared by Arafat. His officialstold the US envoy
that he represented the only way out of the crisis,causing him, in
a moment of reflection, to imagine that he stood on thebrink of
becoming Brown of Palestine.42 But if both sides were to row
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back considerably and accept agreement, the longer term question
was oneof security. Who would police the reconstruction of
Lebanonthe Syrians,the Palestinians, the UN, an inter-Arab force or
a mixture of all four?Brown informed Kissinger of his belief that
if it had to be Syria, then thesituation would have deteriorated so
badly that they would probablyrequire three to four brigades plus
support troops.
Nevertheless, Browns diplomacy began to pose a threat to
Asadsstrategy through the construction of a plan to put in place a
joint securityforce for Lebanon, comprising Christians,
Palestinians, Saiqa forces andunits of a reconstructed Lebanese
army. This, and Kissingers willingness toopen contacts with the
PLO, placed Asad in a difficult position. The Syrianpresident could
hardly oppose USPLO dialogue, but he was most anxiousto prevent the
internationalization or Arabization of the Lebanon problem.Such a
development would enhance the US role, strengthen his Arab rivalsin
Lebanon, and extend Arafats independence from Damascus.
Asadresponded by stepping up Syrian military activity in Lebanon,
surroundingthe fuel refineries in Tripoli and Sidon and moving to
block arms shipmentsto the leftist forces.
US diplomacy bore fruit on 10 April, when the Lebanese
Parliamentapproved an amendment to article 73 of its constitution,
which permittedfor the election of a new president with the
expectation that Frangieh wouldmake an early departure from office.
Without informing Washington,where it was viewed as at least
halfway to outright military intervention,Asad immediately sent
troops and a large number of tanks across theLebanese border.43
Brown was not going to deter Asad from his primaryobjective of
intervening in Lebanon. The Syrian president declared that
theintransigence of Jumblatt and his allies, who he deemed the
principalculprits in the Lebanon crisis, had made military
intervention unavoidable.
As three Syrian brigades entered the Bekka Valley, causing
panicamongst the LNM and their Palestinian allies, Kissinger sent a
message toAsad indicating that his intervention had gotten just
about to the brink ofwhere the US could be expected to restrict an
Israeli response.44 The US, hesaid, was walking through a mine
field in its efforts to prevent a clashthat could escalate into a
wider Middle East war.45 Kissinger was thenimmediately forced onto
the defensive, as press reports suggested that hehad formulated a
red line of engagement with the Israeli Government.Comments made
publicly by Rabin, that there was a red line in Lebanonthat Syria
could not cross without risking Israeli military
intervention,appeared to correspond with the wording of Kissingers
private warningsto Asad. Seeking to reassure the Syrian president,
he stressed that TheWashington Posts headline: Kissinger, Rabin,
caution Syria on Lebanon,was simply misleading and
irresponsible.46
The ceasefire then collapsed, shelling and gun battles
recommencedin Beirut and the Christian militias made advances in
the mountains.
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Brown suspected that the Christian offensive was the result of
externalsupport and Chamouns desire to internationalize the crisis
by making itworse. The objective of Kissingers balancing act,
through Brownsmediation, had been to bolster the Christians to the
extent that they werestrong enough to negotiate an agreement
without capitulating. But itmerely prompted the Christians to
escalate the violence in the hope ofprovoking a major confrontation
between Asad and the PLO. Brownwarned Kissinger that the Maronites
were drawing all the wrongconclusions from their newfound position
of strength. He lamented, thatin Lebanon, one years history has
shown that a winner hates to quit and aloser begins to palm his
cards.47
Sensing the impending danger, Arafat cunningly tried to detach
himselffrom the losing side, preserve his position and act as a
mediator betweenthe Lebanese and the Syrians. On 15 April, he set
off for Damascus andpresented the US Envoys security proposals to
Asad as his own, promptingBrown to complain that, I feel as if Ive
been mugged.48 Arafat wasattempting to carve out a role as honest
broker between Jumblatt andAsad, and find agreement in which the
Syrians would hold their forces intheir current positions and
reduce pressure on LNM. Arafat was extremelyapprehensive that the
LNM would ultimately drag the PLO back intohostilities with the
Lebanese Forces and of the Syrian reprisals that wouldsurely
follow. He hoped to coordinate Syrian/Palestinian positions on
theelection of a new president, establish a commission to set up
Browns jointsecurity force and renegotiate the Constitutional
Document. Asad,however, was now ready to assert himself in
Lebanon.
THE DAMASCENE VIEW
Although under increasing pressure from the Soviets and deeply
suspiciousof Browns diplomacy in Lebanon, Asad held his nerve.
Kissingers attemptto support Syrian intervention, on the one hand,
and limit it throughBrowns diplomacy, on the other, had resulted in
a cooling in USSyrianrelations as the crisis reached boiling point.
Calling for the reconvening of aGeneva conference on the Middle
East peace process, with full Palestinianrepresentation, the
Soviets were poised to defend their investment in thePLO.49
Nevertheless, Asad moved to prevent Jumblatt and the Christiansfrom
successfully establishing separate governmental institutions
indifferent parts of Lebanon and reinforcing the de facto partition
of thecountry. Having been rearmed by the Israelis, the Lebanese
forces againescalated the conflict in efforts to provoke Syria to
intervene against thePLO. Asad responded by deploying PLA troops
onto the streets of Beirut,but the violence that raged across the
capital now served only todemonstrate clearly that his forces, at
their present strength, wereincapable of quelling the civil
unrest.
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The political and military support the Christian militias
enjoyed fromboth the Israeli and Syrian governments had
considerably tempered theirpropensity to compromise. Having lost
the sense of urgency and impendingdoom that had gripped their
community in late March and early April,the Christians looked to
the US for some deus ex machina to ensure theytriumphed from the
continuing crisis. Brown feared that the Christianleaders had
interpreted US support as an ironclad guarantee for their futureor,
at least, a position that Fords administration could not
easilydisentangle itself from. Brown felt that US policy was coming
unstuck inthe Lebanese imbroglio. He warned Kissinger that Syrian
short-termintentions and long-term objectives remained unclear. Put
in the Egyptiancontribution, which was, he said, at least
temporarily, anti-Syria, a pinchof Libya and Iraq, and you get a
stew that is quite indigestible.50
On 8 May, Elias Sarkis was elected as Frangiehs successor and,
havingignored Arafats eleventh hour endeavours to broker a
compromise,Asad prepared for a military showdown with Jumblatt and
the PLO.Kissinger immediately sought to restrain Asad, telling him
that the USwould be in a strong position to make the all-out effort
for a settlementthe following year.
The US Government, he said, was committed to, and understood
fully,Asads determination to bring the Palestinians into the
negotiatingprocess.51 At the same time, Brown was desperately
trying to bringJumblatt into the political process before the
crisis reached the point of noreturn. He believed that it was still
possible to extricate the Lebanesesituation from the ongoing feud
between Asad and Sadat, by preventing theLebanese factions from
playing one off against the other. But Asad nowopenly rejected the
notion that his freedom of action in Lebanon would belimited by
external powers. As ChristianPalestinian clashes succeeded
inforcing Arafat back into Jumblatts arms, Asad accused the US
ofconcocting a plot to prolong the civil war.52 Having failed to
reducethe crisis by diplomacy, Kissinger withdrew Brown, on 11 May,
and theChristians launched a major offensive against the LNM,
adding to thepressure on Jumblatts coalition.
On 1 June, the Soviet prime minister, Aleksej Kosygin, travelled
toDamascus intent on avoiding a clash between his two main allies
in theregionthe PLO and Syria. As he arrived, Asad deployed more
troopsdeeper into Lebanon. They were successful in alleviating
pressure onChristian villages in the Bekka Valley, but suffered
heavy losses in Beirut asArafats Fatah and Jumblatts LNM
retaliated, decimating pro-SyrianSaiqa and PLA units there.53
Anticipating a massive Syrian intervention,Kissinger set in train
plans to evacuate all US citizens.54 And by 7 June,Syrias 12,000
troops in Lebanon had taken up positions outside Sidon inthe south
and Sofar on the BeirutDamascus highway.55 However, theymade heavy
work of securing the southern Lebanese port and resorted to
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shelling the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps on the
outskirts ofthe capital in frustrated attempts to subdue the
PLO.
Dissident forces from all sides coalesced to ensure no quarter
would begiven to those calling for mediation. The new US
Ambassador, FrancisMeloy, mused that the Saudis, who were
signalling their willingness tomediate, should present Lebanons
president designate with an inaugura-tion gift of an armour plated
car. But soon after, on 16 June, Meloy waskidnapped and
subsequently executed by Palestinian gunmen as his owncar attempted
to navigate Beiruts green linethe demarcation zonedividing the
capitals Christian and Muslim territory. Bruised and
deflated,Kissinger intimated that the US would not be driven off
its course byviolence but, in the same breath, ruled out the
possibility of US militaryintervention.56
At the end of June, Lebanons political process suffered another
setbackwhen Chamouns Tiger Militia launched a major offensive
against thePalestinian camps in East Beirut. This relieved the
Syrian forces there,which welcomed the Christian advance.
Consequently, the tables turneddramatically in July, as the PLO and
the LNM were caught up in a deadlycrossfire between the Lebanese
forces and the Syrian army. This promptedthe Soviet Union to defend
its position in the Middle East and, anticipatinga major crisis,
Kissinger told Ford that he had an uneasy feeling that theywere
going for broke.57 As Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon put it,
ifthe PLO is destroyed, the Soviets will have lost a great vehicle
in theregion.58 Arafat then unexpectedly broke with Asad during an
Arab Leagueconference, illustrating the Soviet Unions determination
to maintain hisindependence from Syria. The PLO leader announced
that he would not goto Damascus until the Syrians withdrew from
Lebanon. King Husseinwarned Kissinger that this was not a Soviet
request but a demand.59 Towithdraw unilaterally would have left
most of Lebanon under Arafatscontrol and represented a humiliating
defeat that would have seriouslythreatened Asads leadership. The
Soviets responded to Asads refusal toease the pressure on the PLO
by freezing the supply of spare parts,economic and military aid to
Syria. This Cold War standoff posed asignificant threat to US
interests in the region and Kissingers Middle Eaststrategy. He
spelt out the inherent danger of a USSoviet clash in theMiddle
East, telling Ford, You may be facing your first real
first-classcrisis since taking office. He advised the US president
to hold his nerve,concluding that, we must keep the Syrians there
and we may have to playtough to do so.60
As a signal of his administrations determination to prevent a
Syrianwithdrawal, Ford moved the US fleet in the Eastern
Mediterranean towithin twenty-four hours notice of deployment.61
King Husseins warningsproved correct. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
delivered a blunt letter toAsad, before taking the highly unusual
step of making public his criticisms
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of the Syrian leaders handling of the Lebanon crisis. He
cautioned Asadagainst taking any further steps that would make
fissures appear in theirrelationship.62 Asad showed no hint of
wavering under Brezhnevs decisionto increase the supply of Soviet
arms to the PLO/LMN alliance. And thetwo sides actually clashed in
an incident at the northern port of Tripoli, asthe Soviet carrier
Kiev attacked a Lebanese gunboat when it approachedto investigate
reports of a vessel unloading arms.63
The Syrian strategy towards the PLO in Lebanon was
neitherspectacular nor conclusive, and had it been, Asads image in
the Arabworld would have been further tarnished. In the event, he
underestimatedArafats strength and the resolve of both Moscow and
his Arab rivals toreplenish rebel supply lines. Having cut his
losses in Beirut, Kissinger wascontent to see the PLO worn down and
Asad embroiled in the Lebanesequagmire. But Asad did not shy away
from the confrontation, havingwaited patiently for his moment to
occupy Lebanon.
On 27 July, a ceasefire agreement was reached, following a
secondrebuke from Brezhnev to Asad and intensive negotiations
between the PLOand the Syrians. The Soviet leader indicated that he
would continue tosupport the Palestinians and block arms supplies
to Syria unless itwithdrew its forces. Syria, he said, must
withdraw to the Bekka Valley, anArab League Force should be
deployed to maintain the ceasefire and thePLO/LNM alliance should
retain control over the areas they occupied. Butas the Soviets were
at odds with their two main allies in the region, Asadknew that
there was a limit to how far Moscow was prepared to go toprevent
his ascendancy in Lebanon.
The US reaffirmed its continued support for Syrias role in
Lebanon,providing Asad with intelligence on direct and indirect
Soviet armsshipments, in a move Kissinger himself described as a
diplomaticrevolution.64 He told Asad to be mindful of getting
bogged down, buthaving made a military commitment to Lebanon,
agreed that there couldbe no question of a withdrawal, as this
would only represent a victory forthe PLO. Asad responded
cryptically. He told Kissinger that there is noreward for losing in
moderation and no substitute in some situations for amilitary
victory. This view had led the Syrian leader to conclude that
therewere no landmarks ahead in the search for a purely political
solution toLebanons civil war.65 Asad had achieved his objectives,
his view that therewould be no solution to the Lebanon crisis that
did not first and foremostsuit Syrian interests, had prevailed.
For Lebanon, however, having failed to provide a window for
peace inKissingers grand design, there were no boundaries to the
civil war thatcontinued to ravage its divided society or to the
Syrian solution whichultimately brought it to a conclusion under
Asads control, again with USsupport, at the end of the Cold War.
Reflecting on his detente with Asad,which the convergence of US,
Syrian and Israeli interests in Lebanon had
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made possible, Kissinger recalled a story that the Tanzanian
president,Julius Nyerere, had once told regarding the intervention
of great powers.At one Nonaligned meeting or another, Nyerere had
justified his mistrustof the great powers to pro-Western Lee Kuan
Yew, the prime minister ofSingapore, by saying: When elephants
fight, the grass gets trampled. Leehad replied: When elephants make
love, the grass gets trampled too.66
NOTES
The author would like to thank the staff at the Gerald R. Ford
Library for their assistance inconducting research for this article
and Professor Rory Miller for reading successive drafts.
1. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 26, Brown to
Kissinger, 21 April 1976, GeraldR. Ford Library.
2. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy,
14 January 1977, GeraldR. Ford Library.
3. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, New York, 1999, pp.
101958.4. Kissinger, Renewal, pp. 347421.5. NSA Memos. Box 19, Memo
of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld and
Scowcroft, The Oval Office, 13 April 1976, Gerald R. Ford
Library.6. On Lebanons civil war see Marius Deeb, The Lebanese
Civil War, New York, 1980; Theodor
Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: The Decline of a State and
the Rise of a Nation,London, 1993; Farid el-Khazen, The Breakdown
of the State in Lebanon 196776, London,2000; Naomi Weinberger,
Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 197576 Civil War, Oxford,1986;
Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society,
London, 1996.
7. Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and
Coexistence in Northern Ireland andLebanon, Dublin, 2006, pp.
112140.
8. The Times, 21 January 1976.9. Kissinger, Renewal, p.
1027.
10. Ibid., p. 1050.11. NSA Memos. Box 19, Memo of Conversation
between Ford and Kissinger, The Cabinet
Room, 18 June 1976.12. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32,
Murphy to Kissinger, 25 November 1975,
Gerald R. Ford Library.13. Ibid., 1 December 1975.14. Kissinger,
Renewal, p. 1026.15. See Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the
Middle East, California, 1996, pp. 267289.16. The Times, 22 January
1976.17. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to
Kissinger, 2 November 1975.18. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box
31, Kissinger to Murphy, 20 September 1975.19. The Times, 5 January
1976.20. The Times, 26 January 1976.21. Kissinger, Renewal, p.
1043.22. The Times, 23 January 1976.23. Under the National Pact,
positions in its ninety-nine seat parliament were originally
distributed
on a ratio of 6:5 between Christians and Muslim. See Kerr,
Imposing, pp. 146147.24. Hanf, Coexistence, pp. 214215.25. Ibid.,
pp. 216217.26. NSA Memos. Box 18, Memo of Conversation between
Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld and
Scowcroft, The Oval Office, 24 March 1976.27. SyriaState
Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 15 March
1976.28. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to
Kissinger, 18 March 1976.29. Ibid., 24 March 1976.30. SyriaState
Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 24 March
1976.
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31. JordanState Department Telegrams, Box 23, Pickering to
Kissinger, 24 March 1976, GeraldR. Ford Library.
32. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to
Pelletreau, 27 March 1976.33. He was assassinated in Lebanon the
following year, most probably by Syrian agents. Interview
with Walid Jumblatt, Beirut, 9 April 2002.34. LebanonState
Department Telegrams, Box 25, Lambrakis to Kissinger, 29 March
1976,
Gerald R. Ford Library.35. NSA Memos, Box 18, Memo of
Conversation between Ford, Kissinger, King Hussein and
Prime Minister Zaid Rifai of Jordan, The Oval Office, 31 March
1976, Gerald R. FordLibrary.
36. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to
Murphy, 31 March 1976.37. The Cairo Agreement, signed on 3 November
1969, granted the PLO freedom of action
against Israel from within Lebanon and limited the possibility
of the government exercising apurely Lebanese foreign policy. The
Melkart Protocols, signed on 18 May 1973, were afurther attempt to
define and regulate the PLOs presence in Lebanon.
38. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 25, Brown to
Kissinger, 1 April 1976.39. Ibid., 2 April 1976.40. Ibid., 9 April
1976.41. Ibid., 5 April 1976.42. Ibid., 7 April 1976.43. Ibid., 13
April 1976.44. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger
to Murphy, 13 April 1976.45. New York Times, 15 April 1976.46.
SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 16
April 1976.47. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 25, Brown to
Kissinger, 13 April 1976.48. Ibid., 15 April 1976.49. New York
Times, 29 April 1976.50. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 26,
Brown to Kissinger, 7 May 1976.51. SyriaState Department Telegrams,
Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 8 May 1976.52. New York Times, 9 May
1976.53. Hanf, Coexistence, p. 220.54. LebanonState Department
Telegrams, Box 25, Kissinger to Meloy, 4 June 1976.55. Hanf,
Coexistence, p. 220.56. New York Times, 18 June 1976.57. NSA Memos.
Box 20, Memo of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft,
The
Oval Office, 19 July 1976.58. NSA Memos. Box 21, Memo of
Conversation between Ford, Kissinger and Israeli Foreign
Minister Yigal Allon, The Oval Office, 11 October 1976.59.
SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 21
July 1976.60. NSA Memos, Box 20, Memo of Conversation between Ford,
Kissinger and Scowcroft, The
Oval Office, 19 July 1976.61. Ibid.62. Le Monde, 20 July
1976.63. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to
Kissinger, 23 July 1976.64. Kissinger, Renewal, p. 1049.65.
SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to Kissinger, 7
August 1976.66. Kissinger, Renewal, p. 1057.
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