A P R I L 2 0 1 2 B U L LE T I N # 8 BSPN - GFSIS › files › projects › 2009 › bspn › ... · (Armenians, Ossetians, Abkhaz); 2. Arming the conflicting parties to aggravate

BSPN The Black Sea Peacebuilding Network

http://www.bspn.gfsis.org/

ISSUES OF STATE SECURITY OF GEORGIA BSPN Regional Seminar

The regional seminar Issues of State Security of Georgia was conducted in Kutaisi on the 27th of December 2011, as part of the ongoing Georgian component of the “Black Sea Peacebuilding Network” project implemented with GFSIS. The regional seminar was designed to assist teachers of security and civil education.. Mamuka Areshidze, Tengiz Pkhaladze and Nika Chitadze experts from the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network; Mikheil Mirziashvili, Chief Manager of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network Project and representative of the Crisis Management Incentive Organization; Kakha Gogolashvili, Director of the Georgian component of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network; and Rusudan Margishvili, Project Coordinator, took part in the seminar. Thirty-seven teachers of security and civil education from various Kutaisi schools attended the seminar. Kakha Gogolashvili opened the meeting. He provided a brief overview of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network Project and described the project goal, how the project is implemented, who may participate and what spheres and resources are involved. Further, Mamuka Areshidze presented the report Mutual Influence of the Processes Ongoing in Caucasus (see details in the text of report). The report evoked great audience interest and the reporter provided thorough answers to numerous. The second speaker was Tengiz Pkhaladze with the report State Strategy with Respect of the Occupied Territories. This issue also led to numerous questions and T. Pkhaladze tried to answer each of them.

A P R I L 2 0 1 2 B U L L E T I N # 8

CONTENTS: __________________________ BSPN Meetings & Events

Promoting Peace in Georgia, BSPN Regional Seminar Unresolved Conflicts and External Factors, BSPN Regional Seminar

__________________________ BSPN Opinion Papers

The Inter-influence of Continuous Developments in the Caucasus,

Mamuka Areshidze

The State Strategy on Occupied Territories, Tengiz Pkhaladze

Georgia’s National Security Priorities after the August War, Nika Chitadze

Challenges in Villages Near ABL and Ways to Overcome them, Iulia Kharashvili

Two North-Caucasian Separatist Movements and Georgian Perspective,

Giorgi Gvimradze

Consolidation of Internationals Support and Prospects of Conflict Resolution,Vasil Chkoidze

1 p

2 p

12 p

6 p

10 p

13 p

16 p

18 p

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BSPN BULLETIN # 8 APRIL 2012

Turkey and Russia mostly with the support from the North Caucasian nations concurred the South of the region. Later, Russia effectively used the Southerners against the Northern Caucasians. Today, the Caucasian groups, nations and states exist in different political spheres. Nevertheless they still consider themselves as part of one cultural environment. The contiguity of the ethnic groups to the Caucasus range enhances their interaction with the next-door neighbors. In this sense, Georgia located in the heart of the Caucasus region is a natural bond between the Caucasian nations. Geopolitically the processes taking place on both sides of the range are closely connected. The inter-influence between those processes is so high a failure to incorporate this factor into the regional co-operation strategy will have dire consequences. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Moscow in its efforts to maintain its position and power, provoked a number of conflicts in the region, specifically:

- Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) - So called South Ossetia (1990) - Abkhazia (1992) - Ossetian-Ingush conflict (1992)

Despite the political nature of these conflicts, Moscow succeeded in presenting them as ethno conflicts. This adventurist approach intended to weaken the anti-Kremlin sentiments in the Caucasian nations, to demonstrate to the international community that these states do not have any prospects for success and to create a situation in which the hostile nations would grant Russia the key role in the reconciliation process. It should be recognized that in the beginning Moscow attained some progress toward achieving this

task.

The last speaker at the seminar Nika Chitadze presented the report Key Priorities of National Security of Georgia after Russian-Georgian War. The audience asked questions regarding the security mechanisms and means. In general, the meeting had an animated and friendly atmosphere. In the end the teachers expressed their gratefulness for the seminar and expressed a desire to arrange similar meetings in the future. The Inter-influence of Continuous Developments in the Caucasus Mamuka Areshidze Historically, the South Caucasian States have always been multi-ethnic societies. Often times they have combined or brought together the majority of the Caucasian people under a single sovereign. This was the case in the Great Armenian Kingdom (IV-V A.D.), Great Albania (VII-VII A.D.) and the Kingdom of Georgia during its greatness (X-XII A.D. Centuries). The King of Georgia, David IV, or “David the Builder”, in fact was the ruler of the Caucasus – a kingdom that included a significant part of both the South and the North Caucasus. The historical past, the authentic traditions of the Caucasus, kindred relationship, and economic ties instigated special relationship between the Caucasian people. The good neighborliness between the nations was not affected by the internal tensions and clashes typical of the whole feudal era. The traditional religious movements such as Orthodox or Gregorian Christianity and Islam share origins in similar ancient pagan religions. Hence the representatives of different confessions especially valued identical traditions and customs. The strength of the Caucasus was defined by the spiritual entirety of the region. Consequently, many invaders including old Romans and Byzantines, Ottomans and Persians tried to adhere to a divide-and-rule approach. Russia sticks to the same strategy.

Mamuka Areshidze is the General Director of the Caucasus Center for Strategic Studies,

the founder of This Georgia, a Georgian non-profit, and Caucasus Com, an electronic newspaper. He is the author and the anchor of Kavkasiuri Palitra, a radio show on radio Palitra. His areas of expertise lie in the Caucasus studies.

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The method that Russia adhered to has been applied and tested since the 19th Century:

1. Punishing the disobedient ethnicities (Georgian, Azerbaijanis, Ingush) through those who are loyal to the Kremlin (Armenians, Ossetians, Abkhaz);

2. Arming the conflicting parties to aggravate the situation as much as possible;

While utilizing this process, Moscow added some interesting aspects to the general picture.

- During the fights with the Kabardinians the staff of the Ministry of Defence of Russia (pilots, artillerists) participated on both sides at different stages. According to some verified information, the same Russian military unit of artillerists was bombing the cities Ganja (Azerbaijani Side) and Stepanaker (Armenian side) for a certain period. Interestingly, the Northern Caucasians made their first appearance in the Southerners’ army during this conflict.

- During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict the Ossetian volunteers attacking Ingush villages were backed by the Russian internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ossetian troops included warriors from South Ossetia.

- Russia used the same method of sending the North Caucasian troops to the battleground during the South Ossetian Conflict.

- This method was more broadly used in Abkhazia. At the local military registration and enlistment offices the North Ossetians were officially volunteering to fight in Abkhazia. Furthermore, the Abkhazians pressured by the Russian generals appointed an ethnic Kabardinian, General Sosnaliev as the Chief of Staff of the military.

Prior to these developments, in 1990 in order to neutralize the North Caucasians’ anti-centrist sentiments and to make the situation work in its favor, the Kremlin created a Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. Russia made South Ossetia and Georgia, in particular, the key object of aggression for the confederation. Many

people in the confederation believed that the new era would bring real prospects of independence though the Kremlin’s envoys in the region managed to portray Georgia – a small empire (one of the phrases used by Academic Saxarov) – as the main foe taking advantage of their “little” brothers – the Abkhaz and Ossetians. The leadership of the Confederation, headed by the Kabardinian professor Musa Shanibov, during one of their last Congresses decided to place their confrontation with the center very low down on the agenda and instead announce Georgia as their main enemy. Later, it became known that Professor Shanibov was at the same time affiliated with the KGB. During the war in Abkhazia along others there were around 500 Chechen volunteers (first under Mr. Gilaev’s, and then later under Mr. Basaev’s command) fighting on the Abkhazian side. As Mr. Shogenov, the Minster of Internal Affairs of Kabardo-Balkaria recalled in person (in late 90’s) he several times arrested Basev’s armed fighters on their way to Abkhazia but had to free them after the phone calls received from Moscow. During the conflicts in the Caucasus one of Moscow’s main tasks were to achieve a massive confrontation throughout the region (the Kremlin used this method during the war in 2008 war as well) so that it would prove impossible for the Caucasian nations to find a common language. During the first war in Chechnya, the Kremlin tried to create a “Caucasian” confrontation again. One of the first military units that entered Grozny in 1995 was Maikop brigade partly comprised of Kabardinians. The Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev applied the same method, countering the Russian Army with a combined military force pieced together from different Caucasian ethnicities (mainly, Ingushetians, Dagestanians, and Qists, citizens of Georgia). During the second war in Chechnya (1999-2001) the religious factor and the Arab Mojahids played the key role yet both parties tried to engage the Caucasus nationals into the war.

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Despite the distress accumulated between Georgians and Chechens thousands of Chechen refugees (over 8 thousand) fled to Georgia after the loss of the Chechen war, including insurgents under Ruslan Gelaev’s command. Some of the refugees escaped to Azerbaijan as well. History repeated itself once again. The ethnic groups of the Caucasus were forced out by a foreign power and sought shelter in a neighboring country, once again a Caucasian nation, who was also experiencing its own stressed relations with Russians. Notably, many observers had an impression that the Russian military leadership deliberately opened up the road toward Georgia for the Chechen refugees and insurgents to be able to use this fact as an excuse for aggression or leverage against Georgia. Later on, in 2000-2001 the Kremlin effectively used this pretext to justify bombing of Georgian territory for a number of times. Before the August 2008 war the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Russia gathered the Ministry’s personnel from the Caucasus, including Georgia in order to create again the same impression of “the Caucasians fighting against Caucasians.” The following groups participated in the war from the Russian side:

1. Two special battalions Vostok and Zapad of Russian military intelligence (GRU) based in Chechnya

2. Maikop brigade (mostly amalgamated from Circassianss)

3. Company of Russian citizens of Georgian nationality with mainly patrolling functions (apparently, they were not fully trusted)

4. A unit of Daghestanians was deployed in Akhalgri during the occupation.

It should be noted that due to the timeframe and the war specificity this format did not work out (the Caucasus nationals serving in the Russian military tried to provide some help to the war affected communities). Most likely, if a new broad scale military conflict starts in the Caucasus (for instance, in Karabagh), Moscow will try to use the same old method. In order to define the political future of the region,

it is necessary to realize the situation before and after the 2008 war and what has changed in the region ever since. The situation before the 2008 war: a) South Caucasus

1) Three frozen conflicts (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabach)

2) Different political views Western Oriented Georgia Russian Oriented Armenia Azerbaijan pursuing the ‘golden middle’

path 3) Regional players’ (Russia, USA, EU, Turkey,

Iran) actions, stiffening geopolitical tensions 4) Increasing economic activities between

Georgia and Azerbaijan. Growing number of economic projects (mainly in the energy sector) excluding Armenia (an additional source of tension)

5) Shortage of consistent regional development projects

6) Regional challenges (terrorism, religious extremism, etc)

b) North Caucasus 1) Growing tensions between the center and the

regions – Moscow rules the national republics through the corrupt clans that only focus on their own self-interest and wellbeing. Consequently, the “Caucasus Imarat” (a.k.a. the Caucasus Emirate), a fundamental Islamic entity is gaining strength.

2) Tensions between the traditional and so called “imported” Islam

3) Economic stagnation, total budget deficit, state corruption, massive unemployment

4) Terrorism, fight “everyone against everyone;” Consequently, total abuse of human rights.

The August 2008 war has profoundly change the situation in the Caucasus. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Moscow ignited the anti-centrist processes in the North Caucasus. Part of the Russian society perceived the Kremlin’s move as a demonstration of Russia’s strength. It should be noted that, in a

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short-term perspective this could really be the case but the war revealed the weakness of the Russian military. This along with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia became an additional argument for the Northern Caucasian states to start their anti-centrist fight. Interestingly, for the first time after a long time-out the national-separatist groups came into sight by joining the pro-confrontation forces. The nationalist-separatists perceive themselves as the successors of Dudaev’s efforts and unlike the religious separatists aspire to use the anti-Russian sentiments in the Caucasus as a resource. This desire is becoming especially strong among Circassianss and Ingushetians as their problems have been largely downplayed and ignored. More specifically, the Circassianss believe that Moscow conducted genocide against them in the 19th Century, forced some of them to move to Turkey and dispersed others throughout the Northern Caucasian republics. They are against holding the Sochi 2014 Olympics “on the soil of their predecessors without addressing their issue first.” A couple of days after the war ended, Turkey’s Premier Erdogan tried to redefine Turkey’s activity vector by offering the Kremlin a new security format in the Caucasus, which would grant Turkey a more active role than it held before the war. Turkey and its neighbor Iran have always been showing their interest in the region linking it to their historical traditions. An important factor to be considered is the big Caucasian Diaspora living in Iran and Turkey (Circassianss, Abkhazians, Chechens, Georgians, etc.), and especially in Turkey, that has a significant influence on the country’s politics. Soon after the war, the government of Georgia triggered its regional politics, which could be observed through the following developments:

1. Intensified relationship (both political and economic) with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey

2. New relationship format with Iran (resulting in establishing a visa free regime between the two countries)

3. Exceptionally pro-active set of policies toward the North Caucasus. Particularly:

a) Opening of Larsi border checkpoint and unilateral declaration of a visa-free regime for North Caucasians

b) Recognition of the so-called Circassian

genocide by the Parliament of Georgia c) Criticizing Moscow’s North Caucasian

politics d) Creation of the First Caucasian

Information channel (Perviy Informacionniy Kavkazsky (PIK) targeting the residents of the North Caucasus as well as Caucasian Diaspora and the World’s Russian speaking societies.

It is possible to understand the reasoning behind the Georgian Government’s above listed steps that contain some elements of revenge against Russia. Nevertheless these actions appear to be impulsive and reckless, especially for the country’s western allies who often find it difficult to understand those steps. At the same time, Moscow continues its occupation of the Georgian territory. It strengthens its military contingent and spares no effort to control the northern part of Georgia proper. The Kremlin applies the same method toward Azerbaijan. Thecurrentsituation–risksandchallenges South Caucasus

1. Occupied zones on the territory of Georgia 2. Russian military bases in Georgia (in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia), in Armenia (Giumri) and military facility in Azerbaijan (Gabala)

3. New contours of regional confrontation – political and military escalation in and around Nagorno-Karabagh.

4. New regional policy of the Georgian Government

5. Negative factors affecting Azerbaijan-Iranian relations

6. More active regional engagement of Iran and Turkey, which often irritates other regional actors and the West

7. Growing threat of terrorism and extremism North Caucasus

1. Expansion of the activity area for the “Caucasus Emirates” (especially toward Circassian populated regions)

2. Growing contradiction between the center and the regions on the one hand, and between the regional governments and the local societies, on the other hand.

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3. Increase of Russia’s military contingent – In addition to the 58th Army the Ministry of Defense of Russia deployed a newly established 49th Army with the main goal to protect the area of and around Sochi from the Caucasians.

4. Ineffectiveness and rigidity of the new economic policy for the Caucasus developed by the Kremlin

5. Anti-Caucasus sentiments in Russian society and conversely, anti-Russian feelings in the Caucasus.

All these and some other factors affect the overall climate in the Caucasus giving reasons to anticipate significant changes in the region. According to expert assessments, the 2012 Russian presidential elections and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi could become stimulus for different forces to shift the situation in their favor. In the given situation, a political face-saver for the small Caucasian states is to pursue a robust neighborhood policy through fully utilizing the regional capacity (certainly with vigorous international engagement). The “State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation:” Its Action Plan and Modalities for Conducting Activities in the Occupied Territories

Tengiz Pkhaladze

The “State Strategy on occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation” and its Action Plan were developed through close collaboration with the civil society, organizations, expert communities, political parties, Western governments, international non-profit and intergovernmental organizations. In general, one could argue that both of the documents focus on the residents of the occupied territories and intends to establish closer ties with the population left on the other side of the administrative borderline, to improve their wellbeing, to reduce their isolation,

and to provide guarantees for individual as well as regional security. The State Strategy reveals a new vision and approaches. The document portrays the Georgian government as the “expelled sovereign” taking responsibility and fully acknowledging its obligations to closely collaborate with the residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. “the Government of Georgia emphasizes its responsibility and obligation, as the expelled sovereign, to engage closely with the populations residing in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia,” is stated in the Strategy. Georgia made a big mistake when it allowed Russia to grant the residents of those regions Russian citizenship. The Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation is a real opportunity to rectify this mistake. The Startegy states the following: “Georgia opposes the isolation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and recognizes the negative repercussions of isolating the populations living there; the Government of Georgia is therefore pursuing a human-centric policy aimed at engagement with residents of these territories. The de-isolation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia should be achieved by fostering interaction among the populations currently separated by dividing lines and by affording these populations access to

Tengiz Pkhaladze is

the Chairman of the

International Centre for Geopolitical Studies (ICGS) and a visiting professor at the Georgian Institute of Public

Administration (GIPA). From 1992 through 2005 Mr.

Pkhaladze held important positions in the Government of

Georgia. He was the President's State Representative

in Mtskheta-Mtianeti Region and the Consul of Georgia to

Azerbaijan.

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the benefits generated by Georgia’s engagement with the wider European and international community.” The Strategy underlines Georgia’s aspirations to resolve the conflict only through peaceful means. It refers to the de-facto governments of the territories as “occupying powers” (instead of “puppet regimes”). The document suggests “elaboration of a status-neutral framework” and “creation of relevant governmental institutions” and appropriate mechanisms “for interaction with authorities in control of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia” in order to support and to implement the goals of the Strategy. The goals of the strategy include:

- Restoring economic relations and promoting economic interaction between the communities across the dividing lines

- Rehabilitating and developing infrastructure and transportation

- Ensuring access to education - Improving access to healthcare - Facilitating people-to-people interaction and

public diplomacy - Supporting the preservation of cultural

heritage and identity - Promoting the free flow of information - Exploring legal avenues and developing

relevant administrative mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the above-mentioned goals

The action plan provides even more detailed outline of the Strategy’s implementation mechanisms. The plan is based on four dimensions of program areas and projects that address the wellbeing of the populations in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and aim at promoting interaction and contacts between communities across the dividing lines. The dimensions of program areas include:

- Humanitarian Dimension: Humanitarian relief, natural disasters

- Human Dimension: Intercommunity relations, preservation of cultural heritage and identity, free flow of information, human rights, youth activities

- Social Dimension: Education, healthcare, environment

- Economic Dimension: Trade, joint production, communication, infrastructure.

The Action Plan endorses a collection of seven instruments for engagement to enable the implementation of the programs and projects. These instruments for engagement are:

1) Status-Neutral Liaison Mechanism 2) Neutral Identification Card and Travel

Document 3) Trust Fund 4) Joint Investment Fund 5) Cooperation Agency 6) Financial Institution 7) Integrated Social-Economic Zone

Status-Neutral Liaison Mechanism The Action Plan establishes a status-neutral liaison mechanism (LM) in order to “facilitate communication among the Government of Georgia, the authorities in control in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and voluntary associations operating in there.” The LM aims at promoting mutually approved and beneficial projects and initiatives. It also intends to support the project implementers in their operations. The LM will consist of Liaison Officers appointed with consent from both parties, with offices and “small support staffs” in Sokhumi, Tskhinvali and Tbilisi. The Action Plan suggests that these mechanisms can be based on previous arrangements, in case of Abkhazia such as the Georgian/Abkhaz Joint Bilateral Coordination Commission. The LM will be established under the umbrella of international humanitarian organization. Neutral Identification Card and Travel Document The Action Plan introduces two new neutral documents:

1) Neutral Identification Card and 2) Neutral Travel Document

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The Government of Georgia hopes that the introduction of these documents will “allow residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia greater access to social services and freedom of movement.” The Action Plan underlines that “the entire population of Georgia is entitled to the same civil rights and social benefits, and the Government of Georgia seeks to improve access for all. To address the practical and political difficulties that some legitimate residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia face in obtaining Georgian identification documents, legislation will be introduced that provides for an easily obtained ‘neutral identification card’ (NID), which allows the holder to claim all the social benefits available to Georgian citizens, to conduct business and other activities in Georgia and to seek employment in the private or public sectors.” It is explained in the document that ‘Neutral’ in this sense means ‘neutral with respect to citizenship status’. According to the Plan both the issuance and acceptance of an NID is solely for practical purposes. For residents of Abkhazia, the NID will be written in Georgian and Abkhaz, in accordance with the Constitution of Georgia. In addition, the cardholders will be able to acquire a ‘neutral travel document’ (NTD), allowing for travel abroad (basically, the NTD is a laissez-passer). The NTD is intended to be developed with the assistance of international legal experts, to avoid any possible misunderstandings, to benefit from the international experience and lessons learned and to harmonize with the international law. Trust Fund The Plan proposes to establish a Trust Fund (TF) to provide grants to the organizations implementing projects in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and across the division lines. The Fund will be managed by an international organization according to best practices, with an advisory function for donors. The main task of the TF will be to ease coordination between donors and grantees and to ensure that funded projects support the goals in the four dimensions of the Action Plan. At the same time,

the Plan will not preclude funding of valuable projects by interested donors, in consultation with the State Ministry for Reintegration (SMR). The plan underlines that “the precise format of the Trust Fund will be determined after adoption of the Action Plan; models might include the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund or the World Bank Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The TF will also take into account lessons learned from the EU/UNDP Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM).” Joint Investment Fund According to the Action Plan, a joint investment fund (JIF) will provide seed money to ventures operating in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and across the division lines. The main aim of the established Fund is to support businesses that promote local economic development, generate employment and build commercial ties between communities on both sides of the division lines. The JIF will be privately operated and jointly funded by donors and businesses. Furthermore, the Fund will employ the services of national as well as regional Chambers of Commerce. Cooperation Agency The establishment of a cooperation agency (CA) should enable and facilitate interactions across the division lines. According to the Plan: “Implementing the engagement strategy will require new functions that cannot be delegated from existing executive agencies, so the CA will be established as a legal person of public law (LPPL) under the authority of the SMR. The CA will act in accordance with the policies of the Government of Georgia in assisting state funded programmes.” Furthermore, the Cooperation Agency intends to assist organizations that seek help in finding partners across the division lines, to coordinate the local authorities’ efforts in improving the local operating environments. Lastly, the CA will ensure that the project activities and the business development comply with the Georgian and

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international law and will promote opportunities for the potential partners both in Georgia and abroad. Financial Institution In order for the humanitarian and development organizations and businesses operating in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia to function normally they need to be able to conduct financial transactions in those territories. According to the document, a financial institution (FI) will be established in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia that will allow for accounts setup and maintenance, cash transfers and other legal transactions. One of the options is to select an already established bank in Georgia to administer the FI offering limited or no retail or commercial services. Integrated Social-Economic Zone The Plan proposes to establish an Integrated Social-Economic Zone (ISEZ), with facilities for business and social services in the areas adjacent to the division lines in Georgia proper, thus creating demand for goods and service from across the division lines. The ISEZ will create a value chain across the division line, from the supply of raw materials to production, packaging, quality control, and distribution. It will focus on agriculture, but envisages the development of value-added agriculture and other businesses. The concept also entails a needs assessment and provision of seeds and technical assistance (vocational training, machinery for cultivation and maintenance etc.) to farmers. Furthermore, according to the Plan, processing and packaging facilities for agricultural products will be built within the ISEZ. By doing so, the authors of the Plan hope that “the benefits to businesses could trump political objections and the added transaction costs of crossing the division lines.” In addition, the Plan suggests that enterprises operating in an ISEZ and employing the local population may be exempted from some taxes. The ISEZ will also promote agricultural exports, taking advantage of Georgia’s business ties as well as special trade regimes that Georgia enjoys or will enjoy in the future. Lastly, an accredited laboratory and standards agency will certify for export products

produced in the zone as well as those brought there from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. As one could assume, both documents prove to be very attractive. Consequently, during the presentations in different cities of the world and Head Quarters of different international organizations the documents received very positive feedback and approval. Modalities for Engagement of Organizations Conducting Activities in the Occupied Territories of Georgia In October 2008 the Parliament of Georgia adopted a “law on Occupied Territories” declaring Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia “occupied territories” and defining the special legal status of these regions. The Law places certain limitations on free migration, economic activities, real-estate transactions, and other activities in the occupied territories. According to the Law “any authorized body (official person) shall be deemed illegal if it is not formed (appointed/elected) under the legislation of Georgia and/or if it actually performs legislative, executive or judicial functions or any other activities that belong to the sphere of authority of the national government or local self-government bodies of Georgia.” In February 2010 in response to the recommendations of the Venice Commission the law “On Occupied Territories” was amended empowering the Government of Georgia to agree on implementation of those programs and projects in the occupied territories that meet humanitarian needs and promote confidence building. This right was granted by the normative acts of the Georgian Government (Regulation N219 of 12 November 2008 of the Government of Georgia, changes added by Regulation N180 of 3 July 2010 of the Government of Georgia). According to these Regulations the Government of Georgia may, by its order, allow for implementation of activities in the occupied territories otherwise prohibited by the law of Georgia “On Occupied Territories,”

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The population of the occupied territories will perceive themselves as citizens of Georgia and not Russia when there is a trust established toward the Georgian society, and consequently, toward the Georgian State. Therefore, a full-fledged engagement of the society in peacebuidling initiatives is an important precondition for their successful implementation.

Georgia’s National Security Priorities

after the Russian-Georgian War

Nika Chitadze

Georgia’s main foreign policy and national security priorities - European and Euro Atlantic integration - are well known. In this regard, the most important concern in the domestic affairs is the successful implementation of the ongoing defense and security reforms. National security means protecting national interests. The concept of “National Security” was introduced after the breakup of the Soviet Union and regaining the national independence. The establishment of the system itself has started since early 90’s. Military security, which entails protection of national interests from internal and external national threats and existence of an effective self-defense, is the most important element of national security. A state aspiring to establish a functional defense system does not exclude the possibilities of a military insult against it, especially if it is a small state. Taking into consideration the fact that starting from early 90’s when

whereas the State Minister of Georgia for Reintegration shall agree on activities falling within the scope of the “Action Plan for Engagement,” which shall be formed by his/her order. Afterwards, under the law of Georgia “On Occupied Territories,” Regulation N320 on “Modalities for Engagement of Organizations Conducting Activities in the Occupied Territories of Georgia” was approved. This Regulation defines the mechanism for granting permissions to conduct activities in the occupied territories within the scope of the State Minister’s Action Plan. The “Engagement Strategy” received harsh criticism from Sokhumi and Tskhinvali calling it a delayed initiative. The remarks mostly focused on the title of the document (the State Strategy on Occupied Territories) rather than its context. Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that stemming from the situation established in the occupied territories the Abkhazian and South Ossetian “authorities” could not react to the strategy differently. At the same time, if both of the documents were presented in a way that would be acceptable for the local population, more likely the public response to the initiative would be positive. This creates a unique opportunity for the civil society to play an exceptional role in depoliticizing the issue by bringing public attention to specific problems rather than the whole political entourage. The practice of issuing “non-citizen passport” exists in many countries, including the European Union. For instance, in accordance with the Latvian law there are “citizen” as well as “non-citizen” passports issued to the residents of Latvia. Therefore, this proposal should not be new to the Western countries. Additionally, in terms of quality, the “non-citizen” passports issued by the government of Georgia will be identical to the existing biometric passports, which fully comply with European standards. Consequently, in terms of practicality, it should be easier to issue a visa for this type of a document with readmission agreement guarantees already in place, as Georgia is obliged to fulfill these responsibilities.

Dr. Nika Chitadze is a widely published specialist in Caucasus geopolitics,

external relations, and strategic affairs. He is currently the Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the International Black Sea University in Tbilisi, Georgia. He is also President of the George C. Marshall Alumni Union, Georgia – International and Security Research Center.

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Georgia regained its independence through August 2008 Russia indirectly exercised aggression against Tbilisi and in August 2008 Moscow openly attacked Georgia, after the end of the military hostilities Georgia faces a set of new challenges. The Kremlin’s main goal in this war was to occupy the whole country and destroy the Georgian state. Moscow hoped to put into power a representative of a puppet regime and to maintain Georgia in its geopolitical trajectory forever. The 2008 August War had dire consequences for Georgia. Russia occupied almost 20% of the country. Nevertheless, the aggressor failed to destroy the Georgian State, to change the regime, and to shift the country’s foreign policy orientation. Based on the above said, the chances are that Russia will repeat similar military aggression against Georgia though more likely, neither in the same form nor in accordance with the same scenario. The truth is that Georgia faces real political, economic, and military threats from Russia and in order to eliminate these threats a number of relevant steps should be made, including a thorough reform of Georgia’s security system. The general vision and documents that were adopted before the 2008 August War should be considered outdated and irrelevant to the “new security environment.” Consequently, Georgia must reassess the new reality and accelerate the security system reform and development of new documents. In this regard, Georgia’s new national security concept adopted in December 2011 plays a very important role. Georgia’s national security concept launched in 2011 In December 2011 Georgia adopted it’s second ever National Security Concept (NSC). The document presents the country’s peaceful development vision and national interests for the post-2008 August war period. The concept outlines Georgia’s national security threats, risks, and challenges and consequently, develops the main priorities of the country’s security policy. The war of August 2008 changed the threats, risks, and challenges facing Georgia. Therefore, along with the new national security concept, new

relevant strategies and plans were developed. The concepts starts with the preamble to the Constitution of Georgia: “t is the strong will of the citizens of Georgia to establish democratic order, economic freedom, a social state governed by the rule of law, to ensure universal human rights and freedoms and to strengthen state independence and peaceful co-existence with other nations…” The first part of the document describes Georgia’s security environment after the August 2008 war and underlines that the security situation not only for Georgia but for the whole region has significantly deteriorated after two historic parts of the country have been occupied by Russia. Hence it roves extremely important for Georgia to maintain strong ties with the world’s leading democratic states and to strengthen democratic achievements through reforms. According to the second chapter of the document, titled “Georgia’s Fundamental National Values,” the national values of the country include - sovereignty and territorial integrity, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, security, prosperity, and peace. Whereas Georgia’s national interests (Chapter Three) are based on ensuring fundamental national values, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security, regional stability, demographic security, fostering IT and social-economic development, strengthening national unity and civic inclusiveness, Euro and Euro Atlantic integration, energy security, and enhancing Georgia’s transit capacity. One of the main chapters of the document titled “Threats, Risks and Challenges Facing Georgia” talks about Russian aggression against Georgia since the Early Twentieth Century and the Soviet annexation, which led to 70 years of Soviet occupation. After regaining its independence in 1991the Russian Federation instigated and supported aggressive separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia resulting in the armed conflicts and the ethnic cleansing of Georgians. The document links these facts to the August 2008 War – a further military aggression, which itself brought about a new wave of ethnic cleansing. Consequently, the intensive militarization of

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the occupied regions and sever human right violations that takes place after the war is a major concern for Georgia. Thus, there is a serious risk of a new military aggression by the Russian Federation, which refuses to fulfill its international obligations under the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement and continues its military build-up in the occupied territories. The possible spillover of conflicts from other Caucasian countries, international terrorism, economic and social challenges stemming from the global financial crisis, challenges related to energy, information, ecology, demography, transnational organized crime are listed as other important threats to the security of Georgia. Based on the security threats and challenges the document defines the following “Priorities of National Security Policy” of Georgia: beginning of de-occupation of Georgia’s territories and establishing good-neighborly relations with the Russian Federation, which will be grounded on mutual respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, implementing the Engagement Policy that would promote integration of the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the whole Georgian space, fostering defense, strengthening state institutions that would itself endorse democratic development, European and Euro Atlantic integration and regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, strengthening international links with the countries such as the United States, Ukraine, Turkey and international and regional organizations, including the United Nations, OSCE, European Council. An important part of the document is devoted to the issue of international terrorism and fight against transnational organized crime, implementation of sound economic, energy, and security policies, as well as health, social and education policies. Furthermore, the document highlights the importance of the information security and ecology, protection of cultural heritage, civic integration, and population policy. Conclusion The ultimate goal of Georgia’s National Security Concept is to present the Government’s new vision on

Georgia’s defense and security policies. The Concept defines the major priorities, which should promote implementation of the principles set forth in the document. Despite a number of problems, there are possibilities that should be fully utilized and this could be done only through joint efforts from the government, the Georgian society, and the international community.

UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

BSPN Regional Seminar

The regional seminar on Unresolved Conflicts and External Factors for NGO representatives was held in Gori on the 15th of March 2012, as part of the on going Georgian component of the “Black Sea Peacebuilding Network” project implemented with GFSIS. Iulia Kharashvili, expert from the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network (Association of IDP Women “Tankhmoba” [Concord]); Gioegi Gvimradze, expert from the Center of Strategical Researches; Vasil Chkoidze, expert from the European Integration research Center; Mikheil Mirziashvili, Chief Manager of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network Project and a representative of the Crisis Management Incentive Organization; Kakha Gogolashvili, Director of Georgian component of Black Sea Peacebuilding Network; and Rusudan Margishvili, the Project Coordinator, took part in the seminar. Fourteen representatives from Gori NGOs and mass media also attended the seminar. Kakha Gogolashvili opened the meeting. He provided a thorough overview of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network Project and described the project goals

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and objectives, as well as its means of implementation. K. Gogolashvili also introduced the experts and his colleagues from Tbilisi to the audience. The Chief Coordinator of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network and representative of the Crisis Management Incentive Organization provided a brief overview of the organization and further plans for the given project. The main part of the seminar commenced with Iulia Kharashvili’s report “Socioeconomic Situation in the Villages ar Demarcation Line”. The speaker provided a detailed description of the lives of villagers living adjacent to the conflict zone and presented her significant findings. The next speakers were Giorgi Gvimradze, with his report “Processes Ongoing on North Caucasus and their Possible Effect on Georgia” (see details in the report) and V. Chkoidze, with his presentation “Prospects of Conflicts Resolution Regarding Participation of International Organizations” (see details in the report). Irrespective of thematic differences, all three presentations provoked great interest and were followed respectively by questions, opinions, and suppositions from the audience. At the end of the meeting the attendees expressed their gratitude and hope that similar seminars would be arranged and that regional NGOs would have the opportunity to listen to and communicate with the experts and speakers of their choice. Challenges in Villages Located Near ABL and Ways to Overcome Them: Nikozi Village Example Iulia Kharashvili

The region of Shida Kartli still is not fully recovered - this region was severely affected by war in 2008 when whole population was temporarily displaced and the majority of villages appeared under occupation. Still region has 15 126 IDPs (4 844 families) from both conflicts – in 1991/92 and in 2008. From this number, 10 555 IDPs live in Gori district, including several collective centers (places, when IDPs from the first and

second waves were settled by the Government by organized manner – mainly fully dilapidated former public buildings), new settlements for displaced persons after August 2008 (Skra, Berbuki, Shavshvebi, Khurvaleti, Karaleti).

Even more difficult situation is in villages located close to Administrative Boundary line with Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia – human security there is constantly challenging, economic income after war is very low, as the major source f income – agriculture – is destroyed. Regardless of big efforts of the Government of Georgia, investing in rehabilitation of this region, still many villages are half-empty, many houses need reconstruction, population concerns about stable peace and young people need better access to education, skills and jobs.

After 2008 war, during emergency period, many international and local organisations were working in Gori district to assist to cure wounds of war. However, after emergency period the majority of humanitarian agencies had left Gori, and in 2012 UNHCR also completed its presence, notifying that the conflict affected population needs mostly development assistance and handling the assistance to UNDP. However, during the Strategic Planning Workshop in UNHCR in February2012, the opinion was expressed that the humanitarian needs still are there, but their satisfaction at this stage already is more in hands of governmental agencies and local NGOs.

The Association of IDP Women “Consent” works in IDP collective centers and new settlements and in two villages located close to ABL.

Iulia Kharashvili, Physicist by education worked in Sukhumi in Experimental Pathology and Therapy Institute as a research worker. She is involved in work with internally displaced persons and people affected by

the conflict. She leads local NGO “IDP Women Association “Consent.” She was a Convener of the Refugee/IDP Commission of Helsinki Citizens Assembly, worked with the UN Volunteers team, and for the UNDP project “New Approach to IDP Assistance.”

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To identify the main problems in these areas, under the auspices of CARE Int. Project “Strengthening women’s participation in peacebuilding in the South Caucasus”, the participatory assessment was conducted in two places – in collective center Gardabani and village Zemo Nikozi. The assessment was conducted by trained women activists from these communities under the supervision of invited expert Ms. Brigitta Bode. One of the main aims of this assessment was to answer to the question - what are the barriers to women’s participation in decision-making at local and national level in the conflict-affected areas of the South Caucasus?

The methodology of assessment included individual and family interviews, focus groups, meetings with communities, with local authorities and individuals. The research consisted of several dimensions: economic, political and social. The research teams conducted analysis around socio-economic differentiation, engaged various state and non-state actors in discussions around governance, and explored changes in gender norms and trends over time.

Village Nikozi was severely affected during the war: the majority of population was temporarily displaced; after return to village they found their homes looted and robbed; elderly, who were staying in the village during occupation, were imprisoned; the church was damaged; 13 persons were killed during the military actions and several wounded. Before the war, the economic income villagers were mainly receiving from gardening (apples, peaches), crops and farming activities – however, during the war the majority of livestock was killed, the main water channel (Tiriphona channel) supplying the village by water for irrigation, was destroyed and now the production of agricultural produces is very limited that significantly influence the well being of villagers. As one of results of war, Nikozi population lost the access to market in Tskhinvali; part of agricultural lands is now occupied, one more part is not controlled by the central Government, and the livelihood opportunities of population became very limited.

The main results of the assessment demonstrated that the level of economic activities was dramatically decreased after 2008 war. Only 5 percent of population of Nikozi feel that they are economically sustainable, can receive medical assistance, have access to high education, have livestock, car, can visit cultural

institutions – mainly, this group of population is represented by public servants who receive stable wages.

The second group of population is represented by those who have not stable income and includes seasonably working people, those, receiving remittances from the relatives from the capital and other countries, women and men who are selling their labor or selling scanty products of their household. Their income is not stable – in previous years they were able to survive due to humanitarian assistance form the international organizations, state and the Nikozi Church, which plays incredibly important role in community physical and moral survival. This group constitutes approximately 80% of population of Zemo Nikozi and is characterized by lack of access to proper nutrition, poor living conditions and housekeeping (rarely they have one cow), lack of opportunities for young people to create families and get higher education that negatively influence their ability to participate actively in life of community.

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The third group (approximately 15%) is represented by those who receive stable low income and mainly includes pensioners and IDPs who receive state allowances. This group is characterised by the same limitations, as the second group. The majority of population of village have no satisfactory nutrition, the young people are limited in access to high education due to lack of finance and are reluctant to create families. This also influenced their ability to participate in civic activities and in community affairs.

The main problem, which appeared from focus groups, interviews and discussions with community, was privatisation of lands. This problem was stressed by the Researcher Ms. Bove and recommended for further examination and advocacy.

To clarify the existing obstacles and barriers for use of lands, the Association conducted further interviews with different state agencies responsible for access and use of lands. The main issues related with the land use in Nikozi, were identified as following:

– Occupation of part of the land plots (in total, the Nikozi village has 330 Ha of arable lands; part of these lands is used as a kitchen plots;): it was difficult to measure what part o the land exactly is occupied, as part of lands cannot be used also from security considerations;

– Less than 40% of lands are officially registered by villagers – the population is reluctant to register lands, as it is expensive due to several reasons (1 - in Shida Kartli and, in particular, in Nikozi village in many cases families have several land plots, located in different places, and each of them should be registered separately, which multiplies the payment size; 2 – for land registration is necessary to have official document such as taxpayer book, or household book – some of these documents were kept in rtsmunebuli 1 office and were destroyed during the occupation period; 3 – often in these books the name, date of birth or other information is written with the mistakes, and in this case necessary to have court decision, which is related with additional bureaucratic procedures and financial spending) – finally, the amount necessary for registration procedure can be doubled and tripled, that often exceeds the financial opportunity of population (as described above).

The Association found also that there are different scheme of treatment of socially vulnerable population in different institutions – thus, if in the state archive to receive necessary document or certificate socially vulnerable categories have certain financial privileges, in other institutions such as Public Registry, they cannot use it. It is not very clear, if the population is accepted as vulnerable in one agency, why the same rules are not acting in other places. The Public Registry agency has clear procedures for lend registration, these procedures are described in samples available in the NAPR building, but in many cases population still needs the juridical assistance to prepare all necessary documentation and to minimize costs for land registration.

All findings of this study the Association had discussed with the local authorities, representatives of concerned agencies and population during the civil forum in December 2011. During the Forum, the opinions were expressed that it is possible to consider population of Nikozi village as a conflict affected population living close to ABL (2 km from Tskhinvali town) and apply to this population provisions from the Engagement Strategy (Strategy on Occupied Territories), which envisages certain privileges as for population of occupied territories, as well for population of villages located close to ABL under the control of the Government of Georgia.

The recommendations of civil forum were formulated together with the lawyers from presented NGOs and discussed with the representatives of Gori Sakrebulo. These recommendations included the following provisions:

To apply to the Ministry of Justice with the proposal to grant privileges during the land registration to persons, who according to Georgian legislation are accounted as socially vulnerable (including – war veterans disabled, people affected by the conflict, multi-children families and so on).

To propose to the State Minister on reintegration issues to consider possibility to assist with registration of lands (especially currently occupied ones) in villages located close to ABL and suffered during the August 2008 war.

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One of the main shortages for implementation of rights of population affected by war appear – lack of access to correct information. It is very difficult in these villages to find which state agency is responsible for what. Several issues raised during the forum and concerned of property rights - such as possibility to privatise “One room warm cottage” – the cottages built by humanitarian actors after war for those whose houses were fully destroyed in August 2008 – were not clarified, as for such clarification the joint effort of state institutions, NGOs and international organisations is necessary. The access to information continues to stay one of crucial issues for population of regions, especially those affected by war.

All recommendations were sent to relevant agencies through the Parliamentary gender equality Council, but to have real results the work should continue. Two North-Caucasian Separatist Movements and Georgian Perspective Giorgi Gvimradze The goal of this report is to consider two key separatist movements in the North Caucasus, the possibilities for their successful secession and related North Caucasian and Georgian perspectives. Currently there are two groups in the North-Caucasus seeking secession. Their objectives are the following: the formation of an Islamic state – the Caucasian Emirate, so called “Imarat Kavkaz” – based on the Sharia, and the formation of a common Circassian state in the western part of the North Caucasus based on civic values. From the outset we can note that the two movements are contradictory in nature due to their differing values. Yet, this contradiction is not the only, nor the primary factor hindering their successful succession. While the movements’ opposition to the interests of the Russian Federation also poses a significant obstacle, we believe there are other obstacles of equal significance.

The main problem for the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus is the group of rebels that call themselves “Imarat Kavkaz”, acting under the flag of “Pure Islam”. Their final objective is the formation of an Islamic state spanning the territory of almost all the North Caucasus. The first question arising here is whether expanding Islam is the actual goal of the rebels or also a means of acquiring territory. There is no clear answer to this question, either in terms of the rebels in the North Caucasus or the general Islamic Jihad movement. In the North Caucasus, experts note that there is currently no understanding of the actual motivation of the rebels. The government is not engaged in a dialogue with the rebels, and, moreover, they are unable to detain and interrogate any of the movement’s actual leaders. The government’s greatest achievement to date is the assassination of a number of its members. Some experts think that it is time for the Federation to recognize the existence of the opposition movement operating in the region and seek to open communications with them. It is vital to understand the motivations of the movement, because the movement is already more highly regarded than the government by the local population and its popularity is increasing. The lack of knowledge makes the question of motivation more and more significant. Hence, it becomes necessary to speculate using certain data. Analysts have found that most of the members of “Imarat Kavkaz” have no real understanding of “Pure Islam”. Their leaders often make theological mistakes, have poor knowledge

Giorgi Gvimradze holds a Master's Degree in

Policy Studies and is a graduate of Tbilisi Theological Academy. He is a Senior Scholar at the Center of Strategic Research. His main areas of expertise include the political aspects of Islam in Georgia and how the developments that take place in the North Caucasus impact Georgia.

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the Arabic language, and also make significant errors when citing the Koran. Though, to be fair, we should note that some rebels, like Said Buriatski, who was killed in 2010, have received higher theological education in the Arab world and are regarded as great authorities by North Caucasian extremists. Analysts have also noted that the transformation from ethnic separatism to Islamic separatism is not yet complete in the region. All agree, however, that there is no longer any organized form of ethnic separatism in the North Caucasus. Some activists have left the region and gained political asylum in Western countries and the majority of those who did not leave joined the Islamic movement. The difficult socioeconomic and political climate is one of the contributing factors to the popularity of the rebels and is a reason for joining them. Social hardships are not a motivation for joining a terrorist network or participating in terrorist acts, for example engaging in armed assaults against law enforcement or suicide missions. According to human rights defenders, however, state authorized terrorism can cause people to lose faith in the government and join a separatist movement. It is important to recognize that for many of separatists, gaining political power is the primary goal. One example is the once rebel, now President of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadirov. Thus it is clear that the rebels have different motivations leading to the assumption that Islam, at least at this stage, is a means for achieving goals rather than the declared primary goal itself, which is the creation of an Islamic state. The different motivations of the rebels pose one of the most important obstacles to the success of the Islamic separatist movement. If, hypothetically, we imagine that the Russian Federation were to stop hindering the movement, the different interests of the rebels would likely lead to internal confrontations. It should be noted here that majority of the population of the North Caucasus regard themselves as adherents of Sufism, objectively placing them in opposition to the Salafi denomination, or the adherents of the above

mentioned “Pure Islam.” The confrontation, irrespective of the fact that both of these groups agree to the practical realization of Sharia law, is quite intense. The rebel attacks against Sufi leaders are becoming more and more widespread. This confrontation is further aggravated by the federal government’s decision to support the leaders of traditional Islam, causing dissatisfaction among the local population and significantly reducing the chances for conflict resolution. Therefore the increasing degree of confrontation is one of the most significant obstacles to the success of the Islamic movement. Here we should consider the second separatist movement, which, as we have already mentioned, is in opposition to the Islamic secessionist movement due to contradictions between their declared goals. Such opposition is itself an obstacle to the success of either movement. The second secessionist movement related to the region seeks to create a unified Circassian state in the territories of Adygei, Karachai-Cherkess and Kabardino-Balkaria. We used the word “related” purpously to stress the fact that the idea has more supporters beyond the borders of the region. A United Circassian state is mostly discussed in Circassian Diaspora. In this issue, as with many Circassian issues, the US and Western European Circassian diasporas are especially active. Their final objective is the creation of a united, independent Circassian state. To achieve this goal, however, several other stages should first be passed. The first stage is the international recognition of the Circassian genocide. This should be followed by their repatriation of Circassians to their historical native land. After this, the United Circassian Republic should be formed within Russian Federation. Later it should further divide from Russia and become an independent state. The dissolution of the Russian Federation is necessary for the achievement of this goal. According to the adherents of this movement, this would be realized unconditionally and not take too long. The necessary dissolution of the Russian Federation makes the likely success of the movement questionable. If however, again hypothetically, we assume that this is possible, many other

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problems will arise. For instance, the direct neighbors of Circassians, the Balkarians and Karachais, are the historical enemies of Circassians. Thus, they would likely oppose this project as well. This is especially likely considering that the Balkarians and Karachais primarily support the Islamic secessionist movement. The Circassian separatist movement seeks the formation of a civic nation. While the idea of a civic nation sounds interesting, and is clear to the representatives of the Circassian Diaspora in the USA and Europe, it is questionable, as to whether the concept is understandable for the Circassians living in the region. Another notable question is whether the wealthy Circassians living in the West are ready for repatriation into such a volatile region of the world. The attitudes of the population living in the region is also of significance. As many experts state, the majority of the population supports independence, however, due to the dependence of the region on federal donations, the movement for full secession is not a popular one. A primary contributing factor is the lack of resources necessary for the independence of North-Caucasian republics. Thus, in our opinion, the mentioned problems make the success of the secession movements almost naive and only increase the probability of increasing tensions. If we assume the hypothetical dissolution of the Russia Federation in the future, or even the loss of control of the Federation, which is much more realistic than an actual breakup, we propose that the situation in the North Caucasus would become even more strained than the status quo. This is due to the inherent opposition of the two key separatist movements. In addition, there is a possibility of confrontations between different ethnic groups, religious denominations, or clans over territorial redistribution and political power. These issues are currently moderated by the Federation’s policies and, largely, the internal opposition to these policies. Conclusion Regarding the above, one could say that the existence of different national and religious movements, their opposition and historical

experience with such opposition, in addition to the maintenance of marginalizing federal policies, would endanger the future of the region. The collective result leads to a strong propensity for danger for both the region itself and its direct neighbors, particularly for Georgia. If the current situation in the North Caucasus is maintained while Georgia continues to develop, there is an increased probability that North Caucasians will migrate into Georgia. Any greater escalation of tensions creates a precondition for immigration and refugees. In addition, due to current Georgian-Russian relations, without any changes, any further escalation of tensions in North Caucasus is likely to result in increasing Russian aggression. Increasing aggression could even lead to the closing of the southern border in order to prevent rebel assistance, but also humanitarian assistance. Thus, Georgia should abstain from any activity that would further strain the situation in the North Caucasus. Despite these findings, some Georgian experts believe Georgia should contribute to the further escalation of the situation in the neighboring northern region. The Georgian government could, for example, recognize the Circassian genocide or attempt to bypass the Kremlin to forge relations with the parliaments of North-Caucasian republics. These actions would be regarded as the results of a desire to increase tensions. It is significant to note that further escalation of the situation in the region could lead to an opportunity for cooperation between Russia and Georgia. A conflict could lead to the coinciding political interests of both countries, which would seek to regulate the regions and mitigate any dangers. Such cooperation, however, should not be committed to without taking into consideration the interests of the North-Caucasians. The starting point for discussion should, in this case, be that both parties stop using the region to influence one another. The region should necessarily become a co-participant in the process to prevent the neglect of the interests of the local population. Though, as we have mentioned earlier, the primary concern is building the political will necessary for really dealing with the regional problems and the

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and the settlement of relations between Russia and Georgia. Consolidation of International Support and Prospects of Conflict Resolution Vasil Chkoidze After Russian military aggression against Georgia in August 2008 and the occupation of its territories, international intervention and the consolidation of international support became one of the most important priorities of Georgian diplomacy. This situation was further aggravated following the decision of the Russian government to recognize the territories, occupied by Russia, as independent states. Post-war, short-term euphoria exhibited among the reactive circles of Russian and separatist elite faded quickly and transformed into severe crisis stagnation. This process included several stages:

1. Unsoundness of the arguments justifying assaulting independent state and non-acceptance thereof by the international community.

2. Suspension and eventual termination of the process of international recognition of the occupied territories.

3. Further aggravation of the severe social and criminal situation in the occupied regions and drastic reduction of the political control from the side of Russian Federation.

Increasing International Pressure It is paradoxical, but the report of the Tagliavini Commission, evaluated positively by the leaders of Russian Federation, created a stable legal and political basis for increasing international influence. The report, prepared by the 20 member commission, provided a number of significant conclusions, which eliminated the basis for all the arguments used by Russia in grounding its aggression and showed the prospects for the recognition of these regions as independent states. A number of significant issues were being identified: 1. The “right on self-determination” used by the

separatists. Tagliavini’s conclusion states that self-determination is associated with the territories under the colonial or apartheid regimes. It mentions also that in international law the appropriation of genocide fact (if such fact actually took place and this is evidenced) to the right of self-determination is still disputed. In the case of South Ossetia, this fact is particularly ungrounded because no proves exist to confirm the Russian propagandist message, which alleged that 2000 civilians were killed in Tskhinvali as the result of a Georgian attack. 2. The attack of Russian peace forces. Tagliavini’s report clearly states that investigations failed to confirm that Russian peacekeeping forces were attacked by the Georgian military. It also states that even if such a case had taken place, Russia still would have had no right to respond with military intervention of such scale. The Russian response should have been limited to military operations necessary for the protection of the peace forces operating in the conflict zone. 3. Protection of Russian citizens. Russia stated that military intervention into Georgia was necessary for the protection of Russian citizens. Here the leaders of the Russian Federation implied that the population of the Tskhinvali region, to whom Russian passports were issued in bulk, were citizens of the Russian Federation. Tagliavini’s report confirms that issuing passports to the citizens of a foreign country in mass, Russia had violated international legal regulations. It also stated that the unlawful delivery of passports could not turn the population of the region into Russian citizens. According to international law, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the residents of these regions were automatically awarded Georgian citizenship.

Vasil Chkoidze is the President and Founder of Research

Center of European Integration. In 2002

he was elected as the President of the European Movement (EM)

in Georgia when the Center became the Preparatory

Committee of EM in Georgia. He teaches European Studies,

history of EU integration and its economy in a number of Georgian Universities.

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They had the right to change their citizenship until 1994, if they submitted the relevant applications. As Tagliavini’s Commission established, only a few people changed their citizenship through such procedures. The report states that the populations remaining in the occupied territories are regarded as Georgian citizens under international law. Thus, the statement made by the Russian Federation that it was protecting its citizens is legally ungrounded. 4. Emphasis on General Kulakhmetov’s statement. In the Tagliavini commission’s report, there are several references to a statement made by Kulakhmetov, the head of the Russian peace forces, at 17:00 on the 7th of August, recognizing that Russian peace forces were not able to hold back separatist forces from attacking Georgian villages. According to Tagliavini’s conclusion, in such a situation, the Georgian government not only had the right to use the military forces for the protection of its citizens, but had an obligation to do so. The report states only that use of force by the Georgian side was excessive. The above statements absolutely exclude any justification for the Russian military invasion and occupation of the Georgian territories by the international community. In addition, the recognition of these two regions of Georgia as independent states has no prospects. The maintenance of the status quo for a long time would be harmful for the population remaining in these regions and the development of Georgia. The only party benefiting from the status quo is Russia, which has the opportunity to misappropriate natural and other resources in the occupied territories. It is clear that the expectations of the Russian Federation that the occupation of two Georgian regions and the issue of Georgian territorial integrity would be forgot with time, did not come true. The issues of the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia and the de-occupation of the occupied regions are still on the agendas of international forums. Moreover, pressure on Russia has not reduced, but become even stronger. There is not any significant international organization that has not protested the violation of the territorial integrity of Georgia and called on Russia to fulfill

the 6-point agreement between Medvedev and Sarkozy. In many high-level international documents there are appeals from international organizations to Russia demanding the withdrawal of its decision recognizing the Georgian regions as independent territories. We can provide several examples: Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution #1633 (2009) states: “The Assembly condemns the recognition by Russia of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and considers it to be a violation of international law and of the Council of Europe’s statutory principles.” The same resolution further states: “The Assembly reaffirms its attachment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and reiterates its call on Russia to withdraw its recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.” It should be mentioned the EU-Russian Summit planned for September 2008 and intended for the consideration of a new, higher-level collaboration and partnership agreement between the EU and Russia was deferred due to the military aggression against Georgia. This agreement has still not been concluded. In December 2011, one of the most influential EU institutions, the European Parliament, adopted a resolution dealing with EU-Russian relations. It did not generally deal with the issue of Georgia, but the Georgian issue was still emphasized in the resolution. Section 25 of the resolution states, “25. Reiterates Russia’s obligation to fully implement the Six-point Ceasefire Agreement, including respect for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;” In the same resolution there is a strict demand that the Russian Federation allow representatives of the EU to implement a monitoring mission in the occupied territories. One more influential EU institution, the European Council, in its report dealing with the South Caucasus, paid significant attention to Russian-Georgian relations. It confirmed its support for Georgian territorial integrity. In the adopted document, the Council expressed its concern about the construction of military infrastructure by Russia in the occupied territories. In

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addition, the Council demanded that Russia fulfill its obligation to provide access to Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region to the EU monitors. The document adopted by the European Council is significant as the position stated herein is binding for all EU member states. Similar calls are stated in NATO documents as well. Among them is the Lisbon Summit Declaration, a strategically important document adopted by the NATO Ministerial on the 7th of December 2011. The above examples clearly show that there is not even the slightest chance of recognition of the occupied Georgian territories as independent states. It is very important that our citizens remaining in the occupied territories are periodically informed of the international community’s attitude towards these issues. The environment created by Russian propaganda prevents the provision of unbiased information to the public about the deadlock of the situation. It is also important to understand that status quo is unfavorable to both Georgia and the populations in these regions. Russian propaganda often indicates to other conflicts, using them for comparison with the situations in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region. We should note that this is an attempt to mislead the local population. For example, regarding the issue of Kosovo, the European Union has no uniform position with respect to the independence of Kosovo. Some EU member states recognize the independence of Kosovo and some of them support the territorial integrity of Serbia. The situation, with respect to the independence of Kosovo, is similar in other important international organizations. While the above examples clearly evidence the position of the European Union, the position of NATO and other international organizations, with respect of territorial integrity of Georgia, is unambiguous and uniform. Similar conclusions could be made with respect to the Karabakh conflict. Not one of the countries has recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, but at the same time, there have only been a few documents adopted by international organizations, which deal with support for the

territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (we should note here that Georgia supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan). This conflict is regarded by the international community as a territorial dispute between two neighboring countries. They often call on Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the conflict peacefully. The most similar case to our situation is the issue of the Turkish part of Cyprus. North Cyprus, which is settled by ethnic Turks, supported by Turkish military forces, and recognized as an independent state by Turkey, has for many decades, only made vain attempts to achieve international recognition. After Cyprus gained EU membership, the attitude of the North Cyprus’s population changed. Now they are considering the possibility of unification with Cyprus, which they rejected earlier. Currently, the central issue of the debates is not restoration or non-restoration of the territorial integrity of Cyprus, but with what status North Cyprus would join the Greek part of Cyprus. The presented analysis shows that the North Cyprus settlement model, even being the only relevant one from the considered examples, still would not be beneficial for the population of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. In my opinion, maintaining the status quo for decades would be unfavorable for both parties, because there should not be further delay in commencing the peace negotiations. Maybe 15 or 20 years is not a significant period in the history of humanity, but this is dooming entire generations to poverty, lack of education and a life of permanent fear.

CONTACT GFSIS

3a Shio Chitadze Street Tbilisi, 0108 GEORGIA

Tel: (995 32) 2473555 Fax: (995 32) 2985265

www.bspn.gfsis.org/ [email protected]

THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK (BSPN) MISSION TheBlackSeaPeacebuildingNetworkrepresentsafirstattempttofocusonrobustcivilsocietyinvolvementinconflictresolutionprocessintheBlackSearegion.TheprojectisimplementedbytheGeorgianFoundationforStrategicandInternationalStudies(GFSIS)inpartnershipwiththeCrisisManagementInstitute(CMI)andsupportedby theMinistry forForeignAffairsofFinland. Theproject targets sevenwiderBlackSearegioncountriesfacingdomesticconflictsandaimsatempoweringcivilsocietytopromotemediationanddialoguefor effective conflict management. The project’s purpose is to strengthen civil society peacebuilding atvarious levels (community, local, regional, national or international) to influence the understanding orattitudeofconflictpartieswithnewideasandapproaches.Furthermore,theestablishmentoftheBlackSeaNGOForumprovidesthebasisforaseriesofregion‐wide,broad‐basedinitiativessuchascreationofregionalcivilsocietyplatformsforlinkinglocalNGOsandcivilsocietygroupsthatarealreadyinvolvedandthosethatwould like to engage for multiplying the peacebuilding efforts across the region. Moreover, the nationalforumshavegreaterincentivestofacilitateregionalcooperationincrisismanagementandensureclosetiesbetweenNGOs,governmentsandtheEU.GFSIS,asalocalpartnerofCMIisresponsibletocreateaforumofNGOsinGeorgiaandtoorganizemeetingsfortheinterestedorganizationsandgroups.Theprojectcomprisesofthreekeycomponents:

‐ Meetings,presentations,discussionsorganizedonaregularbasiswith theparticipationofGeorgiancivil society actors and the Experts’ Council, preparation of consecutive reports with the meetingfindingsandoutcomes.

‐ Theprojectwebpagecreatedtoposttheprojectinformation,updates,experts’opinions,anddata.

‐ The BSPN bulletin produced to familiarize the wider society with the project’s work and todisseminateanalyticalpapersaboutconflictresolution,peacebuidling,regionalsecurity,andstability,aswellasabouttheEU’scontributionanditsroleinpeacebuidlingpreparedbytheproject’sGeorgianandforeignexperts.

The project intends to increase the public’s interest in conflict prevention, conflict management,transformation,andpeacefulresolution,tocontributetowiderpublicdebatesontheseissuesandtopromotedialoguebetweenallinterestedpartiesatthenationalandregionallevels.

BSPN Team Project Director: Kakha Gogolashvili Project Coordinator: Rusudan Margishvili Advisory Council: Giorgi Volski, Naira Bepievi, Julia Kharashvili, Natela Sakhokia, Aleksander Rusetsky, Aleksander Kukhianidze

Documents

A P R I L 2 0 1 2 B U L LE T I N # 8 BSPN - GFSIS › files › projects › 2009 › bspn › ... · (Armenians, Ossetians, Abkhaz); 2. Arming the conflicting parties to aggravate