A Note on the Transcription This digital edition of Lenin ... · A Note on the Transcription This digital edition of Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks, the whole of Volume 38 of the

A Note on the Transcription

This digital edition of Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks,the whole of Volume 38 of the Fourth (English language)Edition of the Collected Works, might be regarded as a “syn-thesis” of the Third (1972) and Fourth (1976) Printing of thevolume. We began our preparation of this volume using the FourthPrinting, having assumed that this edition marked an im-provement over the previous one. Only much later did it be-come clear, after some spot-checking with the Third Print-ing, that in certain very important respects the newer print-ing reflected a carelessness that rendered it inferior to itspredecessor. For example, in the Fourth Printing there werethe inconsistent use of Greek and German characters for thesame words which introduced unnecessary confusion; therewere also instances where verticle lines that Lenin placed inthe margins adjacent to his comment were omitted. On acouple of other ocassions small blocks of text were re-ordered,and while such practice can clearly fall within the purview ofeditorial discretion, there were also a couple of places wherea few lines of text are repeated, word for word, with no ac-companying editorial nore to indicate that such a faux pashad its source in Lenin's reading notes (which suggests thatthe problem was with the editorial staff). In nearly all caseswhere there were disrepancies between the Third and Fourthprintings, be they substantive or merely annoying, the greaterconfidence in the Third Printing prevailed. Notwithstanding such carelessness, we proceeded to usethe Fourth Printing as the basis for the formatting, layoutand pagination of this digital edition. The afore-mentionedfaux pas were removed and this required some reformatting,and this proceeded on the basis of the 1972 printing. Perhapsit is worth noting that neither edition was particulaly gener-ous in translating into English the German expressions andphrases Lenin’s frequently used in the body of the texts. Nor

was it ever indicated why some German text was renderedinto English and other text (by far most) never was. In thoseinstances when translations were ventured, unlike the1972 edition which placed them in the footnotes, the 1976 edi-tion placed the English translations directly in the body ofthe text and omitted the German altogether. The latter edi-tion also revised some of the editors’ endnotes, expandingon a few items, reducing others, and most salient of all: omit-ting the repetative phrase “reactionary philosophy” fromevery note pertaining to idealist philosophers.

Although Marx to Mao has always tried to limit its role tothat of transcription, we are confident that in spite of, orperhaps because of, our ocassional editorial intrusion in thisinstance, nothing has been done to degrade the integrity ofthe material we are placing before the reader.

In preparing this digital edition of the Philosophical Note-books we encountered one nagging technical problem: estab-lishing a consistent and uniform appearance for the veriticalparallel lines (both “normal” and “bold” faced) appearingthroughout the volume. We have reached the limit (as weknow it) of what we can do to controll this. The file has beentested on two different versions of Acrobat Reader (4.0 and6.0), but there has been no cross-platform testing. We canonly apologize if these marginal markings are aesthetic di-sasters on your particular system.

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7

CONTENTS

1895

1903

1904

1909

1914- 1916

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONSPECTUS OF THE BOOK THE HOLY FAMILY BY MARXAND ENGELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FR. ÜBERWEG. OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY .(Revised by Max Heinze) 3 volumes. 1876-1880. Leipzig . . .

FR. PAULSEN. INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 1899 . . .

NOTE ON A REVIEW OF THE WORKERS OF LIFE AND THE RID-DLE OF THE UNIVERSE BY E. HAECKEL . . . . . . . . .

REMARKS ON BOOKS ON THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND PHI-LOSOPHY IN THE SORBONNE LIBRARY . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH’S BOOK LECTURES ON THEESSENCE OF RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOK THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC.Preface to the First Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . .Preface to the Second Edition . . . . . . . . . . .Introduction: General Concept of Logic . . . . . .

Book One:T h e D o c t r i n e o f B e i n g . . . . . . . . . . .

13

19

52

53

56

57

61

85878995

101

CONTENTS8

With What Should One Begin Science? . . . . .Section One: Determinateness (Quality) . . . . .Section Two: Magnitude (Quantity) . . . . . . .Section Three: Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Book Two:E s s e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Section One: Essence as Reflection in Itself . . . .Section Two: Appearance . . . . . . . . . . . .Section Three: Actuality . . . . . . . . . . . .

Book Three:S u b j e c t i v e L o g i c o r t h e D o c t r i n e o f t h eN o t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

On the Notion in General . . . . . . . . . . . .Section One: Subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . .Section Two: Objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . .Section Three: the Idea . . . . . . . . . . . .

NOTES ON REVIEWS OF HEGEL’S LOGIC . . . . . . . . . .CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOK LECTURES ON THE HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction to the History of Philosophy . . . . . . . .

Volume XIII. Volume I of The History of Philosophy.History of Greek Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ionic Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pythagoras and Pythagoreans . . . . . . . . . . .The Eleatic School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of Heraclitus . . . . . . . . . . .Leucippus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Democritus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of Anaxagoras . . . . . . . . . .

Volume XIV. Volume II of The History of Philosophy . .The Philosophy of the Sophists . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of Socrates . . . . . . . . . . . .The Socratics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of Plato. . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of Aristotle . . . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of the Stoics . . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of Epicurus . . . . . . . . . . . .The Philosophy of the Sceptics . . . . . . . . . .

Volume XV. Volume III of The History of Philosophy.(The End of Greek Philosophy, Medieval and ModernPhilosophy up to Schelling, pp. 1-692) . . . . . . .

103105116120

127129148156

165167176185192

238

243

245

247247247250259263265266

269269272275277280288289295

301

9CONTENTS

The Neo-Platonists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hegel on Plato’s Dialogues . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOK LECTURES ON THE PHI-LOSOPHY OF HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hegel on World History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PLAN OF HEGEL’S DIALECTICS (LOGIC). (Contents of the SmallLogic (Encyclopaedia)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GEORGES NOËL: HEGEL’S LOGIC. Paris, 1897 . . . . . . . .

J. PERRIN. TREATISE ON PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY. PRINCIPLES.Paris, 1903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PETER GENOV. FEUERBACHS ERKENNTNISTHEORIE UNDMETAPHYSIK. Zürich, 1911 (Berner Dissertation) (S. 89) . .

PAUL VOLKMANN. EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THENATURAL SCIENCES (“Sciences and Hypothesis,” IX). SecondEdition. Leipzig, 1910 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MAX VERWORN. THE HYPOTHESIS OF BIOGENESIS. Jena,1903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FR. DANNEMANN. HOW DID OUR PICTURE OF THE WORLDARISE? (Kosmos). Stuttgart, 1912. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LUDWIG DARMSTAEDTER. HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OFTHE NATURAL SCIENCES AND TECHNIQUE. Berlin, 1908,2nd edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NAPOLÉON. PENSÉES. Paris, 1913. Bibliothèque MiniatureNo. 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ARTUR ERICH HAAS. THE SPIRIT OF HELLENISM INMODERN PHYSICS. Leipzig, 1914 (32 pp.) (Veit & Co.) . . . .

THEODOR LIPPS. NATURAL SCIENCE AND WORLD OUTLOOK.(Speech at the 78th Congress of German Natural Scientists inStuttgart). Heidelberg, 1906. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONSPECTUS OF LASSALLE'S BOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OFHERACLITUS THE OBSCURE OF EPHESUS . . . . . . . . .

ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONSPECTUS OF ARISTOTLE’S BOOK METAPHYSICS . . . .

NOTE ON THE COLLECTED WORKS OF FEUERBACH AND HEGEL

CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH'S BOOK EXPOSITION, ANALY-SIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ . .

DR. JOHANN PLENGE. MARX AND HEGEL. Tübingen, 1911 . . .

NOTES ON BOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

301302

303313

315

319

325

326

328

329

331

338

334

335

336

337

355363373

375

388392

CONTENTS10

392392

393393

394395395

395396396

397

398

399

400

401

403407475

484

501

559590608627

F. Raab. Die Philosophie von R. Avenarius. Systema-tische Darstellung und immanente Kritik. Leipzig,1912 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Perrin. Les atomes. Paris (Alcan) . . . . . . . . . .Gideon Spicker. Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaftzur Philosophie. Berlin, 1874 . . . . . . . . . . . .Hegel. Phänomenologie (hrs. Bolland, 1907) . . . . .Albrecht Rau. Fr. Paulsen über E. Haeckel. 2-te Aufl.Brackwede, 1907 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .E. Haeckel. Gott-Natur. Leipzig, 1914 . . . . . . . . .Ühde. Feuerbach. Leipzig, 1914 . . . . . . . . . . . .A. Zart. Bausteine des Weltalls: Atome, MoleküleStuttgart, 1913 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ruttmann. Die Hauptergebnisse der modernen PsychologieSuter. Die Philosophie von Richard Avenarius. 1910

ON THE REVIEW OF JOH. PLENGE'S BOOK MARX ANDHEGEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ON THE REVIEW OF R. B. PERRY'S BOOK PRESENT PHILO-SOPHICAL TENDENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ON THE REVIEW OF A. ALIOTTA'S BOOK THE IDEALISTREACTION AGAINST SCIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .REMARKS ON HILFERDING'S VIEWS ON MACH (IN FINANCECAPITAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

REMARKS IN BOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G. V. Plekhanov. Fundamental Questions of Marxism.St. Ptsbrg, 1908 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Abel Rey. Modern Philosophy. Paris, 1908 . . . . . .A. Deborin. Dialectical Materialism . . . . . . . . .V. Shulyatikov. The Justification of Capitalism in West-European Philosophy. (From Descartes to E. Mach).Moscow, 1908 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .G. V. Plekhanov. N. C. Chernyshevsky. “Shipovnik”Publishing House. St. Petersburg, 1910 . . . . . . . .

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Index of Sources Mentioned by Lenin . . . . . . . . . . . .Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1908-1911

11CONTENTS

18-19

21

79

86-87

224-225

338-339

356-357

545

Portrait of V. I. Lenin.—1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .First page of V. I. Lenin’s manuscript: Conspectus of the BookThe Holy Family by Marx and Engels.—1895 . . . . . . .A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript: Conspectus of Feuer-bach’s book Lectures on the Essence of Religion.—1909 . . .The cover of the first notebook containing Conspectus of Hegel’sbook The Science of Logic.—September-December 1914 . . .A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript: Conspectus of Hegel'sbook The Science of Logic.—September-December 1914 . . .Reading Hall of the Berlin Library. V. I. Lenin worked herein 1914-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript On the Question of Dialec-tics.—1915 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A page from G. V. Plekhanov’s book N. G. Chernyshevsky withV. I. Lenin’s notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ILLUSTRATIONS

13

P R E F A C E

Volume 38 of the Fourth Edition of the Collected Worksof V. I. Lenin comprises resumes and excerpts from books,plus his critical remarks and evaluations concerning variousaspects of Marxist philosophy; it also includes notes, frag-ments and other philosophical material.

The volume includes Lenin’s philosophical writings firstpublished in Lenin Miscellanies IX and XII in 1929-30,and then, from 1933 to 1947, published repeatedly as a sepa-rate book under the title of Philosophical Notebooks. Thismaterial comprises the contents of ten notebooks, eight ofwhich, relating to 1914-15, were entitled by Lenin Note-books on Philosophy. In addition, the volume includes com-ments on books dealing with problems of philosophy andthe natural sciences made by Lenin as separate notes in othernotebooks containing preparatory material, as well as ex-cerpts from books by various authors, with notes and under-lineation by Lenin.

Unlike previous editions of Philosophical Notebooks ,this volume contains Lenin's comments and markings inG. V. Plekhanov's pamphlet Fundamental Questions ofMarxism and in V. Shulyatikov's book The Justificationof Capitalism in West-European Philosophy, from Descartesto E. Mach , markings and underlinings on those pagesof A. Deborin's article “Dialectical Materialism” which werenot included in earlier editions; comments in G. V. Ple-khanov's book N. G. Chernyshevsky, including markings,which in the course of work on this edition were proved tohave been made by Lenin; and a number of notes on books

PREFACE14

and reviews of books on philosophy and the natural sciences.Publ ished in this vo lume for the f irst t ime is a notewhich Lenin wrote late in 1904 on a review of The Wondersof Life and The Riddle of the Universe, two works by theGerman biologist Ernst Haeckel.

A large number of the items included in PhilosophicalNotebooks relate to 1914-16. It is no coincidence that Lenindevoted so much attention to philosophy, and above all, toMarxist dialectics, precisely during the First World War,a period in which a l l the contradict ions of capita l ismbecame extremely acute and a revolutionary crisis matured.Only materialist dialectics provided the basis for makinga Marxist analysis of the contradictions of imperialism,revealing the imperialist character of the First World War,exposing the opportunism and social-chauvinism of the lead-ers of the Second International and working out the strat-egy and tactics of struggle of the proletariat. All the worksof Lenin written during that period — the classical treatiseImperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Socialismand War, The United States of Europe Slogan, The JuniusPamphlet, Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nationsto Self-Determination and other writings — are inseparablefrom Philosophical Notebooks. The creative elaboration ofMarxist philosophy, the Marxist dialectical method, anda profound scientific analysis of the new historical periodwere the basis for Lenin’s great discoveries, which equippedthe proletariat with a new theory of socialist revolution.Philosophical Notebooks is inspired by a creative approachto Marxist philosophy, which is indissolubly bound up withreality, the struggle of the working class and the policyof the Party.

The volume opens with Lenin’s conspectus of The HolyFamily, or Critique of Critical Criticism by Marx andEngels. The conspectus written in 1895 traces the formationof the philosophical and political world outlook of Marxand Engels. Lenin quotes and marks those passages in thebook which show how Marx approached “the concept of thesocial relations of production” (p. 30 of this volume) andwhich characterise “Marx’s view—already almost fully de-veloped—concerning the revolutionary role of the proletariat”(p. 26). Lenin gives prominence to Marx and Engels’ crit-

15PREFACE

icism of the subjective sociology of Bruno and Edgar Bauerand their followers and their idealist views on the role ofcritical-minded people.” Lenin stresses the theses advancedby the founders of scientific communism: that the real andactual makers of h istory are the people , the workingmasses; and that “with the thoroughness of the historicalaction, the size of the mass who perform it will thereforeincrease” (p. 82). These theses are organical ly l inkedwith the struggle waged by Lenin at that t ime againstidealist Narodnik views on “heroes” and “the crowd,” againstattempts to provide a theoretical basis for the cult of theindividual. Lenin made a detailed résumé of the chapterof the book in which Marx thoroughly characterises the sig-nificance of 17th-18th century English and French material-ism.

Philosophical Notebooks pays great attention to Germanclassical philosophy, one of the sources of Marxism. In asummary of Ludwig Feuerbach’s book, Lectures on the Es-sence of Religion, which he wrote apparently in 1909, Leninemphasises Feuerbach’s contributions as a materialist andatheist. He also points out those propositions in the Lec-tures expressing the materialist conjectures contained inFeuerbach’s views on society. On the other hand, Lenin re-veals the weaknesses and limitations of Feuerbach’s materi-alism, noting that “both the anthropological principle andnaturalism are only inexact, weak descriptions of m a t e-r i a l i s m” (p. 82). In comparing Marx and Engels’works of the same period with Lectures on the Essence ofReligion, which Feuerbach delivered in 1848-49 and whichwere published in 1851, Lenin writes: “How far, even att h i s time (1848-1851), h a d Feuerbach l a g g e db e h i n d M a r x (The Communist Manifesto, 1847, NeueRheinische Zeitung, etc.) and Engels (1845: Lage)” (p. 77).

In elaborating the theory of materialist dialectics, Leninpaid special attention to the study and critical analysisof Hegel’s philosophical legacy. His résumés of Hegel’sThe Science of Logic, Lectures on the History of Philosophyand Lectures on the Philosophy of History occupy a centralplace in Philosophical Notebooks.

Lenin sharply criticises Hegel’s idealism and the mys-ticism of his ideas. But Lenin also reveals the significance

PREFACE16

of Hegelian dialectics and points out the necessity forevaluating i t from a material ist standpoint . “Hegel ’slogic,” wrote V. I. Lenin, “cannot be applied in its givenform, it cannot be taken as given. One must s e p a r a t eo u t from it the logical (epistemological) nuances, after puri-fying them from Ideenmystik...” (p. 266). In summarisingHegel’s writings, Lenin formulates a series of highly impor-tant propositions on the essence of materialist dialectics.

The bril l iant article “On the Question of Dialectics,”written in 1915, is related to Lenin’s summary of Hegel’sworks. Though small in size, this article is a crystallisa-tion of unsurpassed depth and richness of thought of allthe important and essential elements in materialist dia-lectics.

Lenin’s résumés of Lassal le ’s The Philosophy ofHeraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus, Aristotle’s Metaphys-ics and Feuerbach’s Exposition, Analysis and Critique ofthe Philosophy of Leibnitz trace the historical preparationof materialist dialectics. Lenin examines the history ofphilosophy from Heraclitus and Democritus to Marx and En-gels, and presents a profound Marxist evaluation of the workof outstanding thinkers. He reveals the progressive contri-bution which they made to the development of philosophicalthought, and at the same time, discloses the historical lim-itations of their views.

In his comments on books concerned with the naturalsciences, as well as elsewhere in the volume, Lenin criti-cises attempts to reconcile a scientific explanation of naturewith a religious world outlook, the vacillations of naturalscientists—spontaneous materialists—between materialismand idealism, and their inability to distinguish betweenmechanistic and dialectical materialism. He inveighs againsta contemptuous attitude toward philosophy and philosophicalgeneralisations and demonstrates the vast importance ofmaterialist dialectics for the natural sciences and for phil-osophical generalisations based on the discoveries of mod-ern science.

The last section of Philosophical Notebooks is made upof markings and comments by Lenin in books on philosophy(by G. V. Plekhanov, V. M. Shulyatikov, A. M. Deborinand other authors), which show how scathingly Lenin crit-

17PREFACE

icised distortions of dialectical and historical materialism.This criticism is a vivid example of the uncompromisingstruggle by Lenin against vulgar matorialism and the slight-est deviations from Marxist philosophy.

The remarks made by Lenin in Plekhanov’s book on Cher-nvshevsky are of considerable interest. They are evidenceof his great attention to the history of Russian social thoughtand his high opinion of its progressive, materialist tradi-tions. Lenin stresses the revolutionary democracy andmaterialisrm of Chernyshevsky and his determined struggieagainst idealism. In pointing out tho shortcomings of Ple-khanov’s book and Plekhanov’s failure to see the class contentof Chernyshevsky’s activity, Lenin writes: “Because of thetheoretical difference between the idealist and materialistviews of history, Plekhanov overlooked the practical-politi-cal and class difference between the liberal and the demo-crat” (p. 546).

In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin consistently upholdsthe principle of partisanship in philosophy, and demonstratesthe organic connection between dialectical materialism andrevolutionary practice.

Philosophical Notebooks contains invaluable ideologicalrichness, and is of immense theoretical and political sig-nificance. In it Lenin elaborates dialectical and historicalmaterialism, the history of philosophy, focussing his atten-tion on the problems of materialist dialectics. Along withhis basic philosophical work, Materialism and Empirio-crit-icism, Philosophical Notebooks is an outstanding achieve-ment of Lenin’s creative genius.

Lenin’s excerpts and comments provide a definition ofdialectics as the science of the most general laws of de-velopment and cognition of the objective world. Of excep-t ional importance is his proposition on the identity ofdialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge. He pointedout that the fundamental failure of metaphysical materialismwas its inabil ity to apply dialectics to the process anddevelopment of cognition; dialectics, he stressed, is thetheory of knowledge of Marxism. In his Philosophical Note-books Lenin advanced Marxist dialectics still further by elab-orat ing the quest ion of the dia lect ical process of cog -nition and the dictum that the dialectical way of cognising

PREFACE18

objective real ity consists in the transit ion from l ivingperception to abstract thought and from this to practice.

In elaborating materialist dialectics, Lenin concentrat-ed on the problem of contradictions. It is in PhilosophicalNotebooks that he explains that the doctrine of the unityand struggle of opposites is the essence and core of dialec-tics, that the struggle of opposites is the source of devel-opment. “The splitting of a single whole and the cognitionof its contradictory parts ... is the e s s e n c e (one of the‘essentials , ’ one of the principal , i f not the principal ,characteristics or features) of dialectics” (p. 359).

It may be presumed that the preparatory material ofNotebooks on Philosophy is evidence of Lenin’s intentionto write a special work on materialist dialectics, a taskwhich he had no opportunity to fulfil. Although the ma-terial in Philosophical Notebooks does not constitute a com-plete work written by Lenin for publication, it is an im-portant contribution to the development of dialect icalmaterialism. The study of the great ideological content ofPhilosophical Notebooks is of tremendous importance fora thorough grasp of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the theo-retical foundation of scientific communism.

* **The summaries as well as the rest of this volume are

given chiefly in chronological order. Remarks made in bookshave also been arranged chronologically in a separate sec-tion.

All of Lenin’s underlineation has been reproduced intype. Words underscored by a wavy or a straight thin linehave been set in italics; those underscored by two lines —in spaced italics; those underscored by three straight thinlines — in boldface, etc.

The text of this edition has been checked with Lenin’smanuscripts; quotations have been verified with originalsources.

Notes, an index of the sources mentioned by Lenin,name and subject indexes are appended.

I n s t i t u t e o f M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s mo f t h e C . C . , C . P . S . U .

V. I. L E N I N1917

CONSPECTUS OF THE BOOKT H E H O L Y F A M I L Y

BY MARX AND ENGELS1

Published accordingto the manuscript

Written not earlier thanApril 25 (May 7)

but not later thanSeptember 1 8 9 5

First published in 1 9 3 0in Lenin Miscellany X I I

First page of V. I. Lenin’s manuscriptConspectus of the book The Holy Family by Marx and Engels.—1895

Reduced

First page of V. I. Lenin’s manuscriptConspectus of the book The Holy Family by Marx and Engels.—1895

Reduced

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BY FREDERICK ENGELS AND KARL MARX

FRANKFORT-ON-MAIN, LITERARY PUBLISHING HOUSE (J. RUTTEN)18452

This little book, printed in octavo, consists of a fore-word (pp. III-IV)* (dated Paris, September 1844), a tableof contents (pp. V-VIII) and text proper (pp. 1-335), dividedinto nine chapters (Kapitel). Chapters I, II and III werewritten by Engels, Chapters V, VIII and IX by Marx,Chapters IV, VI and VII by both, in which case, however,each has signed the particular chapter section or subsec-tion, supplied with its own heading, that was written byhim. All these headings are satirical up to and includingthe “Critical Transformation of a Butcher into a Dog” (theheading of Section 1 of Chapter VIII). Engels is responsiblefor pages 1-17 (Chapters I, II, III and sections 1 and2 of Chapter IV), pages 138-142 (Section 2a of ChapterVI) and pages 240-245 (Section 2b of Chapter VII);

i.e., 26 pages out of 335.The first chapters are entirely criticism of the style (t h e

w h o l e (!) first chapter, pp. 1-5) of the Literary GazetteAllgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of Bruno Bauer3—in their

foreword Marx and Engels say that their criticism is directedagainst its first eight numbers , criticism of its distortionof history (Chapter II, pp. 5-12, especially of Englishhistory), criticism of its themes (Chapter III, pp. 13-14ridiculing the Gründlichkeit** of the account of some dispute

* Engels, F. und Marx, K., Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik derkritischen Kritik, Frankfurt a. M., 1845.—Ed.

** pedantic thoroughness—Ed.

V. I. LENIN24

of Herr Nauwerk with the Berlin Faculty of Philosophy),criticism of views on love (Chapter IV, 3 by Marx), criticismof the account of Proudhon in the Literary Gazette ((IV,4)—Proudhon, p. 22 u. ff. bis* 74. At the beginning there isa mass of corrections of the translation: they have confusedformule et signification,** they have translated la justiceas Gerechtigkeit*** instead of Rechtpraxis,**** etc.). Thiscriticism of the translation (Marx entitles it—Charakteri-sierende Übersetzung No. I, II u.s.w.*****) is followedby Kritische Randglosse No. I u.s.w.,****** where Marxdefends Proudhon against the critics of the Literary Gazette,counterposing his clearly socialist ideas to speculation.

Marx’s tone in relation to Proudhon is very laudatory(although there are minor reservations, for example refer-ence to Engels’ Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalöko-nomie4 in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher5).

Marx here advances from Hegelian philosophy to social-ism: the transition is clearly observable—it is evident whatMarx has already mastered and how he goes over to thenew sphere of ideas.

(36) “Accepting the relations of private property ashuman and rational, political economy comes into contin-ual contradiction with its basic premise, private property,a contradiction analogous to that of the theologian, whoconstantly gives a human interpretation to religious concep-tions and by that very fact comes into constant conflictwith his basic premise, the superhuman character of re-ligion. Thus, in political economy wages appear at the be-ginning as the proportionate share of the product due tolabour. Wages and profit on capital stand in the mostfriendly and apparently most human relationship, recipro-cally promoting one another. Subsequently it turns out thatthey stand in the most hostile relationship, in inverse pro-portion to each other. Value is determined at the beginningin an apparently rational way by the cost of production

* und folgende bis—and following up to—Ed.** formula and significance—Ed.

*** justice—Ed.**** juridical practice—Ed.

***** characterising translation No. I, II, etc.—Ed.****** critical gloss No. I, etc.—Ed.

25CONSPECTUS OF THE HOLY FAMILY BY MARX AND ENGELS

of an object and its social usefulness. Later it turns out thatvalue is determined quite fortuitously, not bearing anyrelation to cost of production or social usefulness. The mag-nitude of wages is determined at the beginning by freeagreement between the free worker and the free capitalist.Later it turns out that the worker is compelled to agreeto the determination of wages by the capitalist, just asthe capitalist is compelled to fix it as low as possible. Free-dom of the contracting Parthei*” [this is the way the wordis spelled in the book] “has been supplanted by compul-sion. The same thing holds good of trade and all other eco-nomic relations. The economists themselves occasionallysense these contradictions, and the disclosure of these con-tradictions constitutes the main content of the conflictsbetween them. When, however, the economists in one wayor another become conscious of these contradictions, theythemselves attack private property in any one of its privateforms as the falsifier of what is in itself (i.e., in their imag-ination) rational wages, in itself rational value, in itselfrational trade. Adam Smith, for instance, occasionally po-lemises against the capitalists, Destutt de Tracy againstthe bankers, Simonde de Sismondi against the factory sys-tem, Ricardo against landed property, and nearly all mod-ern economists against the non-industrial capitalists, inwhom private property appears as a mere consumer.

“Thus, as an exception—and all the more so when theyattack some special abuse—the economists sometimes stressthe semblance of the humane in economic relations, while,more often than not, they take these relations preciselyin their marked difference from the humane, in their strictlyeconomic sense. They stagger about within that contra-diction without going beyond its limits.

“Proudhon put an end to this unconsciousness once forall. He took the humane semblance of the economic relationsseriously and sharply opposed it to their inhumane reality.He forced them to be in reality what they imagine themselvesto be, or, more accurately, to give up their own idea ofthemselves and confess their real inhumanity. He there-fore quite consistently represented as the falsifier of econom-

* party—Ed.

V. I. LENIN26

ic relations not one or another particular type of privateproperty, as other economists have done, but private prop-erty as such, in its entirety. He has done all that can bedone by criticism of political economy from the stand-point of political economy.” (39)

Herr Edgar’s reproach (Edgar of the Literary Gazette)that Proudhon makes a “god” out of “justice,” Marx brushesaside by saying that Proudhon’s treatise of 18406 does notadopt “the standpoint of German development of 1844”(39), that this is a general failing of the French, and thatone must also bear in mind Proudhon’s reference to theimplementation of justice by its negation—a referencemaking it possible to have done with this Absolute in his-tory as well (um auch dieses Absoluten in der Geschichteüberhoben zu sein)—at the end of p. 39. “If Proudhon doesnot arrive at this consistent conclusion, it is owing to hismisfortune in being born a Frenchman and not a German.”(39-40)

Then follows Critical Gloss No. II (40-46), setting out invery clear relief Marx’s view—already almost fully devel-oped—concerning the revolutionary role of the proletariat.

...“Hitherto political economy proceeded from the wealththat the movement of private property supposedly createsfor the nations to an apology of private property. Proudhonproceeds from the opposite side, which political economysophistically conceals, from the poverty bred by the move-ment of private property, to his conclusions negating pri-vate property. The first criticism of private property pro-ceeds, of course, from the fact in which its contradictory es-sence appears in the form that is most perceptible andmost glaring and most directly arouses man’s indignation—from the fact of poverty, of misery.” (41)

“Proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such theyform a single whole. They are both begotten by the worldof private property. The question is what particular placeeach occupies within the antithesis. It is not sufficient todeclare them two sides of a single whole.

“Private property as private property, as wealth, is com-pelled to maintain itself, and thereby its opposite, the pro-letariat, in existence. That is the positive side of the contra-diction, self-satisfied private property.


“The proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled asproletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, thecondition for its existence, that which makes it the pro-letariat, i.e., private property. That is the negative sideof the contradiction, its restlessness within its very self,dissolved and self-dissolving private property.

“The propertied class and the class of the proletariatpresent the same human self-alienation. But the formerclass feels happy and confirmed in this self-alienation, itrecognises alienation as its own power, and has in it thesemblance of human existence. The class of the proletariatfeels annihilated in its self-alienation; it sees in it its ownpowerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. Touse an expression of Hegel’s, the class of the proletariatis in abasement indignation at this abasement, an indigna-tion to which it is necessarily driven by the contradictionbetween its human nature and its conditions of life, whichare the outright, decisive and comprehensive negationof that nature.

“Within this antithesis the private property-owner istherefore the conservative side, the proletarian, the destruc-tive, side. From the former arises the action of preservingthe antithesis, from the latter, that of annihilating it.

“In any case, in its economic movement private prop-erty drives towards its own dissolution, but only througha development which does not depend on it, of which itis unconscious and which takes place against its will, throughthe very nature of things, only inasmuch as it produces theproletariat as proletariat, misery conscious of its spiritualand physical misery, dehumanisation conscious of its dehu-manisation and therefore self-abolishing. The proletariatexecutes the sentence that private property pronouncedon itself by begetting the proletariat, just as it executesthe sentence that wage-labour pronounced on itself by be-getting wealth for others and misery for itself. When theproletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the ab-solute side of society for it is victorious only by abolishingitself and its opposite. Then the proletariat disappearsas well as the opposite which determines it, private property.

“When socialist writers ascribe this historic role to theproletariat, it is not, as Critical Criticism would have

V. I. LENIN28

one think, because they consider the proletarians as gods.Rather the contrary. Since the abstraction of all humanity,even of the semblance of humanity, is practically completein the fully-formed proletariat; since the conditions of lifeof the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of so-ciety today in their most inhuman and acute form; sinceman has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same timehas not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss,but through the no longer removable, no longer disguis-able, absolutely imperative need—the practical expressionof necessity—is driven directly to revolt against that in-humanity; it follows that the proletariat can and mustfree itself. But it cannot free itself without abolishingthe conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditionsof its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditionsof life of society today which are summed up in its ownsituation. Not in vain does it go through the stern butsteeling school of labour. It is not a question of what thisor that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at themoment considers as its aim. It is a question of what theproletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being,it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and his-torical action is irrevocably and clearly foreshadowed in itsown life situation as well as in the whole organisation of bour-geois society today. There is no need here to show that a largepart of the English and French proletariat is already con-scious of its historic task and is constantly working to de-velop that consciousness into complete clarity.” (42-45)

CRITICAL GLOSS NO. 3

“Herr Edgar cannot be unaware that Herr Bruno Bauerbased all his arguments on ‘infinite self-consciousness’and that he also saw in this principle the creative principleof the gospels, which, by their infinite unconsciousness,appear to be in direct contradiction to infinite self-con-sciousness. In the same way Proudhon considers equalityas the creative principle of private property, which is indirect contradiction to equality. If Herr Edgar comparesFrench equality with German self-consciousness for an in-stant, he will see that the latter principle expresses in Ger-


man, i.e., in abstract thought, what the former says inFrench, that is, in the language of politics and of thoughtfulobservation. Self-consciousness is man’s equality withhimself in pure thought. Equality is man’s consciousnessof himself in the element of practice, i.e., therefore, man’sconsciousness of other men as his equals and man’s attitudeto other men as his equals. Equality is the French expressionfor the unity of human essence, for man’s consciousnessof his species and his attitude towards his species, for thepractical identity of man with man, i.e., for the socialor human relation of man to man. As therefore destructivecriticism in Germany, before it had progressed in Feuerbachto the consideration of real man, tried to solve everythingdefinite and existing by the principle of self-consciousness,destructive criticism in France tried to do the same bythe principle of equality.” (48-49)

“The opinion that philosophy is the abstract expressionof existing conditions does not belong originally to HerrEdgar. It belongs to Feuerbach, who was the first to describephilosophy as speculative and mystical empiricism, andproved it.” (49-50)

“‘We always come back to the same thing... Proudhonwrites in the interests of the proletarians.’* He does notwrite in the interests of self-sufficient criticism or out ofany abstract, self-made interest, but out of a massive,real, historical interest, an interest that goes beyond crit-icism, that will go as far as a crisis. Not only does Prou-dhon write in the interests of the proletarians, he is himselfa proletarian, un ouvrier. His work is a scientific manifestoof the French proletariat and therefore has quite a differenthistorical significance from that of the literary botchworkof a Critical Critic.” (52-53)

“Proudhon’s desire to abolish non-owning and the oldform of owning is exactly identical to his desire to abol-ish the practically alienated relation of man to his ob-jective essence, to abolish the political-economic expressionof human self-alienation. Since, however, his criticismof political economy is still bound by the premises of polit-ical economy, the reappropriation of the objective world

* Marx is quoting Edgar.

V. I. LENIN30

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

is still conceived in the political-economic form of posses-sion.

“Proudhon indeed does not oppose owning to non-owningas Critical Criticism makes him do, but possession to theold form of owning, to private property. He declares posses-sion to be a ‘social function.’ In a function, ‘interest’ is notdirected however toward the ‘exclusion’ of another, buttoward setting into operation and realising my own powers,the powers of my being.

“Proudhon did not succeed in giving this thought appro-priate development. The concept of ‘equal possession’ is apolitical-economic one and therefore itself still an alienatedexpression for the principle that the object as being forman, as the objective being of man, is at the same time theexistence of man for other men, his human relation to othermen, the social behaviour of man in relation to man. Prou-dhon abolishes political-economic estrangement within po-litical-economic estrangement.” (54-55)

This passage is highly characteristic, for it shows howMarx approached the basic idea of his entire “system,” sitvenia verbo,* namely the concept of the social relations ofproduction.

As a trifle, it may be pointed out that on p. 64 Marxdevotes five lines to the fact that “Critical Criticism” trans-lates maréchal as “Marschall” instead of “Hufschmied.”**

Very interesting are: pp. 65-67 (Marx approaches thelabour theory of value); pp 70-71 (Marx answers Edgar’scharge that Proudhon is muddled in saying that the workercannot buy back his product), 71-72 and 72-73 (spec-ulative, idealistic, “ethereal” (ätherisch) socialism—and“mass” socialism and communism).p. 76. (Section 1, first paragraph: Feuerbach disclosed

real mysteries, Szeliga—vice versa.)p. 77. (Last paragraph: anachronism of the n a ï v e rela-

tion of rich and poor: “si le riche le savait!”***)pp. 79-85. (All these seven pages are extremely interesting.

This is Section 2, “The Mystery of Speculative Con-

* if the Word may be allowed—Ed.** “blacksmith”—Ed.

*** “if the rich only knew it!”—Ed.


struction”—a criticism of speculative philosophy usingthe well-known example of “fruit”—der Frucht—a crit-icism aimed directly a g a i n s t H e g e l as well. Heretoo is the extremely interesting remark that Hegel “veryoften” gives a real presentation, embracing the thingitself—die S a c h e selbst—within the speculative pre-sentation.)

pp. 92, 93—f r a g m e n t a r y remarks against Degradie-rung der Sinnlichkeit.*

p. 101. “He” (Szeliga) “is unable ... to see that industryand trade found universal kingdoms that are quitedifferent from Christianity and morality, family hap-piness and civic welfare.”

p. 102. (End of the first paragraph—barbed remarks on thesignificance of notaries in modern society.... “The notaryis the temporal confessor. He is a puritan by profes-sion and ‘honesty,’ Shakespeare says, is ‘no puritan.’He is at the same time the go-between for all possiblepurposes, the manager of civil intrigues and plots.”)

p. 110. Another example of ridiculing abstract specula-tion: the “construction” of how man becomes masterover beast; “beast” (das Tier) as an abstraction is changedfrom a lion into a pug, etc.

p. 111. A characteristic passage regarding Eugène Sue7:owing to his hypocrisy towards the bourgeoisie, he ideal-ises the grisette morally, evading her attitude to mar-riage, her “naïve” liaison with un étudiant** or ouv-rier.*** “It is precisely in that relation that she” (gri-sette) “constitutes a really human contrast to the sanc-timonious, narrow-hearted, self-seeking wife of thebourgeois, to the whole circle of the bourgeoisie, thatis, to the official circle.”

p. 117. The “mass” of the sixteenth and of the nineteenthcenturies was different “von vorn herein.”****

pp. 118-121. This passage (in Chapter VI: “Absolute Crit-ical Criticism, or Critical Criticism in the Person ofHerr Bruno.” 1) Absolute Criticism’s First Campaign.

* debassing of sensuousness—Ed.** a student—Ed.

*** worker—Ed.**** “from the outset”—Ed.

V. I. LENIN32

a) “Spirit” and “Mass”) is e x t r e m e l y important:a criticism of the view that history was unsuccessfulowing to the interest in it by the mass and its relianceon the mass, which was satisfied with a “superficial” com-prehension of the “idea.”

“If, therefore, Absolute Criticism condemns some-thing as ‘superficial,’ it is simply previous history, theactions and ideas of which were those of the ‘masses.’It rejects mass history to replace it by critical history(see Herr Jules Faucher on Topical Questions in Eng-land8).” (119)

“The ‘idea’ always exposed itself to ridicule inso-far as it differed from ‘interest.’ On the other hand,it is easy to understand that every mass ‘interest’ thatasserts itself historically goes far beyond its real limitsin the ‘idea’ or ‘imagination’ when it first comes onthe scene, and is confused with human interest ingeneral. This illusion constitutes what Fourier callsthe tone of each historical epoch” (119)—as an illus-tration of this the example of the French Revolu-tion (119-120) and the well-known words (1 2 0 in fine*):

“With the thoroughness of the historical action, thesize of the mass who perform it will therefore increase.”

How far the sharpness of Bauer’s division into Geist**and Masse*** goes is evident from this phrase that Marxattacks: “In the mass, not somewhere else, is the true enemyof the spirit to be sought.” (121)

Marx answers this by saying that the enemies of prog-ress are the products endowed with independent being (ver-selbständigten) of the self-abasement of the mass, althoughthey are not ideal but material products existing in an out-ward way. As early as 1789, Loustalot’s journal9 had themotto:

Les grands ne nous paraissent grandsQue parceque nous sommes à genoux.Leuons-nous!****

* at the end—Ed.** spirit—Ed.

*** mass—Ed.**** The great only seem great to us

Because we are on our kneesLet us rise!—Ed.

NB

NB


But in order to rise (122), says Marx, it is not enoughto do so in thought, in the idea.

“Yet Absolute Criticism has learnt from Hegel’s Phenom-enology10 at least the art of converting real objective chainsthat exist outside me into merely ideal, merely subjectivechains existing merely within me, and thus of convertingall exterior palpable struggles into pure struggles ofthought.” (122)

In this way it is possible to prove, says Marx bitingly,the pre-established harmony between Critical Criticism andthe censorship, to present the censor not as a police hangman(Polizeischerge) but as my own personified sense of tactand moderation.

Preoccupied with its “Geist,” Absolute Criticism doesnot investigate whether the phrase, self-deception andpithlessness (Kernlosigkeit) are not in its own empty (win-dig) pretensions.

“The situation is the same with ‘progress.’ In spite ofthe pretensions of ‘progress,’ continual retrogressions andcircular movements are to be observed. Far from suspectingthat the category ‘progress’ is completely empty and ab-stract, Absolute Criticism is instead so ingenious as to rec-ognise ‘progress’ as being absolute, in order to explainretrogression by assuming a ‘personal adversary’ of progress,the mass.” (123-124)

“All communist and socialist writers proceeded fromthe observation that, on the one hand, even the most favour-able brilliant deeds seemed to remain without brilliantresults, to end in trivialities, and, on the other, all prog-ress of the spirit had so far been progress against the massof mankind, driving it to an ever more dehumanised situation.They therefore declared ‘progress’ (see Fourier) to be aninadequate abstract phrase; they assumed (see Owen, amongothers) a fundamental flaw in the civilised world; that iswhy they subjected the real bases of contemporary societyto incisive criticism. This communist criticism immediate-ly had its counterpart in practice in the movement of thegreat mass, in opposition to which the previous historicaldevelopment had taken place. One must be acquaintedwith the studiousness, the craving for knowledge, the moralenergy and the unceasing urge for development of the French

V. I. LENIN34

and English workers to be able to form an idea of the humannobility of this movement.” (124-125)

“What a fundamental superiority over the communistwriters it is not to have traced spiritlessness, indolence,superficiality and self-complacency to their origin but tohave denounced them morally and exposed them as theopposite of the spirit, of progress!” (125)

“The relation between ‘spirit and mass,’ however, hasstill a hidden sense, which will be completely revealedin the course of the reasoning. We only make mentionof it here. That relation discovered by Herr Bruno is, in fact,nothing but a critically caricatured culmination of Hegel’sconception of history; which, in turn, is nothing but thespeculative expression of the Christian-Germanic dogmaof the antithesis between spirit and matter, between Godand the world. This antithesis is expressed in history, inthe human world itself, in such a way that a few chosenindividuals as the active spirit stand opposed to the restof mankind, as the spiritless mass, as matter.” (126)

And Marx points out that Hegel’s conception of his-tory (Geschichtsauffassung) presupposes an abstract andabsolute spirit, the embodiment of which is the mass. Par-allel with Hegel’s doctrine there developed in France thetheory of the Doctrinaires11 (126) who proclaimed the sove-reignty of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of thepeople in order to exclude the mass and rule alone (al-lein).

Hegel is “guilty of a double half-heartedness” (127):1) while declaring that philosophy is the being of the Abso-lute Spirit, he does not declare this the spirit of the philo-sophical individual; 2) he makes the Absolute Spirit thecreator of history only in appearance (nur zum Schein),only post festum,* only in consciousness.

Bruno does away with this half-heartedness, he declaresthat Criticism is the Absolute Spirit and the creator of histo-ry in actual fact.

“On the one side stands the Mass, as the passive, spirit-less, unhistorical material element of history, on the other—the Spirit, Criticism, Herr Bruno and Co. as the active ele-

* after the event—Ed.


ment from which all historical action arises. The act ofthe transformation of society is reduced to the brain workof Critical Criticism.” (128)

As the first example of “the campaigns of Absolute Crit-icism against the Mass,” Marx adduces Bruno Bauer’sattitude to the Judenfrage, and he refers to the refutationof Bauer in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.12

“One of the chief pursuits of Absolute Criticism con-sists in first bringing all questions of the day into theirright setting. For it does not answer, of course, the realquestions—but substitutes quite different ones.... It thusdistorted the ‘Jewish question,’ too, in such a way that itdid not need to investigate political emancipation, whichis the subject-matter of that question, but could instead besatisfied with a criticism of the Jewish religion and a descrip-tion of the Christian-German state.

“This method, too, like all Absolute Criticism’s original-ities, is the repetition of a speculative verbal trick. Spec-ulative philosophy, in particular Hegel’s philosophy, musttranspose all questions from the form of common senseto the form of speculative reason and convert the real ques-tion into a speculative one to be able to answer it. Havingdistorted my questions and having, like the catechism, placedits own questions into my mouth, speculative philosophycould, of course, again like the catechism, have its readyanswer to each of my questions.” (134-135)

In Section 2a (...“‘Criticism’ and ‘Feuerbach’—Damna-tion of Philosophy...”)—pp. 138-142—written by Engels,one finds Feuerbach warmly praised. In regard to “Criti-cism’s” attacks on philosophy, its contrasting to philosophythe actual wealth of human relations, the “immense contentof history,” the “significance of man,” etc., etc., right upto the phrase: “the mystery of the system revealed,” En-gels says:

“But who, then, revealed the mystery of the ‘system’?Feuerbach. Who annihilated the dialectics of concepts, thewar of the gods known to the philosophers alone? Feuer-bach. Who substituted for the old rubbish and for ‘infiniteself-consciousness’ not, it is true, ‘the significance of man’—as though man had another significance than that of being

V. I. LENIN36

man—but still ‘Man’? Feuerbach, and only Feuerbach.And he did more. Long ago he did away with the very cate-gories that ‘Criticism’ now wields—the ‘real wealth ofhuman relations, the immense content of history, the strug-gle of history, the fight of the mass against the spirit,’etc., etc.

“Once man is conceived as the essence, the basis of allhuman activity and situations, only ‘Criticism’ can inventnew categories and transform man himself again into a cate-gory and into the principle of a whole series of categoriesas it is doing now. It is true that in so doing it takes theonly road to salvation that remained for frightened andpersecuted theological inhumanity. History does nothing, itpossesses no immense wealth,’ it ‘wages no battles.’ It isman, and not ‘history,’ real living man, that does all that,that possesses and fights; ‘history’ is not, as it were, a personapart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; historyis nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims. If Ab-solute Criticism, after Feuerbach’s brilliant reasoning, stilldares to reproduce the old trash in a new form...” (139-140)etc.—then, Engels says, this fact alone is sufficient toassess the Critical naïveté, etc.

And after this, in regard to the opposition of Spirit and“Matter” (Criticism calls the mass “matter”), Engels says:

“Is Absolute Criticism then not genuinely Christian-German? After the old contradiction between spiritualismand materialism has been fought out on all sides and over-come once for all by Feuerbach, ‘Criticism’ again makesa basic dogma of it in its ugliest form and gives the victoryto the ‘Christian-German spirit.’” (141)

In regard to Bauer’s words: “To the extent of the prog-ress now made by the Jews in theory, they are emancipated;to the extent that they wish to be free, they are free” (142),Marx says:

“From this proposition one can immediately measurethe critical gap which separates mass profane communismand socialism from absolute socialism. The first propositionof profane socialism rejects emancipation in mere theoryas an illusion and for real freedom it demands besidesthe idealistic ‘will,’ very tangible, very material conditions.


How low ‘the Mass’ is in comparison with holy Criticism,the Mass which considers material, practical upheavalsnecessary, merely to win the time and means requiredto deal with ‘theory’!” (142)

Further, (pp. 143-167), the most boring, incrediblycaviling criticism of the Literary Gazette, a sort of wordby word commentary of a “blasting” type; Absolutely noth-ing of interest.

The end of the section ((b) The Jewish Question No. II.Pp. 142-185)—pp. 167-185 provides an interesting answer byMarx to Bauer on the latter’s defence of his book Judenfrage,which was criticised in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.(Marx constantly refers to the latter.) Marx here sharplyand clearly stresses the basic principles of his entire worldoutlook.

“Religious questions of the day have at present a social sig-nifcance” (167)—this was already pointed out in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. It characterised the “real positionof Judaism in civil society today.” “Herr Bauer explainsthe real Jew by the Jewish religion, instead of explainingthe mystery of the Jewish religion by the real Jew.” (167-168)

Herr Bauer does not suspect “that real, worldly Judaism,and hence religious Judaism too, is being continuallyproduced by present-day civil life and finds its final develop-ment in the money system.”

It was pointed out in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücherthat the development of Judaism has to be sought “in derkommerziellen und industriellen Praxis”* (169),—that prac-tical Judaism “vollendete Praxis der christlichen Weltselber ist.”** (169)

“It was proved that the task of abolishing the essenceof Judaism is in truth the task of abolishing Judaism incivil society, abolishing the inhumanity of the present-daypractice of life, the summit of which is the money system.”(169)

In demanding freedom, the Jew demands somethingthat in no way contradicts political freedom (172)—it isa question of political freedom.

* “in commercial and industrial practice”—Ed.** “is the perfected practice of the Christian world itself”—Ed.

V. I. LENIN38

“Herr Bauer was shown that it is by no means contraryto political emancipation to divide man into the non-re-ligious citizen and the religious private individual.” (172)

And immediately following the above:“He was shown that as the state emancipates itself from

religion by emancipating itself from state religion andleaving religion to itself within civil society, so the indi-vidual emancipates himself politically from religion by re-garding it no longer as a public matter but as a privatematter. Finally, it was shown that the terroristic attitudeof the French Revolution to religion far from refuting thisconception, bears it out.” (172)

The Jews desire allgemeine Menschenrechte.*“In the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher it was expounded

to Herr Bauer that this ‘free humanity’ and the ‘recogni-tion’ of it are nothing but the recognition of the selfish,civil individual and of the uncurbed movement of the spir-itual and material elements which are the content of hislife situation, the content of civil life today; that the Rightsof Man do not, therefore, free man from religion but givehim freedom of religion; that they do not free him fromproperty, but procure for him freedom of property; that theydo not free him from the filth of gain but give him freedomof choice of a livelihood.

“He was shown that the recognition of the Rights of Manby the modern state means nothing more than did the recog-nition of slavery by the ancient state. In fact, just as theancient state had slavery as its natural basis the modernstate has civil society and the man of civil society, i.e.,the independent man connected with other men only by theties of private interest and unconscious natural necessity,the slave of labour for gain and of his own as well as othermen’s selfish need. The modern state has recognised this asits natural basis as such in the universal Rights of Man.”13

(175)

“The Jew has all the more right to the recognition ofhis ‘free humanity’” “as ‘free civil society’ is of a thoroughlycommercial and Jewish nature and the Jew is a necessarylink in it.” (176)

* the universal rights or man—Ed.


That the “Rights of Man” are not inborn, but arose histor-ically, was known already to Hegel. (176)

Pointing out the contradictions of constitutionalism,“Criticism” does not generalise them (faßt nicht den allge-meinen Widerspruch des Konstitutionalismus*). (177-178)If it had done so, it would have proceeded from constitu-tional monarchy to the democratic representative state,to the perfect modern state. (178)

Industrial activity is not abolished by the abolitionof privileges (of the guilds, corporations, etc.); on the con-trary it develops more strongly. Property in land is notabolished by the abolition of privileges of landownership,“but, rather, first begins its universal movement with theabolition of its privileges and through the free divisionand free alienation of land.” (180)

Trade is not abolished by the abolition of trade privilegesbut only then does it become genuinely free trade, so alsowith religion, “so religion develops in its practical univer-sality only where there is no privileged religion (one callsto mind the North American States).”

...“Precisely the slavery of bourgeois society is in appear-ance the greatest freedom....” (181)

To the dissolution (Auflösung) (182) of the politicalexistence of religion (the abolition of the state church),of property (the aboIition of the property qualificationfor electors), etc.—corresponds their “most vigorous life,which now obeys its own laws undisturbed and developsto its full scope.”

Anarchy is the law of bourgeois society emancipatedfrom privileges. (182-183)

... C) CRITICAL BATTLE AGAINSTTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION

“The ideas”—Marx quotes Bauer—“which the FrenchRevolution gave rise to did not, however, lead beyond theorder that it wanted to abolish by force.

* does not conceive the general contradiction or constitutional-ism—Ed.

V. I. LENIN40

“Ideas can never lead beyond an old world order butonly beyond the ideas of the old world order. Ideas cannotcarry anything out at all. In order to carry out ideas menare needed who dispose of a certain practical force.” (186)

The French Revolution gave rise to the ideas of commu-nism (Babeuf), which, consistently developed, containedthe idea of a new Weltzustand.*

In regard to Bauer’s statement that the state must hold incheck the separate egotistic atoms, Marx says (188-189) thatthe members of civil society are, properly speaking, by nomeans atoms, but only imagine themselves to be such, forthey are not self-sufficient like atoms, but depend on otherpersons, their needs continually forcing this dependenceupon them.

“Therefore, it is natural necessity, essential human prop-erties, however alienated they may seem to be, and interestthat hold the members of civil society together; civil, notpolitical life is their real tie.... Only political superstitionstill imagines today that civil life must be held togetherby the state, whereas in reality, on the contrary, the stateis held together by civil life.” (189)

Robespierre, Saint-Just and their party fell because theyconfused the ancient realistically-democratic society, basedon slavery, with the modern, spiritualistically-democraticrepresentative state, based on bourgeois society. Beforehis execution Saint-Just pointed to the table (Tabellea poster? hanging) of the Rights of Man and said: “C’estpourtant moi qui ai fait cela.”** “This very table proclaimedthe rights of a man who cannot be the man of the ancientrepublic any more than his economic and industrial relationsare those of the ancient times.” (192)

On the 18th Brumaire,14 not the revolutionary movementbut the liberal bourgeoisie became the prey of Napoleon.After the fall of Robespierre, under the Directorate, theprosaic realisation of bourgeois society begins: Sturmund Drang*** of commercial enterprise, the whirl (Taumel)of the new bourgeois life; “real enlightenment of the land

* world order—Ed.** “Yet it was I who made that.”—Ed.

*** storm and stress—Ed.


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of France, the feudal structure of which had been smashedby the hammer of revolution, and which the numerousnew owners in their first feverish enthusiasm now put underall-round cultivation; the first movements of an industrythat had become free—these are a few of the signs of lifeof the newly arisen bourgeois society.” (192-193)

CHAPTER VI. ABSOLUTE CRITICAL CRITICISM,OR CRITICAL CRITICISM IN THE PERSON

OF HERR BRUNO

. . . 3) A B S O L U T E C R I T I C I S M ’ S T H I R D C A M P A I G N . . .

d) CRITICAL BATTLE AGAINST FRENCH MATERIALISM

(195-211)

This chapter (subsection d in the third section of Chap-ter VI) is one of the most valuable in the book. Here thereis absolutely no word by word criticism, but a completelypositive exposition. It is a short sketch of the history of Frenchmaterialism. Here one ought to copy out the whole chapter,but I shall limit myself to a short summary of the contents.

The French Enlightenment of the eighteenth centuryand French materialism are not only a struggle against theexisting political institutions, but equally an open struggleagainst the metaphysics of the seventeenth century, namely,against the metaphysics of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinozaand Leibnitz. “Philosophy was opposed to metaphysics asFeuerbach, in his first decisive attack on Hegel, opposedsober philosophy to drunken speculation.” (196)

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century, defeated bythe materialism of the eighteenth century, underwent a vic-torious and weighty (gehaltvolle) restoration in Germanphilosophy, especially in speculative German philosophy ofthe nineteenth century. Hegel linked it in a masterly fashionwith the whole of metaphysics and with German idealism,and he founded ein metaphysisches Universalreich.* This

* a metaphysical universal kingdom—Ed.

V. I. LENIN42

was followed again by an “attack on speculative metaphysicsand metaphysics in general. It will be defeated for everby materialism, which has now been perfected by the workof speculation itself and coincides with humanism. Justas Feuerbach in the theoretical field, French and Englishsocialism and communism in the practical field representedmaterialism coinciding with humanism.” (196-197)

There are two trends of French materialism: 1) fromDescartes, 2) from Locke. The latter mündet direkt in denSocialismus.* (197)

The former, mechanical materialism, turns into Frenchnatural science.

Descartes in his physics declares matter the only sub-stance. Mechanical French materialism takes over Des-cartes’ physics and rejects his metaphysics.

“This school begins with the physician Le Roy, reachesits zenith with the physician Cabanis, and the physicianLamettrie is its centre.” (198)

Descartes was still living when Le Roy transferred themechanical structure of animals to man and declared thesoul to be a modus of the body, and ideas to be mechanicalmovements. (198) Le Roy even thought that Descartes hadconcealed his real opinion. Descartes protested.

At the end of the eighteenth century Cabanis perfectedCartesian materialism in his book Rapports du physiqueet du moral de l’homme.15

From the very outset the metaphysics of the seventeenthcentury had its adversary in materialism. Descartes—Gas-sendi, the restorer of Epicurean materialism, in England—Hobbes.

Voltaire (199) pointed out that the indifference of theFrenchmen of the eighteenth century to the disputes of theJesuits and others was due less to philosophy than to Law’sfinancial speculations. The theoretical movement towardsmaterialism is explained by the practical Gestaltung** ofFrench life at that time. Materialistic theories correspondedto materialistic practice.

* flows directly into socialism—Ed.** mould—Ed.


The metaphysics of the seventeenth century (Descartes,Leibnitz) was still linked with a positive (positivem) content.It made discoveries in mathematics, physics, etc. In theeighteenth century the positive sciences became separatedfrom it and metaphysics war fad geworden.*

In the year of Malebranche’s death, Helvétius and Con-dillac were born. (199-200)

Pierre Bayle, through his weapon of scepticism, theo-retically undermined seventeenth-century metaphysics. Herefuted chiefly Spinoza and Leibnitz. He proclaimed atheis-tic society. He was, in the words of a French writer, “thelast metaphysician in the seventeenth-century sense of theword and the first philosopher in the sense of the eighteenthcentury.” (200-201)

This negative refutation required a positive, anti-meta-physical system. It was provided by Locke.

Materialism is the son of Great Britain. Its scholasticDuns Scotus had already raised the question: “ob die Ma-terie nicht denken könne?”** He was a nominalist. Nomi-nalism is in general the first expression of materialism.16

The real founder of English materialism was Bacon.(“The first and most important of the inherent qualitiesof matter is motion, not only as mechanical and mathe-matical movement, but still more as impulse, vital spirit,tension, or ... the throes (Qual) ... of matter.”—202)

“In Bacon, its first creator, materialism has still con-cealed within it in a naïve way the germs of all-round devel-opment. Matter smiles at man as a whole with poeticalsensuous brightness.”

In Hobbes, materialism becomes one-sided, menschen-feindlich, mechanisch.*** Hobbes systematised Bacon, buthe did not develop (begründet) more deeply Bacon’s funda-mental principle: the origin of knowledge and ideas fromthe world of the senses (Sinnenwelt).—P. 203.

Just as Hobbes did away with the theistic prejudices ofBacon’s materialism, so Collins, Dodwell, Coward, Hartley,Priestley, etc., destroyed the last theological bounds ofLocke’s sensualism.17

* became insipid—Ed.** “whether matter can think?”—Ed.

*** misanthropic, mechanical—Ed.

V. I. LENIN44

Condillac directed Locke’s sensualism against seventeenth-century metaphysics; he published a refutation of the sys-tems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Malebranche.

The French “civilised” (205) the materialism of the En-glish.

In Helvétius (who also derives from Locke), materialismwas given a properly French character.

Lamettrie is a combination of Cartesian and Englishmaterialism.

Robinet has the most connection with metaphysics.“Just as Cartesian materialism passes into natural science

proper, the other trend of French materialism flows directlyinto socialism and communism.” (206)

Nothing is easier than to derive socialism from the prem-ises of materialism (reconstruction of the world of thesenses—linking private and public interests—destroyingthe anti-social Geburtsstätten* of crime, etc.).

Fourier proceeds immediately from the teaching of theFrench materialists. The Babouvists18 were crude, immaturematerialists. Bentham based his system on the morality ofHelvétius, while Owen takes Bentham’s system as hisstarting-point for founding English communism. Cabetbrought communist ideas from England into France (po-pulärste wenn auch flachste** representative of commu-nism) 208. The “more scientific” are Dézamy, Gay, etc., whodeveloped the teaching of materialism as real humanism.

On pp. 209-211 Marx gives in a note (two pages of smallprint) extracts from Helvétius, Holbach and Bentham, inorder to prove the connection of the materialism of the eigh-teenth century with English and French communism of thenineteenth century.

Of the subsequent sections the following passage is worthnoting:

“The dispute between Strauss and Bauer over Substanceand Self-Consciousness is a dispute within Hegelian specu-lation. In Hegel there are three elements: Spinoza’s Sub-stance, Fichte’s Self-Consciousness and Hegel’s necessary

* sources—Ed.** the most popular, though most superficial—Ed.


and contradictory unity of the two, the Absolute Spirit.The first element is metaphysically disguised nature inseparation from man; the second is metaphysically dis-guised spirit in separation from nature; the third is themetaphysically disguised unity of both, real man and thereal human race” (220), and the paragraph with its assess-ment of Feuerbach:

“In the domain of theology, Strauss quite consistentlyexpounded Hegel from Spinoza’s point of view, and Bauerdid the same from Fichte’s point of view. Both criticisedHegel insofar as with him each of the two elements wasfalsified by the other, while they carried each of the elementsto its one-sided and hence consistent development.—Bothof them therefore go beyond Hegel in their Criticism, butboth of them also remain within the framework of his specu-lation and each represents only one side of his system. Feuer-bach was the first to bring to completion and criticise Hegelfrom Hegel’s point of view, by resolving the metaphysicalAbsolute Spirit into ‘real man on the basis of nature,’ andthe first to bring to completion the Criticism of religion bysketching in a masterly manner the general basic featuresof the Criticism of Hegel’s speculation and hence of everykind of metaphysics.” (220-221)

Marx ridicules Bauer’s “theory of self-consciousness”on account of its idealism (the sophisms of absolute ideal-ism—222), points out that this is a periphrasing of Hegel,and quotes the latter’s Phenomenology and Feuerbach’scritical remarks (from Philosophie der Zukunft,19 p. 35,that philosophy negates—negiert—the “materially sensuous,”just as theology negates “nature tainted by original sin”).

The following chapter (VII) again begins with a seriesof highly boring, caviling criticisms 1). Pp. 2 2 8 - 2 3 5 .In section 2a there is an interesting passage.

Marx quotes from the Literary Gazette the letter of a“representative of the Mass,” who calls for the study ofreality of natural science and industry (236), and who onthat account was reviled by “criticism”:

“Or”(!), exclaimed “the critics” against this representa-tive of the Mass,—“do you think that the knowledge of his-torical reality is already complete? Or (!) do you know

V. I. LENIN46

of any single period in history which is actually known?”“Or does Critical Criticism”—Marx replies—“believe that

it has reached even the beginning of a knowledge of histori-cal reality so long as it excludes from the historical move-ment the theoretical and practical relation of man to na-ture, natural science and industry? Or does it think that itactually knows any period without knowing, for example,the industry of that period, the immediate mode of pro-duction of life itself? True, spiritualistic, theological Crit-ical Criticism only knows (at least it imagines it knows)the major political, literary and theological acts of his-tory. Just as it separates thinking from the senses, thesoul from the body and itself from the world, it separateshistory from natural science and industry and sees the originof history not in vulgar material production on the earthbut in vaporous clouds in the heavens.” (238)

Criticism dubbed this representative of the mass a mas-senhafter Materialist.* (239)

“The criticism of the French and the English is not anabstract, preternatural personality outside mankind; itis the real human activity of individuals who are activemembers of society and who as human beings suffer, feel,think and act. That is why their criticism is at the sametime practical, their communism a socialism in which theygive practical, tangible measures, and in which they do notonly think but even more act; it is the living real crit-icism of existing society, the discovery of the causes of‘decay’.” (244)

The whole of Chapter VII (228-257), apart from thepassages quoted above, consists only of the most incrediblecaptious criticisms and mockery, noting contradictions ofthe most petty character, and ridiculing each and everystupidity in the Literary Gazette, etc. In Chapter VIII (258-333) we have a section on the “Crit-ical Transformation of a Butcher into a Dog”—and furtheron E u g è n e S u e’s Fleur de Marie20 (evidently a novelwith this title or the heroine of some novel or other) withcertain “radical” but uninteresting observations by Marx.

* mass materialist—Ed.

No-tabe-ne


Worth mentioning perhaps are only p. 2 8 5 ;—a fewcomments on Hegel’s theory of punishment, p. 2 9 6—against Eugène Sue’s defence of the prison cell system(Cellularsystem).

((Apparently, Marx here attacks the superficial socialismpropagated by Eugène Sue and which, apparently, was de-fended in the Literary Gazette.))

Marx, for example, ridicules Sue for the concept of statereward for virtue, just as vice is punished (pp. 300-301,giving even a comparative table of justice criminelle andjustice vertueuse!*).

Pp. 3 0 5 – 3 0 6: Critical remarks against Hegel’s Phe-nomenology.

3 0 7: But sometimes Hegel in his Phenomenology—inspite of his theory—gives a true description of humanrelations.

3 0 9: Philanthropy as a Spiel** of the rich. (309-310 )312-313 : Quotations from F o u r i e r on the humili-

ation of women, very striking contra the moderate aspi-rations of “Criticism” and of Rudolf—Eugène Sue’s hero?

;“According to Hegel, the criminal in his punishmentpasses sentence on himself. Gans developed this theory atgreater length. In Hegel this is the speculative disguise ofthe old jus talionis*** that Kant expounded as the only ju-ridical penal theory. For Hegel, self-judgment of the criminalremains a mere ‘Idea,’ a mere speculative interpretation ofthe current empirical penal code. He thus leaves the modeof application to the respective stages of developmentof the state, i.e., he leaves punishment just as it is. Pre-cisely in that does he show himself more critical than hiscritical echoer. A penal theory that at the same time seesin the criminal the man can do so only in abstraction, inimagination, precisely because punishment, coercion, iscontrary to human conduct. Besides, the practical realisationof such a theory would be impossible. Pure subjectivearbitrariness would replace abstract law because in each

* criminal justice and justice for virtue!—Ed.** plaything—Ed.

*** the law of the talion—an eye for an eye—Ed.

V. I. LENIN48

case it would depend on official ‘honest and decent’ mento adapt the penalty to the individuality of the criminal.Plato long ago had the insight to see that the law must beone-sided and must make abstraction of the individual.On the other hand, under human conditions punishmentwill really be nothing but the sentence passed by the cul-prit on himself. There will be no attempt to persuade himthat violence from without, exerted on him by others, isviolence exerted on himself by himself. On the contrary,he will see in other men his natural saviours from the sen-tence which he has pronounced on himself; in other words,the relation will be exactly reversed.” (285-286)

“The mystery of this” (305) (there was a quotation fromAnekdota21 above) “courage of Bauer’s is Hegel’s Phenom-enology. Since Hegel here puts self-consciousness in theplace of man, the most varied human reality appears onlyas a definite form, as a determination of self-consciousness.But a mere determination of self-consciousness is a ‘purecategory,’ a mere ‘thought’ which I can consequently alsotranscend in ‘pure’ thought and overcome through purethought. In Hegel’s Phenomenology the material, sensuous,objective bases of the various alienated forms of humanself-consciousness are left as they are. The whole destructivework results in the most conservative philosophy sic!because it thinks it has overcome the objective world, thesensuously real world, by merely transforming it intoa ‘thing of thought,’ a mere determination of self-conscious-ness, and can therefore dissolve its opponent, which hasbecome ethereal, in the ‘ether of pure thought.’ The Phenom-enology is therefore quite consistent in ending by replacingall human reality by ‘Absolute Knowledge’—Knowledge,because this is the only mode of existence of self-conscious-ness, and because self-consciousness is considered as theonly mode of existence of man;—Absolute Knowledge forthe very reason that self-consciousness knows only itselfand is no more disturbed by any objective world. Hegelmakes man the man of self-consciousness instead of makingself-consciousness the self-consciousness of man, of the realman, and therefore of man living also in a real objectiveworld and determined by that world. He stands the world


on its head and can therefore in his head dissolve all limita-tions, which nevertheless, of course, remain in existencefor evil sensuousness, for real man. Moreover, everythingwhich betrays the limitations of general self-consciousness—all sensuousness, reality, individuality of men and of theirworld—is necessarily held by him to be a limit. The wholeof the Phenomenology is intended to prove that self-con-sciousness is the only reality and all reality....” (306)

...“Finally, it goes without saying that if Hegel’s Phe-nomenology, in spite of its speculative original sin, givesin many instances the elements of a true description of hu-man relations, Herr Bruno and Co., on the other hand,provide only an empty caricature....” (307)

“Thereby Rudolph unconsciously revealed the mystery,long ago exposed, that human misery itself, the infiniteabjectness which is obliged to receive alms, has to serve asa plaything to the aristocracy of money and educationto satisfy their self-love, tickle their arrogance and amusethem.

“The numerous charitable associations in Germany, thenumerous charitable societies in France and the great num-ber of charitable quixotic societies in England, the concerts,balls, plays, meals for the poor and even public subscrip-tions for victims of accidents have no other meaning.”(309-310)

And Marx quotes from Eugène Sue:“Ah, Madame, it is not enough to have danced for the

benefit of these poor Poles.... Let us be philanthropic tothe end.... Let us have supper now for the benefit of thepoor!” (310)

On pp. 312-313 quotations f r o m F o u r i e r (adul-tery is good tone, infanticide by the victims of seduction—a vicious circle.... “The degree of emancipation of womanis the natural measure of general emancipation....” (312)Civilisation converts every vice from a simple into a com-plex, ambiguous, hypocritical form), and Marx adds:

“It is superfluous to contrast to Rudolph’s thoughtsFourier’s masterly characterisation of marriage or theworks of the materialist section of French communism.”(313)

V. I. LENIN50

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P. 313 u. ff., against the political-economic projects ofEugène Sue and Rudolph (presumably the hero of Sue’snovel?), projects for the association of rich and poor, andthe organisation of labour (which the state ought to do),etc.—e.g., also the Armenbank* 7)—b) “The Bank for thePoor” pp. 314-318 = interest-free loans to the unemployed.Marx takes the f i g u r e s of the project and exposes theirmeagreness in relation to need. And the idea of an Armen-bank, says Marx, is no better than Sparkassen**..., i.e.,die Einrichtung*** of the bank “rests on the delusion thatonly a different distribution of wages is needed for the workersto be able to live through the whole year.” (316-317) Section c) “Model Farm at Bouqueval” 318-320, Rudolph’sproject for a model farm, which was praised by “Criticism,”is subjected to devastating criticism: Marx declares itto be a utopian project, for on the average one French-man gets only a quarter of a pound of meat per day, only93 francs in annual income, etc.; in the project they worktwice as much as before, etc., etc. ((Not interesting.))

320: “The miraculous means by which Rudolph accom-plishes all his redemptions and marvellous cures is nothis fine words but his ready money. That is what the moral-ists are like, says Fourier. One must be a millionaire to beable to imitate their heroes.

“Morality is ‘Impuissance mise en action.’**** Every timeit fights a vice it is defeated. And Rudolph does not evenrise to the standpoint of independent morality based at leaston the consciousness of human dignity. On the contrary,his morality is based on the consciousness of human weak-ness. He represents theological morality.” (320-321)

...“As in reality all differences boil down more and moreto the difference between poor and rich, so in the idea doall aristocratic differences become resolved into the oppo-sition between good and evil. This distinction is thelast form that the aristocrat gives to his prejudices....”(323-324)

* bank for the poor—Ed.** savings-banks—Ed.

*** the institution—Ed.**** “impotence in action”—Ed.


...“Every movement of his soul is of infinite importanceto Rudolph. That is why he constantly observes and ap-praises them....” (Examples.) “This great lord is like themembers of ‘Young England,’ who also wish to reformthe world, to perform noble deeds, and are subject to sim-ilar hysterical fits....” (326)

Has not Marx in mind here theEnglish Tory philanthropists whopassed the Ten Hours Bill?22

52

FR. ÜBERWEG.OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

(REVISED BY MAX HEINZE)THREE VOLUMES. 1876-1880. LEIPZIG23

The book is rather strange in character: rather shortsections with a few words on the content of doctrines andvery long explanations given in small print, consistingthree-quarters of names and titles of books moreover, outof date: bibliography up to the sixties and seventies .Something unleserliches!* A history of names and books!

* unreadable!—Ed.


Written in 1 903First published in 1 9 3 0

in Lenin Miscellany X I I , p. 347

53

FR. PAULSEN.INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

189924

Highly characteristic is the frank formulation of thequestion in the introduction: the task of modern philos-ophy is “to reconcile the religious world outlook and thescientific explanation of nature” (p. IV*). Sic! And thisidea is developed most circumstantially: there is said to bea struggle on two fronts—against materialism and “Je-suitism” (both Catholic and Protestant). Materialism, ofcourse, is understood (described?) as rein mechanisch, phy-sikalisch u.s.w.**

The author also says directly that modern philosophyrests on Kant and is the representative of “idealistic mon-ism.”

Up to p. 10 ...”Peace between science and faith...”And p. 11: “The real corner-stone of Kant’s philosophy”

(to create this peace) ...“is to give to both their due: toknowledge against the scepticism of Hume, to faith againstits dogmatic negation in materialism—that is the sum-total of his undertaking.” (12)

“What is capable of disappointing this hopeful” (the hopeof this peace) “expectation is the absolutely anti-religiousradicalism that is at present becoming widespread in thebroad mass of the population.... Thus atheism now ap-pears” (as formerly among the bourgeoisie) “as an articleof faith of Social-Democracy” (pp. 14-15). “It is the cat-echism turned inside out. And like the old dogmatism,this new, negative dogmatism, too, is hostile to science,

* Paulsen, Fr., Einleitung in die Philosophie, Berlin, 1899.—Ed.** purely mechanical, physical, etc.—Ed.

?

V. I. LENIN54

insofar as by its dogmas it puts fetters on the spirit ofcriticism and doubt.” (He recalls the term Antipfaffen*and assures us that Christianity has no predilection forthe rich, that it (Christianity) will go through the samestruggle towards which Europe is advancing.)

Refuting materialism and defending the theory of All-beseelung** (which he interprets in an idealist sense), Paul-sen ignores: 1) that he is not refuting materialism, butmerely some arguments of some materialists; 2) that hecontradicts himself in interpreting modern psychology inan idealist sense.

9 Cf. p. 126. “A force ... is nothing but a tendency toa certain action, and hence in its general essence coincideswith an unconscious will.”

(Ergo—Seelenvorgänge und Kraft*** are by no meansso unüberbrückbar**** as it previously seemed to theauthor, p. 90 u. ff.*****)

Pp. 112-116: Why could not the Weltall****** be thebearer of des Weltgeistes?******* (because man and hisbrain are the highest development of mind, as the authorhimself admits.

When Paulsen criticises materialists—he counterposes thehighest forms of mind to matter. When he defends idealismand interprets modern psychology idealistically—he approx-imates the lowest forms of mind to Kräfte,******** etc.That is the Achilles heel of his philosophy).

Cf. especially pp. 106-107, where Paulsen opposes theview that matter is something dead.BBBBBBBBBBBBBB

9 Contra p. 86: “Motion has absolutely nothing of thoughtin it....”

The author seems to dispose too lightly of the conceptthat Gedanke ist Bewegung.********* His arguments

* anti-clericalism—Ed.** universal soul embodiment—Ed.

*** soul processes and force—Ed.**** incompatible—Ed.

***** und folgende—et seq.—Ed.****** universe—Ed.

******* universal spirit—Ed.******** forces—Ed.

********* thought is motion—Ed.

NB

BBBBBBB

55REMARKS ON FR. PAULSEN’S INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

amount only to “ordinary common sense: senseless,” “thoughtis not motion, but thought” (87). Perhaps heat, too, isnot motion, but heat??

Quite stupid are the author’s arguments that a physiol-ogist will not cease to speak about thoughts, instead ofmovements equivalent to these thoughts? And no one willever cease to speak about heat.

One who has fallen in love does not speak to “his lady-love about the corresponding vascular-motor process....That is obviously nonsense” (86-87). Precisely what is doneby Herr Paulsen! And if we experience a lack of heat, wedo not speak about heat being a form of motion, but ofhow to get some coal.

Paulsen considers that the statement that thought isBewegung* is sinnlos.** But he himself is against dualism,and speaks about the “equivalent” (140 and 143)—“the phys-ical equivalent of the psychical” (or Begleiterscheinung***).Is not that the same begriffliche Konfusion**** for whichhe contemptuously abuses Büchner?

When Paulsen declares that his parallelism is “not local”but “ideal” (p. 146), his dualist character shows still moreclearly. That is no explanation of the matter, nor a theory,but a simple verbal trick.

* motion—Ed.** senseless—Ed.

*** accompanying phenomenon—Ed.**** conceptual confusion—Ed.


Written in 1 903First publ ished in 1 9 3 0

in Lenin Miscellany X I I

56

NOTE ON A REVIEW OF THE WONDERS OF LIFE

AND THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE

BY E. HAECKEL

F r a n k f u r t e r Z e i t u n g, 1904, No. 348 (De-cember 15).

First morning edition

A Feuilleton on New Biological Books25

E r n s t H a e c k e l: Lebenswunder (Gemeinverständ-liche Studien über biologische Philosophie). Stuttgart.(Alfred Kröner.)

(To Haeckel, “the spirit is a physiological function of thecerebral cortex.” P. 378 of his book. To be sure, the re-viewer is against this opinion.)

Welträtseln by the same author ((published earlier)) (inwhich it is demonstrated that, properly speaking, thereare no world riddles).

Written late in 1 904 Published for the firsttime according to the

manuscript

57

REMARKS ON BOOKS ON THE NATURAL SCIENCESAND PHILOSOPHY IN THE SORBONNE LIBRARY 26

Sorbonne. New books: C. 819 (7)*Richard Lucas, Bibliographie der radioaktiven Stoffe,

Hamburg und Leipzig, 1908, 8°.(A. 47. 191).*

Mach, Grundriss der Physik (bearbeitet von Harbordtund Fischer), Leipzig, 1905-8, 2 Volumes, 8°.

(A. 46. 979)* S. Φ. ϕ. 587.*Max Planck, Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie,

Leipzig, 1908 (2 Auflage) 12°.(A. 47. 232).* S. ϕ. ϕ. 63.*

Eduard Riecke, Handbuch der Physik, 4 Auflage, Leip-zig, 1908, 2 Volumes, 8°.

(A. 47. 338).* S. Φ. ϕ. 301a.*Fénelon Salignac, Questions de Physique générale et d’Ast-

ronomie, Toulouse, 1908, 4°.(D. 55. 745).* C. 818 (2).*

J. J. Thomson, Die Korpuskulartheorie der Materie,Braunschweig, 1908, 8°.

S. D. e. 101 (25).*

In the Sorbonne library:I. Vierteiljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie,

p. 5 3 (8°) (A. 16. 404).*II. Archiv für Philosophie, 2-te Abteilung, p. 4 8 . (A. 17,

027).*

* Letters and numbers denote press-marks—Ed.

V. I. LENIN58

Vierteiljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1909,Heft I. Raoul Richter’s review (sympathetic, indeed laud-atory) of:

Ludwig Stein, Philosophie Strömungen der Gegenwart,Stuttgart, 1908, (Enke) XVI#452 Seiten. (12 Mark.)

Seiten 1-293—philosophical trends—294-445—philosophical problemsTen trends in philosophy27:

1) neo-idealism (voluntarist metaphysics)2) neo-positivism (pragmatism) of W. James3) “new movement in natural philosophy” (Ostwald

and the “triumph” of energetics over materialism)4) “neo-romanticism” (H. St. Chamberlain, etc.)5) neo-vitalism6) evolutionism (Spencer)7) individualism (Nietzsche)8) geisteswissenschaftliche Bewegung* (Dilthey)9) philosophiegeschichtliche**

10) neo-realism (Eduard von Hartmann!!!).

New books:

Max Schinz, Die Wahrheit der Religion nach den neues-ten Vertretern der Religionsphilosophie, Zürich, 1908, 8°.(307 pages. 6. 50 Mark.)

Kr. Guenther, Vom Urtier zum Menschen, (Ein Bilder-atlas.) Stuttgart, 1909. (7-19 issues x1 Mark.)

A. Pelazza, R. Avenarius e l’empiriocriticismo, 1908?9? Torino (Bocca). 130 Seiten.

Spaventa, La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni conla filosofia europea, 1908? 9? Ban (Laterza).

New books (1909):

L. Boltzmann, Wiener wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen,Leipzig, (Barth).

H. Strache, Die Einheit der Materie, des Weltäthers undder Naturkräfte, Wien (Deuticke).

* humanities movement—Ed.** philosophical-historical—Ed.

59REMARKS ON BOOKS IN THE SORBONNE LIBRARY


Written in the first half of 1 909First publ ished in 1 9 3 3

in Lenin Miscellany XXV

-

P. 48.

Archiv für Philosophie, 2 Abteilung = Archiv für s y s -t e m t a t i s c h e Philosophie, 1908, Heft 4. Vitalis Nor-ström’s s e c o n d article (Seiten 447-496) ((interesting;almost all of it about Mach)).

Where is the first??Note—is it late??

CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH’S BOOKLECTURES ON THE ESSENCE

OF RELIGION 28

Written not earlier than 1 909First published in 1 9 3 0

in Lenin Miscellany X I IPublished according

to the manuscript

63

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

* Feuerbach, L., Sämtliche Werke, Bd. 8, Leipzig, 1851.—Ed.** sense of place and time—Ed.

*** of the monarch—Ed.**** “God-believing world”—Ed.

8°. R. 807

Feuerbachdid not

understandthe 1848

revolution

Sic!!

The preface is dated 1. X. 1851.—Feu-erbach speaks here of the reasons whyhe did not take part in the 1848 revolu-tion, which had “such a shameful, sucha barren end” (VII).* The revolution of1848 had no Orts- und Zeitsinn,** theconstitutionalists expected freedom from theword des Herrn,*** the republicans (VII-VIII) from their desire (“it was only nec-essary to desire a republic for it to comeinto being”).... (VIII)

“If a revolution breaks out again and Itake an active part in it, then you can ...be sure that this revolution will be vic-torious, that Judgment Day for the mon-archy and hierarchy has arrived.” (VII)

F i r s t l e c t u r e (1-11).P. 2: “We have had enough of political as

well as philosophical idealism; wenow want to be political materialists.”

3-4—Why Feuerbach fled to the seclusionof the country: the break with the“gottesgläubigen Welt”**** p. 4

L . F E U E R B A C H .

C O L L E C T E D W O R K S VOL. 8, 1851L E C T U R E S O N T H E E S S E N C E O F

R E L I G I O N

V. I. LENIN64

* Zeile 7 von unten—line 7 from bottom—Ed.** at the end—Ed.

*** to discard—Ed.**** “extravagant”—Ed.

***** s e n s u o s n e s s—Ed.****** sensuous—Ed.

******* stomach—Ed.******** head—Ed.

down with“Überspann-

tes”!

“sensuous-ness” in

Feuerbach

(Z. 7 v. u.*) (cf. p. 3 in f.**)—to livewith “nature” (5), ablegen*** allüberspannten”**** ideas.

7-11 Feuerbach gives an outline of hisworks (7-9): Geschichte der neuren Phi-losophie (9-11 Spinoza, Leibnitz).S e c o n d L e c t u r e (12-20).

12-14—Bayle. 15: S i n n l i c h k e i t***** for me means

“the true unity of the material andthe spiritual, a unity not thought upand prepared, but existing, and whichtherefore has the same significance asreality for me.”Sinnlich****** is not only theMagen,******* but also theKopf ******** (15).

(16-20: Feuerbach’s work on Immortality:paraphrased.)T h i r d L e c t u r e (21-30).

The objection was raised to my Essenceof Christianity29 that for me man does notdepend on anything, “there was oppositionto this alleged deification of man by me.”(24) “The being, whom man presupposes ... isnothing other than nature, not your God.” (25)

“The unconscious being of nature is forme the eternal being, without origin, thefirst being, but first in point of time, andnot in point of rank, the physically butnot morally first being....” (27)

My denial includes also affirmation....“It is, of course, a consequence of my doc-trine that there is no God” (29), but this

65CONSPECTUS OF LECTURES ON THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION

* “fear”—Ed.** und folgende—et seq.—Ed.

cf. Marxund Engels30

“egoism” andits

significance

follows from the conception of the essenceof God (=an expression of the essenceof nature, of the essence of man).

Fourth Lecture.“The feeling of dependence is the basis

of religion.” (31) (“Furcht”* 33-4-5-6)“The so-called speculative philosophers

are ... those philosophers who do not con-struct their notions in accordance withthings, but rather construct things accord-ing to their notions. (31)

(Fifth Lecture.)—it is especially d e a t h that arouses

fear, belief in God. (41)“I hate the idealism that divorces man

from nature; I am not ashamed of my de-pendence on nature.” (44)

“As little as I have deified man in Wesendes Christenthums, a deification with whichI have been stupidly reproached ... so littledo I want to deify nature in the senseof theology ....” (46-47)

Sixth Lecture—The cult of animals (50u. ff.**).

“What man is dependent on is ... nature,an object of the senses ... all the impressionswhich nature makes on man through thesenses ... can become motives of religiousveneration.” (55)

(Seventh Lecture.)By egoism I understand, not the egoism

of the “philistine and bourgeois” (63), butthe philosophical principle of conformitywith nature, with human reason, against“theological hypocrisy, religious and spec-ulative fantasy, political despotism.” (63i. f.) Cf. 6 4, v e r y i m p o r t a n t.

Idem 68 i. f. and 69 i. f.—Egoism (in thephilosophical sense) is the root of religion.

V. I. LENIN66

on thequestion of

the wordenergy

the sensuous=the prima-ry, the self-existing and

true

(70: Die Gelehrten* can only be beatenwith their own weapons, i.e., by quo-tations) ... “man die Gelehrten nurdurch ihre eigenen Waffen, d. h.Zitate, schlagen kann....” (70)

Incidentally, on p. 78 Feuerbach usesthe expression: Energie d. h. Thätigkeit.**This is worth noting. There is, indeed,a subjective moment in the concept of ener-gy, which is absent, for example, in theconcept of movement. Or, more correctly,in the concept or usage in speech of theconcept of energy there is something thatexcludes objectivity. The energy of themoon (cf.) versus the movement of the moon.

107 i. f. ...“Nature is a primordial, pri-mary and final being....”111: ...“For me ... in philosophy ... the

sensuous is primary; but primary notmerely in the sense of speculativephilosophy, where the primary sig-nifies that beyond the bounds of whichit is necessary to go, but primaryin the sense of not being derived, ofbeing self-existing and true.”...“The spiritual is nothing outsideand without the sensuous.”

NB in general p. 111 ... “the truthand essentiality (NB) of the senses, fromwhich ... philosophy ... proceeds....”112 ...“Man thinks only by means of his

sensuously existing head, reason hasa firm sensuous foundation in thehead, the brain, the focus of thesenses.”

See p. 112 on the veracity (Urkunden***)of the senses.

* the pundits—Ed.** energy, i.e., activity—Ed.

*** evidence—Ed.


* underivable primordial being—Ed.

114: Nature=the primary, unableitbares,ursprüngliches Wesen.*“Thus, Die Grundsätze der Philosophie

is interconnected with the Wesen der Re-ligion.”31 (113)

“I deify nothing, consequently not evennature.” (115)

116—Answer to the reproach that Feuer-bach does not give a d e f i n i t i o n o fn a t u r e:

“I understand by nature the total-ity of all sensuous forces, things andbeings which man distinguishes fromhimself as not human.... Or, if theword is taken in practice: nature iseverything that for man—indepen-dent of the supernatural whisperingsof theistic faith—proves to be imme-diate and sensuous, the basis andobject of his life. Nature is light,electricity, magnetism, air, water,fire, earth, animal, plant, man, in-sofar as he is a being acting involun-tarily and unconsciously—by the word‘nature’ I understand nothing morethan this, nothing mystical, nothingnebulous, nothing theological” (above:in contrast to Spinoza).

...“Nature is ... everything that you seeand that is not derived from human handsand thoughts. Or if we penetrate into theanatomy of nature, nature is the being,or totality of beings and things, whoseappearances, expressions or effects, in whichprecisely their existence and essence aremanifested and consist, have their basisnot in thoughts or intentions and decisionsof the will, but in astronomical, or cosmic,mechanical, chemical, physical, physiolo-gical or organic forces or causes.” (116 -117)

NB

It turns outthat nature=

everythingexcept the

supernatural.Feuerbach isbrilliant but

not profound.Engels definesmore profound-ly the distinc-tion betweenmaterialism

and idealism.

(( (

V. I. LENIN68

* summation—Ed.** objective = outside ourselves—Ed.

objectiv =außer uns**

Here too it amounts to opposing matterto mind, the physical to the psychical.121—against the argument that there mustbe a prime cause (= God).

“It is only man’s narrowness and love ofconvenience that cause him to put eternityin place of time, infinity in place of theendless progress from cause to cause, a stat-ic divinity in place of restless nature,eternal rest instead of eternal movement.”(121 i. f.)

124 -125. Owing to their subjectiveneeds, men replace the concrete by the ab-stract, perception by the concept, the manyby the one, the infinite Σ* of causes bythe single cause.

Yet, “no objective validity and exist-ence, no existence outside ourselves” mustbe ascribed to these abstractions. (125)

“Nature has no beginning and no end.Everything in it is in mutual interaction,everything is relative, everything at onceeffect and cause, everything in it is all-sided and reciprocal....” (129)

there is no place there for God (129-130;simple arguments against God).

...“The cause of the first and generalcause of things in the sense of thetheists, theologians and so-called spec-ulative philosophers is man’s under-standing....” (130) “God is ... cause ingeneral, the concept of cause as essencepersonified and become independent....”(131)

“God is abstract nature, i.e., nature re-moved from sensuous perception, mentallyconceived, made into an object or being


* the moral highest (= the ideal)—Ed.** the natural highest (= nature)—Ed.

of the understanding; nature in the propersense is sensuous, real nature, as immedi-ately manifested and presented to us bythe senses.” (133)

The theists see in God the cause of themovement in nature (which they make intoa dead mass or matter). (134) The power ofGod, however, is in reality the power ofnature (Naturmacht: 135).

...“Indeed it is only through their effectsthat we perceive the properties of things....”(136)

Atheism (136-137) abolishes neither dasmoralische Über (= das Ideal)* nor dasnatürliche Über (= die Natur.)**

...“Is not time merely a form of theworld, the manner in which particularbeings and effects follow one another? Howthen can I ascribe a temporal beginningto the world?” (145)

...“God is merely the world in thought....The distinction between God and the worldis merely the distinction between spiritand sense, thought and perception ....” (146)

God is presented as a being existing out-side ourselves. But is that not preciselyan admission of the truth of sensuous being?Is it not (thereby) “recognised that thereis no being outside sensuous being? For,apart from sensuousness, have we anyother sign, any other criterion, of an exist-ence outside ourselves, of an existence in-dependent of thought?” (148)

...“Nature ... in isolation from its mate-riality and corporeality ... is God....” (149)

immediately

time andworld

being outsideourselves =independentof thought

NBnature out-side, inde-pendent of

matter = God

V. I. LENIN70

* perversity of endowing abstractions with independence—Ed.

NBtheory of

“the copy”

time outsidetemporal

things = God

time andspace

cf. Engelsidem in Lud-wig Feuer-

bach32

“To derive nature from God is equivalentto wanting to derive the original from theimage, from the copy, to derive a thingfrom the thought of the thing.” (149)

Characteristic of man is Verkehrtheit(149 i. f.) verselbständigen abstractions*—for example, time and space (150):

“Although ... man has abstracted spaceand time from spatial and temporal things,nevertheless he presupposes those as theprimary grounds and conditions of thelatter’s existence. Hence he thinks of theworld, i.e., the sum-total of real things,matter, the content of the world, as havingits origin in space and time. Even Hegelmakes matter arise not only in, but out of,space and time....” (150) “Also, it is reallyincomprehensible why time, separated fromtemporal things, should not be identifiedwith God.” (151)

“In reality, exactly the opposite holdsgood, ...it is not things that presupposespace and time, but space and time thatpresuppose things, for space or extensionpresupposes something that extends, andtime, movement, for time, is indeed only aconcept derived from movement, presup-poses something that moves. Everything isspatial and temporal....” (151-152)

“The question whether a God has createdthe world ... is the question of the relationof mind to sensuousness” (152—the mostimportant and difficult question of philos-ophy (153), the whole history of philosophyturns on this question 153)—the conflictbetween the Stoics and the Epicureans,the Platonists and the Aristotelians, theSceptics and the Dogmatists, in ancientphilosophy; between the nominalists and


realists in the Middle Ages; between theidealists and the “realists or empiricists”(sic! 153) in modern times.

It depends in part on the nature of people(academic, versus practical types) whetherthey incline to one or another philosophy.

“I do not deny ... wisdom, goodness,beauty; I deny only that, as such genericnotions, they are beings, whether in theshape of gods or properties of God, or asPlatonic ideas, or as self-posited Hegelianconcepts....” (158)—they exist only as prop-erties of men.

Another cause of belief in God: mantransfers to nature the idea of his ownpurposive creation. Nature is purposive—ergo it was created by a rational being. (160)

“That which man calls the purposivenessof nature and conceives as such is in real-ity nothing but the unity of the world,the harmony of cause and effect, the in-terconnection in general in which every-thing in nature exists and acts.” (161)

...“Nor have we any grounds for imagin-ing that if man had more senses or organshe would also cognise more properties orthings of nature. There is nothing morein the external world, in inorganic nature,than in organic nature. Man has just asmany senses as are necessary for him toconceive the world in its totality, in itsentirety.” (163)

important against agnosticism

168—Against Liebig on account of thephrases about the “infinite wisdom”(of God).... Feuerbach and naturalscience!! NB. Cf. Mach and Co.33

today.

153

(materialism)contra theol-

ogy andidealism

(in theory)

If man hadmore senses,

would hediscover morethings in theworld? No.

V. I. LENIN72

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

* too lofty, too noble (!!) an idea—Ed.** a state counsellor—Ed.

NB(cf. Dietz-

gen)34

witty!

IdemDietzgen35

natureis material

the necessityof nature

174-175-178—Nature = a republican;God = a monarch. This occurs notonly once in Feuerbach!

188-190—God was a patriarchal monarch,and he is now a constitutional monarch:he rules, but according to laws.

Where does spirit (Geist) come from?—ask the theists of the atheist. (196) Theyhave too disdainful (despektierliche: 196)an idea of nature, too lofty an idea of spir-it (zu hohe, zu vornehme (!!) Vorstel-lung*).

Even a Regierungsrath** cannot bedirectly explained from nature. (197)

“The spirit develops together with thebody, with the senses ... it is connectedwith the senses ... whence the skull, whencethe brain, thence also the spirit; whencean organ, thence also its functioning” ((197):cf. above (197) “the spirit is in the head”).

“Mental activity is also a bodily activi-ty.” (197-198)

The origin of the corporeal world from thespirit, from God, leads to the creation ofthe world from nothing—“for whence doesthe spirit get the matter, corporeal sub-stances, if not from nothing?” (199)

...“Nature is corporeal, material, sen-suous....” (201)

Jakob Boehme = a “m a t e r i a l i s t i ct h e i s t” (202): he deifies not only themind but also matter. For him God is ma-terial—therein lies his mysticism. (202)

...“Where the eyes and hands begin, therethe gods end.” (203)

(The theists) have “blamed matter orthe i n e v i t a b l e n e c e s s i t y o f n a-t u r e ... for the evil in nature” (212)


* the “natural” and “civil world”—Ed.** spiritual religion—Ed.

*** feeling—Ed.**** comfortless—Ed.

***** “natural necessity”—Ed.****** “necessity of nature”—Ed.

2 1 3 in the middle and 2 1 5 in themiddle “natürliche” und “bürgerlicheWelt.”*(226): Feuerbach says that he is ending the

first part here (on nature as the basisof religion) and passing to the secondpart: the qualities of the human spir-it are manifested in Geistesreligion.**

(232)—“Religion is poetry”—it can be said,for faith = fantasy. But do I (Feuer-bach) not then abolish poetry? No.I abolish (aufhebe) religion “only in-sofar” (Feuerbach’s italics) “as it isnot poetry, but ordinary prose.” (233)

Art does not require the recognition ofits works as reality. (233)

Besides fantasy, of great importance inreligion are das Gemüth*** (261), the prac-tical aspect (258), the search for the better,for protection, help, etc.

(263)—In religion one seeks consolation(atheism is alleged to be trostlos****).———

“A concept, however, congenial to man’sself-love, is that nature does not act withimmutable necessity, but that above thenecessity of nature is ... a being that lovesmankind.” (264) A n d i n t h e n e x ts e n t e n c e “Naturnotwendigkeit”*****of the falling of a stone. (264)

p. 287 twice in the middle: likewise“Notwendigkeit der Natur.”******

Religion = childishness, the childhoodof mankind (269), Christianity has madea god of morality, it has created a moralGod. (274)

a germ ofhistorical

materialism

NB


NB

V. I. LENIN74

* “course of nature”—Ed.

Feuerbachagainst

misuse of theword religion

NB


NB

NB

NB

Religion is rudimentary education—onecan say: “education is true religion....”(275) “However, this is ... a misuse ofwords, for superstitious and inhuman ideasare always linked with the word religion.”(275)

Eulogy of education—277.“Superficial view and assertion ... that

religion is absolutely of no concern tolife, namely to public, political life.” (281)I would not give a farthing for a politicalfreedom that allows man to be a slaveof religion. (281)

Religion is innate in man (“this state-ment ... Simply means”) = superstition isinnate in man. (283)

“The Christian has a free cause of nature,a lord of nature, whose will, whose word,nature obeys, a God who is not bound by theso-called causal nexus, by necessity, by thechain which links effect to cause and causeto cause, whereas the heathen god is boundby the necessity of nature and cannot saveeven his favourites from the fatal necessityof dying.” (301) (Thus Feuerbach says sys-tematically; Notwendigkeit d e r Natur.)

“The Christian, however, has a free causebecause in his wishes he is not bound bythe interconnection of nature, nor by thenecessity of nature,” (301) ((And t h r e et i m e s more on t h i s page: Notwendig-keit der Natur.))

And p. 302; “...all the laws or naturalnecessities to which human existence issubjected....” (302)

cf. 307: “Lauf der Natur.”*“To make nature dependent on God, means

to make the world order, the necessity ofnature, dependent on the will.” (312) Andp. 313 (above)—“Naturnotwendigkeit”!!

eee

eee


* disembodied spirit—Ed.** sensuous, physical—Ed.

320: “necessity of nature” (der Natur)...In religious ideas “we have ... examples

how in general man converts the subjec-tive into the objective, that is to say,he makes that which exists only in histhought, conception, imagination, intosomething existing o u t s i d e thought,conception, imagination....” (328)

“So Christians tear the spirit, the soul,of man out of his body and make thistorn-out, disembodied spirit into their God.”(332)

Religion gives (332) man an ideal. Manneeds an ideal, but a human ideal corres-ponding to nature and not a supernaturalideal:

“Let our ideal be no castrated, disem-bodied, abstract being, let our ideal be thewhole, real, all-sided, perfect, developedman.” (334)

Mikhailovsky’s ideal is onlya vulgarised repetition of thisideal of advanced bourgeoisdemocracy or of revolutionarybourgeois democracy.

“Man has no idea, no conception, of anyother reality, of any other existence, thansensuous, physical existence....” (334)

“If one is not ashamed to allow the sen-suous, corporeal world to arise from thethought and will of a spirit, if one is notashamed to assert that things are notthought of because they exist, but thatthey exist because they are thought of;then let one also not be ashamed to allow

what is theobjective?

(according toFeuerbach)

EntleibterGeist* = God

Sinnlichphysisch**

excellentequating!

NB

((((

V. I. LENIN76

Feuerbach’sitalics

A germ ofhistorical

materialism!

things to arise from the word; then let onealso not be ashamed to assert that wordsexist not because things exist, but thatthings exist only because words exist.”(341-342)

A God without the immortality of thesoul of man is only a God in name:

...“Such a God is ... the God of somerationalist natural scientists, who is noth-ing but personified nature or natural ne-cessity, the universe, with which of coursethe idea of immortality is incompatible.”

349The last (30th) lecture, pp. (358-370),

could be put forward almost in its entiretyas a typical example of an enlighteningatheism with a socialist tint (concerningthe mass that suffers want, etc., p. 365middle), etc. Final words: it was my taskto make you, my hearers,

“from friends of God into friends of man,from men of faith into thinkers, from menof prayer into workers, from candidatesfor the beyond into students of this world,from Christians, who, as they themselvesacknowledge and confess, are ‘half-beast, half-angel,’ into men , whole men”(370 end).

Next follow Additions and Notes. (371-463)

Here there are many details, quotations,which contain repetitions. I pass over allthat. I note only the most important ofthat which affords some interest: thebasis of morality is egoism (392). (“Loveof life, interest, egoism”)... “there isnot only a singular or personal, butalso a social egoism, a family egoism,a corporation egoism, a community, egoism,a patriotic egoism.” (393)


...“The good is nothing but that whichcorresponds to the egoism of all men....”(397)

“One has only to cast a glance at history!Where does a new epoch in history begin?Only wherever an oppressed mass or major-ity makes its well-justified egoism effec-tive against the exclusive egoism of a na-tion or caste, wherever classes of men (sic!)or whole nations, by gaining victory overthe arrogant self-conceit of a patrician mi-nority, emerge into the light of historicalglory out of the miserable obscurity ofthe proletariat. So, too, the egoism of thenow oppressed majority of mankind mustand will obtain its rights and found a newepoch in history. It is not that the aristoc-racy of culture, of the spirit, must be abol-ished; no indeed! it is merely that notjust a handful should be aristocrats and allothers plebeians, but that all should—at least should—be cultured; it is not thatproperty in general should be abolished;no indeed! it is merely that not just a hand-ful should have property, and all othersnothing; all should have property.” (398)

These lectures were delivered from1.XII.1848 to 2.III.1849 (Preface,p. V), and the preface to the bookis dated 1.I.1851. How far, evenat t h i s time (1848-1851), h a dFeuerbach l a g g e d b e h i n dM a r x (The Communist Manifesto1847, Neue Rheinische Zeitung,etc.) and Engels (1845: Lage37)

Examples from the classics of the useof the words God and nature without dis-tinction. (398-399)

NBNB

A germ ofhistorical

materialism,cf. Cherny-shevsky36

NBFeuerbach’s“socialism”

V. I. LENIN78

* thought entity—Ed.

NB

NB

NB

Sehr gut!

Sehr gut!

an excellentpassage!

Pp. 402-411—an e x c e l l e n t, phi-losophical (and at the same time simpleand clear) explanation of the essence ofreligion.

“In the final analysis, the secret of reli-gion is only the secret of the combinationin one and the same being of consciousnesswith the unconscious, of the will with theinvoluntary.” (402). The Ego and the non-Ego are inseparably connected in man.“Man does not grasp or endure the depthsof his own being and therefore splits it intoan ‘Ego’ without a ‘non-Ego,’ which hecalls God, and a ‘non-Ego’ without an‘Ego,’ which he calls nature.” (406)

P. 408—an excellent quotation from Sen-eca (against the atheists) that they makenature into a god. Pray!—Work!38 (p. 411)

Nature is God in religion, but natureas Gedankenwesen.* “The secret of re-ligion is the identity of the subjectiveand objective,’ i.e., the unity of the beingof man and nature, but as distinct from thereal being of nature and mankind.” (411)

“Human ignorance is bottomless and thehuman force of imagination is boundless;the power of nature deprived of its foun-dation by ignorance, and of its boundsby fantasy, is divine omnipotence.” (414)

...“Objective essence as subjective, theessence of nature as different from nature,as human essence, the essence of man asdifferent from man, as non-human essence—that is the divine being, that is the essenceof religion, that is the secret of mysticismand speculation....” (415)

Speculation in Feuerbach = ideal-ist philosophy. NB.

A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript:Conspectus of Feuerbach’s book Lectures on the Essence of Religion.—

1909Reduced

A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript:Conspectus of Feuerbach’s book Lectures on the Essence of Religion.—

1909Reduced


* being, essence—Ed.** All that is not God is nothing, i.e., all that is not I is nothing.—

Ed.

“Man separates in thought the adjectivefrom the substantive, the property fromthe essence.... And the metaphysical Godis nothing but the compendium, the total-ity of the most general properties extractedfrom nature, which, however, man bymeans of the force of imagination—andindeed in just this separation from sen-suous being, matter, nature—reconvertsinto an independent subject or being.”(417)

The same role is played by Logic ((418)—obviously Hegel is meant)—which convertsdas Sein, das Wesen* into a special real-ity—“how stupid it is to want to makemetaphysical existence into a physical one,subjective existence into an objective one,and again logical or abstract existence intoall illogical real existence!” (418)

...“‘Is there, therefore, an eternal gulfand contradiction between being and think-ing?’ Yes, but only in the mind; howeverin reality the contradiction has long beenresolved, to be sure only in a way corres-ponding to reality and not to your schoolnotions, and, indeed, resolved by not fewerthan five senses.” (418)428: Tout ce qui n’est pas Dieu, n’est rien,

i.e., tout ce qui n’est pas Moi, n’estrien.**

431-435. A good quotation from Gassendi.A very good passage: especially 433God = a collection of adjectival words(without matter) about the concreteand the abstract.

435 “The head is the house of representa-tives of the universe—and if our

NBprofoundly

correct!NB

Excellent(against

Hegel andidealism)

beautifullysaid!

bien dit!

NB

NB

V. I. LENIN82

* generic concepts—Ed.** dramatic psychology—Ed.

heads are stuffed with abstractions,Gattungsbegriffen,* then of coursewe derive (ableiten) “the individualfrom the universal, i.e., ... naturefrom God.”

436-437: (Note No. 16.) I am not againstconstitutional monarchy, but only thedemocratic republic is “‘immediatelyreasonable’ as the form of state ‘cor-responding to the essence of man.’”

...“The clever manner of writing consists,among other things, in assuming that thereader also has a mind, in not expressingeverything explicitly, in allowing the read-er to formulate the relations, conditionsand restrictions under which alone a prop-osition is valid and can be conceived.”(447)

Interesting is the answer to (Feuerbach’s)critic Professor v o n S c h a d e n (448-449) and to S c h a l l e r. (449-450-463)

...“I do indeed expressly put naturein place of being, and man in place of think-ing,” i.e., not an abstraction, but somethingconcrete———die dramatische Psycholo-gie.** (449)

That is why the term “the anthropolog-ical principle” in philosophy,39 used byFeuerbach and Chernyshevsky, is n a r-r o w. Both the anthropological principleand naturalism are only inexact, weakdescriptions of m a t e r i a l i s m.

“Jesuitism, the unconscious original andideal of our speculative philosophers.” (455)

the individu-al and the

universal =Nature and

God

ha-ha!!

hits themark!

NB“being and

nature,”“thinkingand man”

bien dit!


“Thinking posits the discreteness of real-ity as a continuum, the infinite multiplic-ity of life as an identical singularity.Knowledge of the essential, inextinguishabledifference between thought and life (orteal ity) is the beginning of all wisdomin thinking and living. Only the distinc-tion is here the true connection.” (458)

End of Volume 8

Volume 9 = “Theogony” (1857).40 Theredoes not seem to be anything of interesthere, to judge from skimming over thepages. Incidentally, p. 320, Pars. 34, 36(p. 334) and following should be read.NB Par. 36 (p. 334)—on looking throughit, nothing appears of interest. Quotations,and again quotations, to confirm whatFeuerbach has already said.

concerningthe questionof the funda-

mentals ofphilosophicalmaterialism

CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOKT H E S C I E N C E O F L O G I C 41


Written in September-December 1 9 1 4First published in 1 9 3 0in Lenin Miscellany I X

Bern: Log. I. 175

H e g e l s W e r k eBd. I. Philosophische Abhandlungen” II. The Phenomenology of Mind” III-V. The Science of Logic” VI-VII. (1 and 2) The Encyclopaedia” VIII. The Philosophy of Law” IX. The Philosophy of History” X. (3 parts) Aesthetics” XI-XII. The History of Religion” XIII-XV. The History of Philosophy” XVI-XVII. Miscellaneous Writings” XVIII. Philosophical Propaedeutic” XIX. (1 and 2) Hegel’s Correspondence

The cover of the first notebook containing Conspectusof Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic.—

September-December 1914Reduced

The cover of the first notebook containing Conspectusof Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic.—

September-December 1914Reduced

87

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C o l l e c t e d W o r k s o f G. W. Fr.H e g e l,

Vol. III (Berlin, 1833)(468 pages)

“T h e S c i e n c e o f L o g i c.”43

Part 1. Objective Logic.Section 1. The Doctrine of Being.

(Bern: Log. I. 175

Vol. III,* p. 5—a shrewd statementabout logic: it is a “prejudice” that it “teach-es how to think” (just as physiology “teaches... to digest”??)

...“logical science, which is the true con-tent of genuine metaphysics or pure spec-ulative philosophy....” (6)

...“Philosophy cannot borrow its methodfrom a subordinate science, such as mathe-matics....” (6-7)

...“But it can be only the nature of thecontent which stirs in scientific cognition,while at the same time it is this veryreflection of the content which itself ini-tially posits and produces its determina-tion.” (7)

(The m o v e m e n t of scientific cog-nition—that is the essential thing.)

“Understanding (Verstand) makes deter-

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Full title ofCollected

WorksG. W. Fr.

Hegel42

“Completeedition bycircle of

friends ofthe deceased:Marheineke,

Schulze,Gans, Hen-

ning, Hotho,Michelet,Förster.”

V. I. LENIN88

* In the manuscript the words “from ignorance to knowledge”are struck out with a horizontal line, apparently instead of beingunderlined.—Ed.

** the nature of pure essentialities—Ed.

minations” (bestimmt), Reason (Ver-nunft) is negative and dialectical becauseit dissolves into nothing (“in Nichts auflöst”)the determinations of Understanding. (7)The combination of these two—“Reasonwhich understands or Understanding whichreasons” (7) = the positive.

Negation of “the simple” ... “movementof Mind....” (7)

“It is along this path of self-constructionalone that Philosophy can become objec-tive, demonstrative science.” (7-8)

(The “path of self-construction” = thepath (this is the crux, in my opinion) ofreal cognition, of the process of cognising,of movement from ignorance to knowledge.*)

The movement of consciousness, “likethe development of all natural and spiri-tual life,” rests on “the nature of the pureessentialities which make up the contentof Logic” (Natur der reinen Wesenheiten**).

Turn it round: Logic and the theoryof knowledge must be derived from“the development of all natural andspiritual life.”

Up to here: preface to the First Edition.

This is char-acteristic

89CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

“To present the realm of thought in itsphilosophical aspect—that is, in its own(NB) immanent activity, or (which comesto the same thing) in its necessary (NB)development....” (10)

“The familiar forms of thought”—an im-portant beginning, “die leblosen Knocheneines Skeletts.* (11)

What is necessary is not lebloseKnochen, but living life.

The connection between thought andlanguage (the Chinese language, inciden-tally, and its lack of development: 11),the formation of nouns and verbs. (11)In the German language words sometimeshave “entgegengesetzte Bedeutung”** (12)(not simply “different” but opposed mean-ings)—“a joy to thought...”

The concept of force in Physics—and ofpolarity (“the things distinguished insep-arably (Hegel’s italics) bound up to-gether”). (12) The transition from forceto polarity—a transition to “higher Denk-verhältnisse.”*** (12)

* “the lifeless bones of a skeleton”—Ed.** opposed meanings—Ed.

*** relations of thought”—Ed.**** “the mental”—Ed.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

nature and“das

Geistige”****

NB also p. 11.... “But if Nature ingeneral is opposed, as physical, to what ismental, then it must be said that logicis rather something supernatural....”

excellent!

OOO O

the historyof thought =the history oflanguage??

V. I. LENIN90

* are familiar to all—Ed.** “what is familiar is not on that account necessarily known”—Ed.

*** abbreviations—Ed.**** epitomised—Ed.

***** s e r v e—Ed.

Logical forms Allbekanntes sind,* but... “was bekannt ist, darum noch nichterkannt.”** (13)

“Infinite progress”—“liberation” of “formsof thought” from the matter (von demStoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration ofthe general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginningof Knowledge....

“It was only after nearly everything thatwas necessary ... was available, that peoplebegan to trouble themselves about philo-sophic knowledge,” says Aristotle (13-14);and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyp-tian priests, the beginning of the mathe-matical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with“pure thought” presupposes “a long stretchof road already traversed by the mindof man.” In this kind of thought

“those interests are hushed which movethe lives of peoples and individuals.”(14)

The categories of Logic are Abbreviatu-ren*** (“epitomiert”**** in another pas-sage) for the “endless multitude” of “par-ticulars of external existence and of ac-tion....” (15) In turn, these categories d i e-n e n***** people in practice (“in theintellectual exercise of living content, inproduction and interchange”). (15)

“We do not say of our feelings, impulsesand interests that they serve us—rather,they are regarded as independent facultiesand powers... all this is just what we are.”(15)

And concerning forms of thought (Denk-formen) it cannot be said that they serve

interests“move the lives

of peoples”

the relationof thought tointerests and

impulses...


us, for they permeate “all our ideas” (16),they are “the Universal as such.”

Objectivism: the categories ofthought are not an auxiliary toolof man, but an expression of lawsboth of nature and of man—com-pare further the antithesis—

of “subjective thinking” and “the objec-tive concept of the very essence of things.”We cannot “get beyond the nature ofthings.” (16)

“Also the remark against the “CriticalPhilosophy.” (17) It conceives the relationbetween “three terms” (We, Thought,Things) so that thoughts stand “in the mid-dle” between things and us, and so thatthis middle term “separates” (abschließt)“rather than ... connects” (zusammenschli-eßen) us. This view may be met, saysHegel, by the “simple observation” that“these very things which are supposedto stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ...are themselves thought entities (Gedanken-dinge)” ... and “the so-called Thing-in-it-self is only ein Gedankending der leerenAbstraktion.*”

In my opinion, the essence of the argu-ment is: (1) In Kant, cognition demar-cates (divides) nature and man; actuallyit unites them; (2) In Kant, “the e m p t ya b s t r a c t i o n” of the Thing-in-it-self instead of living Gang, Bewegung,**deeper and deeper, of our knowledgeabout things.

* a thought entity of empty abstraction—Ed.** progress, the movement—Ed.

againstKantianism

V. I. LENIN92

* the Thing-in-itself—Ed.** the essence—Ed.

*** “the ob ject ive concept o f th ings const i tutes the ir veryessence”—Ed.

**** a “means,” “for use”—Ed.***** “external forms”—Ed.

****** forms with content—Ed.

In Kant, Ding an sich* is an emptyabstraction, but Hegel demands abstrac-tions which correspond to der Sache**:“der objective Begriff der Dinge dieSache selbst ausmacht,”*** which cor-respond—speaking materialistically—tothe real deepening of our knowledge ofthe world.It is incorrect to say that Denkformen

are only “Mittel,” “zum Gebrauch.”**** (17)It is also incorrect to say that they are

“äußere Fomen,”***** “Formen, die nuran dem Gehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbstseien” (forms which are merely forms at-tached to the content, and not the contentitself). (17)...

What Hegel demands is a Logic,the forms of which would be ge-haltvolle Formen,****** forms ofliving, real content, inseparablyconnected with the content.

And Hegel draws attention to “thoughtsof all natural and spiritual things,” to the“substantial content....” (18)

—“To bring into clear consciousness thislogical character, which gives soul to mindand drives and operates in it, this is ourproblem.” (18)

Logic is the science not of ex-ternal forms of thought, but ofthe laws of development “of allmaterial, natural and spiritual

NB


things,” i.e., of the developmentof the entire concrete content ofthe world and of its cognition, i.e.,the sum-total, the conclusion of theHistory of knowledge of the world.

“Instinctive action” (instinktartiges Tun)“is broken up ... into an infinitely diversematter.” On the other hand, “intelligentand conscious action” brings out “the con-tent of that which motivates” (den Inhaltdes Treibenden) “out of its immediate unitywith the subject” and makes it “an objectfor it” (for the subject).

“In this web, strong knots are formednow and then, which are foci of the arrestand direction of its” the spirit’s, or thesubject’s “life and consciousness....”

How is this to be understood?Man is confronted with a web

of natural phenomena. Instinctiveman, the savage, does not distin-guish himself from nature. Con-scious man does distinguish, cate-gories are stages of distinguishing,i.e., of cognising the world, focalpoints in the web, which assistin cognising and mastering it.

...“Truth is infinite” (19)—its finitenessis its denial, “its end.” The forms (Denk-formen*), if one regards them as forms,“distinct from the substance and merely at-tached to it” (19), are incapable of embrac-ing truth. The inaneness of these forms of

formal logic makes them deserving of“contempt” (19) and “derision.” (20) The

* forms of thought—Ed.

V. I. LENIN94

* “insufferable”—Ed.** “content”—Ed.

*** things, but the essence, the concept of things—Ed.**** The word “laws” is linked by an arrow with the word “logos”

in the next Paragraph—Ed.

NB

Law of Identity, A = A,—vacuousness,“unerträglich.”* (19)

It is unfair to forget that these categories“have their place and validity in cognition.”(20) But as “indifferent forms” they can be“instruments of error and sophistry” (20),not of truth.

“Contemplative thought” should include“der Inhalt”** as well as the “externalform.” (20)

...“With this introduction of Content intological consideration,” the subject becomesnot Dinge but die Sache, der Begriff derDingo.***

not things, but the laws**** of theirmovement, materialistically

...“the logos, the reason of that whichis.” (21)

And on page (22) at the beginning,the subject of logic is expressed in thewords:

...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seinerNotwendigkeit.”

The categories have to be derived (andnot taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (notby “exposition,” not by “assurances,” butwith p r o o f s) (24) proceeding from thesimplest, most fundamental (Being, Noth-ing, Becoming (das Werden)) (withouttaking others)—here, in them, “in thisgerm, the whole development.” (23)

NB

“develop-ment” of

thinking inaccordance

with itsnecessity


Logic is usually understood as being the“science of thinking,” the “bare form ofcognition.” (27)

Hegel refutes this view. He is againstDing an sich* as “something beyondthought.” (29)

Forms of thinking apparently “have noapplicability to Things-in-themselves.” (31)Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis,** which doesnot cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is notVerstand*** also a Thing-in-itself? (31)

“Transcendental idealism, carried moreconsistently to its logical conclusion, hasperceived the nullity of the spectre of theThing-in-itself left over from the criticalphilosophy—that abstract shadow detachedfrom all content—and has had the aimof demolishing it altogether. Also, this phi-losophy (Fichte?) made a beginning of mak-ing reason develop its own determinationsout of itself. But the subjective attitudeof this attempt did not admit of its beingcarried to completion.” (32)

Logical forms are tote Formen****—for they are not regarded as an “organicunity,” (33) as “their living concrete unity”(ibidem).

* Thing-in-itself—Ed.** True cognition is absurd.—Ed.

*** understanding—Ed.**** dead forms—Ed.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC

V. I. LENIN96

* disrepute—Ed.** It has fallen into disrepute.—Ed.

*** and others—Ed.

In the Phenomenology of Mind I haveexamined the movement of consciousness,from the first direct contradiction (Gegen-satz) between itself and the object, upto absolute knowledge. (34) This path goesthrough all the forms of the relation of con-sciousness to the object....”

“Truth, as science, is pure self-conscious-ness unfolding itself...” (35) “objective think-ing” ... “the concept, as such, is that whichexists in and for itself.” (35) (36: clerical-ism, God, the realm of truth, etc., etc.)37: Kant imparted “an essentially subjec-

tive signification” to “logical determi-nations.” But “thought determinations”have “an objective value and exist-ence.” (37)The old logic has fallen into Verach-ting.* (38) It requires transformation....

39—The old, formal logic is exactly likea child’s game, making pictures outof jig-saw pieces (in Verachtung ge-kommen**: (38))

40 Philosophy must have its own method(not that of mathematics, contra Spi-noza, Wolff und Andere***).

40-41: “For method is the consciousness ofthe form taken by the inner sponta-neous movement of its content,”and the rest of page 41 gives a goodexplanation of dialectics

...“es ist der Inhalt in sich, die Dia-lektik, die er an ihm selbst hat, welcheihn fortbewegt.” (42)

“The given sphere of phenomena ismoved forward by the content itselfof this sphere, the dialectic, which

NB


* “a n i n n e r, n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n”—Ed.** “transition”—Ed.

it (this content) has in (an) itself”(i.e., the dialectic of its own move-ment).

“The negative is to an equal extent pos-itive” (41)—negation is something defi-nite, has a definite content, the inner con-tradictions lead to the replacement of theold content by a new, higher one.

In the old logic there is no transition,development (of concept and thought), thereis not “e i n e s i n n e r e n, n o t w e n-d i g e n Z u s a m m e n h a n g s”* (43) ofall the parts and “Übergang”** of someparts into others.

And Hegel puts forward two basic require-ments:1) “The necessity of connection”

and2) “the immanent emergence of distinctions.

Very important!! This is what it means,in my opinion:

1. N e c e s s a r y connection, the ob-jective connection of all the aspects,forces, tendencies, etc., of the givensphere of phenomena;

2. The “immanent emergence of dis-tinctions”—the inner objective logic ofevolution and of the struggle of thedifferences, polarity.Shortcomings of the Platonic dialectics

in Parmenides.44

“Dialectic is generally regarded as anexternal and negative procedure, that doesnot belong to the subject-matter itself,that is based on pure vanity, as a subjec-tive craving to shake and break down whatis fixed and true,—or that at best leads

DDDD

DDDD

DDD

V. I. LENIN98

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* “the semblance or arbitrariness”—Ed.** the objectivity of semblance—Ed.

*** the necessity of contradiction—Ed.**** self-moving soul

***** essence—Ed.

( (NB: unclear,re turn to i t ! !

to nothing but the inaneness of the dialec-tically treated matter.” (43)(44)—The great merit of Kant was that he

removed “den Schein von Willkür”*from dialectics.

Two important things:(1) Die Objektivität

#des Scheins**

(2) die Notwendigkeit des Wider-spruchs***

selbstbewegende Seele****... (“inherentnegativity”) ... “the principle of all physi-cal and spiritual life.” (44)

#Is not the thought here that semblance

also is objective, for it contains oneof the aspects of the o b j e c t i v e world?Not only Wesen,***** but Schein, too,is objective. There is a difference betweenthe subjective and the objective, BUTIT, TOO, HAS ITS LIMITS.

The dialectical == “comprehending the antithesis in its

unity....”45 Logic resembles grammar, being one

thing for the beginner and another thingfor one who knows the language (and lan-guages) and the spirit of language. “It isone thing to him who approaches Logicand the Sciences in general for the firsttime and another thing for him who comesback from the sciences to Logic.”

Then logic gives “the essential characterof this wealth” (des Reichtums der Welt-

subtle andprofound!


vorstellung*), “the inner nature of spir-it and of the world....” (46)

“Not merely an abstract universal, buta universal which comprises in itself thewealth of the particular.” (47)

A beautiful formula: “Not merelyan abstract universal, but a uni-versal which comprises in itselfthe wealth of the particular, theindividual, the single” (all thewealth of the particular and sin-gle!)!! Très bien!

“—Just as one and the same moralmaxim in the mouth of a youth whounderstands it quite accurately doesnot have the significance and scopewhich it has in the mind of a manof years and experience, for whom itexpresses the full force of its con-tent.

Thus, the value of logic only receives dueappreciation when it is the result of ex-perience of the sciences; then it presentsitself to the mind as universal truth, notas a particular department of knowledgealongside other departments and realities,but as the essence of all this other con-tent....” (47)

“The system of logic is the realm ofshades” (47), free from “all sensuous con-creteness....”

* the wealth of the world view—Ed.

cf. Capital

a goodcomparison(materialist)

“sum-total ofexperience ofthe sciences”

NB

(“Essence”)the “essentialcontent of all

otherknowledge”

V. I. LENIN100

(50)—...“not abstract, dead and immo-bile, but concrete....”[This is characteristic! The spirit andessence of dialectics!]

(52) Note ... the results of Kant’s philos-ophy...: “that reason can cognise novalid content, and with regard toabsolute truth must be referred tofaith....”

(53) Once again, that Ding ansich = an abstraction, the productof thinking that abstracts.

Kant: to res-trict “reason”and strength-

en faith45

B O O K O N E:

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

BOOK ONE:

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING


(59) * ...(en passant)“the nature ofcognition” (idemp. 6 1)

(60) ...“There is nothing (Hegel’s italics)in Heaven, Nature, Spirit, or anywhereelse, which does not contain immedia-cy as well as mediacy....”

1) Heaven—Nature—Spirit. Heavenaway: materialism.

2) Everything is vermittelt = mediat-ed, bound into One, connected by transi-tions. Away with Heaven—law-governedconnection of the whole (p r o c e s s)of the world.

(62) “Logic is pure science, that is, pureknowledge in the WHOLE extent ofits DEVELOPMENT....”

1st line nonsense.2nd line brilliant.

What should one begin with? “Pure Be-ing” (Sein) (63)—“no assumption to be

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.

The themeof logic. To becompared topresent-day“epistemol-

ogy.”( (

NB

WITH WHAT SHOULD ONE BEGIN SCIENCE?

V. I. LENIN104

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* of knowledge—Ed.** “nothing”—Ed.

*** “being”—Ed.

NB

made,” the beginning. “Not hold in itselfany content....” “to be mediated by noth-ing....”

(66) ...“The advance” (des Erken-nens*)... “must be determined bythe nature of the subject and thecontent itself....”

(68) Beginning contains both“Nichts”** and “Sein,”*** it is theirunity:...“that which is beginning, as yetis not: it is merely advancing to-wards Being ....” (from n o t - B e -i n g t o Be i n g: “not-Being, whichis also Being”).

Nonsense about the absolute (68-69).I am in general trying to read Hegelmaterialistically: Hegel is materialismwhich has been stood on its head (accord-ing to Engels46)—that is to say, I castaside for the most part God, the Abso-lute, the Pure Idea, etc.

(70-71) One cannot begin philosophy withthe “Ego.” There is no “objectivemovement.” (71)


(77) Pure Being—“without any further de-termination.”(Bestimmung* is already Qualität.**)

Transitionof Sein—intoDasein***

Sein—Nichts—Werden****“Pure Being and pure Nothing are ... the

same.” (78)(81: This seems to be a “paradox.”) Their

union is Werden.“Movement of immediate disappearance

of the one into the other....”Nichts is opposed to dem Et-

was.***** But Etwas is alreadya determinate Being distinguish-ed from another Etwas, but itis a question here of simpleNichts. (79)

(The Eleatics and Parmenides,especially the former, arrivedat this abstraction of Being.)According to Heraclitus “allthings flow” (80)..., i.e., “every-thing is Becoming.”

* determination—Ed.** quality—Ed.

*** Existent Being—Ed.**** Being—Nothing—Becoming—Ed.

***** Something—Ed.

Existent (?)Being

FiniteBeing

—and thisinto Fürsich-sein (Beingfor Self?)( (

S E C T I O N O N E:

DETERMINATENESS (QUALITY)

V. I. LENIN106

* Out or nothing comes nothing?—Ed.** D e t e r m i n a t e Being—Ed.

*** in fine—at the end—Ed.

Ex nihilo nihil fit?* Out of Nichts comesSein (Werden)....

(81): “It would not be difficult to dem-onstrate this unity of Being and Noth-ing ... in every (Hegel’s italics) example,in every fact and thought” ... “neitherin heaven nor on earth is there anythingnot containing both Being and Nothing.”Objections presume b e s t i m m t e s Sein**(I have 100 taler or not) 82 i. f.***,—but that is not the question....

“A determinate or finite Being is suchas refers itself to another; it is a contentwhich stands in a relation of necessity withother content or with the whole world.In view of the mutually determinant connec-tion of the whole, metaphysics could makethe assertion—which is really a tautology—that if the least grain of dust were destroyedthe whole universe must collapse.” (83)(86): “What is first in science has had to

show itself first, too, historically.”

It sounds very materialistic!

(91): “Becoming is the subsistence of Be-ing as much as of not-Being....”“Transition is the same thing asBecoming....” (92 i. f.)

(94) “Parmenides, equally with Spinoza,will not admit transition from Being,or the absolute Substance, to the neg-ative, finite.”For Hegel, however, the unity or indi-visibility (p. 9 0 this term is some-times better than unity) of “Being” and“Nothing’ gives the transition, Werden.

“The neces-sary connec-tion of the

wholeworld”... “the

mutuallydeterminantconnection of

the whole”NB


* Perhaps so?—Ed.** “external reflection”—Ed.

*** “incomprehensibility of the beginning”—Ed.**** sophistry—Ed.

***** arising and passing away—Ed.****** The superseding of Becomnig.—Ed.

The absolute and the relative, the fin-ite and the infinite = parts, stagesof one and the same world. So etwa?*

(92: “We shall reserve for such Being asis mediated the term Existence.”)

102: According to Plato in the “Parme-nides,” the transition from Being andthe One = “äußere Reflexion.”**

104: It is said that darkness is the ab-sence of light. But “as little is seenin pure light as in pure darkness....”

107—Reference to infinitely small mag-nitudes, which are taken in processof disappearing....

“There exists nothing that is not a meancondition between Being and Nothing.”

“Unbegreiflichkeit des Anfangs”***—ifNothing and Being exclude each other, butthat is not dialectics, but Sophisterei.****(108)

“For sophistry is an argument proceedingfrom a baseless supposition which is allowedwithout criticism or reflection; while weterm dialectic that higher movement ofReason where terms appearing absolutelydistinct pass into one another through them-selves, through what they are, and the as-sumption of their separateness cancels it-self.” (108)

Werden. Its Moments: Entstehen undVergehen.***** (109)

Das Aufheben des Werdens******—das

Dasein. concrete, determinate Being (?)

NB

Sophistry

and

dialectics

V. I. LENIN108

* supersede = terminate-maintain (simultaneously to pre-serve)—Ed.

** Existent Being is Determinate Being—Ed.*** “concrete”—Ed.

**** an other—v a r i a b l e a n d f i n i t e—Ed.***** every determination is negation—Ed.

****** abstract and obscure Hegelianism.—Ed.******* Thing-in-itself—Ed.

******** being-for-other—Ed.

110: aufheben = ein Ende machen= erhalten

(aufbewahren zugleich)*

112: Dasein ist bestimmtes Sein** (NB114 “ein Konkretes”***),—Quality,separate from Anderes,—v e r ä n d e r-l i c k u n d e n d l i c h.****

114 “Determinateness, taken thus isolatedand by itself as existent determinate-ness, is Quality..,.” “Quality, which isto count as something separately exist-ing, is Reality.” (115)

117 ...“Determinateness is negation....”(Spinoza) Omnis determinatio est ne-gatio,***** “this statement is of im-measurable importance....”

120: “Something is the first negation ofnegation....”

125—...Two pairs of determinations: 1)“Something and Other”; 2) “Being-for-Other and Being-in-Self.”

127—Ding an sich*******—“a very simpleabstraction.” The proposition that wedo not know what Things-in-themselvesare seems sagacious. The Thing-in-itselfis an abstraction from all determi-nation S e i n - f ü r - A n d e r e s*******

Here the exposition’is somewhat fragment-

ary and highlyobscure.

( ( abstrakte undabstruse Hege-

lie******—Engels

NB


* the quest ion, in thought lessness , is so put as to render ananswer impossible—Ed.

** in reading Hegel—Ed.*** Something—Ed.

from all relation to Other , i.e., aNothing. Consequently, the Thing-in-itself is “nothing but an abstraction,void of truth and content.”

This is very profound: the Thing-in-it-self and its conversion into a Thing-for-others (cf. Engels47). The Thing-in-itself is altogether an empty, lifelessabstraction. In life, in movement, eachthing and everything is usually bothin itself” and “for others” in relationto an Other, being transformed fromone state to the other.

129 En passant: dialectical philosophy,which is unknown to “metaphysicalphilosophy, which includes also thecritical philosophy.”

D i a l e c t i c s is the teaching whichshows how O p p o s i t e s can beand how they happen to be (how theybecome) i d e n t i c a l,—under what con-ditions they are identical, becomingtransformed into one another,—why thehuman mind should grasp these oppos-ites not as dead, rigid, but as living, con-ditional, mobile, becoming transformedinto one another. En lisant Hegel**....

134: “L i m i t (is) simple negation or firstnegation” (das Etwas.*** Every Some-thing has its L i m i t) “while Other isat the same time negation of negation....”

NB

Sehr gut!! Ifwe ask whatThings- i n -

t h e m s e l v e sare, so ist indie Frage ge-dankenloser

Weise dieUnmöglich-

keit derBeantwort-

ung ge-legt*.... (127)

Kantian-ism =

metaphysics

V. I. LENIN110

NB

thoughts ondialectics enlisant Hegel

137: “Etwas mit seiner immanenten Gren-ze gesetzt als der Widerspruch seinerselbst, durch den es über sich hinaus-gewiesen und getrieben wird, ist dasEndliche.”

(“S o m e t h i n g, taken fromthe point of view of its imma-nent Limit—from the point ofview of its self-contradiction,a contradiction which drives itthis Something and leads itbeyond its limits, is the Finite.)

When things are described as finite,—that is to admit that their not-Beingis their nature (“not-Being constitutes theirBeing”).

“They” (things) “are, but the truth of thisbeing is their end.”

Shrewd and clever! Hegel analysesconcepts that usually appear to be deadand shows that there is movement inthem. Finite? That means moving toan end! Something?—means n o t t h a twhich is Other. Being in general?—means such indeterminateness that Be-ing = not-Being. All-sided, univer-sal flexibility of concepts, a flexibil-ity reaching to the identity of oppo-sites,—that is the essence of the matter.This flexibility, applied subjectively =eclecticism and sophistry. Flexibility,applied objectively, i.e., reflecting theall-sidedness of the material processand its unity, is dialectics, is the correctreflection of the eternal developmentof the world.

139—The Infinite and the Finite, it issaid, are opposite to one another?(see p. 148) (cf. p. 151).


* Ought, or Should-be; and Bound or Boundary—Ed.** the Finite—Ed.

*** In the MS., the Russian letter “и” appears above the lastletter of the word for “evolution”. In Russian, the ending “и” formsthe plural of the word—Ed.

**** impulse, pain—Ed.

sehr gut!

The dialect-ics of thingsthemselves,of Nature

itself, of thecourse of

events itself

141—Sollen und Schranke*—Moments ofdes Endlichen.**

143—“At Ought the transgression beyondfinitude, Infinity, begins.”

143—It is said that reason has its bounds.“When this assertion is made it is notseen that by the very fact that some-thing has been determined as a bound-ary, it has already been surpassed.”

144: A stone does not think, therefore itsrestrictedness (Beschränktheit) is nobound (Schranke) for it. But the stonealso has its bounds, for instance itsoxydisability, if it “is a base capableof being oxydised.”

Evolution*** of the stone144-145:—Everything (human) passes be-

yond its bounds (Trieb, Schmerz,****etc.), but Reason, if you please, “can-not pass beyond its bounds”!

“It is true that not every passagebeyond the bound is a veritable eman-cipation from it!”

A magnet, if it had consciousness,would consider its turning to the northas freely made (Leibnitz).—No, itwould know then all directions of space,and it would consider the one directionas a boundary to its freedom, a limi-tation of it.

148 ...“It is the nature of the finite topass beyond itself, to negate its nega-tion and to become infinite....” Notexternal (fremde) power (Gewalt) (149)converts the finite into the infin-

V. I. LENIN112

* “bad infinity”—Ed.** on this side—Ed.

*** on that side—Ed.**** they are—Ed.

***** inseparable—Ed.

To be appliedto atoms ver-sus electrons.

In generalthe infinite-ness of mat-

ter deepwithin...

The connec-tion (of all

parts) of infi-nite progress

ite, but its (finite’s) nature (seine Natur).151: “Schlechte Unendlichkeit”*—infini-

ty qualitatively counterposed to fini-tude, not connected with it, separatedfrom it, and if the finite were dies-seits,** and the infinite jenseits,***as if the infinite stood above the finite,outside it....

153: In fact, however, sind sie**** (thefinite and the infinite) untrennbar.*****They are a unity. (155)

158-159: ...“The unity of finite andinfinite is not an external juxtapositionof these terms, nor an improper con-nection contrary to their determinat-ion, and binding together entitiesseparate and opposed and mutuallyindependent and hence incompatible;on the contrary, each in itself is thisunity, and is so only in transcendingitself, neither excelling the other inBeing-in-Self and affirmative ExistentBeing. It has been demonstrated abovethat finitude exists only as a passingbeyond itself; it thus contains infin-ity, which is its Other....”

...“The infinite progress, however, assertsmore than this” (than the mere compar-ison of the finite with the infinite): “in it isalso posited the connection (Hegel’s italics)of terms which also are distinct....” (160)167 “The nature of speculative thought ...

consists solely in seizing the opposedmoments in their unity.”The question how the infinite arrivesat finite is sometimes considered as


the essence of philosophy. But thisquestion amounts to elucidating theirconnection....

168 ...“In the other subjects, too, the artof putting questions demands someeducation; still more so in philosoph-ical subjects, if a better answer is to bereceived than that the question is id le .”

The relation to the Other has disappeared;what has remained is the relation toSelf.

173-174: Fürsichsein—Being-for-Self—in-finite Being, consummated qualitativeBeing. The relation to the Other has dis-appeared; what has remained is the relat-ion to Self. Quality reaches its climax(auf die Spitze) and becomes quantity.

The idealism of Kant and Fichte... (181)“remains in the dualism” ((unclear)) “ofexistent Being and Being-for-Self...,”

i.e., that there is no transition of theThing-in-itself (mentioned in the fol-lowing sentence) to the appearance? ofthe object to the subject?

Why Fürsichsein is Eins* is not clearto me. Here Hegel is extremely obscure,in my opinion.

The One is the old principle of the äτο−µον** (and the void). The void is consideredQuell der Bewegung*** (185) not onlyin the sense that space is not filled, butalso enthüllt**** “this profounder thought,

* One—Ed.** atom (indivisible)—Ed.

*** source of motion—Ed.**** contains—Ed.

***** self-movement—Ed.

Bien dit!

NB:Selbstbeweg-

ung.*****

V. I. LENIN114

* inordinate—Ed.** the One—Ed.

that the negative in general contains theground of Becoming, the unrest of self-movement.” (186)1 8 3: “The ideality of Being-for-Self as

totality thus, first, passes into reality,and into the most fixed and abstractof all, as One.”

Dark waters...

The thought of the ideal passing intothe real is profound: very importantfor history. But also in the personallife of man it is clear that this containsmuch truth. Against vulgar materialism.NB. The difference of the ideal from thematerial is also not unconditional, notüberschwenglich.*

189—Note: The monads of Leibnitz. Theprinciple of Eins** and its incomplete-ness in Leibnitz.

Obviously, Hegel takes his self-de-velopment of concepts, of categories,in connection with the entire historyof philosophy. This gives still a newaspect to the whole Logic.

193 ...“It is an old proposition that Oneis Many, and more especially that theM a n y are O n e....”

195 ...“The distinction of One and Manyhas determined itself to be that of theirrelation to one another; this is dividedinto two relations, Repulsion and At-traction....”


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In general, all this Fürsichsein* was,probably, in part required by Hegel todeduce the transition of quality intoquantity” (199)—quality is determi-nateness, determinateness for self, Ge-setzte,* it is the One—this gives theimpression of being very far fetched andempty.

Note, page 203, the remark, which is notdevoid of irony, against that

“procedure of knowledge reflecting onexperience, which first perceives determi-nations in the phenomenon, next makesthem the basis, and assumes for theirso-called explanation corresponding funda-mental materials or forces which are sup-posed to produce these determinations ofthe phenomenon....”

* Being-for-self—Ed.** the posited—Ed.

V. I. LENIN116

S E C T I O N T W O:

MAGNITUDE (QUANTITY)

* continuity—Ed.** discreteness—Ed.

*** true dialectics—Ed.**** In the MS., the word “separateness” is crossed out.—Ed.

***** In the MS. , the words “cont igu i ty , success iveness” arecrossed out.—Ed.

Kant has four “antinomies.” In fact,every concept, every category is similarlyantinomous. (217)

“The old scepticism did not shrink fromthe labour of demonstrating this contra-diction or antinomy in every concept whichit found in the sciences.”

Analysing Kant very captiously (andshrewdly), Hegel comes to the conclusionthat Kant simply repeats in his conclusionswhat was said in the premises, namelyhe repeats that there is a category of Kon-tinuität* and a category of Diskretion.**

From this it follows merely “that, takenalone, neither determination has truth,but only their unity. This is the true dia-lectic consideration of them, and the trueresult.” (226)229: “Die Diskretion translation? sepa-

rateness,**** d i s m e m b e r m e n tlike die Kontinuität continuity (?),successiveness (?),***** continuity isa moment of Q u a n t i t y....”

The role ofscepticism inthe history of

philosophy

WahrhafteDialek-tik***


232: “Quantum—which, first, means quan-tity having any determinateness or lim-it at all—is, in its complete determi-nateness, Number....”

234: “A n z a h l amount enumeration? andUnit constitute the moments of Num-ber.”

248—On the problem of the role and sig-nificance of number (much about Py-thagoras, etc., etc.)

Among other things, an apt remark:“The richer in determinateness, and hence

in relation, thoughts become, the more con-fused, on the one hand, and the more arbit-rary and senseless, on the other hand, be-comes their representation in such formsas numbers.” (248-249) ((Valuation ofthoughts: richness in determinations a n dc o n s e q u e n t l y in relations.))

In regard to Kant’s antinomies (worldwithout beginning, etc.) Hegel again dem-onstrates des Längeren* that the premisestake as proved that which has to be proved.(267 -278)

Further the transition of quantity intoquality in the abstract-theoretical expo-sition is so obscure that nothing can beunderstood. Return to it!!

2 8 3: the infinite in mathematics. Hither-to the justification has consistedo n l y in the correctness of the results(“welche aus sonstigen Gründen erwie-sen ist”**),... and not in the clear-ness of the subject cf. Engels48 .

* in detail—Ed.** “demonstrated on other grounds”—Ed.

NB

V. I. LENIN118

* justification—Ed.** abstruse—Ed.

*** Reflections on the Metaphysics of the Infintesimal Calcul-us—Ed.

**** relation—Ed.

285: In the infinitesimal calculus acertain inexactitude (conscious) is ig-nored, nevertheless the result obtainedis not approximate but absolutely exact!

285: Notwithstanding this, to demandRechtfertigung* here is “not as super-fluous” “as to ask in the case of the nosefor a demonstration of the right touse it.”49

Hegel’s answer is complicated, abst-rus,** etc., etc. It is a question ofh i g h e r mathematics; cf. E n g e l son the differential and integral calcu-lus.50

Interesting is Hegel’s remark made inpassing—“transcendentally, that is reallysubjective and psychological”... “tran-scendental, that is, in the subject.” (288)

Pp. 282-327 u. ff.—379A most detailed consideration of the

differential and integral calculus, withquotations—Newton, Lagrange, Carnot,Euler, Leibnitz, etc., etc.,—showinghow interesting Hegel found this “vanish-ing” of infinitely small magnitudes,this “intermediate between Being and not-Being.” Without studying highermathematics all this is incomprehens-ible. Characteristic is the title Carnot:“Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du calculinfinitésimal”!!!***

The development of the concept Verhält-nis**** (379-394) extremely obscure. Note


only, p. 394, the remark on symbols, thatthere is nothing to be said against them ingeneral. But “against all Symbolism” itmust be said that it sometimes is “a con-venient means of escaping from compre-hending, stating and justifying the concep-tual determinations” (Begriffsbestimmun-gen). But precisely this is the concernof philosophy.

“The common determinations of force,or substantiality, cause and effect, andothers, are themselves too only symbolsused to express, for example, vital andspiritual relations; that is, they are untruedeterminations of those relations.” (394)

NB?

V. I. LENIN120

S E C T I O N T H R E E:

M E A S U R E

“In Measure, to put it abstractly, Qual-ity and Quantity are united. Being assuch is the immediate self-identity of de-terminateness. This immediacy of determi-nateness has transcended itself. Quantity isBeing which has returned upon itself insuch a manner that it is simple self-identity as indifference to determinateness.”(395) The third term is Measure.

Kant introduced the category of modal-ity (possibility, actuality, necessity) andHegel remarks that in Kant:

“This category means that it is the rela-tion of the object to thought. In the senseof this idealism, thought in general isessentially external to the Thing-in-itself ...,objectivity, which is a quality of the othercategories, is lacking in the categories ofmodality.” (396)

En passant: (397)Indian philosophy, in which Brahma

passes to Siva (change = disappearance,arising)....

The peoples deify M e a s u r e. (399)? Measure passes into Essence (Wesen).(Regarding the question of Measure it is

not without interest to note the remarkmade in passing by Hegel that “in devel-


oped civil society aggregates of individ-uals belonging to different trades are ina certain relation to one another.”) (402)

On the question of the category of Grad-ualness (Allmähligkeit), Hegel remarks:

“Recourse is so readily made to this cat-egory in order to render intelligible to theeye or to the mind the disappearance of aQuality or of Something; for thus the illu-sion is created that one can almost beeye-witness of disappearance; for, Quantumbeing posited as limit external and variableby its very nature, change (as a change ofQuantum only) needs no explanation. Butin fact nothing is thereby explained; thechange is also essentially the transitionof one Quality into another, or (a more ab-stract transition) of one existence into anon-existence; and this contains a determi-nation different from that of gradual, whichis only a decrease or increase and a one-sided retention of magnitude.

“But already the ancients were aware ofthe connection by which a change appearingas merely quantitative turns into one whichis qualitative, and they illustrated theconfusions which arise from ignorance ofthis connection by popular examples...”(405-406) (“bald”—the removal of one hairfrom a head; a “heap”—the removal of onegrain...) “what” (here) “is refuted is” daseinseitige Festhalten an der abstraktenQuantumsbestimmtheit (“the one-sidedclinging to abstract quantitative deter-minateness,” i.e., “without taking accountof the manifold changes and concrete quali-ties,” etc.). ...“Therefore those changes areno idle and pedantic joke; they are in them-selves correct and the product of a conscious-ness which takes an interest in the phenom-ena which occur in thought.

NB

V. I. LENIN122

* law, or measure—Ed.** higher proof—Ed.

*** qualit ies or determinate concepts ( l ike space and t ime)that are related—Ed.

**** measure—Ed.***** specific quantity—Ed.

****** real measure—Ed.******* elective affinities—Ed.

Gesetz oderMaß*

?

“Quantum when it is taken as indiffer-ent limit is that side from which an Exist-ent Being can unsuspectedly be attackedand destroyed. It is the cunning of theNotion to seize it from this side, where itsQuality does not appear to come into play;and this so much so that the aggrandise-ment of a state or of a property, and so on,which leads in the end to disaster for thestate or the owner of the property, mayat first actually appear as their good for-tune.” (407)

“It is a great merit to become acquaintedwith the empirical numbers of nature (asthe distances of the planets from oneanother), but an infinitely greater meritto cause the empirical Quanta to disappearand to raise them into a universal form ofquantitative determinations, so that theybecome moments of a law or Measure”;the merit of Galileo and Kepler... “Theydemonstrated the laws which they discov-ered by showing that the totality of detailsof perception corresponds to these laws.”(416) But höheres Beweisen** of these lawsmust be demanded in order that theirquantitative determinations be known fromQualitäten oder bestimmten Begriffen, diebezogen sind (wie Baum und Zeit).***

The development of the concept desMaßes,**** as a spezifische Quantität****and as reales Maß****** (including Wahl-verwandtschaften*******—for example,


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chemical elements, musical tones), very ob-scure.

A lengthy note on chemistry, witha polemic against Berzelius and histheory of electro-chemistry. (433-445)

The “nodal line of measure relations”(Knotenlinie von Maßverhältnissen)—tran-sitions of quantity into quality... Gradual-ness and leaps.

In Hegel’s note as always, factual mate-rial, examples, the concrete (hence Feuer-bach said jestingly on one occasion thatHegel banished nature to his notes, Feuer-bach, Works, II, p. ?).51

Pp. 448-452, a note included in thetable of contents (not in the text!! pedant-ry!!): “Examples of such Nodal Lines;in this connection, that there are no leapsin nature.”

Examples: chemistry; musical tones; wa-ter (steam, ice)—p. 449—birth and death.

Abbrechen der Allmähligkeit,p. (450)

“It is said that there are no leaps in nature;and ordinary imagination, when it has toconceive an arising or passing away, thinksit has conceived them (as was mentioned)when it imagines them as a gradual emer-gence or disappearance. But we saw thatthe changes of Being were in general notonly a transition of one magnitude intoanother, but a transition from the quali-tative into the quantitative, and converse-ly: a process of becoming other which

NB NB

Leaps!

Breaksin

gradualness

Leaps!

Leaps!

And again p. 448, that gradualnessexplains nothing without leaps.

e

e

V. I. LENIN124

breaks off graduality and is qualitativelyother as against the preceding ExistentBeing. Water on being cooled does not littleby little become hard, gradually reachingthe consistency of ice after having passedthrough the consistency of paste, but issuddenly hard; when it already has quiteattained freezing-point it may (if it standsstill) be wholly liquid, and a slightshake brings it into the condition ofhardness.

“The gradualness of arising is based uponthe idea that that which arises is already,sensibly or otherwise, actually there, andis imperceptible only on account of itssmallness; and the gradualness of vanishingis based on the idea that not-Being or theOther which is assuming its place equallyis there, only is not yet noticeable;—there, not in the sense that the Other iscontained in the Other which is there initself, but that it is there as existence,only unnoticeable. This altogether can-cels arising and passing away; or the In-itself, that inner thing in which some-thing is before it attains its existence, istransmuted into a smallness of externalexistence, and the essential or conceptualdistinction into a difference external andmerely magnitudinal.—The procedure whichmakes arising and passing away conceiv-able from the gradualness of change isboring in the manner peculiar to tautol-ogy; that which arises or passes away isprepared beforehand, and the change isturned into the mere changing of an exter-nal distinction; and now it is indeed a meretautology. The difficulty for such Under-standing which attempts to conceive con-sists in the qualitative transition of Some-thing into its Other in general and its op-


posite; Understanding, on the other hand,fancies identity and change to be of thatindifferent and external kind which appliesto the quantitative.

“In the moral sphere, insofar as it is con-sidered in the sphere of Being, the sametransition from quantitative to qualitativetakes place, and different qualities appearto base themselves on differences in magni-tude. A ‘more’ or ‘less’ suffices to trans-gress the limit of levity, where somethingquite different, namely, crime, appears;whereby right passes over into wrong, andvirtue into vice.—Thus too do states—other things being equal—derive a differ-ent qualitative character from magnitu-dinal difference....” (450-452)

Further:Transition of Being into Essence (Wesen),

expounded extremely obscurely.End of Volume I.

B O O K T W O:

ESSENCE

B O O K T W O:

ESSENCE


Volume IV. (Berlin, 1834) Part I.Objective Logic. Book II: The Doctrine

of Essence


ESSENCE AS REFLECTION IN ITSELF

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.** Incidentally, Hegel more than once pokes fun at cf. the

passages cited above on gradualness the word (and the concept)erklären (explanation), obviously opposing to the metaphysical solu-tion once for all (“it has been explained”!!) the eternal process of cogni-tion penetrating deeper and deeper. Cf. Volu m e I I I , p . 4 6 3 : “ c a n b ecognised or, as they say, explained.”

*** movement—Ed.

“The truth of Being is Essence.” (3)*Such is the first sentence, sounding thor-oughly idealistic and mystical. Butimmediately afterwards, a fresh wind,so to speak, begins to blow: “Being is theimmediate. Knowledge seeks to understandthat truth** which Being, in and foritself, is, and therefore it does not halt”(d o e s n o t h a l t NB) “at the imme-diate and its determinations, but p e n e-r a t e s (NB) through (NB) it, assum-ing that behind (Hegel’s italics) this Beingthere is something other than Being itself,and that this background constitutes thetruth of Being. This cognition is mediatedknowledge, for it is not lodged immedi-ately with and in Essence, but begins atan Other, at Being, and has to make a pre-liminary passage, the passage of transitionbeyond Being, or rather of entrance intoit....”

This Bewegung,*** the path of knowledge,seems to be the “activity of cognition”

theoryof

knowledge

“p a s s a g e”

V. I. LENIN130

O b j e c t i v es i g i f i-c a n c e

* The Essential and the Unessential.—Ed.** approximately—Ed.

(Tätigkeit des Erkennens) “external to Be-ing.”

“However, this movement is the move-ment of Being itself.”

“Essence ... is what it is ... by virtueof its own infinite movement of Being.” (4)

“Absolute Essence has no DeterminateBeing. Into this, however, it must pass.” (5)

Essence stands midway between Beingand the Notion, as the transition to the Not-ion (=Absolute).

Subdivisions of Essence: Semblance orShow (Schein), Appearance (Erscheinung),Actuality (Wirklichkeit).

Das Wesentliche und das Unwesentli-che.* (8) Der Schein. (9)

In the unessential, in Semblance, thereis a moment of not-Being. (10)

i.e., the unessential, seeming, super-ficial, vanishes more often, does nothold so “tightly,” does not “sit so firmly”as “Essence.” Etwa**: the movementof a river—the foam above and thedeep currents below. B u t e v e n t h ef o a m is an expression of essence!

Semblance and scepticism, Kantianism,respectively:

“Semblance then is the phenomenon ofscepticism; or again the appearance of ideal-ism, such an immediacy, which is neitherSomething nor Thing, and, generally, isnot an indifferent Being which could beoutside its determinateness and relationto the subject. Scepticism did not dare to


NB

the imme-diacy of

Semblance

they did notgo deeper!

affirm ‘it is’; modern idealism did notdare to regard cognition as a knowledgeof the Thing-in-itself; with the former,Semblance was supposed to have no basisat all in any Being; with the latter, theThing-in-itself was supposed incapable ofentering into cognition. But at the sametime scepticism admitted manifold deter-minations of its Semblance, or rather itsSemblance had for content all the manifoldriches of the world. In the same mannerthe appearance of idealism comprehendsthe whole range of these manifold determi-natenesses.”

You include in Schein* all the wealthof the world and you deny the objectivityof Schein!!

“Semblance and appearance are immediate-ly determined so diversely. The contentmay then have no basis in any Being nor inany thing nor Thing-in-itself; for itself itremains as it is: it has only been translatedfrom being into Semblance; thus Semblancecontains these manifold determinatenesses,which are immediate, existent and recip-rocally other. Semblance itself is, then,immediately determinate. It may have thisor that content; but whatever content ithas is not posited by itself but belongs to itimmediately. The idealism of Leibnitz,Kant or Fichte, like any other form of ideal-ism, did not reach beyond Being as deter-minateness, beyond this immediacy anymore than scepticism. Scepticism allowsthe content “that which is immediatelygiven”!! of its Semblance to be given

* Semblance or Show—Ed.

V. I. LENIN132

to it; for it, it is immediate, whatever con-tent it is to have. The monad of Leibnitzdevelops its presentations out of itself;but it is no creative and connecting force,—the presentations arise in it like bubbles;they are indifferent and immediate rela-tive to one another, and therefore to themonad itself. Similarly Kant’s phenomenonis a given content of perception; it presup-poses affections, determinations of the sub-ject which are immediate to one anotherand to the subject. The infinite limitationor check of Fichte’s idealism refuses, per-haps, to be based on any Thing-in-itself,so that it becomes purely a determinate-ness in the Ego. But this determinatenessis immediate and a limit to the Ego, which,transcending its externality, incorporatesit; and though the Ego can pass beyondthe limit, the latter has in it an aspectof indifference by virtue of which itcontains an immediate not-Being ofthe Ego, though itself contained in theEgo.” (10-11)

...“Determinations which distinguish it”(den Schein) “from Essence are deter-minations of Essence....” (12)

It is the immediacy of not-Beingwhich constitutes Semblance; in Essence,Being is not-Being. Its nullity in itself is thenegative nature of Essence itself....” (12)

...“These two moments thus constituteSemblance: Nullity, which however persists,and Being, which however is Moment; oragain negativity which is in itself, andreflected immediacy. Consequently thesemoments are the moments of Essence it-self....”

“Semblance is Essence itself in the deter-minateness of Being....” (12-13)

cf. Machism!!

Semblance =the negative

nature ofEssence


Semblance is (1) nothing, non-exist-ent (Nichtigkeit) whichexists—(2) Being as moment

“Thus Semblance is Essence itself, butEssence in a determinateness, and this insuch a manner that determinateness is onlyits moment: Essence is the showing of it-self in itself.” (14)

That which shows itself is essence inone of its determinations, in one of itsaspects, in one of its moments. Essenceseems to be just that. Semblance is theshowing (Scheinen) of essence itself initself.

...“Essence ... contains Semblance withinitself, as infinite internal movement....” (14)

...“In this its self-movement Essence isReflection. Semblance is the same as Re-flection.” (14)

Semblance (that which shows itself)is the R e f l e c t i o n of Essence in (it)itself.

...“Becoming in Essence—its reflectivemovement—is hence the movement fromNothing to Nothing and through Nothingback to itself....” (15)

This is shrewd and profound. Move-ments “to nothing” occur in nature andin life. Only there are certainly none“from nothing.” Always from something.

“Commonly Reflection is taken in thesubjective meaning of the movement ofjudgment which passes beyond a given im-mediate presentation, seeking universal de-

V. I. LENIN134

* If it may be called that—Ed.** Variants of the translation of the German word “die Reflex-

ion” into Russian are given within the parentheses.—Ed.*** The word Gegensatz is crossed out in the MS.—Ed.

terminations for it or comparing them withit.” (21) (Quotation from Kant—Critiqueof the Power of Judgment52).... “Here, how-ever, neither the reflection of conscious-ness nor the more determinate reflection ofunderstanding, which has the particular andthe universal for its determinations, is inquestion, but only Reflection in general....”

Thus here, too, Hegel charges Kantwith subjectivism. This NB. Hegel isfor the “objective validity” (sit veniaverbo*) of Semblance, “of that whichis immediately given” [the expression“t h a t w h i c h i s g i v e n” is gener-ally used by Hegel, and here see p. 21i. f.; p. 22]. The more petty philosophersdispute whether essence or that whichis immediately given should be takenas basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists).Instead of or, Hegel puts and, explain-ing the concrete content of this “and.”

“Die Reflexion is the showing of Essenceinto itself” (27) (translation? Reflectivity?Reflective determination? Реzлексия isnot suitable).**

...“It” (das Wesen) “is a movement throughdifferent moments, absolute self-media-tion....” (27)Identity — Difference — Contradiction

#Gegensatz*** (Ground)...in particularantithesis

Therefore Hegel elucidates the one-sided-ness, the incorrectness of the “law of iden-tity” (A=A), of the category (all determi-

( (


nations of that which is are categories—pp. 2 7 - 2 8).

“If everything is self-identical it is notdistinguished: it contains no oppositionand has no ground.” (29)

“Essence is ... simple self-identity.” (30)Ordinary thinking places resemblance and

difference next to (“daneben”) each other,not understanding “this movement oftransition of one of these determinationsinto the other.” (31)

And again, against the law of identity(A=A): its adherents

“since they cling to this rigid Identitywhich has its opposite in Variety, they donot see that they are thereby making itinto a one-sided determinateness, whichas such has no truth.” (33)

(“Empty tautology”: 32)(“It contains only f o r m a l truth,

which is a b s t r a c t and incomplete.” (33)

Kinds of reflection: external, etc.; ex-pounded very obscurely.

The principles of difference: “All thingsare different....” “A is also not A....” (44)

“There are no two things which are en-tirely alike....”

There is a difference in one or anotheraspect (Seite), Rücksicht, etc., “insofern,”*etc.

bien dit!!“The customary tenderness for things,

whose only care is that they shall notcontradict one another, forgets here as else-where that this is no solution of the contra-diction, which is merely planted elsewhere,namely, into subjective or external re-flection; and that the latter does in fact

* consideration, etc., “insofar as,” etc.—Ed.

NB

terms under-lined by me

V. I. LENIN136

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contain the two moments—which this re-moval and transplantation proclaim to bea mere positedness—in one unity as tran-scended and related to each other.” (47)

(This irony is exquisite! “Tenderness”for nature and history (among the philis-tines)—the endeavour to cleanse them fromcontradictions and struggle....)

The result of the addition of plus and mi-nus is nought. “The result of contradictionis not only nought.” (59)

The solution of the contradiction, the re-duction of positive and negative to “onlydeterminations” (61) converts Essence (dasWesen) into Ground (Grund) (ibidem)

...“Resolved Contradiction is, then,Grund, that is, Essence as unity of Positiveand Negative....” (62)

“Even a slight experience in reflectivethought will perceive that, if anything hasjust been determined as Positive, it straight-way turns into Negative if any progressis made from that base, and converselythat a Negative determination turns intoPositive; that reflective thought becomesconfused in these determinations and con-tradicts itself. Insufficient acquaintancewith the nature of these determinationsleads to the conclusion that this confusionis a fault which should not occur, andattributes it to a subjective error. Andin fact this transition does remain mereconfusion insofar as the n e c e s s i t y for thism e t a m o r p h o s i s is not present toconsciousness.” (63)

...“The opposition of Positive and Nega-tive is especially taken in the meaningthat the former (although etymologicallyit expresses being posited or positedness)is to be an objective entity, and the lattersubjective, belonging only to external

NB


reflection and in no way concerned withthe objective, which is in and for itselfand quite ignores it.” (64) “And indeed ifthe Negative expresses nothing but theabstraction of subjective caprice....” (thenit, this Negative, does not exist “für dasobjective Positive”*)....

“Truth, too, is the Positive, as knowl-edge, corresponding with its object butit is this self-equality only insofar asknowledge has already taken up a negativeattitude to the Other, has penetrated theobject, and transcended that negation whichthe object is. Error is a Positive, as anopinion affirming that which is not inand for itself, an opinion which knowsitself and asserts itself. But ignorance iseither indifference to truth and error, andthus determined neither as positive nor asnegative,—and if it is determined as a de-ficiency, this determination belongs to ex-ternal reflection; or else, objectively andas proper determination of a nature, itis the impulse, which is directed againstitself, a negative which contains a positivedirection.—It is of the greatest impor-tance to recognise this nature of the Deter-minations of Reflection which have beenconsidered here, that their truth consistsonly in their relation to each other, andtherefore in the fact that each contains theother in its own concept. This must beunderstood and remembered, for withouthis understanding not a step can reallybe taken in philosophy.” (65-66) Thisfrom the Note 1.————

Note 2. “The Law of the Excluded Middle.”Hegel quotes this proposition of the ex-

cluded middle. “Something is either A ornot A; there is no third” (66) and “a n a l -

* “for the objective positive”—Ed.

Truth andObject

that whichis in and for

itself

V. I. LENIN138

* “everything is a term of an opposition”—Ed.

y s e s” it. If this implies that “alles einEntgegengesetztes ist,”* that everythinghas its positive and its negative determi-nation, then it is all right. But if it isunderstood as it is generally understood,that, of all predicates, either a givenone, or its not-Being, applies, then thisis a “triviality”!! Spirit ... sweet, not sweet?green, not green? The determination shouldlead to determinateness, but in this triv-iality it leads to nothing.

And then—Hegel says wittily—it is saidthat there is no third. There is a thirdin this thesis itself. A itself is the third,for A can be both # A and — A. “The Some-thing thus is itself the third term whichwas supposed to be excluded.” (67)

This is shrewd and correct. Every con-crete thing, every concrete something,stands in multifarious and often con-tradictory relations to everything else,ergo it is itself and some other.

Note 3 (at the end of Chapter 2, Sec-tion 1 of Book II of the Logic). “T h eL a w o f C o n t r a d i c t i o n.”

“If now the primary Determinations ofReflection—Identity, Variety and Oppo-sition—are established in a proposition,then the determination into which theypass over as into their truth (namely Con-tradiction) should much more so be com-prehended and expressed in a proposition:a l l t h i n g s a r e c o n t r a d i c t o-r y i n t h e m s e l v e s, in this meaning,that t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n as opposed to theothers expresses much better the t r u t ha n d e s s e n c e o f t h i n g s .—Contradiction,


which emerges in Opposition, is no morethan developed Nothing; and this is alreadycontained in Identity, and occurred in theexpression that the law of identity statesnothing. This negation further determinesitself into Variety and into Opposition,which now is posited Contradiction.

“But it has been a fundamental prejudiceof hitherto existing logic and of ordinaryimagination that Contradiction is a deter-mination having less essence and immanencethan Identity; but indeed, if there wereany question of rank, and the two deter-minations had to be fixed as separate, Con-tradiction would have to be taken as themore profound and more fully essential.For as opposed to it Identity is only thedetermination of simple immediacy, orof dead Being, while Contradiction is theroot of all movement and v i t a l i -t y, and it is only insofar as it contains a Con-tradiction that anything m o v e s a n dh a s i m p u l s e a n d a c t i v i t y.

“Ordinarily Contradiction is removed,first of all from things, from the existentand the true in general; and it is assertedthat there is nothing contradictory. Nextit is shifted into subjective reflection,which alone is said to posit it by relat-ing and comparing it. But really it doesnot exist even in this reflection, for it isimpossible to imagine or to think anythingcontradictory. Indeed, Contradiction, bothin actuality and in thinking reflection, isconsidered an accident, a kind of abnormal-ity or paroxysm of sickness which will soonpass away.

“With regard to the assertion that Con-tradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement.In every experience there must be an ab-

V. I. LENIN140

solute determination of Essence—in everyactuality as well as in every concept.The same remark has already been madeabove, under Infinity, which is Contradic-tion as it appears in the sphere of Being.But ordinary experience itself declares thatat least there are a number of contradic-tory things, arrangements and so forth, thecontradiction being present in them andnot merely in an external reflection. Butit must further not be taken only as anabnormality which occurs just here andthere; it is the Negative in its essentialdetermination, the p r i n c i p l e o f a l l s e l f -m o v e m e n t , which consists of nothing elsebut an exhibition of Contradiction. Exter-nal, sensible motion is itself its immediateexistence. Something moves, not becauseit is here at one point of time and thereat another, but because at one and thesame point of time it is here and not here,and in this here both is and is not. Wemust grant the old dialecticians the contra-dictions which they prove in motion; butwhat follows is not that there is no mo-tion, but rather that motion is existentContradiction itself.

“And similarly internal self-movementproper, or impulse in general (the appe-titive force or nisus of the monad, the en-telechy of absolutely simple Essence), isnothing else than the fact that something isin itself and is also the deficiency or the neg-ative of itself, in one and the same respect.A b s t r a c t self-identity h a s n o v i -t a l i t y but the fact that Positive in itselfis negativity causes it to pass outside itselfand t o c h a n g e . Something therefore isliving only insofar as it contains Contra-diction, and is that force which can bothcomprehend and endure Contradiction. But


if an existent something cannot in its pos-itive determination also encroach on itsnegative, cannot hold fast the one in theother and contain Contradiction within it-self, then it is not living unity, or Ground,but perishes in Contradiction. Speculativethought consists only in this, that thoughtholds fast Contradiction and itself in Con-tradiction and not in that it allows itselfto be dominated by it—as happens to imag-ination—or suffers its determinations to beresolved into others, or into Nothing.”(67-70)

Movement and “se l f -m o v e m e n t” (thisNB! arbitrary (independent), spon-taneous, internally-necessary movement),“change,’’ “movement and vitality,” “theprinciple of all self-movement,” “impulse”(Trieb) to “movement” and to “activity”—the opposite to “d e a d B e i n g”—whowould believe that this is the core of “He-gelianism,” of abstract and abstrusen (pon-derous, absurd?) Hegelianism?? This corehad to be discovered, understood, hin-überretten,* laid bare, refined, which isprecisely what Marx and Engels did.

The idea of universal movement andchange (1813 Logic) was conjectured beforeits application to life and society. In regardto society it was proclaimed earlier (1847)than it was demonstrated in applicationto man (1859).53

“In movement, impulse, and the like,the simplicity of these determinations con-ceals the contradiction from imagination;but this contradiction immediately standsrevealed in the determinations of relation.The most trivial examples—above and be-low, right and left, father and son, and so

* rescued—Ed.

V. I. LENIN142

on without end—all contain Contradictionin one term. That is above which is notbelow; ‘above’ is determined only as notbeing ‘below,’ and is only insofar as thereis a ‘below,’ and conversely: one deter-mination implies its opposite. Father isthe Other of son, and son of father, andeach exists only as this Other of the other;and also the one determination exists onlyin relation to the other: their Being is onesubsistence......... (70)

“Thus although Imagination everywherehas Contradiction for content, it neverbecomes aware of it; it remains an externalreflection, which passes from Likeness toUnlikeness, or from negative relation tointro-reflectedness of the different terms.It keeps these two determinations externalto each other, and has in mind only theseand not their transition, which is the es-sential matter and contains the Contradic-tion.—On the other hand, intelligent reflec-tion, if we may mention this here, consistsin the understanding and enunciating ofContradiction. It does not express the con-cept of things and their relations, and hasonly determinations of imagination for ma-terial and content; but still it relates them,and the relation contains their contradic-tion, allowing their concept to show throughthe contradiction.—Thinking Reason, onthe other hand, sharpens (so to speak)the blunt difference of Variety, the meremanifold of imagination, into essentialdifference, that is, Opposition. The mani-fold entities acquire activity and vitalityin relation to one another only when drivenon to the sharp point of Contradiction;thence they draw negativity, which is theinherent pulsation of self-movement andvitality....” (70-71)


* The word “received” is crossed out in the MS.—Ed.

NB(1) Ordinary imagination grasps dif-

ference and contradiction, but not thetransition from the one to the other,t h i s h o w e v e r i s t h e m o s ti m p o r t a n t.

(2) Intelligence and understanding.Intelligence grasps contradiction,

enunciates it, brings things into rela-tion with one another, allows the“concept to show through the contra-diction,” but does not express theconcept of things and their relations.

(3) Thinking reason (understanding)sharpens the blunt difference of vari-ety, the mere manifold of imagination,into essential difference, into opposi-tion. Only when raised to the peak ofcontradiction, do the manifold enti-ties become active (regsam) and livelyin relation to one another, they re-ceive* acquire that negativity whichis the i n h e r e n t p u l s a t i o no f s e l f - m o v e m e n t a n dv i t a l i t y.

Subdivisions:Der Grund—(ground)(1) Absolute Ground—die Grundlage (the

foundation). “Form and Matter.” “Con-tent.”

(2) Determinate Ground (as the ground[for] a determinate content)

Its transition to Conditioning Media-tiondie bedingende Vermittelung

(3) The Thing-in-itself (transition to Exist-ence). Note. “The Law of Ground.”

V. I. LENIN144

* “relation” of causes—Ed.** matter—Ed.

Customary proposition: “Everything hasits sufficient Ground.”

“In general this just means that what ismust be considered not as an existent im-mediate, but as a posited entity. We mustnot remain at immediate Determinate Be-ing or at determinateness in general, butmust pass back to its Ground....” (76)It is superfluous to add: sufficient Ground.What is insufficient, is not Ground.

Leibnitz, who made the law of sufficientground the basis of his philosophy, un-derstood this more profoundly. “L e i b -n i t z especially opposed the sufficiency ofGround to c a u s a l i t y in its strictmeaning of m e c h a n i c a l efficacy.”(76) He looked for “Beziehung” der Ursach-en* (77),— —“the whole as essential unity.”

He looked for ends, but teleologydoes not belong here, according toHegel, but to the doctrine of the No-tion.

...“The question cannot therefore beasked, how Form is added to Essence; forForm is only the showing of Essence initself—it is its own immanent (sic!) Re-flection....” (81)

Form is essential. Essence isformed. In one way or another also independence on Essence....

Essence as formless identity (of itselfwith itself) becomes matter. (82)

“...It” (die Materie**) “is the real foun-dation or substratum of Form....” (82)

“If abstraction is made from every de-termination and Form of a Something,


indeterminate Matter remains. Matter isa pure abstract. (—Matter cannot be seenor felt, etc.—what is seen or felt is a de-terminate Matter, that is, a unity of Matterand Form).” (82)

Matter is not the Ground of Form, butthe unity of Ground and Grounded. (83)Matter is the passive, Form is the active(tätiges). (83) “Matter must be formed,and Form must materialise itself....” (84)

“Now this, which appears as the activityof Form, is equally the proper movementof Matter itself....” (85-86)

...“Both—the activity of Form and themovement of Matter—are the same.... Mat-ter is determined as such or necessarily hasa Form; and Form is simply material,persistent Form.” (86)

Note: “Formal Method of Explanationfrom Tautological Grounds.”

Very often, Hegel says, especially in thephysical sciences, “Grounds” are explainedtautologically: the movement of the earthis explained by the “attractive force” ofthe sun. And what then is attractive force?It is also movement!! (92) Empty tautol-ogy: why does this man go to town? Be-cause of the attractive force of the town!(93) It also happens in science that at firstmolecules, the ether, “electrical matter”(95-96), etc., are put forward as “groundand then it turns out “that they’’ (these con-cepts) “are determinations deduced fromthat for which they are meant to be thegrounds—hypotheses and figments derivedby an uncritical reflection....” (96) Or it issaid that we “do not know the inner natureitself of these forces and classes of matter...”(96) then there remains indeed nothing to“explain,” but one must simply limit one-self to the facts....

NB

V. I. LENIN146

* real Ground—Ed.** “multiple”—“content determinations, relations and consid-

erations”—Ed.*** empty—Ed.

**** Hegel materialistically turned upside down—Ed.***** It coincides.—Ed.

Der reale Grund*... is not tautology,but already “some other determination ofContent.” (97)

On the question of “Ground” (Grund),Hegel remarks inter alia:

“If it is said of Nature that it is theground of the world, then what is calledNature is identical with the world, andthe world is nothing but Nature itself.”(100) On the other hand, “if Nature is to bethe world, a manifold of determinationsis added externally....”

Since everything has “mehrere”—“Inhalts-bestimmungen, Verhältnisse und Rücksich-ten,”** so any number of arguments forand against can be put forward. (103)That is what Socrates and Plato calledsophistry. Such arguments do not contain“the whole extent of the thing,” they do not“exhaust” it (in the sense “of constituting itsconnections” and “containing all” its sides).

The transition of Ground (Grund) intocondition (Bedingung).

If I am not mistaken, there is muchmysticism and leeres*** pedantry inthese conclusions of Hegel, but the basicidea is one of genius: that of the univer-sal, all-sided, vital connection of every-thing with everything and the reflec-tion of this connection—materialistischauf den Kopf gestellter Hegel****—inhuman concepts, which must likewisebe hewn, treated, flexible, mobile, rel-ative, mutually connected, united inopposites in order to embrace the world.

And purelylogical

elaboration?Das fälltzusam-

men*****It must

coincide, asinduction anddeduction in

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Continuation of the work of Hegel andMarx must consist in the d i a l e c -t i c a l elaboration of the history of hu-man thought, science and technique.

A river and the drops in this river.The position of every drop, its relationto the others; its connection with theothers; the direction of its movement;its speed; the line of the movement—straight, curved, circular, etc.—upwards,downwards. The sum of the movement.Concepts, as registration of individualaspects of the movement, of individ-ual drops (=“things”), of individual“streams,” etc. There you have à peuprès* the picture of the world accordingto Hegel’s Logic,—of course minus Godand the Absolute.

“When all the Conditions of a thing arepresent, it enters into existence....” (116)

Very good! What has the AbsoluteIdea and idealism to do with it?

Amusing, this “derivation” of ... exis-tence....

The word“moment” isoften usedby Hegel inthe sense ofmoment ofc o n n e c -

t i o n,moment

of concate-nation

V. I. LENIN148


APPEARANCE

The first phrase: “Essence must appear....”(119) The appearance of Essence is (1)Existenz (Thing); (2) Appearance (Erschei-nung). (“Appearance is what the Thingis in itself, or its truth” p. 120. “The intro-reflected self-existent world stands opposedto the world of Appearance....” (120) (3)Verhältnis (relation) and Actuality.

Incidentally: “Demonstration in generalis mediated cognition....” (121).

...“The various kinds of Being demandor contain their own kind of mediation;consequently the nature of demonstrationtoo is different for each.......” (121)

And again ... on the existence ofGod!! This wretched God, as soon asthe word existence is mentioned, hetakes offence.

Existence differs from Being by its medi-ation (Vermittlung: 124). [?By concrete-ness and Connection?]

...“The Thing-in-itself and its mediatedBeing are both contained in Existence,and each is an Existence; the Thing-in-it-self exists and is the essential Existenceof the Thing, while mediated Being is itsunessential Existence....” (125)


?The Thing-in-itself is related toBeing as the essential to the non-essential?

...“The latter” (Ding-an-sich) “is not sup-posed to contain in itself any determinatemultiplicity, and consequently obtains thisonly when brought under external reflec-tion, but remains indifferent to it (—TheThing-in-itself has colour only in relationto the eye, smell in relation to the nose,and so forth.)...” (126)

...“A Thing has the Property of effectingthis or that in an Other, and of disclosingitself in a peculiar manner in its relationto it....” (129) “The Thing-in-itself thusexists essentially....” (131)

The Note deals with “The Thing-in-itselfof Transcendental Idealism....”

...“The Thing-in-itself as such is no morethan the empty abstraction from all deter-minateness, of which it is admitted thatnothing can be known just because it ismeant to be the abstraction from all deter-mination....” (131)

Transcendental idealism ... places “alldeterminateness of things (both with regardto form and to content) in consciousness...”(131) “accordingly, from this point of view,it falls within me, the subject, that I seethe leaves of a tree not as black but asgreen, the sun as round and not as square,and taste sugar as sweet and not as bit-ter; that I determine, the first and secondstrokes of a clock as successive and not assimultaneous, and determine the first to beneither the cause nor the effect of thesecond, and so forth” (131).... Hegel furthermakes the reservation that he has hereinvestigated only the question of the

V. I. LENIN150

* “external reflection”—Ed.** thinghood—Ed.

*** property—Ed.**** “substance”—Ed.

the core =against sub-

jectivism andthe split

between theThing-in-itself and

appearances

law (ofappearances)

Thing - in - i t se l f and “äußer l i che Ref le -xion.”*

“The essential inadequacy of the stand-point at which this philosophy halts con-sists in this, that it clings to the abstractThing-in-itself as to an ultimate determi-nation; it opposes Reflection, or the deter-minateness and multiplicity of the Prop-erties, to the Thing-in-itself; while infact the Thing-in-itself essentially has thisExternal Reflection in itself, and deter-mines itself as an entity endowed with itsproper determinations, or Properties; whenceit is seen that the abstraction of the Thing,which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, i s a nuntrue determination.” (132)

...“Many different Things are in essen-tial Reciprocal Action by virtue of theirProperties; Property is this very recipro-cal relation, and apart from it the Thingis nothing....” (133)

Die Dingheit** passes over into Eigen-schaft.*** (134) Eigenschaft into “matter”

or “Stoff”**** (“things consist of sub-stance”), etc.

“Appearance at this point is Essencein its Existence....” (144) “Appearanceis the unity of semblance and Existence....”(145)

Unity in appearances: “This unity is theLaw of Appearance. Law therefore is thepositive element in the mediation of theApparent.” (148)

Here in general utter obscurity.But there is a vital thought, evident-ly: the concept of law is one of thestages of the cognition by man of


unity and connection, of the recip-rocal dependence and totality of theworld process. The “treatment” and“twisting” of words and concepts towhich Hegel devotes himself here isa struggle against making the con-cept of law absolute, against simplify-ing it, against making a fetish of it.NB for modern physics!!!

“This enduring persistence which belongsto Appearance in Law....” (149)

“Law is the Reflection of Appearanceinto identity with itself.” (149) (Law isthe identical in appearances: “the Reflectionof Appearance into identity with itself.”)

...“This identity, the foundation of Ap-pearance, which constitutes Law, is thepeculiar moment of Appearance....” (150)“Hence Law is not beyond Appearance,but is immediately present in it; the realmof Laws is the quiescent (Hegel’s italics)reflection of the existing or appearingworld....”

This is a remarkably materialisticand remarkably appropriate (withthe word “ruhige”*) determination.Law takes the quiescent—and there-fore law, every law, is narrow, in-complete, approximate.

* “quiescent”—Ed.

NBLaw

is the endur-ing (the

persisting) inappearances(Law is theidentical in

appearances)

NB

Law = thequiescent

reflection ofappearances

NB

V. I. LENIN152

* deficiency—Ed.** Totality of Appearance—Ed.

“Existence passes back into Law as intoits Ground; Appearance contains themboth—simple Ground and the dissolvingmovement of the appearing universe, ofwhich Ground is the essentiality.”“Hence law is essential appearance.”(150)

Ergo, law and essence are conceptsof the same kind (of the same order),or rather, of the same degree, expressingthe deepening of man’s knowledge ofphenomena, the world, etc.

The movement of the universe in ap-pearances (Bewegung des erscheinenden Uni-versums), in the essentiality of this move-ment, is law.

“The realm of Laws is the q u i e s -c e n t content of Appearance; Appearanceis this same content, but presents itselfin unquiet change and as Reflection intoother.... Appearance, therefore, as againstLaw is the t o t a l i t y , for it contains Law,b u t a l s o m o r e, namely the momentof self-moving Form.” (151)

But further on, although unclearly,it is admitted, it seems, p. 154,that law can make imp for this Man-gel* and embrace both the negativeside and the Totalität, der Erschei-nung** (especially 154 i. f.). Re-turn to this!

The World in and for itself is identicalwith the World of Appearances, but at the

NBLaw is

essentialappear-

ance

NB(Law is the

reflection ofthe essentialin the move-ment of theuniverse)

(appearance,totality) ((law =

part))(Appearanceis r i c h e r

than law)

e

ee

e


same time it is opposite to it. (158) Whatis positive in the one is negative in theother. What is evil in the World of Appear-ances is good in the world which is in andfor itself, Cf.—Hegel says here—The Phe-nomenology of Mind, p. 121 et seq.

“The Appearing and the Essential Worldare each ... the independent whole of Exist-ence. One was to have been only reflectedExistence, and the other only immediateExistence; but each continues itself inthe other, and consequently in itself is theidentity of these two moments.... Bothin the first instance are independent, butthey are independent only as totalities,and they are this insofar a each essentiallyhas in itself the moment of the other....”(150-160)

The essence here is that both theworld of appearances and the world initself are moments of man’s knowledgeof nature, stages, alterations or deepen-ings (of knowledge). The shifting ofthe world in itself further and furtherfrom the world of appearances—that iswhat is so far still not to be seen in Hegel.NB. Have not Hegel’s “moments” ofthe concept the significance of “mo-ments” of transition?

...“Thus Law is E s s e n t i a l R e -l a t i o n.” (160) (Hegel’s italics)

(Law is r e l a t i o n. This NB for theMachists and other agnostics, and for theKantians, etc. Relation of essences or be-tween essences.

The term world expresses the formlesstotality of multifariousness....” (160)

And the third chapter (“Essential Rela-tion”) begins with the proposition: “The

( (

V. I. LENIN154

truth of Appearance is Essential Relation....”(161)

S u b d i v i s i o n s:The relation of W h o l e to P a r t s;

this relation passes into the followingone (sic!! (p. 168)):—of Force to its Man-ifestation;—of Inner to Outer.—The tran-sition to Substance, Actuality.

...“The truth of the relation consists,then, in mediation....” (167)

“Transition” to Force: “Force is the neg-ative unity into which the contradictionof Whole and Parts has resolved itself; itis the truth of that first Relation.”(170)

((This is one of 1,000 similar passagesin Hegel, which arouse the fury of naïvephilosophers like Pearson, the author ofThe Grammar of Science.54—He quotes asimilar passage and exclaims in fury: Whata galimatias is being taught in ourschools!! And in a certain limited sense heis right. To teach that is stupid. One mustfirst of all e x t r a c t the material-istic dialectics from it. Nine-tenths of it,however, is chaff, rubbish.))

Force makes its appearance as “belong-ing” (als angehörig) (171) “to the existingThing or Matter....” “When therefore it isasked how the Thing or Matter comes tohave a Force, then the Force appears asconnected with it externally, and impressedon the Thing by all alien power.” (171)

...“This is apparent i n a l l n a t u r a l ,scientfic , and, in general, intel lectuald e v e l o p m e n t ; and it is essential to under-stand that the First, when as yet Somethingis internal, or in its concept, is, for thisreason, only its immediate and passive ex-istence....” (181)


Feuerbachdaran

“knüpftan.”***

Down withGott, there

remainsNatur.****

TThe beginning of everything can

be regarded as inner—passive—andat the same time as outer.

But what is interesting here isnot that, but something else: Hegel’scriterion of dialectics that has acci-dentally slipped in: “i n a l l n a t -u r a l, s c i e n t i f i c a n d i n -t e l l e c t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t”:here we have a g r a i n of profoundtruth in the mystical integument ofHegelianism!

Example: the germ of a man, says Hegel,is only internal man, dem Anderssein Preis-gegebenes,* the passive. Gott** at firstis not yet Spirit. “I m m e d i a t e l y,t h e r e f o r e, G o d i s only N a t u r e.”(182)

(This is also characteristic!!)

* s o m e t h i n g g i v e n u p t o o t h e r n e s s — E d .** God—Ed.

*** “links up to this”—Ed.**** nature—Ed.

V. I. LENIN156


A C T U A L I T Y

* Here Lenin’s manuscript gives the list of chapters of Section III:1) “The Alsolute”; 2) “Actuality”; 3) “The Absolute Relation.”—Ed.

...“Actuality is the unity of Essence andExistence....” (184)

Subdivisions: 1) “T h e A b s o l u t e”—2) Actuality proper. “Actuality, Possibil-ity and Necessity constitute the formalmoments of the Absolute.” 3) “AbsoluteRelation”: Substance.*

“In it itself” (dem Absoluten) “there isno Becoming” (187)—and other nonsenseabout the Absolute....

The Absolute is the absolute Absolute...The Attribute is a relative Absolute...In a “note” Hegel speaks (all too gener-

ally and obscurely) of the defects of thephilosophy of Spinoza and Leibnitz.

Inter alia note:“The one-sidedness of one philosophic

principle is generally faced by its oppositeone-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totalityat least is found as a dispersed complete-ness.” (197)

Actuality is higher than Being, andhigher than Existence.(1) Being is Imme-

diate“B e i n g i s n o t

y e t a c t u a l.” (200)It passes into other.

usually: fromone extremeto the other

totality = (inthe shape of)

dispersedcompleteness

BBBBBB


* At this point Lenin’s manuscript continues in a new notebook.—Ed.** Hegel, Werke , Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

(2) Existence (itpasses into Ap-pearance)

(3) Actuality

...“Actuality also stands higher than Exist-ence” (200)....

...“Real Necessity is a relation whichis full of content”.... “But this Necessity isat the same time relative....” (211)

“Absolute Necessity then is the truthinto which Actuality and Possibility ingeneral pass back, as well as Formal andReal Necessity.” (215)

(Continued)*...(End of Volume II of the Logic, the Doc-

trine of Essence)...It is to be noted that in the small Logic

(the Encyclopaedia)5 5 the same thing isexpounded very often more clearly, withconcrete examples. Cf. idem Engels andKurio Fischer.56

On the question of “possibility,” Hegelnotes the emptiness of this category andsays in the E n c y c l o p a e d i a:

“Whether a thing is possible or impossibledepends on the content, i.e., on the sum-total of the moments of Actuality which inits unfolding discloses itself to be Ne-cessity.” (Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 287,**§ 143, Addendum.)

“T h e s u m - t o t a l , t h e e n -t i r e t y o f t h e m o m e n t s o fA c t u a l i t y, which in its u n f o l d -i n g discloses itself to be Necessity.”

—arises out of Ground,o u t o f c o n d i t i o n s ,but it still lacks theunity of “Reflectionand immediacy.”u n i t y o f E x i s t e n c ea n d B e i n g - i n - S e l f(Ansichsein) B

BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB

V. I. LENIN158

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DISTRIBUTION

* to man—Ed.** Logic—Ed.

*** Hegel, Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

The unfolding of the sum-total ofthe moments of actuality NB = theessence of dialectical cognition.

Cf. in the same Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI,p. 289, the eloquent words on the vanity ofmore delight at the wealth and flux of thephenomena of nature and on the neces-sity

...“of advancing to a closer insight intothe i n n e r harmony and u n i f o r m i t yo f n a t u r e....” (289) (C l o s e n e s st o m a t e r i a l i s m.)

Ibidem. Encyclopaedia, p. 292: “DevelopedActuality, as the coincident alternationof Inner and Outer, the alternation of theiropposite motions combined in a singlemotion, is Necessity.”

E n c y c l o p a e d i a, Vol. VI, p. 294:...“Necessity is blind only insofar as it isnot understood....”

Ibidem, p. 295 “it happens to him” (demMenschen*)... “that from his activity therearises something quite different from whathe had meant and willed....”

Ibidem, p. 301 “Substance is an essen-tial s t a g e i n t h e p r o c e s s o fd e v e l o p m e n t of the Idea....”

Read: an important stage in the proc-ess of development of human knowl-edge of nature and matter.

Logik,** Vol. IV...“It” (die Substanz) “is the Being in all

Being....” (220)***The Relation of Substantiality passes

over into the Relation of Causality. (223)

BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB


...“Substance attains ... Actuality onlywhen it has become Cause....” (225)

On the one hand, knowledge of mat-ter must be deepened to knowledge (tothe concept) of Substance in order tofind the causes of phenomena. On theother hand, the actual cognition of thecause is the deepening of knowledgefrom the externality of phenomena tothe Substance. Two types of examplesshould explain thus: 1) from the his-tory of natural science, and 2) from thehistory of philosophy. More exactly:it is not “examples” that should behere—comparaison n’est pas raison,*—but the quintessence of the history ofboth the one and the other # the his-tory of technique.

...“Effect contains nothing whatever whichCause does not contain...” (226) und um-gekehrt**....

Cause and effect, ergo, are merely mo-ments of universal reciprocal dependence,of (universal) connection, of the recip-rocal concatenation of events, merelylinks in the chain of the developmentof matter.

NB:“It is the same fact which displays itself

first as Cause and then as Effect,—here aspeculiar persistence and there as posited-ness or determination in an Other.” (227)

The all-sidedness and all-embrac-ing character of the interconnection

NB of the world, which is only one-

* comparison is not proof—Ed.** and vice versa—Ed.

NB

V. I. LENIN160

* external stimulus—Ed.

sidedly, fragmentarily and incom-pletely expressed by causality.

“But we may here and now observe that,insofar as the relation of cause and effectis admitted (although in an improper sense),effect cannot be greater than cause; foreffect is nothing further than the manifes-tation of cause.” (230)

And further about history. Hegel saysthat it is customary in history to quoteanecdotes as the minor “causes” of majorevents—in fact they are only occasions,only äußere Erregung,* which “the innerspirit of the event would not have required.”(230) “Consequently, these arabesques ofhistory, where a huge shape is depicted asgrowing from a slender stalk, are a spright-ly but a most superficial treatment.” (Ibi-dem)

This “inner spirit”—cf. Plekhanov57—is an idealistic, mystical, but a veryprofound indication of the historicalcauses of events. Hegel subsumes his-tory completely under causality and un-derstands causality a thousand timesmore profoundly and richly than themultitude of “savants” nowadays.

“Thus a stone in motion is cause; itsmovement is a determination which it has,while besides this it contains many otherdeterminations of colour, shape, and soon, which do not enter into its causal na-ture.” (232)

Causality, as usually understood byus, is only a small particle of universalinterconnection, but (a materialist ex-

in history“minor causes

of majorevents”


tension) a particle not of the subjective,but of the objectively real intercon-nection.

“But the m o v e m e n t of the Determi-nate Relation of C a u s a l i t y has nowresulted in this, that the cause is notmerely extinguished in the effect, andwith it the effect too (as happens in FormalCausality),—but the cause in its extinction,in the effect, becomes again; that effectvanishes into cause, but equally becomesagain in it. Each of these determinationscancels itself in its positing and posits it-self in its cancellation; what takes placeis not an external transition of causalityfrom one substratum to another, but thisits becoming other is at the same timeits own positing. Causality, then, presup-poses or conditions itself.” (235)

“The movement of the relation of cau-sality” = in fact: the movement of mat-ter, respective the movement of history,grasped, mastered in its inner connec-tion up to one or other degree of breadthor depth....

“At this point Reciprocity presents itselfas a reciprocal causality of presupposedsubstances conditioning each other; eachis, in relation to the other, at once activeand passive substance.” (240)

“In Reciprocity, original Causality pre-sents itself as an arising out of its negation(or passivity) and as a passing away intoit—as a Becoming....

“Necessity and Causality have, then, van-ished in it; they contain both the imme-diate identity (as connection and relation)and the absolute substantiality of dis-

“connectionand relation”

V. I. LENIN162

“unity of sub-stance in the

distinct”

relation,mediation

necessity doesnot disap-

pear, when itbecomesfreedom

tincts, and therefore their absolute con-tingency,—the original unity of substan-tial variety, hence absolute contradiction.Necessity is Being, because it is;—the self-unity of Being, which has itself for ground;but, conversely, because it has a ground,it is not Being, it is nothing whateverbut Semblance, relation or mediation. Cau-sality is this posited transition of originalBeing, or cause, into Semblance or merepositedness, and conversely of positednessinto originality; but the identity itselfof Being and Semblance is, still, inner Ne-cessity. This internality (or Being-in-Self)transcends the movement of Causality; andconcurrently, the substantiality of the sideswhich are in relation is lost—Necessityreveals itself. Necessity does not becomeFreedom because it vanishes, but onlybecause its identity (as yet an inner iden-tity) is manifested.” (241-242)

When one reads Hegel on causality,it appears strange at first glance thathe dwells so relatively lightly on thistheme, beloved of the Kantians. Why?Because, indeed, for him causality isonly one of the determinations of univer-sal connection, which he had alreadycovered earlier, in his entire exposition,much more deeply and all-sidedly; al-ways and from the very outset empha-sising this connection, the reciprocaltransitions, etc., etc. It would be veryinstructive to compare the “b i r t h -p a n g s” of neo-empiricism (respective“physical idealism”) with the solutionsor rather with the dialectical methodof Hegel.It is to be noted also that in the E n c y -

c l o p a e d i a Hegel stresses the inadequacy


and emptiness of the bare concept of “re-ciprocal action.”

Vol. VI, p. 308*:“Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proxi-

mate truth of the relation of cause andeffect, and stands, so to say, on the thresh-old of the Notion, nevertheless, preciselyon this account one should not rest con-tent with applying this relation, inso-far as it is a matter of conceptual cogni-t ion. If one gets no further than consideringa given content merely from the pointof view of reciprocity, then such an atti-tude is in fact quite without concept; it isthen merely a matter of a dry fact, andthe requirement of mediation, which isthe point of immediate concern in apply-ing the relation of causality, still remainsunsatisfied. On closer examination, thedeficiency in the application of the rela-tion of reciprocal action is seen to be thatthis relation, instead of being the equiva-lent of the Notion, has itself to be graspedfirst of all. And this occurs through itstwo sides not being left as an immediatedatum but, as was shown in the two pre-ceding paragraphs, being recognised as mo-ments of a third, higher determination,which is precisely the Notion. If, forexample, we regard the customs of theSpartans as the effect of their constitu-tion, and the latter, conversely, as theeffect of their customs, such a view mayperhaps be correct, but it is a conceptionthat gives no final satisfaction, because inpoint of fact it enables neither the con-stitution nor the customs of this people

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

NB

mere“recipro-city” =

emptiness

the require-ment of med-

iation, (ofconnection),that is the

point at issuein applyingthe relationof causality

NB

V. I. LENIN164

to be understood. Such understanding canonly come about when these two aspects,and likewise all the other special aspectsof the life and the history of the Spartansare recognised to be grounded in thisNotion.” (308-309)— — — — —

At the end of the second volume of theLogic, Vol. IV, p. 243, in the transitionto the “Notion,” the determination is given:“the Notion, the realm of Subjectivity, orof Freedom....”

NB Freedom = Subjectivity(“or”)

End, Consciousness, Endeavour NB

all the “spe-cial aspects”

and the whole(Begriff”*)

B O O K T H R E E:

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

BOOK THREE:

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC OR THE DOCTRINE

OF THE NOTION


Vol. V. The Science of LogicPart II: S u b j e c t i v e L o g i c or t h e D o c t r i n e

o f t h e N o t i o n

ON THE NOTION IN GENERAL

* previous works—Ed.** “ossified material”—Ed.

*** “to render fluid”—Ed.**** Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

***** of the Notion—Ed.

In the first two parts, says Hegel, I hadno Vorarbeiten,* but here, on the otherhand, there is “verknöchertes Material”**(which it is necessary “in Flüssigkeit brin-gen”***...) (3)****

“Being and Essence are the moments ofits becoming” (= des Begriffs).***** (5)

Should be inverted: concepts arethe highest product of the brain,the highest product of matter.

“Accordingly Objective Logic, which con-siders Being and Essence, really constitutesthe genetic exposition of the Notion.” (6)9-10: The great significance of the phi-

losophy of Spinoza as the philosophyof substance (this standpoint is veryadvanced, but it is incomplete andnot the most advanced: in generalthe refutation of a philosophic systemdoes not mean discarding it, but de-veloping it further, not replacing itby another, one-sided opposed system,but incorporating it into something

V. I. LENIN168

* in fine—at the end—Ed.** “to speak ill” of imagination and memory—Ed.

*** “the summit of thought”—Ed.**** “the incomprehensible”—Ed.

***** truth—Ed.****** sensation on and intuition—Ed.

more advanced). In Spinoza’s systemthere is no free, independent, conscioussubject (it lacks “the freedom and inde-pendence of the self-conscious subject”)(10), but in Spinoza also t h o u g h tis an attribute of substance (10 i. f.*)

1 3 i. f.: Incidentally—just as at one timeit was the fashion in philosophy “dasSchlimme nachzusagen” der Einbil-dungskraft und den Gedächtnisse**—sonow it is the fashion to belittle thesignificance of the “notion” (= “dashöchste des Denkens”***) and to praise“das Unbegriefliche”**** allusion toKant? .

Passing to criticism of K a n t i a n -i s m, Hegel regards as Kant’s greatmerit (15) the advancement of theidea of the “transcendental unity ofapperception” (the unity of the con-sciousness in which the Begriff is cre-ated), but he reproaches Kant for hiso n e - s i d e d n e s s and s u b j e c -t i v i s m:

“The object is truly in and for it-self only as it is in thought; as it is inintuition or ideation, it is appear-ance....” (16) (Hegel raises Kant’s ideal-ism from being subjective to beingobjective and absolute)....

Kant admits the objectivity of con-cepts (Wahrheit***** is their object),but all the same leaves them subjective.

He makes Gefühl und Anschau-ung****** precede understanding (Ver-

from intui-tion to

cognition ofobjectivereality...


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stand). Hegel speaks of this asfollows:

“Now, first, with regard to this relationof the understanding or the Notion to thestages which are supposed to precede it,it is of importance what science it is thatis being treated, in order to determine theform of these stages. In our science, sinceit is pure logic, these stages are Being andEssence. In psychology, sensation and in-tuition and also ideation in general pre-cede understanding. In the Phenomenologyof Mind, since it is the doctrine of con-sciousness, the ascent was made throughthe stages of sensuous consciousness and,next, perception, to understanding.” (17)In Kant the exposition is very “incom-plete” here.

After that—the CHIEF THING—...“The Notion must not here be con-

sidered as an act of self-consciousunderstanding, or as subjective under-standing: what we have to do withis the Notion in and for itself, whichconstitutes a STAGE AS WELL OFNATURE AS OF SPIRIT. LIFE, ORORGANIC NATURE, IS THAT STAGEOF NATURE AT WHICH THE NO-TION EMERGES.” (18)

There follows a very interesting passage(pp. 19-27) where Hegel refutes Kant,p r e c i s e l y e p i s t e m o l o g c a l l y (Engelsprobably had this passage in mind when hewrote in Ludwig Feuerbach58 that the mainpoint against Kant had already been madeby Hegel, insofar as this was possiblefrom an idealistic standpoint),—exposingKant’s duality and inconsistency, his, soto speak, vacillation between empiricism(= materialism) and idealism, Hegel him-self arguing w h o l l y a n d e x c l u -

The “eve” of

V. I. LENIN170

Kantbelittles the

power ofreason

the moreconsistent

idealistclings toG o d!

s i v e l y from the standpoint of a moreconsistent idealism.

Begriff is still not the highest concept:still higher is the I d e a = the unity ofBegriff and Reality.

“ ‘It is only a notion’ is a thing com-monly said; and not only the Idea, but sen-suous, spatial, and temporally palpableexistence is opposed to the Notion, assomething which is more excellent thanit. And the abstract is counted of lessworth than the concrete, because from theformer so much of that kind of materialhas been omitted. To those who hold thisview, the process of abstraction means thatfor our subjective needs one or another char-acteristic is taken out of the concrete insuch a manner that, while so many otherproperties and modifications of the ob-ject are omitted, it loses nothing in valueor dignity. They are the real and are reck-oned as counting in full, only they areleft on the other side; and it is only theincapacity of understanding to absorb suchriches that forces it to rest content withmeagre abstraction. But if the given ma-terial of intuition and the manifold ofideation are taken as the real in opposi-tion to that which is thought and to theNotion, then this is a view the renuncia-tion of which is not only a condition ofphilosophy, but is assumed even by reli-gion; for how can these be needed andhave significance if the fugitive and super-ficial appearance of the sensuous and the in-dividual are taken for the truth?.. Con-sequently, abstracting thought must notbe considered as a mere setting-aside ofthe sensuous material, whose reality is


said not to be lowered thereby; but it isits transcendence, and the reduction of it(as mere appearance) to the essential, whichmanifests itself in the Notion only.” (19-21)

Essentially, Hegel is completely rightas opposed to Kant. Thought proceedingfrom the concrete to the abstract—provided it is correct (NB) (and Kant,like all philosophers, speaks of correctthought)—does not get away f r o mthe truth but comes closer to it. Theabstraction of matter, of a law of nature,the abstraction of value, etc., in shortall scientific (correct, serious, not ab-surd) abstractions reflect nature moredeeply, truly and c o m p l e t e l y. Fromliving perception to abstract thought,and from this to practice,—such is thedialectical path of the cognition oftruth, of the cognition of objective real-ity. Kant disparages knowledge in orderto make way for faith: Hegel exaltsknowledge, asserting that knowledge isknowledge of God. The materiatist exaltsthe knowledge of matter, of nature,consigning God, and the philosophicalrabble that defends God, to the rubbishheap.

“A principal misapprehension here isthat the natural principle or the beginning,which is the starting-point in natural de-velopment or in the history of the individ-ual in its formation, is taken as the trueand as that which is first also in the No-tion.” (21) (—It is correct that peoplebegin with that, but truth lies not inthe beginning but in the end, or rather,in the continuation. Truth is not the ini-tial impression).... “But, philosophy is not

V. I. LENIN172

* constitutive—Ed.** objective—Ed.

*** dispenses with the material of sensuousness—Ed.

meant to be a narrative of what happens,but the cognition of what is true in happen-ings.” (21)

In Kant there is “psychological ideal-ism” (22): Kant’s categories “are onlydeterminations which are derived from self-consciousness.” (22) Rising from under-standing (Verstand) to reason (Vernunft),Kant belittles the significance of thought,denying it the capacity to “reach perfectedtruth.” (23)

“It is declared” (Kant) “to be an abuse iflogic, which ought to be merely a canonof judgment, is regarded as an organ forthe production of objective discoveries. Thenotions of Reason, in which a higherforce (an idealistic phrase!) and a deeper(c o r r e c t!!) content were of necessitydivined, are less Konstitutives* it shouldbe: Objektives** than even the categories;they are mere ideas. Their use may cer-tainly be permissible, but these intelligibleessences, which should wholly unlock thetruth, are to signify no more than hypothe-ses; and it would be completely arbitraryand reckless to ascribe any truth to themin and for themselves, since they can occurin no kind of experience. Could it ever havebeen thought that philosophy would gain-say the validity of the intelligible essencesbecause they are without the spatial andtemporal material of sensuousness?” (23)

Here, too, Hegel is essentially right:value is a category which entbehrt desStoffes der Sinnlichkeit,* but it ist r u e r than the law of supply anddemand.


Only Hegel is an idealist: hence thenonsense of “k o n s t i t u t i v e s,”* etc.Kant, on the one hand, quite clearly recog-

nises the “o b j e c t i v i t y” (24) of thought(“des Denkens”) (“an identity of the Notionand the thing” (24))—but, on the other hand,

“the assertion is made again that we sure-ly cannot know things as they are in andfor themselves, and that truth does notallow cognising reason to approach it; thattruth which consists in the unity of objectand Notion is after all only appearance, andthe reason now is that content is only themanifold of intuition. Of this argument ithas been remarked that this manifoldness,insofar as it belongs to intuition as op-posed to the Notion, is transcended preciselyin the Notion, and that the object is led backby the Notion into its non-contingent essen-tiality; the latter enters into appearance,and for this very reason the appearance isnot merely non-essential, but manifesta-tion of Essence.” (24-25)

“It will always remain a matter for aston-ishment how the Kantian philosophy knewthat relation of thought to sensuous exist-ence, where it halted, for a merely rela-tive relation of bare appearance, and fullyacknowledged and asserted a higher unityof the two in the Idea in general, and, forexample, in the idea of an intuitive under-standing; but yet stopped dead at this rel-ative relation and at the assertion that theNotion is and remains utterly separatedfrom reality;—so that it affirmed as truthwhat it pronounced to be finite knowledge,and declared to be superfluous, improper,and figments of thought that which itrecognised as truth, and of which it estab-lished the definite notion.” (26)

* c o n s t i t u t i v e—Ed.

Hegelin

favour of thecognisabilityof the Thing-

in-itself

appearance ismanifestation

of essence

NB

NB

NB

ee

V. I. LENIN174

* “formal science”—Ed.** “pure truth”—Ed.

!! Ha-ha!

?

In logic, the Idea “becomes the creatorof Nature.” (26)

Logic is “formelle Wissenschaft”* (27)as against the concrete sciences (of natureand mind), but its object matter is “diereine Wahrheit”**.... (27)

Kant himself, in asking what truth is (27)(the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 83) andgiving a trivial answer (“correspondenceof knowledge with its object”), strikes athimself, for “the fundamental assertionof transcendental idealism” is

—that “cognition is not capable of appre-hending Things-in-themselves” (27)—

—and it is clear that all this is “anuntrue idea.” (28)

In arguing against the purely formal con-ception of logic (which Kant, too, is saidto have)—saying that from the ordinarystandpoint (truth is the correspondence“Übereinstimmung” of knowledge with

the object) correspondence “essentially de-mands two sides” (29), Hegel says that theformal element in logic is “pure truth” (29)and that

...“this formal element must thereforebe thought of as being in itself much richerin determinations and content, and as hav-ing infinitely more influence upon theconcrete, than it is generally held to have....”(29)

...“But, even if the logical forms are tobe regarded as nothing more than formalfunctions of thought, yet this characterwould make them worthy of an investi-gation as to how far they correspond tothe truth in themselves. A system of logicwhich neglects this can claim at most


to have the value of a natural-historicaldescription of the empirical phenomena ofthought.” (30-31) (Herein is said to liethe immortal merit of Aristotle), but “itis necessary to go further....” (31)

Thus, not only a description of theforms of thought and not only a n a t -u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l d e s c r i p -t i o n o f t h e p h e n o m e n a ofthought (wherein does that differ froma description of the forms??) but alsoc o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h t r u t h,i.e.??, the quintessence or, more sim-ply, the results and outcome of the his-tory of thought?? Here Hegel is ideal-istically unclear, and fails to speakout fully. Mysticism.

Not psychology, not thephenomenology of mind,b u t logic = the questionof truth.

Cf. Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 319*;“But in point of fact they” (die logischenFormen**), “turned round as forms of thenotion, constitute the living spirit of theactual....”

Begriff in its development into “adäquatenBegriff,”*** becomes the Idea. (33)****“Notion in its objectivity is the objectwhich is in and for itself.” (33)

= objectivism # mysticismand betrayal of development

* Hegel, Werke , Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.** the logical forms—Ed.

*** “adequate notion”—Ed.**** Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

?

In this con-ception, log-ic coincides

with thet h e o r y o f

k n o w l -e d g e. Thisis in general

a veryimportantquestion.

The generallaws of move-ment of thew o r l d and

of t h o u g h t

NBNB

a

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

b

V. I. LENIN176


SUBJECTIVITY

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.** Lenin wrote this in English.—Ed.

En lisant...These partsof the workshould be

called: a bestmeans forgetting a

headache!**

The dialectical movement of the “No-tion”—from the purely “formal” notionat the beginning—to the Judgment (Urteil),then—to the Syllogism (Schluß) and—fi-nally to the transformation of the subjectiv-ity of the Notion into its objectivity.(34-35)*

The first distinguishing feature of theNotion is Universality (Allgemeinheit). NB:The Notion grew out of Essence, and thelatter out of Being.

The further development of the Uni-versal, the Particular (Besonderes) and theIndividual (Einzelnes) is in the highestdegree abstract and “a b s t r u s e.”

Kuno Fischer expounds these “abstruse”considerations very poorly, taking upthe lighter points—examples from theE n c y c l o p a e d i a, and adding ba-nalities (against the French revolution.Kuno Fischer, Vol. 8, 1901, p. 530),etc., but not showing the reader howto look for the key to the difficulttransitions, nuances, ebbs and flows ofHegel’s abstract concepts.

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF


Obviously, here too the chief thingfor Hegel is to trace the t r a n s i t i o n s.From a certain point of view, undercertain conditions, the universal is theindividual, the individual is the uni-versal. Not only (1) connection, andinseparable connection, of all conceptsand judgments, but (2) transitions fromone into the other, and not only transi-tions, but also (3) identity of opposites—that is the chief thing for Hegel. Butthis merely “glimmers” through the fog ofextremely abstruse exposition. The his-tory of thought from the standpointof the development and application ofthe general concepts and categories ofthe Logic—voilà ce qu’il faut!**Quoting, on p. 125, the “famous” syllo-

gism—“all men are mortal, Gaius is a man,therefore he is mortal”—Hegel shrewdlyadds: “Boredom immediately descends whensuch a syllogism is heard approaching”—this is declared to be due to the “unnützenForm,”*** and Hegel makes the profoundremark:

“All things are a Syllogism, a universalwhich is bound together with individualitythrough particularity; but of course theyare not wholes consisting of three propo-sitions.” (126)

Very good! The most common logical“figures”—(all this in the Par. on the“First Figure of the Syllogism”) are themost common relations of things, setforth with the pedantic thoroughness ofa school textbook, sit venia verho.****

* notion-determinations—Ed.** That’s what is needed!—Ed.

*** “otiose form”—Ed.**** If I may be allowed to say so.—Ed.

Or is thisafter all a

tribute to oldformal logic?

Yes! Andanother trib-ute—a trib-ute to mys-ticism =idealism

Voilà, anabundance of “determina-tions” and of

Begriffsbe-stimmungen*in this part

of the Logic!

True!

“All thingsare a s y l l o-

g i s m”...NB

NB

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FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

V. I. LENIN178

NB:Umkeh-ren*****

MarxappliedHegel’s

dialecticsin its

rationalform topoliticaleconomy

The formation of (abstract)notions and operations withthem already includes idea,conviction, c o n s c i o u s n e s sof the law-governed characterof the objective connectionof the world. To distinguishcausality from this connectionis stupid. To deny the objec-tivity of notions, the objec-tivity of the universal inthe individual and in theparticular, is impossible. Con-sequently, Hegel is much moreprofound than Kant, andothers, in tracing the reflec-tion of the movement of theobjective world in the move-ment of notions. Just asthe simple form of value, theindividual act of exchange of

One wouldhave to

return toHegel fora step-by-step anal-

ysis ofany cur-

rent logicand t h e o-

r y o fk n o w l-

e d g e of aKantian,

etc.

N B

Con-cerning

the ques-tion of

the truesignifi-

cance ofHegel’sLogic

* individual—Ed.** particular—Ed.

*** universal—Ed.**** Chapter I of Capital—Ed.

***** to be inverted—Ed.

Hegel’s analysis of syllogisms (E.—B.—A., Eins*; Besonderes**; Allge-meines,*** B.—E.—A., etc.) recallsMarx’s imitation of Hegel in ChapterI.****

On KantInter alia:“Kant’s Antinomies of Reason are just

this, that first one determination of a No-tion is made the foundation of the Notion,and next, and with equal necessity,the other....” (128-129)


one given commodity foranother, already includes inan undeveloped form all themain contradictions of capi-talism,—so the simplest gen-eralisation, the first andsimplest formation of no-tions (judgments, syllogisms,etc.) already denotes man’sever deeper cognition ofthe objective connection ofthe world. Here is where oneshould look for the truemeaning, significance androle of Hegel’s Logic. ThisNB.

Concerningthe questionof the criti-

cism of mod-ern Kantian-ism, Mach-ism, etc.:

Two aphorisms:1. Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (and

agnosticism in general) more from a vul-gar-materialistic standpoint than from adialectical-materialistic standpoint, inso-far as he merely rejects their views a li-mine,* but does not correct them (as He-gel corrected Kant), deepening, generalis-ing and extending them, showing thec o n n e c t i o n and t r a n s i t i o n s ofeach and every concept.

2. Marxists criticised (at the beginningof the twentieth century) the Kantiansand Humists more in the manner of Feuer-bach (and Büchner) than of Hegel.

...“An experience which rests upon in-duction is taken as valid although admitted-ly the perception is not completed; but nomore can be assumed than that no example

* from the threshold—Ed.

NB

V. I. LENIN180

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can be produced contrary to this experience,insofar as the latter is true in and foritself.” (154)

This passage is in the §: “The Syllo-gism of Induction.” The simplest truthobtained in the simplest inductive wayis always incomplete, for experience isalways unfinished. Ergo: the connectionof induction with analogy—with sur-mise (scientific foresight), the relativityof all knowledge and the absolute con-tent in each step forward in cognition.

Aphorism: It is impossible completelyto understand Marx’s Capital , and es-pecially its first chapter, without havingthoroughly studied and understood thewhole of Hegel’s Logic. Consequently,half a century later none of the Marxistsunderstood Marx!!

The t r a n s i t i o n from the syllogismof analogy (about analogy) to the syllogismof necessity,—from the syllogism of induc-tion to the syllogism of analogy,—thesyllogism from the universal to the individ-ual—the syllogism from the individualto the universal,—the exposition of c o n-n e c t i o n and t r a n s i t i o n s con-nection is transition , that is Hegel’s

task. Hegel actually p r o v e d thatlogical forms and laws are not an emptyshell, but the reflection of the objec-tive world. More correctly, he did notprove, but made a brilliant guess.

aphorism


In the E n c y c l o p a e d i a Hegel re-marks that the division of Understandingand Reason, of N o t i o n s of one kindor the other must be understood in such a way

“that our mode of behaviour is eitherto stop short at the merely negative andabstract form of the Notion, or to conceivethe latter, in accordance with its truenature, as that which is at once positiveand concrete. Thus, for example, if freedomis regarded as the abstract opposite of ne-cessity, this is merely the Notion of under-standing of freedom, whereas the true andrational Notion of freedom contains ne-cessity as transcended within it.” (Pp. 347-348, Vol. VI*)

Ibidem p. 349: Aristotle described thelogical forms so completely that “essen-tially” there has been nothing to add.

Usually the “figures of the syllogism”are regarded as empty formalism. “They”(these figures) “have, however, a very fun-damental meaning, based on the necessitythat every moment, as determination ofthe Notion, itself becomes the whole andthe mediating Ground.” (352, Vol. VI)

Encyclopaedia (Vol. VI, pp. 353-354)“The objective meaning of the figures

of the syllogism is in general that every-thing rational is manifested as a threefoldsyllogism, such that each of its membersassumes the position of one of the extremesas well as that of the mediating middle.Such, for example, is the case with the threebranches of philosophy, i.e., the LogicalIdea, Nature and Mind. Here it is Naturethat is first of all the middle, connectingmember. Nature, this immediate totality,unfolds itself in the two extremes of the Log-ical Idea and Mind.”

* Hegel, Werke , Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

abstract andconcretenotions

Freedom andNecessity

NB

NB

(

V. I. LENIN182

NB

NB:Hegel “only”

deifies this“logical

idea,” obe-dience to

law, univer-sality

#“Spirit, however, is only spirit throughbeing mediated by Nature....” “It is Spiritthat recognises the logical Idea in Natureand so raises it to its essence....” “Thelogical Idea is the absolute Substanceboth of Spirit and of Nature, the universal,the all-pervading.” (353-354)

“Nature, this immediate totality, un-folds itself in the Logical Idea andMind.” Logic is the science of cognition.It is the theory of knowledge. Knowl-edge is the reflection of nature by man.But this is not a simple, not an imme-diate, not a complete reflection, butthe process of a series of abstractions,the formation and development of con-cepts, laws, etc., and these concepts,laws, etc. (thought, science = “the log-ical Idea”) embrace conditionally, ap-proximately, the universal law-governedcharacter of eternally moving and de-veloping nature. Here there are actually,objectively, three members: 1) nature;2) human cognition = the humanb r a i n (as the highest product of thissame nature), and 3) the form of reflec-tion of nature in human cognition, andthis form consists precisely of con-cepts, laws, categories, etc. Man cannotcomprehend = reflect = mirror nature asa whole, in its completeness, its “imme-diate totality,” he can only eternallycome closer to this, creating abstrac-tions, concepts, laws, a scientific pic-ture of the world, etc., etc.

In regard to analogy an acute observation:It is the instinct of reason which allows

one to divine that one or another empiri-cally found determination has its roots in

( (


* The word “logic” in the manuscript is linked to the word “here” in thefollowing quotation from Hegel.—Ed.

Againsthimself!

the inner nature or genus of an object,and which bases itself further on this de-termination.” (357) (Vol. VI, p. 359)

And p. 358: justifiable contempt forthe philosophy of nature has beenevoked by the futile play with emptyanalogies.

In ordinary logic* thought is forma-listically divorced from objectivity.

“Thought is held here to be a mere sub-jective and formal activity, and what isobjective is held to be, in contrast tothought, something firm and present foritself. This dualism, however, is not thetruth, and it is thoughtless procedure toaccept the determinations of subjectivityand objectivity in this way without fur-ther question, and without inquiring intotheir origin....” (359-360) In reality, sub-jectivity is only a stage of developmentfrom Being and Essence—whereupon thissubjectivity “dialectically ‘breaks throughits Barrier’” and “opens out into objectiv-ity by means of the syllogism.” (360)

Very profound and clever! The lawsof logic are the reflections of the objec-tive in the subjective consciousness ofman.

Vol. VI, p. 360“The realised Notion” is the object.This transition from the subject, from

the notion, to the object is said to seem“strange,” but by the object one shouldunderstand not simply Being, but some-

V. I. LENIN184

thing definitive, “something independent,concrete and complete in itself....” (361)

“The world is the other being of the Idea.”

Subjectivity (or the Notion) and theobject—are the same and not the same....(362)

Nonsense about the ontological argu-ment, about God!

...“It is wrong to regard subjectivity andobjectivity as a fixed and abstract antithe-sis. Both are wholly dialectical....” (367)

NB



OBJECTIVITY

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.** of objective reality—Ed.

(Logic) V, 178: *The twofold significance of objectivity:

...“similarly a twofold significance appearsfor Objectivity: it stands opposed to the in-dependent Notion, but also is that whichis in and for itself....” (178)

...“The knowledge of truth is placed inthe cognition of the object ‘as object withoutthe addition of any subjective reflection...”(178)

Discourses on “mechanism”—furtheron—extremely abstruse and almost com-plete nonsense.

Further, idem about chemism, the stagesof “judgment,” etc.

The paragraph entitled “L a w” (198-199)does not give what could be expectedfrom Hegel on such an interesting question.It is strange why “law” is referred to “mech-anism”?

The concept of law approximateshere the concepts “order” (Ordnung);uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit); necessi-ty; the “soul” der objective’s Totalität,**the “principle of self-movement.”

objectivity

cognition ofthe object

this approxi-mation is

very important

V. I. LENIN186

* “natural necessity”—Ed.

All this from the standpoint that mech-anism is the other-being of spirit, ofthe Notion, etc., of the soul, of individ-uality.... Obviously, playing withempty analogies!

To be noted: on p. 210 the concept of‘Naturnotwendigkeit”* is encountered—“both Mechanism and Chemism are, then,comprehended under natural necessity”...for we see here “its” (des Begriffs) “submer-sion into externality” (ibidem).

“It was mentioned that the opposition be-tween Teleology and Mechanism is, in thefirst instance, the more general oppositionbetween freedom and necessity. Kant setsout the opposition in this form under theAntinomies of Reason, as the ‘Third Con-flict of Transcendental Ideas.”’ (213) Brieflyrepeating Kant’s proofs, thesis and antith-esis, Hegel notes the hollowness of theseproofs and directs attention to the resultof Kant’s considerations:

“Kant’s solution of this Antinomy isthe same as the general solution of theothers: that reason can prove neither ofthese propositions, since we can have nodeterminant principle a priori about the pos-sibility of things according to mere empiri-cal laws of nature; consequently the two mustn o t b e r e g a r d e d a s o b j e c t i v e p r o p -o s i t i o n s b u t a s s u b j e c t i v e m a x i m s ;on the one hand I ought always to reflect

“nature =submersionof the No-tion into

externality”(ha-ha!)

freedom andnecessity

Hegel versusKant (on

freedom andnecessity)

( ( ( ((


upon all natural events according to theprinciple of pure natural mechanism; butthis does not prevent me from investigat-ing certain forms of nature, should theoccasion be given, according to anothermaxim, namely, that of final causes;—asthough these two maxims (which furtherare supposed to be required only by humanreason) were not in the same oppositionin which the propositions stand.—As wasobserved above, from this whole standpointthe only question which is demanded byphilosophic interest is not looked into,namely, which of these two principles istrue in and for itself; but, for this pointof view, it is irrelevant whether the prin-ciples are to be considered as objective de-terminations of nature (that is here, as de-terminations existing externally) or as meremaxims of a subjective cognition.—Butin fact this is a s u b j e c t i v e , t h a t i s , ac o n t i n g e n t , c o g n i t i o n , which appliesone or the other maxim as the o c c a s i o nmay suggest according to whether it thinksit appropriate to the given objects, butotherwise does not ask about the truthof these determinations themselves, wheth-er both are determinations of the objectsor of cognition.” (215-216)

Bien!

M a t e r i a l i s t D i a le c -t i c s:

The laws of the externalworld, of nature, which aredivided into m e c h a n i c a land c h e m i c a l (this is veryimportant) are the bases ofman’s purposive activity.

In his practical activity,man is confronted with theobjective world, is depend-

H e g e l:...“The End has turned out

to be the third term withrespect to Mechanism andChemism; it is their truth.Since it still stands withinthe sphere of Objectivity orof the immediacy of the to-tal Notion, it is still affec-ted by externality as such;an objective world to which

V. I. LENIN188

it relates itself still standsopposed to it. From thisside mechanical causality(in which generally Chem-ism must be included)still appears in this End-relation (which is external),but as subordinated to itand as transcended in andfor itself.” (216-217)

...“From this results thenature of the subordinationof the two previous formsof the objective process: theOther, which in them liesin the infinite progress, isthe Notion which at firstis posited as external tothem, which is End; notonly is the Notion theirsubstance, but also exter-nality is the moment whichis essential to them and con-stitutes their determinate-ness. Thus mechanical orchemical technique sponta-neously offers itself to theEnd-relation by reason ofits character of being deter-mined externally; and thisrelation must now befurther considered.” (217)

ent on it, and determineshis activity by it.

From this aspect, fromthe aspect of the practical(purposive) activity of man,the mechanical (and chemi-cal) causality of the world(of nature) appears as thoughsomething external, asthough something second-ary, as though somethinghidden.

Two forms of the o b -j e c t i v e process: nature(mechanical and chemical)and the p u r p o s i v e ac-tivity of man. The mutualrelation of these forms. Atthe beginning, man’s endsappear foreign (“other”) inrelation to nature. Humanconsciousness, science (“derBegriff”), reflects the essence,the substance of nature,but at the same time thisconsciousness is somethingexternal in relation to na-ture (not immediately, notsimply, coinciding with it).

MECHANICAL ANDCHEMICAL TECHNIQUEserves human ends just be-cause its character (essence)consists in its being deter-mined by external condi-tions (the laws of nature).

((T E C H N I Q U E and the O B J E C T I V E world.T E C H N I Q U E and E N D S))

...“It” (der Zweck*) “has before it an* the End—Ed.


objective, Mechanical and Chemical world,to which its activity relates itself as tosomething already given....” (219-220) “Tothis extent it still has a truly extra-mundane existence, namely, insofar asthis objectivity stands opposed to it....”(220)

In actual fact, men’s ends are engen-dered by the objective world and pre-suppose it,—they find it as somethinggiven, present. But it seems to manas if his ends are taken from outsidethe world, and are independent of theworld (“freedom”).

((NB. All this in the § on “The Sub-jective End.” NB)) (217-221)

“The End binds itself with objectivitythrough a Means, and in objectivity withitself.” (221 §: “The Means.”)

“Further, since the End is finite it hasa finite content; accordingly it is notabsolute or utterly in and for itself reason-able. The Means however is the externalmiddle of the syllogism which is the realisa-tion of the End; in it therefore reason-ableness manifests itself as such—as pre-serving itself in this external Other andprecisely through this externality. To thatextent the Means is higher than the finiteEnds of external usefulness: the ploughis more honourable than those immediateenjoyments which are procured by it, andserve as Ends. The instrument is preserved,while the immediate enjoyments pass awayand are forgotten. IN HIS TOOLS MANPOSSESSES POWER OVER EXTERNALNATURE, ALTHOUGH AS REGARDSHIS ENDS, HE FREQUENTLY IS SUB-JECTED TO IT.” (226)

the germs ofhistorical

materialismin Hegel

Hegel andhistorical

materialism NB

V. I. LENIN190

Vorbericht, i.e., preface, of the bookdated: Nuremberg, 21. VII. 1816

This is in the §:“The Realised End”

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM ASONE OF THE APPLICATIONS AND

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE IDEAS OFGENIUS—SEEDS EXISTING IN

EMBRYO IN HEGEL.

“The teleological process is the transla-tion into objectivity of the Notion (sic!)which exists distinctly as Notion....” (227)

When Hegel endeavours—sometimeseven huffs and puffs—to bring man’spurposive activity under the categoriesof logic, saying that this activityis the “syllogism” (Schluß), that thesubject ‘(man) plays the role of a “mem-ber” in the logical “figure” of the“syllogism,” and so on,—THEN THATIS NOT MERELY STRETCHING APOINT, A MERE GAME. THIS HASA VERY PROFOUND, PURELY MA-TERIALISTIC CONTENT. It has to beinverted: the practical activity of manhad to lead his consciousness to therepetition of the various logical figuresthousands of millions of times in orderthat these figures could obtain the sig-nificance of axioms. This nota bene.

“The movement of the End has nowachieved that the moment of externalityis posited not only in the Notion, andthe Notion is not only Ought and tendency,but, as concrete totality, is identical

NB

NB

THE CATEGO-RIES OF LOGIC

AND HUMANPRACTICE

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with immediate Objectivity.” (235) At theend of the § on “The Realised End,” at theend of the section (Chapter III: Te-leology)—of S e c t i o n II: “O b j e c t i v i -t y,” the transition to Section III: “TheIdea.”

Remarkable: Hegel comes to the “Idea”as the coincidence of the Notion and theobject, as t r u t h, t h r o u g h thepractical, purposive activity of man.A very close approach to the view thatman by his practice proves the objectivecorrectness of his ideas, concepts, knowl-edge, science.

NB

From thesubjective

Notion andsubjective

end too b j e c t i v e

truth

V. I. LENIN192


THE IDEA

The beginning of Section III: “T h e I d e a”...“The Idea is the adequate Notion: o b -

j e c t i v e t r u t h, or the truth assuch.” (236)

In general, the introduction to Section III(“The Idea”) of Part II to the L o g i c(“Subjective Logic”) Volume V, pp. 236-243 and the corresponding §§ of theEncyclopaedia (§§ 213-215)—ARE PER-HAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OFDIALECTICS. Here too, the coincidence,so to speak, of logic and epistemology isshown in a remarkably brilliant way.

The expression “Idea” is used also inthe sense of a simple representation.Kant.

“Kant has claimed the expression ideaagain for the Notion of reason. Now accord-ing to Kant the Notion of reason is to bethe Notion of the unconditioned, and, withrespect to phenomena, to be transcen-dental, which means that it is impossibleto make any adequate empirical use ofit. Notions of reason (according to Kant)are to serve for the conceptual compre-hension, and Notions of understandingfor the bare understanding, of percep-tions. But, in fact, if the latter reallyare Notions then they are Notions,—con-

NB

Hegel againstKant

against thetranscenden-

tal in thesense

of the sepa-ration of

(objective)truth fromempiricism

NB


ceptual comprehension takes place throughthem....” (236)

See also below on Kant

It is equally incorrect to regard the Ideaas something “unreal”—as people say: “itis merely an idea.”

...“If thoughts are merely subjective andcontingent they certainly have no furthervalue; but in this they are not inferiorto temporal and contingent actualities,which also have no further value except thatwhich is proper to contingencies and phe-nomena. And if conversely the Idea is notto be rated as true because, with respectto phenomena, it is transcendental, and noobject can be assigned to it, in the sen-suous world, coinciding with it, thisis a strange lack of understanding,—forso the Idea is denied objective validitybecause it lacks that which constitutesappearance, or the untrue being of the ob-jective world.” (237-238)

In relation to practical ideas, Kant him-self admits that the appeal to experienceagainst ideas is pöbelhaft*: he holds ideasas a Maximum to which one should endeav-our to bring actuality closer. And Hegelcontinues:

“But, the result having been reached thatthe Idea is the unity of the Notion andObjectivity, the truth, it must not merelybe considered as a goal which must beapproached while it still remains a kindof beyond; it must be held that whateveris actual is only insofar as it containsand expresses the Idea. The object, andthe objective and subjective world, not

* vulgar—Ed.** “beyond”—Ed.

très bien!

très bien!

Hegel against“Jenseits”**

of Kant

V. I. LENIN194

The confor-mity of con-cepts withobjects is

n o tsubjective

merely ought to conform to the Idea, butare themselves the conformity of Notionand reality; that reality which does notcorrespond to the Notion is mere appear-ance, or that subjective, contingent, ca-pricious entity which is not the truth.” (238)

“It” (die Idee) “is, first,simple truth, the identityof the Notion and Objec-tivity as a universal....(242)

...“Secondly, it is the re-lation of the Subjectivity,which is for itself, of thesimple Notion to its Ob-jectivity which is distinctfrom it, the former is es-sentially the impulse to tran-scend this separation....

...“As this relation, theIdea is the process in whichit sunders itself into in-dividuality and its inor-ganic nature, and againbrings the latter back un-der the power of the sub-ject, returning to the firstsimple universality. Theself-identity of the Idea isone with the process; andthe thought which frees ac-tuality from the semblanceof purposeless changeabili-ty and transfigures it intothe Idea must not imaginethis truth of actuality asa dead repose or bare pic-ture, matt, without im-pulse or notion, or as a gen-ius, number, or abstract

The Idea (read: man’sknowledge) is the coinci-dence (conformity) of no-tion and objectivity (the“universal”). This—first.

Secondly, the Idea is therelation of the subjectiv-ity (= man) which is foritself (= independent, as itwere) to the objectivitywhich is d i s t i n c t (fromthis Idea)....

Subjectivity is the im-pulse to destroy this sepa-ration (of the idea fromthe object).

Cognition is the processof the submersion (ofthe mind) in an inorganicnature for the sake ofsubordinating it to thepower of the subject andfor the sake of gener-alisation (cognition of theuniversal in its phenome-na)....

The coincidence ofthought with the object is aprocess: thought (= man)must not imagine truth inthe form of dead repose,in the form of a bare pic-ture (image), pale (matt),without impulse, without

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Cognition is the eternal, endlessapproximation of thought to theobject. The reflection of nature inman’s thought must be understoodnot “lifelessly,” not “abstractly,” n o td e v o i d o f m o v e m e n t, notwi thout contradic t ions , but in theeternal process of movement, the aris-ing of contradictions and their solution.

thought. In the Idea theNotion reaches freedom, andbecause of this the Ideacontains also the harshestopposition; its repose con-sists in the security andcertainty with which it eter-nally creates and eternallyovercomes it, coinciding init with itself.”

“The Idea is ... the Ideaof the True and of theGood, as Cognition and Vo-lition.... The process of thisfinite cognition and (NB)a c t i o n (NB) makes theuniversality, which at firstis abstract, into a totali-ty, whence it becomes per-fected objectivity.” (243)

Also in the E n c y c l o -p a e d i a (Vol. VI).* E n -c y c l o p a e d i a § 213(p. 385)

...“The Idea is truth,for truth is the correspond-

motion, like a genius, likea number, like abstractthought.

The idea contains alsothe strongest contradiction,repose (for man’s thought)consists in the firmness andcertainty with which heeternally creates (this con-tradiction between thoughtand object) and eternallyovercomes it....

The Idea is Cognition andaspiration (volition) [ofman]... The process of (tran-sitory, finite, limited) cog-nition and action convertsabstract concepts into per-fected objectivity.

Individual Being (an ob-ject, a phenomenon, etc.)

NB

NB

V. I. LENIN196

The t o t a l i t y o f all sides of thephenomenon, of reality and their (re-ciprocal) r e l a t i o n s—that is whattruth is composed of. The relations(= transitions = contradictions) ofnotions = the main content of logic,by which these concepts (and theirrelations, transitions, contradictions)are shown as reflections of the objec-tive world. The dialectics of t h i n g sproduces the dialectics of ideas, andnot vice versa.

T This aphorism should be expressedmore popularly, without the word dia-lectics: approximately as follows: Inthe alternation, reciprocal dependenceof a l l notions, in the identity of theiropposites, in the transitions of one no-

* existing specially for themselves.—Ed.

ence of objectivity withthe Notion.... But alsoeverything actual, insofaras it is true, is the Idea....The individual Being issome one aspect of theIdea; hence it requires alsoother actualities, whichlikewise appear as existingspecially for themselves; itis only in all of them to-gether and in their rela-tion that the Notion isrealised. The individual byitself does not correspondto its Notion; this limi-tation of its determinateexistence constitutes its fi-nitude and its downfall....”

is (only) one side of theIdea (of truth). Truth re-quires still other sides ofreality, which likewise ap-pear only as independentand individual (besondersfür sich bestehende*).O n l y i n t h e i r t o -t a l i t y (zusammen), andin their r e l a t i o n (Be-ziehung) is truth realised.

Hegelbrilliantly

d i v i n e d thedialectics of

things (phenom-ena, the world,n a t u r e) inthe dialecticsof concepts T

indeeddivined,

not more


tion into another, in the eternal change,movement of notions, Hegel brilliantlydivined PRECISELY THIS RELATIONOF THINGS, OF NATURE.

“Truth is first of all taken to meanthat I know how something is. This istruth, however, only in reference to con-sciousness, or formal truth, bare correct-ness. (§ 213, 386) Truth in the deepersense, on the contrary, consists in theidentity between objectivity and theNotion....

“A bad man is an untrue man, i.e.,a man who does not behave in confor-mity with the notion of him, or his posi-tion. Nothing, however, can exist entire-ly devoid of identity between the no-tion and reality. Even what is bad anduntrue has being only insofar as its real-ity still, somehow, conforms to its no-tion....

...“Everything deserving the name ofphilosophy has always been based onthe consciousness of an absolute unityof that which the unders tandingaccepts as va l id only in i t s sep -aration.. . .”

whatconstit-

utesdialec-tics?

= . . . . . . . . . . . .mutual dependence of notions ” ” a l l ”

without exceptiontransit ions of notions from

one into another ” all ” without

exception.

The relativity of opposition between notions...the ident i ty of opposi tes between not ions.

= NBEvery notion oc-curs in a certain

r e l a t i o n,in a certain

connection witha l l the others

V. I. LENIN198

“The s t a g e s o f B e i n g and Essence hith-erto considered, as well as those of No-tion and of Objectivity, are not, when sodistinguished, s o m e t h i n g p e r m a n e n t ,r e s t i n g upon t h e m s e l v e s . But they haveproved to be dialectical, and their truth con-sists only in being m o m e n t s o f t h eidea.” (387-388)

Vol. VI, 388

The moments of the cognition (= ofthe “idea”) of nature by man—theseare the categories of logic.

Vol. VI, p. 388 ( 214):“The Idea may be described in many

ways. It may be called reason (this is theproper philosophical signification of rea-son); also subject-object; the unity of theideal and the real, of the finite and theinfinite, of soul and body; the possibilitywhich has its actuality in its own self;that whose nature can be conceived onlyas existent, etc. All these descriptionsapply, because the Idea contains all therelations of understanding, but containsthem in their infinite self-return and self-identity.

“It is easy work for the understanding toshow that everything said of the Idea isself-contradictory. But that can quite as wellbe rendered to the understanding or ratherit is already accomplished in the idea. Andthis work, which is the work of reason, iscertainly not so easy as that of the under-standing.—The understanding may demon-strate that the Idea is self-contradictory,because, for instance, the subjective isonly subjective and is always confrontedby the objective; that Being is something

The differ-ences between

Being andEssence, be-

tween Notionand Objec-tivity, are

relative

(the idea)truth isall-sided


quite different from the notion and there-fore cannot be extracted out of it; and thatlikewise the finite is only finite and theexact antithesis of the infinite, and there-fore not identical with it; and so on withall the determinations. Logic, however,demonstrates the opposite of all this, name-ly, that the subjective, which is to besubjective only, the finite, which is to befinite only, the infinite, which is to beinfinite only, and so on, have no truth,but contradict themselves, and pass intotheir opposites. Thus, this transition, andthe unity in which the extremes are in-cluded as transcended, as appearance ormoments, is revealed as their truth. (388)

“The understanding, when it tackles theIdea, falls into a double misunderstand-ing. First, it takes the extremes of theIdea (be they expressed as they will, solong as they are in their unity) still inthat sense and determination in whichthey are not in their concrete unity, butremain abstractions outside of the Idea.“It” (der Verstand*) “no less mistakes therelation between them, even when it hasbeen expressly stated; thus, for example,

it overlooks even the nature o f the cop -ula in the judgment , which affirms thatthe i n d i v i d u a l , the subject, i s j u s t a sm u c h n o t i n d i v i d u a l , b u t u n i v e r -s a l . —In the second place, the understand-

ing believes its reflection,—that the self-identical Idea contains its own negative,the contradiction,—to be an external reflec-tion which does not lie within the Ideaitself. In fact, however, this is not theunderstanding’s own wisdom. T h e I d e aitse l f is the dialectic which for ever sepa-

* the understanding—Ed.

NB:Abstractions

and the“concreteunity” ofopposites.

A beautifulexample: thesimplest andclearest. Thedialectic ofnotions andits material-

its rootsThe dialecticis not in man’sunderstand-ing, but inthe “idea,”

i.e., in objec-tive reality

NB

the in-

divid-

ual =

the uni-

versal

V. I. LENIN200

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“eternallife” =

dialectics

The ideais ... a process

This NB

* false—Ed.

rates and distinguishes the self-identicalfrom the differentiated, the subjective fromthe objective, the finite from the infinite, thesoul from the body. Only insofar i s i t a ne t e r n a l c r e a t i o n , e t e r n a l v i t a l i t y ,and e ternal spiri t . . . .” (389)

VI, § 215, p. 390:...“The Idea is essentially a process, be-

cause its identity is the absolute and freeidentity of the notion, only insofar asit is absolute negativity and for thatreason dialectical.”

Hence, Hegel says, the expression “uni-ty” of thinking and being, of finite andinfinite, etc., is falsch,* because it ex-presses “quietly persisting identity.”** Itis not true that the finite simply neutral-ises (“neutralisiert”) the infinite and viceversa. Actually, we have a process.

If one calculates ... every second morethan ten persons in the world die, andstill more are born. “Movement” and “mo-ment”: catch it. At every given moment... catch this moment, Idem in simplem e c h a n i c a l motion (contra Chernov).59

“The idea as a process runs throughthree stages in its development. The firstform of the idea is Life.... The second formis ... the idea in the form of Knowledge,which appears under the double aspectof the theoretical and practical idea. Theprocess of knowledge results in the resto-ration of unity enriched by difference,and this gives the third form, that ofthe Absolute Idea....” (391)

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* Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.** e s s e n t i a l l y i s i n c o g n i t i o n—Ed.

The idea is “truth’’ (p. 365, § 213).The idea, i.e., truth as a process—for truth is a p r o c e s s—passes in itsdevelopment (Entwicklung) through threestages: 1) life; 2) the process of knowl-edge, which includes human practiceand technique (see above); 3) the stageof the absolute idea (i.e., of completetruth).

Life gives rise to the brain. Natureis reflected in the human brain. Bychecking and applying the correctnessof these reflections in his practice andtechnique, man arrives at objectivetruth.

The question of Life does not belong to“logic as it is commonly imagined.” (Bd.V, p. 244*) If, however, the subject-mat-ter of logic is truth, and “t r u t h a ss u c h w e s e n t l i c h i m E r k e n n e ni s t,**” then cognition has to be dealtwith—in connection with cognition it isalready (p. 245) necessary to speak oflife.

Sometimes so-called “pure logic” is fol-lowed by “applied” (angewandte) logic, butthen...

...“every science must be absorbed inlogic, since each is an applied logic in-sofar as it consists in apprehending itsobject in forms of thought and of theNotion.” (244)

Truth is aprocess. Fromthe subjective

idea, manadvances

towards objec-tive truth

t h r o u g h“practice”

(andtechnique).

every scienceis applied

logic

Logic. Volume V.

Section III. Idea. Chapter I. Life.

V. I. LENIN202

* Hegel, Werke , Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.** Hegel, Werke , Bd. V, Berlin, 1834, pp. 248-262.—Ed.

The idea of including L i f e inlogic is comprehensible—and brilliant—from the standpoint of the process ofthe reflection of the objective worldin the (at first individual) consciousnessof man and of the testing of thisconsciousness (reflection) through prac-tice—see:

If one considers the relation of sub-ject to object in logic , one must takeinto account also the general premisesof Being of the concrete subject (= l i f eo f m a n) in the objective surroundings.

Subdivisions:**1) Life , as “the l iv ing individual” (§ A)2) “The Life-process”3) “The Process of Kind” (Gattung) , re -

product ion of man , and transi t ion tocognition.

(1) “subjective totality” and “indiffer-ent” “objectivity”(2) The unity of subject and object

...“Consequently,the original Judg-ment of Life con-sists in this, thatit separates itselfas individual sub-ject from the objec-tive....” (248)

Encyclopaedia*§ 216: Only in their

connection arethe individual

limbs of the bodywhat they are.

A hand,separated fromthe body, is ahand only in

name (Aristotle).

Life = indi-vidual sub-

ject separatesitself from

the objective


...“Thisobjectivity of

the LivingEntity is

Organism; theobjectivity isthe meansand instru-ment of the

End....” (251)

The comicin Hegel

Encyclopaedia § 219: ...“Inorganicnature which is subdued by the livingbeing suffers this because it is in itselfthe same as life is for itself.”

Invert it = pure materialism. Ex-cellent, profound, correct!! And alsoNB: shows how extremely correct andapt are the terms “an sich” and “fürsich”!!!

NB

Further, the “subsumption” under log-ical categories of “sensibility” (Sensi-bilität), “irritability” (irritabilität)—this is said to be the particular in con-trast to the universal!!—and “reproduc-tion” is an idle game. Forgotten is thenodal line, the transition into a d i f -f e r e n t plane of natural phenomena.

And so on. Pain is “actual existence”of contradiction in the living individual.

...“Its” (des Begriffs**) “reality in gener-al is the form of its determinate existence,and what matters is the determination

Hegeland the

play with“organicNotions”

!!!

Hegeland the play

with“organism”

subjectiveconsciousness

Or again: reproduction ofman . . . “is their” (of twoindividuals of different sex)“real ised identi ty , is thenegative unity of the kindwhich intro-reflects itselfout of the division....” (261)

Logic. Volume V.Section III. The Idea.

Chapter II. T h e I d e a o f C o g n i t i o n(pp. 262-327)

* “in itself” and “for itself”!!!—Ed.** the Notions—Ed.

V. I. LENIN204

* abstract one-sided determinations of “former—pre-Kantian—metaphysics”—Ed.

and its sub-mersion inobjectivity

mysticism!

H e g e la g a i n s t

K a n t

? i.e., that inKant the“Ego” isan empty

form(“self-

extraction”)withoutconcrete

analysis ofthe processof cognition

NB:Kant andHume—sceptics

of this form; upon this depends thedistinction of that which the Notion is initself or as subjective, and of what it isas submerged into Objectivity, and nextin the Idea of Life.” (263)

...“Spirit not only is infi-nitely richer than Nature,but the absolute unity ofopposites in the Notion con-stitutes its essence....” (264)

In Kant “the Ego” is “as a transcenden-tal subject of thoughts” (264); “At thesame time this Ego, according to Kant’sown expression, is awkward in this respect,that we must always make use of it inorder to make any judgment about it....”

(p. 265)

“In his” (= Kant’s) “criticism of thesedeterminations” (namely: absrakte ein-seitige Bestimmungen “der vormaligen—pre-Kantian—Metaphysik”* concerning the“soul”) “he” (Kant) “simply followed Hume’ssceptical manner: holds fast to that whichappears as Ego in self-consciousness, from

?

mysticism!

NB


which however everything empirical mustbe omitted, since the aim is to know itsessence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now noth-ing remains but the phenomenon of theI think which accompanies every idea;and nobody has the slightest notion of this‘I think.’” (266) T T T

Apparently, Hegel perceives scepti-cism here in the fact that Hume andKant do not see the appearing Thing-in-itself in “phenomena,” divorce phenom-ena from objective truth, doubt theobjectivity of cognition, remove, weg-lassen, alles Empirische* from theDing-an-sich....** And Hegel contin-ues:

T T T ...“It must certainly be admittedthat it is impossible to have the slightestnotion of Ego or anything else (the No-tion included), if no Notion is formedand a halt is made at the simple, fixed,general idea and name.” (266)

In order to understand, it is necessaryempirically to begin understanding,study, to rise from empiricism to the uni-versal. In order to learn to swim, it isnecessary to get into the water.

According to Hegel, the old metaphysics,in the endeavour to cognise truth, dividedobjects in accordance with the characteris-tic of truth into substances and phenome-

* everything empirical—Ed.** Thing-in-itself—Ed.

Wherein doesHegel see thescepticism of

Hume andKant?

It is impossi-ble to under-stand withoutthe process ofunderstand-ing (of cog-nition, con-crete study,

etc.)

V. I. LENIN206

* “Beyond”—Ed.

Kant restrictshimself to

“phenomena”

Kantelevated

o n eside to

the Abso-lute

in Kant,the Thing-

in-itselfis an

absolute“Jenseits”*

Kant’s Critique rejected the investigationof truth .... (269) “But to stand fast at appearanceand what proves to be mere sensuousrepresentation in everyday consciousnessis tantamount to a renunciation of theNotion and of philosophy.” (269)

§ A:“The Idea of the True. At first the sub-

jective Idea is impulse.... Consequently,the impulse has the determinateness ofcancelling its own subjectivity, of makingconcrete its reality (which was abstractat first), and of filling it, for content,with the world which is presupposed byits subjectivity.... As Cognition is the Ideaas End or as subjective idea, so the ne-gation of the world which is presupposedas being in itself is first negation....”(274-275)

i.e., the first stage, moment, begin-ning, approach of cognition is its fini-tude (Endlichkeit) and subjectivity, thenegation of the world-in-itself—the endof cognition is at first subjective....“Strangely enough this side

of finitude has latterly” (ob-viously Kant) “been seized uponand has been taken to be theabsolute relation of Cognition—as though the finite as such wasto be the absolute! From thispoint of view the Object isassigned the unknown propertyof being a Thing-in-itself beyondcognition, which, together withtruth, is considered an absolute.Beyond for Cognition.

HegelagainstKant:


The determinations of thought in general,the categories and the determinations ofreflection as well as the formal Notionand its moments, are here given the posi-tion not that they are finite determina-tions in and for themselves, but that theyare so in the sense that they are subjectiveas against that empty Thinghood-in-itself;the error of taking this relation of theuntruth of Cognition as valid has becomethe universal opinion of modern times.”(276)

Kant took the finite, transitory, rel-ative, conditional character of humancognition (its categories, causality, etc.,etc.) as subjectivism, and not as thedialectics of the idea (= of nature itself) ,divorcing cognition from the object....“But cognition must by its own proc-

ess resolve its finitude and therefore itscontradiction.” (277)

...“It is one-sided to imagine analysisin such a manner as though nothing werein the object except what has been putinto it; and it is equally one-sided tothink that the determinations which re-sult are simply taken out of it. The formeridea is, as is known, the thesis of sub-jective idealism, which in analysis takesthe activity of Cognition only as a one-sided positing, beyond which the Thing-in-itself remains hidden; the latter ideabelongs to so-called realism, which takesthe subjective Notion as an empty iden-tity that absorbs the thought determina-tions from without.” (280)

...“But the two moments cannot be sep-arated; in its abstract form, into which

Kant’ssubjec-tivism

But the proc-ess of cogni-tion leads itto objective

truth

Hegel againstsubjective

idealism and“realism”

V. I. LENIN208

* At this point Lenin’s manuscript continues in a new notebook“Hegel. Logic. Section III”—Ed.

analysis elaborates it, the logical is cer-tainly present only in Cognition; whileconversely it is not only something positedbut also something which is in itself.” (280)

Logical concepts are subjective so longas they remain “abstract,” in their ab-stract form, but at the same time theyexpress also the Things-in-themselves.Nature is both concrete and abstract,both phenomenon and essence, both mo-ment and relation. Human concepts aresubjective in their abstractness, sepa-rateness, but objective as a whole, inthe process, in the sum-total, in thetendency, in the source.

Very good is § 225 of the Encyclopae-dia where “cognition” (“theoretical”) and“will,” “practical activity,” are depictedas two sides, two methods, two meansof abolishing the “one-sidedness” bothof subjectivity and of objectivity.

And further 2 8 1 - 2 8 3 very importanton the t r a n s i t i o n of the categoriesinto one another (and against Kant, p. 282).

Logic, VoI. V, p. 282 (the end)*...“Kant ... takes up the determiniate

connection (the relation-notions and thesynthetic principles themselves) from for-mal logic as given. They ought to havebeen deduced by the e x p o s i t i o n o f t h et r a n s i t i o n of this simple unity of self-con-sciousness into these its determinations anddistinctions; but Kant spared himself thetrouble of demonstrating this veritablysynthetic p r o g r e s s, that of the sel f -producing Notion.” (282)

The Objectiv-ity of logic

NB


Kant did not show the t r a n s i -t i o n of the categories into one another.

280-287—Turning once more to highermathematics (showing, inter alia, thathe is familiar with Gauss’ solution ofthe equation Xm—1=060), Hegel againtouches on the differential and integralcalculus, and says that:

“to this day mathematics by itself, thatis, in a mathematical manner, has failedin justifying these operations, which arebased upon this transition” (from one mag-nitude to another), “for the transition isnot of a mathematical nature.” Hegel saysthat Leibnitz, to whom is ascribed the hon-our of having discovered the differentialcalculus, effected this transition “in a mostinadequate manner, a manner both thor-oughly notionless and unmathematical....”(287)

“Analytic cognition is the first premiseof the whole syllogism,—the immediaterelation of the Notion to the Object. Con-sequently, identity is the determinationwhich it recognises as its own: it is onlythe apprehension of what is. SyntheticCognition endeavours to form a Notionof what is, that is, to grasp the multiplic-ity of determinations in its unity. Henceit is the second premise of the syllogismin which terms various as such are related.Its goal is therefore necessity in general.”(288)

Regarding the practice in certain sciences(e.g., physics) of taking various “forces,”etc., for “explanation,” and of pulling in(stretching), adjusting the facts, etc., Hegelmakes the following clever remark:

“It is now seen that the so-called expla-nation and proof of the concrete element

V. I. LENIN210

which is brought into Propositions is partlya tautology and partly a confusion of thetrue relationship; partly, too, it is seen thatthis confusion served to disguise the trickof Cognition, which takes up the data ofexperience one-sidedly (the only mannerin which it could reach its simple defini-tions and formulas), and does away withrefutation from experience by proposingand taking as valid experience not in itsconcrete totality but as example, and onlyin that direction which is serviceable forthe hypotheses and the theory. Concreteexperience being thus subordinated to thepresupposed determinations, the foundationof the theory is obscured, and is exhibitedonly from that side which is in conformitywith the theory.” (315-316)

The old metaphysics (e.g., of Wolff[example: ridiculous pomposity over tri-vialities, etc.]) was overthrown by Kantand Jacobi. Kant showed that “strict de-monstration” led to antinomies,

“but he” (Kant) “did not reflect uponthe nature of this demonstration, which isbound to a finite content; yet the two standand fall together.” (317)

Synthetic cognition is still not complete,for “the Notion does not become unity withitself in its object or its reality.... Hencein this Cognition the Idea does not yetreach truth because of the inadequacy ofthe object to the subjective Notion.—Butthe sphere of Necessity is the highestpoint of Being and of Reflection: in andfor itself it passes over into the freedomof the Notion, while the inner identitypasses over into its manifestation, whichis the Notion as Notion....”

...“The Idea, insofar as the Notion isnow for itself the Notion determinate in

remarkablycorrect andprofound

cf. the polit-ical econo-my of the

bourgeoisie

against sub-jectivism andone-sidedness

i.e., Kantdid not un-

derstand theu n i v e r s a l

law of thedialectics of

the “Finite”?

( (


and for itself, is the Practical Idea, orAction.” (319) And the following § isheaded “B: The Idea of the Good.”

Theoretical cognition ought to givethe object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory mo-vement, an- und für-sich.* But the humannotion “definitively” catches this objecti-ve truth of cognition, seizes and masters it,only when the notion becomes “being-for-itself” in time sense of practice. Thatis, the practice of man and of mankindis the test, the criterion of the objecti-vity of cognition. Is that Hegel’s i d e a ?It is necessary to return to this.

Why is the transition from practice,from action, only to the “good,” dasGute? That is narrow, o n e - s i d e d ! A n dthe useful?

There is no doubt the useful alsocomes in. Or is this, according to Hegel ,also das Gute?

All this in the chapter “The Ideaof Cognition” (Chapter II)—in the tran-sition to the “Absolute Idea” (ChapterIII)—i.e., undoubtedly, in Hegel prac-tice serves as a link in the analysisof the process of cognition, and indeedas the transition to objective (“abso-lute,” according to Hegel) truth. Marx,consequently, clearly sides with Hegelin introducing the criterion of practiceinto the theory of knowledge: see theTheses on Feuerbach.61

* in and for itself—Ed.

Hegel onpractice andthe objectiv-

ity of cog-nition

V. I. LENIN212

Practice in the theoryof knowledge:

(320) “As subjective It”(der Begrifi) “has again thepresupposition of an other-ness which is in itself; it isthe impulse to realise itself,or the end which tries togive itself objectivity in theobjective world, and to car-ry itself out, through itself.In the Theoretical Idea thesubjective Notion stands op-posed, as the universalwhich is indeterminate inand for itself, to the ob-jective world, from whichit draws determinate con-tent and fulfilment. But inthe Practical Idea it standsopposed as actual to theactual. But the self-certain-ty which the subject hasin the fact of its deter-minateness in and for itself,is a certainty of its ownactuality and of the non-actuality of the world;....”......

Alias:Man’s consciousness

not only reflects the ob-jective world, but cre-ates it.

The notion (= man), assubjective, again presup-poses an otherness whichis in itself (= nature inde-pendent of man). This no-tion (= man) is the im-pulse to realise itself, togive itself objectivity inthe objective world throughitself, and to realise (ful-fil) itself.

In the theoretical idea(in the sphere of theory)the subjective notion (cog-nition?), as the universaland in and for itself inde-terminate, stands opposedto the objective world, fromwhich it obtains determi-nate content and fulfilment.

In the practical idea (inthe sphere of practice) thisnotion as the actual (act-ing?) stands opposed to theactual.

The self-certainty whichthe subject here sudden-ly instead of “Notion” hasin its being in and for it-self, as a determinate sub-ject, is a certainty of itsown actuality and of thenon-actuality of the world.


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...“The realised Good is good by virtue of what it isalready in the Subjective End, in its Idea; realisation gives

...“This determinateness,which is contained in theNotion, and is equal to it,and includes within itselfthe demand of the individ-ual external actuality, isthe Good. It appears withthe dignity of absoluteness,because it is the totality ofthe Notion within itself—the objective in the formsimultaneously of free unityand subjectivity. This Ideais higher than the Ideaof Cognition which hasa l r e a d y b e e n c o n s i d -ered, for it has not only thedignity of the universal butalso of the s i m p l y a c -tual . . . .” (320-321)

...“Consequently, the ac-tivity of the end is not di-rected against itself, for thepurpose of absorbing andassimilating a given deter-mination; it aims rather atpositing its own determi-nation, and, by transcend-ing the determinations ofthe external world, at giv-ing itself reality in the formof external actuality....”(321)

i.e., that the worlddoes not satisfy man andman decides to changeit by his activity.

The essence:The “good is a “demand

of external actuality,” i.e.,by the “good” is understoodman’s practice = the de-mand (1) also of externalactuality (2).

P r a c t i c e i s h i g h e rt h a n ( t h e o r e t i c a l )k n o w l e d g e , for it has notonly the dignity of univer-sality, but also of immedi-ate actuality.

“The activity of the endis not directed against it-self....

but aims, by destroyingdefinite (sides, features,phenomena) of the e x t e r -n a l world, at giving itselfreality in the form of ex-ternal actuality....”

V. I. LENIN214

it an external existence....” (322) Presupposed to it (theGood) is the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , in the presupposition ofwhich the subjectivity and finitude of the Good consists andwhich, as being other, pursues its own course ; and in iteven the realisation of the Good is exposed to obstacles,and may even be made impossible.....” # (322-323)

The “objective world” “pursues its owncourse,” and man’s practice, confrontedby this objective world, encounters “ob-stacles in the realisation” of the End,even “impossibility....”

# ...“Thus the Good remains an Ought;it is in and for itself, but Being, as lastand abstract immediacy, remains deter-mined against it as a not-Being too.... ##(323)

The Good, wel fare , wel l -meaningaspirat ions remain a SUBJECTIVEOUGHT....

## ...“Although the Idea of the perfectedGood is an absolute postulate, it is no morethan a postulate,—that is, the absoluteinfected with the d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s o fs u b j e c t i v i t y . There are still t w o w o r l d sin opposit ion : one a realm of s u b j e c -t i v i t y in the p u r e spaces of t r a n s -p a r e n t thought, the other a realmof o b j e c t i v i t y in the element of an exter-nally manifold actuality, which is anunexplored realm of darkness. The com-plete development of the unresolved con-tradiction, of that absolute end which thebarrier of this actuality insuperably op-poses, has been considered more closelyin Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 453 etseq....” (323)

NB

NB

Two worlds:subjective

andobjective


A gibe at the pure “spaces of transparent thought”in the realm of subjectivity, which is confronted by the“darkness” of “objective,” “manifold” actuality.

...“In the latter” (= der theoretischenIdee* in contrast to der praktischen Idee**)...“Cognition knows itself only as appre-hension, as the self-identity of the No-tion, which for itself is indeterminate;fulfilment, that is, objectivity determinedin and for itself, is given to it, and thatwhich truly is is the actual i ty that i spresent independent ly o f subjec t iveposi t ing . The Practical Idea on the otherhand counts this actuality (which at thesame time opposes it as an insuperablebarrier) as that which in and for itselfis null, which is to receive its true deter-mination and sole value through the endsof the Good. Will itself consequently barsthe way to i t s own goal insofar as i tseparates i t se l f f rom Cogni t ion andexternal ac tual i ty does not , for i t ,re tain the form of that which trulyis ; consequently the Idea of the Good canfind its complement only in the Idea ofthe True.” (323-324)

Cognition ... finds itself faced bythat which truly is as actuality presentindependently of subjective opinions(Setzen***). (This is pure materi-alism!) Man’s will, his practice, itselfblocks the attainment of its end...in that it separates itself from cog-nition and does not recognise externalactuality for that which truly is (for

* the Theoretical Idea—Ed.** the Practical Idea—Ed.

*** positing—Ed.

NB

Nota bene

V. I. LENIN216

objective truth). What is necessary isthe u n i o n o f c o g n i t i o n andp r a c t i c e.

And immediately following this:...“But it makes this transition through

itself” (the transition of the idea of truthinto the idea of the Good, of theory intopractice, and vice versa). “In the syllo-gism of action one premise is the immediaterelation of the g o o d e n d t o a c t u a l i t y ,of which it makes itself master, directingit (in the second premise) as e x t e r n a lm e a n s against external actuality.” (324)

The “syllogism of action” ... For He-gel action, practice, is a l o g i c a ls y l l o g i s m,” a figure of logic. Andthat is true! Not, of course, in the sensethat the figure of logic has its otherbeing in the practice of man (= abso-lute idealism), but vice versa: man’spractice, repeating itself a thousandmillion times, becomes consolidated inman’s consciousness by figures of logic.Precisely (and only) on account of thisthousand-million-fold repetition, thesefigures have the stability of a preju-dice, an axiomatic character.First premise: The good end (subjective-

end) versus actuality(“external actuality”).

Second premise: The external means (in-strument), (objective).

Third premise or conclusion: The coin-cidence of subjectiveand objective, the testof subjective ideas, thecriterion of objectivetruth.

...“The realisation of the Good in the

NB

NB


teeth of an opposing and other actualityis the mediation which is essential forthe immediate relation and actualisationof the Good....” (325)

...“If now in spite of this” (through activ-ity) “the end of the Good should not berealised, then this is a relapse of the Notionto the standpoint which the Notion hasbefore its activity—the standpoint of thatactuality which was determined as nulland yet was presupposed as real. Thisrelapse becomes a progress to bad infin-ity; it has its only ground in the factthat in the transcendence of this abstractreality the transcendence is equally imme-diately forgotten, or that it is forgottenthat this reality has already been presup-posed as non-objective actuality which isnull in and for itself.” (325)

The non-fulfilment of ends (of humanactivity) has as its cause (Grund) thefact that reality is taken as non-existent(nichtig), that its (reality’s) objectiveactuality is not being recognised.

“By the activity of the objective No-tion external actuality is altered, and itsdetermination is accordingly transcended;and by this very process it loses merelyapparent reality, external determinability,and nullity, and it is thus posited as beingin and for itself....” (326) #

The activity of man, who hasconstructed an objective picture ofthe world for himself, c h a n g e sexternal actuality, abolishesits determinateness (= alters somesides or other, qualities, of it),and thus removes from it the fea-tures of Semblance, externality and

V. I. LENIN218

nullity, and makes it as being inand for itself (= objectively true).

# ...“Presupposition in general is heretranscended,—that is, the determinationof the Good as an end which is m e r e l ys u b j e c t i v e and restricted in its content,the necessity of realising it by subjectiveactivity, and this activity itself. I n t h er e s u l t mediation transcends itself; theresult is an immediacy which is not thereconstitution of the presupposition butrather the fact of its transcendedness. TheIdea of the Notion which is determinedin and for itself is thus posited no longermerely in the active subject, but equallyas an immediate actuality; and the latterconversely is posited as it is in C o g n i -t i o n , as o b j e c t i v i t y w h i c h t r u l y i s .”(326)

...“In this result then Cognition is re-constructed and uni ted wi th the Prac -t i c a l I d e a ; the actuality which is foundas given is at the same time determinedas the realised absolute end,—not however(as in inquiring Cognition) merely as ob-jective world without the subjectivity ofthe Notion, but as objective world whoseinner ground and actual persistence is theNotion. This is the Absolute Idea.” (327)((End of Chapter II. Transition to Chap-ter III: “The Absolute Idea.”))

Chapter III: “The Absolute Idea.” (327)...“The Absolute Idea has turned out

to be the identity of the Theoretical and thePractical Idea; each of these by itselfis one-sided....” (327)

The result of activity is the test of subjective cognitionand the criterion of OBJECTIVITY WHICH TRULY IS.


The unity of the theoretical idea (ofknowledge) a n d o f p r a c t i c e—thisNB—and this unity p r e c i s e l y i nt h e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e, forthe resulting sum is the “absolute, idea”(and the idea = “das objektive Wahre”*).Vol. V, 236 What remains to be considered is no long-

er Inhalt,** but ... “the universal elementof its form—that is, the method.” (329)

“In inquiring cognition the method islikewise in the position of a tool, of ameans which stands on the subjective side,whereby the subjective side relates itself tothe object.... But in true cognition the meth-od is not merely a quantity of certaindeterminations; it is the fact that the No-tion is determined in and for itself, andis the middle member” (in the logical figureof the syllogism) “only because it equallyhas the significance of objective....” (331)

...“The absolute method” (i.e., the meth-od of cognition of objective truth) “onthe other hand does not behave as exter-nal reflection; it draws the determinateelement directly from its object itself,since it is the object’s immanent principleand soul.—It was this that Plato demandedof cognition, that it should consider thingsin and for themselves, and that while part-ly considering them in their universality,it should also hold fast to them, not catch-ing at externals, examples and compari-sons, but contemplating the things aloneand bringing before consciousness whatis immanent in them....” (335-336)

This method of “absolute cognition is ana-lytic... “but equally it is synthetic”.... (336)

* “the objectively true”—Ed.** content—Ed.

V. I. LENIN220

* In the manuscript, there is an arrow from the parenthesispointing to the paragraph: “Dialectics is ....” located on the followingpage of the manuscript. (See p. 223 of this volume.)—Ed.

** the other of itself—Ed.

“Dieses so sehr synthetische als analy-tische Moment des Urteils, wodurch dasanfängliche Allgemeine aus ihm selbst alsdas Andere seiner sich bestimmt, ist dasdialektische zu nennen”... (336) (# see thenext page).*

“This equally synthetic and analyticmoment of the Judgment, by which (themoment) the original universality gen-eral concept determines itself out ofitself as other in relation to itself,must be called dialectical.”A determination which is not a clear

one!!1) The determination of the concept out

of itself the thing itself must be consid-ered in its relations and in its develop-ment ;

2) the contradictory nature of the thingitself (das Andere seiner**), the contra-dictory forces and tendencies in each phe-nomenon;

3) the union of analysis and synthesis.Such, apparently, are the elements of

dialectics.One could perhaps present these ele-

ments in greater detail as follows:1) the o b j e c t i v i t y of consideration

(not examples, not divergences, butthe Thing-in-itself)

92) the entire totality of the manifold

r e l a t i o n s of this thing to others.3) the d e v e l o p m e n t of this thing,

One of thedefini-

tions ofdialectics

E l e m e n t so f d i a l e c-

t i c s


(phenomenon, respectively), its ownmovement, its own life,

4) the internally contradictory t e n d e n -c i e s (and sides) in this thing.

5) the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as thesum a n d

#u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s

6) the s t r u g g l e, respectively unfold-ing, of these opposites, contradictorystrivings, etc.

7) the union of analysis and synthesis—the break-down of the separate partsand the totality, the summation ofthese parts.

8) the relations of each thing (phenome-non, etc.) are not only manifold, butgeneral, universal. Each thing (phe-nomenon, process, etc.) is connectedwith e v e r y o t h e r.

9) not only the unity of opposites, butthe t r a n s i t i o n s of e v e r y de-termination, quality, feature, side,property into e v e r y other into itsopposite? .

10) the endless process of the discoveryof n e w sides, relations, etc.

11) the endless process of the deepeningof man’s knowledge of the thing, ofphenomena, processes, etc., from ap-pearance to essence and from less pro-found to more profound essence.

12) from co-existence to causality and fromone form of connection and reciprocaldependence to another, deeper, moregeneral form.

13) the repetition at a higher stage ofcertain features, properties, etc., ofthe lower and

9

V. I. LENIN222

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine ofthe unity of opposites. This embodies the essenceof dialectics, but it requires explanations and develop-ment.

* See p. 220 of this volume.—Ed.

14) the apparent return to the old (nega-tion of the negation).

15) the struggle of content with form andconversely. The throwing off of theform, the transformation of the con-tent.

16) the transition of quantity into qualityand vice versa. ((1 5 and 1 6 are e x a m -p l e s of 9))

# (continuation. See the previouspage.*)

...“Dialectics is One of those ancientsciences which has been most misjudged inmodern metaphysics here obviously = the-ory of knowledge and logic and in thepopular philosophy of ancients and mod-erns alike....” (336) Diogenes Laertiussaid of Plato that he was the father ofdialectics, the third philosophical science(as Thales was the father of natural phi-losophy and Socrates of moral philoso-phy), but that those who are particularlyloud in talking about this merit of Plato’sgive little thought to it....

...“Dialectics has often been consideredan art, as though it rested upon a sub-jective talent and did not belong to theobjectivity of the Notion....” (336-337)It is an important merit of Kant’s to havere-introduced dialectics, to have recognisedit as “necessary” (a property) “of reason”(337) but the result (of the applicationof dialectics) must be “opposite” (to Kant-ianism). See below.

Plato anddialectics

The objec-tivity of

dialectics

{


There follows a very interesting, clearand important outline of dialectics.

...“Besides generally appearing as con-tingent, dialectics usually has this moredetailed form, that when in respect of anyparticular object, e.g., the world, mo-tion, point etc., it is shown that it hasany particular determination—e.g. (inthe order of the above-mentioned objects)finitude in space or time, presence atthis place, absolute negation of space—it is, however, shown further that it haswith equal necessity the opposite deter-mination, e.g., infinity in space and time,non-presence at this place, and a rela-tion to space, consequently spatiality. Theolder Eleatic school applied its dialec-tics chiefly against motion; Plato frequent-ly against contemporary ideas and con-cepts (especially those of the Sophists),but also against pure categories and re-flection-determinations; the developed lat-er scepticism extended it not only tothe immediate so-called data of conscious-ness and maxims of ordinary life, butalso to all the concepts of science. Theconclusion which is drawn from such dia-lectics is contradiction and the nullity ofthe assertions made. But it may occur ina double sense,—in the objective sense,the object which thus contradicts itselfbeing held to cancel itself and to be null(—this was, for instance, the Eleatic con-clusion, by which, for example, the world,motion, and the point were deprived oftruth), or in the subjective seuse, cogni-tion being held to be defective. The latterconclusion is sometimes understood to meanthat it is only this dialectics that effectsthe trick of an illusive show. This is theordinary view of so-called sound common

from thehistory ofdialectics

the role ofscepticism inthe history of

dialectics

dialectics isunderstoodto be a trick

V. I. LENIN224

* nothing else—Ed.

sense, which holds fast to the evidenceof the senses and to customary ideas andexpressions....” (337-338)

Diogenes the Dog,62 for example, provedmovement by walking up and down, “a vuI-gar refutation” (338), says Hegel.

...“Or again the result reached—that ofsubjective nullity—relates, not to the dia-lectic, itself, but rather to the cognitionagainst which it is directed, and in thesense of scepticism and likewise of theKantian philosophy, to cognition in gener-al....” (338).

...“The fundamental prejudice here isthat the dialectic has only a negatitve re-sult.” (338)

Among other things, it is said thatit is a merit of Kant’s to have drawnattention to dialectics and to the con-sideration “of the determinations of thoughtin and for themselves.”* (339)

“The object in its existence withoutthought and Notion is an image or a name:it is what it is in the determinations ofthought and Notion....”

...“It must not therefore be considered thefault of an object, or of cognition, that theymanifest themselves as dialectical by theirnature and by an external connection....”

...“Thus all opposites which are takenas fixed, such as, for example, finite andinfinite, or individual and universal, arecontradictory not by virtue of some exter-nal connection, but rather are transitionsin and for themselves, as the considera-tion of their nature showed....” (339)

Kantian-ism = (also)scepticism

That is cor-rect!

I m a g e andt h o u g h t,the develop-

ment of both,nil aliud*The objectmanifestsitself as

dialecticalConcepts arenot immobilebut—in and

for them-selves, bytheir na-ture =

t r a n s i t i o n

A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript:Conspectus of Hegel’s book The Science of Logic.—

September-December 1914

A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript:Conspectus of Hegel’s book The Science of Logic.—

September-December 1914


Not empty negation, not futile negation, not scepti-cal negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristicand essential in dialectics,—which undoubtedly containsthe element of negation and indeed as its most impor-tant element—no, but negation as a moment of con-nection, as a moment of development, retaining thepositive, i.e., without any vacillations, without anyeclecticism.

“Now this is the standpoint which wasreferred to above, in which a universal#

first term considered in and for itself showsitself to be its own Other....” (340)

...“But the Other is essentially not theempty negative or Nothing which i s com-monly taken as the resul t o f d ia lec -t ics , it is the Other of the first, the negativeof the immediate; it is thus determinedas mediated—and altogether contains thedetermination of the first. The first is thusessentially contained and preserved in theOther.—To hold fast the positive in its neg-ative, and the content of the presuppositionin the result, is the most important partof rational cognition; also only the simplestreflection is needed to furnish convictionof the absolute truth and necessity of thisrequirement, while with regard to theexamples of proofs, the whole of Logicconsists of these.” (340)

Dialectics consists in general in the ne-gation of the first proposition, in its re-placement by a second (in the transitionof the first into the second, in the demon-stration of the connection of the firstwith the second, etc.). The second can bemade the predicate of the first—

#The first uni-

versal con-cept (also =

the firstencountered,

universalconcept)

This is veryimportant forunderstand-

ingdialectics

V. I. LENIN226

— “for example, the finite is infinite,one is many, the individual is theuniversal....” (341)...“The first or immediate term is the No-

tion in itself, and therefore is the nega-tive only in itself; the dialectical momentwith it therefore consists in this, thatthe distinction which it implicitly containsis posited in it. The second term on theother hand is itself the determinate en-tity, the distinction or relation; hence withit the dialectical moment consists in thepositing of the unity which is containedin it....”—(341-342)

(In relation to the simple and origi-nal, “first,” positive assertions, proposi-tions, etc., the “dialectical moment,” i.e.,scientific consideration, demands the dem-onstration of difference, connection, tran-sition. Without that the simple positiveassertion is incomplete, lifeless, dead. Inrelation to the “second,” negative propo-sition, the “dialectical moment” demandsthe demonstration of “u n i t y,” i.e., ofthe connection of negative and positive,the presence of this positive in the nega-tive. From assertion to negation—fromnegation to “unity” with the asserted—without this dialectics becomes empty ne-gation, a game, or scepsis.)

... —“If then the negative, the deter-minate, the relation, judgment, and alldeterminations which fall under this sec-ond moment, do not of themselves appearas contradictory and dialectical, this isa mere fault of thought which does notconfront its thoughts one with another.For the materials—opposite determinationsin one relation—are posited already andare at hand for thought. But formal thoughtmakes identity its law, and allows the

“in itself” =potentially,not yet de-

veloped, notyet åunfolded


contradictory content which lies before itto drop into the sphere of sensuous repre-sentation, into space and time, where thecontradictory terms are held apart in spa-tial and temporal juxtaposition and thuscome before consciousness w i t h o u t m u -tual contact .” (342)

“Come before consciousness withoutmutual contact” (the object)—that isthe essence of anti-dialectics. It is onlyhere that Hegel has, as it were, allowedthe ass’s ears of idealism to show them-selves—by referring time and space (inconnection with sensuous representation)to something lower compared withthought. Incidentally, in a certain sense,sensuous representation is, of course,lower. The crux lies in the fact thatthought must apprehend the whole “re-presentation” in its movement, but forthat thought must be dialectical. Issensuous representation c l o s e r toreality than thought? Both yes and no.Sensuous representation cannot appre-hend movement a s a w h o l e, it can-not, for example, apprehend movementwith a speed of 300,000 km. per second,but thought does and must apprehend it.Thought, taken from sensuous representa-tion, also reflects reality; time is a formof being of objective reality. Here, in theconcept of time (and not in the relationof sensuous representation to thought)is the idealism of Hegel....“In this connection this thought*

makes it its fixed principle that contradic-tion is unthinkable; but in truth the think-ing of contradiction is the essential mo-ment of the Notion; in point of fact formal

* formal thought—Ed.

NB

V. I. LENIN228

* “the most objective moment”—Ed.** quadruplicity—Ed.

the kernel ofdialectics

the criterionof truth

the unityof the con-cept andreality

thought does think contradiction, but im-mediately disregards it, and with the asser-tion of that principle” (the statement thatcontradiction is unthinkable) “passes overto abstract negation.” (342)

“The negativity which has just beenconsidered is the turning-point of themovement of the Notion. It is the simplepoint of negative self-relation, the inter-nal source of all activity, vital and spirit-ual self-movement, the dialectic soul whichall truth has in it and through which italone is truth; for the transcendence ofthe opposition between the Notion andReality, and that unity which is the truth,rest upon this subjectivity alone.—Thesecond negative, the negative of the neg-ative, which we have reached, is thistranscendence of the contradiction, but isno more the activity of an external reflec-tion than the contradiction is; it is the in-nermost and most objective moment of Lifeand Spirit, by virtue of which a subject,the person, the free, has being.” (342-343)

Important here is: 1) the char-acterisation of dialectics: self-move-ment, the source of activity, themovement of life and spirit; thecoincidence of the concepts of thesubject (man) with reality; 2) ob-jectivism to the highest degree (“derobjektiviste Moment”*).

This negation of the negation is thethird term, says Hegel (343)—“if numberis applicable”—but it can also be takenas the fourth (Quadruplicität**), (344)counting two negations: the “simple” (or

( (


The difference is not clear to me, is not the absolu-te equivalent to the more concrete?

“formal”) and the “absolute.” (343 i.f.)

“That this unity, as well as the wholeform of the method, is a triplicity is wholly,however, the merely superficial and ex-ternal side of the manner of cognition”(344)

—but, he says, that is already “an infi-nite merit of Kant’s philosophy” that itat least (even if ohne Begriff*) demon-strated this.

“Formalists, it is true, have also seizedupon triplicity, and have held fast to itsempty framework; and this form has beenrendered tedious and of ill-repute by theshallow misuse and the barrenness of mod-ern so-called philosophic construction,which consists simply in attaching the for-mal framework without concept and im-manent determination to all sorts of mat-ter and employing it for external arrange-ment. But its inner value cannot be dimin-ished by this vapid misuse, and it muststill be deemed of high value that the out-ward form of the rational has been dis-covered, albeit not understood.” (344-345)

The result of the negation of the nega-tion, this third term is “not a qui-escent third term, but, as this unity”(of contradictions), “is self-mediatingmovement and activity....” (345)

The result of this dialectical transforma-tion into the “third” term, into the synthe-sis, is a new premise, assertion, etc., whichin turn becomes the source of a furtheranalysis. But into it, into this “third”

* without any concept—Ed.

NB:the “triplici-ty” of dialec-

tics is itsexternal su-

perficial side

Hegel sav-agely attacks

formalism,tedious and

idle playwith

dialectics

V. I. LENIN230

* Going into itself—Ed.

stage has already entered the “c o n t e n t”of cognition (“the content of cognition assuch enters within the sphere of contempla-tion”*) — and the method is extended intoa system. (346)

The beginning of all consideration, ofthe whole analysis—this first premise—now appears indeterminate, “imperfect”;the need arises to prove, “derive” (ablei-ten) (347) it and it turns out that

“this may seem equivalent to the demandfor an infinite backward progress in proof andderivation” (347)—but, on the other hand,the new premise drives f o r w a r d....

...“Thus, cognition rolls forward from con-tent to content. This progress determinesitself, first, in this manner, that it be-gins from simple determinatenesses andthat each subsequent one is richer andmore concrete. For the result contains itsown beginning, and the development ofthe beginning has made it the richer bya new determinateness. The universal isthe foundation; the progress therefore mustnot be taken as a flow from Other to Other.In the absolute method the Notion pre-serves itself in its otherness, and the uni-versal in its particularisation, in the Judg-ment and in reality; it raises to each nextstage of determination the whole mass ofits antecedent content, and by its dialec-tical progress not only loses nothing andleaves nothing behind, but carries withit all that it has acquired, enriching andconcentrating itself upon itself....” (349)

This extract is not at all bad as a kindof summing up of dialectics.

But expansion requires also deepening(“In-sich-gehen”*) “and greater extensionis also higher intensity.” (349)

( (


“The richest consequently is also themost concrete and subjective, and thatwhich carries itself back into the simplestdepth is also the most powerful and com-prehensive.” (349)

“In this manner it comes about that eachstep in the progress of further determi-nation in advancing from the indetermi-nate beginning is also a rearward approachto it, so that two processes which mayat first appear to be different (the regres-sive confirmation of the beginning and itsprogressive further determination) coincideand are the same.” (350)

It is impermissible deprezieren* thisindeterminate beginning:

...“It requires no apology that it”(the beginning) “may be admitted mere-ly as provisional and hypothetical. Anyobjections which might be advanced—about the limits of human cognition, orthe need of a critical investigation of theinstrument of cognition before the prob-lem is attacked—are themselves supposi-tions which, as concrete determinations,imply the need for their mediation andproof. Formally then they are no betterthan that beginning against which theyprotest, and rather require a derivationby reason of their more concrete content; sothat it is s h e e r p r e s u m p t i o n to demandthat they should have preferential consid-eration. Their content is untrue, for theymake incontrovertible and absolute whatis known to be finite and untrue (namely,a restricted cognition which is determinedas form and instrument as against its

* to depreciate—Ed.

This NB: Therichest isthe mostconcreteand most

s u b j e c-t i v e

NB:Hegel against

Kant

\

e

V. I. LENIN232

* “fulfilled Being”—Ed.** the idea of absolute cognition—Ed.

content); and this untrue cognition is it-self form and regressive confirmation.—The method of truth too knows the begin-ning to be incomplete because it is be-ginning, but also knows this incompleteterm in general as necessary, because truthis only the coining to itself through thenegativity of immediacy....” (350-351)

By reason of the nature of the methodwhich has been demonstrated, science isseen to be a circle which returns upon it-self, for mediation bends back its end intoits beginning, simple ground. Further, thiscircle is a circle of circles.... The varioussciences ... are fragments of this chain....”(351)

“The method is the pure Notion whichis related only to itself; it is thereforethe simple self-relation which is Being.But now it is also Being fulfilled, the self-comprehending Notion, Being as the con-crete and also thoroughly intensive to-tality....” (352)

...“Secondly, this Idea” ((die Idee desabsoluten Erkennens**)) “still is logical,it is enveloped in pure thought, and isthe science only of the divine Notion.The systematic development is itself a real-isation, but is maintained within thesame sphere. Since the pure Idea of Cogni-tion is to that extent enclosed in subjectiv-ity, it is an impulse to transcend the latter,and pure truth, as the last result,also becomes the beginning of another sphereand science. This transition need here onlybe intimated.

against Kant(correct)

Science is acircle ofcircles

NB: the con-nection of the

dialecticalmethod with

“erfülltesSein”* withBeing that is

full of con-tent andconcrete


It is noteworthy that the whole chapter on the “Absol-ute Idea” scarcely says a word about God (hardly everhas a “divine” “notion” slipped out accidentally) andapart from that—this NB—it contains almost nothingthat is specifically i d e a l i s m, but has for its mainsubject the d i a l e c t i c a l method. The sum-total, the last word and essence of Hegel’s logic is thedialectical method—this is extremely noteworthy. Andone thing more: in this m o s t i d e a l i s t i c ofHegel’s works there is the least idealism and them o s t m a t e r i a l i s m. “Contradictory,” but a fact!

Vol. VI, p. 399****The Encyclopaedia § 227—excellent on

* addendum—Ed.** Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

*** “but this Idea which has firing is Nature”—Ed.**** Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

“For the idea posits itself as the abso-lute unity of the pure Notion and itsReality, and thus gathers itself into theimmediacy of Being; and in doing so,as totality in this form, it is Nature.”(352-353)

This sentence on the last (353) page ofthe Logic is highly noteworthy. The tran-sition of the logical idea to nature. Itbrings one within a hand’s grasp of mate-rialism. Engels was right63 when he saidthat Hegel’s system was materialism turnedupside down. This is not the last sen-tence of the Logic, but what comes afterit to the end of the page is unimportant.

End of the Logic. 17.XII.1914.

Transitionfrom the Idea

to N a -t u r e...

NB:In the smallLogic (Ency-clopaedia,

Par. 244, Zu-satz* p. 414**the last sen-tence of thebook reads:

“diese seiendeIdee aber

ist dieNatur”***

V. I. LENIN234

* is usually said—Ed.** “tortures”—Ed.

NB:“genus, orforce and

law”(genus = law!)

Quite correct!Cf. Marx’sremark inCapital,I, 5, 264

the analytical method (to “analyse” the“Given concrete” phenomenon—“to give theform of abstraction” to its individualaspects and “herausheben”—“to bring intorelief”—“the genus, or force and law”p. 398—and on its application:

It is not at all “an arbitray matter” (398)whether we apply the analytical or thesynthetical method (as man pflegt zu sprech-en*)—“it is the form of the very objectsthat have to be cognised upon which itdepends” (399)

Locke and the empiricists adopt thestandpoint of analysis. And they oftensay that “in general cognition cannotdo more.” (398)

“It is, however, at once apparent thatthis turns things upside down, and thatcognition which wishes to take things asthey are thereby falls into contradictionwith itself.” The chemist, for example,“martert”** a piece of flesh and discoversin it nitrogen, carbon, etc. “But then theseabstract substances have ceased to beflesh.”

There can be many definitions, for ob-jects have many aspects.

“The richer the object to be defined,i.e., the more numerous the aspects whichit offers to one’s notice, the more variousalso are the definitions framed from them”(400 § 229)—for example, the definitionof life, of the state, etc.

In their definitions, Spinoza and Schel-ling present a mass of “speculation” (Hegelhere obviously uses this word in the goodsense) but “in the form of assurances.”


* the Notion, the “idea,” “the unity of the Notion and objectiv-ity”—Ed.

** v o l i t i o n—Ed.*** “The Idea of the Good”—Ed.

Philosophy, however, must prove and de-rive everything, and not limit itself todefinitions.

Division (Einteilung) must be “naturaland not merely artificial, i.e., arbitrary.”(401)

Pp. 4 0 3 - 4 0 4—anger at “construction”and the “play” of construing, whereas itis a question of Begriff, of “Idee,” of “Ein-heit des Begriffs und der Objektivität....”*(403)

In the small Encyclopaedia § 233,section b is entitled D a s W o l l e n**(which in the large Logic is “Die Idee desGuten”***).

Activity is a “contradiction”—the pur-pose is real and not real, possible andnot ... etc.

“Formally, however, the disappearanceof this contradiction consists in activityabolishing the subjectivity of the pur-pose and along with it the objectivity,the opposite, in virtue of which bothare finite, and abolishing not merely theone-sidedness of this subjectivity, but thesubjectivity as a whole.” (406)

The standpoint of Kant and Fichte (es-pecially in moral philosophy) is the stand-point of purpose, of subjective ought (407)(without connection with the objective)....

Speaking of the Absolute Idea, Hegelridicules (§ 237, Vol. VI, p. 409) “decla-mation” over it, as if everything wererevealed in it, and he remarks that

“the absolute idea” ... is ... “the univer-sal,” “but the universal not merely as ab-

V. I. LENIN236

stract form, to which (sic!) the particularcontent stands contrasted as an Other,but, as the absolute form into which alldeterminations, the whole fullness of thecontent posited by it, have retreated. Inthis respect the absolute idea can be com-pared to an old man, who utters the samestatements of religion as a child, but forwhom they have the significance of hiswhole lifetime. Even if the child under-stands the religious content, it is for himstill only something outside of which thewhole of life and the whole of the worldlie.” (409)

...“The interest lies in the whole move-ment....” (§ 237, 409)

...“The content is the living develop-ment of the idea....” “Each of the stageshitherto reviewed is an image of the ab-solute, but at first in a limited way....”(401)

§ 238, Addendum:“The philosophical method is both ana-

lytical and synthetical, but not in thesense of a bare juxtaposition or a merealternation of these two methods of finitecognition, but rather in such a way thatit holds them transcended in itself, andin every one of i t s movements , there-fore, it proves itself simultaneously ana-lytical and synthetical. Philosophicalthought proceeds analytically, insofar as itonly accepts its object, the Idea, allowsthe latter its own way and, as it were,only looks on at its movement and de-velopment. To this extent philosophisingis wholly passive. Philosophic thought,however, is equally synthetic and showsitself to be the activity of the Notion itself.That, however, involves the effort to re-frain from our own fancies and private

très bien!

A beautifulcomparison!

Instead ofbanal reli-gion, one

must take allkinds of ab-stract truths

excellent!

très bien!

verygood!

(and graphic)


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opinions, which always seek to obtrudethemselves....” (411)

(§ 243, p. 413)... “Thus the method isnot an external form, but the soul andnotion of the content....”

(End of the Encyclopaedia; see above onthe side the extract from the end of Log-ic.*)


238

Preußische Jahrbücher66 (Bd. 151) 1913,March, an article by Dr. Ferd. J. Schmidt:“Hegel and Marx.” The author hails thereturn to Hegel, reviles “theoretico-cognitive scholasticism,” quotes theneo-Hegelians Constantin Rössler and AdolfLasson (of the Preußische Jahrbücher)and, in connection with Plenge’s book,states that Marx did not understand thesignificance of the “national idea” as a syn-thesis. Marx’s merit—that of organisingthe workers—was a great one, but ...one-sided.

An example of the “liberal” (or ratherbourgeois, worker-loving—for the authoris probably a conservative) castration ofMarx.

MacTaggart, Ellis M’Taggart: Studies inthe Hegelian Dialectic, Cambridge, 1896(259 pp.). Review in Zeitschrift für Phi-losophie,67 Bd. 119 (1902), S. 185———,says that the author is an expert on He-gel’s philosophy, which he defends againstSeth, Balfour, Lotze, Trendelenburg, etc.(the author MacTaggart is obviously anarch-idealist).

Emil Hammacher: Die Bedeutung derPhilosophic Hegels. (92 SS.) 1911, Leipzig.

NB

NOTES ON REVIEWSOF HEGEL’S LOGIC 65

239NOTES ON REVIEWS OF HEGEL’S LOGIC

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Review in Zeitschrift für Philosophie,Bd. 148 (1912), p. 95. Says that the bookcontains rather good observations on “thereappearance of post-Kantian idealism atthe present time,” that Windelband is anagnostic (p. 96), etc., but that the authorcompletely failed to understand Hegel’s“absolute idealism,” as incidentally alsoRiehl, Dilthey and other “stars.” Theauthor is said to have undertaken a taskbeyond his powers.

Andrew Seth: The Development from Kantto Hegel with Chapters on the Philosophyof Religion, London, 1882. Review inZeitschrift für Philosophie, Bd. 83, S. 145(1883).

The author is said to defend Hegelagainst Kant. (Laudatory in general.)

Stirling: The Secret of Hegel. Reviewin the same journal, Bd. 53 (1868), p. 268.The author is said to be an exceptionallyfervent worshipper of Hegel, whom he in-terprets for English readers.

Bertrando Spaventa: Da Socrate a He-gel, Bari, 1905. (432 pp. 4,50 lire). Reviewibidem, Bd. 129 (1906)—the book is saidto be a collection of articles, inter aliaabout Hegel, of whom Spaventa is a faith-ful adherent.

Stirling: The Secret of Hegel.Italian:

Spaventa: Da Socrate a Hegel.Ralf. Mariano.

German:Michelet and Haring. Dialekitische

Methode Hegels (1888).Schmitt. Das Geheimnis der Hegel-

schen Dialektik (1888).

V. I. LENIN240

Regarding recent literatuire on H e g e l.Neo-Hegelians: C a i r d, B r a d l e y.J. B. B a i l l i e: The Origin and Signifi-

cance of Hegel’s Logic, L o n d o n, 1901(375 pp.). A review in Revue Philoso-phique,68 1 9 0 2 , 2, S 3 1 2. Says that hedoes not merely repeat Hegelian terminol-ogy (like Véra), but tries to examine andexplain historically. Incidentally, ChapterX: the relation of logic to nature (Hegelis said not to have achieved his aim). He-gel’s significance is that he “demonstratedthe objective character of knowledge.”(p. 314)

W i l l i a m W a l l a c e: Prolegomenato the Study of Hegel’s Philosophy andEspecially of His Logic, Oxford and London,1 8 9 4. Review in R e v u e P h i l o -s o p h i q u e, 1 8 9 4, 2, p. 538. Secondedition, the first was in 1874. The authortranslated Hegel’s Logic.

“Mr. Wallace accurately expounds theHegelian conception of this science (logic)... a science which governs both the philo-sophy of nature and that of mind, since purethought or the idea is the common basisboth or material reality and psychical real-ity.”

On Wallace, a laudatory but shallowreview in Z e i t s c h r i f t f ü r P h i -l o s o p h i e, Bd. 111 (1898), p. 208.P. R o t t a: La renaissance de Hegel

et “la philosophia perennis” in the ItalianRivista di Filosofia, 1911, I—(review inRevue Philosophique, 1911, 2, p. 333).

Rotta is a supporter of Caird. Seemingly,nil.

By the sameauthor: 1894a translationof The Philo-

sophyof Mind,69

with anexplanatory

chapter.Review ibid. D

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

241NOTES ON REVIEWS OF HEGEL’S LOGIC

Among other things ... “Bradley’s neo-Hegelian conception of an invisible energytransferred from one manifestation toanother, present and operative in all changesand all particular activities.”70

J. G r i e r H i b b e n: Hegel’s Logic,an Essay in Interpretation, New York,1 9 0 2 (313 pp.).

Review in Revue Philosophique, 1904,Vol. I, p. 430: “In spite of its title, thework of M. H. is not an interpretativecommentary but rather an almost literalsummary.” The author has compiled some-thing in the nature of a dictionary of theterms used in Hegel’s Logic. But this, it issaid, is not the essence of the matter: “Thecommentators are still in dispute overthe very position taken by Hegel overthe fundamental meaning and true aimof his dialectic. The celebrated criticismsof S e t h are opposed by recent exegeseswhich attribute a quite different significanceto the Logic, taken as a whole, notably suchas those of M a c T a g g a r t and G. N o ë l.” (431)

According to Hibben, Hegel’s Logic “n’estpas on simple système spéculatif, une plusou moins savante combinaison de conceptsabstraits; elle est en même temps ‘une in-terprétation de la vie universelle danstoute la plénitude de sa signification con-crète.’ ”** (p. 430)

* L. Weber—Ed.** “is not a simple peculstive system, a more or less scientific

combination of abstract concepts; it is at the same time “an interpreta-tion of universal life in all the fullness of its concrete significance.”—Ed.

an idealistinterpreta-

tion ofenergy??

The writerof the re-

view* notesin general

“the rebirthof Hegelian-ism in the

Anglo-Saxoncountries”

... “in recentyears.”

NB


Written in December 1 9 1 4First published in 1 9 3 0


NB


Written in 1 9 1 5First published in 1 9 3 0


CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOKL E C T U R E S

O N T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 71

245

p. 37* ...“If the truth is abstract itmust be untrue. Healthy human rea-son goes out towards what is con-crete.... Philosophy is what is most an-tagonistic to abstraction, it leads backto the concrete....”

p. 40: comparison of the history of phi-losophy with a c i r c l e —“a circle ...which, as periphery, has very manycircles....”

...“I maintain that the sequence in thesystems of philosophy in history is thesame as the sequence in the logical deduc-tion of the Notion-determinations of theIdea. I maintain that if the fundamental

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. XIII, Berlin, 1833—Ed.

A very pro-found correctcomparison!!Every shadeof thought =

a circle onthe great

circle (a spi-ral) of the

developmentof humanthought in

general

NB

HEGEL. LECTURES ON THE HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY, WORKS, VOL. XIII

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

V. I. LENIN246

Extremely lengthy, empty and tedious on the relationof philosophy to religion. In general, an introduction ofalmost 200 pages—impossible!!

* “to all every twaddle (?) a philosophy”—Ed.** beginning—Ed.

conceptions of the systems appearing inthe history of Philosophy b e e n t i r e l y d i -v e s t e d of that which pertains to theiroutward form, their relation to the partic-ular and the like, the various stages inthe determination of the Idea itself arefound in its logical Notion.” (43)

“Conversely in the logical progressiontaken for itself, there is, so far as its prin-cipal elements are concerned, the progres-sion of historical manifestations; but it isnecessary, of course, to be able to discernthese pure Notions in what the historicalform contains.” (43)P. 56—ridicule of the chasing after fash-

ion,—after those who are ready “auchjedes G e s c h w ö g e (?) für eine Philo-sophie auszuschreien.”* Pp. 57-58—excellent for strict historicity in thehistory of philosophy, so that oneshould not ascribe to the ancients a“development” of their ideas, whichis comprehensible to us but whichin fact was not present in the ancients.

Thales, for example, did not possessthe conception ÄÇχÅ** (as a prin-ciple), did not possess the concept ofcause...

...“Thus there are whole nationswhich have not this concept” (of cause)“at all; indeed it involves a greatstep forward in development....” (58)

247CONSPECTUS OF LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

...“Hence the determinations are dry,destitute of process, undialectical, and sta-tionary....” (244)

This refers to the general ideas of thePythagoreans;—“number” and its sig-nificance, etc. Ergo: it is said in regardto the primitive ideas of the Pythago-reans, their primitive philosophy; their“determinations” of substance, things,the world, are “dry, destitute of process(movement), undialectical.”

Tracing predominantly the dialectical inthe history of philosophy, Hegel cites theviews of the Pythagoreans: ...“one, addedto even, makes odd (2 + 1 = 3);—addedto odd, it makes even (3 + 1 = 4);—it”(Eins*) “has the property of making ge-rade (= even), and consequently it must

* one—Ed.

negative de-terminationof dialectics

VOLUME XIII.VOLUME I OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

IONIC PHILOSOPHY 72

“Anaximander (610-547 B. C.) supposesman to develop from a fish.” (213)

PYTHAGORAS AND PYTHAGOREANS 73

V. I. LENIN248

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* Antichthon—Ed.

(“harmony ofthe world”)

relation ofthe subjec-tive to theobjective

itself be even. Thus unity contains in it-self different determinations.” (246)

Musical harmony and the philosophy ofPythagoras:

“The subjective, and, in the case of hear-ing, simple feeling, which, however, existsinherently in relation, Pythagoras has at-tributed to the understanding, and he at-tained his object by means of fixed deter-minations.” (262)Pp. 265-266: the movement of the heav-

enly bodies—their harmony—the har-mony of the singing heavenly spheresinaudible to us (in the P y t h a g o -r e a n s): Aristotle, De coelo, II, 13(and 9)74:

...“Fire was placed by the Pythagoreansin the middle, but the Earth was madea star that moved around this central bodyin a circle....” But for them this fire wasnot the sun.... “They thus rely, not onsensuous appearance, but on grounds....These ten spheres” ten spheres or orbits

or movements of the ten planets: Mer-cury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Sun,Moon, Earth, the Milky Way and theGegenerde* (—antipode?) invented “foran even number,” for 1075 “like all that

is in motion, make a sound; but eachmakes a different tone, according to thedifference in its size and velocity. Thisis determined by the different distances,which bear a harmonious relationship toone another, in accordance with musicalintervals; by this means a harmonioussound (music) arises in the moving spheres(world)....”


Concerning the soul, the Pythagoreansthought “die Seele sei : die Sonnenstäub-chen”* (p. 268) (= dust particle, atom)(Aristotle, De anima, I, 2).76

In the soul—seven circles (elements)as in the heavens. Aristotle, De ani-ma, I, 3—p. 269.

And here immediately are recounted thefables that Pythagoras (who had takenfrom the Egyptians the doctrine of the im-mortality of the soul and the transmi-gration of souls) related about himself, thathis soul had dwelt 207 years in other people,etc., etc. (271)

NB: the linking of the germs of scien-tific thought with fantasy à la religion,mythology. And nowadays! Likewise,the same linking but the propor-tions of science and mythology are dif-ferent.

More on the theory of numbers of Pythag-oras.

“Numbers, where are they? Dispersedthrough space, dwelling in independencein the heaven of ideas? They are notthings immediately in themselves, for a

* “the soul is solar dust”—Ed.

An allusionto the struc-

ture ofmatter!

the role ofdust (in thesunbeam) in

ancientphilosophy

Pythagoreans:“guesses,”fantasies

on the resem-blance of themacrocosm

and themicrocosm

NB

V. I. LENIN250

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL77

* In the Eleatic school—Ed.** The next page of the manuscript contains the text given be-

low.—Ed.

what isdialectics?

(α)

(β)

thing, a substance, is something quiteother than a number—a body bears noresemblance to it.” 254

Q u o t a t i o n from Aristotle?—Met-aphysik, I, 9, is it not? From SextusEmpiricus? Unclear .

Pp. 279-280—the Pythagoreans accept theether (...“A ray penetrates from thesun through the dense and cold ether,”etc.)

Thus the conjecture about the etherhas existed for thousands of years, re-maining until now a conjecture. Butat the present time there are alreadya thousand times more subsurface chan-nels leading to a solution of the prob-lem, to a scientific determination ofthe ether.

In speaking of the Eleatic school, Hegelsays about d i a l e c t i c s:

...“We here” (in der eleatischen Schule*)“find the beginning of dialectics, i.e.,simply the pure movement of thoughtin Notions; likewise we see the oppositionof thought to outward appearance or sen-suous Being, or of that which is implicitto the being-for-another of this implicit-ness, and in the objective existence we seethe contradiction which it has in itself,or dialectics proper....” (280) See the nextpage.**


Here are essentially two determinations(two characteristics, two typical featuresBestimmungen, keine Definitionen*) ofdialectics78:

α) “the pure movement of thoughtin Notions”;

β) “in the (very) essence of objects(to elucidate) (to reveal) the con-tradiction which it (this essence)has in itself (d i a l e c t i c sp r o p e r).”

In other words, this “fragment” of He-gel’s should be reproduced as follows:

Dialectics in general is “the pure move-ment of thought in Notions” (i.e., puttingit without the mysticism of idealism:human concepts are not fixed but areeternally in movement, they pass intoone another, they flow into one another,otherwise they do not reflect living life.The analysis of concepts, the study ofthem, the “art of operating with them”(Engels)79 always demands study of them o v e m e n t of concepts, of their inter-connection, of their mutual transitions).

In particular, dialectics is the studyof the opposition of the Thing-in-itself(an sich), of the essence, substratum, sub-stance—from the appearance, from “Be-ing-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a tran-sition, a flow from the one to the other: theessence appears. The appearance is essen-tial.) Human thought goes endlessly deeperfrom appearance to essence, from essence ofthe first order, as it were, to essence ofthe second order, and so on withoutend.

Dialectics in the proper sense is the

* determinations, not definitions—Ed.

Hegel ondialectics(see theprevious

page)

V. I. LENIN252

the compari-son is

a temptingone...

Gods in theimage of

man

dialectics

study of contradiction in the very essenceof objects: not only are appearances tran-sitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated onlyby conventional boundaries, but the es-sence of things is so as well.

Sextus Empiricus presents the point ofview of the Sceptics as follows:

...“Let us imagine that in a house inwhich there are many valuables, therewere those who sought for gold by night;each would then think that he had foundthe gold, but would not know for certainwhether he had actually found it. Thusphilosophers come into this world as intoa great house to seek the truth, but werethey to reach it, they could not tellwhether they had really attained it....”(288-289)

Xenophanes (the Eleatic) said:“Did beasts and lions only have hands,Works of art thereby to bring forth, as

do men,They would, in creating divine forms,

give to themWhat in image and size belongs to

themselves....” (289-290)“What especially characterises Zeno is

dialectics, which ... begins with him....”(302)

...“We find in Zeno likewise true objectivedialectics .” (309)

(310: on the refutation of philosophicsystems: “Falsity must not be demonstrat-ed as untrue because the opposite is true,but in itself....”)

“Dialectics is in general α) external dia-lectics, in which this movement is differ-ent from the comprehension of this move-ment; β) not a movement of our intelli-gence only, but what proceeds from the


nature of the thing itself, i.e., from thepure Notion of the content. The formeris a manner of regarding objects in sucha way that reasons are revealed and aspectsof them shown, by means of which allthat was supposed to be firmly fixed, ismade to totter. There may be reasons whichare altogether external too, and we shallspeak further of this dialectics when deal-ing with the Sophists. The other dialectics,however, is the immanent contemplationof the object: it is taken for itself, withoutprevious hypothesis, idea or obligation,not under any external conditions, laws,grounds. We have to put ourselves rightinto the thing, to consider the object initself and to take it in the determina-tions which it has. In regarding it thus,it” (er) (sic!) “shows from itself that it con-tains opposed determinations, and thustranscends itself; this dialectics we moreespecially find in the ancients. Subjec-tive dialectics, which reasons from exter-nal grounds, does justice when it is grantedthat: ‘in the correct there is what is notcorrect, and in the false the true as well.’True dialectics leaves nothing whateverto its object, as if the latter were defi-cient on one side only; but it disintegratesin the entirety of its nature....” (p. 311)

With the “principle of development” inthe twentieth century (indeed, at the endof the nineteenth century also) “all areagreed.” Yes, but this superficial, notthought out, accidental, philistine “agree-ment” is an agreement of such a kind asstifles and vulgarises the truth—if every-thing develops, then everything passes fromone into another, for development as iswell known is not a simple, universal andeternal growth, enlargement (respective dim-

objectivedialectics

Regardingthe questionof d i a l e c-

t i c s andits objective

significance...

V. I. LENIN254

NB

NB. This canand must bet u r n e d

r o u n d: thequestion is

not whetherthere is

movement,but how

to expressit in the logicof concepts

Not bad!Where is thiscontinuationof the anec-

inution), etc.—If that is so, then, inthe first place, evolution has to be under-stood more exactly, as the arising andpassing away of everything, as mutualtransitions.—And, in the second place,if e v e r y t h i n g develops, does not thatapply also to the most general conceptsand categories of thought? If not, it meansthat thinking is not connected with being.If it does, it means that there is a dialec-tics of concepts and a dialectics of cogni-tion which has objective significance. +

...“Zenos treatment of motion was aboveall objectively dialectical....” (p. 313)

...“Movement itself is the dialectic ofall that is....” It did not occur to Zenoto deny movement as “sensuous certainty,”it was merely a question “nach ihrer (move-ment’s) Wahrheit” (of the truth of move-ment). (313) And on the next page, wherehe relates the anecdote how Diogenes theCynic, of Sinope, refuted movement bywalking, Hegel writes:

...“But the anecdote continues that, whena pupil was satisfied with this refutation,Diogenes beat him, on the ground that,since the teacher had disputed with reasons,

+ In addition, the uni-versal principle of de-velopment must be com-bined, linked, made tocorrespond with the uni-versal principle of theu n i t y o f t h ew o r l d, nature, motion,matter, etc .

I. The principleof develop-ment...

II. The principleof unity...


the only valid refutation is one derivedfrom reasons. Men have not merely to sat-isfy themselves by sensuous certainty butalso to understand....” (314)

Zeno has four ways of refuting motion:1. That which is moving to an end must

first cover half of the path. And ofthis half, again first i t s half, and soon ad infinitum.

Aristotle replied: space and timeare infinitely divisible (δννáµει*)(p. 316), but not infinitely divided(êνεργεíα**), Bayle (Dictionnaire,82

Vol. IV, article Zeno) calls this replyof Aristotle’s pitoyable*** and says:

...“i f one drew an infinite numberof lines on a particle of matter, onewould not thereby introduce a divisionthat would reduce to an actual infin-ity that which according to him wasonly a potential infinity....”

And Hegel writes (317): “Dies si istgut!”****

i.e., i f one carried out the i n f i n i t edivision to the end!!...“The essence of space and time, is mo-

tion, for it is universal; to understandit means to express its essence in the form

* in potentiality—Ed.** in actuality—Ed.

*** pitiful—Ed.**** “This if is good!”—Ed.

dote takenfrom? It isnot to be

found in Dio-genes Laerti-us, VI, § 39,80

or in SextusEmpiri-

cus, III, 881

Hegel p.314). Did He-gel invent it?

correct!

V. I. LENIN256

of the Notion. As unity of negativity andcontinuity, motion is expressed as the No-tion, as thought; but neither continuitynor discontinuity is to be posited as theessence....” (pp. 318-319)

“To understand means to express in theform of notions.” Motion is the essenceof space and time. Two fundamental con-cepts express this essence: (infinite) con-tinuity (Kontinuität) and “punctuality”(= denial of continuity, d i s c o n t i n u-i t y). Motion is the unity of continuity(of time and space) and discontinuity (oftime and space). Motion is a contra-diction, a unity of contradictions.

Überweg-Heinze, 10th edition, p. 63(§ 20), is wrong when he says that Hegel“defends Aristotle against Bayle.” Hegelrefutes both the sceptic (Bayle) and theanti-dialectician (Aristotle).

Cf. Gomperz, Les penseurs de laGrèce,83 p. ..., the forced recognition, underthe lash, of the unity of contradictions,without recognising dialectics (owing tocowardice of thought)....

2. Achilles will not overtake the tortoise.“First the half” and so on endlessly.Aristotle answers: he will overtakeit if he be permitted “to overstep thelimits.” (320)And Hegel: “This answer is cor-rect and contains all that can besaid” (p. 321)—for actually the halfhere (at a certain stage) becomes the“limit”....


...“If we speak of motion in general, wesay that the body is in one place and thenit goes to another; because it moves it isno longer in the first, but yet not in thesecond; were it in either it would be atrest. If we say that it is between both,this is to say nothing at all, for were itbetween both, it would be in a place, andthis presents the same difficulty. But move-ment means to be in this place and notto be in it; this is the continuity of spaceand time—and it is this which first makesmotion possible.” (Pp. 321-322)

Movement is the presence of a body ina definite place at a given moment andin another place at another, subsequentmoment—such is the objection which Cher-nov repeats (see his Philosophical Studies)in the wake of all the “metaphysical”opponents of Hegel.

This objection is incorrect: (1) it de-scribes the result of motion, but not mo-tion itself; (2) it does not show, it doesnot contain in itself the possibility of mo-tion; (3) it depicts motion as a sum, asa concatenation of states of rest , that isto say, the (dialectical) contradiction isnot removed by it, but only concealed,shifted, screened, covered over.

“What makes the difficulty is alwaysthought alone, since it keeps apart the mo-ments of an object which in their separa-tion are really united.” (322)

We cannot imagine, express, measure,depict movement, without interrupting con-tinuity, without simplifying, coarsening,dismembering, strangling that which is liv-ing. The representation of movement bymeans of thought always makes coarse,

cf. Chernov’sobjections

againstEngels84

NBcorrect!

correct!

V. I. LENIN258

Kant and hissubjectiv-ism, scep-

ticism, etc.

kills,—and not only by means of thought,but also by sense-perception, and not onlyof movement, but every concept.

And in that lies the essence of dialectics.And precisely t h i s e s s e n c e is ex-

pressed by the formula: the unity, identityof opposites.

3. “The flying arrow rests.”And Aristotle’s answer: the errorarises from the assumption that “timeconsists of the individual Nows” (êκτñν νÜν) p. 324.

4. Half is equal to the double: motionmeasured in comparison with all un-moving body and in comparison witha body moving in the o p p o s i t edirection.

At the end of the § on Zeno, Hegel com-pares him to K a n t (whose antinomies, hesays, “do no more than Zeno did here”).(p. 326)

The general conclusion of the dialecticof the Eleatics: “the truth is the one, allelse is untrue”—“just as the Kantian phi-losophy resulted in ‘We know appearancesonly.’ On the whole the principle is thesame.” (p. 326)

But there is also a difference.“In Kant it is the spiritual that de-

stroys the world; according to Zeno, theworld of appearance in itself and for itselfhas no truth. According to Kant, it is ourthought, our spiritual activity that is had;—it shows excessive humility of mind to be-lieve that knowledge has no value....”(327)

The continuation of the Eleatics in Leu-cippus and among the S o p h i s t s...

( (


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After Zeno (? he lived after Heracli-tus?)85 Hegel passes on to Heraclitus andsays:

“It” (Zeno’s dialectics) “may, to thatextent, also be called subjective dialec-tics, insofar as it rests in the contemplativesubject, and the one, without this dialec-tics, without this movement, is one ab-stract identity....” (328)but it was previously said, see thepassage quoted from p. 309, andothers, that Zeno’s dialectics is obj-ective dialectics. Here is some kindof superfine “distinguo.” Cf. thefollowing:

“Dialectics: (α) external dialectics,a reasoning which goes hither andthither, without reaching the soul of thething itself; (β) the immanent dialecticsof the object, but (NB) following withinthe contemptation of the subject; (γ) theobjectivity of Heraclitus, i.e., dialecticsitself taken as principle.” (328)

α) subjective dialectics.β) in the object there is dialectics,

but I do not know, perhaps it isSchein,* merely appearance, etc.

γ) fully objective dialectics, as theprinciple of all that is

(In Heraclitus): “Here we see land; there isno proposition of Heraclitus whichI would not have adopted in my Log-ic....” (328)

“Heraclitus says: Everything is be-coming; this becoming is the principle.

* semblance, show—Ed.

NB

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

( ( (NB

NB

V. I. LENIN260

This is contained in the expression: Beingno more is than not-Being....” (p. 333)

“The recognition of the fact that Beingand not-Being are only abstractions de-void of truth, that the first truth is to befound only in Becoming, forms a great ad-vance. The understanding comprehends bothas having truth and validity in isolation;reason on the other hand recognises the onein the other, and sees that in the one itsother’, (NB “its other’) “is contained—that is why the All, the Absolute is to bedetermined as Becoming.” (334)“Aristotle says (De mundo,86 Chapter 5)

that Heraclitus ‘joined together thecomplete whole and the incomplete’(part)” ... “what coincides and whatconflicts, what is harmonious and whatdiscordant; and from out of them all(the opposite) comes one, and fromone, all.” (335)

Plato, in his Symposium,87 puts forwardthe views of Heraclitus (inter alia in theirapplication to music: harmony, consistsof opposites), and the statement: “The artof the musician unites the different.”

Hegel writes: this is no objection againstHeraclitus (336), for difference is the es-sence of harmony:

“This harmony is precisely absolute Be-coming, change,—not becoming other, nowthis and then an other. The essentialthing is that each different thing, eachparticular, is different. from another, notabstractly so from any other, but from itsother. Each particular only is, insofaras its other is implicitly contained in itsNotion....” (336)

“So also in the case of tones; they mustbe different, but so that they can alsobe united....” (336) P. 337: incidentally

NB

Quite rightand impor-

tant: the“other” asi t s other,

developmentinto i t sopposite


Sextus Empiricus (and Aristotle) are reck-oned among the ... “best witness”....

Heraclitus said: “die Zeit ist das erstekörperliche Wesen”* (Sextus Empiricus)—p. (338)

körperliche**—an “unfortunate” expres-sion (perhaps, Hegel says (NB), it waschosen by a sceptic (NB)),—but time, hesays, is “das erste sinnliche Wesen”***....

...“Time is pure Becoming, as per-ceived....” (338)

In regard to the fact that Heraclitusconsidered fire as a process, Hegel says:“Fire is physical time, it is this absoluteunrest” (340)—and further, in regard tothe natural philosophy of Heraclitus:

...“It” (Natur) “is process in itself....”(344) “Nature is the never-resting, andthe All is the transition out of theone into the other, from division intounity, and from unity into division....”(341)

“To understand Nature means to rep-resent it as process....” (339)

Here is what is said to be the narrow-ness of natural scientists:

...“If we listen to their account” (Natur-forscher****), “they only observe and saywhat they see; but this is not true, for un-consciously they transform what is im-mediately seen by means of the Notion.And the strife is not due to the opposi-tion between observation and the absoluteNotion, but between the limited rigidnotion and the Absolute Notion. Theyshow that changes are non-existent....”(344-345)

* “Time is the first corporeal existence”—Ed.** corporeal—Ed.

*** “the first sensuous existence”—Ed.**** of natural scientists—Ed.

NB

NB

V. I. LENIN262

“a b s o l u t ec o n n e c-

t i o n”

...“Water in its decomposition re-veals hydrogen and oxygen: these havenot arisen for they were already thereas such, as the parts of which the waterconsists” (346) (thus Hegel mimics thenatural scientists)....

“As we find in all expression of per-ception and experience; as soon as menspeak, there is a Notion present, itcannot be withheld, for in conscious-ness there is always a touch of univer-sality and truth.” (346)

Quite right and important—it is pre-cisely this that Engels repeated in morepopular form, when he wrote that natu-ral scientists ought to know that the re-sults of natural science are concepts, andthat the art of operating with conceptsis not, inborn, but is the result of 2,000years of the development of natural scienceand philosophy.88

The concept of transformation is takennarrowly by natural scientists and theylack understanding of dialectics.

...“He” (Heraclitus) “is the one who firstexpressed the nature of the infinite, andwho first understood nature as infinite initself, i.e., its essence as process....” (346)

On the “concept of necessity”—cf. p.347. Heraclitus could not, see truth in“sensuous certainty” (348), but in “necessity”(εíµαÇµéνη*)—((λóγος**)).

“A b s o l u t e m e d i a t i o n (348) NB( (* fate—Ed.

** logos—Ed.


LEUCIPPUS

* “subterfuge”—Ed.** “One”—Ed.

*** “the principle of the One” is “altogether ideal”—Ed.

“The rational, the true, that which Iknow, is indeed a withdrawal from theobjective as from what is sensuous, individ-ual, definite and existent; but what rea-son knows within itself is just as muchnecessity or the universal of being; it isthe essence of thought as it is the essenceof the world.” (352)

368: “The development of philosophy inhistory must correspond to the de-velopment of logical philosophy; butthere will still be passages in the lat-ter which are absent in historical de-velopment.”

Here there is a very profound and cor-rect, essentially materialist thought (ac-tual history is the basis, the foundation,the Being, which is followed by conscious-ness).

Leucippus says that atoms are invisible“because of the smallness of their body”(369)—Hegel, however, replies that thisis “Ausrede”* (ibid.), that “Eins”** cannotbe seen, that “das Princip des Eins” “ganzideell”*** (370), and that Leucippus is no“empiricist,” but an idealist.

?? s t r e t c h i n g o f a p o i n tby the idealist Hegel,

of course, stretching a point.

NB: Necessi-ty = “the

universal ofBeing” (theuniversal in

Being)(connection,

“absolutemediation”)

The develop-ment of phi-losophy in

history “mustcorrespond”

(??) to thedevelopment

of logicalphilosophy

( (( (

V. I. LENIN264

* Being-for-itself—Ed.** In Lenin’s manuscript these five l ines have been crossed

out—Ed.*** mysticism of ideas—Ed.

materialism(Hegel is

afraid of theword: keepaway fromme) versus

atomism

([Straining to make Leucippus conform tohis logic, Hegel expatiates on the impor-tance, the “greatness” of the principle (368)Fürsichsein,* descrying it in Leucippus.It savours in part of stretching a point.]**

But there is also a grain of truth in it;the nuance (the “moment) of separateness;the interruption of gradualness; the mo-ment of the smoothing out of contradic-tions; the interruption of continuity—theatom, the one. (Cf. 371 i.f.):—“The oneand continuity are opposites....”

Hegel’s logic cannot be applied in itsgiven form, it cannot be taken as given.One must s e p a r a t e o u t from itthe logical (epistemological) nuances, afterpurifying them from Ideenmystik***: thatis still a big job.)The Atomists are, therefore, generally

speaking, opposed to the idea of the crea-tion and maintenance of the world bymeans of a foreign principle. It is in thetheory of atoms that natural science firstfeels released from the need for demonstrat-ing a foundation for the world. For if natureis represented as created and held togetherby another, then it is conceived of as notexistent in itself, and thus as having itsNotion outside itself, i.e., its basis isforeign to it, it has no basis as such, it isonly conceivable from the will of another—as it is, it is contingent, devoid, of ne-cessity and Notion in itself. In the ideaof the atomists, however, we have the con-ception of the inherency of nature, that isto say, thought finds itself in it....” (372-373)


DEMOCRITUS

* Diogenes Laertius (p. 235)—“vertiginem”—Latin translation.** treated—Ed.

*** step-motherly—Ed.**** “my feeling, mine”—Ed.

In the presentation—according to Dio-genes Laertius, IX, § 31-33—of the atomismof Leucippus, the “vortex” (Wirbel—δíνην)*of atoms, Hegel finds nothing of interest(“no interest,” ...“empty representation,”“dim, confused ideas”—p. 377 i.f.).

Hegel’s blindness, the one-sidedness of theIdealist!!

Democritus is behandelt** by Hegel ina very stiefmütterlich*** fashion, in allpp. 378-380! The spirit of materialism isintolerable to the idealist!! The words ofDemocritus are quoted (p. 379):

“Warmth exists according to opin-ion (νóµϕ) and so do cold and colour,sweet and bitter; only the indivisibleand the void are in accordance withtruth (êτεÑ)” (Sextus Empiricus, Ad-versus Mathematicos, VII, § 135).89

And the conclusion is drawn:...“We see this much, that Demo-

critus expressed the difference betweenthe moments of Being-in-itself andBeing-for-other more distinctly... .”(380)

By this “the way is at once opened up”to “the bad idealism,” that... “meine Emp-findung, mein....”****

...“A sensuously notionless manifold offeeling is established, in which there isno reason, and with which this idealismhas no further concern.”

NB

“bad ideal-ism” (my

feeling) Cf.Mach90

Hegelversus

E. Mach...

V. I. LENIN266

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS

* reason—Ed.** A word has remained undeciphered here.—Ed.

*** It is here that these extremes come into contact (and aretransformed!).—Ed.

Anaxagoras. ΝοÜς*—“the cause of the worldand of all order”, and Hegel elucidates this:

...“Objective thought ... reason in theworld, also in nature—or as we speak ofgenera in nature, they are the universal.A dog is an animal, this is its genus, itssubstantial; the dog itself is this. Thislaw, this understanding, this reason isitself immanent in nature, it is the essenceof nature; the latter is not formed fromwithout as men make a chair.” (381-382)

“ΝοÜς is the same as soul” (Aristotleon Anaxagoras)—p. 394

and ...** the elucidation of thisl e a p from the general in natureto the soul; from objective to subjec-tive, from materialism to idealism.C’est ici que ces extrêmes se touchent(et se transforment!)***

On the homoeomeriae91 of Anaxagoras(particles of the same kind as the wholebody) Hegel writes:

“Transformation is to be taken in adouble sense, according to existence andaccording to the Notion....” (403-404)Thus, for instance, it is said that watercan be removed—the stones remain; bluecolour can be removed, red, etc., willremain.

“This is only according to existence;according to the Notion, they only inter-penetrate, it is inner necessity.” Just asone cannot remove the heart by itself from

NBthe conceptof genus is

“the essenceof nature,” is

l a w...

tranforma-tion (its

significance)


the living body without the lungs perish-ing, etc.

“Nature likewise exists only in unity,just as the brain exists only in unity withthe other organs” (404)

whereby some conceive transformationin the sense of the presence of smallqualitatively determined particles andtheir growth (respective diminution)combination and separation. Theother conception (Heraclitus)—thetransformation of the one into an other.(403)

Existence and Notion—are to be dis-tinguished in Hegel approximately asfollows: fact (Being) taken separately,torn from its connection, and connection(the Notion), mutual relation, concat-enation, law, necessity.

415: ...“The Notion is that which thingsare in and for themselves....”

Hegel speaks of grass being the end foranimals, and the latter for men, etc., etc.,and concludes:

“It is a circle which is complete in itself,but whose completion is likewise a passinginto another circle; a vortex whose mid-point, that into which it returns, is founddirectly in the periphery of a higher circlewhich swallows it up....” (414)

So far the ancients are said to have fur-nished little: “Universal is a meagre deter-mination: everyone knows of the univer-sal, but not of it as essence.” (416)

...“But here we have the beginning ofa more distinct development of the relation-ship of consciousness to Being, the de-velopment of the nature of knowledge asa knowledge of the true.” (417) “The mind

NB:the “univer-sal” as “es-

sence”

“developmentof the nature

of knowl-edge”

V. I. LENIN268

has gone forth to express essence as thought.”(418)

“We see this development of the univer-sal, in which essence goes right over to theside of consciousness, in the so much de-cried wordly wisdom of the Sophists.” (418)

((End of the first volume)) The secondvolume begins with the Sophists.


VOLUME XIV.VOLUME II

OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOPHISTS 92

Speaking of the Sophists, Hegel in ex-treme detail chews over the thought thatsophistry contains an element common toall culture (Bildung) in general, our ownincluded, namely, the adducing of proofs(Gründe) and Gegengründe*—“reflectingreasoning”;—the finding of the most di-verse points of view in everything; ((sub-jectivity—lack of objectivity)). In discuss-ing Protagoras and his famous thesis (manis the measure of all things) Hegel placesKant close to him:

...“Man is the measure of everything,—man, therefore, is the subject in general;the existent, consequently, is not in iso-lation, but is for my knowledge—conscious-ness is essentially the producer of the con-tent in what is objective, and subjectivethinking is thereby essentially active. Andthis view extends even to the most modernPhilosophy, as when, for instance, Kantsays that we only know phenomena, i.e.,that what seems to us to be objective, tobe reality, is only to be considered in itsrelation to consciousness, and does notexist without this relation....” (31)**

* counterproofs—Ed.** Hegel, Werke, Bd. XIV, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.

Protagorasand

Kant

V. I. LENIN270

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* the universal—Ed.** the “relativity”—Ed.

the relativ-ism of theSophist...

Kantand the

Sophists andPhenomenol-ogism93 à la

MachNB

not, onlyrelativism

scepticism

NB

Hegelon

“commonsense”

The second “moment” is objectivity(das Allgemeine*), “it is posited byme, but is likewise in itself objec-tively universal, not posited by me....”(32)

Diese “Relativität”** (32) “Every-thing has a relative truth only” (33),according to Protagoras.

...“Kant’s phenomenon is no more thanan external impulse, an x, an unknown,which first receives these determinationsthrough our feeling, through us. Even ifthere were an objective ground for ourcalling one thing cold and another warm,we could indeed say that they must havediversity in themselves, but warmth andcold first become what they are in ourfeeling. Similarly ... things are, etc. ...thus experience was called a phenome-non....” (34)

“The world is consequently not onlyphenomenal in that it is for consciousness,and thus that its Being is only one rela-tive to consciousness, but, it is likewisephenomenal in itself.” (35)

...“This scepticism reached a much deep-er point in Gorgias....” (35)

...“His d i a l e c t i c s” ... that of Gor-gias, the Sophist many times: p. 36, idemp. 37.

Tiedemann said that Gorgias went fur-ther than the “common sense” of man. AndHegel makes fun of this: every philosophygoes f u r t h e r than “common sense” forcommon sense is not philosophy. Prior toCopernicus it was contrary to commonsense to say that the earth goes round thesun. (36)


* common sense—Ed.** This excerpt was made by Lenin somewhat later in outlining

the philosophy of Socrates (pp. 43-44 of Hegel; see p. 273 of thisvolume).—Ed.

“It” (der gesunde Menschenverstand*)“is the mode of thought of its time, con-taining all the prejudices of this time.”(36)Gorgias (p. 37): 1) Nothing exists. Nothing

is.2) Assuming that Being

is, it cannot be known.3) Even if it is knowable,

no communication ofwhat is known is pos-sible.

...“Gorgias is conscious that they” (Be-ing and not-Being, their mutual sublation)“are vanishing moments; the unconsciousconception has this truth also, but knowsnothing about it.....” (40)

“Vanishing moments” = Beingand not-Being. That is a magnifi-cent definition of dialectics!!

...“Gorgias α) justly argues against abso-lute realism, which, because it has a no-tion, thinks it possesses the very thingitself, when actually it possesses only some-thing relative; β) falls into the bad ideal-ism of modern times: ‘what is thoughtis always subjective, and thus not theexistent, since through thought an existentis transformed into what is thought....’” (41)

(and further below (p. 41 i.f.) Kantis again mentioned).

To be added on Gorgias**: He puts “either—or” to the fundamental questions. “Butthat is not true dialectics; it would benecessary to prove that the object must

commonsense = the

prejudices ofits time

Gorgias,“absoluterealism”

(and Kant)

dialectics inthe object

itself

V. I. LENIN272

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES

* the universal—Ed.** the “relativity”—Ed.

NB

cf.Feuerbach94

be necessarily in one or another determi-nation, not in and for itself. The objectresolves itself only into those determi-nations; but from that nothing followsregarding the nature of the object it-self.” (39)

To be added further on Gorgias*:In the exposition of his view that the

existent cannot be imparted, communi-cated:

“Speech, by which the existent has to beexpressed, is not the existent, what isimparted is thus not the existent, butonly words.” (Sextus Empiricus, AdversusMathematicos. VII. § 83-84)—p. 41—He-gel writes: “The existent is also compre-hended as non-existent, but the comprehen-sion of it is to make it universal.” (42)

...“This individual cannot be ex-pressed....” (42)

Final words of the section on the Soph-ists: “The Sophists thus also made dia-lectic, universal Philosophy, their object,and they were profound thinkers....” (42)

Socrates is a “world-famed personage”(42), the “most interesting” (ibid.) in thephilosophy of antiquity—“subjectivity of

The senses showreality; thoughtand word — the

universal.

Every word(speech) alreadyuniversalises cf.

Feuerbach.95


* “in it itself”—Ed.** Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt on

Gorgias’ philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added onGorgias....” (See p. 271 of this volume.)—Ed.

*** the art of midwifery—Ed.**** Becoming = not-Being and Being.—Ed.

***** “drugged”—Ed.

thought” (42) “freedom of self-conscious-ness” (44) .

“Herein lies the ambiguity of dia-lectics and sophistry; the objectivedisappears” (43): is the subjective con-tingent or is there in it (“an ihm selhst”*)the objective and universal? (43)**

“True thought thinks in such a way thatits content is as truly objective as subjec-tive” (44)—and in Socrates and Plato wesee, Hegel says, not only subjectivity (“thereference of any judgment to conscious-ness is held by him—Socrates—“in commonwith the Sophists”)—but also objectivity.

“Objectivity has here” (in Socrates) “thesense of the universal, existent in and foritself, and not external objectivity” (45)—idem 46: “not external objectivity but thespiritual universal.”

And two lines further down:“Kant’s ideal is the phenomenon, not

objective in itself....” (46)Socrates called his method Hebammen-

kunst***—(p. 64) (derived from his mother,he said) ((Socrates’ mother = midwife))—to help in bringing thoughts to birth.

Hegel’s example: everyone knows, hesays, what Werden is, but it surprises usif we analyse (reflektierend) and find that itis “the identity of Being and not-Being”—“so great a distinction.” (67)

Meno (Plato’s “Meno”)96 compared Socra-tes to an electric eel (Zitteraal), which makesanyone who touches it “narkotisch”*****

NB

Kant

shrewd!

Werden =Nichtsein

undSein.****

V. I. LENIN274

Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent ma-terialism than stupid materialism.

Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent;metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude,rigid instead of stupid.

* Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt on Gorgias’philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added further on Gor-gias....” (See p. 272 of this volume.)—Ed.

** very well put—Ed.

(69): and I, too, am “narkotisch” and Ic a n n o t answer you.*

...“That which is held by me as truthand right is spirit of my spirit. But whatthe spirit derives thus from itself, whatit so holds, must collie from it as the uni-versal, as from the spirit which acts ina universal manner, and not from its pas-sions, interests, likings, whims, aims, in-clinations, etc. These, too, certainly comefrom something inward which is ‘implantedin us by nature,’ but they are only ina natural way our own....” (74-75)

To be elaborated:Plekhanov wrote on philosophy (dialec-

tics) probably about 1,000 pages (Beltov +against Bogdanov + against the Kantians +fundamental questions, etc., etc.).97 Amongthem, a b o u t the large Logic, i n c o n -n e c t i o n w i t h it, its thought (i.e.,dialectics p r o p e r, as philosophical sci-ence) nil!!

Protagoras: “man is the measure of allthings.” Socrates: “man, as thinking, is themeasure of all things.” (75)

Xenophon in his Memorabilien describedSocrates better, more accurately and morefaithfully than Plato. (Pp. 80-81)

très biendit!!**

NB

Nuance!


THE SOCRATICS

In connection with the sophisms aboutthe “heap” and “bald,” Hegel repeats the tran-sition of quantity into quality and viceversa: dialectics. (Pp. 139-140)143-144: At length about the fact that

“language in essence expresses onlythe universal; what is meant, however,is the special, the particular. Hencewhat is meant cannot be said in speech.”(“It”? The most universal word of all.)

Who is it? I . Every person is an I.D a s Sinnliche?* It is a u n i v e r -s a l, etc., etc. “This”?? Everyoneis “this.”

Why can the particular not benamed? One of the objects of a givenkind (tables) is distinguished by some-thing from the rest.

“That the universal should in philosophybe given a place of such importance thatonly the universal can be expressed, andthe ‘it’ which is meant, cannot, indicatesa state of consciousness and thought whichthe philosophical culture of our time hasnot yet reached.” (143)

Hegel includes here “the scepticism ofour times” (143)— Kant’s? and those whoassert that ‘sensuous certainty is the truth.”(143)

For das Sinnliche “is a universal.” (143)

Thereby Hegel hits every materialismexcept dialectical materialism. NB

* the sensuous—Ed.

NBin languagethere is onlythe universal

NB

V. I. LENIN276

* t h e v e r y e s s e n c e o f t h e t h i n g—Ed.** C f . Ü b e r w e g - H e i n z e , § 3 8 , p . 1 2 2 ( 1 0 t h e d i t i o n ) — a n d a l s o

about them in Plato’s Theaetetus.99 Their (the Cyrenaics’) scepticismand subjectivism—Ed.

Hegeland

dialecticalmaterialism

sensationin the theoryof knowledge

of theCyrenaics...

NB**the Cyrenaics

and Machand Co.

To call by name?—but the name is acontingent symbol and does not expressS a c h e s e l b s t* (how can the partic-ular be expressed?) (144)

Hegel seriously “believed,” thought,that materialism as a philosophy wasimpossible, for philosophy is the scienceof thinking, of the universal, but theuniversal is a thought. Here he repeatedthe error of the same subjective ideal-ism that he always called “bad” ideal-ism. Objective (and still more, abso-lute) idealism came very close to ma-terialism by a zig-zag (and a somersault),even partially became transformed into it.The Cyrenaics98 held sensation for the

truth, “the truth is not what is in sensation,the content, but is itself sensation.” (151)

“The main principle of the Cyrenaicschool, therefore, is sensation, whichshould form the real criterion of the trueand the good....” (153)

“Sensation is the indeterminate unit”(154), but if thinking is added, then theuniversal appears and “simple subjectivity”disappears.

(Phenomenologists à la Mach & Co.i n e v i t a b l y become idealists on thequestion of the universal, “law,” “ne-cessity,” etc.)Another Cyrenaic, Hegesias, “recognised”

“this incongruity between sensation anduniversality....” (155)


THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO

They confuse sensation as a principleof the theory of knowledge and a prin-ciple of ethics. This NB. But Hegelseparated the theory of knowledge.

In regard to Plato’s plan by whichphilosophers ought to rule the state:

...“The territory of history is differentfrom that of philosophy....”

We must recognise that action repre-sents at the same time the endeavours of thesubject as such for particular ends.... Allthose particular ends are really only meansfor bringing forth the Idea, because itis the absolute power.” (193)

Concerning Plato’s doctrine on ideas:...“because sensuous perception shows

nothing purely, or as it is in itself” (Pha-edo)—p. 213—therefore the body is ahindrance to the soul.

The significance of the universal iscontradictory: it is dead, impure, in-complete, etc., etc., but it alone isa s t a g e towards knowledge of thec o n c r e t e, for we can never knowthe concrete completely. The infinitesum of general conceptions, laws, etc.,gives the concrete in its completeness.

The movement of cognition to theobject can always only proceed dia-lectically: to retreat in order to hit

Particularends in

history createthe “Idea”(the law of

history)

“purity”(= lifeless-

ness?) ofuniversal

conceptions

NBthe dialec-

tics, ofcognition

NB

b

V. I. LENIN278

P l a t o in the “Sophistes”:

* to fall back, the better to leap (to know?)—Ed.** nodal point—Ed.

NB

“emptydialectics”

in Hegel

NB

“emptydialectics”

more surely—reculer pour mieux sauter(savoir?)* Converging and diverginglines: circles which touch one another.Knotenpunkt** = the practice of man-kind and of human history.

Practice = the criterion of the coin-cidence of one of the infinite aspectsof the real.

These Knotenpunkte represent aunity of contradictions, when Be-ing and not-Being, as vanishingmoments, coincide for a moment,in the given moments of the move-ment (= of technique, of history,etc.)

In analysing Plato’s dialectics, Hegelonce again tries to show the differencebetween subjective, sophistic dialectics andobjective dialectics:

“That everything is one, we say of eachthing: ‘it is one and at the same time weshow also that it is many, its many partsand properties’—but it is thereby said:‘it is one in quite another respect fromthat in which it is many’—we do notbring these thoughts together. Thus theconception and the words merely go back-wards and forwards from time one to theother. If this passing to and fro is performedwith consciousness, it is empty dialectics,which does not unite the opposites anddoes not come to unity.” (232)

“The point of difficulty, and what weought to aim at, is to show that what

((


is other is the same, and what is the sameis other, and indeed in the same regardand from the same point of view.” (233)

“But we must be conscious of the factthat the Notion is neither merely the im-mediate in truth, although it is the sim-ple—but it is of spiritual simplicity,essentially the thought which has re-turned into itself (immediately is onlythis red, etc.); nor that it is only thatwhich reflects itself in itself, the thingof consciousness; but is also in itself, i.e.,it is objective essence....” (245)

The concept is not something imme-diate (although the concept is a “simple”thing, but this simplicity is “spiritual,”the simplicity of the Idea)-what is im-mediate is only the sensation of “red”(“this is red”), etc. The concept is not“merely the thing of consciousness”; butis the e s s e n c e o f t h e o b j e c t (ge-genständliches Wesen), it is somethingan sich, “in itself.”

...“This conviction of the nature of theNotion, Plato did not express so defi-nitely....” (245)

Hegel dilates at length on Plato’s“Philosophy of Nature,” the ultra-non-sensical mysticism of ideas, such as that“triangles form the essence of sensuousthings” (265), and such mystical non-sense. That is highly characteristic! Themystic-idealist-spiritualist Hegel (likeall official, clerical-idealist philosophyof our day) extols and expatiates onmysticism, idealism in the history ofphilosophy, while ignoring and slight-

NB

NBobjectivism

idealism andmysticism inHegel (and

in Plato)

V. I. LENIN280

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

what is realis rational

NB

NB

((merelyinvert it))precisely!

Hegel hasmade a com-plete mess ofthe criticism

of Plato’s“ideas” inAristotle

ing materialism. Cf. Hegel on Democ-ritus—nil!! On Plato a huge massof mystical slush.

Speaking of Plato’s republic and of thecurrent opinion that it is a chimera, Hegelrepeats his favourite saying:

...“What is real is rational. But one mustknow, distinguish, exactly what is real;in common life all is real, but there isa difference between the phenomenal worldand reality....” (274)

Incorrect, says Hegel, is the generallyheld opinion that the philosophy of Aristotleis “realism” (299), id. p. 311 “empiricism”)in contrast to the idealism of Plato ((Hereagain, Hegel clearly squeezes in a greatdeal under idealism.))

In presenting Aristotle’s polemic againstPlato’s doctrine on ideas, Hegel s u p -p r e s s e s its materialistic features. (Cf.3 2 2 - 3 2 3 and others.)

He has let the cat out of the bag: “Theelevation of Alexander” (Alexander of Mac-edon, Aristotle’s pupil) “... into ... a godis ... not matter for surprise ... God andman are not at all so very wide asunder ....”(305)

Hegel perceives the idealism of Aris-totle in his idea of god. (326) ((Ofcourse, it is idealism, but more ob-jective and further removed, more gen-eral than the idealism of Plato, hencein the philosophy of nature more fre-quently = materialism.))


Aristotle’s criticism ofPlato’s “ideas” is a criti-cism of idealism a s i d e a l -i s m i n g e n e r a l: forwhence concepts, abstrac-tions, are derived, thencecome also “law” and “ne-cessity,” etc. The idealistHegel in cowardly fashionfought shy of the under-mining of the foundationsof idealism by Aristotle(in his criticism of Plato’sideas).

“Leucippus and Plato accordingly saythat motion has always existed, but theygive no reason for the assertion.” (Aristo-teles, Metaphysik, XII, 6 and 7.) p. 328

Aristotle t h u s pitifully bringsforward god against the material-ist Leucippus and the idealistPlato. There is eclecticism in Aris-totle here. But Hegel conceals theweakness for the sake of m y s -t i c i s m!

Hegel, the supporter of dialectics,could not understand the dialec-tical transition f r o m matter t omotion, f r o m matter t o con-sciousness—especially the second.Marx corrected the error (or weak-ness?) of the mystic.

When one idealistcriticises the founda-tions of idealism ofanother idealist, ma-terialism is always thegainer thereby. Cf.Aristotle versus Plato,etc., Hegel versusKant, etc.

Not only isthe transitionfrom matterto conscious-ness dialecti-cal, but also

that fromsensation tothought, etc.

NB

NB

V. I. LENIN282

* substance—Ed.

What distinguishes the dialectical tran-sition from the undialectical transition?The leap. The contradiction. The inter-ruption of gradualness. The unity (iden-tity) of Being and not-Being.The following passage shows especially

clearly how Hegel conceals the weaknessof Aristotle’s idealism:

“Aristotle makes objects into thoughts;hence, in being thoughts, they exist intruth; that is their αûσíα.*

“The meaning of this is not, however,that natural objects have themselves thepower of thinking, but as they are subjec-tively thought by me, my thought is thusalso the Notion of the thing, which there-fore constitutes its substance. But in na-ture the Notion does not exist as thoughtin this freedom, but has flesh and blood;yet it has a soul, and this is its Notion.Aristotle recognises what things in andfor themselves are; and that is their αûσíα.The Notion does not exist for itself, but itis stunted by externality. The ordinary def-inition of truth is: ‘truth is the harmonyof the conception with the object.’ Butthe conception itself is only a conception,I am still not at all in harmony with myconception (with its content); for whenI represent to myself a house, a beam, andso on, I am by no means this content—‘I’ is something other than the conceptionof house. It is only in thought that there ispresent a true harmony between objectiveand subjective; that constitutes me (Hegel’sitalics). Aristotle therefore finds himselfat the most advanced standpoint; nothingmore profound can one desire to know.”(332-333)

naive!!


“In nature” concepts do not exist “inthis freedom” (in the freedom of thoughtand the fantasy of man!!). “In nature”they (concepts) have “flesh and blood.”—That is excellent! But it is materialism.Human concepts are the soul of nature—thus is only a mystical way of sayingthat in human concepts nature is reflect-ed in a distinctive way (this NB: ina distinctive and d i a l e c t i c a l way!!).

Pp. 318-337 s o l e l y on the Meta-physics of Aristotle!! Everything essen-tial that lie has to say against Plato’sidealism is s u p p r e s s e d!! In particu-lar, there is suppressed the question ofexistence o u t s i d e man and humani-ty!!! = the question of materialism!

Aristotle is an empiricist, but a think-ing one. (340) “The empirical, comprehend-ed in its synthesis, is the speculative No-tion....” (341) (Hegel’s italics.)

The coincidence of concepts with “syn-thesis,” with the sum, summing upof empiricism, sensations, the senses,is indubitable for the philosophers ofall trends. Whence this coincidence? FromGod (I, the idea, thought, etc., etc.)or from (out of) nature? Engels was rightin his formulation of the question.101

...“The subjective form constitutes theessence of the Kantian philosophy....” (341)

)))(cf. Feuer-bach: Toread thegospel ofsenses in

interconnec-tion = to- think100

NB

Kant

V. I. LENIN284

* logos—Ed.** sense-perception (sensation) and cognition—Ed.

On the teleology of Aristotle....“Nature has its means in itself and

these means are also end. This end innature is its λóγος,* the truly rational.”(349)

...“Understanding is not only thinkingwith consciousness. There is contained init also the whole, true, profound Notionof nature, of life....” (348)

Reason (understanding), thought,consciousness, without nature, notin correspondence with nature isfalsity = materialism!

It is repulsive to read how Hegel extolsAristotle for his “true speculative notions”(373 of the “soul,” and much more besides),clearly spinning a tale of idealistic (= mys-tical) nonsense.

Suppressed are a l l the points on whichAristotle wavers between idealism and ma-terialism!!!

Regarding Aristotle’s views on the “soul,”Hegel writes:

“All that is universal is in fact real,as particular, individual, existing for anoth-er” (375)—in other words, the soul.

Aristotle. De anima, II, 5:“The difference” (between Empfinden, and

Erkennen**) “is: that which causes thesensation is external. The cause of this isthat perceptive activity is directed on theparticular, while knowledge has as itsobject the universal; but the universal is

“end” andcause, law,connection,

reason

lets the catout of the

bag in regardto “realism”

sense-percep-tion andcognition


to a certain extent, in the soul itself assubstance. Everyone can therefore thinkif he wishes but sense-perception does notdepend on him, since the necessary con-dition is that the object perceived be pres-ent.” (377)

The crux here—“außen ist”*—o u t -s i d e man, independent of him. Thatis materialism. And this foundation,basis, kernel of materialism, Hegelbegins wegschwatzen**:

“This is an entirely correct view of sense-perception,” writes Hegel, and he goes onto explain that there is undoubtedly “pas-sivity in sense-perception: “it is a matterof indifference whether subjectively orobjectively; in both there is containedthe moment of passivity.... With this mo-ment of passivity, Aristotle does not fallshort of idealism, sense-perception is al-ways in one aspect passive. That is, how-ever, a bad idealism which thinks thatthe passivity and spontaneity of the minddepend on whether the determination givenis from within or from without, as if therewere freedom in sense-perception; the lat-ter is a sphere of limitation”!!... (377-378)

((The idealist stops up the gap leadingto materialism. No, it is not gleich-gültig*** whether from without or fromwithin. This is precisely the point!“From without”—that is materialism.“From within” = idealism. And withthe word “passivity,” while keepingsilent about the term (“from without”)in Aristotle, Hegel described in a differ-ent way the same f r o m w i t h o u t.

* “is external”—Ed.** to talk out of existence—Ed.

*** a matter of indifference—Ed.

Aristotlecomes very

close tomaterialism

NB!!

the idealistis caught!

V. I. LENIN286

Passivity means precisely from with-out!! Hegel replaces the idealism ofsense-perception by the idealism ofthought, but equally by idealism .))

...“Subjective idealism declares that thereare no external things, they are a determi-nation of our Self. This must be admittedin respect to sense-perception. I am passivein sense-perception, sense-perception issubjective; it is existence, a state, a deter-mination in me, not freedom. Whetherthe sense-perception is external or in me,is a matter of indifference, it exists....” (378)

Then follows the famous analogy of thesoul with wax, causing Hegel to twist andturn like the devil confronted with holywater, and to cry out about it having “sooften occasioned misapprehension.” (378-379)

Aristotle says (De anima, II, 12):“Sense-perception is the receiving of sen-

sible forms without matter” ... “as waxreceives only the impress of the goldensignet ring, not the gold itself, but merelyits form.”

H e g e l writes: ...“In sense-perceptiononly the form reaches us, without matter.It is otherwise in practical life—in eatingand drinking. In the practical sphere ingeneral we behave as single individuals,and as single individuals in a determinateBeing, even a material determinate Being,we behave towards matter in a materialway. Only insofar as we are of a materialnature, are we able to behave in such away; the point is that our material exist-ence comes into play.” (379)

((A close approach to materialism—andequivocation.))

Hegel gets angry and scolds on accountof the “wax,” saying: “everyone can under-

NB

NBan evasionof m a t e -r i a l i s m

NBSoul = W a x

“otherwise”in practice

a cowardlyevasion of

materialism


FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

stand it” (380), “we do not get beyond thecrude aspect of the analogy,” (379) etc.

“The soul should by no means be pas-sive wax or receive determinations fromwithout...” (380)

...“It” (die Seele*) “changes the form ofthe external body into its own....” (381)A r i s t o t l e, D e a n i m a, III, 2:

...“The effect of being perceived and ofsense-perception is exactly one and thesame; but their existence is not the same....”(381)

And Hegel comments:...“There is a body which sounds and a

subject which hears: their existence istwofold....” (382)

But he leaves aside the question ofBeing outside man!!! A sophistical dodgef r o m materialism!

Speaking about thinking, and about rea-son (νοÜς), Aristotle (De anima, III, 4) says:

...“There is no sense-perception independ-ent of the body, but νοÜς is separablefrom it...” (385) “νοÜς is like a book uponwhose pages nothing is actually written”(38)—and Hegel again becomes irate:“another much-decried illustration” (386),the very opposite of what he means isascribed to Aristotle, etc., etc. ((and thequestion of Being i n d e p e n d e n t ofmind and of man is suppressed!!))—all thatfor the sake of proving “Aristotle is there-fore not a realist.” (389)A r i s t o t l e:

“In this way he who perceives nothingby his senses learns nothing and under-stands nothing; when he discerns anything

* the soul—Ed.

ha-ha!

Aristotle

Hegel con-ceals the

weaknessesof idealism

tabula rasa

ha-ha!

ha-ha! he’safraid!!

V. I. LENIN288

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STOICS102

* perceives—Ed.** reason.—Ed.

*** what is apprehended by reason—Ed.

Aristotleand

m a t e r i a l -i s m

distortionof

Aristotle

Hegel againstthe Stoicsand theircriterion

there are“reasons” for

everything

(ϑεωÇÑ*) he must necessarily discern itas a pictorial conception, for such con-ceptions are like sense-perceptions, onlywithout matter....” (389)

...“Whether the understanding thinksactual objects when it is abstractedfrom all matter requires special inves-tigation....” (389) And Hegel scrapesout of Aristotle that ostensibly “νοÜς**and νοητóν*** are one and the same”(390), etc. A model example of theidealistic misrepresentations of an ideal-ist!! Distorting Aristotle into an idealistof the eighteenth-nineteenth century!!

In regard to the “criterion of truth” ofthe S t o i c s—“the conception that is laidhold of” (444-446)—Hegel says that con-sciousness only compares conception withconception (n o t with the object—(446):“truth ... is the harmony of object andconsciousness” = “the celebrated definitionof the truth”) and, consequently, the wholequestion is one of the “objective logos, therationality of the world.” (446)

“Thought yields nothing but the formof universality and identity with itself;...hence everything may harmonise withmy thought.” (449)

“Reasons, however, prove to be a hum-bug; for there are good reasons for every-thing....” (449) “Which reasons should beesteemed as good thereby depends on theend and interest....” (ibidem)


THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS

* In the manuscript the word “Canonic” is linked by an arrowwith the word “It” at the beginning of the following paragraph.—Ed.

Speaking of Epicurus (342-271 B. C.),Hegel i m m e d i a t e l y (before describ-ing his views) adopts a hostile attitudeto materialism and declares:

“It is already (!!) self-evident (!!) thatif sense-perceived Being is regarded asthe truth, the necessity for the Notion isaltogether abrogated, in the absence ofspeculative interest everything falls apart,and, on the contrary, the vulgar viewof things prevails; in point of fact it doesnot go beyond the view of ordinary humanunderstanding, or rather, everything islowered to the level of ordinary humanunderstanding”!! (473-474)

Slander against materialism!! “Ne-cessity for the Notion” is not in theslightest “abrogated” by the theoryof the s o u r c e of cognition andthe concept!! Disagreement with“common sense” is the foul quirkof an idealist.

Epicurus gave the name of Canonic*to the theory of knowledge and the crite-rion of truth. After a brief exposition ofit, Hegel writes:

“It is so simple that nothing can wellbe simpler—it is abstract, but also verytrivial; more or less on the level of ordi-nary consciousness that begins to reflect.It consists of ordinary psychological con-ceptions; they are quite correct. Out ofsense-perceptions we make conceptions asthe universal; thanks to which it becomeslasting. The conceptions themselves (bei

Slanderagainst

materialismWhy?

!!!!

NB

V. I. LENIN290

* in opinion—Ed.

der δóξα, Meinung*) are tested by meansof sensations, as to whether they are last-ing, whether they repeat themselves. Thatis quite correct on the whole, but quitesuperficial; it is the first beginning, themechanics of conception with respect tothe first sense-perceptions....” (483)

The “first beginning” is forgottenand distorted by idealism. D i a -l e c t i c a l materialism alonelinked the “beginning” with thecontinuation and the end.

NB: p. 4 8 1—on the significance ofwords according to Epicurus:

Everything has its evidence, energy,distinctness, in the name first conferredon it” (Epicurus: Diogenes Laertius, X,§ 33). And Hegel: The name is somethinguniversal, belongs to thinking, makes themanifold simple.” (481)

“On the objective manner in generalin which the images of external thingsenter into us, and on our relation to exter-nal things, by which conceptions arise—Epicurus has evolved the following met-aphysical explanation:

“From the surfaces of things there passesoff a constant stream, which cannot bedetected by our senses ... and this be-cause, by reason of the counteracting re-plenishment, the thing itself in its solid-ity long preserves the same arrangementand disposition of the atoms; and the mo-tion through the air of these surfaces whichdetach themselves is of the utmost rapidity,because it is not necessary that what isdetached should have any thickness.” “The

!!!

Epicurus:objects

outside us

N Btheory of

knowledge ofEpicurus...


* The words in brackets are missing in Lenin’s manuscript.—Ed.

sensation does not contradict such an idea,when we consider” (zusehe) “how imagesproduce their effects; they bring us a cor-respondence, a sympathetic link with ex-ternal things. Therefore something passesout from them which within us is likesomething external.” “And since the ema-nation passes into us, we know of the def-initeness of a sensation; the definite liesin the object and thus flows into us”(pp. 484-485, Diogenes Laertius, X, § 48-49).

The genius of Epicurus’ conjecture (300B.C., i.e., more than 2,000 years beforeHegel), e.g., on light and its velocity.

Hegel completely c o n c e a l e d (NB)the m a i n t h i n g: (N B) the existenceof things o u t s i d e the consciousnessof man and i n d e p e n d e n t of it

—all that Hegel suppresses and merelysays:

...“This is a very trivial way of repre-senting sense-perception. Epicurus electedto take the easiest criterion of the truth—acriterion still in use—inasmuch as it is notapprehended by sight, namely: that it doesnot contradict what we see or hear. For intruth such matters of thought as atoms, thedetachment of surfaces, and so forth, arebeyond our powers of sight and hearing; [cer-tainty we manage to see and to hear some-thing different]* but there is abundance ofroom for what is seen and what is conceivedor imagined to exist alongside of one another.If the two are allowed to fall apart, theydo not contradict each other; for it is notuntil we relate them that the contradic-tion becomes apparent....” (485-486)

A model ofdistortion

and slanderagainst

materialismby an ideal-

ist

V. I. LENIN292

* meagre—Ed.** a l s o—Ed.

*** difference—Ed.**** “c u r v i li n e a r” m o t i o n—Ed.

This,a u c h,** is

wonderful!!!!Epicurus

(341-270 B. C.).

Locke(1 6 3 2 -

1 7 0 4). Dif-ferenz*** =2,000 years

andelectrons?

nonsense!lies!

slander!

Hegel has avoided Epicurus’ theoryof cognition and begun to speak of s o m e -t h i n g e l s e, which Epicurus does nottouch on here and w h i c h i s c o m -p a t i b l e with materialism!!P. (486):Error, according to Epicurus, proceeds

from an interruption in movement (inthe movement from the object to us, tosense-perception or to conception).

“It is impossible,” Hegel writes, “to have amore meagre (theory of knowledge).” (486)

Everything becomes dürftig,*if it is distorted and despoiled.

The soul, according to Epicurus, is a“certain” arrangement of atoms. “This iswhat Locke also (!!!) said.... These areempty words ...” (488) ((no, they are theguess-work of genius and signposts for sci-ence, but not for clericalism)).

NB. NB. (489), id. (490):Epicurus ascribes to the atoms a “k r u m m-

l i n i g t e” B e w e g u n g,**** this ac-cording to Hegel is “most arbitrary andwearisome” (488) in Epicurus—((and the“God” of the idealists???)).

“Or else Epicurus altogether denies No-tion and the Universal as the essential....”(490) although his atoms “themselves have


this very nature of thought”... “the incon-sistency ... which all empiricists are guil-ty of....” (491)

This a v o i d s the essence ofm a t e r i a l i s m and material-ist dialectics.

“In Epicurus there is no ... final end inthe world, wisdom of a Creator; everythingconsists of events, which are determinedby the chance (??) external (??) comingtogether of configurations of atoms....” (491)

And Hegel simply h u r l s a b u s e atEpicurus: “His thoughts on particular as-pects of Nature are, however, in them-selves feeble....” (492)

And immediately afterwards is a polemicagainst the “Naturwissenschaft” heute,*which, like Epicurus, allegedly judges “byanalogy,” and “explains” (492)—e.g., lightas “vibrations of the ether....” This is ananalogy quite in the manner of Epicu-rus....” (493)

((Modern n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ver-sus Epicurus,—against (NB) Hegel.))

In Epicurus, “the kernel of the matter,the principle, is nothing else than theprinciple of our usual natural science....”(495) ... “it is still the manner which liesat the basis of our natural science....” (496)

Correct is only the reference tothe ignorance of dialectics in gen-eral and of the dialectics of con-cepts. But the criticism of m a -t e r i a l i s m is schwach.**

* “natural science” today—Ed.** feeble—Ed.

NB

he pitiesGod!! theidealistic

scoundrel!!

!!

and the“manner” of

naturalscience!and its

successes!!

Epicurus andmodern na-

tural science

V. I. LENIN294

* s u p e r s t i t i o n s—Ed.

!NB!

NB!!

NB

NB

NB

NB

Hegel onthe pros ofmaterialism

“Of this method (of Epicurean philosophy)we may say in general that it likewisehas a side on which it possesses value.Aristotle and the more ancient philosopherstook their start in natural philosophy fromuniversal thought a priori, and from thisdeveloped the Notion. This is the one side.The other side is the necessary one thatexperience should be worked up into uni-versality, that laws should be determined;that is to say, that the result which fol-lows from the abstract Idea should coin-cide with the general conception to whichexperience and observation have led. Thea priori is with Aristotle, for instance,most excellent, but not sufficient, becauseit lacks connection with and relation toexperience and observation. This develop-ment of the particular to the general isthe discovery of laws, natural forces andso on. It may be said that Epicurus is theinventor of empirical natural science, ofempirical psychology. In contrast to theStoic ends, conceptions of the understand-ing, is experience, the sensuous present.There we have abstract, limited understand-ing, without truth in itself; and thereforewithout the presence and reality of nature;here we have this sense of nature, whichis more true than these other hypotheses.”(496-407)

(THIS ALMOST COMPLETELY AP-PROACHES DIALECTICAL MATERIAL-ISM.)

The importance of Epicurus—the strug-gle against A b e r g l a u b e n* o f t h eG r e e k s a n d R o m a n s (4 9 8)—andmodern priests??

all this nonsense about whether a hare ranacross the path (493), etc. (and the good Lord?).

NBNB


THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCEPTICS104

* “finite” things—Ed.** “the universal”—Ed.

*** thinking scepticism—Ed.

“And from it” (the philosophy of Epi-curus), “more than anything, those con-ceptions which have altogether denied thesupersensuous have proceeded.” (498)

But this is good only for “end-lichen”*.... “With superstition therealso passed away self-dependent Connec-tion and the world of the Ideal.” (499)

This NOTA BENE.P. 4 9 9: Epicurus on the soul: the

f i n e r (NB) atoms, their more rapid(NB) motion, their c o n n e c t i o n (NB)etc., etc., with the body (D i o g e n e sL a e r t i u s, X, § 66; 63-64)—very naïveand good!—but Hegel becomes irate, hehurls abuse: “meaningless talk,” “emptywords,” “no thoughts.” (500)

The Gods, according to Epicurus, are“das Allgemeine”** (506) in general—“theyconsist partly in number” as number,i.e., abstraction from the sensuous....

“In part, they” (the gods) “are the perfect-ed type of man, which, owing to the simi-larity of the images, arises from the con-tinuous confluence of like images on oneand the same subject.” (507)

Speaking of Scepticism, Hegel pointsto its apparent “invincibility” (Unbezwing-lichkeit) (538):

“If anyone actually desires to be a Scep-tic, he cannot be convinced, or be broughtto a positive philosophy, any more than hewho is paralysed can be made to stand.” (539)

“Positive philosophy in relation to it”(den denkenden Skeptizismus***) “may

NB

for what didthey (the

classics) val-ue idealism??

for Hegelthe “soul”is a l s o aprejudice

N BGods = the

perfectedtype of man,cf. F e u e r-

b a c h103

NB

Bien dit!!

V. I. LENIN296

NBdialectics ofScepticism is“contingent”

not a badanecdoteabout theSceptics

NBScepticism is

not doubt

have this consciousness: it contains in itselfthe negative of Scepticism; Scepticism isnot opposed to it, nor outside it, but isa moment of it; but it contains the negativein its truth, as it is not present in Scepti-cism.” (539)

(The relation of philosophy to Scepti-cism:)

“Philosophy is dialectical, this dialecticis change; the Idea, as abstract Idea, isthe inert and existent, but it is only trueinsofar as it grasps itself as living; thisis that it is dialectical in itself, in orderto transcend that quiescence and inertness.Hence the philosophic idea is dialecticalin itself and not contingent; Scepticism,on the contrary, exercises its dialecticcontingently—for just as the material, thecontent comes before it, it shows that itis negative in itself....” (540)

The old (ancient) Scepticism has to bedistinguished from the new (only Schulzeof Göttingen is named). (540)

Ataraxie (imperturbability?) as the idealof the Sceptics:

“Pyrrho once pointed out to his fellow-passengers on hoard a ship, who were fright-ened during a storm, a pig, which remainedquite indifferent and peaceably ate on,saying to them: in such imperturbabilitythe wise man must also abide” (DiogenesLaertius, IX, 68)—pp. 551-552.

“Scepticism is not doubt. Doubt is justthe opposite of the tranquillity that isthe result of scepticism.” (552).

...“Scepticism, on the contrary, is indif-ferent to the one as well as to the other....”(553)

Schulze-Aenesidemus passes off for Scep-ticism the statement that everything sen-suous is truth (557), but the Sceptics did


not say so: one must sich danach richten,orientate oneself by the sensuous, but thatis not the truth. The new Scepticism doesn o t doubt the reality of things. The oldScepticism does doubt the reality of things.

Tropes (turns of speech, arguments, etc.)of the Sceptics:

a. The diversity of animal organisation.(558)Differences in sensations: the jaun-diced (dem Gelbsüchtigen) sees asyellow what to others appears white,etc.

b. The diversity of mankind. “Idiosyn-crasies.” (559)Whom to believe? The majority? Fool-ish, for all men cannot be interro-gated. (560)Diversity of philosophies: Stupid re-ference, Hegel waxes indignant: ...“such men see everything in a phi-losophy excepting Philosophy itself,and this is overlooked....” “Howeverdifferent the philosophic systems maybe, they are not as different as whiteand sweet, green and rough, for theyagree in the fact that they are philos-ophies and this is what is overlooked.”(561)

...“All tropes proceed against the‘is,’ but the truth is all the samenot this dry ‘is,’ but essentially proc-ess....” (562)

c. The diversity in the constitution ofthe organs of sense: the various senseorgans perceive differently (on a paint-ed panel something appears erha-

NB

everything inS e x t u sEmpiricus

(second cen-tury A. D.)

NB

NB

NB

V. I. LENIN298

ben* to the eye but not to thetouch).

d. The diversity of circumstances in thesubject (rest, passion, etc.).

e. The diversity of distances, etc.

the earth going roundthe sun or vice versa, etc.,

f. Intermixture (scents in strong sun-shine and without it, etc.).

g. The composition of things (poundedglass is not transparent, etc.).

h. The “relativity of things.”i. The frequency, rarity of happenings,

etc.; habit.k. Customs, laws, etc., their diversity....

These (10) are all o l d tropes and He-gel: this is all “empirical”—“do not haveto do with the Notion....” (566) This is“trivial”..., but....

“In fact, as against the dogmatism ofthe common human understanding theyare quite valid....” (567)

The five new tropes (are said by Hegelto be much more advanced, they containdialectics, concern concepts)—also accord-ing to Sextus:

a. The diversity of the opinions ...of p h i l o s o p h e r s...

b. The falling into an infinite pro-gression (one thing depends on an-other and so on without end).

c. Relativity (of premises).d. Presupposition. The dogmatists put

forward unprovable presupposi-tions.

e. Reciprocity. Circle (vicious)...

* raised—Ed.


* Lenin’s remark in parentheses was evoked by a misprint in theGerman text, which had nicht (not) instead of nichts (nothing) beforethe word “absolute.”—Ed.

“These sceptical tropes, in fact, concernthat which is called a dogmatic philosophy(and in accordance with its nature sucha philosophy must display itself in allthese forms) not in the sense of its havinga positive content, but as asserting some-thing determinate as the absolute.” (575)

Hegel a g a i n s t t h e a b s o l u t e!Here we have the germ of dialecticalmaterialism.

“To the criticism which knows nothingin itself, nothing (not nichts) (sic!!)* ab-solute, all knowledge of Being-in-itself,as such, is held to be dogmatism, whileit is the worst dogmatism of all, becauseit maintains that the ‘I,’ the unity of self-consciousness, opposed to Being, is in andfor itself, and that what is ‘in itself’ inthe outside world is likewise so, and there-fore that the two absolutely cannot cometogether.” (570)

“These tropes hit dogmatic philosophy,which has this manner of representing oneprinciple in a determinate proposition asdeterminateness. Such a principle is alwaysconditioned; and consequently contains dia-lectics, the destruction within it of itself.”(577) “These tropes are a powerful weaponagainst the philosophy of reason.” (ib.)

Sextus, for example, reveals the dialec-tics of the concept of a point (der Punkt).A point has no dimensions? That meansthat it is outside space! It is the limitof space in space, a negation of space, andat the same time “it touches space”—“butat time same time it is also in itself some-thing dialectical.” (570)

NB

N B

“Criticism” isthe “worst

dogmatism”

Biendit!!!

Dialectics =“destruction

of itself”

NB

V. I. LENIN300

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“These tropes ... are powerless againstspeculative ideas, because the latter containwithin themselves a dialectical momentand the abrogation of the finite.” (580)

End of Volume XIV (p. 586).

NB


VOLUME XV. VOLUME II OF THE HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY

(THE END OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. MEDIEVAL ANDMODERN PHILOSOPHY UP TO SCHELLING, pp. 1-692)

BERLIN, 1836

THE NEO-PLATONISTS105

...“The return to God....” (5),* “self-consciousness is absolute Essence”..., “theworld-spirit”... (7), “Christian religion”....(8) And a m a s s o f t h i n p o r r i d g eladled out about God.... (8-18)

But this philosophical idealism, open-ly, “seriously” leading to God, is morehonest than modern agnosticism withits hypocrisy and cowardice.

A. Philo—(about the time of the birthof Christ), a Jewish savant, a mystic,“finds Plato present in Moses” (19),etc. The main point is “the knowl-edge of God” (21), etc. God is λóγος,**“the epitome of all Ideas,” “pure Be-ing” (22) (“according to Plato”)....(22) Ideas are “angels” (messengersof God).... (24) The sensuous world,however, “as with Plato” = οûκ öν*** == not-Being. (25)

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. XV, Berlin, 1836.—Ed.** logos—Ed.

*** non-existent—Ed.

Ideas(of Plato)and the

good Lord

V. I. LENIN302

HEGEL ON PLATO’S DIALOGUES**

p.(230)*** Sophistes(238) Philebus(240) P a r m e n i d e s

(Timaeus) (248)

* clever people—Ed.** This entry was made by Lenin in German on the back cover

of the notebook containing the conspectus of Hegel’s book Lectureson the Philosophy of History.—Ed.

*** Hegel, Werke, Bd. XIV, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.

on theeclectics...

Plato’s ideasand the, good

Lord

B. Cabbala,106 the Gnostics107 ——————idem...

C. Alexandrian philosophy108—(= eclectic-ism) (= Platonists, Pythagoreans, Ari-stotelians). (33, 35)

Eclectics are either uncultured men, orcunning (die klugen Leute*—they take thegood from every system, but...

—they collect every good but do not have“consistency of thought., and consequentlythought itself.” (33)

They developed Plato....“The Platonic universal, which is in

thought, accordingly receives the significa-tion of being as such absolute essence” (33)....




CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOKL E C T U R E S O N T H E P H I L O S O P H Y

O F H I S T O R Y 109

305

HEGEL. WORKS, VOL. IX (BERLIN, 1837)LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

(Edition of E. Gans)

Materials: Notes of the lectures 1822-1831.Hegel’s manuscript u p t o p. 7 3, etc.

P. 5* ...“Speeches ... are transactions be-tween people”... (hence these speechesare not mere talk).

7—The French and English are more edu-cated (“they have more ... nationalculture”),—but we Germans rack ourbrains to discover how history oughtto be written, rather than writing it.

9—History teaches “that peoples and gov-ernments of a people have neverlearned anything from history; each pe-riod is t o o i n d i v i d u a l for that.”

“But what experience and historyteach is this—that peoples and gov-ernments have never learned any-thing from history, or acted accord-ing to the lessons that could havebeen drawn from it. Each period hassuch peculiar circumstances, it isa state of things so unique that onemust and can judge of it only onthe basis of itself.”

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. IX, Berlin, 1837.—Ed.

shrewd andclever!

very clever!

NB

NB

NB

V. I. LENIN306

* feeble—Ed.** “self-interest”—Ed.

*** in fine—at the end—Ed.**** human beings—Ed.

p. 12—“reason governs the world....”20: The substance of Matter is Gravity.

The substance of Spirit is Freedom.22: “World history is the progress of the

consciousness of freedom—a progresswhich we have to know in its ne-cessity....”

24—(approach to historical materialism).What guides the actions of men? Aboveall, “Selbstsucht”**—motives of love,etc., are rarer and their sphere nar-rower. What, then, is the outcomeof this interweaving of passions, etc.?of needs, etc.?

28 “Nothing great in the world has beenaccomplished without passion....” Pas-sion is the subjective and “therefore;the formal side of energy....”

28 i.f.***—History does not begin witha conscious aim.... What is importantis that which

29 ...appears unconsciously for mankind asthe result of its action....

29 ...In this sense “Reason governs theworld.”

30 ...In history through human actions“something else results in additionbeyond that which they aim at andobtain, beyond that which they direct-ly know and desire.”

30 ...“They” (die Menschen****) “gratifytheir own interest, but something fur-ther is thereby brought about, whichwas latent in their interest, but whichwas not in their consciousness or in-cluded in their intention.”

schwach!*

30

NB(cf. Engels110)

307CONSPECTUS OF LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

32 ...“Such are the great men in history,whose own particular aims containthat substantial element which is thewill of the World Spirit....

36—the religiousness and virtue of a shep-herd, a peasant, etc., is highly honour-able (examples!! NB), but ...“the rightof the World Spirit stands above allspecial rights....”

Here in Hegel is often to befound—about God, religion, moral-ity in general—extremely trite ideal-istic nonsense.

97: “the gradual abolition of slav-ery is better than its sudden re-moval....”

50. The constitution of a state togetherwith its religion, philosophy, thought,culture, “external forces” (climate,neighbours...) comprise “one substance,one Spirit....”

51 In nature movement takes place onlyin a cycle (!!)—in history, somethingnew arises....

62. Language is richer among peoples inan undeveloped, primitive state—lan-guage becomes poorer with the advanceof civilisation and the developmentof grammar.

67: “World history develops on a higherground than that on which moralityhas its position (Stätte)....

73: An excellent picture of history: thesum of individual passions, actions,etc. (“everywhere something akin toourselves, and therefore everywheresomething that excites our interest foror against”), sometimes the mass of

“great men”

?

very good

V. I. LENIN308

* very important!—Ed.** See p. 313 of this volume.—Ed.

*** order—Ed.**** duration—Ed.

Sehr wich-tig!* see

below thispassagem o r e

f u l l y**

NBcf. Plekha-

nov111

!!!

some general interest, sometimes amultitude of “m i n u t e f o r c e s”(“an infinite exertion of minute forceswhich produce a tremendous resultfrom what appears insignificant”).The result? The result is “exhaustion.”P. 74. End of the “Introduction.”

P. 75—“The Geographical Basis of WorldHistory” (a characteristic heading):(75-101).

75—Under the mild Ionic sky,” a Homercould more easily arise—but this isnot the only cause.—“Not under Turk-ish rule,” etc.

82—Emigration to America removes “dis-content,” and the continued exist-ence of the contemporary civil order isguaranteed (but this Zustland***—“riches and poverty” 8 1)....

82. In Europe there is no such outlet:had the forests of Germany still beenin existence, the French Revolutionwould not have occurred.

102: Three forms of world history: 1) des-potism, 2) democracy and aristocracy,3) monarchy.

Subdivisions: The Oriental World—TheGreek—The Roman—The GermanWorld. Empty phrase-mongering aboutmorality, etc., etc.

China. Chapter 1 (113 to 139). Descriptionof the Chinese character, institutions,etc., etc. Nil, nil, nil!

India—to 170—To...Persia (and Egypt)—to 231. Why did the

Persian Empire fall, but not Chinaor India? Dauer**** is not as such


vortreffliches* (229)—“The imperish-able mountains are not superior tothe rose that quickly loses its petalsin its fleeting existence.” (229) Persiafell because the “spiritual view ofthings” began here (230), but the Greeksproved superior, “higher principle” oforganisation, “self-conscious freedom.”(231)

2 3 2 : “The Greek World” ... the principle(of “pure individuality”—the period ofits development, flowering and decline,“encounter with the succeeding organof world history” (233)—Rome withits “substance” (ibidem).

234: The geographical conditions of Greece:the diversity of its nature (in con-trast to the monotony of the East).

2 4 2—The colonies in Greece. Amassingof wealth. Want and poverty “always”bound up with it....

2 4 6 . “The natural, as explained by men,its internal, essential element, is thebeginning of the divine in general”(in connection with the mythology ofthe Greeks).

2 5 1: “Man with his requirements behavesin a practical way in relation to ex-ternal nature; in making it serve forhis satisfaction, he wears it away, there-by setting to work as an intermediary.For natural objects are powerful andoffer resistance in many different ways.In order to subdue them, man intro-duces other natural objects, thus turn-ing nature against itself, and he in-vents tools for this purpose. These hu-man inventions belong to the spirit,and such a tool must be regarded as

* something excellent—Ed.

world historyas a whole

and theseparate

peoples—its“organs”

Wealth andpoverty

Hegel andFeuerbach112

Germs ofhistorical

materialismin Hegel

V. I. LENIN310

* ardour—Ed.** “industriousness”—Ed.

Hegeland

Marx

??

Hegel and“contradic-

tions” inhistory

c a t e g o -r i e s of thepossible andcontingentversus act-uality and

confirmationin history

higher than a natural object.... Thehonour of human invention for sub-jugating nature is ascribed to the Gods”(among the Greeks).

264: Democracy in Greece was bound upwith the small size of the states.Speech, living speech, united the cit-izens, created Erwärmung.*“Hence” in the French Revolutionthere was never a republican consti-tution.

322-323. “He” (Caesar) “removed the in-ternal contradiction” (by abolishingthe republic, which had become a“shadow”) “and created a new one. Forworld rule had hitherto reached onlyto the rim of the Alps, but Caesar open-ed a new arena: he founded the theatrewhich was now to become the centreof world history.”

And then on the murder of Caesar:...“In general, a political revolu-

tion is, as it were, sanctioned in man’sopinion if it is repeated” (Napoleon,the Bourbons).... “By repetition thatwhich at first appeared merely a mat-ter of chance and possibility becomessomething real and confirmed.” (323)

“Christianity.” (328-346) Banal, cleric-al, idealistic chatter about the greatnessof Christianity (with quotations fromthe Gospels!!). Disgusting, stinking!

420-421: Why was the Reformation lim-ited to a few nations? Among otherreasons—“the Slav nations were agri-cultural” (421) and this brings withit “the relation of lords and serfs,”less “Betriebsamkeit,**” etc. But why


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* fundamental character—Ed.** “already changed everything for the better”—Ed.

*** “unspeakable injustice”—Ed.

NBclass

relations

! !

cf. Marx andEngels113

?

the Romanic nations? Their character(Grundcharakter* 421 i.f.)

4 2 9: ...“Polish freedom likewise was noth-ing but the freedom of the baronsagainst the monarchs.... Hence thepeople had the same interest againstthe barons as the kings.... When free-dom is mentioned, one must alwaysbe careful to see whether it is not reallyprivate interests that are being spokenof.” (430)

439: On the French Revolution... Why didthe French pass “immediately from thetheoretical to the practical,” but notthe Germans? Among the Germans, theReformation had “schon Alles gebes-sert,”** abolished “das unsägliche Un-recht,”*** etc.

441: For the first time (in the FrenchRevolution) humanity had arrived atthe conclusion “that man bases himselfon the head, i.e., on thought, andbuilds reality accordingly....” “Thiswas ... a glorious dawn....”In considering further the “course ofthe Revolution in France” (441) Hegelstresses in freedom in general—freedomof property, and of industry (ibid.)....The promulgation of laws? The willof all.... “The few should representthe many, but they often merely re-press them....” “The power of themajority over the minority is tono less degree a great inconsistency”(ibid).

444: ...“In its content this event” (the FrenchRevolution) “is world historical....”

V. I. LENIN312

* introduction—Ed.** On the next page of the manuscript the excerpt “Hegel on

World History” begins—Ed.

“Liberalism,” (444) “liberal institu-tions” (443) spread over Europe.

p. 446—end

4 4 6: “World history is nothing but thedevelopment of the notion of free-dom....”

In general the philosophy of historyyields very, very little—this is compre-hensible, for it is precisely here, inthis field, in this science, that Marxand Engels made the greatest step for-ward. Here most of all, Hegel is obso-lete and antiquated.

(see the next page**)

N B:Most impor-tant is Ein-

leitung,*where thereis much that

is magni-ficent in theformulation

of thequestion


“If then, finally, we regard world his-tory from the standpoint of the categorythrough which it should be considered,we have before us an endless picture ofhuman life and activity under the mostvaried circumstances, with all kinds ofaims and the most diverse events anddestinies. In all these occurrences andevents we see human action and effortin the forefront; everywhere something akinto ourselves, and therefore everywhere some-thing that excites our interest for oragainst. Sometimes it attracts us by beauty,freedom and richness, sometimes by ener-gy, sometimes even vice succeeds in makingitself important. Often there is the com-prehensive mass of some general interestthat cumbrously moves forward, but stillmore often the infinite exertion of minuteforces, which produce a tremendous resultfrom what appears insignificant; every-where the motleyest spectacle, and as soonas one vanishes another takes its place.

“But the immediate result of this con-sideration, however attractive it may be,is exhaustion, such as follows after a veryvaried spectacle, a magic lantern show;and even if we accord to each individual

HEGEL ON WORLD HISTORY

V. I. LENIN314

* Hegel, Werke , Bd. IX, Berlin, 1837.—Ed.** “elaboration”—Ed.

representation its true worth, the questionnevertheless arises in our minds, what isthe final aim of all these particular events,is each one exhausted by its special aim,or ought one not rather think of a singleultimate aim of all these events; behindthe loud noises at the surface is there notgoing on the labour and production of awork, an internal quiet, secret work inwhich the essential force of all those tran-sitory phenomena is stored up? But if onedoes not bring thought, rational cognition,to world history from the beginning, onemust at least approach it with the firmunshakable faith that it has reason in it,or at least that the world of the intellectand self-conscious will is not a victimof chance but must reveal itself in the lightof the self-knowing idea.” (73-74)*((NB. In the Preface, p. XVIII, the pub-lisher, i.e., the editor, Ed. Gans, statesthat u p t o p. 7 3 the text was writtenby Hegel in 1830; the manuscript is an“Ausarbeitung.”**))

315

PLAN OF HEGEL’S DIALECTICS(LOGIC)114

CONTENTS OF THE SMALL LOGIC (ENCYCLOPAEDIA)

I. The Doctrine of Being.A) Quality

a) Being;b) Determinate Being;c) Being-for-self.

B) Quantitya) Pure quantity;b) Magnitude (Quantum);c) Degree.

C) MeasureII. The Doctrine of Essence.

A) Essence a Ground of Existence.a) Identity—Difference—Ground;b) Existence;c) The Thing.

B) Appearance.a) The World of Appearance;b) Content and Form;c) Relation.

C) Actuality.a) Relationship of Substantiality;b) Relationship of Causality;c) Reciprocal Action.

III. The Doctrine of the Notion.A) The Subjective Notion.

a) The Notion;b) The Judgment;c) The Syllogism.

V. I. LENIN316

B) The Object.a) Mechanism;b) Chemism;c) Teleology.

C) The Idea.a) Life;b) Cognition;c) The Absolute Idea.

* Being—Ed.** D e t e r m i n a t e B e i n g—Ed.

*** Being-for-self—Ed.**** mysticism of ideas—Ed.

The concept (cognition) reveals the es-sence (the law of causality, identity,difference, etc.) in Being (in immediatephenomena)—such is actually the g e n -e r a l c o u r s e of all human cogni-tion (of all science) in general. Suchis the course also of n a t u r a l s c i -e n c e and p o l t i c a l e c o n o m yand history. Insofar Hegel’s dialectic isa generalisation of the history of thought.To trace this more concretely and ingreater detail in the history of the sep-arate sciences seems an extraordinarilyrewarding task. In logic, the historyof thought must, by and large, coin-cide with the laws of thinking.

It is strikingly evident that Hegel some-times passes from the abstract to the con-crete (Sein* (abstract)—D a s e i n** (con-crete)—Fürsichsein***) and sometimes theother way round (the subjective Notion—the Object—Truth (the Absolute Idea)).Is not this the inconsistency of an ideal-ist (what Marx called the Ideenmystik****in Hegel)? Or are there deeper reasons?(e.g., Being = Nothing—the idea of Be-

317PLAN OF HEGEL’S DIALECTICS (LOGIC)

coming, of development). First of all im-pressions flash by, then Something emerges,—afterwards the concepts of quality T(the determination of the thing or the phe-nomenon) and quantity are developed. Afterthat study and reflection direct thought tocognition of identity—of difference—ofGround—of the Essence versus the Pheno-menon—of causality, etc. All these mo-ments (steps, stages, processes) of cognitionmove in the direction from the subjectto the object, being tested in practice andarriving through this test at truth (=theAbsolute Idea).

T Quality and sensation (Empfindung)are one and the same, says Feuerbach. Thevery first and most familiar to us is sen-sation, and i n i t there is inevitably alsoq u a l i t y....

If Marx did not leave behind him a“Logic” (with a capital letter), he did leavethe logic of Capital, and this ought to beutilised to the full in this question. InCapital, Marx applied to a single sciencelogic, dialectics and the theory of knowl-dge of materialism [three words are notneeded: it is one and the same thing]which has taken everything valuable inHegel and developed it further.

Commodity—money—capital

production of absoluteMehrwert**production of relativeMehrwert

* everything flows—Ed.** surplus-value—Ed.

abstract“Sein” only

as a m o-m e n t inπáντα çεì*

b

b

V. I. LENIN318

Cf. concerning the question of Essence versus Appearance

* value (=crystallized labour)—Ed.

The history of capitalism and the anal-ysis of the c o n c e p t s summing it up.

The beginning—the most simple, ordi-nary, mass, immediate “Being’’: the singlecommodity (“Sein” in political economy).The analysis of it as a social relation.A double analysis, deductive and inductive—logical and historical (forms of value).

Testing by facts or by practice respec-tively, is to be found here in each stepof the analysis.

— price and value— demand and supply versus Wert

(= krystallisjerte Arbeit*)— wages and the price of labour-power..

Written in 1 9 1 5Firs t pub l i shed in 1 9 3 0in Lenin Miscellany X I I


DDDDDD

DDDDDD

319

GEORGES NOËL: HEGEL’S LOGIC

PARIS, 1897115

Bibliothèque de Genève, Ca 1219

Printed in installments in Revue de Mé-taphysique et de Morale; edited by XavierLéon.The author is an idealist and a shallow

one. A re-writing of Hegel, a defence ofHegel against “modern philosophers,” a com-parison with Kant, etc. Nothing of interest.Nothing profound. Not a word about ma-terialist dialectics: the author evidentlyhas no notion of it.

Note the t r a n s l a t i o n s of He-gel’s terms:

Ê t r e [B e i n g]—E s s e n c e—N o -t i o n (Mesure, etc. [Measure]).Devenir (das Gewordene) [Becoming].L’être déterminé (Dasein) [Determinate

Being, Existent Being].Être pour un autre (Sein-für-anderes)

[Being-for-other].Quelque chose (Etwas) [Something].Limite (Grenze) [Limit].Borne (Schranke) [Boundary].Devoir être (Sollen) [Ought].Être pour soi (Für-sich-Sein) [Being-

for-itself].Existence hors de soi (Außer-sich-Sein)

[Being outside itself].La connaissance (dos Erkennen) [Cog-

nition].

V. I. LENIN320

* These three words are in English in the original.—Ed.

Actualité (Wirklichkeit) [Actuality].Apparence (Schein) [Semblance].Être posé (Das Gesetzsein) [Posited Be-

ing].Position (Setzende Reflexion) [Positing

reflection].Fondement ou raison d’être (Grund)

[Ground].L’universel (das Allgemeine) [The Uni-

versal].Particulier (das Besondere) [The Par-

ticular].Jugement (das Urteil) [Judgment].Raisonnement ou Syllogismne (Schluß)

(Reasoning or Syllogism (Conclu-sion)].

Note also the amusing attempts of theauthor to justify Hegel as it were* againstaccusations of “realism” (read: material-ism). According to Hegel “philosophy asa whole is a syllogism. And in this syllo-gism, logic is the universal, nature the par-ticular, and spirit the individual” (p. 123).The author “analyses” (= rehashes) the lastsentences of the Logic on the transitionfrom the Idea to Nature. It transpires thatthrough nature (in nature) the understand-ing cognises the Idea = uniformity, ab-stractions, etc.... Help! Almost material-ism!!....

“To treat nature by itself, abstractedfrom mind, is that not to return implicitlyto the most naïve realism?” (p. 129)

“True, by interposing a philosophy ofnature between Logic and the philosophyof mind, Hegel adopts the standpoint ofrealism, but in doing so he is not guiltyof any inconsistency.... Hegel’s realism

NB!

NB

321REMARKS ON NOEL’S HEGEL’S LOGIC

is only provisional. It is a point of viewthat has to be superseded.” (129)

“That realism has its relative truth isindisputable. A point of view so naturaland universal is not an aberration of thehuman mind.... In order to supersede real-ism, it” (dialectics) “will have to give itfirst its full development and only thuswill it demonstrate the necessity of ideal-ism. Hence Hegel will put time and spaceas the most general determinations of na-ture and not as forms of the mind. Onthis point he seems to disagree with Kant,but this is only in appearance and inwords....

...“That is why he” (Hegel) “speaks ofsensuous qualities as if they were reallyinherent in the body. It is surprising thaton this account Herr Wundt accuses himof ignorance. Does the learned philosopherbelieve that Hegel had never read Des-cartes, Locke or even Kant? If he is a real-ist, it is due neither to ignorance nor in-consistency, but only tentatively and as amethod of approach.” (130)

Comparing Hegel with Spinoza, the authorsays: “In short, Hegel and Spinoza agreein submitting nature to logic” (p. 140),but in Hegel logic is not mathematicallogic but the logic of contradictions, ofthe transition “from pure abstraction toreality” (etc.). Of Spinoza it is said “withhim” (Spinoza) “we are at the antipodes ofidealism” (138); for “the world of spirits” (inSpinoza) “exists side by side with the worldof bodies: it does not stand above it....”

...“The idea of evolution so characteris-tic of Hegelianism has no meaning forSpinoza....” (138)

Hegel develops the dialectics of Plato(“he recognises with Plato the necessary

NB

??!!

NBHegel = a“realist”

NB

V. I. LENIN322

Hegel nota “sceptic”

NB

Kantan agnostic

NBmaterial-

ists = “dog-matists”

coexistence of opposites” 140)—Leibnitz isclose to Hegel. (141)

Noël defends Hegel against the chargeof pantheism.... (here, he says, is the basisof this charge):

...“Absolute spirit, the final point ofhis” (Hegel’s) “dialectics, is it basicallyother than the idealised and deified spiritof man himself? Does his God exist any-where but in nature and humanity?” (142)

Noël’s “defence” consists in stress-ing (chewing over) the fact thatHegel is an idealist.

Is Hegel not a “dogmatist”? (Chapter VI:“The Dogmatism of Hegel”). Yes, in thesense of non-scepticism, in the sense ofthe a n c i e n t s (p. 147). But accordingto Kant that = cognisability of “Things-in-themselves.” Hegel (just like Fichte) deniesThings-in-themselves.

“A g n o s t i c r e a l i s m ” according to K a n t (p. 148 i.f.).

...“Kant defines dogmatism from thepoint of view of agnosticism. A dogmatistis one who claims to determine the Thing-in-itself, to know the unknowable. More-over, dogmatism can take two forms....”(149) Either it is mysticism, or

...“it can also naïvely raise sensuousreality to absolute reality, identifythe phenomenon with the noumenon.It is then empirical dogmatism, thatof the common mass and of the savantwho is alien to philosophy. The ma-terialists fall into this second error;the first was that of Plato, Descartesand their disciples....”

In Hegel, it is stated, there is not atrace of dogmatism, for “he will certainly

323REMARKS ON NOEL’S HEGEL’S LOGIC

not be accused of not recognising the rel-ativity of things with respect to thought,since his whole system rests on this prin-ciple. Nor will he be accused of applyingthe categories undiscerningly and uncritical-ly. Is not his logic precisely a critique of thecategories, a critique incontestably moreprofound than the Kantian critique?” (150)

...“There is no doubt that by the veryrejection of noumena he” (Hegel) “putsreality in the phenomenon,116 but this real-ity in the phenomenon as such is onlyan immediate reality, consequently rela-tive and intrinsically incomplete. It istrue reality only implicitly and on condi-tion of its further development....” (151)

...“Moreover, between the intelligible andthe sensuous there is no absolute opposi-tion, no hiatus, no unbridgeable gulf. Thesensuous is the intelligible in anticipation;the intelligible is the sensuous under-stood....” (152)

(Even you, a shallow idealist, have de-rived some benefit from Hegel!)

...“Sensuous being contains the abso-lute implicitly and it is through a contin-uous gradation that we raise ourselves fromthe one to the other.” (153)

...“Thus, whatever may have been saidabout it, Kant’s philosophy retains the fun-damental vice of mystical dogmatism. Wefind in it the two characteristic featuresof this doctrine: absolute opposition be-tween the sensuous and the supersensuous,and an immediate transition from the oneto the other.” (156)

In Chapter VII: “Hegel and ModernThought,” Noël takes the positivism ofAuguste Comte and, analysing it, calls it“an agnostic system.” (166)

(Idem 169: “positivist agnosticism”)

NB

not bad!

positivism =agnosticism

V. I. LENIN324

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French translations of Hegel: Véra: Logic, The Philos-ophy of Mind, The Philosophy of Religion, The Philosophyof Nature;

Ch. Bénard: Aesthetics and Poetics

Works on Hegelianism:

E. Beaussire: Antécédents de l’hégélianisme.P. Janet: La dialectique dans Hégel et dans Platon. 1860.Mariano: La Philosophie contemporaine en Italie.Véra: Introduction à la Philosophie de Hégel.

* “of permanent facts”—Ed.

In criticising positivism as agnosticism,the author sometimes castigates it not atall badly for its half-heartedness,—saying,for example, that the question of thesource of laws or of the “permanence” offacts (“des faits permanents,”* 170) cannotbe evaded:

...“Depending on whether one regardsthem” (les faits permanents) “as uncognis-able or cognisable, one is brought backeither to agnosticism or to dogmatic philos-ophy....” (170 i.f.).

The neo-criticism of M. Renouvier isdescribed as eclecticism, something midwaybetween “positivist phenomenalism andKantianism proper.” (175)

Chattering about morality, freedom,etc., Noël, the vulgariser of Hegel, hasnot the slightest word to say aboutfreedom as the understanding of neces-sity.

Written in 1 9 1 5Firs t pub l i shed in 1 9 3 0in Lenin Miscellany X I I


325

J. PERRIN.T R E A T I S E O N P H Y S I C A L C H E M I S T R Y .

P R I N C I P L E S

PARIS, 1903117

Note J. P e r r i n: Traité de chimie physique. Les prin-cipes (300 pp.). Paris, 1 9 0 3. Review by Abel R e y inR e v u e P h i l o s o p h i q u e, 1 9 0 4, 1, entitled: “Phi-losophical Principles of Physical Chemistry.” (Perrin ana-lyses the notions of f o r c e, etc., c a u s e, etc., e n e r g y,etc.—against “the view of e n e r g y as a mysterious entity”(p. 401).... Abel Rey calls Perrin an opponent of “n e o -s c e p t i c systems.”)


Written in December 1 9 1 4First published in 1 9 3 0


326

PETER GENOV.F E U E R B A C H E R K E N N T N I S T H E O R I E

U N D M E T A P H Y S I K

ZÜRICH, 1911 (BERNER DISSERTATION) (S. 89)118

Landesbibliothek

This purely amateurish work consists a l m o s t e x -c l u s i v e l y of quotations from Feuerbach’s collectedworks Jodl edition . It can be useful o n l y as a collectionof quotations, and incomplete at that.

the author has far from worked out his subjectThe author quotes mainly:Vol. II, especially “Thesen und Grundsätze,” and then

“Wider den Dualismus.”119

X, especially “Über Spiritualismus und Materialismus.”NB V I I I , Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion (Feu-

erbach himself wrote in 1 8 4 8 that this was amore mature work of his than The Essence ofChristianity; published in 1 8 4 1) VIII, SS. 26,29; 102-109; 288; 329 and others .

VII. Das Wesen der Religion (1 8 4 5: Fe u e r b a c hr e g a r d s i t a s i m p o r t a n t).

IV. “Leibnitz” with the notes of 1847 (NB) IV,SS. 261; 197; 190-191; 274 .

VII. Addenda to Wesen des Christentums.The author quotes (in the spirit of Feuerbach):Ebbinghaus: Experimentelle Psychologie, SS.110 und 45.Fr. Jodl: Lehrbuch der Psychologie, S. 403.A. Forel: Gehirn und Seele, X Auflage, S. 14.

Lange120 (II Buch, S. 104) against Feuerbach, he says,is obviously wrong (S. 83 and 88), distorting (and denying)Feuerbach’s materialism.

{ {

327NOTE ON ERKENNTNISTHEORIE UND METAPHYSIK

At the beginning the author gives a sketch of Feuer-bach’s philosophical evolution,—Todesgedanken (1830)—still a Hegelian; Der Schriftsteller und der Mensch* (1834)—beginning of the rupture; Kritik des Antihegel (1835)—against the enemies of Hegel, but not in favour of Hegel(cf. de Grün,121 Bd. II, 409; I, 390 and 398).—The Critiqueof Hegelian Philosophy** (1839).—The Essence of Christian-ity (1 8 4 1)—the rupture—Theses and Principles of thePhilosophy of the Future (1842 and 1843).—The Essenceof Religion (1845).—Lectures on the Essence of Religion(1 8 4 7).

* Here the author was “not a pantheist, but a polytheist” (S. 15);“more a Leibnitzian than a Hegelian” (S. 15).

** The German titles of Feuerbach’s works are: Kritik der Hegel-schen Philosophie; Wesen des Christentums; Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformder Philosophie; Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft; Wesen derReligion; Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion.—Ed.


Written December 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 9 1 4First published in 1 9 3 0


328

PAUL VOLKMANN.E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L F O U N D A T I O N S O F

T H E N A T U R A L S C I E N C E S

(“SCIENCES AND HYPOTHESIS,” IX) SECOND EDITION, LEIPZIG, 1910122

(Nat. IV. 171 in Bern library)

The author is an eclectic and vulgariser in philosophy,especially when speaking against Haeckel, about Buckle,etc., etc. Nevertheless, the tendency is materialist, e.g.,p. 35*—“The question whether we dictate concepts to na-ture, or nature to us” is, he says, a combination of bothpoints of view. Mach, he says, is right (p. 38), but I coun-terpose to it (Mach’s point of view) the “objective” pointof view:

“Thus I hold that logic in us has its origin in the uni-form course of things outside us, that the external necessi-ty of natural events is our first and most real schoolmis-tress” (p. 39).

He rebels against phenomenology and modern monism,—but completely fails to understand the essence of material-ist and idealist philosophy. In fact, he reduces the mat-ter to “methods” of natural science in a general positivistsense. He is not even capable of raising the question of theobjective reality of nature outside the consciousness(and sensations) of mankind.

* Volkmann, P., Erkenntnistheorische Gründzüge der Natur-wissenschaften, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910.—Ed.




329

MAX VERWORN.T H E H Y P O T H E S I S O F B I O G E N E S I S

JENA, 1903123

* Verworn, M., Die Biogenhypothese, Jena, 1903.—Ed.** fruitfulness—Ed.

The author expounds a special themeconcerning “living substance” and its chem-ical metabolism. A special theme.

A bibliography is provided on this question.P. 112—a “working hypothesis,” this,

he says, is the essence. For example, hesays that materialism in the nineteenthcentury was of great benefit to the naturalsciences,—but now “no philosophical nat-ural scientist any longer considers the ma-terialist conception to be adequate” (112).There are no eternal truths. The signifi-cance of ideas, their Fruchtbarkeit,** theirrole as a “ferment”—“which creates a n dacts.” (113)

Characteristic here is the naïve ex-pression of the view that “materialism”hinders! Not the haziest conception ofdialectical materialism and completeinability to distinguish materialism asa p h i l o s o p h y from the individualhide-bound views of the philistines ofthe day who call themselves mate-rialists .

(Med. 5218)cf. p. 9*

definition of“Enzyme”124

V. I. LENIN330

The aim of the author is a “mechanicalanalysis of the phenomena of life” (p. 1,Preface)—a reference to the last chapterof the Allgemeine Physiologie.

Instead of “living protein” (p. 25)—said to be an unclear concept, and insteadof the “living protein molecule” (“sincea molecule cannot he alive”), the authorproposes to speak of the “biogen-molecule.”(25)

The conversion of the chemicalinto the living—that, evidently,is the crux. In order to move morefreely in this new, still obscure,hypothetical, down with “material-ism,” down with antiquated “shackl-ing” ideas (the “molecule”), letus invent a new term (biogen), inorder to seek new knowledge morefreely! N B. Concerning the ques-tion of the sources and vital im-pelling motives of modern “ideal-ism” in physics and natural sciencein general.




331

FR. DANNEMANN.H O W D I D O U R P I C T U R E

O F T H E W O R L D A R I S E

(KOSMOS). STUTTGART, 1912125

(Nat. XII. 456)

In this pamphlet the author gives a kind of summaryof his four-volume work : “N a t u r w i s s e n s c h a f -t e n i n i h r e r E n t w i c k l u n g u n d i n i h r e r mZ u s a m m e h a n g e”...

* D a n n e m a n n , F r . , W i e u n s e r W e l t b i l d e n t s t a n d ? S t u t t g a r t ,1912.—Ed.

About 5,000 years of the developmentof civilisation from ancient Egypt to ourtime. According to Homer, the world wasonly the Mediterranean Sea and surround-ing countries. (P. 8)*

In Egypt the clear nights facilitatedthe pursuit of astronomy. They observedthe stars and their movement, the moon,etc.

At first the month was reckoned as 30days, and the year as 360 (p. 31). The an-cient Egyptians already had 365 days.(P. 32) Eratosthenes (276 B. C.) determinedthe circumference of the earth as 250,000“stadia” = 45,000 km. (instead of 40,000).

Aristarchus guessed that the earth re-volved round the sun, p. 37 (1,800 yearsbefore Copernicus, 1473-1543). (Third cen-tury B.C.) he considered the moon to be

(((Much p o p-u l a r i s a-t i o n...)))

The authorcarelessly,pompously,vulgarly, infeuilleton

style outlinesphilosophical

questions,banal.

The bookletis neitherhere nor

there: for aphilosophical

work it iscareless, sen-tentious, pet-ty, banal;—

for a popular

DDDD

DDDD

DDDD

DDDD

DDDD

DDD

DDDD

DDDD

DDDD

DDDD

DDDD

DDD

V. I. LENIN332

work it ispretentious

3 0 (instead of 48) times smaller thanthe earth, and the sun to be 300 (insteadof 1,300,000) times larger than the earth....

Pythagoras (sixth centu-ry B.C.) the world is gov-erned by number and meas-ure....

The four elements, sub-stances, of the ancient phil-osophers: earth, fire, water,air....

Democritus (fifth centu-ry B.C.): atoms...

seventeenth century:chemical elements.

Spectral analysis (1860)Electricity, etc.Law of conservation offorce.

g

the telescopeand so forth((discoveryof more than20 millionstars, etc.))

flatteningof the earthat the poles— �� dia-

meter insteadof ��


gDD

DDDD

D

DDDD

DDD

Ptolemy’s system (secondcentury A.D.)

fifteenth century: therevival of astronomy—con-nection with navigation.

Copernicus (1473-1543):heliocentric system. Circles(not ellipses).

((Only in the middle ofthe nineteenth century im-proved measuring instru-ments showed alteration inthe appearance of the fixedstars))

Galileo—(1564-1642).Kepler—(1571- 1630).Newton—(1643-1727).



333

LUDWIG DARMSTAEDTER.H A N D B O O K O N T H E H I S T O R Y

O F T H E N A T U R A L S C I E N C E S

A N D T E C H N I Q U E

BERLIN, 1908, 2nd EDITION126

(Lesesaal in der Landesbibliothek)

Determination of the velocity of light:

1 6 7 6: Olaf Römer (from theeclipse of Jupiter): 40,000geographical miles (less than... .300,000) km. per sec.

( less than. . . .298,000 km.)1 6 4 9: Fizeau (toothed wheel

and mirror): 42,219 geo-graphical miles . . . . . . . =

1 8 5 4: Foucault (2 revolvingmirrors , etc . ) : 40,160 geo -graphical miles . . . . . . . =

1 8 7 4: Al fred Cornu (à laF i z e a u ) . . . . . . . . . . .

1 9 0 2: Perrotin (idem) . . .{

313,000 km. per sec.

298,000 ” ” ”300,400 ” ” ”300,330 ” ” ”299,900 (± 80 m.) ”



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334

NAPOLÉON. P E N S É E S

PARIS, 1913 BIBLIOTHÈQUE MINIATURE No. 14127

( Landesbibliothek)

“Cannon killed feudalism. Ink will kill modern society(p. 43)....

— — —“In every battle there comes a moment whenthe bravest soldiers, after the greatest tension, feel inclinedto take to flight. This terror arises from a lack of confi-dence in their courage: it needs only an insignificant event,some pretext, to return this confidence to them: the greatart consists in bringing this about” (pp. 79-80).



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NB

335

ARTUR ERICH HAAS.T H E S P I R I T O F H E L L E N I S M

I N M O D E R N P H Y S I C S

LEIPZIG, 1914 (32 pp.) (VEIT & CO.)128

Reviewed in Kant-Studien, 1914, No. 3 (Vol. XIX),pp. 391-392, the author is described as a professor of thehistory of physics (P. Volkmann pays particular attention tothis history), is said to emphasise the special connectionbetween Heraclitus and Thomson, etc., etc.



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336

THEODOR LIPPS.N A T U R A L S C I E N C E S

A N D W O R L D O U T L O O K 129

(SPEECH AT THE 78TH CONGRESS OF GERMAN NATURALSCIENTISTS IN STUTTGART), HEILELBERG, 1906

(Bern Library, Nat. Varia. 160)

An idealist of the Kant-Fichte persuasion, who empha-sises that both phenomenology (modern—“only phenomena.”P. 40) and energetics and vitalism (ibidem) work in thespirit of idealism.

Matter—x“Materiality”—“a conventional mode of expression”...

(p. 3 5)“Nature is a product of the mind” (37), etc.“In short, materialism is primarily nothing but a new

name for the task of natural science.” (32)



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CONSPECTUS OF LASALLE’S BOOKT H E P H I L O S O P H Y

O F H E R A C L I T U S T H E O B S C U R E

O F E P H E S U S 130

Rea

ding

Hal

l o

f t

he B

erli

n L

ibr a

r yV

. I.

Len

in w

orke

d h

ere

in

191

4-1 6

Reading Hall of the Berlin Library

V. I. Lenin worked here in 1914-16

339

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F. LASALLE.THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

THE OBSCURE OF EPHESUS,TWO VOLUMES

BERLIN, 1858 (pp. 379 + 479)(Bern: Log. 119. 1)

* Hegel, Werke , Bd. XIII, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.** Reference i s be ing made to the conspectus o f Hege l ’s work

Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in which Lenin makes this quota-tion. (See p. 259 of this voluine.)—Ed.

In the epigraph, inter alia,from Hegel—from his Historyof Philosophy—that there is nota single proposition of Heraclitusthat he would not have adoptedin his Logic.

Hegel. Collected Works, Vol.XIII, p. 328.*My quotation from Vorlesun-gen über die Geschichte derPhilosophie.**

One can understand why Marx calledthis work of Lassalle’s “school boyish” (seethe letter to Engels of ...131): Lassalle simplyrepeats Hegel, copies from him, re-echo-ing him a million times with regard toisolated passages from Heraclitus, furnish-ing his opus with an incredible heap oflearned ultra-pedantic ballast.

The difference with respect to Marx:In Marx there is a mass of new material,

V. I. LENIN340

* industrious—Ed.

and what interests him is only the move-ment forward f r o m Hegel and Feuer-bach f u r t h e r, from idealistic to mate-rialistic dialectics. In Lassalle there isa rehash of Hegel on the particular themeselected: essentially transcribing from He-gel with respect to quotations from Hera-clitus and about Heraclitus.

Lassalle divided his work into two parts:“General Part. Introduction” (Vol. 1,pp. 1-68), and “Historical Part. Fragmentsand Evidence” (the remainder). Chapter IIIin the general part: “Short LogicalDevelopment of the System of Heraclitus”(pp. 45-68)—gives the quintessence ofthe method, of Lassalle’s conclusions. Thischapter is sheer plagiarism, slavish repe-tition of Hegel concerning Heraclitus! Heretoo (and still more in the historical part)there is a mass of erudition, but it is eru-dition of the lowest kind: the exercise setwas to seek out the Hegelian element inHeraclitus. The Strebsamer* pupil per-forms it “brilliantly,” reading throughe v e r y t h i n g about Heraclitus in all theancient (and modern) authors, and puttinga Hegelian construction on e v e r y t h i n g.

Marx in 1844-47 went from Hegel toFeuerbach, and further b e y o n d Feuer-bach to historical (and dialectical) mate-rialism. Lassalle in 1846 began (Preface,p. III), in 1855 resumed, and in August1857 (Preface, p. XV) finished a work ofsheer, empty, useless, “learned” r e h a s h-i n g of Hegelianism!!

Some chapters of the second part areinteresting and not without use solely forthe translations of fragments from Her-aclitus and for the popularisation of He-

341CONSPECTUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

gel, but that does not do away with allthe above-mentioned defects.

The philosophy of the ancients and ofHeraclitus is often quite delightful in itschildish naïveté, e.g., p. 162—how is itto be explained that the urine of personswho have eaten garlic* smells of garlic?”

and the answer:“is it not that, as some of the fol-

lowers of Heraclitus say, one and thesame fiery process of transformationtakes place both in the universe andin (organic) bodies, and then aftercooling appears there (in the universe)as moisture, and here takes the formof urine, but the transformation(Äναϑνµíασις**) from the food causesthe smell of that from which it hasarisen by mixing with it?...” (162-163)

On p. 221 ff.*** Lassalle quotes Plu-tarch, who says with regard to Heraclitus:...“in the same way as everything is createdby transformation out of fire, so also fireout of everything, just as we obtain thingsfor gold and gold for things....”

In this connection, Lassalle writes aboutv a l u e (Werth) (p. 2 2 3 NB) and aboutFunction des Geldes**** , expounding itin the Hegelian manner (as “separatedabstract unity”) and adding: ...“that thisunity, money, is not something actual, butsomething merely ideal (Lassalle’s italics)is evident from the fact...,” etc.

(But all the same NB that this waswritten in a book that appeared in 1858,the preface being dated August 1857.)

Heraclitus ongold and

commodities

incorrectLassalle’sidealism

* V. I. Lenin wrote the word “garlic” above the word “Knob-lauch.”—Ed.

** evaporation—Ed.*** et seq.—Ed.

**** function of money—Ed.

( (

V. I. LENIN342

* token of value—Ed.** modern discoveries in this field—Ed.

In note 3 on p. 224 (pp. 224-225) Las-salle speaks in still greater detail aboutmoney, saying that Heraclitus was no “po-litical economist,” that money is ((only(??)))a Wertzeichen,* etc., etc. (“all money ismerely the ideal unity or expression ofvalue of all real products in circulation”)(224), etc.

Since Lassalle here speaks vaguelyof moderne Entdeckungen auf diesemGebiet**—the theory of value andmoney, it can be assumed that he hasprecisely in mind conversations withMarx and letters from him.On pp. 225-228. Lassalle reproduces

a long p a s s a g e from Plutarch, provingfurther (convincingly) that it is indeedHeraclitus who is referred to, and that Plu-tarch here expounds “the basic featuresof the speculative theology of Heraclitus”(p. 228).

The passage is a good one: it conveysthe spirit of Greek philosophy, the na-ïveté, profundity, the flowing transitions.

Lassalle reads into Heraclitus evena whole system of theology and “objec-tive logic” (sic!!), etc.—in short, Hegel“apropos of” Heraclitus!!

An infinite number of times (trulywearisomely) Lassalle emphasises andrehashes the idea that Heraclitus not onlyrecognises motion in everything, that hisprinciple is motion or becoming (Wer-den), but that the whole point lies inunderstanding “the processing identity of


absolute (schlechthin) opposites” (p. 289and many others). Lassalle, so to speak,hammers into the reader’s head theHegelian thought that in abstract con-cepts (and in the system of them) theprinciple of motion cannot be expressedotherwise than as the principle of theidentity of opposites. Motion andWerden, generally speaking, can be with-out repetition, without return to thepoint of departure, a n d t h e n suchmotion would not be an “identity ofopposites.” But astronomical and me-chanical (terrestrial) motion, and thelife of plants, animals and man—all thishas hammered into the heads of man-kind not merely the idea of motion,but motion precisely with a return tothe point of departure, i.e., dialect i c a lmotion.

This is naïvely and delightfully expressedin the famous formula (or aphorism)of Heraclitus: “it is impossible to bathetwice in the same river”—actually, how-ever (as had already been said by Cratylus,a disciple of Heraclitus), it cannot bedone even once (for before the whole bodyhas entered the water, the latter is al-ready not the same as before).

(NB: This Cratylus reduced Heraclitus’dialectics to sophistry, pp. 294-295 andmany others, by saying: nothing is true,nothing can be said about anything. A neg-ative (and merely negative) conclusionfrom dialectics. Heraclitus, on the otherhand, had the principle: “everything is true,”there is (a part of) truth in everything. Cra-tylus merely “wagged his finger” in answer toeverything, thereby showing that everythingmoves, that nothing can be said of anything.

V. I. LENIN344

* logos—Ed.** necessity—Ed.

Lassalle in this work has nosense of moderation, absolutelyd r o w n i n g Heraclitus i n H e -g e l. It is a pity. Heraclitus i nm o d e r a t i o n, as one of thefounders of dialectics, would beextremely useful: the 850 pagesof Lassalle should be compressedinto 85 pages of quintessence andtranslated into Russian: “Hera-clitus as one of the founders of dia-lectics (according to Lassalle).”Something useful could result!

The basic law of the world, accordingto Heraclitus (λóγος,* sometimes εí µαρ−µéνη**), is “the law of transformation intothe opposite” (p. 327) (= êναντιοτροπÅ,êναντιοδροµíα).

Lassalle expounded the meaning ofεí µαρµé νη as the “law of development”(p. 333), quoting, inter alia,

the words of Nemesius: “Democritus, Her-aclitus and Epicurus assume that neitherfor the universal nor for the particulardoes foresight exist” (ibidem).

And the words of Heraclitus: “The worldwas created by none of the Gods or men,but is eternally living fire and will al-ways be so” (ibidem).

It is strange that, in rehashing thereligious philosophy of Heraclitus, Las-salle does not once quote or mentionFeuerbach! What was Lassalle’s atti-tude in general to Feuerbach? Thatof an idealist Hegelian?


NB

Hence Philo said of Heraclitus’ doctrine,...“that it” (die Lehre*), “like thatof the Stoics, derives everything f r o mthe world, and brings it i n t o theworld, but does not believe that any-thing came from God.” (334) An exam-ple of “touching up” as Hegelian:

Lassalle translates the famous passageof Heraclitus (according to Stobaeus) on“(Das) Eine Weise”** (ëν σοϕóν) as follows:

“However many discourses I haveheard, no one has succeeded in recog-nising that the wise is that whichis separated from all (i.e., from allthat exists)” (344)—considering that the words “beastor god” are an insertion, and rejectingthe translations of Ritter (“wisdomis remote from all”) (344) and Schleier-macher “the wise is separated fromall,” in the sense of “cognition” dis-tinct from the knowledge of partic-ulars.

According to Lassalle the meaningof this passage is as follows:that “the absolute (the wise) is aliento all sensuous determinate being, thatit is the negative” (349)—i.e., Nega-tive = the principle of negation, theprinciple of motion. A clear misrep-resentation as Hegelian! Reading He-gel into Heraclitus.

A mass of details on the (exter-nal) connection between Heracli-tus and Persian theology, Ormazd-Ahriman,132 and the theory of mag-ic, etc., etc., etc.

* the doctrine—Ed.** “the One Wise”—Ed.

V. I. LENIN346

* justice—Ed.** necessity of all things—Ed.

Heraclitus said: “time is a body” (p.358)... this, Lassalle says, is in the senseof the unity of being and nothing. Timeis the pure unity of Being and not-Be-ing, etc.!

Fire for Heraclitus, it is said = theprinciple of motion and not simply fire ,something similar is fire in the teachingof Persian philosophy (and religion)! (362)

If Heraclitus was the first to use theterm λóγος (“word”) in the objective sense(law), this, too, is said to be taken fromthe Persian religion.... (364)

— A quotation from the Zend-Avesta.133

(367)In § 17 on the relation between ∆íκη*

and εí µαρµé νη, Lassalle interprets theseideas of Heraclitus in the sense of “n e -c e s s i t y,” “c o n n e c t i o n.” (376)

NB: “the bond of all things” (δεσµòς!πáντων) (p. 379)Plato (in the T h e a e t e t u s) is al-

leged to express the Heraclitean philosophywhen he says:

“Necessity binds together the essential-ity of Being....”

“Heraclitus is ... the source of the con-ception, common among the Stoics, thatεíµαρµéνη, rerum omnium necessitas,** ex-presses b o n d and ligation, illigatio....”(376)Cicero:

“I, however, call fate what the Greekscall εíµαρµéνη, i.e., the order and sequenceof causes, when one cause linked withanother produces the phenomenon out ofitself” (p. 377).


Thousands of years have passedsince the time when the idea wasborn of “the connection of allthings,” “the chain of causes.” Acomparison of how these causeshave been understood in the his-tory of human thought would givean indisputably conclusive theoryof knowledge.

Volume II.Speaking of “fire,” Lassalle proves, by

repeating himself a thousand times over,that this is a “principle” for Heraclitus.He insists especially on the idealism ofHeraclitus (p. 2 5—that the principle ofdevelopment, des Werdens,* in Heracli-tus is logisch -präexistent,** that his phi-losophy = Idealphilosophie .*** Sic!!)(p. 25).

((Squeezing into Hegelian!))Heraclitus accepted “pure and absolute-

ly immaterial fire” (p. 28 Timaeus, onHeraclitus).

On p. 56 (Vol. II) Lassalle introducesa quotation from Clemens Al.,**** Stro-mata V; Chapter 14 about Heraclitus,which, translated literally, reads:

“The world, an entity out of everything,was created by none of the gods or men,but was, is and will be eternally livingfire, regularly becoming ignited and reg-ularly becoming extinguished....”

A very good exposition of the principlesof dialectical materialism. But on p. 58

* of becoming—Ed.** logically pre-existent—Ed.

*** idealistic philosophy—Ed.**** Clement of Alexandria—Ed.

NB

V. I. LENIN348

* free translation—Ed.** corrects (ironic)—Ed.

Lassalle provides the following “freie Über-setzung”* of this passage:

“The world — — was, is and will be con-tinuous becoming, being constantly, but invarying measure, transformed from Beinginto (proceeding) not-Being, and from thelatter into (proceeding) Being.”

An excellent example how Lassalleverballhornt* Heraclitus, representinghim as Hegelian, spoiling the liveliness,freshness, naïveté and historical integ-rity of Heraclitus by misrepresentinghim as Hegelian (and in order to achievethis misrepresentation Lassalle presentsa rehash of Hegel for dozens of pages).

The second section of the second part(“Physics,” pp. 1 - 2 6 2!!!, Vol. II) is ab-solutely intolerable. A farthingsworth ofHeraclitus, and a shillingsworth ofrehash of Hegel and of misrepresentation.One can only leaf through the pages—inorder to say that it should not be read!

From Section III (“The Doctrine of Cog-nition”) a quotation from P h i l o:

“For the One is that which consists oftwo opposites, so that when cut into twothe opposites are revealed. Is not this theproposition which the Greeks say theirgreat and famous Heraclitus placed at thehead of his philosophy and gloried in asa new discovery....” ((265))

And the following quotation also fromPhilo:

...“In the same way, too, the parts ofthe world are divided into two and mutual-ly counterposed: the earth—into moun-tains and plains, water—into fresh andsalt.... In the same way, too, the atmos-

NB

NB


phere into winter and summer, and like-wise spring and autumn. And this servedHeraclitus as the material for his bookson nature: borrowing from our theologianthe aphorism about opposites, he addedto it innumerable and laboriously worked-out examples (Belege)” (p. 267).

According to Heraclitus the criterionof truth is not the consensus omnium, notthe agreement of all (p. 285)—in that casehe would be a subjectiver Empiriker*(p. 284). No, he is an objectiver Idealist**(285). For him, the criterion of truth,independent of the subjective opinion ofall men, is agreement with the ideal lawof the identity of Being and not-Being(285).

On p. 337, quoting, inter alia, Büch-ner (note 1), Lassalle says that Her-aclitus expressed a priori “the verysame thought” as “modern physiology”(“thought is a movement of matter”).

An obvious exaggeration. In thequotations about Heraclitus it ismerely said that the soul is alsoa process of transformation—thatwhich moves is known by that whichmoves.

* subjective empiricist—Ed.** objective idealist—Ed.

Here it is clear-ly seen that Lassal-le is a Hegelian ofthe old type, anidealist.

Cf. Marx 1845in his theses onFeuerbach!134

Lassalle is herereactionary.

NB

V. I. LENIN350

A quotation from Chalcidius (in Ti-macus):

...“Heraclitus, however, links our rea-son with the divine reason that guidesand rules the world, and says that, onaccount of inseparable accompaniment, it,too, possesses knowledge of the governingdecree of reason and, when the mind restsfrom the activity of the senses, it predictsthe future” (p. 342).

From Clemens (Stromata V.):...“owing to its incredibility it—namely,

the truth—escapes from becoming cog-nised....” (347)

Heraclitus, Lassalle says, is “the fatherof objective logic” (p. 351), for in him“natural philosophy” umschlägt* into thephilosophy of thought, “thought is recognisedas the principle of existence” (350), etc., etc.à la Hegel.... The moment of subjectivityis said to be lacking in Heraclitus....

§ 36. “Plato’s Cratylus”,135

pp. 373-396

In the § on “Cratylus,” Lassalle provesthat in this dialogue of Plato’s Cratylusis represented (not yet as a sophist andsubjectivist as he subsequently became,but) as a true disciple of Heraclitus, whoreally expounded his, Heraclitus’, theoryof the essence and origin of words andlanguage as an i m i t a t i o n of nature(“imitation of the essence of things,” p. 388),the essence of things, “the imitation andcopy of God,” “imitation of God and theuniverse” (ibidem).

* is transformed—Ed.


Ergo:

T h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y

” ” the separate sciences” ” the mental development

of the child” ” the mental development

of animals” ” l a n g u a g e NB:

# psychology# physiologyof the senseo r g a n s

...“We have shown—says Lassalle—thatthe” (above-mentioned) “conceptual iden-tity (precisely identity, and not merelyanalogy) between word, name and law isin every respect a principled view of theHeraclitean philosophy and of fundamentalimportance and significance in it....” (393)

...“Names are for him” (Heraclitus) “lawsof being, they are for him the commonelement of things, just as for him lawsare the ‘common element of all’”.... (394)

And it is precisely Heraclitean ideasthat Hippocrates e x p r e s s e s when hesays:

“Names are the laws of nature.”“For both laws and names are for the

Ephesian . . . equally merely products andrealisations of the universal, both are for

* briefly—Ed.

these arethe fields of

knowledgefrom whichthe theoryof knowl-edge anddialecticsshould be

builtkurz,* thehistory ofcognitionin general

the wholefield of

knowledge

NB

veryimportant!

NB

GreekPhiloso-

phyindicated

allthese

moments

V. I. LENIN352

* natural necessity—Ed.

Naturnot-wendigkeit*in Lassalle

him the achieved, purely universal, idealbeing, freed from the stain of sensuousreality....” (394)

Plato analyses and refutes the philos-ophy of Heraclitus in his “C r a t y l u s”and “T h e a e t e t u s,” and in so doing(especially in the latter) he confuses Heracli-tus (the objective idealist and dialectician)with the subjective idealist and sophistProtagoras (man is the measure of allthings). And Lassalle proves that in thedevelopment of ideas there has actuallystemmed from Heraclitus 1) sophistry (Pro-tagoras) and 2) Platonism, the “ideas”(objective idealism).

One gets the impression that Las-salle, the idealist, left in the shadethe materialism or materialistictendencies of Heraclitus, misrepre-senting him as Hegelian.

(IV. Ethik, pp. 427-462.)In the section on ethics—nil.On pp. 458-459 Lassalle writes that Ne-

mesios said that Heraclitus and Demo-critus denied prevision (προνοíαν), whereasCicero (De Fato) said that Heraclitus, asalso Democritus and others (including Aris-totle), recognised fatum—necessity.

...“This fatum is intended to signify onlythe immanent natural necessity belongingto the object, its natural law....” (459)

(The Stoics, according to Lassalle, tooke v e r y t h i n g from Heraclitus, makinghim banal and one-sided, p. 461.)


* summa summarum—Ed.

The index to Lassalle’s book iscompiled in a learned, pedanticmanner, but senselessly; a heap ofnames of the ancients, etc., etc.

In general, ΣΣ,* Marx’s judgment iscorrect, Lassalle’s book is not worth read-ing.

ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS136

Published according tothe manuscript


in the magazine Bolshevik, No. 5 -6

A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscriptOn the Question of Dialectics.—1915

Reduced

A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscriptOn the Question of Dialectics.—1915

Reduced

357

ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS

The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of itscontradictory parts (see the quotation from Philo on Her-aclitus at the beginning of Section III, “On Cognition,”in Lassalle’s book on Heraclitus*) is the e s s e n c e (oneof the “essentials,” one of the principal, if not the principal,charactetistics or features) of dialectics. That is preciselyhow Hegel, too, puts the matter (Aristotle in his Meta-physics continually g r a p p l e s with it and combats Her-aclitus and Heraclitean ideas).

The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialecticsmust be tested by the history of science. This aspect ofdialectics (e.g., in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequateattention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of e x a m p l e s “for example, a seed,” “for example,primitive communism.” The same is true of Engels. Butit is “in the interests of popularisation...” and not as al a w o f c o g n i t i o n (a n d as a law of the objectiveworld).

In mathematics: + and – . Differential and integral.In mechanics: action and reaction.In physics: positive and negative electricity.In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.In social science: the class struggle.The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, per-

haps, to say their “unity,”—although the difference betweenthe terms identity and unity is not particularly impor-tant here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recog-nition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,


V. I. LENIN358

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

opposite tendencies in a l l phenomena and processes ofnature (including mind and society). The condition forthe knowledge of all processes of the world in their “self-movement,” in their spontaneous development, in theirreal life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites.Development is the “struggle” of opposites. The two basic(or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptionsof development (evolution) are: development as decreaseand increase, as repetition, and development as a unityof opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusiveopposites and their reciprocal relation).

In the first conception of motion, s e l f - movement, itsd r i v i n g force, its source, its motive, remains in theshade (or this source is made external—God, subject, etc.).In the second conception the chief attention is directedprecisely to knowledge of the source of “s e l f”- movement.

The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The secondis living. The second a l o n e furnishes the key to the“self-movement” of everything existing; it alone furnishesthe key to the “leaps,” to the “break in continuity,” to the“transformation into the opposite,” to the destruction ofthe old and the emergence of the new.

The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of oppositesis conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. Thestruggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, justas development and motion are absolute.

NB: The distinction between subjectivism (sceptic-ism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, isthat in (objective) dialectics the difference between therelative and the absolute is itself relative. For objec-tive dialectics there is an absolute within the relative.For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is onlyrelative and excludes the absolute.

In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, mostordinary and fundamental, most common and everydayrelation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation en-countered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodi-ties. In this very simple phenomenon (in this “cell” of bour-geois society) analysis reveals a l l the contradictions (or

359ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS

the germs of all the contradictions) of modern society. Thesubsequent exposition shows us the development (bothgrowth and movement) of these contradictions and of thissociety in the Σ* of its individual parts, from its beginningto its end.

Such must also be the method of exposition (or study)of dialectics in general (for with Marx the dialectics ofbourgeois society is only a particular case of dialectics).To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common,etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green;John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we havedialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individuali s the u n i v e r s a l (cf. Aristotele’s, Metaphysik, transla-tion by Schwegler, Bd. II, S. 40, 3. Buch, 4. Kapitel, 8-9: “denn natürlich kann man nicht der Meinung sein, daßes ein Haus (a house in general) gebe außer den sichtbarenHäusern,” “οû γàρ äν ϑεíηµεν εïναí τινα οîκíαν παρàτàς τινàς οîκíας”. Consequently, the opposites (the in-dividual is opposed to the universal) are identical: theindividual exists only in the connection that leads to theuniversal. The universal exists only in the individual andthrough the individual. Every individual is (in one way oranother) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, oran aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universalonly approximately embraces all the individual objects.Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands oftransitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenom-ena, processes), etc. H e r e already we have the elements,the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connectionin nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent andthe necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when wesay: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree,etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent;we separate the essence from the appearance, and counter-pose the one to the other.

Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose asin a “nucleus” (“cell”) the germs of all the elements of dia-

* summation—Ed.** “for, of course, one cannot hold the opinion that there can be

a house (in general) apart from a visible house.”—Ed.

V. I. LENIN360

lectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property ofall human knowledge in general. And natural science showsus (and here again it must be demonstrated in any simpleinstance) objective nature with the same qualities, the trans-formation of the individual into the universal, of thecontingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations,and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics i sthe theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This isthe “aspect” of the matter (it is not “an aspect” but theessence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speakof other Marxists, paid no attention.

* * *Knowledge is represented in the form of a series of circles

both by Hegel (see Logic) and by the modern “epistemolog-ist” of natural science, the eclectic and foe of Hegelianism(which he did not understand!), Paul Volkmann (see hisErkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge,* S.)

“Circles” in philosophy: is a chronology of personsessential? No!

Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialec-tics of Heraclitus.

Renaissance: Descartes versus Gassendi (Spinoza?)Modern: Holbach—Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume,

Kant). Hegel—Feuerbach—Marx.

Dialectics as living, many-sided knowledge (with thenumber of sides eternally increasing), with an infinitenumber of shades of every approach and approximation toreality (with a philosophical system growing into a wholeout of each shade)—here we have an immeasurably richcontent as compared with “metaphysical” materialism, thefundamental misfortune of which is its inability to applydialectics to the Bildertheorie,** to the process and devel-opment of knowledge.

* P. Volkmann, Erhenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Natur-wissenschaften, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910, p. 35.—Ed.

** theory of reflection—Ed.

361ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS

Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the stand-point of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. Fromthe standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the otherhand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated,überschwengliches (Dietzgen)137 development (inflation, dis-tention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowl-edge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature,apotheosised. Idealism is clerical obscurantism. True. Butphilosophical idealism is (“m o r e c o r r e c t l y” and“i n a d d i t i o n”) a road to clerical obscurantism througho n e o f t h e s h a d e s of the infinitely complexk n o w l e d g e (dialectical) of man.

Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straightline, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a seriesof circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of thiscurve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) intoan independent, complete, straight line, which then (ifone does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quag-mire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is a n c h o r e dby the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearityand one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectiv-ism and subjective blindness—voilà the epistemologicalroots of idealism. And clerical obscurantism (= philosoph-ical idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it isnot groundless; it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but asterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fer-tile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolutehuman knowledge.

NBthis

apho-rism

CONSPECTUS OF ARISTOTLE’S BOOKM E T A P H Y S I C S 138




365

Philosophy isoften divert-

ed by thedefinition ofwords, etc.E v e r y -

t h i n g, allcategories are

affected

ARISTOTLE. THE METAPHYSICSTRANSLATED BY A. SCHWEGLER

TWO VOLUMESTÜBINGEN, 1847

See above, quotation about “house.”*A mass of extremely interesting, lively,

n a ï v e (fresh) matter which introducesphilosophy and is replaced in the exposi-tions by scholasticism, by the result withoutmovement, etc.

Clericalism killed what was living inAristotle and perpetuated what was dead.

“But man and horse, etc., exist as individ-uals, a universal for itself does not existas an individual substance, but only asa whole composed of a definite concept anddefinite matter” (p. 125, Book 7, Chapter10, 27-28).

Ibidem, p. 126, § 32-33:...“Matter is in itself unknowable. Some

matter is sensible and some intelligible;sensible, such as bronze and wood, in aword, all movable matter; intelligible, thatwhich is present in sensible things notqua sensible, e.g., the objects of mathe-matics....”

Highly characteristic and profoundly in-teresting (in the beginning of the Meta-physics) are the polemic with Plato and


V. I. LENIN366

* doubts—Ed.** everywhere—Ed.

the “puzzling’’ questions, delightful fortheir naïveté, and Bedenken* regardingthe nonsense of idealism. And all thisalong with the most helpless confusionabout the fundamental, the concept andthe particular.

NB: At the beginning of The Metaphysicsthe s t u b b o r n struggle against Her-aclitus, against his idea of the identity ofBeing and not-Being (the Greek philos-ophers approached close to dialectics butcould not cope with it). Highly character-istic in general, throughout the wholebook, passim,** are the living germs ofdialectics and inquiries about it....

In Aristotle, objective logic is every-where confused with subjective logic and,moreover, in such a way that everywhereobjective logic is v i s i b l e. There is nodoubt as to the objectivity of cognition.There is a naïve faith in the power ofreason, in the force, power, objective truthof cognition. And a naïve confusion, ahelplessly pitiful confusion in the d i a -l e c t i c s of the universal and the par-ticular—of the concept and the sensuouslyperceptible reality of individual objects,things, phenomena.

Scholasticism and clericalism took whatwas dead in Aristotle, but not what wasl i v i n g; the i n q u i r i e s, the search-ings, the labyrinth, in which man losthis way.

Aristotle’s logic is an inquiry, a search-ing, an approach to the logic of Hegel—and it, the logic of Aristotle (who every-where, at every step, raises p r e c i s e l ythe question o f d i a l e c t i c s), has beenmade into a dead scholasticism by reject-

367CONSPECTUS OF ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS

ing all the searchings, waverings and modesof framing questions. What the Greekshad was precisely modes of framing ques-tions, as it were tentative systems, a naïvediscordance of views, excellently reflectedin Aristotle.

...“Hence it is clear that no universalexists next to and in separation from itsparticulars. The exponents of the Forms arepartly right in their account when theymake the Forms separate; for the Formsare particular substances, but they arewrong in considering the one-over-manyas form. The reason for this is that theycannot explain what are the imperishablesubstances of this kind which exist besideand outside particular sensible substances;so they make the forms the same in kind asperishable things (for these we know); i.e.,they make Ideal Man and Ideal Horse, add-ing the word ‘Ideal’ to the names of sensiblethings # (p. 136, Book 7, Ch. 16, § 8-12) #.However, I presume that even if we hadnever seen the stars, nonetheless therewould be eternal substances besides thosewhich we knew; and so in the present caseeven if we cannot apprehend what theyare, still they must be in existence. It isclear, then, both that no universal termis particular substance and that no par-ticular substance is composed of particularsubstances (οûσíα)” (— § 13 at the e n d o fthe chapter).

Delightful! There are no doubts of thereality of the external world. The mangets into a muddle precisely over thedialectics of the universal and the par-ticular, of concept and sensation, etc.,of essence and phenomenon, etc.

!

!

V. I. LENIN368

(P. 146, Book 8—can it have beeninserted afterwards?—Chapter 5, § 2-3).

...“There is a difficulty in the question(Äπορíα) how the matter of the individualis related to the contraries. For example,if the body is potentially (δυνáµει) healthy,and the contrary of health is disease, isnot the body potentially both healthy anddiseased?...

...“Further, is not the living man poten-tially (δυνáµει) dead?”

(P. 181), Book 11, Chapter 1,§ 12-14:

...“They” (the philosophers) “posit theobjects of mathematics as intermediate be-tween the Forms and sensible things, asa third class besides the Forms and thethings of our world. But there is no thirdman or horse besides the Ideal one andthe particulars. If on the other hand it isnot as they make out, what sort of ob-jects are we to suppose to be the concernof the mathematician? Not surely the thingsof our world; for none of these is of thekind which the mathematical sciences in-vestigate....”

Ibidem, Chapter 2, § 21-23:...“Again, is there anything besides the

concrete whole (I mean by this matterand the material) or not? If not, all thingsare perishable, at least everything mate-rial is perishable; but if there is something,it must be the form or shape. It is hardto determine in what cases this is possibleand in what it is not....”

Pp. 185-186, Book 11, Chapter 3, § 12—mathematics sets aside heat, weight andother “sensible contrarieties,” and has inmind “only quantity”... “it is the samewith regard to Being.”

NB


* “In as many ways as categor ies are s tated , in so many waysdo they denote being.”—Ed.

Here we have the point of view ofdialectical materialism, but accidental-ly, not consistently, not elaborated, inpassing.

Windelband in his sketch of the historyof ancient philosophy (Müller’s Handbuchder klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft, V,I, S. 265) (“Reading room of the Bern Li-brary”) stresses that in Aristotle’s Logic(die Logik) “has as its most general pre-mise the identity of the forms of thoughtwith those of Being,” and he quotes Metaph-ysik , V , 7 : “ óσαχñς λéγεται , τ ο σ α χ ñ ςτò εìναι σηµαíνει.” That is § 4. Schweglertranslates it: “Denn so vielfach die Ka-tegorien ausgesagt werden, so vielfach be-zeichnen sie ein Sein.* A bad translation.

An approach to God:Book 12, Chapter 6, § 10-11:...“For how can there be motion if there

is no actual cause? Wood will not moveitself—carpentry must act upon it; norwill the menses or the earth move them-selves—the seeds must act upon the earth,and the semen on the menses....”

Leucippus (idem, § 14) accepts eternalmotion, but he does not explain why(§ 11).

Chapter 7. § 11-19—G o d (p. 213)....“eternal motion must be excited bysomething ... eternal” (Chapter 8, § 4)...

B o o k 1 2, C h a p t e r 1 0—again a“re-examination” of the fundamental ques-tions of philosophy; “interrogation marks,”so to speak. A very fresh, naïve, doubtingexposition (often hints) of various pointsof view.

V. I. LENIN370

* logos—Ed.** in the final analysis—Ed.

NB

NB

I n B o o k 1 3 Aristotle again returnsto a criticism of Pythagoras’ theory ofnumbers (and Plato’s theory of ideas), inde-pendent of sensible things.

Primitive idealism: the universal (con-cept, idea) is a p a r t i c u l a r b e i n g.This appears wild, monstrously (more accu-rately, childishly) stupid. But is notmodern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the ideaof God, of the same nature (absolutelyof the same nature)? Tables, chairs andthe ideas of table and chair; the worldand the idea of the world (God); thingand “noumen,” the unknowable “Thing-in-itself”; the connection of the earth andthe sun, nature in general—and law, λóγος,*God. The dichotomy of human knowledgeand the possibility of idealism (= religion)are g i v e n already in the first, elemen-tary abstraction

“house” in general and particular houses

The approach of the (human) mind toa particular thing, the taking of a copy(= a concept) of it i s n o t a simple,immediate act, a dead mirroring, but onewhich is complex, split into two, zig-zag-like, which includes in it the possibilityof the flight of fantasy from life; morethan that: the possibility of the transfor-mation (moreover, an unnoticeable trans-formation, of which man is unaware) ofthe abstract concept, idea, into a fantasy(in letzter Instanz** = God). For even inthe simplest generalisation, in the mostelementary general idea (“table” in gen-eral), t h e r e i s a certain bit of fantasy.


(Vice versa: it would be stupid to denythe role of fantasy, even in the strictestscience: cf. Pisarev on useful dreaming,as an impulse to work, and on empty day-dreaming.)139

Naïve expression of the “difficulties” ofthe “philosophy of mathematics” (to usemodern language): Book 13, Chapter 2, § 23:

...“Further, body is a kind of substance,since it already in some sense possessescompleteness; but in what sense are linessubstances? They could not be that, neitheras form or shape as, for instance, the soul,nor as matter, like the body; for it doesnot appear that anything can be composedeither of lines or of planes or of points....”(p. 224)

Book 13, Chapter 3 solves these dif-ficulties excellently, distinctly, clearly,materialistically (mathematics and othersciences abstract one of the aspects ofa body, phenomenon, life). But the au-thor does not consistently maintain thispoint of view.

Schwegler in his commentary (Vol. IV,p. 303) says: Aristotle gives here a positiveexposition of “his view of the mathemat-ical: the mathematical is the abstractionfrom the sensuous.”

Book 13, Chapter 10 touches on the ques-tion, which is better expounded by Schweg-ler in the commentary (in connection withMetaphysik VII, 13, 5): science is con-cerned only with the universal (cf. Book 13,Chapter 10, § 6), but only the particularis actual (substantial). Does that mean thatthere is a gulf between science and real-ity? Does it mean that Being and thoughtare incommensurable? “Is true knowledge

NB

V. I. LENIN372

* most valuable—Ed.

#

NB?

#

ha-ha!!!

of reality impossible?” (Schwegler, Vol. IV,p. 338.) Aristotle answers: potentiallyknowledge is directed to the universal,actually it is directed to the particular.

Schwegler (ibidem) describes as höchstbeachtenswert* F. Fischer’s work: DieMetaphysik, von empirischem Standpunkteaus dargestellt year of publication (1847) ,who speaks of Aristotle’s “realism.”

Book 14, Chapter 3, § 7: ...“why is it thatwhile the mathematical is in no way presentin sensible things, its attributes are pres-ent in sensible things?”... (p. 254)

(The last sentence of the book, Book 14,Chapter 6, § 21, has the same meaning.)

End of The Metaphysics.

Friedrich Fischer (1801-1853), Professorof philosophy in Basle. An article abouthim by Prantl (Allgemeine Deutsche Bio-graphie, Vol. 7, p. 67) gives a disparag-ing account of him and says that “througha complete rejection of subjective idealismhe nearly fell into the opposite extremeof an un-ideal empiricism.”

373

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NOTE ON THE COLLECTED WORKSOF FEUERBACH AND HEGEL*

L O G . 5 6 3

Collected Works of Feuerhach, Bolin’s editionVol. I. Thoughts on Death and Immortality

” II. Critical Philosophical Notes and Basic Proposi-tions

” III. The History of Modern Philosophy ” IV. The Philosophy of Leibnitz ” V. Pierre Bayle ” VI. The Essence of Christianity ” VII. Notes and Supplements to this book ” VIII. Lectures on the Essence of Religion ” IX. Theogony ” X. Letters on Ethics and Posthumous Aphorisms.

Log. I. 175Collected Works of HegelIII, IV and V. LogicXIX, 1 and 2—Hegel’s Correspondence.

* Lenin wrote the list in German on a separate sheet.—Ed.

Written in September 1 9 1 4First published in 1 9 3 0

in Lenin Miscellany X I I, p. 24

CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH’S BOOKEXPOSITION, ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ 140

Written between Septemberand November 4 (17) , 1 8 9 5First published in 1 9 3 0


to the manuscript

377

( (

L. FEUERBACH. COLLECTED WORKS, VOL. IV, 1910.LEIBNITZ

etc.

In the brilliant exposition of Leibnitzsome especially outstanding passages shouldbe mentioned (this is not easy, for thewhole—i.e., the first part (§ 1-13) is out-standing), and then the s u p p l e m e n t so f 1 8 4 7.

P. 27—The feature that distinguishes Leib-nitz from Spinoza: in Leibnitz thereis, in addition to the concept of sub-stance, the c o n c e p t o f f o r c e“and indeed of active force...” the prin-ciple of “self-activity” (29)—

Ergo, Leibnitz through theologyarrived at the principle of the in-separable (and universal, absolute)connection of matter and motion.So, it seems to me, Feuerhach isto be understood?

p. 32: “Spinoza’s essence is unity, that ofLeibnitz is difference, distinction.”

The book on Leibnitz waswritten by Feuerbach in1836, when he was stillan idealist

§ 20§ 21 1 8 4 7and separate passages

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p. 34: The philosophy of Spinoza is a tele-scope, that of Leibnitz a micro-scope.141

“Spinoza’s world is an achromatic lensof divinity, a medium through which wesee nothing but the colourless celestiallight of the single substance; Leibnitz’sworld is a many-faceted crystal, a dia-mond, which by its specific nature mul-tiplies the simple light of the substanceinto an infinitely varied wealth of coloursand darkens it.” (Sic!)p. 40: “Consequently, for Leibnitz, corpo-

real substance is no longer, as for Des-cartes, a merely extended dead mass,brought into motion from outside, butas substance it has within it an activeforce, a never-resting principle of act iv -ity.”

For this, to be sure, Marx valuedLeibnitz,142 despite his, Leibnitz’s,“Lassallean” features and his con-ciliatory tendencies in politics andreligion.

The monad is the principle of Leibnitz’sphilosophy. Individuality, movement, soul(of a special kind). Not dead atoms, butthe living, mobile monads, reflecting thewhole world in themselves, possessing(vaguely) the capacity of sensuous represen-tation (souls of a certain kind)—such arethe “ultimate elements” (p. 45).

Each monad is different from the others....“It would be quite contradictory

to the beauty, order and reason of natureif the principle of life or of its own internalactions were to be linked only with a smallor special part of matter” (Leibnitz—p. 45).

NB

379CONSPECTUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ

“Hence the whole of nature is full ofsouls, as the ancient philosophers alreadycorrectly recognised, or at any rate ofbeings analogous to souls. For, by meansof the microscope, one finds that there area multitude of living beings not visibleto the naked eye, and that there are moresouls than grains of sand and atoms” (Leib-nitz—p. 4 5).

cf. electrons!

Qualities of monads: Vorstellung,* Re-präsentation.

“Sensuous representation itself, however,is nothing more than the representation(reproduction in the mind and presenta-tion) of the complex or the external, i.e.,of multiplicity in the simple”... or ...“the transitory state, which contains andreproduces multiplicity in unity or simplesubstance” (p. 49, Leibnitz)—verworrene**(p. 50) (confuse,*** p. 52) Vorstellung inthe monads (man also has many uncon-scious, verworrene, feelings, etc.).

Every monad is “a world for itself, eachis a self-sufficient unity” (L e i b n i t z,p. 55).

“A mixture of vague conceptions, thesenses are no more than that, matter is nomore than that” (Leibnitz, p. 58).... “Hencematter is the bond of the monads” (ibi-dem).

My free interpretation:Monads = souls of a certain kind.

Leibnitz = idealist. And matter issomething in the nature of an other-

* sensuous representation—Ed.** confused—Ed.

*** vague—Ed.

V. I. LENIN380

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NBLeibnitz

lived1646-1716

being of soul, or a jelly linkingthem by a worldly, fleshly connec-tion.

“Absolute reality lies only in the mo-nads and their conceptions” (Leibnitz,p. 60). Matter is only a phenomenon.

“Clarity is only spirit” (p. 62)... matter,however, is “unclearness and unfreedom.”(64)

Space “in itself is something ideal”(Leibnitz, pp. 70-71).

...“The material principle of the diver-sity of matter is motion....” (72)

“Similarly—Newton and his adherentsto the contrary—there is no empty spacein material nature. The air pump by nomeans proves the presence of a vacuum,for the glass has pores through whichall kinds of fine matter can penetrate”(L e i b n i t z, 76-77)....

“Matter is a phenomenon” (Leibnitz, 78).“The Being-for-itself of the monads istheir soul, their Being-for-others ismatter” (Feuerbach, 78). The humansoul—the central, higher monad, en-telechy,143 etc., etc.

“Hence every body is affected by every-thing that goes on in the universe” (Leib-nitz, 83).

“The monad represents the whole uni-verse” (Leibnitz, 83).

“The monad, despite its indivisibility,possesses a complex impulse, i.e., a mul-tiplicity of sensuous representations, whichindividually strive for their special changesand which, by virtue of their essentialconnection with all other things, at thesame time are found within it....” “Individ-uality contains the infinite within it, asit were, in the germ” (Leibnitz, 84).


Here is dialectics of a kind, and veryprofound, d e s p i t e the idealism andclericalism.

“Everything in nature is analogical”(Leibnitz, 6).

“In general, there is nothing absolutelydiscrete in nature; all opposites, all bound-aries of space and time, and kind, vanishin the face of the absolute continuity, theinfinite interconnection of the universe”Feuerbach, 87).

“Owing to its peculiar nature, consistingsolely of nerves and not of flesh and blood,the monad is influenced and affected byeverything that takes place in the world....”Nevertheless “it is only a spectator of theworld drama, not an actor. Therein liesthe chief defect of the monads” (Feuer-bach, 90).

The conformity of soul and body is aharmonie préétablie* by God.

“The weak side of Leibnitz” (Feuer-bach, 95).144

“The soul is a kind of spiritual automa-ton” (Leibnitz, 98). (And Leibnitz himselfsaid once that the transition from Occa-sionalism145 to his philosophy is an easyone, Feuerbach, 100.) But in Leibnitz thisis deduced from the “nature of the soul”....(101)

In his Theodicée 146 (§ 17) Leibnitzessentially repeats the ontological argu-ment”147 for the existence of God.

In his Nouceaux essais sur l’entendement,148

Leibnitz criticised Locke’s empiricism,—

* harmony pre-established—Ed.

NB

ijjjjjjjjlllllk

V. I. LENIN382

* there is nothing in the intellect except the intellect itself.—Ed.

transitionto

Kant

ridiculingKant

saying nihil est in intellectu, etc., nisiintellectus ipse* (!) (152).

(Feuerbach in the first edition also ideal-istically criticises Locke.149)

The principle of “necessary truths” lies“w i t h i n u s” (Leibnitz, 148).

Cf. Kant likewise

The ideas of substance, change, etc., liewithin us (Leibnitz, 150).

“To be determined towards the bestthrough reason is the highest degree of free-dom” (Leibnitz, 154).

“The philosophy of Leibnitz is idealism”(Feuerbach, 160), etc., etc.

...“The cheerful, lively polytheism ofLeibnitz’s monadology passed into the se-vere, but for that reason more spiritualand intense monotheism of ‘transcendentalidealism’” (Feuerbach, 188).

Pp. 188-220: supplements of 1847.P. 188: “Idealistic, a priori philosophy....”

“But, of course, what for man is a pos-teriori is for a philosopher a priori; forwhen man has gathered experiences andhas embraced them in general concepts,then he is, of course, in a position to make‘synthetic judgments a priori.’ Hence whatfor an earlier time is a matter of experienceis for a later time a matter of reason....Thus, earlier, electricity and magnetismwere only empirical, i.e., here accidental,properties perceived only in particularbodies, whereas now, as the result of compre-hensive observations, they are recognisedto be properties of all bodies, essentialproperties of a body.... Hence the historyof mankind is the sole standpoint that


yields a positive answer to the problemof the origin of ideas....” (191-192)

The soul is not wax, it is no tabularasa*.... “The creation of a sensuous re-presentation requires the addition of some-thing distinct from the object, hence itwould be sheer folly for me to seek toderive this distinct element, which is thebasis of the real essence of the sensuousrepresentation, from the object. But whatis this then? The form of universality; foreven the individual idea or sensuous re-presentation is, as Leibnitz remarked, atleast in comparison with the real individualobject, originally universal, i.e., in thiscase undetermined, wiping out differences,destructive. Sensuousness is massive, uncrit-ical, luxurious; but the idea, the sensuousrepresentation, is restricted solely to theuniversal and necessary.” (192)

“The basic thought, therefore, of the Nou-veaux essais sur l’entendement humain isalready, as in Der Kritik der reinen Ver-nunft , that universal i ty , and the n e -c e s s i t y which is inseparable from it,express the essence belonging to the under-standing or apperceiving being, and there-fore cannot come from the senses, orfrom experience, i.e., from outside....”(193)

This idea occurs already among the Car-tesians—Feuerbach quotes C l a u b e r g,1 6 5 2.150

“Undoubtedly this axiom” (that the wholeis greater than the part) “owes its certaintynot to induction, but to the understand-ing, for the latter has no other aim andvocation than to generalise the data ofthe senses, in order to save us the tedious

* smoothed tablet—Ed.

Leibnitzand Kant

necessityi n s e p a r -a b l e fromthe universal

NB

Kantianism= old

lumber

V. I. LENIN384

NB

bien dit!

NB

trouble of repetition, to anticipate, replace,spare, sensuous experience and perception.But does the understanding do this byitself, without a basis for it being pres-ent in sense-perception? Is then the individ-ual case shown me by the senses an individ-ual case in abstracto? Is it not a qualita-tively determined case? But does notthis quality, however, contain so muchas an identity of the individual cases thatis perceptible by the senses?... Do thesenses show me only leaves and not alsotrees?... Is there no feeling of identity,likeness and difference? Is there no differ-ence for my senses between black andwhite, day and night, wood and iron?...Are not the senses the unconditional affir-mation of what is? Consequently, is notthe highest law of thought, the law ofidentity, also a law of sensuousness; indeed,does not this law of thought rest on thetruth of sense-perception?”.... (193-194)

Leibnitz in Nouveaux essais: “Generalityconsists in the resemblance to each otherof individual things, and this resemblanceis a reality” (Book III, Chapter 3, § 12).“But is this resemblance then not sensuoustruth? Do not the beings which the un-derstanding refers to a single class, a singlegenus, affect also my senses in an identical,equal manner?... Is there for my sexualsense—a sense which theoretically alsois of the greatest importance, althoughin the theory of the senses it is usuallyleft out of account—no difference betweenan animal and a human female? Whatthen is the difference between the facultyof understanding and that of sensuous per-ception or sensation? The senses presentthe thing, but the understanding adds thename to it. There is nothing in the under-


bien dit!

standing that is not in sensuous perception,but what is found in the sensuous perceptionin fact is in the understanding only inname. The understanding is the highestbeing, the ruler of the world, but only inname, not in fact. What, however, is aname? It is a mark of difference, a strikingcharacteristic, which I make the character,the representative, of the object in orderthereby to represent it to mysel f in i tstotality.... (195)

...“The senses tell me just as well asthe understanding that the whole is greaterthan the part; but it tells me so not bywords, but by examples, for instance, thatthe finger is smaller than the hand....(196-197)

...“Hence the certainty that the wholeis greater than the part indubitably doesnot depend on the senses. But on whatthen? On the word: the whole. The state-ment that the whole is greater than thepart says absolutely nothing more thanthe word ‘whole’ itself says.... (197)

...“Leibnitz, on the other hand, as anidealist or spiritualist, makes the meansinto an end, the denial of sensuousnessinto the essence of the mind.... (198)

...“That which is conscious of itself existsand is, and is called soul. We are, there-fore, certain of the existence of our soulbefore we are certain of the existence ofour body. Of course, consciousness is pri-mary, but it is only primary for me, it isnot primary in itself. In the sense of myconsciousness, I am, because I am conscious;but in the sense of my life I am conscious,because I am. Which of these two is right?The body, i.e., nature, or consciousness,i.e., I? I, of course, for how could I admitmyelf wrong? But can I then in fact sepa-

V. I. LENIN386

rate consciousness from my body and thinkby myself?... (201)

...“The world is the object of the sensesand the object of thought. (204)

“In a sensuous object, man distinguishesthe essence as it really is, as an objectof sense-perception, from the essence ofit in thought, abstracted from sensuous-ness. The former he calls the existenceor also the individual, the latter the es-sence or the genus. The latter is definedby him as necessary and eternal—because,although a sensuous object may have van-ished from the sensible world, it stillremains as an object of thought or sensuousrepresentation—but existence as accidentaland transitory.... (205)

...“Leibnitz is half -Christian, he is atheist, or Christian and a naturalist. Helimits the goodness and power of God bywisdom, by the understanding; but thisunderstanding is nothing but a cabinetof natural objects, it is only the idea ofthe interconnection of nature, of the uni-verse; hence he limits his theism by na-turalism; he affirms and defends theismby that which abolishes it....” (215)

P. 274 (from the supplement of 1 8 4 7):“How much has been said of the decep-

tion of the senses, how little of the decep-tion of speech, from which, however, thoughtis inseparable! Yet how clumsy is thebetrayal of the senses, how subtle thatof language! How long have I been led bythe nose by the universality of reason, theuniversality of Fichte’s and Hegel’s Ego,until finally, with the support of myfive senses, I recognised for the salvationof my soul that all the difficulties andmysteries of the logos, in the sense of rea-son, find their solution in the meaning of

NB


End of Volume IV.

* et seq.—Ed.** Relation to Hegel (1840 and later), p. 417 et seq.—Ed.

the word! For that reason Haym’s statement‘the critique of reason must become thecriticism of language’ is for me in a theo-retical respect a soul-inspired statement.—As regards, however, the contradiction be-tween me as a perceiving, personal beingand me as a thinking being, it reducesitself in the sense of this note and the dis-sertation quoted” (of Feuerbach himself)151

“to the sharp contradiction: in sensationI am individual, in thinking I am univer-sal. However, in sensation I am not lessuniversal than I am individual in thinking.Concordance in thinking is based only onconcordance in sensation.” (274)

...“All human communion rests on theassumption of the likeness of sensationin human beings.” (274)

Spinoza and Herbart (1836).152 P. 400 ff.*A d e f e n c e of Spinoza against the ba-nal attacks of the “moralist” Herbart.

The objectivism of Spinoza, etc., isstressed. NB.

Verhältnis zu Hegel (1840 and später).S. 417 ff.**

Not very clear, intermittentlyemphasised that he was a discipleof Hegel.

From the notes:“What is a dialectic that is in contradic-

tion to natural origin and development?What is its necessity?...” (431)

Herr von Shelling (1843). Letter toMarx (434 ff.). According to the roughdraft. Castigation of Schelling.153

V. I. LENIN388

DR. JOHANN PLENGE.M A R X A N D H E G E L

TÜBINGEN, 1911 154

extremelyvulgar!

T h e o -r e t i c a laspect ofdialecticshas been

over-looked!!

Marx =ideologist”...

!

Plenge fails to understand how “ma-terialism” can coincide with r e v o l u -t i o n i s m (calling the latter “ideal-ism,” etc.) and w a x e s a n g r y overhis lack of understanding!!!A good example of how bourgeois

professors vulgarise the fundamentals ofMarxism, its theoretical fundamentals!!Ad notam of the imperialist economists”155

and Co.!!After a pretentious introduction (How I,

I, I “read” Hegel and Marx) follows anessay of the Hegelian “doctrine” that isextremely shallow (idealism is not distin-guished from “speculation,” very, very fewthings have been grasped; still there issome good in this essay as compared withKantianism, etc.). Then, comes a criti-cism of Marx which is altogether nonsens-ical.

Marx is being accused of “pure ideology,”when by “actual” proletarian he meansa representative of a class. (82)

“Now the strong language of the apos-tate, who decisively renounced any sortof idealism ... now the ideal demand ofthe political enthusiast—such is the actual-ity of Karl Marx.” (81-82)

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389REMARKS ON PLENGE’S MARX AND HEGEL

“It is passing strange that this Jewishradical healer should have known all hislife just one universal remedy for all socialconditions that are in need of cure; c r i t i c -ism and political struggle.” (56)

Marx’s historical materialism is ac-tually “nothing but ... a pathetical gesture,”an extremely rationalistic doctrine,” “inits most profound basis an idealist examina -tion of society,” etc., etc. ... (83)

...“agitational motives”... (84) (id. 86,92 et al.) (1 1 5 et al.)

Marx borrowed “this natural-scientificempiricism” (88), “Marx naturalises, soc ia lscience” (ibid.).

...“His” (Marx’s) “path is not that of thethinker, but ... of the prophet of free-dom....”!!! (94-95)

Socialist revolution = subjectivist hopeto present it as “an objectively scientificcognition” “is an illusion of an ecstaticdreamer, an illusion which degenerated intocharlatanry” (p. 110).

...“Marx ... was dominated by the passion-ate will of a radical apostle of freedom....”(111)

Marx “agitationally whipping up all theinstincts of hatred....” (115)

“Marxism ... becomes ethics of abstractnegative, fanatical enthusiasm” (just likeMohammedanism according to Hegel!)....(120)

...“Temperament of a fanatic” ofMarx (and his “hot head”)—that’s thepoint. (120)

And more of such vulgar gibberish!Whence this quotation? The author did

not give chapter and verse.

* “just”!!—Ed.** hence the ire!!—Ed.

{“nur”!!*

Marx!!“did not

understand”Hegel

9 7 et al.

!!

!!

inde ira!!**

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\

* theory of surplus-value—Ed.

NB

NB

“Clever-r-r”

!!

“Without revolution socialism cannotbe realised. It stands in need of a polit-ical act, inasmuch as it stands in needof destruction and dissolution. But wher-ever its organic activity begins and itsend-in-itself bares its soul, socialism castsoff its political integument.”

—After quoting this passage withoutgiving its source Plenge continues: “‘Thepolitical integument’ that will be hurledaside is of course the whole of Marxism.”(129)

How Plenge seeks out “contradictions”:Marx, he says, wrote in Rheinische Zei-tung156: “‘The same spirit which con-structs railways with the help of industry,constructs philosophical systems in theminds of philosophers’ (p. 143). Andthen these means of production are eman-cipated from the spirit which createdthem and begin, in turn, sovereignly,to determine the spirit.”

Example of how Plenge criticisesMehrwertstheorie*:

“By its gross exaggeration it brings toa white heat the hard fact of capitalismthat the urge for profit lowers wages andworsens working conditions. But then itsuffers from the elementary mistake of du-plication of concepts veiled by the termi-nology used....” (157)

...“Agitational requirements dictate thatthe inflammatory theory of surplus-valuebe given the most prominent place in theentire system....” (164)

,

391REMARKS ON PLENGE’S MARX AND HEGEL

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...“Marx is a revolutionary Jew of thenineteenth century who has re-tailored thegarment borrowed from our great philos-ophy to suit his ends.” (171)

This Plenge is an extreme vulgar-iser; the scientific value of his

trashy book is zero.

A pearl!!

( (Published according to

the manuscript

Written not later than June 1 9 1 6First published in 1 9 3 3

in Lenin Miscellany X X I I

392

NOTES ON BOOKS

F. Raab, Die Philosophie von R. Avenarius. SystematischeDarstellung und immanente Kritik, Leipzig, 1912 (164 p.).5 Mk.

Perrin, Les atomes, Paris (Alcan).157


Written not earlier than 1 9 1 2First published in 1 9 3 8

in Lenin Miscellany X XXI

393

From books on p h i l o s o p h y in the ZürichC a n t o n a l Library158

Gideon Spicker, Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaftzur Philosophie (especially versus Kant and Lange’s His-tory of Materialism). Octavo. Berlin, 1874. IV. W. 57 K.

Hegel, Phänomenologie (hrs. Bolland, 1907), IV. W. 165 g.


in Lenin Miscellany XX I IPublished according

to the manuscript

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394

(Cantonal Library in Zürich159)(Signatur: K. b i.)

Flugschriften des deutsehen Monistenbundes. Heft 3:A l b r e c k t R a u. “Fr. Paulsen über E. Haeckel.”2-te Aufl. Brackwede, 1907. (48 SS.)

A very sharp criticism of Paulsen from the stand-point of Feuerbach. A “Mohican” of the bourgeois

enlightenment!(( (( NB


in Lenin Miscellany XX I IPublished according

to the manuscript

395

Section III. (“Works of informative and scientificcontent”)160:

Theories of Origin... 1914.(Present-day Culture III, IV).E. Haeckel, Gott-Natur, Leipzig, 1914... Sch. 480 N 24.

Uhde, Feuerbach, Leipzig, 1914 ... XVI. 906.

A. Zart, Bausteine des Weltalls: Atome, Moleküle...Stuttgart, 1913.



in Lenin Miscellany XX VI I

396

Ruttmann, Die Hauptergebnisse der modernen Psycholo-gie, Pe. VII. 3551.

Suter, Die Philosophie von Richard Avenarius, 1910 (Diss).St. Bro. 1 1. 3 4 1



in Lenin Miscellany XX I X

397

ON THE REVIEW OF JOH. PLENGE’S BOOKM A R X A N D H E G E L 161

Joh. Plenge, Marx und Hegel, Tübingen, 1911.(184 SS.) (Mk. 4).

An unfavourable review by O. Bauer in Vol. III, 3rdnumber of Archiv für Geschichte des Sozialismus.


in Lenin Miscellany XXXIPublished according

to the manuscript

{ {

398

ON THE REVIEW OF R. B. PERRY’S BOOKP R E S E N T P H I L O S O P H I C A L

T E N D E N C I E S 162

Mind. 1913. April. Review by F. C. S. Schiller of RalphBarton Perry’s Present Philosophical Tendencies: a CriticalSurvey of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism and Realism,together with a Synopsis of the Philosophy of WilliamJames, London and New York. (Longmans & Co.). 1912.383 pages.

Schiller is against Perry’s “realism” and makes the chargethat “his mind is so preoccupied with the metaphysicalantithesis between realism and idealism that he is alwaystrying to reduce all other issues to this.”

It is to be noted that Schilier quotes the following pas-sage from Perry: “The organism is correlated with an en-vironment, from which it evolved and on which it acts.Consciousness is a selective response to a pre-existing andindependently existing environment. There must be some-thing to be responded to, if there is to be any response”(p. 323 in Perry’s book). And Schiller raises the objection:

“Unless the question is begged in the ‘independently exist-ing environment’” (Schiller’s italics), “nothing is hereproved except the correlation of the mind and its ‘environ -ment’”... (p. 284).


Char-acter-istic!!


in Lenin Miscellany XXXI

399

ON THE REVIEW OF A. ALIOTTA’S BOOKT H E I D E A L I S T R E A C T I O N A G A I N S T

S C I E N C E 163

Antonio Aliotta: La reazione idealistica contro la scienza.1 vol. 8°. XVI + 526 pages. Palerme. Casa editrice Optima,1912.

Review in Revue Philosophique (Ribot). Paris, 1912,No. 12, pp. 644-646, by J. Segond, who states:

“He” (Aliotta) “shows us in agnosticism all the latestsources of contemporary reaction; he shows how it de-velops through German (Riehl) and French (Renouvier)neo-criticism, the empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius,and English neo-Hegelianism; he describes and exposes theintuitionism of Bergson and Schmitt, the Anglo-Americanpragmatism of W. James, Dewey and Schiller, the philos-ophy of values and the historicism of Rickert, Croce, Mün-sterberg and Royce,” etc. (645), and so on up to Schuppe,Cohen and others.

In the second part the author examines the energeticsof Ostwald and “the new physics des qualités”* of Duhemand the “theory of models” of Hertz, Maxwell and Pastore.The author particularly dislikes, he says, mysticism (includ-ing that of Bergson), etc.

The point of view of the author is stated to be “the spir-it of the happy mean of truly rational intellectualism,that of M. Aliotta and of M. Chiapelli.” (645)

* of qualities—Ed.


in Lenin Miscellany XXXIPublished according

to the manuscript

400

muddle...

incorrectnot “in thesame way”incorrect

p. 13—”According to E. Mach” “the ‘ego’is only the focus in which the infinitethreads of sensation meet most closely....In exactly the same way money is the focalpoint in the network of social connec-tions....”p. 71 note. “Only our perception givesthings the form of space” (a Kantian).


Written not later than June 1 9 1 6First published in 1 9 3 4

in Lenin Miscellany X XVII

REMARKS ON HILFERDING’S VIEWS ON MACH(IN F I N A N C E C A P I T A L )164

H i l f e r d i n g: F i n a n c e C a p i t a l. (“The LatestPhase in the Development of Capitalism”). Moscow, 1912

Published in German in 1910 (III Band Marx-Studien)

REMARKS IN BOOKS

403

G. V. PLEKHANOV.FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF

MARXISM

ST. PTSBRG, 1908

[23]...The idealists first convert thought intoan independent essence, independent of man(“subject for itself’’), and then declare that in it,in this essence, the contradiction between beingand thought is resolved precisely because it,essence independent of matter, possesses a separate,independent being. And the contradiction is infact resolved in it, for what is this essence afterall? T h o u g h t. And this thought exists—i s—in-dependently of anything else. But this solution ofthe contradiction is a purely formal solution.It is attained only because—as we have alreadystated above—one of its elements is eliminated:that is, being independent of thought. Being proves

to be a simple property of thought, and when wesay that a given object exists, it means only thatit exists in thought....

[24]...To be does not mean to exist in thought.In this respect Feuerbach’s philosophy is far clearerthan the philosophy of Dietzgen. “The proof thatsomething exists,” Feuerbach remarks, “has noother meaning than that something exists n o ti n t h o u g h t a l o n e.”*

[28-29]...The materialist explanation of historywas primarily of m e t h o d o l o g i c a ls i g n i f i c a n c e. Engels understood this per-fectly when he wrote: “we need not so much bareresults as study (das Studium); results are nothingwithout the development leading up to them..”**

* Werks , X, 187.

** Nachlass, I, 477.

((

NB

V. I. LENIN404

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

[29-30]...Generally speaking, one of the greatestservices rendered by Marx and Engels to material-ism is their elaboration of a c o r r e c t m e t h -o d. Concentrating on the struggle against thes p e c u l a t i v e element in Hegelian philo-sophy, Feuerbach did not appreciate its d i a l e c -t i c a l method and made little use of it. He says:“True dialectics is by no means a monologue ofa solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialoguebetween I and You.”* But, first, in Hegel, too,dialectics does not signify “a dialogue of a solitarythinker with himself”; secondly, Feuerbach’s re-mark correctly defines the s t a r t i n g-p o i n to f p h i l o s o p h y, b u t n o t i t s m e t h -o d. This deficiency was made good by Marxand Engels, who understood that it would bewrong, in combating Hegel’s speculative philos-ophy, to ignore its dialectics....

[31]...Many people confuse dialectics with thetheory of development, and it is in fact such

DDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDa theory. But dialectics differs substantially from

the vulgar “theory” of evolution, which is whollyconstructed on the principle that n e i t h e rn a t u r e n o r h i s t o r y m a k e s l e a p s,

and that a l l c h a n g e s i n t h e w o r l dt a k e p l a c e o n l y g r a d u a l l y. Hegelhad already pointed out that the theory of develop-ment understood in this way is ridiculous anduntenable....

[33]...In general, the right to d i a l e c t i c a lt h o u g h t is confirmed by him** from thed i a l e c t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s o f b e i n g.

Here too being determines thought....[39]...Thus the feature of the geographical

environment determine the development of theproductive forces; the development of the produc-tive forces in turn determines the development ofeconomic relations and, then, all other socialrelations....

[42]...Each given stage of development of theproductive forces has its corresponding definitetype of w e a p o n s, m i l i t a r y a r t, and,finally, of i n t e r n a t i o n a l—more exactly:I n t e r - s o c i a l, i.e., also, incidentally, inter-

* Werke, II, 345.** Engels—Ed.

NBee

405PLEKHANOV’S FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF MARXISM

t r i b a l—law. H u n t i n g t r i b e s cannotcreate large-scale political organisations preciselybecause the low level of their productive forcesc o m p e l s t h e m, in the ancient Russianexpression, t o w a n d e r s e p a r a t e l y, insmall social groups, in search of the means ofsubsistence....

[46-47]...According to Marx, the geographicalenvironment influences man t h r o u g h t h ep r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s a r i s i n g i nt h e g i v e n l o c a l i t y o n t h e b a s i so f t h e g i v e n p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s,t h e p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r t h ed e v e l o p m e n t o f w h i c h i s t h i se n v i r o n m e n t’s f e a t u r e s....

[65-66]...The character of the “economic struc-ture” and the direction in which it changes do notdepend on man’s will, but on the state of the pro-ductive forces and on the changes that arise inproduction relations and become necessary tosociety due to the continued development of theseforces. Engels explains this as follows: “Men maketheir history themselves, but not as yet witha collective will according to a collective plan oreven in a definite, delimited given society. Theiraspirations clash, and for that very reason allsuch societies are governed by n e c e s s i t y,the complement and form of appearance of whichis a c c i d e n t.” Here human activity itself isdetermined not as free, but as n e c e s s a r y,i.e., as i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h l a w, i.e.,a s b e i n g c a p a b l e o f b e c o m i n ga n o b j e c t o f s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i -g a t i o n. Thus, historical materialism, whilenot ceasing to point out that circumstances arechanged by people, also gives us an opportunityfor the first time of l o o k i n g u p o n t h ep r o c e s s o f t h i s c h a n g e f r o m t h es t a n d p o i n t o f s c i e n c e. And that iswhy we are fully entitled to say that the material-ist explanation of history provides the necessaryp r o l e g o m e n a f o r a n y t h e o r y o fh u m a n s o c i e t y t h a t d e s i r e s t oc o m e f o r w a r d a s s c i e n c e....

[68]...In primitive society which knew no divi-sion into classes, man’s productive activityd i r e c t l y influences his outlook on the worldand his aesthetic taste....

[81-82]...If we were to state briefly the viewof Marx and Engels on the relation between thenow famous “b a s i s” and the no less famous

V. I. LENIN406

“s u p e r s t r u c t u r e,” the result would bethe following:

1) The s t a t e o f t h e p r o d u c t i v ef o r c e s;

2) The e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s deter-mined by it;

3) The socio - p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m whichhas grown up on the economic “basis” in question;

4) The p s y c h o l o g y o f s o c i a l m a nas determined in part directly by the economy andin part by the socio-political system which hasgrown up on it;

5) D i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i e s reflectingthe properties of this psychology....

[98]...Let us take as an example our agrarianproblem as it stands today. To the intelligentConstitutional Democratic l a n d o w n e r, “thecompulsory alienation of land” may seem to bemore or less, i.e., in inverse proportion to theamount of “fair compensation,” a sad historicalnecessity. But to the p e a s a n t, who is eagerto come by “a bit of land,” it is only this “faircompensation” that will seem to be a more or lesssad necessity, while “compulsory alienation” isbound to appear to him to be an expression of hisfree will and the most valuable guarantee of hisfreedom.

In saying this, we touch perhaps on the mostimportant point in the doctrine of freedom, a pointnot mentioned by Engels, of course, only becauseit is self-explanatory to one who has passed throughthe Hegelian school....

Feuerbach and Dietzgen. 24*(

Written not earlier thanMay 1 9 0 8

Published in part in 1 9 3 3in Lenin Miscellany X X V

Published in full for thefirst time

Published accordingto the original

* The reference is in page 24 of Plekhanov’s book (see p. 403 of thisvolume).—Ed.

407

PREFACE

[6]*...Science, the creation of the intellect andreason, serves only to ensure our effective powerover nature. It only teaches us how to utilisethings, but tells us nothing about their essence....

[7]...Thus my essential task in this study hasFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

been to contrast two points of view: the positive,FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF“scientific” and the “pragmatic”. I have tried toFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFbe as impartial as possible in outlining these twopoints of view, since I am well aware of a thirdand serious danger in this kind of work: that ofnot giving one’s adversaries their due. I do notflatter myself that I have fully achieved my aim.Such perfect “neutrality” is impossible....

C H A P T E R I

THE MODERN CENTREOF PHILOSOPHIC DISCUSSIONS

§ 5. BASIC CONTRADICTION OF MODERNPHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

[28-29]...But contemporary systems of philos-ophy still oppose one another, battling over a fun-damental contradiction that arises from the mannerin which the philosophical problem is posed in ourepoch. The form of the antithesis is therefore si-multaneously the form taken by the succession ofphilosophical views at different times and the formtaken by the views existing at the same time.

* Rey A., La Philosophie Moderne , Paris, 1908.—E d .

NB

ABEL REY.MODERN PHILOSOPHY

PARIS, 1908165

V. I. LENIN408

What, in the present position of the philoso-phical problem in general, are the possible alterna-tives? There can be only one, for it is a matter ofkeeping science and practice in the closest possibleunity, without sacrificing one to the other, withoutopposing one to the other. This means either thatpractice will be the consequence of science or, onthe other hand, science will be the consequenceof practice. In the first case, science covers prac-tice; in the second, practice covers science. It isa question of preserving a logical connection be-tween the two terms, and it can only be varied byreversing them, making the first dependent on thesecond, or the second on the first. In the one casewe get rationalistic, intellectualist, and positivistsystems: the dogmatism of science. In the other,we get systems of pragmatism, fideism or activeintuition (like that of Bergson): the dogmatismof action. According to the first systems, one hasto know in order to act: cognition produces action.According to the second, knowledge follows therequirements of action: action produces cognition.

It should not be thought that these latter systemsresurrect contempt for science and the philosophyof ignorance. It is after serious investigation,scientific erudition often of the most excellentkind, after profound critical thinking about sci-ence, and even through thoroughly “thinking outthis science,” as certain of these philosophers liketo put it, that they arrive at the derivation ofscience from practice. If in so doing they belittle

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFscience, it is only indirectly; for many of them, onFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFthe contrary, believe that they are revealing itsfull value....

§ 6. THE INTEREST OF CONTEMPORARYPHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS

[33-35]...Let as, however, allow for a momentthat the thesis of pragmatism is correct and thatscience is only a particular art, an appropriatetechnique for satisfying certain requirements.What results from that?

First of all, truth is reduced to an empty word.A true affirmation appears as the recipe for anartifice that will prove successful. And since thereare several artifices capable of ensuring our success

NB

NB

ee

409NOTES ON REY’S MODERN PHILOSOPHY

in the same circumstances, since different individ-uals have extremely different requirements, weshall have to accept the pragmatist thesis: allpropositions and arguments which lead us to thesame practical results are of equal value and areequally true, all ideas which yield practical resultsare equally legitimate. From this new meaningof the word “truth,” it follows that our sciences arepurely contingent and fortuitous structures, thatthey could have been totally different and yetjust as true, that is to say, just as suitable asmeans of action.

The bankruptcy of science, as a real form ofknowledge, as a source of truth, there you havethe first conclusion. The legitimacy of othermethods differing considerably from the methodsof intellect and reason, such as mystical feeling,there you have the second conclusion. It is forthe sake of these conclusions that this entirephilosophy, which to all appearance is crownedby them, was actually constructed....

What a good argument it is, therefore, to payback these powerful thinkers in their own coin!Scientific truths! But they are only truths in name.They, too, are beliefs, and beliefs of a lower order,beliefs that can be utilised only for material action;they have only the value of a technical instrument.Belief for the sake of belief, religious dogma,

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFmetaphysical or moral ideology, are far superior.FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

In any case, they need not be embarrassedbefore science, because its privileged position hascrumbled.

Indeed, the bulk of the pragmatist army, in theface of scientific experience, hastens to rehabilitatemoral experience, metaphysical experience and,particularly, religious experience. All these typesFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFof experience develop side by side with one anotherand can in no way hinder one another, becausethey are directed towards different needs, quitedistinct aspects of practice (satisfaction of mate-rial needs, of moral consciousness or religioussentiments), and create different values....

[37]...The metaphysicians would not be slowto take advantage of such a windfall. Besides

FFFFFFFFrestoring religion, pragmatism helps to restoreFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFmetaphysics. Since Kant and Comte positivismFFFFFFFFFFFFFFduring the nineteenth century has invaded almostthe entire sphere of cognition....

(1)

(2)

NB

NB

NB

V. I. LENIN410

[39-40]...Thus, the pragmatist attitude andthose others which, while not being so philosophi-cal, original and interesting, lead to similar con-clusions, always have as their consequence therehabilitation of obsolete guiding forms of humanthought which since the middle of the eighteenthcentury had been victoriously displaced by scien-tific positivism: religion, metaphysics, moral dog-matism, i.e, basically social authoritarianism.That is why it is one of the two poles, between whichall contemporary thinking, all contemporary phi-losophy, vacillates. It is the pole of dogmaticreaction, of the spirit of authority in all its forms.This attitude is the more dangerous since it is atfirst presented, by its greatest adherents too, asthe boldest and latest revolt of the free spirit,a revolt against the only barrier still remainingand which hitherto served as a lever for overthrow-ing all the rest: science and scientific truth.

On the other hand, the opposite pole of modernphilosophical thought, the purely scientific atti-tude—since in making practice the consequenceof knowledge it subordinates everything to sci-ence—is characterised above all by an endeavourtowards emancipation and liberation. It is herethat one finds the innovators. They are the inheri-tors of the Renaissance spirit; their fathers anddirect teachers are especially the philosophers andscientists of the eighteenth century, the greatcentury of liberation, of which Mach so truly said:“He who, if only through books, has had theopportunity of participating in this upsurge andliberation, will throughout his life preserve afeeling of melancholy regret for the eighteenthFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFcentury.” For thinkers of this type a truth existswhich, if not immutable, is one that can continual-ly be approached. It cannot be reached except byscientific methods, and it cannot be found any-where outside science; truth, science are the neces-sary and sufficient conditions for all human activ-ity....

§ 8. THE METHOD.—RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

[48-49]...It is a matter of its [science’s] objective

significance. Some will think that it is insufficient

to exhaust the reality which comprises its object,even though they admit, from a certain viewpoint,that it is necessary....

2

?!!


C H A P T E R II

THE PROBLEM OF NUMBER AND EXTENSION.QUANTITATIVE PROPERTIES OF MATTER

§ 2. THE OLD ARGUMENT BETWEEN EMPIRICISMAND APRIORISM

[55]...But is not the elimination of all empiricalelement also an unattainable limit? The mathema-tician, the rationalists note, could continue toincrease the wealth of his science even if the ma-terial world were suddenly annihilated. Yes,undoubtedly, if it were annihilated now, butcould he create mathematics if the material worldhad never existed?...

§ 3. THE CONTEMPORARY FORMOF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF NUMBER

AND EXTENSION. THE “NOMINALIST”AND “PRAGMATIST” ATTITUDE

[61]...Bergson, who perhaps more than any

other helped to propagate these ideas in philoso-phical literature, would not accept without reserva-tion the word “artifice.” He believes that scienceis greater and higher than merely an artifice, inrelation to matter. But for him matter is not true

reality; it is reality that is diminished, regressive

and dead. And in relation to true reality, whichis living, spiritual and creative, mathematics andscience as a whole can hardly have more than anartificial and symbolical character. In any case,the fact remains that it was for action on matter,and not for cognition of its essence, that mathema-tics was created by the intellect, that first instru-ment forged under the pressure of practical require-ments in relation to matter....

[62]...Is it not mathematics which, of all thesciences, has in our day most strongly inclinedcertain minds towards pragmatism, and towardsthat sophistry of pragmatism, namely scientificagnosticism? In point of fact, it is in mathematicsthat we feel furthest from the concrete and real,nearest to the arbitrary playing with formulasand symbols, so abstract that it appears empty....

((

ee

V. I. LENIN412

[62-63]...All the truths, more relative and lessexact, which other sciences try to express mathe-matically and with which they endeavour tosupplement mathematics, gravitate towards thisabsolute, as planets to the sun.

§ 4. RATIONALISM, LOGICISM ANDINTELLECTUALISM

[65]...The rigid and homogeneous space ofgeometry is not sufficient; the mobile and hetero-geneous space of physics is required. The universalmechanism of nature does not signify that mattercontains nothing but geometry. According tomodern hypotheses it can signify that there alsoexists the release or transformation of energy orthe movement of electrical masses.....

§ 5. GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEMOF QUANTITY : BASICALLY IT IS A PROBLEM OF

REASON

[74]...It is, in the first place, incontestable thatreason, no matter how disinterested, has a utilitar-ian function. Scientists are neither mandarins nordilettantes. And pragmatism is not wrong in em-phasising the usefulness of reason, its pre-eminentusefulness. Only, has it the right to assert thatreason has only a utilitarian function? Cannotthe rationalists reply very plausibly that the use-fulness of reason results only from the fact that,in deducing propositions from propositions, itsimultaneously deduces from one another therelations between the facts of nature? It thus allowsDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDus to act on these facts; not that this is its aim,but this follows from it. Logic and the science ofquantity created by the mind, insofar as it simplyanalyses the relations it perceives, extend theirpower to things themselves because quantitativerelations are simultaneously the laws of things,and of the mind. If to know is to be able, then itis not, as the pragmatists think, because sciencewas created by our practical requirements and fortheir sake, so that reason is of no value apart fromits usefulness, but because our reason, in learningto cognise things, provides us with the means for

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDacting on them....DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

NB

NB

NB


§ 6. IDEAS OF POINCARÉ. THE MATHEMATICIAN

[75-76]...The great mathematician, Poincaré,*insists particularly on this arbitrary nature ofmathematics.

Of course, our mathematics fully correspondsto reality, in the sense that it is adapted to thesymbolic expression of certain relations of thereal; strictly speaking, it was not prompted byexperience; experience merely gave the mind theoccasion for creating it. But, our mathematics,as it gradually became constituted for convenientlyexpressing what we needed to express, is only oneof the infinitely numerous possible mathematics or,rather, a particular case of some much more generalmathematics which the mathematicians of thenineteenth century have tried to attain. Havinggot this clearly in mind, we at once realised thatmathematics, by its essence and nature, is abso-lutely independent of its application in experienceand, consequently, absolutely independent of

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDexperience. It is the free creation of the mind, theDDDDDDDDDDDDmost striking manifestation of its own creativepower.

Axioms, postulates, definitions, conventions are,in essence, synonymous terms. Therefore, everyimaginable mathematics can lead to conclusionswhich, when properly expressed by a suitablesystem of conventions, would permit us to discoverabsolutely identical applications to the real....

[77-79]...This theory is a good criticism ofabsolute rationalism and even of the attenuatedrationalism of Kant. It shows us that it was notinevitably necessary for the mind to have elaborat-ed just that mathematics which is so well adaptedfor describing our experience; in other words,mathematics is not the expression of a universallaw of reality, whether our conception of reality(of the kind that is given us, of course) is the Carte-sian, Kantian or some other. But Poincaré pre-sents this conclusion in quite a different way fromthat of pragmatism.

Some pragmatists, and even all the commenta-tors on Poincaré that I have had occasion to read,seem to me to have very largely failed to under-

NB

Poincaré

* Poincaré, La Science et l’Hypothèse, livre I (Paris, Flammarion).

V. I. LENIN414

Poincaré andKant;

stand his theory. We have here an excellent exam-ple of distortion by interpretation. They havemade of Poincaré—on this point as also on others,where their error is still greater—a pragmatistwithout the name. But who can fail to see thattrue pragmatism makes mathematics indirectlydependent upon experience? It is a decree of themind, as with Poincaré, but a decree of the minddirected towards practical action, the free willof active thought, as the new philosophy conceivesit. For the pragmatist there is no purely contem-plative and disinterested thought; there is nopure reason. There is only thought which desiresto understand things and to this end alters therepresentation that it makes of them, for its great-est convenience. Science and reason are the ser-vants of practice. For Poincaré, on the other hand,thought has to be taken to a certain degree in theAristotelian sense of the word. Thought thinks,reason reasons, for its own satisfaction; and then,over and above this, it turns out that certainresults of its inexhaustible creative power can beuseful to us for other ends than purely spiritualsatisfaction.

But, in that case, practice is the servant ofscience and reason, which go far beyond the boundsof usefulness. “Thought is only lightning, but thislightning is everything.”*

One may not fully accept Poincaré’s theory;but it should not be distorted in order to invokeits authority. Insufficient attention has been paidto its connection with Kantianism, from which itfully borrows the theory of synthetic judgmentsa priori, with the proviso (and it is here thatKant’s rationalism seems to Poincaré too rigid)that these synthetic judgments a priori, on whichour mathematics (Euclidean) rests, are not to beconsidered the only possible and necessary postu-lates of rational mathematics....

§ 7. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MATHEMATICALSCIENCES AND THE OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES

[80]...Does Poincaré’s theory assign to expe-rience the role which seems to be its due? Strange!

* Poincaré, La Valeur de la Science (conclusion).


NB

NB

I would like to tell the pragmatists, who have

constantly enlisted it for their own ends and used

it author’s name like an artillery piece, thatI find very little of the pragmatic in it....

§ 8. INDICATIONS RELATIVE TO THE GENERALEVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND

KNOWLEDGE[87]...And if science then develops thanks to its

material usefulness, it should not be forgotten thatonly owing to its intellectual usefulness and thedisinterested satisfaction of the mind that desiresto cognise things did it free itself at the outsetfrom a crude empiricism in order to become truescience. It first enables us to cognise reality, priorto allowing us to act on it. And it is necessary thatit should first enable us to cognise in order laterto allow us to act....

§ 9. MACH’S IDEAS, REASONAND THE ADAPTATION OF THOUGHT

[90-91]...Does this not give us a valuable indica-tion of the nature and scope of logic and rationalthought, of which mathematics has always beenconsidered the pure emanation? And perhaps, also,of the nature and scope of reason? Here we arenot far from the thought of Mach, who was alsofrequently made out to be a pragmatist withoutthe name.

He seems to us to be much closer to rationalismin the sense which, in our opinion, should henceforthbe put into that term—a rationalism which byno means excludes a psychological history of reasonwith its opportunities and temporary contingenciesand, above all, does not in any way belittle therole of experience; reason being only codified ex-perience and, reciprocally, the necessary and uni-versal code of every kind of experience, taking intoaccount simultaneously both the moment of evolu-tion and the psychological organisation of man....

[93-94]...Hence one sees that reason, subjectedto abstract analysis in the consciousness of therational being, is capable, with the help of theprinciples discovered in it and the ideal develop-ment of these principles, of agreeing with thelaws of the environment and expressing them.One sees, further, that, given what we are and

((

V. I. LENIN416

!!

!!

NB

Compare93-94

what the environment is, reason cannot be differentfrom what it is: it is then, as the rationalists claim,necessary and universal. In a certain sense, it iseven absolute, but not in the sense that this wordis understood by traditional rationalism. For this

latter it means that things exist as reason conceivesthem. From our point of view, on the contrary,

we do not know how things exist in themselves,FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

and to this extent Kantian or positivist relativism

has its raison d’être. But we have the right to saythat if, in a being of a totally different constitu-tion, the needs of evolution had established a con-formity with the environment different from ourown (since one of the two factors of which it isthe product would be different), one would alwaysbe able to establish a system of translation thatwould make these two kinds of conformity coincidewith each other. There is nothing absurd in thishypothesis, because to a certain degree this shouldoccur between domestic animals and ourselves....

[95-96]...Number and extension, despite theirabstractness, arise from the nature of the real,because reality is multiplicity and extension, andbecause relations in space are real relations arisingfrom the nature of things.

In that case, does it not appear that extremelyimportant conclusions could be deduced from theseinitial propositions? Scientific abstraction wasoften considered synonymous with non-reality.Increased abstractness would then signify con-tinual movement beyond the limits of the real,further and further removal from it. Is that cor-rect?

Mathematics, in progressively moving awayfrom sensuous space in order to rise to geometricalspace, does not become removed from real space,i.e., from the real relations between things. Ratherdoes it come closer to them. According to the dataof modern psychology, each of our senses seemsto give us extension and duration (i.e., definiteconnections and relations of the real) in its ownfashion. Perception begins to eliminate this subjec-tivity which depends on the individual or onaccidental peculiarities of the structure of thespecies: it builds up a homogeneous and uniform


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Mach #objectivity

space, as well as a uniform duration—those syn-theses of all our various sensuous notions of space.Why should not scientific work pursue this progresstowards objectivity? In any case, its strictness, its

exactitude, its universality (or its necessity, theyare one and the same) are so many arguments infavour of the objectivity of its results. Consequently

number, order and extension, in spite of our criticaland subjective habits of thought, can be regardedas properties of things, i.e., real relations;—themore real because science has gradually freed themfrom the individual and subjective distortions,with which they were originally presented to usin concrete and immediate sensations. Shouldwe not, therefore, rightly consider that what re-mains after all these abstractions is the real andpermanent content, which imposes itself on everyspecies with equal necessity, for it depends neither

on the individual nor the moment of time, northe point of view?...

§ 10. WHAT DOES MATHEMATICS TEACH ITS?

[97]...Psychology, for its part, teaches that all oursensations (which are the direct and ultimate data

of experience) possess one property: extensiveness

or extension. This property is totally unlikegeometrical extension, particularly if we considerthe sensations that affect us most.....

[98]...Geometrical, space is the result of anabstract interpretation of optical space, whichde-individualises, generalises, and makes moremanageable for the mind the relations implied bythis optical space. We would willingly supplement

Mach’s thought by saying that the aim of thisoperation has been to give these relations theirmost exact and precise expression, a universaland necessary expression, hence their objective’

expression. Thus geometrical space is the outcomeof an evolution, which has made our thoughtincreasingly better adapted to certain propertiesof the environment. This was a prolonged and con-tinuous experience, the success of which has cons-tantly strengthened certain habits of thought thathave become the principles of our geometry....

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[100]...Thus, what mathematics teaches us arethe relations between things from the point of viewof order, number and extension.

By analysing the real relations that exist be-tween things, our mind naturally acquires thecapacity to form similar relations from them,thanks to associations by resemblance. It can,therefore, also imagine combinations which arenot found in reality, basing itself on those whichare found in it. After having formed conceptions

that are copies of the real, we can form ideas that

are models, as Taine says, in a slightly differentsense.

§ 11. RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

[103-105]...Absolute rationalism would seemto have sufficiently good grounds for asserting, bya kind of idealist realism, that, the laws of reasoncoincide with the laws of things. But is it not atall wrong in separating reason from things, andin thinking that reason by itself alone, in splendidisolation, obtains cognition of the laws that governthings? It would have to be admitted, then, thatby virtue of some sort of agreement or miraculousgrace, we possess intuitive knowledge of theselaws or at least a germ of it. Revived in this way,the Platonic myth of reminiscence seems to be anextremely gratuitous and extremely uneconomicalhypothesis.

Yes, the analysis of reason becomes co-extensivewith the analysis of nature. Yes, mathematics,in being concerned with the former, is at the sametime concerned with the latter, or, if you prefer,provides some of the elements necessary for thelatter. But is it not simpler to suppose that thisis because our psychological activity is graduallyformed through adaptation to the environment andto the practical conditions in which it has to beexercised?...

Hence, despite very great differences betweenabsolute rationalism and the theory outlined hereour the question of genesis and history, we reach,on the other hand, very similar conclusions on thequestion of the value and scope of mathematics:this value and this scope are absolute, in the human

sense of the word. As regards the superhuman sense:


goldenmean!!

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and a transcendental point of view, I confess I that

I have not yet unearthed the secret of it, and amvery little concerned to do so. The possibilityof attaining human understanding of things andof translating them truthfully into human languageis enough for me....

Is not this conclusion superficial and too petty?In my view, pragmatism goes to the other extreme,diametrically opposed to that of traditional ration-alism. The latter took the end point for the pointof departure and transferred the properties of theresult to the beginning. Pragmatism, on the con-trary, approximates the end point to the point ofdeparture to the extent of confusing the two andascribes to the result the properties of the beginning.Is it not more rational to think that mathematics,after emerging from a utilitarian anthropomor-phism, gradually burst through the subjectivelimits of this initial horizon? By constantly improv-ing its analysis, it arrived at certain real, objec-

tive, universal and necessary relations of things.

[107]...It has its foundation in the nature ofthings, just like our reason and our logic, of whichit is a particular application and which arebasically formed in a similar fashion.

It does not matter what path has been takento arrive at reality if, by investigating it moreand more closely, we finally envelop it from allsides.

C H A P T E R III

THE PROBLEM OF MATTER§ 1. THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS

OF THE PROBLEM OF MATTER

[109-110]...First of all, after the failures of the“physicist” philosophers, the great philosophicaltradition of the Greeks, headed by the Eleaticsand Plato throws doubt on the very existence ofmatter. Matter is only appearance or, at anyrate, the barest minimum of existence; the scienceof material things, in its turn, can only be a purelyrelative science, and there is no true science butthat of spiritual things. Thus the problem of matterbegins to be solved by suppressing the problemitself. Matter can only exist as the indefinable

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boundary of the mind and as a function of themind, and everything relating to matter is ofa lower order....

[111]...Thus disputes about the reality, of theexternal world, idealism, spiritualism, material-ism, mechanism, dynamism, increasingly appearto be an outdated and sterile game which mustbe left to classic philosophy, understanding thisexpression in the sense in which Taine did, philos-ophy for the classroom....

[113]...Vulgar materialism borrows from it[physics] all that is basic as well as all that isexaggerated and monstrous in it. What a luckychance for the religious spirit, if it can show thatphysics knows nothing about the things on whichit allows us to act, and that its explanations arenot explanations at all!

§ 2. THE CRISIS IN PHYSICS AT THE ENDOF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:

ENERGETISTIC PHYSICS

In point of fact, at the time when this philo-sophical hope was born and growing strong in theminds of educated and sincere believers, every-thing in physics seemed destined to justify andrealise it.

[114]...The new physics, energetistic physics,DDDD DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

come into opposition with this traditional mecha-nistic physics. “Come into opposition”—is this

phrase quite correct? As regards a large number ofphysicists, one would be tempted to say, rather:“is used interchangeably” (according to the casein hand) with the mechanistic method,

[115-116] Indeed, energy is nothing but theability to perform work, it is a mechanical conceptand can always be measured mechanically, i.e.,with the aid of motion and the science of motion.Helmholtz, Gibbs and many others by no meansbroke with the mechanistic tradition when theyadded to mechanics the new chapter, generalisingit in its application to physical realities. Theywished for nothing more, and in fact they didnothing more than correct and further developmechanical conception in line with the progress

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of physics, as had always been done since the timeof Galileo and Descartes. Side by side with theprinciples of mechanics and within the mechanicalinterpretation of reality, they put forward theprinciple of the conservation of force or of energy,the principle of Carnot and the principle of leastaction, one which had already played an importantrole since the time of Maupertuis.

Thus, the word “energetics” has primarily themeaning which makes it part of the science ofphysics, as recognised by all scientists. Let us addthat in France this part of physics is more usuallycalled thermodynamics, and although, etymological-ly, this word has too restricted a meaning for thecontent implied by it, it has the advantage of elim-inating all the misunderstandings caused by theother uses of the word “energetics.”

The second use of this word relates not to a part

of physics, but to a general theory of physics asa whole...

[117]...This law was not incompatible withthe mechanical conception. The latter had goodreasons for claiming that the different manifesta-tions of energy were basically only differentappearances caused by one and the same basicreality—motion....

[120-122]...But if everything can be reduced tothe principles of classical mechanics, then, in theopinion of the energeticists there was no explana-tion for this increasing waste of force, this diminu-tion of usable energy. Nature ought to be capableof going back, as it were, and endlessly recommenc-ing the same cycle of transformations; for classicalmechanics is essentially the science of reversibletransformations, for which time is of no account,and which, like happy peoples, have no history.In reality, however, the systems would be no hap-pier than peoples. They would all the same havea history. That is why certain physicists haverefused to regard physics simply as the continua-tion of classical mechanics. They have wanted tothrow off the yoke of tradition, finding it, like allgood revolutionaries, too narrow and too tyranni-cal. Hence the trivial criticism and later the revi-sion of the basic principles of mechanics. Fromthese efforts there arose a new conception of physicsperhaps not so much in opposition to the former,

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as was sometimes asserted, but in any case con-taining profound modifications.

In general it can be said that, finding classicalmechanics to be an insufficient basis for physics,the latter has ceased to see in physical phenomenathat which until then was always seen in them:the various kinds of motion, forming preciselythe science of classical mechanics. Until then, toexplain a physical phenomenon, to study it, meantreducing it to forms of motion: the motion ofmaterial masses, of atoms, or vibrations of theuniversal transmitting medium—the ether. Thus,every physical explanation could be representeddiagrammatically with the aid of the geometryof motion.

The new conception, which, it was proposed,should replace the former, consisted in the firstplace in the absolute rejection of all the figurativerepresentations, of those “mechanical models,”as the English say, without which at one time therewas no real physics. Mach severely accuses themof being nothing but “mythology.” Like all mythol-ogy, it is childish; it could be useful when we didnot know how to look at things directly; but hewho can walk without crutches is not likely tomake use of them. Let us throw away the crutchesof atomism and vortices in the ether. Havingreached the age of maturity, physics no longerhas need of crude images for worshipping its gods.The abstract language of mathematics is alonecapable of suitably expressing the results of expe-rience. It alone will be able to tell us what actuallyis, without adding and concealing anything, withthe strictest accuracy. Magnitudes, defined algeb-raically and not geometrically, and even lessmechanically, numerical variations measured withthe aid of a conventional scale, and no longerperceptible changes measured by displacementsin space in relation to a local origin—there youhave the materials of the new physics: conceptualphysics in opposition to mechanistic or figurativephysics....

[123]...This new general theory of physics,which Rankin already had in mind in 1855, waselaborated particularly by Mach, Ostwald and

OO


Duhem. “The aim of every science is to replaceexperience by the shortest possible operationsof the mind,” says Mach; this formula could bethe motto of scientific energetics....

§ 3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATIONOF ENERGETICS

[127]...It is clear how philosophy, desiring tosilence the arguments drawn from science againstcertain particular dogmas and against the religiousstandpoint in general, could use this ingeniousinterpretation. Do you put forward certain physicaltruths in opposition to certain beliefs? Well, thenew physics desires only one thing, to return to theideas of the great epoch of faith. After the stormyonslaught of three centuries, it returns, like a newprodigal son, to the paternal bosom of the mostorthodox Thomism.

What is the most serious of all is that a scientistrenowned for the mathematical precision and ele-gance of his works, particularly known for hisactive propagation of the new physics, for thelimpid, admirably French form in which he hasexpounded it, and for his splendid generalisationsin the sphere of energetistic mechanics—this scien-tist himself considered it possible to align himselfwith this philosophical interpretation of the newscientific theories. We refer to Duhem. Of course,in doing so he has tried carefully to draw a strictline between his scientific and his metaphysicalconceptions....

[130]...Developing this point of view, the newphilosophy could almost immediately deduce fromthe contemporary attempts at reforming physicsthe purely descriptive character of this physics,which made no pretence of explaining anything.And this played into the hands of “fideism.” Science

is powerless to go beyond the limit of qualities;therefore it has to restrict itself to describing them.It has to be a simple analysis of sensations, to useMach’s expression which, however, our new philos-ophy fears to borrow from him in its true sense,which is of a completely ”scientific-like” character.

[131-134]...In contemporary literature, one canquite often encounter ideas of this kind in exposi-

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tions varying considerably in quality: the sciencesof matter tell us nothing about the real, for matter,as they understand it, matter itself, in the popularsense of the word, does not exist. Simple, everydayperception already distorts external reality. Itbuilds it up wholly according to the requirementsof our activity. Science then further processesthese raw materials. What it shows us under thename of matter is only a rough scheme in whichall the living wealth of the real is lost through thesieve of scientific laws, or a heterogenous mixtureof abstract elements, arbitrarily isolated or com-bined, and entirely fabricated by us. Thus theroad lies open for justifying the most mysticalforms of idealism....

Without dwelling on these extreme misconcep-tions one can nevertheless note that even amongserious and well-informed thinkers there remainsa tendency to apply to the physical sciences a crit-icism analogous to that which Poincaré appliedto the mathematical sciences, despite the energeticprotestations of Poincaré himself. From this pointof view physics, like mathematics, is a symbolic

language intended simply to make things more

intelligible, by making them simpler and clearer,more communicable and, above all, more flexiblein practice. To make something intelligible evi-dently means systematically to distort and alterthe ideas we obtain directly from reality, in orderto be able to make better use of the latter forsatisfying our needs.

Intelligibility, rationality have nothing to dowith the nature of things. They’re merely instru-ments of action. Moreover, every new discoveryseems to directly contradict our reason, for itupsets our old habits. The mind has to adapt itselfto it (just as the body first has to learn to ridea bicycle), for the new law in its turn to appearto us as rational, arising from our apparent needof intelligibility. We grossly deceive ourselveswhen we think that this arbitrary symbolismteaches us anything that could satisfy our purecuriosity, our need for disinterested knowledge.For knowledge, for cognition in the full sense ofthe word, it is necessary to turn elsewhere....

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§ 4. CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMOF PHYSICS

Although the attitude of the vast majority ofphysicists to this interpretation of physical sciencehas been one of silence or contempt, it cannot bedisregarded by philosophical criticism. Thoughscientists have the right to say: the dogs bark,the caravan goes on, philosophical criticism whichis necessarily interested in the social and educa-tional significance of doctrines, is compelled tostop and take notice.

[136-138]...The majority of the adherents of thenew philosophy have addressed themselves exclu-sively to the scientists, supporters of energetisticphysics and resolute opponents of mechanisticphysics. But among physicists, the extreme sup-porters of energetistic physics are altogether a small

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFminority. In the main, physicists continue to beFFFFFFFFFFmechanistic of course, they are changing theirmechanical conceptions in order to bring theminto accord with the new discoveries, for they arenot scholastics. But they always seek to depictand explain physical phenomena with the aid ofmovements open to sensuous perception.

On the other hand, it should not be forgottenthat, while energetics has produced a number ofelegant theories and expositions, almost all thegreat discoveries of recent times are due to mecha-nistic physicists and are connected with attemptsto present a picture of the material structure ofphenomena. It is worth giving some thought tothis circumstance.

In order to provide theoretical physics withgeometrical rigour, energetics decided to make itsimply a more concise and economically-wordedexposition of experimental data; but can thetheory of physics be reduced to a mere instrumentof economically-worded exposition? Can it totallyban hypotheses from a science that has always beenmade fertile by hypotheses? Should it not con-stantly orientate itself for the discovery of the realwith the help of theories which, like the mechanis-

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tic theories, are always anticipations of experience,attempts to obtain a clear idea of the real?

Does it not follow then that to construct thephilosophy of physics by relying exclusively onpurely energetistic physics amounts to a peculiarnarrowing of the basis on which this philosophyshould be built? The new philosophy in essenceturns for confirmation of its ideas only to thosewho can be well-disposed towards it, and they areonly a small minority. This is a convenient ruse,but a ruse nevertheless.

Besides, are they favourably inclined towardsit as it imagines?

This is more than doubtful. Almost all thescientists appealed to by pragmatism or so-called

nominalism have made serious reservations, includ-ing Poincaré. Let us now turn to them.

§ 5. WHAT CONTEMPORARY PHYSICISTS THINK

[138]...Thus, physics is a science of the real,and even if it seeks to express this reality in a “con-venient” fashion, it is nevertheless always realitythat it expresses. The “convenience” is only in themeans of expression. What is concealed behindthese means of expression which the mind canvary in searching always for the most convenient,is the “necessity” of the laws of nature. This neces-sity is not arbitrarily decreed by the mind. On thecontrary, it constrains the mind, confines itsmeans of expression within narrow limits. Withinthe limits close to the approximations of experi-ence, and the small differences which physical phe-nomena, governed by one and the same law, retainbecause they are never identical, but only verysimilar—within these limits the law of nature isdictated to us from outside and by things them-selves: it expresses a real relation between things.

[139]...Duhem will say, too, that one shouldnot take the experience of the physicist as a copyof reality. Every physical experiment consists ofmeasurements, and these measurements presupposea multitude of conventions and theories....

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[140]...Duhem will never deny this truth to thepropositions of physics: they are the description ofreality. Moreover, physical theory is not only anexact description of the real, it is a well-arrangeddescription, for it always strives for a naturalclassification of physical phenomena—a naturalclassification, hence one which reproduces theorder of nature. No dogmatist, whether Descartes,Newton or Hegel, has ever demanded more....

[141]...Moreover, even if the latter [Duhem]believes in the necessity for metaphysics side byside with science, then why does he adhere toThomist metaphysics? Because it seems to himthat it is in better agreement with the results ofphysical science....

[142-143]...Ostwald’s “scientism” is very closeto that of the great Viennese mechanist, Mach,

who on these grounds even refuses to be called,a philosopher.

Sensation is absolute. Through our sensationswe cognise reality. But science is the analysis of oursensations. To analyse sensations is to discoverthe exact relations between them, in short, todiscover the order of nature, giving this expressionits most objective sense, for the order of nature isnothing but the order of our sensations.

[144]...In the criticisms of Mach by the rational-ists, he was sometimes reproached for a tendencytowards pragmatism. He was accused of sceptical

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

relativism. Is it because this brilliant historianDDDDDDDDDDDof science often traces for us its humble beginningsin the primitive arts of our ancestors? After all,these were only a first attempt at adaptation. Togive it a precise evaluation, it is necessary to takea look at the result, at the final point reached.Or is it because his biological theory of sciencemakes truth into human truth? But human truthremains truth; moreover, it is the only truth forman. Sensation is evidently something human.Nevertheless it is the absolute, and human truthis absolute truth, because for man it is the wholetruth and the only truth, the necessary truth. Theproperties of man and the universe being what theyare, it is based on the nature of things. It is, in

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human terms, the cognition of everything thatexists....

[147]...It is possible to imagine the existence ofmicrobes even though they were invisible up tothe moment when some reagent reveals them. Whythen should we not have the right to imaginematter as having a certain structure, which expe-rience will some day reveal?

§ 6. MATTER ACCORDING TO CONTEMPORARYPHYSICS: GENERAL REVIEW

[148]...In that case what is the sense of the cam-paign begun by Brunetière and continued by reli-gious-minded people, who were certainly sincere,but who desired to destroy everything that couldbe a stumbling-block; a campaign which, if itdid not lead to pragmatism, at any rate led to somedefinite form of pragmatism?...

[149-150]...Just as in mathematics we use termsof order, number and extension to denote certaingroups of relations on which our sensations depend,and just as mathematics takes these relations forits subject, so, further, we denote by the extremelygeneral name of “matter” a very large number ofrelations—far more complex—on which our sensa-tions also depend. Physics makes a study of theserelations. This is all we wish to express when wesay that physics is the science of matter....

[152]...To many people it might seem naturalthat physics should have as its subject the elementscapable of entering into these relations and givingthem a real content, and filling them up as it were.This was Spencer’s idea in his classification of thesciences. However, this idea cannot be considereda happy one. We register the elements of realitydirectly, immediately, just as they are, and as theycannot help being.

Their existence requires no justification. Onecannot ask whether it is possible for them to beother than they are. To assert that would meanrestoring the old metaphysical idol of the thing-in-itself, i.e., in essence, idle verbalism in one formor another. Experience should be simply accepted.It is its own justification, because in the scientificsphere it is for the positive mind the justificationof every proposition.

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[154-155]...Is then agnostic criticism of sciencecorrect? And is there a thing-in-itself which is outof the reach of science? etc., etc. Here, surely, wehave metaphysics and its inevitable playing withwords! Let us try to see clearly into this matter.

If the relative signifies something that deals withrelations, then physics is relative. But if the relativemeans something that has not penetrated to thebasis of things, then physics, as we understand it,is not relative, but absolute, because the basisof things, that at which analysis inevitably ar-rives in order to explain them, consists of relationsor, rather, the system of relations on which oursensations depend. Sensations, the given, are

permeated with subjectivity: these fleeting, lightn-

ing flashes are what they are made by a systemof relations which will probably never be repeatedin exactly the same form and which determinesmy state and the state of the environment at themoment under consideration. But here the scientiststeps in to separate out the universal which is partof the composition of the individual moment,those laws of which it is the complex expression,those relations which made it what it is.

All scientific laws in effect tell us why and howthe given thing is what it is, by what it was condi-tioned and created, because they analyse the rela-tions on which it depends. And they will revealto us absolute human truth when this analysis

has been completed, if ever it can be.

§ 7. THE CONCRETE DATA OF CONTEMPORARYPHYSICS

[156-157]...All the relations on which the trans-formation and reduction, the diffusion or dispersionof energy, depend are grouped in the generalphysical theory called energetics.

This theory tells us nothing about the nature of

the energies considered and, consequently, about

the nature of physico-chemical phenomena. It

simply describes how, at the expense of what, andin what direction, physical or chemical changesof the state of a given body take place.

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an amusingfellow, this“positivist”

Mechanistsversus ener-getics. NB.Plus loin*than mate-rialisticallyinterpreted(p. 157) ener-

getics!

The energeticists claim that it is not possibleto go further, that energetics gives us the complete,necessary and sufficient explanation of materialphenomena, that is to say, the sum-total of therelations on which they depend. In order to givemore objectivity to their view, some even raise

energy to a sort of substance which is alleged to bethe true material substance, the real and actingDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDcause of all our sensations, the model accordingDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDto which we should build our idea of nature.DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

Here energy takes the place of the corpusclesof the atomic theories. It plays the same role andhas the same kind of existence: it is the basisof things their final nature the absolute. Accord-

ing to Ostwald, for example, the description of thetransformations of energy gives us absolute knowl-edge of the material universe. “When you arestruck with a stick, what do you feel: the stickor its energy?” Energy—that is the substantialreality which lurks beneath all material phenom-ena...

[158]...The mechanists claim, on the other hand,that it is possible to proceed further. Energetics,

in their opinion, remains as it were on the surfaceof things, but its laws should either be reduceableto other, more profound laws or, at any rate,supplement them, by presuming their existence.

As already said, the vast majority of physicists,DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

and particularly the experimental physicists towhom physics owes its latest successes, belong to

DDDDDDDDDDthe mechanistic school.DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

The supporters of this school criticise in thefirst place the conception of energy and show thatone cannot raise it, as some people do, to a physicalor metaphysical entity.

The energy of a system signifies only the capa-city of the system to perform work: potentialwhen it does not result in detectable work, actualor kinetic in the opposite case. Consequently, theconcept of energy is co-relative with the concept

* further—Ed.


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of work, which is a mechanical concept. Hence,it does not seem possible to represent energy exper-imentally without turning to mechanics andmotion. But, in that case, to provide an intelligibleexplanation of physico-chemical phenomena, shouldnot energetics be joined with mechanics, be estab-lished as its continuation and, consequently, bereconciled with the consideration of mechanicalideas?...

[159-161]...From this point of view, mechanics,physics and chemistry form a vast theoreticalsystem, and mechanics represents the fundamentalbasis of this system, just as motion is the ultimate

essence of physico-chemical phenomena.

Of course, modern mechanists no longer claimthat the mechanics of today, any more than thelaws governing transformations of energy, havereached their final form, that science has foundits unshakable foundation. Having encounteredthe criticism of the energeticists—and that is oneof the advances which modern physics certainlyowes to it—they abandoned the rather narrowdogmatism of the old mechanistic and atomicviews. They think that the new discoveries shouldbroaden the scientific horizon and introduce cons-tant changes in the idea of the external world.Have we not been witnessing during the last fiftyyears the reconstruction, almost the overthrow,of classical mechanics? The old framework wassmashed first of all by the principle of the conserva-tion of energy (Helmholtz) and Carnot’s principle.The phenomena of radioactivity, which allowedus to penetrate more deeply into the nature of theatom, led to the idea of the possibility of an electri-cal structure of matter and of the necessity of sup-plementing the principles of classical mechanics bythose of electro-magnetism.

Indeed, the mechanistic viewpoint now tendsto adopt the form which is termed the electron

theory. Electrons are the ultimate elements of

all physical reality. Simple electrical charges,or else modifications of the ether, symmetricallydistributed around one point, by virtue of the lawsof the electro-magnetic field, perfectly representinertia, i.e., the basic property of matter. The

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latter, therefore, is nothing but a system of elec-trons. Depending on the nature of the modifica-tions of the ether (modifications as yet unknown)

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFelectrons are positive or negative; a material atomconsists of an equal quantity of each of them, orat least, possesses positive and negative chargesof equal size, the positive charge apparentlyoccupying the centre of the system. The negativeelectrons, or perhaps only part of them, revolveround the remainder like planets round the sun.Thus, molecular and atomic forces are only mani-festations of the movement, of electrons, just likethe various forms of energy (light, electricity,heat)

Hence, the remarkable conclusion: the conceptof the conservation of mass (or of the quantityof matter), which, together with the concept ofinertia, formed the basis of mechanics, cannot,apparently, be retained in electro-magnetic mechan-ics: gravitational mass remains constant onlyat moderate velocities, less than one-tenth of thatof light; but, being a function of velocity, it

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFincreases together with it, and the more rapidlyFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFthe closer we approach the velocity of light.This hypothesis presupposes either the existenceof various electrical charges and the ether, or theether alone, of which the electron is only a modifi-cation.

Finally, at the present time, the works ofDr. Le Bon* and certain English physicists leadus, apparently, to the conclusion that neitherthe quantity of matter nor even the quantity ofenergy remains constant. They are both onlyrelations depending on the state of the ether and onits motion.**

* Gustave Le Bon: L’Evolution de la Matière.—L’Evolution des Forces . (Flammarion, éditeur.)

** Apparently, matter is converted into energyand energy into matter. By matter, of course, oneshould understand only gravitational matter, and by

energy—only the capacity to perform detectable work.If by matter is meant the unknown basis of things,from which everything originates and into with every-thing returns, the ether, for example, or some otherprimordial entity, then Le Bon’s conclusions by nomeans refute its eternal nature and constancy; theylead neither to creation out of nothing nor to absolutedestruction.

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Agnosticism =shamefaced

materialism166

[163-171]...Today nothing remains, nor shouldanything remain, of this idea. We have arrivedat the diametrically opposite viewpoint. Allphysicists are prepared to revise the fundamentalprinciples of their science or to restrict theirapplication as soon as new experimental dataprovide the necessary motive for doing so.

The experimental method consists in risingfrom particular facts to general laws, and fromthe latter to still more general laws, constantlydeepening the nature of the given thing by thisascending movement. It deduces particular lawsfrom general laws in its systematising theories onlyto the extent that it encounters these general lawson its path; and it encounters them by means ofparticular experiments and by hypotheses whichthese experiments are called upon to ver-ify.

But should it be concluded from this thatphysicists thereby abandon the hope of arrivingat basic principles and increasingly deep-seatedelements that will explain and embrace an evergreater part of the given thing? Such a conclusion,even though it opposes the mistake of the ancientmechanists, would be a no less dangerous error.The present-day spirit of the physico-chemicalsciences, the scientific modern spirit, is not suchas to retreat before the unknown. It advancesmore and more boldly towards conquest of it,but by increasingly reliable methods. The stabilityof the principles of physics will be assured onlyat the end of the task. That is why we are witness-ing today, and will witness more than onceagain, so many revolutions produced in former,or in future, ideas by the unforeseen discoverieswhich have already thrown light on the path orare destined to do so in the future. Progressivephysicists, as we have seen, are no longer frightenedby doubt being cast on the principles of theconservation of mass or of gravitationalmatter.

Truth is not given ready-made; every daysomething more is added to it. That is the con-clusion which should be constantly repeated.Thanks to scientific work, our mind daily becomesadapted more closely to its subject, penetrating

*

V. I. LENIN434

more deeply into it. The assertions which we

believed we could put forward after studying themathematical sciences present themselves here,too, in an almost necessary way, and at leastin a very natural way. Every moment scientificprogress establishes between things and ourselves

a conformity which is at once closer and deeper.

We are comprehending more and better. And weinvariably see that a result established by scien-tific experiment, i.e., carried through methodically,may no longer, in the light of new results, havethe same degree of importance but yet continuesto exist by itself, intact and indelible, eternalas truth, for it is a truth. He who would claimthat this effort is fruitless, or that it will alwaysbe only strictly limited, is very daring and isrefuted in advance by everything that the historyof science reveals to us.

The dispute between energeticists and mechan-

ists, a dispute often extremely lively, particularlyon the part of the energeticists, is properly onlya moment of the progress of the physico-chemical

sciences and, moreover, a necessary moment.Far from breaking the unity of development whichall historians have noted in these sciences, itwould rather seem to have its natural place there,like the old disputes between Cartesians andatomists, between Cartesians and Newtonians orLeibnitzians, between the kineticists and thedynamists. And just as in the case of the oldtheoretical disputes, the encounter between thetwo great contemporary theories or, better still,their parallel development, has rather had fruitfulresults. It has promoted the forward movementof science.

In the first place, energetics has put us on ourguard against certain abuses of mechanist models,against the temptation of taking these models for

objective reality. Further, it has deepened thermo-

dynamics and shown very well the universalsignificance of its basic laws which, instead of beingrestricted to researches relating to heat, havea legitimate and necessary application to thewhole field of the physico-chemical sciences.By extending the scope of these laws, energeticshas greatly contributed to making their formulasmore exact. More than this, while energetics has


shown itself to be less fruitful than mechanism,from the viewpoint of discoveries, it neverthelessalways represents a splendid instrument of exposi-tion—sober, elegant and logical. Finally, andthis is particularly notable in such chemists as

Van’t Hoff, Van der Waals and Nernst, but ismore and more frequently encountered also amongthe physicists, both theories are readily accepted;in each case that theory which best lends itselfto the investigation is selected. They are usedconcurrently; scientists start out from the generalequations of mechanics or from the general equa-tions of thermodynamics, depending on whetherthe path thus followed appears simpler or moresuccessful. The point is that physical theories areessentially hypotheses, instruments of investiga-tion and exposition, or organisation. They areforms, frameworks, which have to be filled in bythe results of experiment. And it is these resultsalone that constitute the true, real content of thephysical sciences.

It is on these that all physicists agree, and theirconstantly increasing quantity, ever more con-current and harmonious, characterises the prog-ress of physics, its unity and its lasting nature.They are the touchstone of the theories and hypo-theses which served to discover them and whichendeavour to organise them, while respectingtheir real affinities, reproducing as closely as

possible the order of nature. And these theories,

although they are always hypothetical and, itFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFfollows, are always losing something—at timesa great deal—to the extent that experience bringsus new discoveries, never, however, die completely.They become integrated by becoming transformedinto more comprehensive, more adequate newtheories. It was so with the Cartesian theory andwith the atomic theory and, from the latter,with Newton’s theory. Evidently it will be sowith energetics and the old mechanism. And arenot the kinetic hypotheses of the present daypreparing for this integration and this reconcilia-tion?

“The chronicler should note the fact that themajority of modern results in the field of physicalchemistry were achieved by means of a successfulcombination of thermodynamic methods and theviews of the molecular theory, in exactly thesame way as the creators of the modern theory of

V. I. LENIN436

NB

?

NB

heat simultaneously devoted their best effortsto the development of atomistics, in particularthe kinetic theory.

“...We should regard, as an outstanding resultof the latter, the transference of atomistics to thescience of electricity.... Through this marvellous

widening of its horizon, atomistics threw a totallynew light on a number of physical and chemicalprocesses....*

§ 8. RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

If the unknown is boundless, it would neverthe-less be wrong in our day to call it incognisable,as was done a few years ago.

The repeated and irreparable setbacks ofmetaphysical attempts led physics to constituteitself as a science by resolutely eliminating theproblem of matter. Thereafter it sought only thelaws of individual phenomena. This was “physics

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFwithout matter.” But the growing successes due toFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFthis new method permit us, it seems, to asserttoday, contrary to the too narrow positivism ofthe Auguste Comte kind, that it changed onlythe method and not the subject or significance ofphysics. Instead of approaching the problem ofmatter in all its generality and from its mostdifficult and basic sides, it approached it, on thecontrary, through superficial details and from themost accessible side. This was putting commonsense before audacious pride. Common sense wasrewarded, for nowadays, as a result of so muchwork in approaching, we are beginning to compre-hend the problem in all its generality and in all itsdepth.

In conformity with history, invariably repeatedby the human mind ever since it has been strivingto know things, science has taken a new subjectof study from the world of metaphysical chimeras.The nature of matter is no longer a metaphysicalproblem because it is becoming a problem of anexperimental and positive order. True, this problemhas not been solved scientifically; there is stillroom for many surprises; but one thing now seems

* W. Nernst, Revue générale des Sciences, 15 mars,

1908.


NB

NB

certain: it is science and not metaphysics that willsolve it.

Furthermore, I think, and I have tried inanother place to demonstrate it, that kineticideas will always be closely linked with the progressof physics, because they constitute an eminentlyuseful, if not indispensable instrument of discovery,and because they are best adapted to the conditionsof our knowledge. That is why I see the future ofphysics in the continuation of mechanistic theories.

That is why I have said that the energeticstheory will probably be absorbed, as was the oldmechanism, into a kinetic theory which is moreflexible and stricter from the viewpoint of theadmission of hypotheses. But mechanistic hypo-theses, despite the repugnance felt for them byabstract minds too preoccupied with mathematicalrigour, will probably always remain necessary for theprogress of physics, because they are hypotheses,while the deliberate aim of the energetics theoryis to exclude hypotheses. More than this: theyare hypotheses that above all appear capable ofbecoming the object of experiments, because theyare expressed in objective terms, in terms of per-ceptions, which if not real are at any rate possible.Indeed, science cannot do without guiding hypo-theses.

C H A P T E R IV

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

§ 1. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

[173-174]...With the problem of life we cometo the basic differences which can separate philos-ophy from science. Up to now the argument hasbeen, one might say, above all theoretical. Themajority of the philosophers worthy of the nameadmit that, practically speaking, scientific resultsare valid for matter. If from the speculative pointof view they were able to raise some objections tothis validity, they nevertheless recognise thateverything takes place as though the conclusionsof science were, if not based on right, at leastapplicable in fact to material reality. To some

extent this reality can be expressed by mathematic-al, mechanical and physico-chemical relations.

V. I. LENIN438

For matter, therefore, geometrism and mechanismremain a good formula of study....

[177] Animism, which was in former timespartly supported by Plato and Aristotle, considersthat all the phenomena of life are due to a rationalforce, hence to the soul. In contradistinction tothe Greek physicians who sought the causes ofhealth or sickness (the theory of humours) inthe data of observation, in contradistinction toDescartes who absolutely separates the thinkingsoul from organic and material facts, Leibnitzand particularly Stahl support the view thatthe inner life processes, although they havenothing in common with conscious and rationalactions, are nonetheless manifestations of thesoul.

Barthez and the Montpellier school, persistingin the belief that the phenomena of life can be dueonly to a special cause, refer them to a vital force

distinct both from material forces and the soul:

hence the name vitalism given to this theory....

§ 3. THE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEENMECHANISM AND NEO-VITALISM

[189-190] If we try in some way to synthesiseneo-vitalism according to its chief representatives,scientists or philosophers, it seems we arrive atthe following: the criticism which the neo-vitalistsmake of biological mechanism is closely linkedwith that which the pragmatist, anti-intellectual-ist or agnostic philosophies made of the mathe-matical and physico-chemical sciences. It appearsto us that we change the problem when we passfrom matter to life. Essentially, we are once morefaced, as we surmised at the outset, with the samebasic problem, and that problem is again theproblem of the value of science insofar as it isFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

knowledge. Only the particular terms in which it isessentially raised are changed.

With what, in fact, did the new philosophyreproach the mathematical or physico-chemicalsciences? With being an arbitrary and utilitariansymbolism created for the practical requirementsof our mind, our reason, which are faculties of


NB

NB

action and not of cognition. Thus, when we extendthe physico-chemical method to biological facts wenaturally also transfer in the results that it allowsus to attain the consequences it implies, as regardsthe value of these results. Hence the physico-chemical mechanism will be an excellent formulafor giving us a practical grasp of living things;it will be totally powerless to enlighten us asto what life itself is. As with the physico-chemicalsciences in the sphere of matter, physico-chemicalmechanism in the sphere of life will allow us toact, but never to know....

[192-194]...The neo-Thomists restore force, aspi-ration, desire in matter, re-animate it with thespirit, although heathen, of hylozoism, fromwhich the Greeks, and in particular Aristotle,seem never to have fully departed. Incidentallythey distort the Hellenic doctrine. For them matterhas no other activity but the force which thecreator put into it: the memory, so to speak,of its creation and the indelible impression of itwhich it bears. Hence its activity is not essentialbut borrowed, it is creative only by authorisation.But precisely thanks to that, it does not escapeat all from the complete grasp of mechanism.

Moreover, the nominalists, who have a closeaffinity to this neo-scholastic movement,* andthe pragmatists, pursuing a regular flirtation with

* The neo-scholastics or neo-Thomists seek aboveall to rehabilitate the scholastic interpretations of Aris-totelianism and therefore the philosophical doctrines ofSaint Thomas.—The nominalists insist on the symbolic,artificial and abstract nature of science, on the huge abyssbetween reality an its formulas.—The pragmatists havea similar doctrine, but one which rests on a more generalmetaphysics. All cognition is directed towards action;consequently we know only what interests our way ofacting. All these philosophies are agnostic in the sense

that they deny that we can reach, with the help of ourintellectual faculties, an adequate and precise knowledge

of reality. Despite the fact that Bergson formulated a

metaphysics close to pragmatism—and prior to it—hearrived at much less agnostic conclusions. Science, reason,attains part of the real, that which lends itself to beingreduced to complete determinism and to being fully repre-sented in the form of spatial multiplicity, in a word,that which is the object of the mathematical and physico-chemical sciences. It is only for the remainder that rea-son and science are inadequate and have to be supple-mented by intuition and philosophy. Incidentally, allthese doctrines are very shadowy and it is very difficultto define them.

NB

letting thecat out ofthe bag!

these philosophies of belief (all too often one hasrather to call them philosophies of believers),considered that they had the right to say that thecontent of their subject is not exhausted by thescience of matter. In order truly to know, it isnecessary “to proceed further.” A fortiori, willthey support the view that when we approachlife the limits of science become still more re-stricted? Physico-chemical mechanism will beapplicable only to the material conditions of life,but not to life itself.

To sum up, for the pure disciples of Bergson itwill be all the material conditions of life, onlythese, but all of them, that mechanism will beable to attain. For the others, it will not even beall the material conditions of life, but, insofar asmatter is already to a certain degree living andstamped with finality, only that which is mechani-cal and inert that we can abstract from it, onlythat which we can adapt from it for our practicalneeds. And these formulas can already serve foranswering the question that has been raised andfor fixing exactly the part of vitalism in mechan-ism.

Is it not possible to find a more expressiveformula of demarcation? For the vitalist lifeplays the part of a creative force; but preciselybecause it depends besides on material conditions,it is not at all a creation ex nihilo. As a resultof its operation it will certainly give somethingnew and unpredictable, but in order to arrive atthat, it will operate on pre-existing elements whichit will have combined, and above all starting frompre-existing elements to which it will have added.The mutations observed by the botanist De Vries

who, as a mechanist, interprets them differently

would here be the manifestation itself and theproof of these creative additions.

§ 4. NEO-VITALISM AND MECHANISM DIFFERONLY IN PHILOSOPHICAL HYPOTHESES

WHICH SUPPLEMENT SCIENCE

[204]...But in the vitalist method the entelechiesand dominants have nothing in common withdescribed elements: the ends cannot be describedbecause they do not exist materially—at any

rate they do not yet exist, for they are in the


FROM MARX

TO MAO

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DISTRIBUTIONNB

process of becoming, of a progressive realisa-tion.

Their influence is not perceptible to the senses.That is why it is more dangerous to turn to themin science than to turn to mechanical models—andthe history of all the sciences proves it. The teleo-logical hypotheses by their very nature escapeexperimental control and can only be harmful ifthey are chimerical.

§ 6. MECHANISM, TOO,IS ONLY A HYPOTHESIS

[216-218]...But it would be contrary to all thelessons of experience to assert that in the phenome-na of life everything can be reduced to physico-chemical laws and that mechanism in its wholescope has been verified experimentally. On thecontrary, we know very little about life. Experi-mental biology has to its credit a number of im-portant results, if they are taken in themselves,but they are very insignificant when compared withall the results that we still have to obtain.

Why, then, concern ourselves with mechanisttheories, one is led to think. Should not thesevery general hypotheses, the verification of whichpresupposes the complete achievement of science,be banned from science? Here again we find anopinion that we have already seen expressed bya number of physicists regarding physics and, inparticular, mechanistic theories in physics. Let usrecall that some energeticists were in favour of

banning mechanist hypotheses from physics asbeing unverifiable, useless and even dangerousgeneralisations. Among biologists, too, we findsome scientists who adopt the same attitude andalign themselves directly with these energetics

physicists. In their opinion biology should be re-stricted to a description of the phenomena of life,without going beyond what experience allows usto affirm. While using the energetistic scheme,it will restrict itself, when seeking general formulasfor systematising its laws, to measuring exchangesof energy between the organism and its environ-ment in the performance of various organic func-tions, and to the enunciation of the laws governingthese exchanges.

V. I. LENIN442

But is not this already an admission that thereis a basic analogy between the physico-chemicalsciences and biology, at any rate from the stand-point of the description of facts and experimentalverification? The energetics school in biologyis less clearly differentiated from the mechanisticschool than in physics. It is rather only a timidaspect of mechanism, for it opposes teleology andpostulates a conformity between the phenomena oflife and inorganic phenomena.

And this again brings us to our previous con-clusions: every time it is possible to make a scien-tific analysis of a biological phenomenon, weagain find ourselves up against the relations be-tween biological activity and physico-chemicalactivity. Hence everything takes place as though,in connection with these facts, the mechanicalhypothesis, or at least the physico-chemical theoryof life, had been partially verified....

§ 7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: BIOLOGICALINDICATIONS

[223-224]...Living matter is clearly conditionedby habit and heredity: everything takes placeas though it remembered all its preceding states.It is said, however, that inanimate matter nevermanifests this property. It would even be a con-tradiction to imagine anything of the kind. Allmaterial phenomena are reversible. All biologicalphenomena are irreversible.

In these conclusions one forgets that the secondprinciple of thermodynamics could have been calledthe principle of evolution or heredity.** One forgetsabout all the phenomena of “residual” electricityand hysteresis. One forgets that physics will notretreat even in the face of this conclusion: nophenomenon of reality is absolutely reversible,which, however, does not prevent this irreversibili-ty of partial systems, when transposed in theinfinity of time and space, i.e., in the total uni-verse, from being conditioned by reversible phenome-na—just as chance and coincidence are, probably,only a sign of our ignorance of necessary, very

* timid aspect of mechanism—Ed.** Clausius called it the principle of entropy which

exactly corresponds to the word “evolution,” thoughderived from Greek rather than from Latin.

un aspecttimide du

mécanisme* NB


complex laws. However that may be, and nomatter which way one looks at irreversibility,heredity cannot be an insurmountable obstaclefor mechanist biology.

[227]...Scientific discipline tries primarily tofind, beneath the appearances which our directsensations of objects and living beings give us,the relations which link them together, the bondsof dependence which explain their appearance ordisappearance, or their variations. The mechanistictheory of evolution is nothing but the effort todetermine these relations of dependence as regardsthe aspects, forms and characters in which lifeand living beings appear to us.

Scientific discipline further tries to link everyparticular sphere it studies with the other spheresin which it is applied. Science cannot resolve toconsider as isolated for all time the various ordersof facts for whose sake it is divided into particularsciences. This division has entirely subjective andanthropomorphic causes. It proceeds solely fromthe requirements of research which compel theserialisation of questions, the concentration ofattention on each of them separately, starting withthe particular in order to arrive at the general.Nature is of itself one whole.FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

C H A P T E R V

THE PROBLEM OF MIND

§ 2. ANCIENT EMPIRICISM AND ANCIENT ANTI-METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS: PSYCHO-

PHYSIOLOGICAL PARALLELISM

[242-243] Although metaphysical rationalismconstituted the great philosophical tradition, itsancient affirmations a priori could not fail to evokeobjections from critical minds. Indeed, in alltimes we see philosophers trying to resist therationalist and metaphysical trends. These werein the first place the sensualists and materialists,then the associationists and phenomenists. Ina general sense they may be called empiricists.

Instead of opposing mind to nature, they tryanew to put mind in nature. Only, they continue

to understand mind in the same simplified and

An approachto dialecticalmaterialism

NB

V. I. LENIN444

intellectualist manner as those whom they arecombating....

[244]...The empiricist theory regarded mindin approximately the same way as atomism regardsmatter. This is the psychological atomism inwhich atoms are replaced by states of consciousness:sensations, ideas, feelings, emotions, sensationsof pleasure and pain, movements, volitions, etc. ...

[245-246]...Thus our psychological states areonly the sum-total of elementary consciousnesses,corresponding to the atoms of which our nervecentres are composed. Mind is parallel to matter.It expresses in its own form, in its own language,what matter, in turn, expresses in its own form,and in a different language. Mind, on the onehand, matter on the other, are two mutually-reversible translations of one and the same text.

For the idealists, the original text is mind; forthe materialists, it is matter; for the dualist-spiritualists both texts are equally the original,since nature is written simultaneously in bothlanguages; for the pure monists, we are concernedwith two translations of an original text that,eludes us....

§ 3. THE MODERN CRITICISMOF PARALLELISM

[248-249]...When it is said that consciousnessis one and continuous, one must beware of thinkingthat the theory of the unity and identity of the“Ego,” the corner-stone of ancient rationalism,is being revived. Consciousness is one, but it doesnot always remain identical with itself, as is thecase, moreover, with all living beings. It is con-stantly changing; not as something created onceand for all, which remains what it is, but as a beingthat is being constantly created: evolution iscreative. There would only be a need for thenotion of identity and permanence if it were neces-sary, in order to discover the real appearances, toimpose the link of syntheses and unity on themultiple states which seem to be revealed behindthese appearances. But if one supposes that realityis essentially continuous, and that the gaps in it,are artificial, then there is no longer any needto appeal to the principle of unity and per-manence.


The theories of Anglo-American pragmatism areextremely close to these. These theories are verydiverse, particularly in the moral and logicalapplications that it has been sought to deducefrom them. But what gives them their unity andallows us to group them together are precisely thegeneral features of the solution they have givento the problem of consciousness. William James,the great psychologist of pragmatism, gave thissolution its clearest and most complete form.His conception opposes at one and the same time,and for almost the same reasons, both the concep-tion of metaphysical rationalism and that ofempiricism.

[251-252]...William James claims also that toarrive at this theory he needed only to followwith the utmost rigour the teaching of experience:hence he calls it “the theory of radical empiricism”

or of “pure experience.” For him the old empiricism

remained impregnated with metaphysical andrationalist illusions. He tried to free it from themcompletely.

Indubitably, these new theories of consciousnesswon very great favour in a very short space of time:the Englishmen—Schiller and Peirce, the Ameri-cans—Dewey and Royce, scientists like Poincaré,Hertz, Mach and Ostwald in France and Germany,and, on the other hand, almost everyone who want-ed to reform Catholicism, while remaining faith-ful to it, could be associated with the trend ofideas which have been most systematically pre-sented by Bergson and James. It is also inconte-stable that this favour seems to be largelymerited.

[254-255]...True, rationalism claimed thatempiricism, i.e., the explanation of the progress ofthe mind by experience alone, destroys all scienceor, if you prefer, all truth. The theory of innateor a priori reason was, above all, a legitimisationof the rights of science. We shall see, in connectionwith the problem of knowledge and truth, thatpragmatism has in fact often led to scepticalconclusions, but these conclusions are by no meansnecessary. James himself, who at times seems to

James’“theory of

experience”

NBJames, Mach

and thepriests

V. I. LENIN446

stand extremely close to sceptical irrationalism,FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFhas pointed out that in a strict interpretation ofexperience it should not be considered as givingus only an idea of isolated facts, but as giving usin addition, and in particular, an idea of therelations existing between the facts.

But does it not then become impossible to saywith the rationalists that the empiricists have noguarantee that tomorrow’s experience will beidentical with yesterday’s or, in other words, thatphenomena always follow one another in thesame order since it is precisely the order of phenom-ena that is the subject of experience? When wecome into contact with nature, the mind actuallyperceives not isolated phenomena, the termsbetween which it will later establish some relationor other, but the relations themselves, a definitecontinuity in which we then arbitrarily mark outthe terms themselves, rather as we mark pointson a line.

Thus, it seems that the new orientation whichhas appeared in philosophy and which has beengiven the name of pragmatism marks an indispu-table advance in the scientific and philosophicalconceptions of the mind.

§ 4. GENERAL CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGICALACTIVITY

[256-258]...One would now have to establishaccurately what constitutes the relations whichform the psychological world and how they differfrom the relations which comprise the rest of natureand experience. Perhaps the Viennese physicist,Mach, has made the clearest points on this sub-ject.* In every experience that which is givendepends on a multitude of relations which in thefirst place are divisible into two groups: thosewhich have been verified in an identical way byall organisms externally analogous to our own,i.e., by all witnesses, and those which differaccording to the witness. It is all the latter thatare the subject of psychology and together theyform what we call psychological activity. Moreexactly, the former are independent of our orga-

* Année psychologique 1906 , XI Ie année . (Par is ,Schleicher.)


nism and biological activity. The latter do depend

on them, intimately and inevitably.If we take a piece of sulphur, their the geometri-

cal, mechanical, physical and chemical propertiesare relations which are independent of our orga-nism. Psychology has nothing to do with them.If a living being is concerned new relations areadded to the previous ones: biological propertieswhich, too, are independent of our organism.If it is a matter of our own organism itself, it alsopossesses properties which to a certain extentare independent of the conditions in which itis given to us in the experience; these are physico-chemical and biological properties. Mathematics,mechanics, physics, chemistry and biology are somany sciences, each of which takes a group of re-lations from the sum-total of relations includedin the given thing, and which are independentand should be examined independently of ourorganisation. These are objective relations, thesubject of the natural science, the ideal of whichis to exclude from what is given all relationswhich make this given dependent on our organ-ism....

[259-261] Experience shows us the reciprocalinfluence of the biological and the psychological,the system of relations between them. Why shouldnot each of these two orders of facts be regardedas two orders of facts of nature, which act andreact on each other, like all the other orders ofnatural facts: heat, electrical, optical, chemical andother phenomena? There is no more and no lessdifference between all these orders than betweenthe biological order and the psychological. Allphenomena should be regarded on one andthe same plane and as able to condition oneanother.

Against this conception the objection willno doubt be raised that it fails to explain whythere is experience and knowledge by the organismof this experience. But does it not seem that onecould and should reply that this question, likeall metaphysical questions, is badly framed,non-existent? It arises from an anthropomorphicalillusion which always opposes mind to the universe.One cannot say why there is experience, for expe-

rience is a fact and as such imposes itself.So as to depart from abstractions and generali-

“experienceis a fact”

V. I. LENIN448

ties, let us try to develop in a more concrete formthe definition of psychology that we have justgiven—and which appears to us the simplestand most scientific. Let us try to imagine the generalconception of psychological activity to which itleads us.

Experience or, to use a less ambiguous term,

the given, has up to now seemed to us to be de-

pendent on mathematical, mechanical, physicaland other relations. When we analyse these condi-tions, it appears to us, in addition, to be dependenton certain relations concerning which one can say,in general, that they distort it according to theindividual to whom it is given: these distortionsconstitute the subjective, the psychological. Canwe establish—of course very roughly and prelimi-narily—the general meaning of these new relations,of these distortions, i.e., the direction in whichscientific analysis, in its progress through thecenturies, dares to reveal the most general relations(principles) which they imply?

Why, in other words, is the given subjectivelydistorted, instead of being identical for all individ-uals, instead of being a direct datum, forminga single unity with the knowledge that we have ofit? It is distorted to such a degree that a fairlylarge number of philosophers and common sensehave gone so far as to smash the unity of experi-ence, and to advance the irreducible dualism ofthings and the mind, which is nothing but thedualism of experience as had by all, to the extentthat the sciences correct it, and experience as dis-torted in the individual consciousness....

[271-272]...Images are not identical with sensa-tions as subjectivism has maintained, if thisword, ambiguous in the scope of its meaning, isgiven the sense of immediate experiences. On thispoint Bergson’s analysis has been by no meansfruitless. The image is the result of certain rela-tions already involved in immediate experience,i.e., in sensations. Only the latter involve quitea number of others. Let there be given only therelations which form the system of the “image”(a partial system, if compared with the wholesystem of sensations and immediate experience)—more exactly, let there be given only those rela-

experience ofsocially

organisedindividuals


NB

NB

tions of the whole system which involve the de-pendence of what is given on the organism, andthen we have precisely the image, the recollec-tion.

In defining recollection in this way we havedone no more than express the latest results ofexperimental psychology as well as the older ideasof common sense: recollection is an organic habit.All that is common to recollection and primitivesensation are the organic conditions. The formerlacks all the extra-organic relations with what wecall the external environment involved in sensa-tion.

This complete dependence of the image andpartial dependence of sensations on organic condi-tions also enables one to understand illusions,errors of the senses, dreams and hallucinations,when relations with the external environmentare to some degree abnormally cut off, and expe-

rience becomes reduced for the individual to that

which is taking place in his organism, i.e., tothe relations which depend on the latter, henceto the purely psychological, the purely subjec-tive....

§ 5. THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

[280]...Our life, fully conscious, is only anextremely limited part of the sum-total of ourpsychological activity. It is as it were the centreof an illuminated area, around which extendsa much larger semi-shaded region that graduallypasses into absolute darkness. Ancient psychologymade a very serious mistake in regarding fullyconscious activity alone as psychological activity.

Although it is difficult to exaggerate the extentof the unconscious in our organisation, one shouldnot, as is very frequently done by a certain kind

of pragmatist psychology, exaggerate the qualita-tive importance of this unconscious.

According to some pragmatists, clear conscious-ness, intellectual and rational consciousness, isthe most superficial and insignificant part of ouractivity....

((((

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V. I. LENIN450

NB

NB

§ 6. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF FINALCAUSE

[285-286]...To immediate and superficial obser-vation, the higher psychological life, of course,seems heavily stamped with final cause. In generalis-ing by a familiar procedure from the known to theunknown, one sees that from the earliest timesattempts have equally been made at interpretingin a teleological way the entire lower psychologicallife. The simplest reflex, like blinking an eyewhen the light is too strong, the simplest physicalpleasures and sufferings, the primitive emotions—do not all these facts appear to be required tomaintain and advance the species, or to maintainand advance the individual? Beginning with theamoeba, that embryonic blob of protoplasm whichstretches out to some light irradiations and triesto avoid others, has not all activity which canbe called conscious always belonged to the categoryof tendency, and is not tendency purpose in action?

Nor should one be surprised that James, Tardeand many others conclude from these thatpsychological laws have a totally different charac-ter from the other laws of nature. They are teleologi-cal laws....

The teleological conception of psychologicallaw is in essence nothing but a scientific facingfor metaphysical conceptions, which make ten-dency, the will to live, instinct, the will, andaction, the basis of everything that exists. Moreov-er, it has been accepted, elucidated and developedby the pragmatists, the adherents of the primacyof action. For them functional psychology andteleological psychology are synonymous terms....

§ 7. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

[294-296]...The antithesis of activity, reality,which cannot be analysed, on the one hand, andof relation on the other, disappears and, both asregards mind and matter, should be left on thedump-heap of obsolete metaphysics. All the givenis merely a synthesis, whose analysis is the concernof science, which traces it to its conditions and,further, resolves it into relations.

But in that case what becomes of the immortal-ity of the soul, particularly its personal immortal-


immortalityand Rey’s

agnosticism

ity, since for two thousand years now we havevalued this above everything. Not to follow thelaw of things, not to follow the law of everythingliving, not to disappear, not to be superseded bysomething else! To run this fine risk, belatedlyinvented by the bad gambler, that is man, the badgambler who wants to win the prize and demandsthat the dice be loaded in his favour!

To be sure a system of relations can hardly seemeternal or immortal. However, there is no absoluteimpossibility about it. Improbable—yes! Impos-sible—no! Only, on the ground on which we nowstand, it would be necessary for experience to de-stroy the improbability or, at any rate, to convertit into probability.

It would be necessary for experience to forceus to discover, beyond the subjective, the condi-tions which would exist after the disappearanceof the organism, the relations which would makeit partially dependent on something other thanthat organism. It is for experience to decide. Italone is capable of dispelling doubts. A priori thereis nothing to stop certain conditions, certain rela-tions, from being discovered which would involve—at least partially—the indestructibility of one partof what is given, for example consciousness.

But need this be said? Experience has so farnever shown us anything of the kind. I am awarethat spiritualists claim the opposite. But that is

mere assertion. Their experiments, at least those

that are not based on trickery or deception (andare not these a minority?), in the present state ofthings can at most induce us to think that thereexist some forces of nature, some kinds of mechani-cal motion, of whose manifestations we know verylittle, and the conditions and laws—still less.It even seems probable that they depend on thehuman organism and are simply related to theunconscious psychological and biological activity.

Moreover, in the face of the poverty of the shamexperimental verifications of the life beyond thegrave, the theory of the immortality of the soulcan only retain the form which Socrates andPlato already gave it: it is a risk one has to take—it is an appeal to the unknown and an appealto which there hardly seems any chance of gettinga reply....

V. I. LENIN452

NB

NB

C H A P T E R VI

THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY

§ 1. IRRATIONAL MORALITY:MYSTICISM OR TRADITIONALISM

[301-302]...The new philosophies are, therefore,primarily moral doctrines. And it appears thatthese doctrines can be defined as: a mysticismof action . This attitude is not new. It was theattitude adopted by the sophists, for whom therewas also neither truth nor error, but only success.It was the attitude adopted by the post-Aristotelianprobabilists and sceptics, the attitude of somenominalists at the time of scholasticism, theattitude of the subjectivists of the eighteenthcentury, notably Berkeley.

The doctrines of the intellectual anarchists likeStirner and Nietzsche rest on these same premises.

Thus, in the stock of modern nominalism andpragmatism the words are newer than the things....

[303]...When some modernists, like Le Roy,derive from pragmatism a justification for Catholi-cism, they perhaps do not derive from it what somephilosophers—the founders of pragmatism—want-ed to obtain. But they draw from it conclusionswhich can legitimately be drawn and which, inci-dentally, were drawn or almost so, by outstandingpragmatists like William James and the philoso-phers of the Chicago school. I think I can sayeven more than this. I believe that Le Roy draws

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFthe only conclusions that should legitimately beFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFdrawn from this way of thinking....FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

[304]...It is characteristic of pragmatism thateverything is true that succeeds and, in one wayor another, is adapted to the moment: sciencereligion, morality, tradition, custom, routine.Everything must be taken seriously, and thatwhich realises an aim and permits one to actmust be taken just as seriously....

[305-306]...What has caused the downfall oftraditions and dogmas up to now? Science, or ifone prefers to consider the instrument rather thanthe product—reason. Science lives by freedom;

FFFFFFFF

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NB

reason in the final analysis is nothing but freeexamination. Moreover, science and reason are,above all, revolutionary, and the Greco-Westerncivilisation founded on them was, is and will re-main a civilisation of men in revolt. Revolt hasso far been our only means of liberation and theonly form in which we have been able to get toknow liberty. I have in mind the spiritual revoltof reason that is master of itself, and not thebrutal revolt that has been only the covering—often useful, sometimes necessary—for the preciousmetal constituting the former.

Thus, the chief aid that can be given to tradi-tion, to the preservation of the ancient moral values,to use a fashionable term, is the depreciation ofscience. That is why pragmatism, nominalism,should have had as logical consequence—as wasvery well seen by the majority of those who adheredto it, with a rational understanding of the cause—the justification of certain motives of action: reli-gious, sentimental, instinctive, traditional. On thesame plane as the motives of action borrowed fromscientific cognition or, still more logically, on ahigher plane, for science aims only at industrialaction, the new philosophy should have led tothe legitimisation of an irrational morality:passionate impulses or submission to authority,mysticism or traditionalism. Traditionalism some-times even goes so far that some (William James,for example) do not hesitate in regard to moralityto return to the absolute of rationalist doctrinesof morality....

§ 4. THE SCIENCE OF MORALS

[314]...For this conception of morality asa rational art to be possible, it is clearly necessarythat a science of morals should be possible. Heremetaphysics renews its high hopes. In fact, so-ciology, of which this science of morals is onlya section, has hardly come into being. Like psychol-ogy, only much less advanced than this, it is stillin the period where it is necessary to argue againstthe metaphysicians concerning the method, thesubject of science and its right to exist. It seems,however, that here as elsewhere the questionwill finally be decided in favour of scientificeffort. One cannot prevent the metaphysicians fromchattering, but one can allow them freedom of

V. I. LENIN454

NB

NB

speech and action. And so sociology, thanks to thework of Durkheim and his school, has been working

and acting....

C H A P T E R VII

THE PROBLEM OF COGNITION AND TRUTH

§ 1. TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS

[325-326]...Actually, scientists, pure scientists,concern themselves very little with this questionof truth. For them it is enough to arrive at state-ments which receive universal assent and which,therefore, appear to be necessary. For them everyexperiment methodically carried out and properlycontrolled is true. Experimental verification—that they say, is the criterion of truth. And thescientists are perfectly right, for practice hasalways justified this attitude. To suppose thatit will not always justify it would be to imaginethe absurd, to doubt for the pleasure of doubt-ing....

[328-332]...The modern rationalists energeti-cally defended themselves against the attacks ofpragmatism, when the latter claimed that thereason of rationalists amounted, in the finalanalysis, to guaranteeing to our mind a true copyof reality. And, indeed, pragmatism reproachedrationalism for dividing cognition into two syn-chronised parts: the objects or things-in-themselvesand the ideas which the mind makes of them....

§ 2. THE PRAGMATIST CRITICISM

In the rationalism of the nineteenth century,as in evolutionary empiricism and also among themodern rationalists, we, of course, already findthis idea that the mind is not a mirror, nor trutha faithful image of things. Usually it is claimedthat truth is the result of the work of the mind onthings. But this again means putting things inopposition to mind. Pragmatism goes further.

All experience, all knowledge, is at the sametime action: to live means to act, and only to act.From which it follows—and it is this that causedthe name of pragmatism to be given to this system,which essentially defines it in the general view—that truth is defined as a function of action, i.e.,

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a function of its practical results. This is success.Every experiment that is successful, i.e., thatallows the expected result to be achieved, determinesa truth. In order to get away from philosophicalabstractions, let us note that in the final analysisthis conclusion is merely a generalised expressionof the faith of scientists in experimentation.At what moment does the scientist say that thehypothesis advanced by him is true? The momentthe result he expected to see in the operationundertaken by him is actually apparent. Sincethis operation corresponds to the hypothesis or,more correctly, to the chain of hypotheses whichhe had in his mind, and the result obtained cor-responds to the conclusion from this chain ofhypotheses, his idea was successful; it has beenverified by experiment. To be sure, if one identifies success with experi-mental verification, then the pragmatist proposi-tion appears to be true; it merely conveys theessence of the experimental method. But thetrouble is that the word success is used sometimesin this limited sense and sometimes in its broad,popular sense, depending on the occasion and thephilosopher. This is particularly noticeable in thecase of William James. He claims that truth ap-plies to everything that is verified experimentally,and, at other times, to everything that ensures anysort of success for our activity. Hence, if oneadopts this latter proposition, one is almost neces-sarily brought to the conclusion that truth no longerexists. For what is successful today may not besuccessful tomorrow—a thing that often happensin practice, as proved by changes in laws andjurisprudence, moral rules and religious faiths,and scientific opinions. The truth of today isthe error of tomorrow, truth on this side of thePyrenees is error on the other side. The theme iscommonplace. And these conclusions, whichPeirce—the founder of pragmatism—firmly set

aside and combated, and from which the greatpragmatist philosophers, William James in partic-

ular, tried to escape by means of the most subtleevasions, are in general accepted by the majorityof the epigones. Moreover, in regard to the problemof truth, pragmatism has become synonymous withscepticism, just as, in regard to morality or faith,it has become synonymous with irrational tradi-tionalism.

V. I. LENIN456

And yet, as in all criticism, there is, of course,an element of truth in the pragmatist criticismof rationalism. One can say of it what frequentlyhas to be said of critical theories: the destructivepart is excellent, but the constructive part leavesmuch to be desired. Certainly the theory of mindas a mirror of things and of truth as a copy, iscrudely superficial. The evolution of scientific

truths through all the mistakes which strew thepath of science proves this.

On the other hand, when we regard ourselvesas an organism operating in the environment of theuniverse, it is true that we cannot separate therealm of practice from that of truth for, in ac-cordance with all that we have said above, andin accordance with all the lessons of science, wecannot separate truth from experimental verifica-tion. Only those concepts that succeed are true.But one has yet to discover whether they are truebecause they succeed or whether they succeedbecause they are true. Pragmatism is alwaysinclined to choose between these alternatives infavour of the first. Common sense, apparently,can only choose the second....

§ 3. AN INDIRECT INDICATION OF A SOLUTIONTO THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

[332-334]...The given, the experience, is evi-dently that which is known. Consequently, it isnecessary to assume complete unity between thegiven and the means by which it is cognised, tomake a determined break with all dualism at thepoint of departure—but only at the point ofdeparture. This is an important limitation. Doesit not in itself already contain the key to thesolution of the problem of truth?

At the point of departure the only possiblemethod of cognition, i.e., the only method ofdiscovery, is the experimental method, the elimina-tion of all a priori methods, all dialectical reason-ing.

Modern science fully confirms this propositionand thereby postulates the first statement whichwe have just advanced. The mathematical sciencesthemselves have experience for their point ofdeparture; reasoning comes later, as we have seen,and always remains to a certain extent subordinateto experience.

sic!

ha!


réalismeabsolu*= histor-ical ma-

terialism

But experience is not merely the immediateexperience of the given; it includes also—and thisin our view is James’ great philosophical innova-tion—the relations implied by the given, andwhich form a rigid fabric between all immediateexperience and past or future experience. If expe-rience consisted only of immediate experience, wewould have only sensations and not science; wewould not even have perception in the full senseof the word. The object of science, and even ofperception, is precisely to analyse immediateexperience in order to arrive at the experiencewhich has prepared it, or which prolongs it. Toperceive and above all to note, to draw attentionand to reflect—this is the beginning of this pro-tracted experience.

From this second remark we can draw thefollowing conclusion: all knowledge that expe-rience gives us is interconnected and becomessystematised. But it does not become systematised,as in rationalism, as the result of an activitythat is superior to it and which would impose itsforms on it. While seeking to guarantee the stabil-ity of science, this concept on the contrary leadsto scepticism, for it makes cognition a creation ofthe mind, and this dualism inevitably raises thequestion as to whether or not this creation of themind, cognition, distorts the given. Here, on theother hand, our knowledge becomes systematised inexactly the same way as it is given to us, and therelations of the given have the same value as thegiven itself. In reality, the immediately given andthe relations it involves form a unity and areindivisible. The acts of cognition are all of thesame kind and of the same value....

§ 4. THE PROBLEM OF ERROR

[336-347]...In the absolute realism in

which we have thus far been moving there isapparently no place for error. But let us recallthat we made experience and cognition identicalonly at the point of departure. The time has cometo show what this limitation implies.

It is a fact established by experience that cogni-tion by different individuals is not exactly the

* absolute realism—Ed.

OO ( (

V. I. LENIN458

!

NB

same. This can be explained in two ways: eitherthere exist as many different realities as there areindividuals (which is absurd: we should be fallinginto subjectivism), or—and we are consequentlyforced to adopt this alternative since the givenis unique and the same for all—the difference be-tween the cognitions which individuals obtainabout the given arises from the conditions inwhich they were and are situated, in other words,from certain individual relations which existbetween them and the given, and which scientificanalysis can reveal. This is the conclusion to whichwe were led by other considerations in connectionwith the problem of consciousness. We saw thatthe given involved relations independent of thecognising individual—objective relations—and re-

lations in which the given depends on the cognisingorganism—subjective relations.

Once this is admitted, we see that in experience,and not now at the point of departure but in themeasure that analyse it, bifurcation takesplace between the cognising agent and the objectof cognition. This relation, in accordance withwhat we have said, has the same value as thegiven itself. It imposes itself on us with the samejustification as does the given; from whichit follows that the difference between the mindand the object should not be regarded as somethingprimary, but as the product of analysis, as twovery common relations which analysis discoversin the given ... (W. James); and this distinctionderives its value from the value given at the outsetto experience taken as a whole, single and indivisi-ble experience.

But in that ease mistakes and errors havea very natural explanation: they are the changes,the distortions, which depend on the individualand subjective conditions of cognition. Whilescience, thanks to experience, makes an increas-ingly complete analysis of the given, it should,no matter how prolonged and arduous the task,gradually exclude all these “personal equations,”which are far more complex than those whichastronomers assign to the visual perceptions of theindividual observer. It should draw a dividingline between objective and subjective relations.It was for just this purpose that it was created.

8


Rey’s theo-ry of cogni-

tion =shamefacedmaterialism

NB

Do these considerations not lead us to a con-venient and practical definition of truth? Truthis the objective. The objective is the sum-totalof observations which are independent of theobserver. In practice, it is that which everyoneadmits, which is the subject of universalexperience universal agreement using these wordsin a scientific sense. In analysing the conditionsof this universal agreement, in seeking behindthis fact the law it conceals, its cause, we arriveat this conclusion: scientific work aims to “de-subjectivise,” de-personalise, experience, methodi-cally prolonging and continuing it. Hence scientificexperience is the continuation of crude experience,and there is no difference in character betweena scientific fact and a crude fact.

It has sometimes been said that scientific truthis nothing but an abstraction. Of course it is onlyan abstraction if one is considering crude expe-rience, i.e., subjective and individual experience,for it excludes from this experience everythingthat depends solely on the individual who cognisesthrough experience. But, on the other hand, thisabstraction aims at discovering the given as itreally is, independent of the individuals andcircumstances which change it; it aims at discover-

ing the objective, the concrete par excellence, the

real.It would be interesting to try to verify this

general theory by analysing some famous errors.Ptolemy’s system, for instance, shows its experienceencumbered with individual ideas which dependon the terrestrial conditions of astronomical obser-vation: it is the stellar system as seen from theearth. The system of Copernicus and Galileo ismuch more objective, since it does away with theconditions which depend on the fact that theobserver is situated on the earth. In a more generalsense, Painlevé has pointed out that causalityin mechanics, in the science of the Renaissanceand in the science of our day, embraced the condi-tions of the appearance of phenomenon independentof space and time. But the point is that the condi-tions of the situation in space and time embrace,particularly in mechanics, almost the totality of

OO

V. I. LENIN460

truth anderror (ap-

proach to dia-lectical mate-

rialism)

?

phrase-mon-gering with

“experience”

“experience”

the subjective conditions which are no longersufficiently crude to be eliminated by summaryconsideration.

An important conclusion: error is not the abso-lute antithesis of truth. As very many philosophershave already claimed, it is not positive; on thecontrary, it is negative and partial, it is in a sensea lesser truth. In ridding it—thanks to experi-ence—of the subjective that it involves, we pro-gressively approach the truth. Once the truth hasbeen reached, it is in the full sense of the wordabsolute and a limit, for it is objective, necessaryand universal. However, this limit is far removedfrom us in almost all cases. It appears to us almostlike a mathematical limit, which one approachescloser and closer without ever being able to reach.The history of science, moreover, shows us thetruth in the becoming of development; the truth isnot yet formed, but is rather in the process of forma-

tion. Perhaps it never will be formed, but it

will always be more and more formed.A final question may perhaps be raised: Instead

of being satisfied with what is, are we not stillobsessed by the old metaphysical illusion of tryingto discover why things exist? Why does experiencehave subjective conditions? Why is its cognitionnot immediately one and the same for all? Itwould appear that we have the right to refuseto reply; but here thanks to psychology it seemsone could indicate in the positive. If full experiencehad to any degree knowledge of itself, like the godof the pantheists, this knowledge would indeedbe immediately one and the same. But in expe-rience, as it presents itself to us, the cognition ofexperience is given in a fragmentary way and it is

only to those fragments of experience that we areourselves.

Biology and psychology tell us that we arewhat we are, or rather have been shaped intowhat we are, by adaptation, a continuous equilib-rium with the environment. From which, ingeneral, it can be concluded that our cognitionshould above all correspond to the requirementsof organic life. Moreover, it is at first restricted,vague, extremely subjective, as in instinctive life.

(

ll

(


l’expérience =le milieu?*

But once consciousness appears in the play ofuniversal energies, it is preserved and strengthenedbecause of its practical utility. Increasingly complexbeings are evolved and develop. Consciousnessbecomes more exact, more precise. It becomesintelligence and reason. And at the same time(adaptation, adequacy in relation to experience,)

becomes more complete. Science is merely thehighest form of this process. Even if it neverattains it, science has the right to hope for a cogni-tion which will rather be at one with the given,which will be absolutely adequate to the object:

objective, necessary and universal. Theoretically

its claim is justified, because it is in line withthe evolution that has taken place up to now.In practice this claim will most probably neverbe satisfied, for it marks the limit of evolution,and to attain it would require a state of the universequite different from that at present, and a kindof identification between the universe and theexperience of cognition.

In any case, one conclusion impresses itself:scepticism in relation to science conceals the mostcomplete and clearest metaphysical illusion thatever deceived philosophical thought. It consistsin raising non-existent problems, in seeking a non-existent reality beyond reality in order to explainthe latter. It is the result of the dualistic abstrac-tions in which philosophy has always been onlytoo willing to engage.

In particular, is it not overthrowing all expe-rience to see in the embryonic, instinctive, vague,almost wholly subjective and instantaneous cogni-tion of awakening consciousness, original and realexperience, as Bergson, Le Roy and some pragma-tists are inclined to do. Primitive experience,wholly stamped with subjectivity—yes, but alsowholly stamped with error and unreality. Thisvague, nebulous experience is only the coveringof experience. True experience of the real, on thecontrary, is in the increasingly lucid limit towardswhich the human mind makes its way, and towardsthe increasingly rational form which it tends toadopt, towards reason. The most artificial of allabstractions is that which excludes from experiencethe results of rational labour and the progress ofevolution.

* experience = environment?—Ed .

V. I. LENIN462

shamefacedmaterialism

This evolution has been definitely guided bypractice and towards practice, for it is transmittedand realised owing to the constant adaptationof the being to its environment. Who would at-tempt to deny this today? That is one of the mostdecisive victories of pragmatism over a now fos-silised rationalism. But it does not mean that truthis defined as a function of utility and success.On the contrary, it means that the utility andsuccess are a consequence of the acquisition oftruth. Why and how did cognition appear innature? Because some beings were incapable ofacting blindly. They had to know the circumstancesof their action. And that is why, having takenfrom pragmatism everything that seemed tous to be excellent in its criticism of the old metaphysics,we resolutely turn our backs on it in the nameof absolute positivism.

To express sensibly and accurately the relationsbetween practice and truth, it seems, therefore,that one should not say that what is successfulis true, but rather that which is true is successful,i.e., what is in conformity with reality, insofaras it concerns attempted action. Direct action is theresult of exact knowledge of realities, in the en-vironment of which it takes place. We act cor-rectly in the measure that we know truly.

§ 5. THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Everyone will agree, I think, that we affirm astrue and objective that which is independent of theindividual coefficient which is to be found in everyindividual in the act of cognition. But when diver-gencies appear it is a matter of saying at whatmoment the individual coefficient disappears.Confronted by any kind of experimental confirma-tion, can I draw a line between that which has beenuniversally noted and that which has been notedonly by me?

We said, in a general way, that the effort ofscience is in all cases directed precisely towarddrawing this line. Basically, science has no otheraim. It could be defined by this characteristic.In practice, then, we already have a primarymeans of distinguishing what is true and objectivefrom what is subjective and illusory. That which


confuses theissue

has been acquired by means of rigorously appliedscientific methods will be true. Scientists havethe duty of elaborating, perfecting and definingthese methods. This primary criterion is morestrict than the very vague rule given thus far:universal agreement. For universal agreement maybe only universal prejudice. And a priori thereis nothing to bar the hypothesis that such preju-dices may exist in a truly universal manner duringa particular period, although one could hardlycite any of them. But if we replace the expres-sion “universal agreement” by the expressionscientific control, then the objection collapses, for,insofar as it is a question of prejudice, it is impos-sible to indicate the reasons for it, whereas scien-tific control only exists when these reasons aremanifest. Obviously, we see scientific control onlywhere hypotheses are excluded, and we admitthat it can just as well establish the limits of anapproximation as a strictly exact truth.

However, scientists will not engage in a searchfor any other criterion. And from the practicalpoint of view they are perfectly right. But fromthe speculative and theoretical point of view onemay find—and this is the opinion of all meta-physicians who have been engaged in creating atheory of knowledge—that the indicated criterionis unsufficient. Let us summarise in their crudestform all the objections that can be raised fromthis new point of view: is not all science, in itsturn, with its methods and its control, a universalprejudice and, to use Bacon’s expression, anidola tribus?* Indeed, one can imagine that nomatter what efforts we make to draw a line be-tween the subjective and the objective, we alwaysremain enclosed, at least to a certain extent, in thesubjective. Our cognition would always dependon our individual structure and, consequently,would also always distort its object. Taking thepsychological hypothesis which we advanced inconnection with consciousness, can it not be saidthat since cognition is the result of the adaptationof our being to the actions which it has to carryout in its environment, all cognition will always be,without our being able to take this into account,a distortion of the environment in accordance withthe structure and the requirements of the humanrace?

* idol of the tribe—Ed.

V. I. LENIN464

relative inthe sceptical

sense!!!

ha!

It seems one could certainly reply: yes. Butprecisely because we cannot take this into account,the problem is insoluble and futile. It must begranted: the truth that man can attain is humantruth. By this we do not mean to say that it isrelative in the sceptical sense of the word. But

we do mean to say that it depends on the structureof the human species, and is valid only for thatspecies. Here, with some correction, one mustrepeat the famous words of Gorgias: we knownothing that is not human. If by chance we wereto know something that had nothing of the humanin it, we would be unable to take account of it;and if, which is impossible, we were able to takeaccount of it, then we would be unable to informothers of it. Consequently, in looking for a signand definition of truth, it is not a question offinding a sign and definition that would be validfor anything other than the human race, butsimply a sign and definition that would be abso-lutely and identically valid for all representativesof the human race. It is in this sense that thecriterion already referred to—scientific control—issufficient.

Moreover, once and for all an end must be put tocertain sophisms: truth, valid for the whole humanrace, human truth, is absolute truth for man, be-

cause if it is supposed, as the adherents of anextra-human absolute suppose, that it is nota copy of the real, it is still, at any rate for man,

the only possible exact translation the absoluteequivalent....

[351]...Perhaps, those who try to find reasonsfor doubting scientific results may still say: weare ready to allow that properly controlled ex-perience gives us effectively and fully the trans-formation of a cause into a given effect and, itfollows, an indubitable relation between the condi-tion and the conditioned. But what can prove to usthat this relation will manifest itself identically ina second experience? Leibnitz claimed that allfacts differ, if only a little, from one another be-cause we can distinguish them from one another(the principle of the indiscernible: in all theforests of the earth no two identical leaves are tobe found). A modern scientist, Poincaré, claimed

=

(


finale =shamefacedmaterialism

also that physics never deals with identical facts,but simply with facts that closely resemble oneanother. In that case, what use is science to us;for if it wants to be strictly exact, then every newfact requires a new law.

This objection is of the same character as thefollowing: every fact embraces infinity. Conse-quently, we would have to have complete sciencein order to have the very minimum exact knowl-edge of the smallest object. It is overcome in thesame way and almost of itself ....

[352]...To sum up, the given is the subject ofscience, because it is analysable, and because thisanalysis reveals to us the conditions of its existence.Science is certain because every analysis it makesgradually brings us to experimental intuitionswhich have the same value as the given; hencescience has the same degree of certainty as the

existence of the universe which it explains andmy own existence which is likewise known to methrough experimental intuition.

C H A P T E R VIII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS:THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIENCE

[353-357]...Up to now philosophy has beenabove all a system of values, to use an expressionnow in vogue. It sought to establish a hierarchyof things and to make laws about the good, thetrue and the beautiful in the name of this hierarchy.In general, one can say that it never conceivednatural facts on one and the same plane, impar-tially and objectively; on the contrary it arrangedthem on different planes in the name of whollysubjective personal preferences or collective preju-dices, human of course but equally subjective forthat very reason.

All Greek philosophy and scholasticism, the heirof Aristotelianism, present us with typical scalesby which the value of things is measured. Both thephilosophy of the Renaissance and all modernphilosophy, despite the isolated efforts of a Spino-za, were crystallised in one and the same mould.Moreover, leaving aside Spinoza’s system, sinceit represents an excellent attempt to conceivethings from a viewpoint as little human and

((

V. I. LENIN466

NB

judgment ofidealism andmaterialism

nonsense!

subjective as possible, we always find, from thevery beginnings of Greek philosophical thought,the same two or three general orientations alongmetaphysical lines. These are the orientationsaccording to which all the textbooks still usuallyclassify philosophical systems under the namesof materialism, spiritualism and idealism.

In essence—considering things from the verygeneral standpoint that we adopt here, i.e., thestandpoint of the “particular scale of values”offered by each of these orientations—since spirit-ualism and idealism often present the closestanalogies, it can be said that metaphysics hasalways confronted us with two great scales ofvalue: the materialist scale and the idealist-spiritualist scale. These two scales oppose each oth-er and each is almost the reverse image of the other.

In the idealist-spiritualist scale, mind occupiesthe topmost position: it gives all the rest its senseand value either because, as in the case of idealism,it represents the sole reality, material appearancesbeing created by it or existing only through it, orbecause, as in the case of spiritualism, it offersabove material reality which is merely its supportor its environment, the higher reality in whichnature culminates and through which nature isexplained.—In the materialist scale, on the otherhand, everything derives from matter and every-thing returns to it. It is the eternal and

immutable creator of all the spectacles of theuniverse, including the spectacle of life and ofconsciousness. Life is only one particular variety—among an infinite number of others—of the combi-nations which blind chance has evoked from theoriginal matter. Consciousness, thought are onlyphenomena of life; the brain secretes them as theliver secretes bile. Basically, all the phenomenathat we can observe—amber which electrifies,iron which heats, steam which vaporises, liquidwhich solidifies, light or sound, life or thought—are all nothing but the appearances embellishedby the various combinations of vortices of a homo-geneous fluid which fills all space, or of the atomswhich collide in the infinite void.

It seems to me that one could represent themanner in which spiritualism and idealism argue


3,000 yearsof idealism and

materialism

ha!

approximately in the same way: motion is incon-ceivable without a force to animate the movingbody. Force is unintelligible except in relationto the effort we ourselves feel in muscular move-ment, in the tendency of life; it follows that effortpresupposes life. But vital effort, in turn, is alwaysdirected to an end; bearing the stamp of purpose,it is conceivable only by the consciousness whichdirects it. Consequently, thought or, at least,something of the order of immaterial and freespirit is necessary both as the supreme principleof explanation and as the essential principle ofexistence and creation. Allow the spirit andeverything in nature becomes clear. Suppress it,and nature becomes incomprehensible. It vanishesinto nothingness.

Materialism on the other hand, claims—ifI may use the same summary procedure—that everyexperiment that explains a psychological factfor us reduces it to organic facts. Organic mattercomes closer and closer to inorganic matter. Forceis nothing but a shock impulse; it is motion com-

bined with something else. Hence at the basis ofthings we find only sheer, blind motion.

And soon it will be three thousand years duringwhich these systems of value have been taken upby generation after generation, elaborated, some-times made more precise, and very often obscuredby the subtleties of thought which is never readyto admit itself conquered. And we are hardly anyfurther advanced than we were at the beginning.

Does this not mean, then, that the questionsthese conflicting systems are debating are idle ques-tions and badly formulated? Is not the desire toestablish an explanatory hierarchy between thingsa purely anthropomorphic prejudice? And is notthis prejudice derived much more from the aspira-tions of individual sentiment than from rationaldiscussion? Basically, it is for ends totally dif-ferent from objective cognition that these systems

are put forward and opposed to one another, andconcern for them has nothing in common withthe impartial search for truth. Thus, since theyare incompatible with a positive discussion, weshall not consider them any further.

ll

ll

V. I. LENIN468

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

W. James onpragmatism

Either I am greatly mistaken or modern philos-ophy in its vital and powerful trends—positivism

and pragmatism—is tending towards this conclu-

sion*....[358-362]...Thus, all the preceding seems to

show not only that contemporary philosophy iscoming closer and closer to science and becomingan increasingly elegant part of it, but also that itis possible to arrive at a scientific conception ofphilosophy: it would be no more than the neces-sary complement to science. By setting aside themetaphysical poems of the individual imagina-tion, it would initiate the collective collaborationof scientists, historians and critics.

All facts are subject to scientific explanation;none of them can be cognised objectively, that isin truth, otherwise than through the sciences.Evidently, science is still very limited and verysuperficial, but it can only be developed by thosewho seek to know; without it all speculation isbarren.

Is philosophy therefore condemned? Is it noth-ing but a word devoid of sense and content?A few years ago many scientists would have saidso. And it is true to say that if we mean by philos-ophy those speculations which, beyond experienceor on this side of it, seek the origin, end, andnature of things, the useless foundations of scienceor action, burdening everything immediatelyknown by an unknowable, which ought to justifyit, if, in a word, we mean by it the old dialectics,whether rational or sceptical, idealist material-ist, individualist or pantheist, then those scientistshave apparently scored a victory. All this meta-physics has only an aesthetic interest which,incidentally, can be a passionate one for thosewho have a predilection for it: it represents theindividual dreams of lofty but hardly practicalminds.

But as this philosophy began to find fewerand fewer adherents, scientists created from itsomething else or other, and in the past few years

* In defining pragmatism, William James insists on

the idea that it is a system which turns away from apriori explanations, from dialectics and metaphysics, inorder constantly to turn to the facts and experiment.

( (

(


blaguer!

fool!

bim, bam!

the most outstanding fact in the field of philo-sophical knowledge has been the appearance ofa large number of philosophies drafted by scientistsin connection with their science, with it and for it.It is true that there have been learned philosophersbefore. Almost all great systems of philosophyare their work. But particularly in their methodsand conclusions these systems lagged considerablybehind and stand apart from the scientific worksof their authors. Contemporary scientists, on thecontrary, instead of seeking a general conceptionof the world, simply seek to supplement andclarify scientific experience by partial hypothesesthat are much more exact and closely linked withthis experience.

So, in a different way but to achieve almostidentical results, Comte’s idea is being vindicated:a section of scientific work is being collectivelyorganised with the object of scientific generalisa-tion and the synthesis of the sciences.

The manner in which scientific work is con-ducted makes this conception of philosophy clearerand more exact. Science is composed at once ofthe totality of experimental results and of thetheories of this totality which are always hypo-theses in one respect or another. But these hypo-theses are indispensable to science, because it isprecisely by their anticipation of future experienceand the unknown that science advances. Theysystematise all that is known in such a way as tothrow light on the unknown. Why should notphilosophy, therefore, in the same way, be a generalsynthesis of all scientific knowledge, an effort torepresent the unknown as a function of the known,in order to aid in discovering it and to keep thescientific spirit in its true orientation? It woulddiffer from science only in the greater generalityof the hypothesis; instead of being the theory ofa group of isolated and very circumscribed facts,philosophical theory would be the theory ofthe totality of the facts that nature presentsus with, the system of nature, as it used to becalled in the eighteenth century, or at any ratea direct contribution to a theory of thiskind.

The philosophical standpoint is not opposedto the scientific standpoint; it stands side by sidewith it. Even when a scientist is making everyeffort to attain positivity he is a philosopher, forpositivity is itself a philosophy....

V. I. LENIN470

phew!

defenceagainst

materialism

1

Science should not differ from philosophy eitherin subject (it is the same: to give an account ofexperience), or in method (it should be the same,for the scientific discipline is by its very defini-tion the only discipline which can satisfy ourintelligence). No, the only difference betweenthem is one of standpoint, and what distinguishes,and is the only thing that should distinguish, thescientific from the philosophical standpoint is thatthe latter is far more general and always appearssomewhat of an adventure....

[364-369]...History shows us that when sciencebecomes too far removed from the most commonhuman concerns, forming the basis of most philo-sophical questions, when it leaves the burden ofreplying to these concerns to various speculationsor traditional beliefs, out of necessity or excessiveprudence, it vegetates or begins to decline. It isnecessary, absolutely necessary, therefore, for thegains of science and the scientific spirit to bedefended, in case of need in spite of themselves,

against excessive presumption or adventurism,when they overstep their rights. For excessivetemerity—seen, for instance, in some materialist

generalisation—is no less dangerous for science in

the case of sane and straightforward minds, than istimidity and lack of spirit in the case of ordinarypeople. Hence, one of the essential tasks of philos-ophy is to maintain the general atmosphere re-quired for the development of science, for thenormal maintenance and dissemination of thescientific spirit....

But philosophy, of course, will only be able tofulfil the dual mission which we feel it is called uponto fulfil—to co-ordinate the efforts of scientists,to provide hypotheses which inspire discoveries,on the one hand, and, on the other, to create thenecessary atmosphere for scientific advance—ifit seeks to be nothing but the organising synthesisof the sciences, regarded and understood in theway scientists regard and understand them, inshort, a synthesis established in an exclusivelyscientific spirit.

It is gratifying to see—to a lesser extent, ofcourse, in pragmatism, but all the same to a suf-ficiently great extent—that philosophical re-search today, having decisively broken away from (


!!positivism,

experimental-ism, realism= “absoluteor rationalistpositivism”

the metaphysical errors of the preceding period, isextremely well informed regarding scientific works,seeks to conform to them and derives its inspirationfrom them.

Without doubt, a very vital and pronouncedscientific sentiment is taking shape today which,in some people, is developing parallel with religiousand moral sentiments and, as it were, on a differentplane where conflict is impossible, while in othersit has replaced the religious sentiment and fullysatisfies their needs. For these, as Renan has beauti-fully expressed it, science has provided a symboland a law. They have adopted a truly positiveattitude which retains from ancient rationalismits unshakable faith in human reason, while atthe same time acquiring from the incontestabletriumph of the experimental method the incon-testable conclusion that reason is nothing but theconstant effort of the mind to adapt itself toexperience and to cognise it more and more deeply,the reciprocal penetration of objective reality

and subjective thought.I believe that the future of philosophy lies on

this side, because it is on this side that truth isto be found. As in all prophecies, this is nothingbut an act of faith. It is for the future to saywhether it will be justified or not. And as this isan act of faith, I consider legitimate all other actsof faith, on condition that the attitude of thosewho perform them is the same towards me. I evenconsider that it is fortunate that one ideologicaltrend is confronted by trends of opposing ideas;it is by the criticism of its opponents that it isrefined, developed, corrected and made precise.

The philosophical attitude which has beenoutlined in these brief studies could be called ra-tionalist positivism, absolute positivism or scien-

tism. To avoid any ambiguity it would, perhaps,be better to call it experimentalism; this would

indicate simultaneously that it rests wholly onexperience—but, contrary to the old empiricism,on controlled experience, the fruit of scientificexperiment—and that it refuses in its absoluterealism and its experimental monism to go beyondthe bounds of experience.

(

=

V. I. LENIN472

experience =Σ* sensations

“chose ensoi”?**

Experience is primarily and immediately the

totality of our sensations, what we call phenomena.

But it begins with analysis of itself as soon asattention, thought is applied to it, for this totalityof sensations is nothing but a crude and verysuperficial view of the given. Almost immediatelythere is to be discerned in it and beneath it some ofthe relations that it involves and which form itstrue basis. Science strives to carry this analysisprogressively forward, penetrating ever moredeeply into the nature of the given. If the immedi-ate given is represented by a point then, in orderto obtain a picture of the real given, one has toimagine that this point is merely a projection of thestraight line extending beyond it. This straight

line can be broken up into several segments, eachof which will embrace, without there being anyimpenetrable partitions between them, familiesof relations on which the immediate given depends.Each of these families will be formed by virtue ofa definition which will be based on the natural

affinities by which these relations are joinedtogether. These will be relations of number andposition, mechanical, physical relations, etc.,and, finally, psychological relations determined bytheir dependence on the organism to which thegiven is related. There will be as many particularsciences as there are such groups of relations.

Philosophy, on the other hand, tries to conceivethe straight line in its entire length and continuity.But the line in its totality, just as much as thepoint which is the projection of it, the immediategiven, as also the relations which supplement itto the extent of its analysis, are of one and thesame character.

These are the data of experience. And theirtotality comprises a single experience: humanexperience. It is our psychological constitution,and not the nature of things, which distinguishes

the world from perception, the universe fromscience; and this distinction is temporary andcontingent.

* summation—Ed .** “Thing-in-itself”?—Ed .

(\\

P


Experience, therefore, needs only to be explained.To explain it means simply to formulate therelations it involves, and which it itself bringsto our attention if we know how to grasp its lessons.And science is beginning to concern itself withthem. But, being all reality, experience is not in

need of justification: it exists.

End

V. I. LENIN474

CONTENTS*

. . . . .— § 6. Ideas of Poincaré, the mathematician, P o i n-

c a r é.. . . . .

Pp. 6-7; 28-9=two lines33=truth=? for pragmatism and 3 549=the objective value of science=centreMathematics and pragmatism—6280 : the pragmatists laid claim to Poincaré,and Mach 90Rey=a pure agnostic 94 (93)98: Mach# objectivity=Rey?!100: Concepts=copies of realityObjectivity 105113 : vulgar materialism

* Written by Lenin on the cover of Rey’s book.—Ed.

Publishedaccording to the original


in Philosophical Notebooks

475

inexact

there is nopoint in using

“foreign”words!

A. DEBORIN.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 167

[39]...As a world outlook, dialectical material-ism provides an answer—not an absolute one, ofcourse—to the question of the structure of matter,of the world; it serves as the basis of a most brillianthistorical theory; on the basis of dialectical ma-terialism, politics and morality become in a certainsense exact sciences. Being foreign to all dogmatism,dialectical materialism—correctly understood, ofcourse—introduces everywhere a fresh stream oftheoretico-cognitive criticism.

[40]...In this article we intend to call the read-er’s attention only to the theoretico-cognitiveaspect of dialectical materialism, which in thiscase does not, as a method, as a guiding principleof investigation, provide absolute solutions toproblems, but primarily assists in their properframing. As a theory of knowledge, dialecticalmaterialism falls into a formal, or logical, partand a real, or material, one.

In the case of primeval, primitive cognition,experience is identical with the object of experience,and the phenomenon with being, with the thing-in-itself. For primitive man , the world of innerexperiences also constitutes the world of things.He knows no distinction between the internaland the external world. At a certain stage ofcultural development, this primitive form ofcognition comes into conflict with the social man’sdesire to subdue the forces of nature, with thenew, higher stage of culture. The contrast betweenperceptions and things, between the world of innerexperiences and the world of things, becomes moreand more marked as man’s requirements multiply,

1)2)

V. I. LENIN476

listen to him!

experimental evidence grows and accumulates,and clashes between perceptions and the externalworld become more frequent. That is when thenecessity arises for new forms of cognition.

...What we are interested in directly is thelogical process which in modern philosophy has ledto dialectical materialism.— The psychologismof Hume, Berkeley and others operates chieflypsychically, in the sensuous world. Sensuous imagesare the objects of cognition. The result of thedevelopment of British empiricism is, Esse=per-cipi, i.e., that exists which is given in perception,and all that is given in perception, has an objectivebeing, exists.

[41]...Kant understood that genuinely scien-tific cognition is possible only through the mediumof “mathematical contemplation.” Sense-perceptiondoes not contain the conditions necessary foruniversally obligatory cognition. Sensuous imagesare not capable of embracing the totality of phenom-ena to be cognised. And Kant, passes from psycholo-gism to transcendentalism....

[43]...Hegelian philosophy represents the lastand closing link of this chain. We have seen thatHume, Kant, and Fichte placed the subject abovethe object, which they declared to be somethinginseparable from the subject....

[48]...Categories, i.e., pure universal concepts,such as time, space, or causality, are, from thepoint of view dialectical materialism, logicaldefinitions, on the one hand, and real forms ofthings, on the other....

[49]...The limitation of transcendentalism con-sists in the fact that it does not extend its rightsto the real sphere of things and considers thatcategories are merely subjective , and furthermorea priori, forms of consciousness. Transcendentalismembraces phenomena in categorical, i.e., logically-universal forms, making it possible to formulatestrictly mathematical laws of nature, and to givethem a universal character. But transcendentalism,as also sensualistic phenomenalism, is concernedonly with phenomena. For them, being, things-in-themselves, are inaccessible....

[50]...Dialectical materialism attains the “abso-luteness” and universality of cognition by declar-

?

?

eee

eee

477NOTES ON DEBORIN’S ARTICLE “DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM”

ing the forms to be universal , objectively real

“perceptions.” On this rests the possibility of

mathematical, or “geometrical” if you will, i.e.,exact, cognition of reality. “Geometrical” spaceand “pure time” are universally real perceptions,

and constitute the premise for the “mathematical”cognition of the sensuous world....

[51]...But at the same time dialectical conscious-ness shows an ability to rise to the “conception” ofnature as a “whole,” to the conception of the neces-sity, of the inherency, of the universal order ofnature....

[52]...Man cognises to the extent that he acts on,and he himself is subject to the action of, the externalworld . Dialectical materialism teaches that manis impelled to reflect chiefly by the sensations heexperiences as he acts on the external world....Proceeding from the consideration that it is pos-sible to dominate nature only by submitting to her,dialectical materialism calls upon us to coordinateour activity with the universal laws of nature,with the necessary order of things, with the univer-sal laws of development of the world....

[53]...Thus Parmenides saw the true essence ofthings (“the One”) in that which can be cognisedby thought or reason and which lies behind fluctuat-ing and mutable phenomena. Thereby, be divorcedsense-perceptions from their basis, the phenomenalworld from the meta-phenomenalistic....

[54]...Whereas for the rationalistic metaphysi-cists true reality is given in the concept, for thesensualists the real is that which is given in

sense-perception or perception. That which liesbeyond the senses is inaccessible to cognition.The objects of cognition are phenomena, whichare raised to the level of absolute reality. Thecontent of empirical consciousness is changeableand fluctuating. Phenomenalism denies thereal substratum of qualities. Given is diversity,the multiplicity of phenomena, but no unity ofsubstance....

[55]...Kant contrived to combine the phenomen-

alistic doctrine of incognisability of things in and

for themselves with the rationalistic metaphys-

ooph!

R

V. I. LENIN478

R

rot!

Clumsy to necplus ultra!*

This isa muddle

=

55

icists’ doctrine of the existence of absolutely realbeing, of “things-in-themselves.”

[56]...The French materialists, headed by Hol-bach, counterposed nature, as the metaphysicalessence of a thing, to its properties. This antithesisin a certain sense denotes the same dualism asthat between Kant’s “thing-in-itself” and “phe-nomena...”

[57]...However, we would be unjust to French

materialism if we identified it with Kantianism.After all, eighteenth-century materialismrecognises the relative cognisability even of theessence of things....

French materialism, taking as its point ofdeparture the same consideration, that matteracts on our external senses, admits, however, thatcertain properties of things in and for themselvesare cognisable. But French materialism is insuffic-iently consistent, since it teaches that only certainproperties of things are cognisable, while the“essence” itself or the “nature” of them is concealedfrom us and is not fully cognisable.

[58]...Kant borrowed this counterposing of theproperties of the things to their “nature” from theagnostics, from the sensualistic phenomenalists(directly from Hume)....

In contrast to phenomenalism and sensualism,materialism regards the impressions which wereceive from things in and for themselves as havingobjective significance. Whereas phenomenalism (andKantianism) sees no points of contact between theproperties of things and their “nature,” i.e., theexternal world, the French materialists emphasisespecifically that things in and for themselves,at least in part, are cognisable precisely throughthe impressions they produce upon us, that theproperties of things are, to a certain extent,objectively real....

[60]...Dialectical materialism puts materialsubstance, the real substratum, at the basis ofbeing. It has looked upon the world “as a process,as a substance, which is developing continuously”(Engels). The metaphysicists’ immutable andabsolute being becomes mutable being. Substantial

* the highest degree.—Ed.

8

(


NB

NBCorrect truthsare outlinedin a diaboli-cally preten-

tious, abstruseform. Whydid Engels

not write suchgibberish?

reality is recognised to be mutable, and changes andmovements are recognised to be real forms of being.Dialectical materialism overcomes the dualism of“being” and “not-being,” the metaphysicallyabsolute antithesis of the immanent to the“transcendental,” of the properties of things to thethings themselves. On the basis of dialecticalmaterialism, it becomes possible scientificallyto connect the thing-in-itself with phenomenaand the immanent with the transcendental, andto surmount the incognisability of things-in-them-selves, on the one hand, and the “subjectivism”of qualities, on the other, for “the nature of thething,” as Plekhanov observes with very goodreason, “manifests itself precisely in its prop-erties.” It is the impressions which we receivefrom things in and for themselves that enable usto judge of the properties of things in and for them-selves, of objectively real being....

[60-61]...The “immanent” acquires an objective-ly real character; the “transcendental,” whichlies beyond phenomena in the sphere of the “in-cognisable,” is transformed from a mysteriousessence that is inaccessible to our senses intoan “immanent” content of our consciousness, intoan object of sensuous perception. The “immanent”becomes “transcendental insofar as it acquiresobjectively real significance, insofar as it makesit possible to judge of the properties of thingsby impressions; the “transcendental” becomes“immanent” insofar as it is declared to lie in thesphere of the cognisable, even though beyond thesubject. Beltov expresses himself in the same sense.“According to this theory,” he says, “nature isprimarily a totality of phenomena. But sincethings-in-themselves are a necessary condition forphenomena, or, in other words, since phenomenaare caused by the action of the object on the sub-ject, we are compelled to admit that the laws ofnature have not only subjective , but also objectivesignificance, i.e., that the mutual relations ofideas in the subject correspond, when man is notin error, to the mutual relations of things outsideit.”* This answers in the only correct and scientificform the question of the mutual relations of phe-nomena and things-in-themselves—that most im-portant question of cognition, over which Kant

* N. Beltov, Criticism of Our Critics, p. 199.

NB

7

V. I. LENIN480

NB

NB

!

NB

?)

the metaphysicists and the phenomenalists rackedtheir brains so much.

[62]...The unity of being and not-being is be-coming, dialectics teaches. Put into concrete ma-terialist language, this thesis implies that at thebasis of all that exists is substance, matter, whichis developing continuously...

[64]...Hence the body does not consist only in

its perceptibility, as the sensualistic phenomenal-

ists believe, but exists quite independently of our

perceptions, exists “for itself,” as a”subject.”But while the body exists independently of our

perceptions, our perceptions, on the other hand,fully depend on the body acting on us. Without thelatter, there are no perceptions, no notions, con-cepts or ideas. Our thinking is determined bybeing, i.e., by the impressions we receive fromthe external world. That being so, our ideas andconcepts, too, have objectively real significance.

[65]...The body, acting on our senses, is re-garded as the cause of the action it produces, i.e.,perception. The phenomenalists dispute the verypossibility of framing the question in this way.The immanenists hold that the external worldis not only inaccessible to perception, but alsoinconceivable, even if such a world existed....

[67]...It has to be assumed also that our per-ceptions, as a result of the action of two factors—the external world and our sensuousness”—arenot identical in content as well with the objectsof the external world, which is immediately in-tuitively * inaccessible to us....

[69]...From the point of view of dialectical ma-terialism, the thing-in-itself is an object such asit exists in itself, and “for itself.” It is in thissense that Plekhanov defines matter “as the totalityof things-in-themselves, since these things are thesource of our sensations.”** This thing-in-itself,

* The sign indicates that the words “immediateiyintuitively” should be transposed.—Ed.

** “Das Bild dieses Seins außer dem Denken ist dieMaterie, das Substrat der Realität!” L. Feuerbach,Werke, Bd. 2, S. 289.

R


??

a clumsy,absurd word!

or matter, is not an abstract concept, which liesbehind the concrete properties of things, but a“concrete” concept. The being of matter is notdivorced from its essence or, vice versa, its essenceis not divorced from its being.

[70]...An object, devoid of all qualities or pro-perties, cannot even be conceived by us, cannotexist, cannot have any being. The external world

is constructed by us out of our perceptions,

on the basis of those impressions evoked in usby the external world, by things in and for them-selves.... Between the external and internal worldthere exists a certain distinction, and at the sametime a definite similarity, so that we arrive at the

cognition of the external world through impres-sions, but they are precisely impressions producedby objects of the external world. On the strengthof the impressions produced upon us by the actionof an object, we attribute definite properties tothe latter. An impression is the resultant of twofactors, and as such it is inevitably conditionedby the nature of these two factors and includessomething which constitutes the nature of oneand the other factor, something which is commonto both....

[71]...Only on the basis of dialectical material-ism, with its recognition of the external world,is the possibility presented of building a purelyscientific theory of knowledge. He who rejectsthe external world also rejects the cause of oursensations and arrives at idealism. But the external

world is also the principle of uniformity. And

if, in our perceptions, we are confronted witha definite, regular connection between them, this

only occurs because the cause of our sensations,i.e., the external world, constitutes the basis ofthis uniform connection....

[72]...Without the possibility of provision it isimpossible scientifically to cognise the phenomenaof nature and human life. ...But the objects of theexternal world are in causal relation not only tous, but also to one another, i.e, between the

V. I. LENIN482

Aha!Plekhanov issilent on this“new trend,”does not know

it. Deborindoes not view

it clearly.Correct!

s t u p i dterm!

objects of the external world themselves thereexists a definite interaction, a knowledge of whoseconditions, for its part, makes it possible to foreseeand predict not only the action to be exercisedupon us by objects, but also their objective rela-tions and actions, which are independent of us,i.e., the objective properties of things....

[73]...Dialectical materialism by no meanspredetermines the question of the structure ofmatter in the sense of an obligatory recognition ofthe atomistic or corpuscular theory, or of anythird hypothesis. And if the new theories of thestructure of atoms are triumphant, dialecticalmaterialism will not only not be confuted but, onthe contrary, will be most brilliantly confirmed.What, indeed, is the essence of the new trend in

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDthe sphere of natural science? It is, above all, theDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDfact that the atom, which physicists used to regardas immutable and most simple, i.e., an elemen-tary and indivisible “body,” is found to consistof still more elementary units or particles. It isassumed that the electrons constitute ultimateelements of being. But does dialectical materialismassert that the atom is the absolute limit of being?...

[74]...It would be erroneous to think, as ourMachists do, that with the recognition of theelectron theory matter disappears as a reality,and hence, together with matter, also dialecticalmaterialism, which considers matter as the solereality and the only suitable tool for systema-tising experience.... Whether all atoms consistof electrons is an undecided question; it is a hypo-thesis that may not be confirmed. But apartfrom this, does the electron theory eliminatethe atom? It only proves that the atom is relatively

stable, indivisible and immutable.... But theatom, as the real substratum is not eliminatedby the electron theory....

[75]...To sum up. From the formal aspect,dialectical materialism, as we have seen, makesuniversally obligatory and objective cognitionpossible thanks to the fact that, from its pointof view, the forms of being are also forms of


Written not earlier than 1 9 0 9Published in part in 1 9 3 0in Lenin Miscellany X II

Published in full for the firsttime


thinking, that to every change in the objectiveworld there corresponds a change in the sphere ofperceptions. As for the material aspect, dialecticalmaterialism proceeds from the recognition of

things-in-themselves or the external world ormatter. “Things-in-themselves” are cognisable. Theunconditional and absolute is rejected by dialecti-cal materialism. Everything in nature is in theprocess of change and motion, which are based ondefinite combinations of matter. According todialectics, one “form” of being changes into anotherthrough leaps. Modern theories of physics, far fromdisproving, fully confirm the correctness of dialec-tical materialism.

484

sic!

incorrect {

incorrect!

V. SHULYATIKOV.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF CAPITALISM

IN WEST-EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

(FROM DESCARTES TO E. MACH)

MOSCOW, 1908

[5] *...In intellectual circles a traditional atti-tude has been established towards philosophy....Philosophical ideas are presented with too littleand too feeble connection with any sort of classsubstratum ....

Very many Marxists adhere to the same view.They are convinced that a variegated medley ofphilosophical views is permissible in the ranksof the proletarian vanguard, that it has no greatsignificance whether ideologists of the proletariatprofess materialism or energeticism, neo-Kantian-ism or Machism....

[6]...To maintain such a viewpoint means fallinginto a naïve, most grievous error.... Withoutexception, all philosophical terms and formulasused by it**... serve it to denote social classes,groups, sections and their mutual relations. Whendealing with the philosophical system of this orthat bourgeois thinker, we are dealing with a pic-

ture of the class structure of society, depicted bymeans of conventional symbols and reproducingthe social profession de foi of a definite bourgeoisgroup....

[7]...These pictures must not be accepted asbeing something that could be utilised and brought

* The page references are to Shulyatikov’s b o o k . — E d .** philosophy—Ed.

485NOTES ON SHULYATIKOV’S BOOK

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

sic!

!!

whatnonsense!

;

into line with the proletarian world outlook. Thatwould mean falling into opportunism, trying tocombine what cannot be combined....

...the first brilliant attempt at this sort of re-

appraisal took place as far back as several yearsago. Comrade A. Bogdanov’s article “AuthoritarianThought”* undoubtedly opens up a new erain the history of philosophy: after the appearanceof this article, speculative philosophy lost the rightto employ its two fundamental concepts of “mind”and “body”; it was established that these conceptswere formed against the background of authoritar-ian relations and the antithesis between themreflected a social antithesis—the antithesis of theorganising “top strata” and the executive “lowerstrata.” With amazing consistency bourgeois criticsignored the work of the Russian Marxist....

[8]...In these circumstances, a social and genet-ic analysis of philosophical concepts and systemsis not only desirable, but definitely necessary.It is a task which is extremely difficult and com-

plicated.... Contemporary fashionable systems, e.g.,

neo-Kantianism or Machism....[9-10]...Our essay is not intended for a limited

circle of experts.... Demos is revealing an interestin philosophy ... our exposition is of a somewhatelementary character.... The viewpoint we aredefending ... can be more easily mastered if illustrat-ed not by unwieldy, but by economically selectedmaterial....

I

THE ORGANISINGAND ORGANISED “PRINCIPLES”

[11]...Economic inequality arose: the organis-ers were gradually transformed into the owners ofthe instruments of production,** which had oncebelonged to society....

* Included in the symposium of his articles“From the Psychology of Society.”

** I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , w e d i s a g r e e s o m e w h a t w i t ht h e e x p l a n a t i o n s p r o p o s e d b y c o m r a d e B o g d a n o v . H e

V. I. LENIN486

??now the

nonsense isclear!!

Fiction andempty

phrases.Indeed,

very “gen-eral”!! Words.

The savageand primitivecommunismare slurredover. Mate-rialism andidealism in

Greece as well.

nothing butidealism!

[11-12]...Production relations of “authoritar-ian” society... The primitive savage every-where begins to see the manifestation of organisa-tory will. “...the executor is accessible to externalsenses—this is the physiological organism, thebody; the organiser is not accessible to them, he ispresumed inside the body; this is the spiritualpersonality....

[13]...The concept of the mind acquires an in-creasingly abstract character.

[14]...When in the history of Greek philosophy

the famous question was raised: flow is it possiblefor the multifarious transient phenomena of thematerial world to have been derived from pure,immutable, non-material substance? What is therelation of “being” to “becoming”?— it was not,contrary to the assertions of all kinds of historiansof philosophy, the highest flight of noble humanthought, a most altruistic effort aimed at solving

does not attach to this last circumstance the impor-tance it undoubtedly had; he does not even advance it.We had occasion to speak about the question elsewhere“From the History and Practice of the Class Struggle”(in the chapters devoted to the genesis of the rulingclasses). Edition of S. Dorovatsky and A. Charushnikov.

eee


So, indeed!And Greek

materialism?

and thesceptics??

not in thesame sense

as yours

the greatest mystery of the universe and therebygiving joy to the human race for all time. Thematter was much simpler! To frame the questionin that manner merely pointed to the fact thatin the Greek towns the process of social stratifica-tion had gone a long way, that the gulf betweenthe “upper” and the “lower strata” of society hadbecome deeper, and the old ideology of the organis-ers, corresponding to less differentiated socialrelations, had lost its right to existence. Earlier,in spite of all the distinctions between substanceand the world of phenomena, the direct connectionbetween them had not been doubted. Now, theexistence of this connection is denied. Substanceand the world of phenomena are declared to beincommensurable magnitudes. Relations betweenthem are only possible through a series of inter-mediary links. Or, in more philosophical language,we cannot establish their reciprocal relationseither by means of the senses or by means ofordinary thought: to do so requires the assistanceof some special “idea,” some special intuition.

IIORGANISING AND ORGANISED“PRINCIPLES” IN THE PERIOD

OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION

[15]...This very question—the question of theincommensurability of the mental and material“principles,” of the absence of a direct connectionbetween them, was put forward and solved by theoriginators of the new philosophy....

[16]...The spiritualistic sympathies of the Re-naissance and subsequent epochs are usually men-tioned in passing, but they are very character-istic.*

[17]...The medieval artisan, while being anorganiser, at the same time fulfilled executivefunctions—he worked together with his appren-tices. The bourgeois manufacturer knows only one

* It will be recalled that Marx in Vol. I of Capi-tal and K. Kautsky note the dependence between ab-

stract religious views and the development of com-

modity production.

V. I. LENIN488

what nonsense!

e.g., trainedworkers andtrainees un-

der them

to page 19

= =Who? See

page 17

nonsense!

type of function: he is purely an organiser. In thefirst case, it is true, a basis is provided for thatdualistic “mode of presenting the facts explainedby Comrade Bogdanov; nevertheless, the anti-thesis of organiser and executor is somewhatveiled. Hence the corresponding antithesis ofmental and corporeal, active and passive, prin-ciples, in the sphere of ideology, could not takea sharp form....

[17]...In the workshop of the medieval artisanthere was no place for representatives of so-calleduntrained, unskilled labour. Work is found forthem in the manufacturing workshop. They consti-tute the “lower stratum.” Above them are otherstrata, other groups of workers, each differingaccording to the degree of skill. Among themcertain organising layers are already formed. Goingfurther up ascending scale, we see groups ofadministrators and technical managers of theenterprises. The owner of the enterprise is thus“freed” not only from every kind of physical labour,but also from many purely organisational duties....

[19]...In contrast to the medieval thinkers, the“fathers” of the new philosophy devote very muchattention in their systems to the world of transientphenomena, make a detailed study of its structureand development, the laws governing the relationsbetween its parts; they create a natural philosophy.The very same “elevated” position of the leadersof the manufacturing enterprises which inspired inthe fathers of the new philosophy the “pure” ideaof organising will, suggested to them, similarly,a mechanical explanation of the processes of mate-rial reality, i.e., the processes taking place amongthe organised mass.

The point is that the leader of the manufactur-ing enterprise is merely the final link in a fairlylong chain of organising links. In relation to him,the other organisers are subordinate and, in turn,stand in opposition to him as organised persons....But insofar as their role differs from that of thechief leader, insofar as it consists in taking partin the technical work from which the chief leaderis “freed,” to that extent their “mental” characteris blurred and their activity is appraised as activityof “matter”....

word


NB

In this vulgar-isation of the

history ofphilosophy,

the struggle ofthe bourgeoi-

sie againstfeudalism

is completelyforgotten.

n o t hence

[21-22]...The bourgeois system in general isa two-faced Janus.... True, we find a definiteformulation of dualism only in Cartesianism,—in the system created just at the dawn of the neweconomic era; true, subsequent philosophicalsystems, beginning with that of Spinoza, declarethat the Cartesian counterposing of God and theworld, of mind and body, is contradictory. ...Thematerialist and positivist systems of bourgeoisphilosophy, in turn, by no means testify to atriumph over the dualistic viewpoint. The differ-ence between bourgeois metaphysics and thebourgeois “positive world outlook” is not as greatas it may appear at first glance. ...The attackmade by materialism is not directed against thefundamental premise put forward by metaphysics;the concept of the organising will is not done awaywith by materialism. It merely figures underanother name: for example, “force” takes the placeof “spirit”......

[22-23]...In the seventeenth century, at the timeof its “storm and stress,” the English bourgeoisiepreached the doctrine that everything in theworld should be explained as a motion of materialparticles taking place from mechanical necessity.The English bourgeoisie were laying the founda-tions for large-scale capitalist economy.... Theyimagined the whole world in the form of an organisa-tion of material particles united in accordancewith immanent laws....

[23-24]...In the second half of the eighteenthcentury, the French bourgeoisie flooded the bookmarket with similar treatises.... But we knowwhat is meant by the internal structure of enter-prises: it is the realm of matter and mechanicalprocesses. Hence the generalisation: man is a ma-chine, nature is a machine....

...The motion of matter is conditioned by itself,or rather by its own force (Holbach). The organisa-tory will, it is seen, has again become extremelytransformed, but its presence is noted and isadmitted to be absolutely essential.

V. I. LENIN490

and whatabout their

struggleagainst clerica-lism? Shulya-tikov has dis-torted history!

NBwhat non-sense! the

p r o l e t a r -i a t = m a t-

t e r

nonsense

= =

and what aboutPlato’s ideas”?

The manufacturers did not act as revolution-ary representatives of “Sturm and Drang”....

IIICARTESIANISM

[25]...The organised require an organiser....[26]...The intermediary organisatory links—

“individual minds” can only fulfil their organisingrole if there exists a superior organisatory centre.Only, the latter brings them into contact with theproletariat—“matter”—within the framework of

organised whole, a manufacturing workshop....

[27]...The Cartesian concept of man is nothingbut the further propagation of a definite form ofthinking, “a definite mode of presenting the facts,a definite type of their union in the psyche.”We have seen that the world in Descartes’ systemis organised on the lines of a manufacturing enter-prise....

...We are dealing with the cult of mental labour....[28]...I am an organiser and, as such, can exist

only by fulfilling organisatory and not executivefunctions: this is the meaning of the Cartesianassertion, if it is translated into the language ofclass relations....

...The common, naïve viewpoint sees the externalworld as it appears through the prism of thesenses....

[29]...The concept of the worker as merelya saddler or merely a paper-hanger gives way to theconcept of the worker in general. Trade no longerconstitutes the “essence” of labour-power....

[31]...Time, Descartes explains, must not beconsidered a property of matter: it is “a mode of

óòò?


infantile

phrase-mon-gering

thinking,” a generic concept created by the latter....[32-33]...Henceforth philosophy is the faithful

servant of capital. ...The revaluation of philo-sophical values was determined by changes in theorganising upper strata and organised lower strata.New organisers, new organised—new concepts ofGod and spirit, new concepts of matter....

IVSPINOZA

[37]...All relations between mind and body areonly through God. All relations between theintermediary organisatory links and the organisedmass are only with the sanction of the supremeorganiser!...

...The motion of matter and the activity of themind are only two aspects of one and the sameprocess. There can be no question of any interactionbetween mind and matter.

[41]...Experience, sensuous perception, is forhim an imperative condition for cognising things....

[42]...But ... when Spinoza died, as is wellknown, the fine fleur of the Dutch bourgeoisiewith great pomp accompanied the hearse thatcarried his remains. And if we become more closelyacquainted with his circle of acquaintances and

correspondents, we again meet with the fine fleur

of the bourgeoisie—and not only of Holland butof the entire world. ...The bourgeoisie reveredSpinoza their bard.

Spinoza’s conception of the world is the songof triumphant capital of all-consuming, all-cen-tralising capital. There is no being, there are nothings, apart from the single substance; there canbe no existence for producers apart from the large-scale manufacturing enterprise....

VLEIBNITZ

[45] Leibnitz’s God is the owner of an exemplar-ily organised enterprise and is himself the supremeorganiser....

V. I. LENIN492

a fine expla-nation! prim-

itive mate-rialism à la

L o r i awhat aboutthe relativ-ism of theGreeks?

vague andinexact

Go ahead,lump every-

thing togeth-er! idealism

as well asscepticism,everything

“corresponds”to manufac-

ture! ComradeShulyatikov

is simple,very simple.

? What aboutFichte?Fichte?

VIBERKELEY

[51]...Hobbes’ materialism corresponded to theSturm-und-Drang period of the English capitalistbourgeoisie. The way was paved for manufacture,quieter times began for the manufacturers: Hobbes’materialism gave place to the half-hearted systemof Locke. The further consolidation of the positionof manufacture determined the possibility of anti-materialist utterances.

[56]...“The attraction and repulsion of workersshould take place without any obstacles”: inperceptual complexes there are decidedly noabsolute elements. Everything is relative.

VIIHUME

[61]...His kinship to all the thinkers who appearin the foregoing chapters is beyond doubt....

The position of philosophical scepticism adoptedby Hume corresponds precisely to such a conceptionof the capitalist organism.

IXFICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL

[81]...There arise systems of so-called objectiveidealism....

[88]...objective idealists....

((

;

1)

2)

3)


Nonsense.What aboutthe contept

of “motion”?

what nonsense!

Fichte — anobjectiveidealist!!!

what non-sense!

whatnonsense!

[94]...But we know that in all the systemsof bourgeois philosophy “matter” is regarded as thesubordinate principle (even by the materialistswho, we repeat, note its subordinate position byintroducing the concept of “force”)....

[98]...It is merely one step from Fichte’s anti-thetical method and Schelling’s potentialisingtheory to Hegel’s dialectics. And in regard tothe latter, after all that has been said in thischapter about the antithetical method, it onlyremains for us to make a few supplementary re-marks. We have already made clear the “realbackground” of dialectics.

Hegel merely more fully substantiated thetheory of development through “contradictions,”which had been outlined by two other objectiveidealists....

[98-99]...The innovation made by Hegel em-phasises the following fact from the sphere of“real” relations. The differentiation of functionsand roles in manufacture reaches its maximum.

A stratification takes place of each separateexecutive group and each separate organisinggroup. The functions belonging to any one definitegroup are distributed among various, newly-formedgroups. Each group breaks up and new groups areformed from it. And the ideologist of the manufac-turers considers this breaking-up process to be theprocess of the internal development of this or that“principle”....

XTHE REVIVAL OF THE “MANUFACTURING”

PHILOSOPHY

[100]...Speculative philosophy loses prestige inbourgeois society. True, this does not occur allat once. But neither did the machine conquerthe territory of industry all at once....

[101]...How can the positive nature of thenew ideological systems be explained? By the

=

OO(

#

V. I. LENIN494

]

whatnonsense!

=what

nonsense!

NB

simple law of contrasts, the simple endeavour

“to do the opposite” of what constituted the “symbolof faith of yesterday?...

Individualised “complexes”—Ivan, Peter, Jacobvanish. In their place there appears in the work-shops the worker in general. “Matter” is given backthe “qualities that were expropriated from it....

[102]...Matter is rehabilitated. Bourgeois so-ciety introduces the cult of the new idol—”environ-ment.” True, in doing so, the fact is not lost sightof that nevertheless matter remains matter, i.e.,the organised mass, and, as such, cannot existwithout a “manager.” And “force,” as a specialistin organisatory duties, is assigned to matter. Trea-tises about Stoff und Kraft (“matter and force”) arewritten.... [104] A comparison between the most recentorganisation of the factories and the internalstructure of manufacture already a priori dictatesthe reply: the new variety of bourgeois philosophyshould reproduce substantial features of the philos-ophy of the manufacturing epoch.... [106] Neo-Kantianism gives way to a “turn”towards systems of “pre-Kantian” thought.

XIW. WUNDT

[108]...“the object can never be separated from theidea, or the idea from the object....” [113]...The considerations that have been givenare already sufficient to define Wundt clearlyas a philosopher who sets himself the task ofcombating materialism or, to use the fashionableterm, “Überwindung” des Materialismus,” “over-coming materialism,” and who, in so doing, doesnot declare himself to be on the side of the schoolwhich is regarded as the traditional opponent ofmaterialism....

OO =

OO


nonsense

this is true,but not as

stated

ha-ha!eclecticnot true

S

S

[114]...Such an equalisation of the intermediaryorganising links and representatives of “physical”labour, the “lower executives,” is indicated in thesphere of philosophy precisely by the endeavourto characterise “subject” and “object,” “psychical”and “physical,” as comprising an “indivisible”whole, the endeavour to reduce the antithesisbetween the phenomena mentioned to a cognitivefiction. Avenarius’ theory on principal coordina-tion, Ernst Mach’s theory on the relation of thepsychical and physical, Wundt’s theory on ideas-objects—these are all theories of the same order....

[116]...Hitherto, Wundt’s monist viewscould not be denied a certain consistency. Norcan he any more be suspected of idealist sym-pathies....

[118]...Wundt takes just such a leap when, onthe heel of his theory on “ideas-objects,” he putsforward his views on “psycho-physical parallel-ism”....

[121]...“Attributes” are transformed into “se-ries,” but this reform, in essence, is more of a verbalcharacter....

[123]...Primacy is asserted for the spiritual principle....

[123-124]...Everything corporeal has necessarilyits psychical correlation. No single worker, howeversimple the function he fulfils, can produce anyproducts, can find any application for his labour-power, can exist, without his being under thedirect, detailed “guidance” of a definite organiser....

...But the psychical series constitutes the “orga-nisers” and the “concomitance” of the latter signi-fies for the “physical series”—for the workers—

nothing but dependence....[128]...Thus, according to Wundt, philosophy

should transcend the bounds of experience, “supple-ment” the latter. The philosophical analysis needsto be continued until we obtain the idea of a unitywhich embraces both series that are independentof each other. Having expressed this ,view, Wundtimmediately hastens to make an important reserva-tion for himself: he declares that we can conceiveof the unity of the world either as a material unity

=

OO

ôô

e

V. I. LENIN496

=

=

nonsense!What about

Schopen-hauer?

inexact {true!

Then Willy,Petzoldt(twice),

Kleinpeter.

or as a mental unity: a third solution of theproblem does not exist...

[129]...Wundt refuses to give the name substanceto his idea of universal unity. He defines it asthe idea of pure reason, i.e., in the Kantian sense.Just as Kant’s God is the idea of the supreme“forming,” non-substantial principle, so alsoWundt’s universal unity is the idea of non-sub-stantial unity, thanks to which all phenomenaacquire vital meaning, indisputable value. In thelight of this idea, there disappears the “empty andcheerless” philosophy which sees in the outwardorder of phenomena, in their mechanical connec-tion, the true essence of the latter. In its placewe obtain the view of the cosmic mechanism asthe external covering of spiritual activity andcreation....

[130]...In this connection, Wundt stronglyemphasises the element of actuality. He reducesthe idea of universal unity, of the “foundation ofthe world, to the idea of a universal will....

[131]...We shall not enter on an analysis ofhis proposed formulation, nor shall we explainhis theory of “voluntarism”......

...Consequently, the ideologists of the modernvanguard of the capitalist bourgeoisie cannotspeak of any “permanent” organised principlesbut, on the contrary, have to describe the latter assomething extremely changeable, something thatis eternally in a state of motion....

XIIEMPIRIO-CRITICISM

[133]...Wundt’s criticism had no crushingforce; it struck at an imaginary target. Wundt’sappearance on the scene and the subsequent reac-tion from the camp of Avenarius’* disciples didnot signify a conflict between the philosophiesof two different classes or two large groups of oneand the same class. The socio-economic background

* Carstanjen was the first to reply.


of the philosophical contest in question was, inthis case, the comparatively insignificant differencebetween the most advanced and the somewhat lessadvanced types of modern capitalist organisa-tions....

[134]...We should say more: the empirio-critic-al philosophy should be understood primarily asan apologia for the idea in question. The conceptof functional dependence is a denial of causaldependence....

[135-136]...Høffding’s conclusion must, in gen-eral, be considered correct. Only his reference to“motives of expediency” is unfortunate: thesemotives are vague and indefinite.

Avenarius, in this case, was merely makinga concession to materialist phraseology, a conces-sion determined by his social position. To manypeople the views of the “parallelists” might appearto be materialist in comparison with vulgar spiri-tualism. The same applies to the views of empirio-criticism. The possibility of their coming closeto materialism is particularly strong. ...And widesections of the reading public have formed the

opinion that empirio-criticism is a materialistschool of thought. More than that, even expertphilosophers judge it erroneously: Wilhelm Wundthimself, the patriarch of modern philosophy, calledit “materialism”. Finally, what is most interestingof all, the empirio-critics, too, while dissociatingthemselves from materialism, at the same timesometimes use its terminology, and sometimeseven begin as it were to waver in their anti-material-ist views....

[137]...Such is the real background that inspiredempirio-criticism with the idea of classifyinghuman cognition on the basis of the principle of“biological” classification. But this sort of “biol-ogy,” we repeat, has nothing in common withmaterialism....

correct

that is soreally??

Of course, butit does notfollow from

this that func-tionality

cannot be avariety ofcausality.

really?

Hm?

a lie!

Why? Youhave not

understoodthis!aha!

V. I. LENIN498

[138-139]...dualism—according to Avenarius—is the fruit of a certain process of our abstractingthought—“introjection”....

But the antithesis of the “external” and “inter-nal” world is the purest fiction.

An analysis of this antithesis is extremelyimportant; it should lead to substantiating themonist world outlook. Commentators of Avenarius’system of philosophy strongly stress this point.“By exposing the impermissibility of introjection,one of them says,* “two aims are achieved ....”

[140]...the subordinate organiser, if his “abso-lute” viewpoint is adopted, i.e., if he is regardedas an organiser independent of the “will” controll-ing him, is confronted also merely by a “thing,”or “body,” in the shape of the workers. But let ustake another case: for the supreme “will,” thesubordinate organiser is not only one who is orga-nised, but one who organises.... The former “object,”now converted into “subject,” “organises” matter:man assimilates a tree, but a tree transformed, the“notion” of tree....

[141-142]...“the fullness of human experience”is also proved in Avenarius’ theory of principalco-ordination....

In Avenarius, like in Wundt, the “series”turn out, in essence, to be “incommensurable.”And instead of the materialist world outlookthat one would expect after the categorical state-ments about “the fullness of experience,” viewsare expressed testifying to the idealist sympathiesof empirio-criticism.... But Wundt and Avenarius part company onthe road of idealist constructions. The author ofThe System of Philosophy reveals a fancy for“Kantian” motives. The author of The HumanConcept of the World proclaims views which bringhim close to the position once taken by Berkeley. Let us hasten to make a reservation. We do notat all intend to assert that the works of the Bishopof Cloyne determined Avenarius’ viewpoint, thatthey had a direct influence on him. But the simi-larity of the idealist positions of both philosophersis indubitable. The afore-mentioned theory of

* Rudolph Wlassak ; quoted by Mach in The Analys isof Sensations, p. 52.

oh, this issuspicious!

A cheapexplanationwith no ana-lysis of thesubstance!

true?


true!

Here Shulya-tikov is un-

der a misap-prehension.

bien!

hm? hm?

a misappre-hension

NB

a misappre-

principal co-ordination, taken as a whole, is evi-dence of this similarity.

With the same straightforwardness as Berkeley,Avenarius presents the thesis that there are noobjects outside the subject. Each “thing” mustnecessarily “he related” to the central nervoussystem, which plays the role of functional centre....

[144]...The supreme “leader” does not figure,not even in the shape of the Kantian idea of reason,Kant’s “form,” or in the shape of Wundt’s “univer-sal unity.” Nevertheless, he is there, and is moreoverthe chief element of the philosophical system.All phenomena are regarded precisely from hispoint of view. His “invisible presence is postulatedby the unusually high appraisal of the organisatoryprinciple, presented parallel with the conceptionof organised organisers. And in the general pictureof the world resulting from Avenarius’ philosophic-al discourses, it is precisely the organisatorycharacter of the organising factors that comesinto the forefront....

For Avenarius the world represents an agglom-erate of central nervous systems. “Matter” isabsolutely deprived of all “qualities,” whether“primary” or “secondary,” which at one time wereconsidered its inalienable property. Absolutelyeverything in matter is determined by the “spirit”or, to use the terminology of the author of theCritique of Pure Experience, by the central nervoussystem....

[145] The viewpoint of idealism in the styleof Berkeley is put forward with great consistencyby the author of the Critique of Pure Experience....

[146 ]...Mach’s theory of the “ego” as a logicalsymbol....

Mach, like Avenarius, knows two “series”—thepsychical and the physical (two kinds of combina-tions of elements). As with Avenarius, theseseries are incommensurable and at the same timerepresent nothing but a fiction of our thought.Alternately, the monist and the dualist viewpointis put forward: alternately the intermediary orga-nisatory links are described as the organised, andas the organising principle. And, as with Avena-rius, in the final analysis the dictatorship of “theorganisatory will” is proclaimed. An idealistic

V. I. LENIN500

FROM MARX

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DISTRIBUTION

picture of the world is drawn: the world is a com-plex of “sensations .”

[147]...Mach’s objection cannot be called valid.The central concept of his philosophical system,the famous “sensation,” is by no means a denial

either of the organisatory principle or of thesupreme organisatory principle.... Mach was prompt-ed in his criticism of the conception of the “ego”by the view of the subordinate organisers as theorganised “mass”....

[148-149]...Besides dealing with the specula-tive constructions of Wundt, Avenarius andMach, we could, for example, subject to analysisthe views of such prominent representatives ofmodern West-European philosophy as RenouvierBradley and Bergson....

The sphere of philosophy is a veritable “Bastil-le of bourgeois ideology.... It is necessary to bearin mind that, for their part, the bourgeois ideolo-gists are not sleeping, but are strengthening theirposition. At the present time, they are even im-bued with the conviction that their position isabsolutely impregnable. The “idealist” sympathiesof certain literary writers who take their standunder the banner of Marxism in turn, createparticularly favourable soil for such a convic-tion....

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XI. Wundt Ostwald . . . . 107 not in the book

The entire book is an example of extreme vul-garisation of materialism. Instead of a concrete analysisof periods, formations, ideologies—empty phrases about“organisers” and ridiculously strained, absurdly falsecomparisons.

A caricature of materialism in history.And it is a pity, for there is an attempt made in

the direction of materialism.

hensionaha!

a misappre-hension

nonsense!

NB

Written not earlier than 1 9 0 8First published in 1 9 3 7 in

the magazine ProletarskayaRevolyutsia, No. 8


=

501

G. V. PLEKHANOV.N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY

SHIPOVNIK PUBLISHING HOUSE, ST. PETERSBURG, 1910168

INTRODUCTION

[51]...The unfortunate outcome [52] of theCrimean War compelled the Government to makea few concessions to educated society and effectat least the more pressing reforms that had longsince become indispensable. Soon the problemof freeing the peasants was placed on the orderof the day, a problem plainly affecting the inter-ests of all social-estates. Needless to say, Niko-lai Gavrilovich** eagerly set about elaboratingthe problem. His excellent articles on the peasants’cause were written in 1857 and 1858. The mutualrelations of our social forces in the epoch of theabolition of serfdom are now fairly well known.We shall therefore mention them only in passing,

only insofar as it may be necessary to elucidate therole adopted in this matter by our advanced publi-cists, chief of whom then was N. G. Chernyshevsky.It is well known that these writers zealouslydefended the interests of the peasants. Our authorwrote one article after another, advocating theemancipation of the peasants and giving themland, and maintaining that the Government wouldfind no difficulty whatever in redeeming the landsallotted to the peasants. He supported this thesisboth with general theoretical considerations andwith the most detailed estimates. “Indeed, in

* Here and elsewhere, a NB underscored with twoslanting l ines implies that Lenin’s NB is in the cornerof the page and apparently refers to al l of it . The fulltext of the page in question is therefore given in suchcases.—Ed.

** Chernyshevsky—Ed.

NB*

V. I. LENIN502

what way can the redemption of land prove dif-ficult? How can it be too much for the people tobear? That is improbable,” he wrote in the article“Is Land Redemption Difficult?” “It runs counterto the fundamental concepts of economics. Politicaleconomy teaches clearly that all the materialcapital which a certain generation takes over fromprevious generations is not too considerable invalue compared with the mass of values producedby the labour of that generation. For example,all of the land belonging to the French people,together with all the buildings and their contents,together with all the ships and cargoes, all thelivestock and money and other riches belongingto that country, is hardly worth a hundred thou-sand million francs, while the labour of the Frenchpeople produces fifteen or more thousand millionfrancs’ worth of values annually, i.e., in no morethan seven years the French people produce a massof values equal to that of the whole of France fromthe Channel to the Pyrenees. Consequently, if theFrench had to redeem all France, they could doso in the lifetime of one [53] generation, usingonly one-fifth of their revenue for the purpose.And what is the point at issue in our country?Is it the whole of Russia that we must redeemwith all her riches? No, only the land. And is itto be all the Russian land? No, the redemptionwould affect only those gubernias of EuropeanRussia alone where serfdom is deep-rooted,” etc.*After showing that the lands to be redeemed wouldconstitute no more than one-sixth of the area ofEuropean Russia, he puts forward as many as eightplans for carrying out redemption. According tohim, if the Government were to accept any oneof these plans, it could redeem the allotted landsnot only without burdening the peasants, butalso to the great advantage of the state treasury.Chernyshevsky’s plans were all based on the con-cept that it is “n e c e s s a r y t o f i x t h em o s t m o d e r a t e p r i c e s p o s s i b l ei n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a m o u n t o fr e d e m p t i o n p a y m e n t s.” We know nowhow much consideration the Government gave tothe interests of the peasantry in the abolition ofserfdom and how much it heeded Chernyshevsky’s

* Collected Works , Vol. IV, p. 335-336. (Here andelsewhere Plekhanov refers to the first Russian edition ofN. G. Chernyshevsky’s works published in St. Petersburgin 1905-06.—Ed.)

503NOTES ON PLEKHANOV’S N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY

advice regarding moderation in fixing redemptionpayments. Whereas our government, in freeingthe peasants, never for a moment forgot the bene-fits to the state treasury, it thought very littleabout the interests of the peasants. In the re-demption operations fiscal and landlord interestswere exclusively borne in mind.

...[57] It was not on economic problems alonethat Chernyshevsky had to wage a fierce polemic.Neither were his opponents only liberal econo-mists. As the influence of the Sovremennik circle169

in Russian literature grew, the greater were thenumber of attacks launched from the most varied[58] quarters both on that circle in general andon our author in particular. The contributors toSovremennik were regarded as dangerous peoplewho were prepared to destroy all time notorious“foundations.” Some of “Belinsky’s friends,” who atfirst considered it possible to go along with Cherny-shevsky and those holding his views, repudiatedthe Sovremennik as an organ of the “Nihilists,”and began to exclaim that Belinsky would neverhave approved of its trend. Such, was I. S. Turge-nev’s attitude.* Even Herzen grumbled at the

“clowns, in his Kolokol. 170 He warned them that:“while exhausting all their ridicule over the litera-ture of exposures, our dear clowns forget thaton this slippery path they may not merely ‘whistle’themselves into becoming like Bulgarin and Grech,but even into being decorated with the StanislavOrder.” Herzen affirmed that there were excellentthings in the “literature of exposures” that the“clowns” were ridiculing. “Do you imagine thatall the tales of Shchedrin and others can just behurled into the water together with Oblomov171 ontheir necks? You indulge yourselves too much,gentlemen!**.... The reference to Shchedrin wasextremely unfortunate since Chernyshevsky him-self was well able to appreciate his work. In gen-eral, everything shows that Herzen was misledby his liberal friends, such as Kavelin. The

* Chernyshevsky relates that Turgenev could stilltolerate him to some extent but had no patience at allwith Dobrolyubov. You’re just a snake but Dobrolyubovis a cobra,” he said to Chernyshevsky (see the letteralready quoted: “By Way of an Expression of Gratitude.”Collected Works, Vol. IX, p. 103).

** The article “Very Dangerous!!” in Kolokol , No. 44.

Sotsial-Dem-okrat No. 1,

p. 152

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Up to here So-tsial-Demokrat

No. 1, p. 152

NB

ee

V. I. LENIN504

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NB

“clowns”—or “whistlers,” as they were called inRussia—were not ridiculing the exposures, butthe naïve people who could not or would not gobeyond innocent exposures, forgetting the moralof Krylov’s fable The Cat and the Cook*....

Herzen himself was to see very soon how badin a political sense were those liberal friends whokept questioning his relations with Chernyshevsky.When he had to break with K. D. Kavelin heperhaps told himself that the “jaundiced oneswere not entirely wrong.** [59]

Incidentally, the majority of the articles inSvistok which evoked the especial dissatisfactionof the well-bred liberals did not belong to thepen of N. G. Chernyshevsky. Only rarely did hecontribute to it, as he was overwhelmed withother work. In the closing years of his literaryactivity he contributed regularly to every issueof Sovremennik ; what is more, every issue usuallycontained several articles by him. As a generalrule, his articles were distributed among thevarious sections of the journal as follows: firstof all, he contributed an article on some generaltheoretical problem, then he wrote a politicalsurvey, reviewed several new books, and, lastly,by way of relaxation and diversion, as it were,he made polemical sorties against his opponents.The Sovremennik of 1861 was particularly rich inpolemical articles written by him. It was at thattime that he wrote his well-known “PolemicalGems,” “National Tactlessness” (attacking Slovoof Lvov), “Popular Muddleheadedness” (attackingAksakov’s Den; we shall speak of this articlelater), and numerous other polemical notes in thesection of Russian and foreign literature.

What is now especially interesting in “Polemi-cal Gems” is our author’s views on his own literaryactivity. We shall cite them here. Chernyshevskywas very well aware that he held a prominentplace in Russian literature. His opponents dreadedhim, and occasionally even paid him compliments.But his growing renown did not make him happy

* Regarding the article “Very Dangerous” andits more or less conjectural consequences, see, amongothers, Vetrinsky’s book Herzen , St. Petersburg, 1908,p. 354.

** The history of this break may be followed in theletters of K. D. Kavelin and I. S. Turgenev to A. I. Herzen,published by M. Dragomanov in Geneva in 1892.

ee


in the least. He had too low an opinion of Russianliterature to consider the prominent place heoccupied in it to be honourable. He was “com-pletely cold to his literary reputation.” The onlything he was interested in was whether he wouldbe able to preserve the freshness of his thoughtand feeling till those better days when our litera-ture would become really useful to society. “I knowthat better times will come for literary activity,when it will be of real benefit to society, andwhen he who possesses talent will really earn a goodname. And so I am wondering whether when thetime comes I shall still be able to serve societyproperly. Fresh strength and fresh convictionsare needed for this. But I see that I am beginningto join the company of ‘respected’ writers, that isto say, of those writers who have been wrung dry,who lag behind the movement of social require-ments. This rouses a feeling of bitterness.But what is there to be done? Age takes its toll.Youth does not come twice, [60] I can’t helpenvying those who are younger and fresherthan I....”*

[61] Meanwhile, feelings were rising at leastin a section of Russian “society.” The studentyouth were filled with unrest and secret revolu-tionary organisations were springing up whichprinted their own manifestoes and programmesand awaited an imminent peasant uprising. Wealready know that Chernyshevsky fully recognisedthe possibility of impending “troubled times”**in Russia and we shall yet see how strongly therise of the social mood was reflected in his activityas a publicist. But was he in any way connectedwith the secret societies? It is not yet possibleto reply with certainty to this question, and whoknows whether we shall ever have the facts toanswer it. In the opinion of M. Lemke, who madean excellent study of the N. C. Chernyshevskycase, “it can be p r e s u m e d (his italics) that hewas the author of the proclamation ‘To the ManorialPeasants,’ which the court found him guilty ofhaving written.” Mr. Lemke supports his conjectureby pointing to the style and content of the procla-mation. We find these arguments not withoutfoundation. But we hasten to repeat with Mr. Lem-

* Collected Works, Vol. VIII, p. 231.** i.e., the possibility of a revolution—Ed.

NB

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ke that “all these are more or less probable consider-ations, and no more.”* We also consider fairlywell founded Mr. Lemke’s opinion that the famouspaper Velikoruss was, in part, the work of Cherny-shevsky. Mr. Lemke supports his hypothesis byquoting Mr. Stakhevich, who for several yearslived with Chernyshevsky in Siberia: “I noticedthat Chernyshevsky was obviously sympatheticallyinclined towards the paper which appeared atirregular intervals under the title of Velikoruss;I recall three issues coming out. As I listened toNikolai Gavrilovich’s conversation, I sometimesnoticed that both his thoughts and the way heexpressed them [62] strongly reminded me of thepaper Velikoruss, and I decided in my own mindthat he was either the author or, at least, co-author of the paper which advocated the need forconstitutional reforms.”** We are in full agreementwith Mr. Stakhevich: the style and content ofVelikoruss are indeed very reminiscent of Cherny-shevsky’s journalistic articles. And if Cherny-shevsky was in fact the author, then that, of course,explains the circumstance that Velikoruss wasfar wiser and more tactful than other such papersof the time.

Simultaneously with the rise of the extremeparty in Russia, there was a growth of the rev-olutionary movement in Poland. Had Cherny-shevsky any formal relations with the Polishrevolutionaries of whom there were not a fewin St. Petersburg at that time? Again, there areno data on this point. Not wishing to indulge inconjectures, we shall limit ourselves, in clarifyingChernyshevsky’s general sympathies towards thePolish cause, to data obtainable from his writings;however, even such data are not numerous.

We know that the Slavophils172 very muchapproved of the struggle of the Galician Ruthen-ians against the Poles. Chernyshevsky was alwayssympathetically inclined towards the Little Rus-sians. He regarded Belinsky’s negative attitudeto the emerging Little Russian literature to bea great mistake. In the January issue of Sovremen-nik for 1861 he published a very sympathetic article

* M. K. Lemke, “The Case of N. G. Chernyshevsky,”Byloye, 1906, No. 4, p. 179.

** M. K. Lemke, “The Trial of the VelikorussPublishers,” Byloye, 1906, No. 7, p. 92. Mr. Stakhe-vich’s article was published in Zakaspiiskoye Obozrenie,1905, No. 143.


on the occasion of the appearance of Osnova, theorgan of the Little Russians. But his attitudetowards the struggle of the Galician Rutheniansagainst the Poles could not be one of unconditionalapproval. First of all, he did not like the factthat the Ruthenians sought the support of theViennese Government. Neither did he like theinfluential role of the clergy in the movement ofthe Galician Ruthenians. “Lay affairs,” he wrote,“should be the concern of laymen.” Finally, Cherny-shevsky did not like the exclusively n a t i o n a lformulation of this question, which he regarded asprimarily an e c o n o m i c one. In an articleentitled “National Tactlessness” (Sovremennik ,July 1861) attacking the Lvov Slovo, Cherny-shevsky [63] sharply criticised the excessive nation-alism of that organ. “It is very possible that acareful examination of existing relations,” hewrote, “would show the Lvov Slovo that at thebasis of the matter there is a question that is farremoved from the racial question—the questionof social-estates. It is very possible that it wouldsee Ruthenians and Poles on each of the two sides—people differing in race, but of the same socialposition. We do not believe that the Polish peasantshould be hostile to the alleviation of the obliga-tions and, in general, of the living conditions of theRuthenian settlers. We do not believe that thesentiments of the Ruthenian landowners shoulddiffer very much in this matter from the sentimentsof the Polish landowners, If we are not mistaken,the root of the Galician question lies not in rela-tions of race, but of social-estate.” The mutual hostility of the peoples composingAustria ought to have appeared even more tactlessto Chernyshevsky, in that the Viennese Govern-ment then, as previously, derived great advantagesfrom it. “When one reflects carefully, one is notsurprised at the many years of existence of theAustrian Empire,” he wrote in a political reviewin the same issue of Sovremennik that publishedthe article “National Tactlessness”; “and whyshould it not maintain itself when there is such‘excellent’ political tact on the part of the nationa-lities embraced within its borders.” To Cherny-shevsky the Austrian Germans, Czechs, Croatsand, as we have seen, Ruthenians seemed equally“slow-witted.” He was afraid that the Slav “slow-wittedness” which was particularly evident in1848-49 would again go very far. At the beginningof the sixties Hungary was waging a stubborn

V. I. LENIN508

Up to here Sot-sial-DemokratNo. 1, p. 158

NB

NB

struggle against the Viennese reactionary central-ists. The discontent of the Hungarians was runningso high that at one time it could have been expectedthat there would be a revolutionary outburst intheir country. In his political reviews, our authorrepeatedly expressed the fear that, in the eventof a revolutionary movement in Hungary, theAustrian Slavs would again become obedienttools of reaction. The tactics of many Slav racesin Austria at that time could only strengthen suchfears, since the Austrian Slays even venturedto boast of the disgraceful role they had playedin the 1848-49 events. Chernyshevsky stronglycondemned these tactics and showed that it wouldhave been more to their advantage if, on thecontrary, they had supported the enemies of theViennese Government, enemies from whom theycould have obtained substantial concessions. Hesaid this concerning the attitude of the Croatsto the Hungarians [64], and repeated this to theRuthenians. “The social-estate party, hostile tothe Ruthenians,” we read in his article “NationalTactlessness,” “is now ready for concessions....It would do no harm for the Lvov Slovo to givethis some thought; perhaps the concessions whichpeople who seem to it to be enemies are sincerelyprepared to make, perhaps these concessions areso great that they would thoroughly satisfy theRuthenian settlers; in any event these concessionsare without doubt far greater and far more impor-tant than the concessions the Ruthenian settlerscan get from the Austrians....”

[65]...Finally, the first part of the novel Prologue173

depicts the friendly attitude of Volgin to Sokolovsky(Sierakowski). Volgin likes Sokolovsky’s utterdevotion to his [66] convictions, the absence ofconceited pettiness, his self-control, combinedwith the passionate zeal of the true agitator.Volgin calls him a r e a l m a n and thinks thatour liberals could learn a great deal from him.All this is very interesting,* but it too in no wayexplains Chernyshevsky’s practical relations withthe Polish affair.174

* Volg in part icu lar ly pr ized in Soko lovsky h is“b a l a n c e d j u d g m e n t which he displayed in1848 when of al l his companions-in-arms in VolhyniaRegion he was the only one not to lose his head and toweigh coolly the chances of the armed insurrection. Theseproved to be all but nil.

ee


idemSotsial-

DemokratNo. 1,

pp. 165-166

At that time Chernyshevsky was about 34 yearsof age. He was in the prime of his mental powers,and who knows to what heights he might not haverisen in his development! But he had not long tolive in freedom. He was the recognised leader ofthe extreme party, a highly influential exponentof materialism and socialism. He was consideredthe “ringleader” of the revolutionary youth, andwas blamed for all their outbursts and agitation.As always happens in such cases, rumour exagger-ated the affair and ascribed to Chernyshevskyintentions and actions which were foreign to him.In “Prologue to a Prologue,”175 Chernyshevskyhimself describes the liberal sympathetic gossipspread in St. Petersburg concerning Volgin’s(i.e., his own) alleged relations with the Londoncircle of Russian exiles.176 The gossip was occa-sioned by the most insignificant incidents thathad absolutely nothing to do with politics. And,as usual, things did not stop at mere gossip. Thepolice-inspired press had long been engaged inliterary denunciations of Chernyshevsky. In 1862,Sovremennik was suspended for some time. Thencame non-literary denunciations as well. “TheDirector of the Third Department of His ImperialMajesty’s Own Chancellery,” said the indictmentof Chernyshevsky, “has received an anonymousletter warning the Government against Cherny-shevsky, ‘that youth ringleader and wily socialist’;‘he himself has said that he will never be convict-ed’; he is said to be a pernicious agitator, andpeople ask to be spared from such a man; ‘allof Chernyshevsky’s former friends, seeing that histendencies were finding expression in deeds andnot merely in words, liberal-minded people...have dissociated themselves from him. Unless youremove Chernyshevsky, writes the author of theletter [67], there will be trouble and bloodshed;they are a band of rabid demagogues, of recklesspeople.... Perhaps they will eventually be eliminat-ed, but just think how much innocent blood willbe shed because of them.... There are committeesof such socialists in Voronezh, Saratov, Tambovand elsewhere, and everywhere they inflame theyouth.... Send Chernyshevsky away wherever youlike, but be quick to deprive him of the opportunityto act.... Deliver us from Chernyshevsky for thesake of public peace’”....

[71]...What is the secret of the extraordinarysuccess of What Is To Be Done? 177 It is the same as

V. I. LENIN510

is generally responsible for the success of literaryworks, the fact that this novel gave a living anduniversally understood answer to questions inwhich a considerable section of the reading publicwas keenly interested. In themselves, the thoughtsexpressed in it were not new; Chernyshevsky hadtaken them wholly from West-European literature.In France,* George Sand had much earlier advocat-ed free and, most important, sincere and honestrelations in the love of a man for a woman. As re-gards the moral demands she puts on love, LucreziaFloriani differs in no way from Vera PavlovnaLopukhova-Kirsanova. And as for the novelJacques [72], it would be simple to copy out a fairlylarge number of passages from it to show thatin the novel What Is To Be Done? the thoughtsand reasonings of George Sand’s** freedom-loving,selfless hero are at times reproduced almost in theirentirety. And George Sand was not the only oneto advocate freedom in relations of this kind.It is well known that they were also advocated byRobert Owen and Fourier, who had a decisive

* Let us note in passing that Goethe’s Wahiver-wandschaften also represents a word in defence of suchrelations. This is well understood by some Germanhistorians of German literature who, while not daring todecry such on authoritative writer, and at the same timenot daring to agree with him because of their ownphilistine virtuousness, usually mutter something totallyunintelligible about the apparently strange paradoxes ofthe great German.

** On March 26, 1853, Chernyshevsky recorded in hisdiary the following conversation with his fiancée: “‘Canyou possibly think that I will deceive you?’ ‘I don’t thinkthat, I don’t expect it, but I have considered such an eventtoo.’ ‘What, then, would you do?’ I told her of GeorgeSand’s Jacques . ‘Then you, too, would shoot yourself?’‘I don’t think so’; and I told her I would try to obtainGeorge Sand for her (she had not read it, or at any rate doesnot remember the ideas in it)” (Collected Works, Vol. X,Part 2, Section 3, p. 78). We consider that it is not su-perfluous to note another passage from Chernyshevsky’sconversations with his fiancée: “But what these relationswould be like—the day before yesterday she said: ‘Wewould have separate halves of the house and you oughtnot to come to me without permission’; I would haveliked to arrange things that way myself, perhaps I thinkmore seriously about it than she does;—she probably onlymeans that she doesn’t want me to bore her, while I un-derstand it to mean that in general every husband shouldbe extremely considerate to his ‘wife in his matrimonialrelations” (ibid., p. 82). Almost literally the same con-versation takes place between Vera Pavlovna and Lo-pukhov in the novel What Is To Be Done?

* These numbers, inserted by Lenin, correspond tothe lines on p. 72 of Plekhanov’s book.—Ed.

21*2223

25

30

35


influence on Chernyshevsky’s outlook.*** Andas early as the forties all these ideas met withwarm sympathy in our country. In his articlesBelinsky often called passionately for freedomand sincerity in relations of love. The reader willrecall, of course, how bitterly the “impetuousVissarion” reproached Pushkin’s Tatyana because,while loving Onegin, she did not follow the dictatesof her heart; she belonged to “another,” her agedhusband, whom she did not love but continued tolive with. In their attitude to women, the bestpeople of the “forties” adhered to the same principlesas those of Lopukhov and Kirsanov. However,prior to the appearance of the novel What Is ToBe Done?, these principles were shared only bya “select” handful; the mass of the reading publicdid not understand them at all. Even Herzenhesitated to expound them fully and clearly inhis [73] novel Who Is To Blame? A. Druzhininhandles the question more resolutely in his storyPolenka Saks.* But this story is too colourless,and its characters, belonging to so-called highsociety—officials and titled personages—did notat all appeal to the non-gentry, who after the

fall of Nicholas regime formed the left wing

of the reading public. With the appearance ofWhat Is To Be Done? everything changed, every-thing became clear, precise and definite. There wasno more room left for doubt. Thinking peoplewere faced with the alternative of being guidedin love by the principles of Lopukhov and Kirsa-nov, or of bowing to the sanctity of marriage andresorting, should a new sentiment arise, to theold, tested method of secret amorous adventures,or else completely subduing all affection in theirhearts in view of the fact that they belonged toa marriage partner, whom they no longer loved.And the choice had to be made quite consciously.Chernyshevsky dealt with the issue in such a waythat what had been natural instinctiveness andsincerity in love relations became utterly impos-sible. Mind control extended to love, and the gener-al public adopted a conscious view of the relations

* It seems hardly necessary to recall what an ener-getic advocate Robert Owen was in this respect. As forFourier, we quote here his very profound words: “lescoutumes en amour ... ne sont que formes temporaires etvariables, et non pas fond immuable” (Oeuvres complètesde Ch. Fourier, tome IV, p. 84).

** Sovremennik, No. 12, 1847.

NB

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404142

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NBcf. Sotsial-Demokrat

No. 1.

between man and woman. And this was particu-larly important in our country in the sixties. Thereforms which Russia had undergone turnedupside down both our social and family relations.A ray of light reached into recesses that had beenin complete darkness. Russian people were com-pelled to examine themselves, to take a soberview of their relation to their kin, to society andfamily. A new element came to play a big role infamily relations, in love and friendship: viz.,convictions, which formerly only the very smallesthandful of “idealists” had possessed. Differencesof conviction led to unexpected ruptures. A woman“given in marriage” to a certain man often discov-ered with horror that her lawful “lord” was anobscurantist, a bribe-taker, a flatterer grovellingbefore his superiors. A man who had enjoyed the“possession” of his beautiful wife, and unexpectedlywas affected by the current of new ideas, oftenrealised in dismay that what his charming play-thing was interested in was not at all “new people”or “new views,” but new dresses and dances, andalso [74] the title and salary of her husband....

[75]...In Vera Pavlovna’s dreams we see thatside of Chernyshevsky’s socialist views to which,unfortunately, Russian socialists up to now havenot paid sufficient attention. That which attractsus in these dreams is the fact that Chernyshevskyfully realised that the socialist system can onlybe based on the broad application to production ofthe technical forces developed by the bourgeoisperiod. In Vera Pavlovna’s dreams huge armiesof labour are jointly engaged in production pass-ing from Central Asia to Russia, from hot climatecountries to the cold countries. All this, of course,could have been conceived with the aid of Fourieras well, but it is evident even from the subsequenthistory of so-called Russian socialism that theRussian reading public was not aware of this.In their ideas of socialist society our revolution-aries frequently went so far as to conceive it inthe form of a federation of peasant communitiescultivating their fields with the same antiquatedplough as that used to scrape the soil in the timeof Basil the Blind. But obviously such “socialism”cannot be recognised as socialism. The emancipa-tion of the proletariat can come about only throughthe emancipation of man from the “p o w e r o ft h e l a n d” and nature in general. And thisee


FROM MARX

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emancipation has made absolutely indispensablethose [76] armies of labour and that extensiveapplication of modern productive forces to produc-tion which Chernyshevsky spoke of in Vera Pav-lovna’s dreams and which we have completelyforgotten in our desire to be “practical.”

Chernyshevsky was present at the birth of the1

new type of “new people” in our country. He hasdrawn this type in the shape of Rakhmetov. Ourauthor joyfully welcomed the emergence of thisnew type could not deny himself the satisfac-tion of depicting at least a vague profile of him.At the same time he foresaw with sorrow how manytrials and sufferings there were in store for theRussian revolutionary whose life must be one ofsevere struggle and great self-sacrifice. And so,in Rakhmetov, Chernyshevsky presents us withthe true ascetic. Rakhmetov positively tortureshimself. He is completely “merciless towards him-self,” as his landlady says. He even decides totest whether he can bear torture by spendinga whole night lying on a length of felt with nailssticking through it. Many people, including Pisa-rev, regarded this as mere eccentricity. We agreethat some aspects of Rakhmetov’s character couldhave been drawn differently. But the character asa whole nevertheless remains completely trueto life. Almost every one of our prominent

2socialists of the sixties and seventies possessed

3no small share of the Rakhmetov spirit.

We should like to say in closing our introduc-tion that Chernyshevsky’s significance in Russianliterature has yet to be appraised properly. Howmuch he is misunderstood in our country evenby many of those who think very well of himcan be seen from V. G. Korolenko’s reminiscencesof him. This gifted and intelligent author portrayshim as a sort of “rationalistic economist” who,moreover, believes “in the power of Comte’s orga-nising reason.”* if the words about “organising

* Korolenko, Those Who Are Gone, p. 78.

1—“the revo-lutionary” in

Sotsial-Demokrat

(No. 1,p. 173)178

2—”Russianrevolution-

aries”3—“enor-

mous” (Sot-sial-DemokratNo. 1, p. 174)

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reason” mean anything at all, then they meanthat Chernyshevsky regarded social phenomenafrom an idealistic standpoint, from which theywere considered by Comte himself. But he wholooks on social phenomena from an i d e a l -i s t i c standpoint cannot be called an e c o n o -m i s t for the simple reason that this name is ap-plied, even if not very properly, to those who,while not believing [77] in the power of organisingreason, do believe in the organising power of eco-nomics. An “economist” who believed in the powerof organising reason would be like a Darwinist whoaccepted the cosmogony of Moses. But this isnot the most important thing here. What is mostimportant is the fact that Mr. Korolenko counter-poses the sociological views of our “subjectivists”179

to the “economism” of Chernyshevsky. “We, too,did not stand still when we ceased to be ‘rationalis-tic economists.’ Instead of purely economic patterns,the literary trend, represented chiefly by N. K. Mi-khailovsky, has opened to us a veritable vista oflaws and parallels of a biological character, whilethe play of economic interests was assigned a sub-ordinate role.”*

“D i d n o t s t a n d s t i l l,” indeed! The“vista of laws and parallels of a biological char-acter,” revealed by Mikhailovsky, w a s a ne n o r m o u s s t e p b a c k w a r d s in com-parison with Chernyshevsky’s social views.**N. K. Mikhailovsky was a disciple of P. L. Lavrov,whose views on the course of social developmentcorresponded to those of Bruno Bauer, as we haveshown in the book The Development of the MonistView of History. Hence whoever would like tounderstand the relation between N. G. Cherny-shevsky’s world outlook and that of our “subjectiv-ists” should first of all try to understand the rela-tion between Feuerbach’s philosophy, to whichChernyshevsky adhered, and Bruno Bauer’s views.And this is clear and simple: Feuerbach is farahead of Bruno Bauer.

As an epigraph to our first article on Cherny-shevsky, written while the news of his death wasstill fresh in mind, and completely revised in thepresent edition we have taken the following

* Korolenko, op. cit., pp. 7 9-80.** No wonder Chernyshevsky’s attitude to those

“laws and parallels” was entirely negative, according tothe selfsame Mr. Korolenko.

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words from Chernyshevsky’s letter to his wife:“My life and yours belong to history; hundreds ofyears will pass and our names will still be dearto people who will recall them with gratitudewhen those who lived with us are no more.” Thisletter was written on October 5, 1862, i.e., whenthe author was already incarcerated.

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PART ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’SPHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL

AND LITERARY VIEWS

SECTION ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S PHILOSOPHICALVIEWS

Chapter OneCHERNYSHEVSKY AND FEUERBACH

[81]...In the first edition of this work, the firstarticle of which, dealing, inter alia, with Cherny-shevsky’s philosophical views, was written in late1 8 9 9, we expressed the conviction that in hisphilosophical views our author was a followerof Feuerbach. Naturally, this conviction of ourswas based above all on a comparison of those ideasof Chernyshevsky which had a more or less directbearing on philosophy, with Feuerbach’s views....

Chapter ThreePOLEMIC WITH YURKEVICH AND OTHERS

...[101] Yurkevich ascribes to Chernyshevskythe idea that there is n o d i f f e r e n c e a ta l l between material and psychical phenomena,and inquires triumphantly how it is that sensa-tions arise from the movement of a nerve. This is theold nonsense that has long been flung at material-ists and from which it merely follows that thepeople who want to “criticise’ materialism do noteven know the ABC of materialism. Nowhere in hisarticle does Chernyshevsky say that there is nodifference at all between so-called [102] physicalphenomena, on the one hand, and psychical pheno-mena, on the other. On the contrary, he categori-cally admits the existence of this difference; buthe believes that it in no way justifies attributingpsychical phenomena to a particular non-materialfactor. We are already acquainted with his re-mark to the effect that there are very many differ-ent qualities in every object. Now we shall discuss

8


it in more detail. “For example,” Chernyshevskysays, “a tree grows and burns; we say it has twoqualities: the power of growth and combustibility.What similarity is there between these two quali-ties? They are totally different; there is no conceptunder which one could put both these qualities,except the general conception—quality; thereis no concept under which we could put both seriesof phenomena corresponding to these qualities,except the concept—phenomenon. Or, for example,ice is hard and sparkles; what is there common tohardness and sparkle? The logical distance fromone of these qualities to the other is immeasurablygreat or, it would be better to say, there is nological distance between them, whether near orfar, because there is no logical relation betweenthem. From this we see that the combination ofquite heterogeneous qualities in one object is thegeneral “law of things.” The same also with thequality we call the capacity for sensation andthought. Its distance from the so-called physicalqualities of the living organism is immeasurably

great. But this does not prevent it being a qualityof the same organism which, at the same time,possesses extension and capacity for movement ....

[103]...Even J. Priestley remarked in hisDisquisitions that the idea that brain vibrationsare identical with perception would be a verygreat abuse of materialist doctrine. “It is easyto form an idea of there being vibrations withoutany perceptions accompanying them. But it issupposed that the brain, besides its v i b r a t i n gp o w e r, has superadded to it a p e r c i p i e n to r s e n t i e n t p o w e r, likewise; there beingno reason that we know why this power may notbe imparted to it.”* This is precisely the pointof view held by all the prominent materialists ofmodern times, including, of course, Feuerbachand Chernyshevsky. The opponents of material-ism—the consistent or inconsistent, conscious orunconscious idealists—ought, in their criticismof this doctrine, to convince us above all thatthey know more about it than Priestley does, andshow us what grounds specifically prevent themfrom recognising, together with Priestley, that

* Disqusitions Relating to Matter and Spirit. ByJoseph Priestley, Vol. I, The second edition, Birmingham,MDCCLXXX, II, p. 121.

not immeasur-ably (al-

though we stilldo not knowthis “meas-

ure”)

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the brain, besides having the ability to vibrate,may also be capable of perceiving. They undoubt-edly have such grounds. But these amount to thespiritualistic prejudice that by itself, i.e., unlessanimated by spirit, matter is dead and incapablenot only of perception, but even of motion. To re-fer, in arguing with the materialists, to suchgrounds means to commit an obvious petitioprincipii, i.e., to argue from the very same proposi-tion which has to be proved. The opponents ofmaterialism themselves more or less vaguely sensethis. Therefore, they are usually very careful not toshow the grounds which hinder them from recognis-ing the capacity for perceiving one of the prop-erties of matter, and prefer to refute what nosingle prominent materialist has ever stated, atleast in modern times, i.e, that perception is thesame as motion.* We leave it to the reader to judgeof this sort of criticism, a criticism which is morewidespread in our country than anywhere else,and is more so now than ever before....

[105] ...It stands to reason,” Chernyshevskyadmits, “that when we speak of the difference inthe state of the body during a chemical processand at a time when it is not in that process, wemean only the quantitative distinction betweena vigorous, rapid course of that process and a veryfeeble slow course of it. Properly speaking, everybody is constantly going through a chemical pro-cess. For example, a log, even if it is not set onfire or burnt in a stove but lies quietly, seeminglyundergoing no changes, in the wall of a house,will nevertheless come in time to the same endto which burning brings it: it will gradually decay,and nothing will be left of it, too, but ashes (thedust of decayed wood, of which in the end nothingremains but the mineral particles of ash). But ifthis process—e.g., in the case of the ordinary decayof a log in a house wall—takes place very slowlyand feebly, then qualities which are proper toa body going through the process manifest them-selves with a microscopic feebleness that is com-pletely imperceptible under ordinary conditions.

* We allow that among the a n c i e n t materialists—Democritus and Epicurus for example—there could havebeen a certain lack of clarity on this account althoughthis is far from having been proved it has to be remem-bered that the views of these thinkers have only reachedus in an incomplete form.

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For example, the slow decay of a piece of woodin a house wall also generates heat; but that quan-tity of it which in burning would have been con-centrated into a few hours, in this case becomesdiluted, so to speak, into several decades, so thatit does not achieve any result that is easily per-ceptible in practice; the existence of this heat isnegligible for practical purposes. It is the same asthe taste of wine in a whole pond of water intowhich one has let fall a drop of wine: from thescientific point of view, the pond contains a mixtureof water and wine, but to all practical purposesit can be assumed that there is no wine at allin it.” [106] This brilliant passage allows one to sur-mise that for Chernyshevsky in this respect toothere was no cleavage between organised matteron the one hand and unorganised matter, on theother. To be sure, the organism of the animal (andeven more so of the animal at the top of the zoologi-cal tree, that is, man) displays in the respect thatis of interest to us such properties as are altogetheralien to unorganised matter. But, after all, theburning of a piece of wood, too, is accompaniedby a number of phenomena that are not to beobserved during the process of its slow decay.However, there is no essential difference betweenthese two processes. On the contrary, this is oneand the same process, with this difference onlythat in the one case it is very rapid and in theother, extremely slow. Therefore, in the one casethe properties which belong to a body undergoingthis process manifest themselves with great force,while in the other case they do so “with microscopicfeebleness that is completely imperceptible underordinary conditions.” In regard to the question ofpsychical phenomena this means that in an unor-ganised form also, matter is not devoid of thebasic capacity for “sensation,” which providessuch rich “spiritual” fruits among the higheranimals. But in unorganised matter this capacityexists to an extremely small extent. Thereforeit is totally imperceptible to the investigator and,without risk of committing any appreciable error,we can equate it to nil. Nevertheless, it must notbe forgotten that this capacity in general is inher-ent in matter and that in consequence there are nogrounds for regarding it as something miraculouswhere it manifests itself particularly strongly, as

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can be seen, for example, among the higher animalsin general, and pre-eminently in man. In express-ing this idea—with the caution necessary under theconditions of our press at that time—Chernyshevskycame close to such materialists as Lamettrie andDiderot who, in turn, adopted the view of Spinoz-ism, freed of the unnecessary theological append-ages....

[107]...Yurkevich also asserted that quantita-tive differences are transformed into qualitativedifferences not in the object itself but in its re-lation to the sentient subject. But this is a verygross logical mistake. In order to become changedin its relation to the sentient subject the object

must undergo a preliminary change in itself.DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDDDDD

If for us ice does not have the same properties assteam, it is because the mutual relations of thewater particles in the former case are entirelydifferent from those in the latter. But enoughof this....

We know how contemptuous Chernyshevskywas of Yurkevich’s arguments. He did not analysethese arguments—and had no possibility of doingso under the conditions of the censorship—but sim-ply declared them to be obsolete and not in theleast convincing.

“I am a seminarian myself,” he wrote in hisPolemical Gems. “I know from my own experiencethe position of people who get their education asYurkevich did. I have seen people in the sameposition as he is. I therefore find it hard to laughat him; it would mean laughing at the impossibilityof having decent books available, laughing at thecomplete helplessness in the matter of developingoneself, at a situation that is unimaginably re-stricted in all possible respects.

“I don’t know Mr. Yurkevich’s age; if he is nolonger a young man, it is too late to worry abouthim. But if he is still young, I gladly offer himthe small collection of books in my possession.”

Mr. Volynsky still finds this reply highly [108]unsatisfactory. He thinks that Chernyshevskyreplied in this way solely because of his inabilityto decisively refute Yurkevich. Evidently somejournalists at the beginning of the sixties alsoreasoned in this manner. For example, Dudyshkin,enumerating Yurkevich’s allegedly irrefutablearguments point by point, wrote the following in

not logical,but episte-mological


Otechestvenniye Zapiski, addressing himself toChernyshevsky:

“The matter would appear to be clear; it nowconcerns not someone else, but you; not philosophyor physiology in general, but your ignorance ofthese sciences. Why drag in the red herring ofseminary philosophy? Why confuse totally differ-ent things and say that you knew all that when youwere in the seminary and even now remember itall by heart?”

To this Chernyshevsky replied that Dudyshkin’slack of acquaintance with seminary notebooksprevented him from understanding what was atissue. “If you took the trouble to look throughthese notebooks,” he continues, “you would seethat all the shortcomings which Mr. Yurkevichdiscovers in me, these notebooks discover inAristotle, Bacon, Gassendi, Locke, etc., etc.,in all the philosophers who were not idealists.Consequently, these reproaches by no means applyto me as an individual writer: they apply properlyto the theory which I consider it useful to popular-ise. If you are incredulous, take a look at thePhilosophical Dictionary, published by Mr. S. G.,which takes the same line as Mr. Yurkevich, andyou will see that the same thing is said there ofevery non-idealist: he does not know psychology,he is not acquainted with the natural sciences, herejects inner experience, he is overwhelmed byfacts, he confuses metaphysics with the naturalsciences, he degrades man, etc., etc....”

Chapter FourTHE DOCTRINE OF MORALITY

[111]...In general, very noticeable in Cherny-shevsky’s view of rational egoism is the endeavour,characteristic of all “periods of enlightenment”(Aufklärungsperioden), to seek support for moralityin reason, and in the more or less well-foundedcalculations of the individual an explanation ofhis character and behaviour. Sometimes Cherny-shevsky’s arguments in this connection are assimilar as two peas in a pod to the arguments ofHelvétius and those who shared his ideas. Theyrecall almost as strongly the arguments of Socrates,the typical representative of the epoch of enlight-enment in ancient Greece, who, in coming forwardas a champion of friendship, showed that it is

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a d v a n t a g e o u s to have friends becausethey may [112] be of some use in times of mis-fortune. The explanation for such extremes ofrationality is that the enlighteners were usuallyincapable of adopting the v i e w p o i n t o fd e v e l o p m e n t.*

We know that, according to Chernyshevsky’stheory, man is by nature neither good nor evilbut becomes good or evil depending on circum-stances.** Were we to recognise that man is alwaysprompted by calculation in his behaviour, thenwe should have to formulate Chernyshevsky’sview on human nature differently; we should haveto say that man is by nature neither good norevil but only calculating, this property of hisbecoming more or less marked depending on cir-cumstances. But such a formulation would hardlybe to our author’s liking.

What is good, and what is evil, according tohis theory? This question is answered by the samearticle, “The Anthropological Principle in Philos-ophy”—a very informative one, as the reader cansee. “Individuals,” says Chernyshevsky in it,“regard as good the actions of other people thatare beneficial to them; society holds as good, whatis good for the whole of society, or for the majorityof its members. Lastly people in general, irrespec-tive of a nation or a class, describe as good thatwhich is beneficial for mankind in general.” It oftenhappens that the interests of different nations orestates run counter to one another or to humaninterests generally; it is also a frequent occurrencethat the interests of one estate are opposed to thoseof the whole nation. How is one to decide in thiscase what is good and what is bad?

* See for particulars in our book Beitäge zur Geschichtedes Materialismus—Holbach, Helvetius und Karl Marx,Stuttgart, 1896.

** It is worth noting, however, that in the past ourauthor expressed a different view of human nature.According to that view, man is a being which by natureis inclined to respect and love truth and good, andto abhor all that is bad, a being capable of violatingthe laws of good and truth only through ignorance,error or under the influence of circumstances strongerthan his character and reason, but a being never capableof preferring evil to good of his own free will.” (See thearticle on Shchedrin’s Provincial Sketches in Sovremennik,No. 6, 1857, reprinted in The Complete Works , Vol. III.The lines quoted are on pp. 221-222 of the volume.)This is closer to Socrates than to the present-day doctrineof development.

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SECTION TWO

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWSON HISTORY

Chapter TwoMATERIALISM IN CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWS

ON HISTORY

[159]...Chernyshevsky applied Feuerbach’s viewsto aesthetics and in this, as we shall see below,he achieved results that in a certain sense aremost remarkable. But here, too, his conclusionswere not quite satisfactory because the perfectlycorrect idea of the aesthetic development of man-kind implies the preliminary elaboration of a generalconception of history. As regards this general con-ception of history, Chernyshevsky succeeded inmaking only a few, if very correct, steps towardsits elaboration. One may cite as examples of suchsteps the large quotations from his writings thatwe have just made [160]....

Chapter ThreeIDEALISM IN CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWS

ON HISTORY

Here is what we read in his article dealing withV. P. Botkin’s well-known book Letters of Spain(Sovremennik, 1857, Book 2):

“The division of a people into hostile castes isone of the greatest obstacles to the improvementof its future; in Spain, there is no such disastrousdivision, no irreconcilable enmity between social-estates every one of which would be prepared tosacrifice the most precious historical achievementsif only it could do harm to another estate; in Spainthe entire nation feels itself a single whole. Thispeculiarity is so extraordinary among the peoplesof Western Europe that it deserves the greatestattention and may in itself be considered anearnest of the country’s happy future.”*

This is not a slip of the pen, because, severalpages further below in the same article, Cherny-shevsky says: “The Spanish people have an indis-putable advantage over most civilised nations inone, exceedingly important respect: the Spanish[161] estates are not divided either by deep-rootedhatred or by substantial conflicting interests; they

* Collected Works, Vol. III, p. 38.

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do not constitute castes inimical to one another,as is the case in many other West European coun-tries; on the contrary, in Spain, all the estates maystrive jointly for a common goal....*

[163]...Utopian socialists took an idealist viewof the entire future of contemporary society. Theywere convinced that the fate of that society wouldbe decided by the “views” held by its members,i.e., the standpoint which they took, withregard to social reorganisation plan put forwardby a particular reformer. They did not askthemselves why it was that the dominantviews in that particular society were suchand not others. That is why they were noteager for a further elaboration of those elementsof a materialist interpretation of history whichtheir doctrines undoubtedly were replete with.In fact, they were prone to look on mankind’s pasthistory as well from an idealist standpoint. Forthis reason, in their statements about that historywe very often encounter the most undoubted and,it would seem, most obvious contradictions: factswhich have apparently been interpreted in anentirely materialist sense are suddenly given anentirely idealist explanation; and, on the otherhand, idealist interpretations are every now andagain upset by perfectly materialist eruptions.This lack of stability, this recurrent shift frommaterialism to idealism and from idealism tomaterialism, a shift perceptible to the modernreader, but imperceptible to the author, makesitself felt also in the historical statements ofChernyshevsky, who in this respect is very reminis-cent of the great utopians of the West. In thefinal analysis he inclines like them, we repeat,to idealism.

This can be clearly seen from his interestingarticle “On the Causes of the Fall of Rome (anImitation of Montesquieu),” published in Sovre-mennik for 1861 (Book 5). In it he vigorouslyopposes the very widespread opinion that theRoman Empire in the West [164] fell because ofits inherent inability to develop further, whereasthe barbarians who put an end to its existencebrought new seeds of progress with them....

No mention is made here either of the internalsocial relations in Rome, which accounted for itsweakness and which were pointed out even by

* Ibid., p. 44.


Guizot in his first article “Essais sur l’histoire deFrance,” or of the forms of communal life to whichthe German barbarians owed their strength at thetime of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West.Chernyshevsky forgot even the famous words ofPliny, which he himself quotes elsewhere: lati-fundia perdidere Italiam (“latifundia were theundoing of Italy”). In his “formula of progress,”as the phrase went in our country afterwards,[165] there is no room for the internal relations inthe country concerned. Everything is reduced tointellectual development. Chernyshevsky statesemphatically that progress is based on intellectualdevelopment and that “its fundamental aspectconsists precisely in the successes and develop-ment of knowledge.” It does not occur to him that“the successes and development of knowledge”may depend on social relations, which in somecases are conducive to those successes and thatdevelopment and in others hinder them. He de-picts social relations as a mere corollary of thespread of certain views. We have just read this:“historical knowledge is broadened; this reducesthe number of false notions that prevent peoplefrom organising their social life, which is, there-fore, organised more successfully than before.”This is very unlike what our author said in hisarticle on Roscher’s book. From what he saidthere it followed, moreover, that it is impossible,and indeed ridiculous, to judge scholars as ifthey were schoolboys, saying that a particularscholar was unfamiliar with a particular scienceand therefore came to hold erroneous views. It alsofollowed from what he said there that what mattersis not the amount of knowledge acquired by a partic-ular scholar, but the interests of the group whichhe represents. In short, it followed from what hesaid there that social views are determined bysocial interests; and social thought, by social life.Now, it is the other way round. Now, it appearsthat social life is determined by social thought andthat if a social system has certain shortcomings,it is because society, like a schoolboy, has studiedpoorly or little and therefore has conceived er-roneous notions. It would he hard to think of a morestriking contradiction.

[170]...Herzen formed his view of Russia’sattitude to the “old world” under the strong in-fluence of Slavophils and this view was wrong.But one can arrive at an erroneous view evenwhen one employs a more or less correct method,

V. I. LENIN526

just as a correct view may result from the employ-ment of a more or less erroneous method. It istherefore fair to ask oneself how the method bywhich Herzen formed his erroneous view was relatedto the method which led Chernyshevsky to a com-pletely justified repudiation and ridicule of thatview....

Chapter FiveCHERNYSHEVSKY AND MARX

[188]...We may be reminded that, as we haveremarked, the reviews by Chernyshevsky whichwe have examined appeared after the historicalviews of Marx and Engels shaped themselves intoa harmonious whole. We are not forgetful of this.But we believe that this matter cannot be settledby mere reference to chronology. The main writingsof Lassalle, too, did not appear until after thehistorical views of Marx and Engels assumeda harmonious form, and yet, in ideological content,those writings, too, belong to the period of transi-tion from historical idealism to historical material-ism. The point is not when a particular work ap-peared but rather what was its content.

If in previous historical periods the advance ofknowledge depended on the character of economicrelations, in passing to our own period Cherny-shevsky should have asked himself: what are theeconomic peculiarities of it that led to the discoveryof social truth and ensured the future realisationof the latter. But in order to ask himself thatquestion, he should have broken resolutely withidealism and firmly adopted a materialist interpre-tation of history. We shall not reiterate thatChernyshevsky was still far from a break withidealism and that his conception of the furthertrend of social development was completely ideal-ist. We merely ask the reader to note that Cherny-shevsky’s historical idealism compelled him in hisconsiderations of the future to give first place to“advanced” people—to the i n t e l l e c t u a l s,as we [189] now call them—who should disseminatethe ultimately discovered social truth among themasses. The masses are allotted the role of back-ward soldiers in the advancing army. Of course,no sensible materialist will assert that the average“man in the street,” just because he is an ordinaryperson, i.e., “one of the masses,” knows no less

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than the average “intellectual.” Of course heknows less. But it is not a matter of the knowledgeof the “man in the street,” but of his actions.The actions of people are not always determinedby their knowledge and are never determined o n l yby their knowledge but also—and chiefly—bytheir position, which is merely made clear andcomprehensible by the knowledge they possess.Here again one has to remember the fundamentalproposition of materialism in general, and of thematerialist explanation of history in particular:it is not being that is determined by consciousness,but consciousness by being. The “consciousness”of a man from the “intelligentsia” is more highlydeveloped than the consciousness of a man from the“masses.” But the “being” of a man from the massesprescribes to him a far more definite method ofaction than that which the social position of theintellectual prescribes to the latter. That is whythe materialist view of history allows one onlyin a certain and, moreover, very limited sense tospeak of the backwardness of the man from the“masses,” compared with the man from the intel-ligentsia; in a certain sense, the “man in the street”undoubtedly lags behind the “intellectual,” butin another sense he undoubtedly is in advance ofhim. And precisely because this is so, an adherentof the materialist interpretation of history, whileby no means repeating the absurd attacks on theintelligentsia that are coming from the Black-Hundred and syndicalist camp, would never agreeto assign the intelligentsia the role of a demiurgeof history which is generally assigned to it byidealists. There are various kinds of aristocratical-ness. Historical idealism is guilty of an “aristocrat-icalness of knowledge.”

What in Chernyshevsky’s historical views wasa shortcoming resulting from the insufficientelaboration of Feuerbach’s materialism laterbecame the basis of our subjectivism, which hadnothing in common with materialism and vigor-ously opposed it not only in the field of historybut also in the field of philosophy. The subjectivistsboastfully called themselves continuers of thebest traditions of the sixties. In reality, theycontinued only the weak aspects [190] of theworld outlook peculiar to that period....

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FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

This is also theshortcoming ofPlekhanov ‘s

book onChernyshevsky

Chapter SixLAST HISTORICAL WORKS OF CHERNYSHEVSKY

[199]...Had Chernyshevsky consistently elabo-rated the idea expressed here, he would have hadto renounce completely the idealist views expressedby him in the article—now familiar to us—con-cerning the causes for the fall of Rome. But thepoint is that he expresses such ideas only in pass-ing, he does not enlarge on them. In expressingthem, he does not at all find it necessary to repu-diate historical idealism, and this is not due toa predilection for idealism as a philosophicaltheory. Chernyshevsky’s attitude to this theorywas in general extremely negative. While expound-ing the idealist view of the trend of historicaldevelopment, he continues to regard himself asa consistent materialist. He is wrong. But theroot of his error lies in one of the chief shortcom-ings of Feuerbach’s materialist system. Marxexpressed it rather aptly: “Feuerbach wants sen-suous objects, really differentiated from the thoughtobjects, but he does not conceive of human activityitself as being o b j e c t i v e activity. Hence, inthe Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoreti-cal attitude as the only genuinely human atti-tude....”* ...Like his teacher, Chernyshevsky directshis attention almost exclusively to the “theoretical”activity of mankind and, as a result, mentaldevelopment becomes for him the most basiccause of historical movement....

[205]...It follows from Chernyshevsky that inhistory vice is always punished as it deserves.In reality, however, the historical facts knownto us do not at all warrant this view, which maybe comforting but is certainly naïve. The onlyquestion of interest to us is how it came to beheld by our author. This question can be answeredby reference to the period when Chernyshevskylived. It was a period of social upsurge, a periodhaving a moral need, so to speak, for such viewsas would bolster faith in the inevitable defeat ofevil....

* See his Theses on Feuerbach , written as early asthe spring of 1845.


SECTION THREE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWSON LITERATURE

Chapter OneTHE SIGNIFICANCE OF LITERATURE AND ART

[221]...The view of art as p l a y, supplementedby the view of play as a “child of labour,” shedsa very bright light on the essence and history ofart. It makes it possible for the first time to viewthem from a materialist standpoint. We knowthat, at the very beginning of his literary activity,Chernyshevsky made an attempt, which was mostsuccessful in its own way, at applying Feuerbach’smaterialist philosophy to aesthetics. We havedevoted a special work to describing that attempt.*So we shall merely say here that although it wasmost successful in its own way, that attemptis affected, in the same way as Chernyshevsky’sviews on history, by the main shortcoming ofFeuerbach’s philosophy: insufficient elaborationof its historical, or to be more exact, dialecticalaspect. And it is just because this aspect was notelaborated in the philosophy assimilated by himthat Chernyshevsky could overlook the greatimportance of the concept of play for a materialistinterpretation of art....

Chapter TwoBELINSKY, CHERNYSHEVSKY AND PISAREV

[236]...“Lasting enjoyment is afforded to manby reality alone; only those desires are of seriousimportance which are based on reality; success[237] may be expected only from hopes evokedby reality, and only from those deeds which areaccomplished with the help of forces and circum-stances offered by reality.”**

Such was the new notion of “reality.” Cherny-shevsky had Feuerbach in mind when he said thatit had been formed by modern thinkers from theobscure allusions of transcendental philosophy.And he expounded Feuerbach’s concept of realityquite correctly. Feuerbach said that sensuousness

* See the article “Chernyshevsky’s Aesthetic Theory”in the collection In Twenty Years.

** N. G. Chernyshevsky, Collected Works , Vol. II,p. 206.

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or actuality is identical truth, i.e, that theobject in its true sense is given only by sensation.Speculative philosophy supposed that ideas ofobjects based only on sense experience do notcorrespond to the real nature of the objects andmust be verified with the aid of pure thought,i.e., thought not based on sense experience. Feuer-bach decisively rejected this idealistic view.He asserted that conceptions of objects based onour sense experience fully correspond to the natureof these objects. The only trouble is that ourimagination frequently distorts these conceptions,which, therefore, come into contradiction withour sense experience. Philosophy should drive outfrom our conceptions the fantastic element thatdistorts them; it should bring them into accordwith sense experience. It must return mankindto a contemplation of real objects undistorted byfancy, such as prevailed in ancient Greece. Andinsofar as mankind passes to such contemplation,it returns to itself, because people who submit tofigments of the imagination can themselves beonly imaginary and not real beings. In the wordsof Feuerbach, the essence of man is sensuousness,i.e., actuality, and not imagination and not ab-straction. The task of philosophy and science ingeneral is to restore reality to its rightful place.But if that is so, it follows of itself that the tasksof aesthetics as a branch of science are also torestore reality to its rightful place and combat theimaginary element in man’s notions. It was onthis conclusion from Feuerbach’s philosophy thatChernyshevsky’s aesthetic views were based; itconstituted the main idea of his dissertation. Andthere is no doubt that Belinsky had the sameconclusion in mind when, in his [238] second butlast annual review of literature, he described theconcept of “reality” as a new one.... [242]...Everyone knows that the criticism ofthe sixties, the criticism of Dobrolyubov forexample, often crossed over into journalism.Hence, in speaking of Chernyshevsky, we shallnot so much present proofs of this thought asillustrations of it. In 1858 Chernyshevsky’s article“The Russian at a Rendezvous. Reflections onTurgenev’s story Asya” appeared in the reviewsection of Atheneum , No. 3. This article is oneof the most brilliant examples of journalisticcriticism. Very little, almost nothing, is said in


Sotsial-Demokrat

No. 1, p. 143

the article about Turgenev’s actual story, whichChernyshevsky calls “practically the only goodnew story.” The author merely draws attentionto the scene in which the hero of the story makeshis declaration of love to Asya, and, in connectionwith this scene, he indulges in “reflections.” Thereader will recall, of course, that at the criticalmoment Turgenev’s hero turned coward andwithdrew. It is this circumstance that causedChernyshevsky to “reflect.” He notes that indeci-sion and cowardice are the distinctive features notonly of this hero, but of most of the heroes ofour best literary works. He recalls Rudin, Beltov,and the tutor of Nekrasov’s Sasha, and sees thesame features in all of them. He does not blamethe authors of the novels on this account sincethey were only recording what is met with atevery step in real life. There is no manliness inRussian people, therefore the characters in thenovels have none either. And Russian peoplehave no manliness because they are not in thehabit of taking part in public affairs. “Whenwe go into society, we see around us people inuniforms and civilian morning or evening dress;these people are five and a half or six feet tall,and sometimes even more; they grow or shavethe hair on their cheeks, above their upper lip and[243] on their chin; and we imagine we are lookingat men. This is a total error, an optical illusion,a hallucination, nothing more. Without acquiringthe habit of elementary participation in civilaffairs, without acquiring the feelings of a citizen,the male child grows up and becomes middle-aged,and then an elderly being of the masculine gender,but he does not become a man or, at any rate,not a man of a noble character.* Among humane,educated people, the absence of noble manlinessstrikes one still more than among ignorant people,because the humane, educated man likes to talkabout important matters. He talks with enthusiasmand eloquence, but only until it becomes a matterof passing from words to deeds. “So long as thereis no question of action, but merely the need tofill up empty hours, an empty mind, or an emptyheart, with talk and dreams, the hero is very glib;but once it is a matter of expressing his feelingsplainly and exactly, the majority of the heroes

* Collected Works, Vol. 1, pp. 97-98.

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Sotsial-Demokrat

No. 1, p. 143—“malicious

and apt char-acterisationof Russian

liberalism”180

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immediately begin to waver and feel tongue-tied.A few, the most courageous, somehow contriveto muster their forces and stammer somethingthat provides a vague idea of their thoughts.But just attempt to take their wishes at facevalue and say to them: ‘you want so-and-so;we’re very glad; begin to do something about itand you’ll have our support’—if such a remarkis made one half of the very brave heroes faint,the other begin to gruffly reproach you for puttingthem in an awkward position; they begin to saythat they did not expect such proposals from you,they are quite at a loss and cannot think properlybecause it is not possible to do so at a moment’snotice and, moreover, they are honest people,and not only honest but very mild, and they donot want to cause you any unpleasantness, andthat, in general, it is not possible, really, to troubleoneself about all that is said merely from havingnothing to do, and that it is best not to undertakeanything at all, because everything involvestrouble and inconvenience, and at present nothinggood can come of it, because, as already said,they never for a moment expected, or anticipated,and so on and so forth.”*

One can say that the portrait is painted witha master’s hand. However, the master was nota literary critic, but a journalist.

[245]...As for the requirements of the period,they consisted, to his mind, [246] in concessionsto the peasantry. Chernyshevsky exhorted the“estimable” gentlemen with this quotation fromthe Gospel: “Agree with thine adversary quickly,whiles thou art in the way with him; lest at anytime the adversary deliver thee to the judge, andthe judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou becast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, thoushalt by no means come out thence, till thouhast paid the uttermost farthing.”(Mat., Ch. V,verses 25 and 26).**

It is self-evident that every theoretical conclu-sion concerning the capacity of a given social classor stratum for definite practical action alwaysrequires a certain degree of verification by expe-rience, and that, consequently, it can be considered

* Collected Works, Vol. I, pp. 90-91.** Ibid., p. 102.


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trustworthy a priori only within certain, more orless broad limits. Thus, for example, it was possiblewith complete assurance to foretell that eventhe most educated section of the nobility wouldrefuse to sacrifice their interests for the sake ofthe peasants. Such a prediction in no way requiredpractical verification. But when it was necessary todetermine to what extent the educated nobilitywere capable of making concessions to the peas-antry i n t h e i r o w n interests, then no one couldsay in advance with absolute certainty: they willnot go in that direction beyond such-and-sucha limit. Here it was always possible to assume thatunder certain circumstances the educated nobilitywould go a little further, after arriving at a some-what more correct understanding of its own inter-ests. Being practical, as Chernyshevsky was in thiscase, he not only could but had to endeavour topersuade the nobility that certain concessions tothe freed peasants were required in its own in-terests. Thus, what might have seemed to consti-tute a contradiction in his article—the demand fora judicious and resolute step on the part of peoplewhose incapacity for decision and wisdom is hereadmitted and explained as a necessary product ofcircumstances—was actually no contradiction atall. Such imaginary contradictions can also befound in the political practice of people who taketheir stand on the firm ground of the materialistexplanation of history. However, here it is neces-sary to make a very essential reservation. Whena materialist applies his theoretical [247] con-clusions in practice with a certain amount of cau-tion, he can nevertheless guarantee that his con-clusions contain a certain element of the mostindisputable certainty. And this is because, whenhe says: “everything depends on circumstances,”he knows from what side one must expect theappearance of the new circumstances that willchange the will of people in the direction he desires;he knows quite well that, in the final analysis,they are to be expected from the side of “econom-ics,” and that the truer his analysis of the socio-economic life of society, the more trustworthyhis prediction concerning the future developmentof society. Not so with the idealist, who is con-vinced that “opinions rule the world.” If “opin-ions” are the basic cause of social movement,then the circumstances on which the further devel-

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opment of society depends are linked chiefly tothe conscious activity of people, while the possi-bility of any practical influence on this activityis dependent on the greater or lesser ability ofpeople to think logically and master the newtruths discovered by philosophy or science. But thisability depends itself on circumstances. Thus, theidealist who recognises the materialist truth thatthe character and also, of course, the views of man,depend on circumstances, finds himself in a viciouscircle: views depend on circumstances, circum-stances on views. The thought of the “enlightener”in theory has never broken out of this vicious circle.In practice the contradiction was usually solvedby a strong appeal to all thinking people, indepen-dently of the circumstances under which suchpeople were living and acting. What we are nowsaying may appear unnecessary and for that reasona boring digression. But in point of fact this digres-sion was essential for us. It will help us to under-

stand the nature of the journalistic criticism of

the sixties.Since the hopes of the “enlightener” are pinned

on the intellect and good will of thinking people,i.e., in effect of the “enlighteners” themselves,it is obvious that critics desiring to support thesepeople will demand from fiction above all ane x a c t depiction of social life with all its prosand cons, with its “positive” and “negative” phenom-ena. Only an exact portrayal of all aspects of lifecan furnish an “enlightener” with the factual dataneeded by him for passing judgment on thatlife....

[253]...However, N. Uspensky used to expresshimself even more emphatically. For example,he wrote: “Nothing is to be expected from thepresent-day peasants who not so long ago were thevictims of serfdom:—they will not be resurrect-ed!... It is unlikely that medicine will ever cureatrophy, because the disease is based on o r g a n i cdamage....”* It was quite difficult for the“people of the seventies” to agree with this. It waschiefly this that gave rise to the unfavourableattitude of the critics of that epoch towardsN. V. Uspensky.

The reader will perhaps ask: but was it easy forChernyshevsky himself to agree with N. V. Uspen-

* N. V. Uspensky, Collected Works , Vol. II, 1883, p . 2 0 2 .

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sky’s completely hopeless view of “the present-daypeasants,” since Chernyshevsky evidently consideredpossible at that time a broad movement of thepeople who were dissatisfied with the conditionsof the abolition of serfdom. To this reply that,obviously, this would not have been easy for himif he considered himself bound to agree uncondi-tionally with N. V. Uspensky. But that is preciselythe point—he did not agree unconditionally withhim. He considered N. V. Uspensky’s essays quitetruthful; but he did not draw a hopeless conclu-sion from them. He said: “Routine dominates theordinary course of life of common people; andamong the plain folk, like in all other social-estates, the routine is just as dull and banal as inall other social-estates. Mr. Uspensky’s merit is tohave had the courage to depict for us, without con-cealment or adornment, the routine thoughtsand actions, feelings and customs of plainpeople. The picture is not at all attractive: atevery step nonsense and dirt, pettiness anddullness.

“But do not be in a hurry to draw conclusionsfrom this regarding the validity or non-validityof your hopes, if you wish to alleviate the lot ofthe people; or of your misgivings, if you were sofar concerned about the dullness and inertia ofthe people. Take the commonest, most colourless,weak-willed, shallow person; no matter how draband petty the life he leads, it has in it momentsof a totally different [254] shade, moments ofenergetic efforts, courageous decisions. The sameis also encountered in the history of every na-tion.”*

The circumstances, on which everything dependsin the last resort, may take such a turn that evenan apathetic mass will become capable of vigorouseffort and courageous decision. While waitingfor the moment when the circumstances takea favourable turn, one must attentively study thebackward mass. The initiative in taking courageousdecisions will never come from the mass of thepopulace; but one has to know the character of thepeople making up this mass “in order to knowin what way initiative may stimulate them.”**

* N. G. Chernyshevsky, Collected Works, Vol. VIII,p. 357.

** Collected Works , Vol. VIII, p. 346.

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And the more accurately fiction represents thecharacter of the mass of the people, the more itwill facilitate the task of those who, under favour-able circumstances, will have to take the initiativein making great decisions.

Now we shall ask the reader to recall that inone of the theses of his dissertation Chernyshevsky,emphasising the portrayal of life as the chiefcharacteristic of art, adds: “works of art often haveanother significance—they explain life; often theyalso provide a verdict on the phenomena of life.”What we have quoted, if only from one article“Is This Not the Beginning of a Change?”, clearlyshows to what extent literary criticism in theperson of Chernyshevsky was inclined to valuethe portrayal of life chiefly as material for inter-preting it and judging it (for passing a verdict onthe phenomena of life). The same tendency ofChernyshevsky manifests itself definitely in allhis other literary articles. Here is what he says,for example, in a review of a collection of poetryby A. N. Pleshcheyev (Sovremennik, 1861,No. 3).

He recalls with displeasure the time when ourcritics treated Pleshcheyev with scorn and evenill-will. “It seems monstrous now,” he says. “Surelythe noble sentiments and noble ideas which breath-ed from every page of Mr. Pleshcheyev’s bookletwere not so commonplace in the Russian poetry ofthe time as to be dismissed with scorn. When,indeed, is such a thing possible and permissible?”Pleshcheyev, according to him, had no great poetictalent and his aspirations [255] and hopes werequite vague. But he did possess great sincerity andas for expressing his hopes with greater preci-sion, he could not do so for reasons beyond hiscontrol.

[262]...Pisarev possessed tremendous literarytalent. But for all the enjoyment that the unpre-judiced reader derived from the literary brilliancyof Pisarev’s articles, it must be admitted that“Pisarevism” was a sort of reductio ad absurdumof the idealism of our “enlighteners....”

[266]...Some of Mikhailovsky’s sociologicalarticles have now been translated into French and,if we are not mistaken, also into German. Pre-sumably, however, they will not make his namevery well known in Europe. But it is very possiblethat they will earn praise from one or two of thoseEuropean thinkers who are going “back to Kant!”


out of hatred of Marxism. In spite of the opinionof our latest historian of literature, there can benothing flattering in these praises. But extremelyworth noting is time irony of history which makesa theoretical weapon of reaction out of what wasan innocent theoretical mistake in a more or lessprogressive utopism.

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PART TWO

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWS ONPOLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

SECTION ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S POLITICAL VIEWS

Chapter OneUTOPIAN SOCIALISM

[280]... His article goes on to tell of the strangeand often ridiculous acts to which the Saint-Simonists were driven in their extreme exaltation.He calls them drawing-room heroes overcome bya fit of philanthropy. But he qualifies this severejudgment of them. The Saint-Simonist movementwas the first expression of the concept of trans-forming society, and that first expression is of great[281] historic significance. It indicates that it ishigh time society concerned itself with the ideasof reform that first appeared in the unsatisfactoryform of Saint-Simonism.

In conclusion, Chernyshevsky says of reformistideas: “We shall soon see that they have begunto appear in more reasonable forms and to reachpeople for whom they are no longer a delightfulamusement but a matter of necessity, and when

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that class which the Saint-Simonists wished tohumbug begins reasonably to concern itself aboutits own well-being, then probably, life on earthwill be better for it than it is at present.* Thisis a highly important remark. It shows that in hisviews on the future of West European socialismChernyshevsky came very close to the theory of theclass struggle. But we know already of the rolewhich this theory has played in his views on history.Sometimes it helped him to explain very successful-

* N. G. Chernyshevsky, Collected Works , Vol. VI, p. 150.

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ly c e r t a i n i s o l a t e d h i s t o r i c a lp h e n o m e n a; but he looked on it as a ratherserious obstacle to progress instead of a necessarycondition for it in a society divided into classes.The reader will recall that Chernyshevsky sawthe weak development of the class struggle inSpain as an earnest of that country’s progressivedevelopment in the future. In his comments onevents in France in 1848, as well as in the passagewe have just quoted, he seems to incline to theidea that the emancipation movement of theproletariat is now becoming the motive force ofsocial progress in Western Europe. But with himthis idea remains one of the germs of a materialistinterpretation of history to which we have repeated-ly called the reader’s attention in dealing with ourauthor’s views on history....

[282]...He explains the backwardness of the“ordinary people” of Europe as being due to thefact that well-known scientific conceptions havenot yet reached the people. When they do, when“ordinary people” become acquainted with philo-sophical views “corresponding to their needs,” thenthe triumph of the new principles in the sociallife of Western Europe will not be far off.* Cherny-shevsky does not ask himself the question whetherany phenomena exist in this life that could providean objective guarantee that the new philosophical

ideas will, in fact, ultimately reach the “ordinarypeople.” He has no need for s u c h a guaranteebecause, as he sees it, the very nature of theseprinciples, and also the nature of man, quitesufficiently guarantee the triumph of the newprinciples....

Chapter TwoUTOPIAN SOCIALISM

(Continuation)

[289]...Chernyshevsky regards the question ofsocialism, as he does all the other general questionsof historical development, from the point of viewof i d e a l i s m. And this idealist attitude to themost important historical phenomena was typicalof the socialism of all countries in the utopianperiod of its development. This feature of utopian

* Ibid., pp. 205-206.

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socialism is of such tremendous importance thatit is necessary to dwell on it—without fear ofa certain amount of repetition, which may verywell occur in the process.

Chapter ThreeCHERNYSHEVSKY’S “OWN” PLAN

AND THE QUESTION OF THE LAND COMMUNE

[313]...“Let us suppose,” he says, turning to hisfavourite method of explanation by means of a“parable”—”let us suppose that I was interestedin taking steps to preserve the provisions from thestore of which your dinner is prepared. Obviously,if I did so out of affection for you, then my zealwould be based on the assumption that the provi-sions belong to you and that the dinner being pre-pared from them is nourishing and good for you.Just imagine my feelings when I learn that theprovisions do not really belong to you and thatfor every dinner prepared from them you paymoney which is not only more than the dinneritself is worth but which, in general, you cannotpay without extremely embarrassing yourself.What ideas will enter my head in the face of suchstrange discoveries?... How stupid I was to botherabout a matter when the conditions for its use-fulness were not guaranteed! Who but a dolt canbother about the preservation of property incertain hands, without first being assured thatthe property will remain in those hands and onadvantageous terms?... Rather let all these provi-sions, which only cause harm to the person I love,be lost! Rather let the whole matter, which onlycauses your ruin, vanish! Sorrow for you, shameon account of my own stupidity—that is whatI feel.”*

[315]...Credit is due to Chernyshevsky for thefact that, at the very beginning of his literaryactivity, he displayed, in his comments on theland commune, far more consideration than manya “Russian socialist” even in the mid-nineties,when to all appearances, only the blind could failto see that our vaunted “age-long foundations”were crumbling. As far back as April 1857 hewrote: but “there is no concealing the fact thatRussia, which until now has had a small share in

* Collected Works , Vol. IV, p. 307.

excessive!


economic progress, is being rapidly swept alongwith it, and our way of life, until now scarcelyaffected by the economic laws which reveal theirpower only in times of increased economic andcommercial activity, is beginning rapidly to besubjected to them. Perhaps it will not be longbefore we, too, are drawn into the sphere of fulloperation of the law of competition.”*

This is precisely what the theoreticians of ourNarodism ever since sought to conceal from them-selves and their readers for so long and with somuch care. What the Scriptures say is true: stardiffers from star in glory .... Being convinced thatour country lacks the conditions for making com-munal land tenure a source of well-being for thepeople, Chernyshevsky was to see that his sym-pathetic attitude to the commune bore in fact verylittle similarity to the Slavophils’ sympatheticview of it. In his article “On the Causes of the Fallof Rome,” he says that although the communecould contribute to the further development ofRussia, it was nonetheless ridiculous to takepride in it, because 13161 it was after all a signof our economic backwardness. He offers an exam-ple: European engineers, he says, now use appliedmechanics to construct suspension bridges. But itappears that in a backward Asiatic country-hedoes not quite remember which one-local engineershave long since been building suspension bridgeson suitable sites. Does that mean that appliedmechanics in Asia may be placed on a footingwith that in Europe? There are bridges and bridges,and the Asian engineers’ suspension bridge isinfinitely inferior to its European counterpart.To be sure, when European engineers arrive in theAsiatic country which has long been familiar withsuspension bridges, they will find it all the easierto convince a mandarin that the suspension bridgeof today is not a godless invention. But nothingmore than that. Despite its suspension bridges,the Asiatic country will remain a backward countryall the same while Europe will still be its preceptor.The same holds true for the Russian commune.Perhaps the latter will promote the developmentof our country; but the chief stimulus will comenonetheless from the West, and it does not reallybefit us to renovate the world, even by means ofthe commune....

* Collected Works, Vol. III, p. 185.

V. I. LENIN542

Chapter FourSOCIALISM AND POLITICS

[317]...He who tries to obtain in idea of Cherny-shevsky’s political views on the basis of his writ-ings, at first feels a little embarrassed, that is,if he himself is not indifferent [318] to politics.Indeed, the man who next to Belinsky was themost colourful exponent of progressive tendenciesin our literature, at first glance appears to bepolitically indifferent. And it is not because he hasemployed a few unfortunate expressions, nor be-cause of a slip of the pen, but on account of thegeneral principles by which he is sometimes guidedin judging the more important phenomena ofWest-European life. For evidence of this we referto the article “Party Struggles in France UnderLouis XVIII and Charles X” (Sovremennik, 1858,Nos. 8 and 9). There we read:

“The fundamental desires, the basic urges, ofliberals and democrats are essentially different.Democrats intend to abolish as far as possiblethe predominance of the upper classes over thelower in the state structure; on the one hand toreduce the power and wealth of the upper social-estates, on the other to give more weight andwell-being to the lower social-estates. How to changethe laws in this sense and to support the newstructure of society is almost a matter of indiffer-ence to them. On the other hand, the liberals can-not at all agree to give the predominance in societyto the lower social-estates because owing to theirlack of education and material poverty, thesesocial-estates are indifferent to the interests thatare of the utmost importance to the liberal party,namely, the right of free speech and a constitu-tional system. For the democrat, our Siberia, wherethe ordinary people are well off, stands far higherthan England, where the majority of the peoplesuffer great privations. Out of all political institu-tions, the democrat is irreconcilably hostile toonly one—aristocracy; the liberal almost alwaysfinds that only with a certain degree of aristocracycan society attain the liberal system. Thereforethe liberals are usually the mortal enemies of thedemocrats, and say that democracy leads to despo-tism and is fatal to freedom.”*

* Collected Works , Vol. IV, pp. 56-57.

Cf. Sotsial-Demokrat

No. 1, p. 124


FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

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DISTRIBUTION

[319]...Chernyshevsky then explains his ideasby arguments which bear out even more forcefullyour supposition that by democrats he meanssocialists. He says: “From the theoretical aspect,liberalism may seem attractive to one whom goodfortune has delivered from want: freedom is a verygood thing. But liberalism takes a very narrow,purely formal view of freedom. To it freedom con-sists of abstract right, of formal permission of theabsence of legal restraint. It refuses to see thatlegal right is of value to a person only when he hasthe material means of exercising that right.*The people have no material opportunity for avail-ing themselves of political freedom. The majorityof them are illiterate almost in all countries. So whyshould they treasure their right to free speech?Want and lack of education doom them to com-plete ignorance [320] of affairs of state. So whyshould they take any interest in parliamentarydebates?” Chernyshevsky states emphatically that“there is no European country where the vastmajority of the people is not completely indif-ferent to the decrees which are the object of theaspirations and concern of liberalism”**

[329]...In the political survey published inNo. 6 of Sovremennik for 1859, Chernyshevskyremarks, after stating that the movement whichinsists on intervention by the German [330] Unionin Austria’s favour is growing stronger in Germany:“we have not been speaking of ordinary people, butactually of classes in which public opinion isconcentrated, classes which engage in politicalaffairs, read the newspapers and influence thecourse of affairs—that crowd which everywhere isa plaything of self-interest a n d i n t r i g u e . ” * * *

The “ordinary people” do not read newspapers,do not occupy themselves with political affairsand have no influence on their course. That is thesituation now, while their consciousness is stillfast asleep. But when it awakens under the in-fluence of the vanguard of the active historicalarmy, consisting of the “best people,” who havelearned the lessons of modern science, then the“ordinary people” will understand that their taskconsists in the radical reconstruction of society,and then they will undertake the work of this re-

* Collected Works, Vol. IV, p. 157.** Ibid., p. 158.

*** Collected Works, Vol. V, p. 249.

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construction, which has no direct relation toquestions of the forms of political structure. Suchwere Chernyshevsky’s predominant views, which

are to be found in the majority of hisnumerous political reviews.* If at timesthis essentially idealist view of politicsmakes way for a different view, the germ,as it were, of a materialist understanding,this is only an exception, quite like thatwhich we encountered in studying Cher-nyshevsky’s historical views: the readerwill remember that in these views whichare also essentially idealist, there are

also germs of the materialist view of history.Let us now elucidate with the help of two exam-ples the character that Chernyshevskys politicalreviews had taken under the influence of hisaforementioned predominant views regarding therelation of politics to the chief tasks of the working class.

First example. In January 1862, in his politicalreview, he enters into a controversy with thePrussian liberal National Zeitung regardingAustria’s internal policy. The National Zeitungwrote: “Let the fate of Austria be a lesson to otherstates not to undertake expenditures that exceedtheir financial strength. The cause of Austria’sruin is her excessive army expenditures.” Cherny-shevsky does not like these reflections of theNational Zeitung.

[331]...Such arguments, which led to the con-clusion that the despotic Austrian Government isacting perfectly correctly, should have astonishedand in fact did astonish a large number of thereaders of Sovremennik. They produced [332]an impression not so much of indifference to ques-tions of political freedom as of direct sympathywith the obscurantists. Chernyshevsky’s opponentsfrequently accused him of such sympathies. It wasjust because of accusations of this kind that atthe end of his political review in March 1862he made the ironical confession: “for us there isno better amusement than liberalism—and we

* These reviews take up at least two volumes of hisCollected Works.

Because of the theo-retical differencebetween the idea-

list and materialistviews of history,Plekhanov over-

looked the practi-cal-political and

class difference be-tween the liberaland the democrat

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No. 1,p. 144181

changed!!

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A page from G. V. Plekhanov’sbook N. G. Chernyshevsky with V. I. Lenin’s notes

A page from G. V. Plekhanov’sbook N. G. Chernyshevsky with V. I. Lenin’s notes



No. 1, p. 144tone!

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have an irresistible desire to look about for liberalsin order to poke fun at them.” But as a matter offact, of course, he did not write his paradoxicalreviews in order to “poke fun” at the liberals, norto defend despotic governments. Basically thethought was that, while the given social relationsexisted, things could not proceed otherwise thanthey were doing and that anyone who wantedthem to proceed differently should devote his

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDefforts to a radical change in social relations. To actDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDdifferently would be a waste of time. The liberalsevoked Chernyshevsky’s ridicule precisely becausethey proposed palliatives where a radical curewas necessary.*

Second example. In April of the same year,Chernyshevsky again appeared to take the side ofabsolutism in its struggle with liberalism in thePrussian Government’s conflict with the PrussianDiet. According to him, the liberals should nothave been surprised that the Prussian Governmentdid not make voluntary concessions to them butpreferred to agitate the country by dissolving theDiet “We find,” he says, “that the Prussian Govern-ment acted as it should have.** This again wasbound to astonish the naïve reader and seem tohim a betrayal of the cause of freedom. It is clearlyunderstandable, however, that here, too, our authorwas not at all taking up the cudgels in defence ofdespotism, but only wanted [333] to utilise thePrussian events in order to communicate to themore astute of his readers the correct view of thechief condition on which, in the final analysis, theoutcome of all broad social conflicts depends.Here is what he says on this point:

“Just as quarrels between different states are

* In his Essays on Political Economy Chernyshevsky,pointing to the lack of agreement between the existingeconomic system and “the demands of a sound theory,”sometimes interrupts his exposition with the question:“Should a system continue which allows such disagree-ment?” (See, for instance, Collected Works , Vol. VII,p. 513.) The reader of Chernyshevsky must have askedhimself the same question on reading his political surveys,especially those leading to the “incongruous” conclusionthat the apologists of despotism, and not its opponents,were in the right. In Chernyshevsky such a conclusionwas just another argument a g a i n s t t h e c o n t e-m p o r a r y l i f e. But the liberals often failed to under-stand this.

** Collected Works, Vol. IX, p. 236.

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at first carried on by diplomatic means, so thestruggle for principles inside the state itself is atfirst carried on by means of civilian influence orso-called legal means. But just as a quarrel be-tween different states, if it is sufficiently important,always leads to military threats, so too with theinternal affairs of states, if the affair is not of minorimportance. If the quarrelling states are veryunequal in power, then the affair is usually solvedby military threats alone: the weaker state suc-cumbs to the will of the stronger, and this preventsopen warfare. In just the same way, in importantinternal affairs, war is only prevented if one ofthe conflicting sides feels too weak compared withthe other: then it submits as soon as it sees thatthe opposing party has really decided to resort tomilitary measures. But if two quarrelling statesare not so unequal in power that the weaker ofthem cannot hope to repulse an attack, then theaffair may pass from threats to war. The defendingside has a very big advantage on its side and,therefore, if it is not too weak, it does not loseheart at the decision of the stronger opponent toattack it”*

It was from this point of view that he examinedwhat was then taking place in Prussia. He defendedand praised the Prussian Government—this mustbe noted—solely because “it was acting in thebest possible way in favour of national progress”by destroying the political illusions of those naïvePrussians who, for no obvious reason, imaginedthat a system of genuinely constitutional rulewould be instituted in their country of itself,without a struggle against the old order. Andif he revealed not the slightest sympathy for thePrussian liberals and even poked fun at them, theexplanation is that, in his just opinion, they too

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDwanted to achieve their aims [334] without a deter-mined struggle against their political enemies.In speaking of the possible outcome of the conflictbetween the Diet and the Government he remarks,with great perspicacity, that “judging by thepresent mood of public opinion in Prussia, it isto be presumed that the opponents of the present

* Collected Works, Vol. IX, p. 241.

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system find themselves too weak for militarystruggle and are ready to yield at the first deter-mined threat from the government that it willresort to military measures.”* And so it turnedout Chernyshevsky was right in his contempt forthe Prussian liberals. They indeed wanted constitu-tional order to be instituted in Prussia of itself.Not only did they not take determined action—forthat they could not be blamed since, with theprevailing relation of social forces, this was notpossible—but they condemned in principle everyidea of such action, i.e., they hampered, insofaras it depended on them, a change in social forcesthat would have made it possible to resort to suchaction in the future. Chernyshevsky could notforgive them that, just as Lassalle could not. It isnoteworthy that just when Chernyshevsky wasridiculing the Prussian liberals in his politicalarticles, Lassalle was tearing them to pieces in hisspeeches. And it is even more noteworthy that inthose speeches the German agitator sometimesused the same words as Chernyshevsky to describethe relation of social forces as the foundation of thepolitical system in a particular country. Lassallehad in many respects the same mentors as Cherny-shevsky. It is natural, therefore, that the politicalthinking of both tended in the same direction, andachieved results that coincided in part. We say“i n p a r t” because, in noting the great s i m -i l a r i t y of Lassalle’s views to Cherny-shevsky’s, one must not close one’s eyes to thed i f f e r e n c e s between them. Lassalle doesnot confine himself to concluding that the constitu-tion of any country is the juridical expression of theprevailing correlation of social forces. He seeksthe causes which determine this correlation, andfinds them in the social economy. Those of Las-salle’s speeches which bear on this question arepermeated with a materialist spirit, which ismore than can be said, for instance, of his speech[335] on the philosophy of Fichte, or his “S y s t e mo f A c q u i r e d R i g h t s.” Neither doesChernyshevsky ignore the question of the causesdetermining the relation of social forces, but in hisanalysis he stops at social self-consciousness, i.e.,not crossing the boundary separating historical

* Collected Works, Vol. IX, p. 241.

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idealism from historical materialism. In contrastto Lassalle, he is a far more consistent idealist inhis comments on Prussian affairs than in manyof his other articles dealing with politics or history.This difference, too, should be attributed com-pletely to the “relation of social forces.” In Prussia,no matter how weak Prussian capitalism was com-pared with what it is at present, a w o r k i n g-c l a s s m o v e m e n t in the modern sense of theword had nevertheless already begun; but inRussia t h e m o v e m e n t o f t h e “n o n-g e n t r y,” which is usually called the movement

of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a, had only justbegun to flourish. Influenced by the requirementsof the working-class movement, even i d e a l i s t sare often compelled to reason m a t e r i a l i s -t i c a l l y. (Joe can find many examples inpresent-day France of how the requirements ofthe working-class movement exert their influence.The movement of the intelligentsia, on the con-trary, sometimes drives even m a t e r i a l i s t sto purely i d e a l i s t reasoning. This is particu-larly marked in Russia today.

Chernyshevsky’s political reviews were intendedfor the “best people,” who had to know what theyshould teach the backward masses. The work of the“best people” amounted, i n t h e m a i n, topropaganda. But not e x c l u s i v e l y. The“ordinary people,” generally speaking, do notfigure on the political stage. And what takes placeon that stage—again speaking generally—littleaffects their interests. But there are exceptionalepochs during which the masses of the peopleawaken from their customary hibernation and makeenergetic, although often hardly conscious, effortsto improve their destiny. In such exceptional epochsthe activity of the “best people” more or less losesits predominantly p r o p a g a n d i s t charac-ter and becomes a g i t a t i o n a l. This is whatChernyshevsky says of such epochs:

“Historical progress takes place slowly andarduously... [336], so slowly that, if we limitourselves to very short periods, the fluctuationsproduced in the advancing course of history byaccidental circumstances may blind us to theaction of the general law. In order to convinceoneself of its immutability, it is necessary to con-


sider the course of events over a fairly long time....Compare the state of the social institutions andlaws of France in 1700 and today—the differenceis extremely great, and it is all to the advantageof the present day; and yet almost all this centuryand a half was very arduous and gloomy. The samealso in England. Whence comes the difference?It was being constantly prepared for by the factthat the best people of each generation found lifein their time extremely difficult; little by little atleast a few of their desires became comprehensibleto society, and then, at some time many yearslater, on propitious occasions, society for sixmonths, a year, or hardly more than three or fouryears, worked for the fulfilment of at least a fewof this small number of desires which had penetrat-ed to it from the best people. The work was neversuccessful: when half the work was done society’szeal would be exhausted, its strength would giveout, and once again the practical life of societywould fall into a long period of stagnation; and, asbefore, the best people, if they survived the workinspired by them, saw that their desires were farfrom having been carried out and as before hadto bemoan life’s burdens. But in the brief periodof noble enthusiasm much was reconstructed. Ofcourse, the reconstruction took place hurriedly,there was no time to think about the elegance of thenew structures, which remained unfinished, therewas no time to bother about the subtle require-ments of architectural harmony between the newparts and the surviving remains, and the periodof stagnation inherited the reconstructed edificewith a multitude of petty incongruities and hideosi-ties. But that period of indolence afforded leisureto examine carefully every detail and since theimprovement of the details that it disliked didnot require any particular effort, it was donelittle by little; and while an exhausted societybusied itself with trivia, the best people weresaying that the reconstruction was incomplete,and argued that the old parts of the building werebecoming more and more dilapidated, and that itwas necessary to resume work on a big scale.At first a tired society refused to heed them, re-garding their jarring cry as interference with itsrest; then, having recovered its energy, societybegan to defer more and more to an opinion whichhad previously aroused its indignation. [337] So-

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ciety gradually became convinced that there wassome truth in it, came to recognise that truth moreand more from year to year, and finally was pre-pared to go along with those progressive peoplewho argued that reconstruction was necessary;and, then, at the earliest opportunity it set towork with renewed fervour, again left it unfinished,and once more fell into a slumber, only to resumethe effort later on.”*

Chernyshevsky’s political articles were aimedat showing the “best people” that the old structureof the contemporary social system was crumblingmore and more and that there was a need to “re-sume work on a big scale.” And everything pointsto the fact that towards the end of the first, i.e.,pre-Siberian period of his literary activity, itbegan to appear to him that society was more andmore heeding his opinion, and falling in with him.In other words, he began to think that in Russianhistory too there was approaching one of thosebeneficial leaps which rarely occur in history, butwhich push far ahead the process of social develop-ment. The spirits of the advanced sections ofRussian society were indeed rapidly rising, andwith them Chernyshevsky’s spirits also rose.At one time he had found it possible and usefulto make clear to the government its own interestsin the matter of freeing the peasants; now he doesnot even think of addressing himself to the govern-ment. To count on it at all seems to him harmfulself-delusion. In the article “The Russian Reformer”(Sovremennik, October 1861), which he wrote inconnection with the publication of M. Korf’s bookThe Life of Count Speransky, Chernyshevskyargues at length that no reformer should deludehimself with such calculations in our country.Speransky’s enemies called him a revolutionary.This opinion amused Chernyshevsky. Speranskyindeed had very broad plans for changes, but it isludicrous to call him a revolutionary, judging bythe extent of the means he intended using to carryout his intentions. He could maintain his positiononly because he had managed to earn the trust ofthe tsar Alexander I. With this trust to supporthim, he intended to carry out his plans. That iswhy Chernyshevsky called him a dreamer....

* Collected Works, Vol. V, pp. 400-491.


Sotsial-Demokrat,

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Cf. omissionSotsial-

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p. 162183

[338]...Only he who constantly remembers thatthe course of social life is determined by the re-lationship of social forces does not succumb toharmful delusions in politics, he who wishes to actin accordance with this basic principle has some-times to go through a difficult moral struggle.Chernyshevsky tries to warn the “best people” ofhis time on this score, in view of what he thoughtwas the imminent leap. Thus, as far back asJanuary 1861, in analysing a book by the well-known American economist, Carey, whose insig-nificance, incidentally, he brilliantly exposes, heunexpectedly passes to the well-known Jewishheroine, Judith, and strongly justifies her action.He says: “The path of history is not paved likeNevsky Prospekt; it runs across fields, either dustyor muddy, and cuts across swamps or forest thick-ets. He who fears being covered with dust or mud-dying his boots, should better not engage in socialactivity, for this is a noble occupation when oneis really concerned with the good of the people,but it is not exactly a tidy one. It is true, however,that moral purity may be understood differently;others, for example, may feel that Judith did nottarnish herself.... Broaden your considerations andon many individual questions you will haveobligations that are different from those resultingfrom an isolated examination of the same ques-tions*

At the beginning of the sixties the governmentconceived the idea of lifting censorship restrictionsto some extent. It was decided that new censorshiprules should be drawn up, and the press was allowedto express itself on the question of its own repres-sion. Chernyshevsky lost no time in stating hispersonal views, which as usual strongly differedfrom the usual liberal views. [339] True, Cherny-shevsky himself maliciously ridicules the peoplewho suppose that the printing press has somespecific power like belladonna, sulphuric acid,fulminate of silver, etc. “Our personal opinion isnot inclined towards expecting unnaturally harm-ful results from objects and actions which do notpossess the power to produce such calamities.We think the printing press is too weak to producesocial misfortune. After all, it does not containso much ink that the latter could come pouring outsomehow and flood our country; nor has it springs

* Collected Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 37-38.

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that, after jumping out somehow and thumpingthe type, could fire it as case shot.” However,Chernyshevsky admits that there are epochs whenthe press can be no less dangerous than case shot tothe government of a country. These are the epochswhen a government’s interests d i f f e r f r o mt h e i n t e r e s t s o f s o c i e t y and a rev-olutionary upheaval is imminent. A governmentin such a position has every ground for restrictingthe press, because the press, together with othersocial forces, is preparing its downfall. Almostall the successive French governments of thiscentury have been continuously in this situation.All this is very painstakingly and calmly expoundedby Chernyshevsky. Nothing is said in the article,until the very end, about the Russian Government.But in conclusion Chernyshevsky suddenly askshis reader—suppose it should turn out that thepress laws are really necessary in our country?“Then we should again deserve to be called obscu-rantists, enemies of progress, haters of freedom,panegyrists of despotism, etc., just as we havealready many times laid ourselves open to suchcensure.” He therefore does not want to investigatethe question of whether there is a need for specialpress laws in our country. “We fear,” he says,“that a conscientious investigation would leadus to reply: yes, they are necessary.”* Theconclusion is clear they are necessary becausethe time for a “leap” is also approaching inRussia.

In the same March issue of Sovremennik thatprinted the article we have just quoted, thereappeared a polemical article entitled “Have WeLearned the Lesson?”, concerning the well-knownstudent demonstrations of 1861. In it Chernyshev-sky defends the students, who were reproached byour “guardians” for allegedly not wanting to study[340]; and, incidentally, he also tells the govern-ment many home truths. The immediate causefor this polemic was an anonymous article in theSt. Petersburg Academic Bulletin entitled “ToStudy or Not To Study?” Chernyshevsky repliesthat in regard to students this question has nosense, since they have always wanted to study,but the restricting university regulations hinderedthem. The university regulations would have

* Collected Works, Vol. IX, pp. 130, 155.


idemSotsial-

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dealt with students—people of an age when by ourlaws a man may marry, be taken into the civil ser-vice, or “command an army unit”—as children.It is not surprising that they protested. Theywere even barred from having such completelyharmless organisations as mutual aid societies,which were undoubtedly essential in view of thematerial insecurity of the majority of the students.Students could not but revolt against such regula-tions, because it was a question of “a crust of breadand the possibility of attending lectures. Thisbread, this opportunity was being withdrawn.”Chernyshevsky declared outright that the peoplewho made the university regulations actuallywanted to deprive the majority of those who enteredthe university of any possibility of studying.“If the author of the article and those who agreewith him consider it necessary to prove that thiswas not the aim in view when the regulationswere drawn up, let them publish the documentsrelating to the meetings at which the regulationswere decided on.” The anonymous writer of thearticle “To Study or Not To Study?” directedhis charge of unwillingness to study not onlyagainst the students but against the whole ofRussian society. Chernyshevsky took advantageof this to carry the controversy about the unrestat the university on to a more general field. Hisopponent allowed that there were certain signs ofthe desire of Russian society to study. Proof ofthis, in his opinion, was the “hundreds” of newperiodicals, the “dozens” of Sunday schools foradults that were appearing in our country. “Hun-dreds of new periodicals, but where did he count thehundreds?” exclaims Chernyshevsky. “And hundredswould really be necessary, but does the author wantto know why hundreds of new periodicals are notbeing founded, as they should? It is because underthe conditions of our censorship it is impossiblefor any lively periodical to exist anywhere, exceptin a few large towns. Every rich commercial townshould [341] have several, even if only small, news-papers; several local news-sheets should be publi-shed in every province. They do not exist, becausethey are not allowed to.... Dozens of Sunday schoolsfor adults.... Now that is no exaggeration, it is notthe same as with the hundreds of new periodicals:in an empire with a population of over 60 million,the Sunday schools for adults are indeed to becounted only in dozens. Yet there should havebeen tens of thousands of them, and it would have

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been possible to establish quickly tens of thousandsof them, and for at least many thousands to be nowin existence. How is it that there are only dozens?Because they are so suspect, so hampered, so cir-cumscribed, that the people who are most loyalto the work of teaching in them have all desire toteach driven out of them.”

After referring to the existence of ‘hundreds”of new periodicals and “dozens” of Sunday schoolsfor adults as apparent signs of the desire of societyto study, the author of the article which Cherny-shevsky was analysing hastened to add that thesesigns were deceptive. “You hear shouting in thestreets,” he proclaims mournfully, “something orother is said to have happened somewhere, andyou involuntarily hang your head and are disillu-sioned....” “Excuse me, Mr. Author of the article,”objects Chernyshevsky, “what is the shouting youhear in the streets? The shouting of constables andpolice officers—we hear their shouting too. Are youspeaking of that shouting? You are told somethingor other has happened somewhere....—what sortof thing, for example? There a theft has occurred,here authority has been exceeded, there the rightsof the weak have been violated, here there hasbeen connivance with the strong—we are inces-santly being told this sort of thing. Because ofthis shouting which everyone hears, and this con-stant talk, one does indeed involuntarily hang one’shead and become disillusioned.”

The accuser of the students attacked them fortheir apparent intolerance of the opinions ofothers, for having recourse in their protests towhistling, pickled apples and similar “street weap-ons.” Chernyshevsky replies that “whistling andpickled apples are not used as street weapons:street weapons take the form of bayonets, rifle-butts and sabres.” He asks his opponent to recall“whether it was the students who used these streetweapons against anyone, or whether they wereused against the students ... and whether there wasany need to use them against the students.”

It is easy to understand the impression sucharticle of Chernyshevsky’s were bound to makeon the Russian students. When [342], subsequently,student demonstrations occurred again at the endof the sixties, the article “Have We Learned theLesson?” was read at student gatherings as beingthe best defence of their demands. It is also easyto understand what the attitude of the “guardians”must have been to such defiant articles. The great

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writer’s “dangerous” influence on the student youthbecame more and more obvious to them.

We know already how that influence was removed.Holding a utopian socialist point of view,

Chernyshevsky believed that the plans which thoseof like mind in the West sought to realise couldbe carried out under the most varied politicalforms. That’s how it was according to theory. Andas long as he did not step out of this sphere, heexpressed this view without mincing words. Whenhe started on his literary career, our social lifeseemed to furnish some confirmation, if onlyindirect, of the correctness of this view; hopearose among the advanced men of the day that thegovernment would take the initiative in reachinga just solution of the peasant question. It was avain hope, which Chernyshevsky abandoned almostbefore anyone else. And while in theory he didnot, even afterwards, clearly see the connectionbetween economics and politics, in his practicalactivity—and by this we mean his j o u r n a l -i s t i c efforts—he was an uncompromising enemyof our old order, although his peculiar irony con-tinued to mislead many liberal-minded readerson that score. In deeds, if not in theory, he becamea man of irreconcilable political struggle andthe thirst for struggle is felt In almost every lineof each of his articles relating to the year 1861and, in particular, to the year 1862, a fateful onefor him.


Written not earlierthan October 1 9 0 9

and not later than April 1 9 1 1Published in part in 1 9 3 3in Lenin Miscellany X X V

Published in full for the first time

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1

2

Conspectus of the book “The Holy Family” by Marx and Engels waswritten by Lenin in 1895 during his first stay abroad when he leftRussia to establish contact with the Emancipation of Labourgroup. p. 19

The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against BrunoBauer and Co.—the first joint work of Karl Marx and FrederickEngels. It was written between September and November 1844and was published in February 1845 in Frankfort-on-Main.

“The Holy Family” is a mocking reference to the Bauer brothersand their followers grouped around the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung(General Literary Gazette). While attacking the Bauers and theother Young Hegelians (or Left Hegelians), Marx and Engels at thesame time criticised the idealist philosophy of Hegel.

Marx sharply disagreed with the Young Hegelians as earlyas the summer of 1842, when the club of “The Free” was formed inBerlin. Upon becoming editor of the Rheinische Zeitung (RhineGazette) in October 1842, Marx opposed the efforts of several YoungHegelian staff members from Berlin to publish inane and preten-tious articles emanating from the club of “The Free,” which hadlost touch with reality and was absorbed in abstract philosophicaldisputes. During the two years following Marx’s break with “TheFree,” the theoretical and political differences between Marx andEngels on the one hand and the Young Hegelians on the other becamedeep-rooted and irreconcilable. This was not only due to the factthat Marx and Engels had gone over from idealism to materialismand from revolutionary democratism to communism, but also dueto the evolution undergone by the Bauer brothers and persons oflike mind during this time. In the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung ,Bauer and his group denounced “1842 radicalism” and its most out-standing proponent—the Rheinische Zeitung . They slithered intovulgar subjective idealism of the vilest kind—propagation of a“theory” according to which only select individuals, bearers of the

562 NOTES

“spirit,” of “pure criticism,” are the makers of history, while themasses, the people, serve as inert material or ballast in the historicalprocess.

Marx and Engels decided to devote their first joint work to theexposure of these pernicious, reactionary ideas and to the defenceof their new materialist and communist outlook.

During a ten-day stay of Engels in Paris the plan of the book(at first entitled Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauerand Co.) was drafted, responsibility for the various chapters ap-portioned between the authors, and the “Preface” written. Engelswrote his chapters while still in Paris. Marx, who was responsiblefor a larger part of the book, continued to work on it until the endof November 1844. Moreover, he considerably increased the initiallyconceived size of the book by incorporating in his chapters parts ofhis economic and philosophical manuscripts on which he had workedduring the spring and summer of 1844, his historical studies of thebourgeois French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, anda number of his excerpts and conspectuses. While the book was inthe process of being printed, Marx added the words The Holy Familyto the title. By using a small format, the book exceeded 20 printer’ssheets and was thus exempted from preliminary censorship accord-ing to the prevailing regulations in a number of German states.

p. 23

Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (General Literary Gazette)—a Germanmonthly published in Charlottenburg from December 1843 toOctober 1844 by Bruno Bauer, the Young Hegelian. p. 23

Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie (Outlines of a Critiqueof Political Economy) was first published by Engels at the beginningof 1844 in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (Franco-German Annals)—see Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow,1959, pp. 175-209. p. 24

Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (Franco-German Annals)—a mag-azine published in German in Paris and edited by Karl Marx andArnold Ruge. The only issue to appear was a double number pub-lished in February 1844. It included Marx’s articles “A Critique ofthe Hegelian Philosophy of Law (Introduction)” and “On the JewishQuestion,” and also Engels’ articles “Outlines of a Critique ofPolitical Economy” and “The Position of England. Thomas Carlyle.‘Past and Present’.” These works mark the final transition of Marxand Engels to materialism and communism. Publication of themagazine was discontinued chiefly as a result of the basic dif-ferences between Marx’s views and the bourgeois-radical viewsof Ruge. p. 24

This refers to Proudhon’s work of 1840 Qu’est-ce que la propriété?ou Recherches sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement (What

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Is Property? or Studies on the Principle of Law and Government).Marx presents a critique of this work in a letter to Schweitzer datedJanuary 24, 1865 (see Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence,Moscow, 1955, pp. 185-192). p. 26

This refers to Eugene Sue’s novel Les mystères de Paris (Mysteriesof Paris), which was written in the spirit of petty-bourgeois senti-mentality. It was published in Paris in 1842-43 and was very popularin France and abroad. p. 31

Marx is referring here to articles by Jules Faucher entitled EnglischeTagesfragen (Topical Questions in England), which were publishedin Nos. VII and VIII (June and July 1844) of the Allgemeine Lite-ratur-Zeitung. p. 32

Loustallot’s journal of 1789—a weekly publication entitled Révolu-tions de Paris (Parisian Revolutions), which appeared in Paris fromJuly 1789 to February 1794. Until September 1790 it was editedby Elisée Loustallot, a revolutionary publicist. p. 32

Phanomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Mind) by G. W. F. Hegelwas first published in 1807. In working on The Holy Family, Marxmade use of Vol. II of the second edition of Hegel’s works (Berlin,1841). He called this first large work of Hegel, in which the latter’sphilosophical system was elaborated, “the source and secret ofHegel’s philosophy.” p. 33

Doctrinaires—members of a bourgeois political grouping in Franceduring the period of the Restoration (1815-30). As constitutionalmonarchists and rabid enemies of the democratic and revolutionarymovement, they aimed to create in France a bloc of the bourgeoisieand landed aristocracy after the English fashion. The most celebrat-ed of the Doctrinaires were Guizot, a historian, and Royer-Collard,a philosopher. Their views constituted a reaction in the field ofphilosophy against the French materialism of the 18th century andthe democratic ideas of the French bourgeois revolution. p. 34

The refutation of the views expounded by Bruno Bauer in his bookDie Judenfrage (The Jewish Question), Braunschweig, 1843, wasmade by Marx in an article entitled “Zur Judenfrage” (“On theJewish Question”), published in 1844 in Deutsch-FranzösischeJahrbücher. p. 35

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The Universal Rights of Man—the principles enunciated in the“Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” and proclaimedduring the time of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789-93.

p. 38

The 18th Brumaire (9 November 1799)—the day of the coup d’etatof Napoleon Bonaparte, who overthrew the Directorate and estab-lished his own dictatorship. p. 40

Cartesian materialism—the materialism of the followers of Descartes(from the Latin spelling of Descartes—Cartesius). The indicatedbook—Rapports du physique et du moral de l’hommne (Relation of thePhysical to the Spiritual in Man) by P. J. G. Cabanis—was publishedin Paris in 1802. p. 42

Nominalism—the trend in medieval philosophy that consideredgeneral concepts as merely the names of single objects in contrastto medieval “realism,” which recognised the existence of generalconcepts or ideas independent of things.

Nominalism recognised objects as primary and concepts as sec-ondary. Thus, as Marx says in The Holy Family , nominalismrepresents the first expression of materialism in the Middle Ages(see Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, Moscow, 1956, p. 172).

p. 43

Sensualism—the philosophical doctrine that recognises sensationas the sole source of cognition. p. 43

Babouvists—adherents of Gracchus Babeuf, who in 1796 leda utopian communist movement of “equals” in France. p. 44

Lenin is referring to Feuerbach’s Grundsätze der Philosophie derZukunft (Principles of the Philosophy of the Future), 1843, whichconstitutes a continuation of the latter’s aphorisms VorläufigeThesen zu einer Reform der Philosophie (Preliminary Theses onthe Reform of Philosophy), 1842, in which the author expounds thebasis of his materialist philosophy and criticises Hegel’s idealistphilosophy. p. 45

Fleur de Marie—heroine of Eugène Sue’s novel Mysteries of Paris.p. 46

Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publizistik. VonBruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk,

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Arnold Ruge und einigen Ungenannten (Unpublished Recent GermanPhilosophical and Other Writings of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach,Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk, Arnold Ruge and Several Anon-ymous Writers)—a collection of articles that were banned forpublication in German magazines. Published in 1843 in Zurichby Ruge and included Marx as one of its contributors. p. 48

Tory philanthropists—a literary-political group—“Young England.”This group was formed in the early 1840s and belonged to the

Tory Party. It voiced the dissatisfaction of the landed aristocracywith the increased economic and political might of the bourgeoisie,and resorted to demagogic methods to bring the working classunder its influence and use it in its fight against the bourgeoisie.

“In order to arouse sympathy,” Marx and Engels wrote in theManifesto of the Communist Party, “the aristocracy were obligedto lose sight, apparently, of their own interests, and to formulatetheir indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of theexploited working class alone.”

Ten Hours’ Bill—a law on the 10-hour working day for womenand juveniles, adopted by the English Parliament in 1847. p. 51

The note on Fr. Überweg’s book “Grundriß der Geschichte der Philo-sophie.” (Bearbeitet von Max Heinze). 3 Vls. 1876-1880, Leipzig(Fr. Überweg, Outline of the History of Philosophy, revised by MaxHeinze, 3 Vols., 1876-1880, Leipzig) is recorded in the samenotebook containing the remarks on Paulsen’s book Introduction toPhilosophy. These entries were made in Geneva in 1903. p.52

Remarks on Fr. Paulsen’s book “Einleitung in die Philosophie,” 1899(Fr. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, 1899) are contained inthe same notebook in which the note on the book by Überwug isrecorded (entries made in Geneva in 1903). After the remarks inthe notebook on Paulsen’s book, there follows: “Note on the Positionof the New Iskra.” (See Lenin, pres. ed., Vol. 7.) p. 53

Note on a Feuilleton in the newspaper “Frankfurter Zeitung” ofNovember 15, 1904, which comments on two books by E. Haeck-el—Lebenswunder (Gemeinverständliche Studien über biologischePhilosophie) [The Wonders of Life (Elementary Studies in BiologistPhilosophy)], Stuttgart (Alfred Kröner) and Welträtsel (The Riddleof the Universe)—was written on a separate sheet, which also con-tained a list of a number of foreign books on the agrarian question.The entry was made at the end of 1904. Lenin gave an evaluationof The Riddle of the Universe by E. Haeckel in Materialism andEmpirio-Criticism (see V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow, 1960, pp. 364-372). p. 56

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566 NOTES

Remarks on Books on the Natural Sciences and Philosophy in theSorbonne Library were written on separate sheets during the firsthalf of 1909. p. 57

Ten Trends in Philosophy—a list of ten chapters in the first partof the book Modern Philosophical Trends by L. Stein. p. 58

Conspectus of Feuerbach’s book “Vorlesungen über das Wesen derReligion” (Lectures on the Essence of Religion) is contained in a sepa-rate notebook whose cover was not preserved. On the first page inabbreviated form is written L. Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke, Band 8,1851; also indicated is the press-mark—8°. R. 807. There is no indica-tion exactly when the Conspectus was worked out by Lenin.

V. Adoratsky has suggested that it was written in 1909 (LeninMiscellany XII). The following arguments speak in favour of thishypothesis. It has been established that the press-mark on the firstpage of the Conspectus is that of the French National Library(Paris) in which Lenin worked from January 13 to June 30, 1909.The contents of Lectures on the Essence of Religion borders upon thoseworks of Feuerbach that were used by Lenin in 1908 in writing hisbook Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, and some of Lenin’s re-marks in the Conspectus are related to propositions formulated inhis book. In the Conspectus, for example, Lenin notes: [(Feuerbachand natural science!! NB. Cf. Mach and Co. today)] (see p. 71 ofthis volume), and in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he writes:“The philosophy of the scientist Mach is to science what the kissof the Christian Judas was to Christ. Mach likewise betrays scienceinto the hands of fideism by virtually deserting to the camp ofphilosophical idealism.” (V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism , Moscow, 1960, p. 303.) Certain remarks in Lenin’s Con-spectus are also related to theses in his article “On the Attitude ofa Working-Class Party to Religion,” written in May 1909. (SeeLenin, pres. ed., Vol. 15.) p. 61

Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity)—L. Feuerbach’s chief philosophical work. Its first edition came out inLeipzig in 1841. The book, which, as Engels said, proclaimedthe triumph of materialism, exerted enormous influence on theideological education of progressive intellectuals in Germany andother countries, including Russia. The first Russian translation ofthe book came out in 1861. p. 64

The reference is to The Holy Family by Frederick Engels andKarl Marx, in which the authors wrote that Feuerbach outlined“in a masterly manner the general basic features of Hegel’s speculation

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and hence of every kind of metaphysics.” (Marx and Engels, The HolyFamily, Moscow, 1956, pp. 186-187.) p. 65

Das Wesen der Religion (The Essence of Religion) by L. Feuerbachwas published in 1846. Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft(Principles of the Philosophy of the Future) was published in 1843.

p. 67

The reference is to the well-known passage on the basic questionof philosophy in Engels’ book Ludwig Feuerbach and the End ofClassical German Philosophy (see Marx and Engels, Selected Works,Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 369-370). p. 70

Lenin contrasts here the attitude toward natural science of Feuer-bach, the materialist, and of Mach, the subjective idealist. A criticalevaluation of Mach’s attitude toward natural science is given byLenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (see V. I. Lenin,Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow, 1960, pp. 363-364).

p. 71

Josef Dietzgen developed analogous ideas. For example, in thebook The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind (SämtlicheWerke, Bd. I, Stuttgart, 1922), in the paragraph “Spirit and Matter,”he wrote: “Long ago, mainly during early Christianity, it becamecustomary to look with disdain upon material, sensual and carnalthings, which become moth-eaten and rusty” (p. 53). p. 72

Josef Dietzgen wrote as follows in The Nature of the Workings ofthe Human Mind (Sämtliche Werke, Bd. I, Stuttgart, 1922), in thechapter “Pure Reason or the Capacity to Think in General”: “Think-ing is a function of the brain, just as writing is a function of thehand” (p. 11) and further “... the reader will not misunderstandme when I call the capacity to think a material power, a sensuousphenomenon” (p. 13). p. 72

See Lenin’s notations in Plekhanov’s book N. G. Chernyshevsky(pp. 534-536, 538, 543, 544, 549-550 and 552 of this volume).

p. 77

Neue Rheinische Zeitung (New Rhine Gazette) was published byMarx in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849.

Engels’ book The Condition of the Working Class in Englandwas published in 1845. Regarding the significance of this book, seeV. I. Lenin, pres. ed., Vol. 2, Moscow, 1960, pp. 22-23. p. 77

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Lenin is referring to the following passage in Feuerbach’s bookVorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion. Werke, Bd. 8, 1851, S. 411(Lectures on the Essence of Religion, Works, Vol. 8, 1851, p. 411):“...godliness consists, so to speak, of two component parts, of whichone belongs to man’s fantasy, the other to nature. Pray!—says onepart, i.e., God, distinct from nature; work!—says the other part,i.e., God, not distinct from nature, but merely expressing its es-sence; for nature is the working bee, Gods—the drones.” p. 78

The Anthropological Principle—the main thesis of Feuerabach’sphilosophy that it is neccessary to consider man as part of nature,as a biological being.

The anthropological principle was directed against religionand idealism. However, by considering man apart from the concretehistorical and social relations, the anthropological principle leadsto idealism in the understanding of the laws of historical develop-ment.

Nikolai Chernyshevsky, in struggling against idealism, alsotook the anthropological principle as his starting-point and devoteda special work to this question under the title “The AnthropologicalPrinciple in Philosophy” (see N. G. Chernyshevsky, Selected Philo-sophical Essays, Moscow, 1953, pp. 49-135). p. 82

The reference is to L. Feuerbach’s Theogonie nach den Quellen desklassischen, hebräischen und christlichen Altertums. Sämtliche Werke,Bd. 9, 1857 (Theogony Based on Sources of Classical, Hebrew andChristian Antiquity, Collected Works, Vol. 9, 1857). Page 320—beginning of § 34, which is headed “’Christian’ Natural Science”;page 334 is in § 36, which is headed “The Theoretical Basis ofTheism.” p. 83

Conspectus of Hegel’s book “The Science of Logic” consists of threenotebooks, which have a common pagination from 1 to 115. On thecover of the first notebook, in addition to the inscription “Hegel.Logic I,” there is the entry: “Notebooks on Philosophy. Hegel,Feuerbach and others.” On the cover of the second notebook, to thepagination 49-88, there is the appendage: NB p. 76 (pp. 192-193of this volume). At the bottom of page 111, there is written: “Endof Logic. 17.XII.1914.” The conspectus was probably begun duringthe first half of September 1914, when Lenin moved from Poroninto Bern, Switzerland. p. 85

The first edition of Hegel’s works in German consists of 18 volumes(1832-45) and an additional volume in two parts (1887). p. 87.

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Wissenschaft der Logik (The Science of Logic) consists of two parts(three books). p. 87

Parmenides—the name of one of Plato’s dialogues, in which thephilosophical views of Parmenides, the ancient Greek Eleaticphilosopher, are discussed. p. 97

Lenin is apparently referring to the following well-known statementby Kant in the preface to the second edition of Critique of PureReason: “I would have to restrict the field of knowledge to makeplace for faith.” p. 100

See F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical GermanPhilosophy. (Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow,1958, p. 372.) p. 104

See F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical GermanPhilosophy. (Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow,1958, p. 371.) p. 109

See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, pp. 74-76, 186. p. 117

An allusion to the couplet “The Question of Right,” from Schiller’ssatirical poem “The Philosophers,” which may be translated asfollows:

Long have I used my nose for sense of smellIndeed, what right have I to this, pray tell? p. 118

See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, pp. 186, 189.p. 118

The reference is to a remark made by Feuerbach in his work Vor-läufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (Preliminary Theses on theReform of Philosophy), appearing in Vol. II, p. 257, of Feuerbach’sWorks published in German in 1846. p. 123

The reference is to Die Kritik der Urteilskraft by Kant. p. 134

Lenin is referring to the appearance of the following three works:Hegel’s Science of Logic (the first two books were published in 1812and 1813, respectively); Marx and Engels’ Manifesto of the Commu-

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nist Party (written at the end of 1847 and published in February1848); and Darwin’s Origin of Species (published in 1859). p. 141

The reference is to K. Pearson’s work The Grammar of Science,London, 1892. p. 154

The reference is to Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaftenim Grundrisse. Hege!, Werke, Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840 (Encyclopaedia ofthe Philosophical Sciences in Outline, Hegel, Works, Vol. 6, Berlin,1840). “Logic” constitutes Part I of the Encyclopaedia and is referredto by Lenin as “small” to distinguish it from the “large” Scienceof Logic, which consists of three volumes. p. 157

Lenin is referring to remarks by Engels on Hegel’s Encyclopaedia.See Engels’ letter to Marx dated September 21, 1874. Also seeEngeis’ letter to Conrad Schmidt dated November 1, 1891 (Marxand Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, pp. 519-520).

Kuno Fischer—a German bourgeois historian of philosophy andthe author of The History of Modern Philosophy, one of whose vol-umes (Vol. 8) is devoted to Hegel. p. 157

See G. V. Plekhanov, “For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel’s Death”(Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Moscow, 1960). p. 160

See F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical GermanPhilosophy (Marx and Engels, Selected Works , Vol. II, Moscow,1958, p. 371). p. 169

A critique of the metaphysical views of the Machist V. Chernovis presented by Lenin in his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism(see V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow,1960). p. 200

The solution of this equation was given by Gauss in his work Dis-quisitiones arithrneticae (Arithmetical Studies), 1801. p. 209

Lenin is referring to Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach,” written in1845 and published by Engels in 1888 as an appendix to LudwigFeuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (see Marxand Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 403-405).

p. 211

The reference is to Diogenes of Sinope, a representative of the Cynicschool who was nicknamed the “Dog,” probably because of hisbeggarly life and disregard for public morals. p. 224

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See F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical GermanPhilosophy (Marx and Engels, Selected Works , Vol. II, Moscow,1958, p. 372). p. 233

See K. Marx, Capital , Vol. 1, Moscow, 1959, Chapter VII, p. 179.In footnote 1, Marx quotes from Hegel’s Encyclopaedia: “Reason isjust as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principallyin her mediating activity, which, by causing objects to act and reacton each other in accordance with their own nature, in this way,without any direct interference in the process, carries out reason’sintentions.” (Hegel, Enzyklopädie, Erster Theil, “Die Logik,” Berlin,1840, S. 382.) p. 234

Notes on Reviews of Hegel’s “Logic”—written after December 17,1914 at the end of the third notebook of the conspectus of Hegel’sScience of Logic. p. 238

Preußische Jahrbücher (Prussian Annals)—German conservativemonthly on problems of politics, philosophy, history and literature,published in Berlin from 1858 to 1935. p. 238

The reference is to Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophischeKritik (Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Criticism), whichwas founded in 1837 by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, German idealistphilosopher. Originally it was called Zeitschrift für Philosophie undspekulative Theologie (Journal of Philosophy and Speculative The-ology). It was edited by German idealist philosophy professors.Publication ceased in 1918. p. 238

Revue Philosophique (Philosophical Review)—a journal founded inParis in 1870. p. 240

Philosophy of Mind—English translation of the third part ofHegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which consistsof three parts—”Logic,” “Philosophy of Nature,” and “Philosophyof Mind.” p. 240

The quotation is from the review of the book by A. Chiappelli,Le pluralisme moderne et le monisme (Modern Pluralism and Monism),in the journal Revue Philosophique, 1911, Vol. LXXII, p. 333.

p. 241

Conspectus of Hegel’s book “Lectures on the History of Philosophy”consists of two notebooks on whose covers is written: Hegel. Theconspectus was made in 1915 in Bern. p. 243

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The Ionic school, or Miletian school (from the town of Miletus,trading and cultural centre of the ancient world on the coast ofAsia Minor), was the earliest school of naturalistic materialism(6th century B. C.) in the history of Greek philosophy. (See F. Engels,Dialectics of Nature, Moscow, 1954, p. 250.) p. 247

Pythagorean philosophy (6th-4th century B. C.)—an idealist philos-ophy that considered the essence of all things to lie in numbers.Named after Pythagoras, the founder of a philosophical, religiousand political league in Crotona (Southern Italy) that fought for thesupremacy of the aristocracy. p. 247

Aristotle’s work De coelo (On the Heavens) belongs to his natural-philosophic writings and consists of four books that are subdividedinto chapters. In modern editions, these books are designated byRoman numerals and the chapters by Arabic ones. p. 248

The number ten was viewed by the Pythagoreans as sacred, as themost perfect number, embracing the entire nature of numbers.

p. 248

Aristotle’s work De anima (On the Soul) belongs to his natural-philosophic writings and consists of three books. p. 249

The Eleatic school (end of 6th-5th century B. C.) was named after thetown of Elea in Southern Italy. In contradistinction to the naturaldialectic teachings of the Miletian school, and of Heraclitus, re-garding the changeable nature of things, the Eleatic school believedin their indivisible, immovable, unchangeable, homogeneous,continuous, eternal essence. At the same time, some of the proposi-tions of representatives of the Eleatic school, and particularlythe proofs advanced by Zeno concerning the contradictoriness ofmotion (the so-called paradoxes of Zeno), despite their metaphysicalconclusions, played a positive role in the development of ancientdialectics, having raised the problem of expressing in logical conceptthe contradictory character of the processes of motion. p. 250

Determination is the comprehensive conception of the object whichcharacterises its essential aspects and connections with the sur-rounding world, its internal development. Definition, in thiscase, is the abstract formal-logical determination that takes intoaccount only the external features of the object. p. 251

See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, p. 21. Also see p. 264of this volume. p. 251

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The reference is to the work of Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinionsof Famous Philosophers, consisting of ten books. It was publishedin ancient Greek by G. Gübner, Vols. 1-2, Leipzig, 1830-33. p. 255

The reference is to the work of Sextus Empiricus, Basic Tenets ofPyrrhonism, in three books. p. 255

The reference is to Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique(Historical and Critical Dictionary), 4 Vols., Amsterdam and Leyden,1740. p. 255

Lenin has in mind the French translation of the first volume ofThéodore Gomperz’s work Griechische Denker (Greek Thinkers).

p. 256

The reference is to § 1 of the book by V. Chernov, Philosophicaland Sociological Studies, Moscow, 1907. p. 257

Heraclitus (c. 530-470 B.C.) lived prior to Zeno of Elea (c. 490-480 B. C.). Hegel discusses Heraclitus after the Eleatics becausehis philosopy, especially his dialectics, was superior to that of theEleatics, in particular, the dialectics of Zeno. Whereas Eleaticphilosophy embodied, in Hegel’ view, the category of being,Heraclitus’ philosopy was an historical expression of the higher,more concrete and genuine category of becoming. This is an exampleof how Hegel “adapted” the history of philosophy to fit the categoriesof his logic. At the same time Hegel’s treatment of Heraclitus and theEleatics reflected the actual law-governed nature of the history ofphilosophy as a science. Such deviations from the chronologicalorder are quite legitimate in examining the history of individualaspects or categories of philosophy, since in this case their develop-ment emerges in a form free from historical accident. Lenin wrotethe following in his fragment On the Question of Dialectics aboutthe “circles” in philosophy: “Ancient: from Democritus to Platoand the dialetics of Heraclitus” and remarks: “Is a chronology ofpersons essential? No!” (See present volume, p. 360.) p. 259

The work De mundo (On the Universe), included in Aristotle’s col-lected works, was written after Aristotle’s death by an unknownauthor at the end of the 1st or beginning of the 2nd century A. D.

p. 262

Symposium (Feast)—a dialogue by Plato. p. 260

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See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, pp. 21-22. p. 262

The reference is to the work of Sextus Empiricus, Against Mathemati-cians, consisting of 11 books, six of which are devoted to a critiqueof grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music,and five (Against Dogmatists) to a critique of logic, physics andethics. p. 265

A critique of the subjective idealist teachings of Mach on sensationswas presented by Lenin in his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Chapter 1, §§ 1 and 2 (V. I. Lenin, Materialism andEmpirio-Criticism, Moscow, 1960, pp. 32-61). p. 265

Homoeomeriae—according to Aristotle, a term used by Anaxagorasto denote tiny material elements consisting in their turn of aninfinite number of smaller particles and containing all existingproperties (“all in everything”). The elements themselves are inertand set in motion by νοÜς (mind, reason), believed by Anaxagorato be a kind of fine and light matter. He explained any emergenceand destruction by the junction and separation of elements. In theextent fragments of Anaxagoras’ work these elements are called“seeds” or “things”; the term homoeomeriae was introduced byAristotle. p. 266

Sophists (from the Greek sophos—a wise man)—the designation(since the second half of the 5th century B. C.) for professional philos-ophers, teachers of philosophy and rhetoric. The Sophists did notconstitute a single school. The most characteristic feature commonto Sophists was their belief in the relativity of all human ideas,ethical standards and values, expressed by Protagoras in the follow-ing famous statement: “Man is the measure of all things, of whatis, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not.” In the first halfof the 4th century B.C., sophism disintegrated and degeneratedinto a barren play with logical conceptions. p. 269

Phenomenologism—a branch of subjective idealism that considersphenomena to be only the totality of man’s sensations. The Machistswere phenomenalists. An important role in the Marxist criticism ofphenomenologism was played by Lenin's book Materialism andEmpirio-Criticism (Collected Works, Vol. 14). p. 270

See § 27 of Feuerbach’s Principles of the Philosophy of the Futurefor his views on being and essence. p. 272

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The reference is to the following statement of Feuerbach: “At thebeginning of phenomenology we immediately come across a con-tradiction between the word which represents the universal, and thething, which is always a particular.” (See § 28 of Feuerbach’sPrinciples of the Philosophy of the Future .) p. 272

Meno—Plato’s dialogue directed against the Sophists. It is con-sidered to be one of Plato’s early works. p. 273

Lenin is referring to the following philosophical works by Plekha-nov: N. Beltov, The Development of the Monist View of History,published as a separate volume in 1895 in St. Petersburg (see SelectedPhilosophical Works , Vol. 1, Moscow, 1900, pp. 542-782); articlesagainst Bogdanov appearing in Social-Democratic periodicals andpublished in the collection entitled “From Defence to Attack”(1910); articles against the Kantians E. Bernstein, C. Schmidtand others appearing in the journal Die Neue Zeit and publishedin the collection: N. Beltov, “Criticism of Our Critics,” St. Peters-burg, 1906; and “Fundamental Questions of Marxism,” publishedas a separate volume in 1908 in St. Petersburg. p. 277

Cyrenaics—adherents of an ancient Greek school of philosophy,founded in the 5th century B. C. by Aristippus of Cyrene (NorthAfrica). In the theory of knowledge, the Cyrenaics adhered to sen-sualism. They asserted that objective truth does not exist and that,with certainty, one can only speak of subjective sensations. InCyrenaicism, the sensualist theory of knowledge is supplemented bysensualist ethics—the doctrine of sensual satisfaction as the basis ofmorality. The Cyrenaic school produced a number of representativesof ancient atheism. p. 276

The reference is to § 38 “The Aristippian and Cyrenaic or HedonisticSchool” in Überweg’s book: Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophiedes Altertums . 10. Auflage, Berlin, 1909. (F. Überweg, Outline ofthe History of Ancient Philosophy, 10th edition, Berlin, 1909).

In the dialogue Theaetetus, Plato expounds his mystical theory ofknowledge, calling cognition the rise of reason into the realm ofideas; this rise is like recollection since, according to Plato, reason,the soul, by their origin, belong to this supersensual world of ideas.

p. 276

See L. Feuerbach, Against Dualism of Body and Soul, Flesh andSpirit. p. 283

See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, p. 54. p. 283

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Stoics—adherents of an ancient Greek school of philosophy arisingabout the 3rd century B. C. and existing until the 6th century A. D.The Stoics recognised two elements in the universe: an enduringelement—matter without quality; and an active one—reason, logos,god. In logic, the Stoics proceeded from the assumption that thesource of all cognition is sensuous perception and that a conceptioncan be true only if it is a faithful and full impression of the object.The Stoics taught, however, that perceptual judgment arises onlyas a result of agreement between the mind and a true conception.This the Stoics called “catalepsy” (or “seizure”) and viewed it asa criterion for truth. p. 288

See L. Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion: “the God ofman is nothing but the deified being of man.” (L. Feuerbach, Werke,Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840, S. 21.) p. 295

Sceptics—in this case, adherents of the ancient Greek philosophicalschool founded by Pyrrho (c. 365-275 B. C.). The best-known of theancient Sceptics were Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus (2ndcentury A. D.).

Tropes—the designation for the reasons for doubt advancedby the ancient Sceptics (ten tropes) and later supplemented (fivetropes) by Agrippa. By means of these reasons the Sceptics triedto prove the impossibility of cognisinig things and the absoluterelativity of all perceptions. p. 295

Neo-Platonists—followers of the mystical philosophical doctrine,the basis of which was Plato’s idealism. Neo-Platonism (Plotinuswas the head of this school) developed during the period from the3rd to the 5th centuries and was a combination of the Stoic, Epicu-crean and Sceptical doctrines with the philosophy of Plato andAristotle. The influence of neo-Platonism was strong in the MiddleAges; it was expressed in the doctrines of the leading medievaltheologians and is also to be seen in certain trends of modern bour-geois philosophy. p. 301

Cabbala—a medieval mystical religious “doctrine” prevalent amongthe most fanatical followers of Judaism, as well as among adher-ents of Christianity and Islam. The basic thought of this doct-rine is the symbolic interpretation of the Holy Scripture, whoseevery word and number acquires special mystical importance inthe eyes of the Cabbalists. p. 302

Gnostics—followers of mystical, religious-philosophical doctrinesduring the early centuries of our era. They tried to unite Christian

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theology and various theses of Platonic, Pythagorean and Stoicphilosophy. p. 302

Alexandrian philosophy—several philosophical schools and trendsthat arose during the early centuries of our era in Alexandria,Egypt. Their distinguishing feature was their attempt to unitePlato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy and the mystical Eastern cults.

p. 302

Conspectus of Hegel’s book “Lectures on the Philosophy of History”consists of a separate notebook on whose cover is written “Hegel.”On the reverse side of the cover, in pencil, there is a list of Plato’sdialogues with references to pages in Vol. XIV of Hegel, whichcontains the second book of Lectures on the History of Philosophy.

p. 303

See F. Engels, Ludwig Ferierbach and the End of Classical GermanPhilosophy, Chapter IV (see Marx and Engels, Sellected Works,Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 391). p. 306

Regarding the influence of geographical conditions on the develop-ment of society see G. V. Plekhanov, “Fundamental Questions ofMarxism,” Chapter VI, and “N. G. Chernyshevsky,” Chapter II.

p. 308

Lenin is evidently comparing the formulations of Hegel and Feuer-bach, who approach the question of the origin of religion fromopposite standpoints. See, for example, Feuerbach’s thesis: “ina deified being, he (i.e., man—Ed.) objectifies solely his own being.”

p. 309

Lenin is probably referring to the following passage in Marx’swork The Civil War in France: “Instead of deciding once in threeor six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresentthe people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people,constituted in Communes...” (See Marx and Engels, Selected Works,Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, p. 520.) p. 311

Plan of Hegel’s Dialectics (Logic)—contained in a notebook directlyfollowing the conspectus of Georges Noël’s book Hegel’s Logic anda list of “writings on Hegelianism”; written in 1915. p. 315

The remarks on Georges Noël’s book La logique de Hegel (Hegel’sLogic), Paris, 1897, are contained in a notebook on whose coverLenin wrote the word “Philosophy.” Probably written in Genevain 1915. p. 319

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Noumena and phenomena—terms used by Kant in his theory ofknowledge. Noumenon means a thing-in-itself, while phenomenonmeans a thing as it appears to us. According to Kant, phenomena areformed as a result of the action on man of something unknown(a thing-in-itself). Noumena are supposed to lie beyond phenomena,and their essence to be unknowable. p. 323

Note on J. Perrin’s book “Traitê de chimie physique: les principes”(Treatise on Physical Chemistry: Principles), Paris, 1903 is con-tained in a notebook following the conspectus of Hegel’s Scienceof Logic and was written at the end of 1914. p. 325

Lenin’s remarks on Peter Genov’s book “Feurbachs Erkenntnistheorie undMetaphysik .” Zürich, 1911 (Berner Dissertation) (S. 89) [PeterGenov, Feuerbach’s Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics, Zurich,1911 (Bern Dissertation) (p. 89)] were written December 29-30,1914, in Bern. p. 326

“Thesen und Grundsätze” (“Theses and Principles”) refers to twoworks by Feuerbach: Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie(Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy) and Grundsätzeder Philosophie der Zukunft (Principles of the Philosophy of theFuture) contained in Vol. II of Feuerbach’s works, published byBolin and Jodl. This volume also contains the work Wider denDualismus von Leib und Seele, Fleisch und Geist (Against Dualismof Body and Soul, Flesh and Spirit). The phrase “particularly überSpiritualismus und Materialismus” refers to Über Spiritualismusund Materialismus in besonderer Beziehung auf die Willensfreiheit(On Spiritualism and Materialism with Particular Reference to FreeWill) contained in Vol. X. p. 326

The reference is to Fr. A. Lange’s book “Geschichte des Materialismus”(F. A. Lange, History of Materialism) in which the history of mate-rialism is given in distorted form. p. 326

The reference is to K. Grün’s book “Ludwig Feuerbachs Briefwechselund Nachlass” (K. Grün, Ludwig Feuerbach’s Correspondence andLiterary Heritage). p. 327

Note on Paul Volkmann’s book “Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzügeder Naturwissenschaften” (Wissenschaft und Hypothese. IX) 2. Auf-lags, Leipzig, 1910 [Paul Volkmann, Epistemological Foundationsof the Natural Sciences (Science and Hypothesis. IX), 2nd ed.,Leipzig, 1910] is contained in a notebook following the commentson Genov’s dissertation. p. 328

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The remarks on Max Verworn’s book “Die Biogenhypothese.” Jena,1903 (Max Verworn, The Hypothesis of Biogenesis, Jena, 1903) arecontained in a notebook following the note on Volkmann’s book.

p. 329

On page 9 of his book, M. Verworn defines “enzyme” as follows:“Enzymes are products of living substance distinguished by thefact that they can cause a large number of specific chemical com-pounds to decompose, without themselves being destroyed in theprocess.” p. 329

The remarks on Fr. Dannemann’s book “Wie unser Weitbild entstand”(Kosmos). Stuttgart, 1912 [F. Dannemasin, How Did Our Pictureof World Arise (Cosmos), Stuttgart, 1912] were written by Leninin a notebook preceding the conspectus of G. Noël’s Hegel’s Logic.

p. 331

The excerpts from Ludwig Darmstaedter’s book “Handbuch zurGeschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik,” Berlin, 1908(Ludwig Darmstaedter, Handbook on the History of the NaturalSciences and Technique, Berlin, 1908) were entered in a notebookdirectly preceding the conspectus of G. Noël’s Hegel’s Logic .

p. 333

The excerpts from Napoléon’s book “Pensées,” Paris, 1913, Biblio-théque miniature No. 14. (Napoleon, Thoughts, Paris, 1913, MiniatureLibrary No, 14) were made in Bern in 1915. They were entered atthe bottom of the first page of the notebook containing the conspec-tus of Noël’s Hegel’s Logic . p. 334

The note on Artur Erich Haas’ book “Der Geist des Hellenentumsin der modernen Physik,” Leipzig, 1914 (32 SS.) (Velt & Co.) [ArturErich Haas, The Spirit of Hellenism in Modern Physics, Leipzig,1914 (32 pp.) (Veit and Co.)] is contained in a notebook following“The Plan of Hegel’s Dialectics (Logic).” p. 335

The note on Th. Lipp’ book “Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung”(T. Lipps, Natural Science and World Outlook) follows the note onHaas’ book, The Spirit of Hellenism in Modern Physics. p.336

Conspectus of Lassalle’s book “Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklenvon Ephesos.” Berlin, 1858 (The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscureof Ephesus, Berlin, 1858) is contained in a notebook following thenote on Lipps’ book Natural Science and World Outlook. Followingthe conspectus of Lassalle’s book, there is a fragment in the note-book entitled “On the Question of Dialectics.” p. 337

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Lenin is referring to a letter from Marx to Engels dated February 1,1858 (see Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955,pp. 121-123). p. 339

Ahriman—the Greek name for the ancient Persian God personifyingthe source of evil, an eternal and irreconcilable enemy of his brotherOrmazd, the Good Spirit. p. 345

Zend-Avesta—the designation for the ancient Persian religiousbooks expounding the Zoroastrian religion founded, according tolegend, by the prophet Zarathustra (Zoroaster). p. 346

Lenin is referring to Theses on Feuerbach by Marx written in 1845(see Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958,pp. 403-405). p. 349

Cratylus—Plato’s dialogue, directed against the Sophists. p. 350

The fragment On the Question of Dialectics is contained in a note-book between the conspectus of Lassalle’s book on Heraclitus andthe conspectus of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Written in 1915 in Bern.

p. 355

The reference is to the use by Josef Dietzgen of the term “überschweng-lich,” which means: exaggerated, excessive, infinite; for example,in the book Kleinere philosophische Schriften (Minor PhilosophicalWritings), Stuttgart, 1903, p. 204, Dietzgen uses this term as fol-lows: “absolute and relative are not infinitely separated.” p. 361

Conspectus of Aristotle’s book “Metaphysics” is contained in a note-book directly following the fragment “On the Question of Dialec-tics.” The book was published by Schwegler in Greek wih a Germantranslation. p. 363

Lenin is referring to the article “Blunders of Immature Thought”by D. I. Pisarev, well-known democratic writer and literary crit-ic. p. 371

Conspectus of L. Feuerbach’s book “Darstellung, Entwicklung undKritik der Leibnizschen Philosophie.” Sämtliche Werke . Bd. IV,Stuttgart. 1910 (Exposition, Analysis and Critique of the Philosophyof Leibnitz, Collected Works , Vol. IV, Stuttgart, 1910) is con-

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tained in a separate notebook on whose cover is written: “Feuer-bach.” The conspectus was made in Bern at the end of 1914 or thebeginning of 1915. p. 375

In the passage referred to by Lenin, Feuerbach states; “Spinoza’sphilosophy is like a telescope which makes objects visible to thehuman eye that are otherwise invisible owing to their remoteness;Leibnitz’ philosophy is like a microscope which makes objectsvisible that are unnoticeable owing to their minuteness and fine-ness.” (See L. Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 34.)

p. 378

See Marx’s letter to Engels dated May 10, 1870. p. 378

Entelechy—a term in idealist philosophy, used by Aristotle todenote the aim inherent in an object—an aim which through itsactivity is transformed from the possible to the actual. Accordingto Leibnitz, entelechy is the urge of the monad towards realisationof the perfection potentially contained in it. p. 380

Lenin is referring to the following statement by Feuerbach: “Pre-es-tablished harmony is Leibnitz’ weak point, despite the fact thatit is his pet creation.... Pre-established harmony, understood ina purely external sense in relation to the monad, basically con-tradicts the spirit of Leibnitz’ philosophy.” (See L. Feuerbach,Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 95.) p. 381

Occasionalism—an idealist, religious trend in 17th-century philosophywhich distorted the teachings of Descartes in the spirit of clericalismand mysticism. The Occasionalists held the reactionary view thatall physical and mental activity, and the reciprocal action betweenthem, is due to the intervention of God. p. 381

Theodicée (a vindication of the justice of God)—an abbreviated titleof G. W. Leibnitz’ book: Essais de Theodicée sur la bonté de Dieu,la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal (Theodician Essays on theGoodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil).

p. 381

The ontological argument for the existence of God was first advancedby Anselm, Bishop of Canterbury and medieval scholastic. It canbe summarised as follows: God is the totality of perfection. Perfec-tion includes existence. Therefore God exists.

On the essence of the ontological argument see F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Part I, Chapter IV. p. 381

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Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (New Essays on HumanUnderstanding) by Leibnitz (written 1700-05 and published in1765)—directed against the materialist trend of Locke’s sensualisttheory of knowledge. p. 381

The first edition of L. Feuerbach’s book Darstellung, Entwicklungund Kritik der Leibniz’schen Philosophie (Exposition, Analysts andCritique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz) was published in 1837.

p. 382

The reference is to the work by Clauberg, German Cartesian philos-opher: Defensio Cartesiana, Amsterdam, 1652 (Defence of Cartesian-ism). p. 383

Feuerbach’s dissertation in Latin, published in Erlangen in 1828under the title “De Ratione una, universali, infinita,” appeared inGerman translation under the title “Über die Vernunft; ihre Ein-heit, Allgemeinheit, Unbegrenztheit” (On Reason; Its Unity,Universality and Infiniteness”) in Vol. IV of Feuerbach’s worksin German; Bolin and Jodl edition, Stuttgart, 1910. p. 387

Lenin is referring to Feuerbach’s work Spinoza and Herbart (1836),appearing in Vol. IV (1910) of Feuerbach’s works in German; Bolinand Jodl edition. p. 387

The reference is to Feuerbach’s letter to Marx in 1843 in whichFeuerbach sharply criticises Schelling’s philosophy (see L. Feuer-bach, Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 434-440). Feuerbach’sletter was written in answer to Marx’s letter of October 20, 1843.

p. 387

The remarks on Johann Plenge’s book “Marx und Hegel.” Tübingen,1911 (J. Plenge, Marx and Hegel, Tübingen, 1911) are contained inthe second notebook on imperialism (notebook “β”). p. 388

Imperialist economists—Lenin’s designation for the opportunistsBukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh in the Russian Social-DemocraticLabour Party (Bolsheviks) during the First World War. The “imper-ialist economists” demanded that the Party delete the programmaticstatement on the right of nations to self-determination. They alsocame out against the entire minimum programme of the R.S.D.L.P.,which envisaged a struggle for democratic reforms that wouldfacilitate the preparation and transition to the socialist revolution.Lenin laid bare the opportunistic essence of the position of Bukharinand those sharing his views, its kinship with “economism”—theopportunistic trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the end of the

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19th century and the beginning of the 20th. Like the old “econo-mists,” who could not understand the need for the political struggleof the working class under conditions of capitalism, the “imperialisteconomists” did not understand the significance of the strugglefor democratic reforms under, conditions of imperialism.

Certain views of the “imperialist economists” were shared by LeftSocial-Democrats of Holland, America, Poland, etc. That is whyLenin called “imperialist economism” an “international disease”(Vol. 35, letter to Inessa Armand of November 30,1916).

A number of articles by Lenin are devoted to a criticism of“imperialist economisin”: “On the Incipient Trend of ‘ImperialistEconomism” (pres. ed., Vol. 23, pp. 1-9); “Reply to P. Kievsky(Y. Pyatakov)” (pres. ed., Vol. 23, pp. 10-15); “A Caricatureof Marxism and Imperialist Economism” (pres. ed., Vol. 23,pp. 16-64). p. 388

The reference is to the Rheinische Zeitung für Politik, Handel undGewerbe (Rhine Gazette on Problems of Politics, Trade and Industry)—a daily newspaper that appeared in Cologne from January 1, 1842to March 31, 1843. It was founded by representatives of the Rhine-land bourgeoisie who were opposed to Prussian absolutism. Marxjoined its staff in April 1842 and became one of its editors in Octoberof the same year. During Marx’s editorship, the revolutionary--democratic character of the newspaper became more and moremarked. The newspaper was ultimately banned by the PrussianGovernment. p. 390

The entry on the books by Raab and Perrin was made in a notebookentitled “Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc.” not earlier than1912. p. 392

The entry on the books under the heading From Books on Philosophyin the Zürich Cantonal Library was made in the first notebook (note-book “α”) on imperialism in 1915. p. 393

The entry under the heading Cantonal Library in Zürich was madein the first notebook on imperialism (notebook “α”) in 1915.

p. 394

The entry under the general heading Section III. (Works of inform-ative and scientific content), containing reference to the books byHaeckel, Uhde and Zart, was made in a notebook on imperialism(notebook “ε”) in 1916. p. 395

Note on the Review of Johann Pleage’s book “Marx and Hegel” waswritten in 1913, amidst bibliographical excerpts on various ques-tions, in the notebook “Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc.”

p. 397

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Remarks on the Review of R. B. Perry’s book “Present PhilosophicalTendencies”—written after April 1913 in the notebook “AustrianAgricultural Statistics, etc.” p. 398

Remarks on the Review of A. Aliotta’s book “The Idealist ReactionAgainst Science”—written in 1913 at the end of the notebook“Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc.” p. 399

Remarks on Hilferding’s Views on Mach (in “Finance Capital”)—contained in notebook “ϑ” on imperialism. p. 400

Lenin’s Remarks and Notations in Abel Rey’s book “La PhilosophieModerne,” Paris, 1908 (Abel Rey, Modern Philosophy, Paris, 1908)constitute a sequel to the sharp criticism in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism of Rey’s views as expounded in his book La théorie de laphysique chez les physiciens contemporains (Modern Physicists’Theory of Physics), Paris, 1907. p. 407

Lenin is referring to the well-known characterisation of agnosticismgiven by Engels in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical Ger-man Philosophy (see Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II,p. 371). p. 433

A. Deborin’s article “Dialectical Materialism” is contained in thecollection Na Rubezhe, St. Petersburg, 1909. p. 475

Lenin’s Remarks in G. V. Plekhanov’s book “N. G . Chernyshevsky,”St. Petersburg, 1910—written not earlier than October 1909 (theactual date of the book’s appearance) and not later than April 1911.They were first published in 1933 in Lenin Miscellany XXV .

Many of Lenin’s comments are devoted to a comparion of state-ments by Piekhanov in his book published in 1910 with his articleson Chernyshevsky published in 1890 and 1892 in Sotsial-Demokrat,a literary and political review (see Sotsial-Demokrat, Book 1,London, 1890; Book 2, Geneva, 1890; Book 3, Geneva, 1890; Book 4,Geneva, 1892).

These four articles by Plekhanov were brought together inthe book N. G. Chernyshevsky appearing in Germany in 1894 inGerman. Plekhanov’s book, which gave, in the main, a correctcharacterisation of Chernyshevsky’s views and which sharplyattacked the Narodniks, was favourably commented upon by Leninin the article “A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy”(see pres. ed., Vol. 4, Moscow, 1961, p. 271).

Plekhanov’s book N. G. Chernyshevsky published in 1910 waswritten at a time when he had already gone over to Menshevism.

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It was in effect directed against Bolshevism, against the Bolshevistevaluation of the world outlook and activity of Chernyshevskyand the revolutionary democrats of the 19th century. In this book,Plekhanov abandons a number of basic propositions in his earlierevaluation of Chernyshevsky, obscuring his revolutionary democrat-ism, his resolute struggle against liberalism and his backing of thepeasant revolution.

Lenin carefully collates the text of the book published in 1910with Plekhanov’s articles in Sotsial-Demokrat, noting which ofPlekhanov’s basic formulations remained unchanged and whichunderwent radical change.

Lenin’s remarks and notations in Plekhanovs book are insepara-bly linked with his numerous statements on Chernyshevsky—in the writings published before he became acquainted with Plekha-nov’s book (What the “Friends of the People” Are and How TheyFight the Social-Democracy, The Heritage We Renounce, On “Vekhi”and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism) as well as in those writtenafterwards (Peasant Reform and Proletarian Peasant Revolution,In Memory of Herzen, From the Past of the Workers’ Press in Russia,etc.) p. 501

The Sovremennik circle included, among others, the revolutionarydemocrats N. G. Chernyshevsky, N. A. Dobrolyubov, N. A. Nekra-sov, M. I. Mikhailov.

Sovremennik (Contemporary)—a monthly scientific-political andliterary journal founded by A. S. Pushkin in 1836. In 1847 thejournal was taken over by N. A. Nekrasov. From the mid-fiftieson the journal became a militant organ of the revolutionary demo-crats, who advocated a peasant revolution and the overthrow oftsarism. Chernyshevsky was a most prominent contributor untilhis arrest in 1862. In 1866 Sovremennik was closed down by thetsarit government.

In 1859-62 the satirical magazine Svistok (Whistle) appearedas a supplement to Sovremennik. It wittily ridiculed the vain hopesof the liberals for bringing about a change in the political systemof Russia through literary denunciations of government officials, andwithout resorting to revolutionary struggle. p. 503

Kolokol (The Bell)—journal founded by A. I. Herzen in Londonand illegally circulated in Russia. It appeared from 1857 to 1868.The journal attacked the autocratic regime and serfdom. It playedan important role in the development of the revolutionary movementin Russia.

“Clowns” and “whistlers” were nicknames given by liberals tothe revolutionary democrats of Sovremennik and Svistok. p. 503

Oblomov—the title of a well-known novel by the Russian authorA. I. Goncharov which depicts the corruption of the serf-owningsystem in 19th century Russia. p. 503

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Slavophils represented a trend of social thought arising in mid-19th-century Russia, which held that Russia’s development wouldtake place along a distinct path of its own. This, according to them,stemmed from the communal system in Russia and its orthodoxy.The Slavophils were confirmed opponents of the revolutionarymovement in Russia and the West. p. 506

Chernyshevsky wrote the novel Prologue while serving at hardlabour in 1865-70. With great difficulty, his friends smuggled themanuscript to St. Petersburg and then to London where it waspublished in 1877.

The novel describes Russia in the late fifties. A revolutionarysituation was maturing in the country and the tsarist government,preferring to free the peasants “from above” rather than wait tillthey took action “from below,” was preparing for the abolition ofserfdom (the so-called Peasant Reform). The book describes thesharp struggle between various classes and groups over the reformand portrays real people of the day under fictitious names. Thus,Chernyshevsky himself, who headed the revolutionary party, ap-pears under the name of Volgin; Kavelin, the liberal, appears underthe name of Ryazantsev; Sierakowski, a prominent figure in thePolish liberation movement—under the name of Sokolovsky,etc. p. 508

The reference here is to the uprising in Poland in 1863-64, one of theorganisers of which was Zygmunt Sierakowski. The uprising againsttsarist autocracy aimed at Polish national liberation. Broad supportfor the uprising came from the szlachta intelligentsia, students,clergy, artisans, workers and some sections of the peasantry. TheRussian revolutionary democrats also sympathised with the upris-ing. Members of the secret organisation Zemlya i Volya, which hadconnections with Chernyshevsky, sought to render help to theinsurrection. A. I. Herzen published a number of articles in Kolokolsupporting the struggle of the Polish people.

However, the insurrection was ruthlessly suppressed by thetsarist government, and its leaders, including Sierakowski, wereexecuted. p. 508

Prologue to a Prologue—the title of the first part of the novel Pro-logue . p. 509

The circle of Russian revolutionary emigrants in London who weregrouped around A. I. Herzen and N. A. Ogaryov. p. 509

The reference is to Chernyshevsky’s novel which exerted great in-fluence on several generations of Russian revolutionary youth.

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Chernyshevsky wrote the novel in 1862-63 in the Peter and Paul For-tress, where he was imprisoned in the summer of 1862. The novelwas published in Sovremennik in 1863.

Vera Pavlovna, Lopukhov, Kirsanov and Rakhmetov mentionedby Plekhanov are the chief characters in the novel. p. 509

Lenin is referring to the following passage in Sotsial-Demokrat(Book I, London, 1890, pp. 173-174):

“Chernyshevsky was present at the birth of the new type of‘new people’ in our country—the revolutionary. He joyfully welcomedthe emergence of this new type and could not deny himself thesatisfaction of depicting at least a vague profile of him. At thesame time, he foresaw with sorrow how many trials and sufferingsthere were in store for the Russian revolutionary, whose life mustbe one of severe struggle and great self-sacrifice. And so, in Rakhme-tov, Chernyshevsky presents us with the true ascetic. Rakhmetovpositively tortures himself. He is completely ‘merciless towardshimself,’ as his landlady says. He even decides to test whether hecan bear torture by spending a whole night lying on a length of feltwith nails sticking through it. Many people, including Pisarev,regarded this as mere eccentricity. We agree that some aspects ofRakhmetov’s character could have been drawn differently. Butthe character as a whole nevertheless remains completely true tolife. Every prominent Russian revolutionary possessed much of theBakhmetov spirit.” p. 513

Our “Subjectivsts”—supporters of the Narodnik doctrine whichdenied the existence of objective laws of social development and heldthat individual outstanding personalities, not the masses, makehistory. The chief exponents of this trend were P. L. Lavrov andN. K. Mikhailovsky. p. 514

Lenin is referring to the following passage in Plekhanov’s articlein Sotsial-Demokrat: “We have never had occasion to read suchmalicious and at the same time such a highly accurate characterisa-tion of Russian liberalism.” (Sotsial-Demokrat , Book I, London,1890, p. 144.) p. 532

Lenin is referring to the following passage, subsequently radicallychanged by Plekhanov, in an article in Sotsial-Demokrat (Book I,London, 1890, p. 144):

“For the sake of impartiality, however, it must be added that ourauthor was not only contemptuous of Russian liberals. In excellentpolitical reviews that he wrote in Sovremennik until the very endof his free life, our author constantly displayed the most mercilesscontempt for all European liberals in general—particularly, theliberals of Austria (i.e., the Liberal Party of Austrian Germans),

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Prussia and Italy. As is well known, in articles on the history ofFrance, he also did not manifest much respect for the liberal party.All this, naturally, could not be pleasing to the spokesmen of Rus-sian liberalism and, in their fight with him, they resorted to themethod so often used by liberals of all countries in their clasheswith people further advanced than themselves politically; theyaccused him of disliking freedom and even of sympathies for despot-ism. Of course, such accusations from liberals could only amuseChernyshevsky. He had so little fear of them that at times hearoused his opponents to new accusations by making believe thathe recognised their complete fairness. ‘For us there is no betteramusement than liberalism,’ he says in one of his last politicalreviews, ‘and we have an irresistible desire to look about for liberalsin order to poke fun at them.’ He then begins to poke fun at thePrussian liberals who, as he aptly puts it, were angered by the factthat political freedom in Prussia ‘does not become established byitself.’

“This mockery did not prevent the attentive reader from under-standing that it was not a lack of love for freedom that made Cherny-shevsky contemptuous of liberalism. It was sufficient to read onlya few of his political reviews to see how passionately he sympathisedwith every liberation movement, no matter where it began: inFrance or in Italy, in America or in Hungary. He simply believedthat the role of the liberals in such movements is usually veryugly. They themselves do very little and often even impede theefforts of others by attacking people who are more daring and resolutethan they.” p. 544

Lenin is referring to the following passage in Plekhanov’s articlein Sotsial-Demokrat (Book I, London, 1890, p. 161):

“In the article ‘The Russian Reformer,’ written on the occasionof the appearance of Baron M. Korf’s book The Life of Count Spe-ransky, Chernyshevsky demonstrates conclusively that no reformerin our country could depend on the government as regards importantsocial reforms. Revolutionaries can depend on it even less. Enemiescalled Speransky a revolutionary, but such an evaluation appearslaughable to Chernyshevsky. Speransky indeed had very extensivereform plans, but ‘it is ludicrous to call him a revolutionary judgingby the extent of the means he intended using to carry out his inten-tions.’ He could maintain his post only because he had managed toearn the trust of the tsar Alexander I. With this trust to supporthim, he intended to carry out his plans. Precisely for this reason,Chernyshevsky considered him to be a dangerous dreamer. Dreamersare often simply ridiculous and their delusions trivial, but they canbe dangerous to society when their delusions concern importantmatters. In their rapturous bustle off the track, they appear toachieve a measure of success, thus confusing many who, as a resultof this illusory success, get it into their heads to follow them. Fromthis standpoint, Speransky’s activity may be called dangerous.”

p. 552

589NOTES

183 The statement in Plekhanov’s article on Chernyshevsky appearingin Sotsial-Demokrat (Book I, London, 1890, p. 162), but omittedby Plekhanov in the 1910 edition of his book on Chernyshevsky,is the following: “With respect to the Russian Government, Cherny-shevsky’s tone becomes more and more defiant.” p. 553.

INDEX OF SOURCESMENTIONED BY LENIN

A

Aliotta, A. La reazione idealistica contro la scienza. Palermo, “Optima”,1912, XVI, 526 p.—399

Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie. Bd, VII. Leipzig, Duncker u. Hum-blot, 1878, S. 66-67.—372

Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung . Charlottenburg, 1843-1844, Hft. I-VIII.—23, 24, 26, 37, 45, 46, 47

Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publizistik von BrunoBauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerck, ArnoldRuge und einigen Ungenannten. Hrsg. von A. Ruge. Bd. I-II.Zürich u. Winterthur, Literarisches Comptoir, 1843.—48

Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung.In Verbindung mit einer Reihe namhafter Fachmänner aller Länderhrsg. von C. Grünberg. Bd. 3, Hft. 3. Leipzig, Hirschfeld, 1913,S. 528-30.—397

Archiv für systematische Philosophie in Gemeinschaft mit WilhelmDilthey, Benno Erdmann und Paul Natorp mitbegründet vonEduard Zeller. Hrsg. von L. Stein. Neue Folge der PhilosophischenMonatshefte. Bd. XIV. Abt. 2. Berlin, 1908. 570 S.—57, 59

Aristoteles. De anima.—249, 284, 286, 287— De coelo.— 248— De mundo.—260— Metaphysik.—250, 281— Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles . Grundtext, Übers. und Komment.

nebst erläut. Abhandlungen von A. Schwegler... Bd. 1-4. Tübingen,Fues, 1847-1848.—357, 359, 365-374

B

Baillie, J. B. The origin and significance of Hegel’s Logic, a generalintroduction to Hegel’s system. London, Macmillan, 1901. XVIII,375 p.—240

Bauch, B. Review of the book: Haas, A. E. Der Geist des Hellenentumsin der modernen Physik. Antrittsvorlesung, gehalten am 17. Januar1914 in der Aula der Universität Leipzig. Verlag von Veit und

591INDEX OF SOURCES

Komp., Leipzig, 1914 (32 S.).—In: Kant-Studien. Bd. XIX, Hft. 3.Berlin, 1914, S. 391-392.—335

Bauer, B. Die Judenfrage. Braunschweig, Otto, 1843. 115 S.—35, 37— Neueste Schriften über die Judenfrage.—In: Allgemeine Literatur-

Zeitung. Charlottenburg, 1844, Hft. IV, März, S. 10-19.—37, 38— Von den neuesten Schriften über die Judenfrage.—In: Allgemeine

Literatur-Zeitung. Charlottenburg, 1843, Hft. I, Dezember, S. 1-16.—35

Bauer, O. Review of the book: Dr. Johann Plenge, Marx und Hegel.Tübingen, Laupp, 1911. 8°. 184 S. (4 M).—In: Archiv für die Geschi-chte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung. Bd. 3, Hft. 3. Leip-zig, Hirschfeld, 1913, S. 528-530.—397

Bayle, P. Dictionnaire historique et critique. 5-e ed., rev., corr. etaugm. Avec la vie de l’auteur, par Mr. Des Maizeaux. T.1-4. Amster-dam-Leiden, 1740.—255

Beaussiré, E. Antécédents de l’hégélianisme dans la philosophie fran-çaise. Dom Deschamps, son système et son école. D’après un manu-scrit et des correspondances inédites du XVIIIe siècle. Paris, Lon-dres, ... Bäillière, 1865. XVI, 233, 3 p. (Bibliothèque de philosophiecontemporaine No. 3).—324

Boltzmann, L. Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen. Im Auftrage und mitUnterstützung der Akademien der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Göt-tingen, Leipzig, München, Wien. Hrsg. von Dr. F. Hasenöhrl.Bd. 1-3. Leipzig, Barth, 1909.—58

Busse, L. Jahresbericht über die Erscheinungen der anglo-amerikani-schen Literatur der Jahre 1893/94. (Falckenberg-Armstrong, Fuller-ton, Wallace, Flint, Ladd, Ormond).—In: Zeitschrift für Philosophieund philosophische Kritik. Bd. 111. Leipzig, 1898, S. 205-213.—240

— Jahresbericht über die Erscheinungen der anglo-amerikanischenLiteratur der Jahre 1896-1897. (Berenson—Caldwell—MacTaggart—Carus—Fraser—Lindsay—Wenley—Seth).—In: Zeitschrift für Phi-losophie und philosophische Kritik. Bd. 119, Leipzig, 1902, S. 182-204.—238

C

Cabanis, P. I. G. Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme. T. 1-2.Paris, Crapart, 1802.—42

Carnot, C. Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du calcul infinitésimal.Paris, Duprat, 1797. 380 p.—118

Clauberg, I. Defensio Cartesiana. Amsterdam, Elzevirium, 1652.[12], 631 p.—383

Clemens, A. Clementis Alexandrini. Opera. Ex rec. Gulielmi Dindorfii.Vol. 3. Oxonii, Clarendoniano, 1869. 694 p.—347

D

Dannemann, F. Die Naturwissenschaften in ihrer Entwicklung undin ihrem Zusammenhange. Dargest. von F. Dannemann. Bd. 1-4.Leipzig-Berlin, Engelmann, 1913.—333

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Ran, A. Friedrich Paulsen über Ernst Haeckel. Eine kritische Unter-

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suchung über Naturforschung und moderne Kathederphilosophie. 2.Aufl. Berlin, Brackwede, 1907. 48 S. (Flugschriften des DeutschenMonistenbundes. Hft. 3).—394

Revolutions de Paris, dédiées à la Nation et au district des Petits-Augus-tins. №№ 1-160. Paris. 1789-1792.—32, 33

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Salignac, F. Questions de physique générale et d’astronomie. Toulouse,Privat, 1908.—57

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V

Véra, A. Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel. Paris, Franck, 1855.VII, 306 p.—324

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Volkmann, P. Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaf-ten und ihre Beziehungen zum Geistesichen der Gegenwart. Allge-mein wissenschaftliche Vorträge. 2. vollst. umgearb. und erw.Aufl. Leipzig u. Berlin, Teubner, 1910. XXIII, 454 S. (Wissen-schaft und Hypothese. IX).—328

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X

Xenophon. Xenophontis memorabilia .—274

Z

Zart, A. Bausteine des Weltalls. Atome und Moleküle. Mit zahlreichenAbbildungen nach Originalaufnahmen und Zeichnungen von C.Schmauck, H. Oeffinger u. a. und einem Titelbild von W. Planck.Stuttgart, Kosmos, Gesellschaft der Naturfreunde, 1913. 100 S.—395

Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.Bd. 53. Halle,1868, S. 248-272.—239

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А

Авенаpиус Р. Кpитиика чистого опыта .—499— Человеческое понятие о тиpе. Пеp. И. Федоpова, под pед. М. Фи-

липпова, Спб., Сойкин, 1901, 91 c.—498

Б

Богданов А. А. Аетоpитаpное тышление .— В кн.: Богданов А. А.Из психологии общества. Статьи 1901-1904 гг. Спб., Доpоватов-ский и Чаpушников, 1904, c. 95-156.—485

— Из психологии общества . Статьи 1901-1904 гг. Спб., Доpова-товский и Чаpушников, 1904, c. 95-156.—485

605INDEX OF SOURCES

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Теpцен, А. Н. «Very Dangerous!»— Колокол. Лондон, 1859, № 44, стp. 363-364.—503, 504Тильzеpдинг, Р. Финансовый капитал. Новейшая Фаза в pазвитии

капитализма. Авт. пеp. с нем. и вступит. статья И. Степанова,М. Знаменский, 1912. XXIX, 576, 8 c.—400

Голос Социал-Демокpата. Женева — Паpиж, 1908, № 6-7, май-нюнь, с. 3-14; № 8-9, нюль-сентябpь, c. 3-14.—275

Д

Деб оpин, А. Диа лектичес кий матеpиа лизм .—В кн. : На pу б еже.(К хаpактеpистике совpеменных исканий.) Кpитический сбоpник.Спб., «Hame Вpемя», 1909, c. 38—75.—475-483

Е

Евангелие.—310

З

Заpя. Шту тгаpт, 1901, № 2-3, декабpь, с. 204-225.—275Зенд-Авеста.—346

К

Колокол. Лондон, 1895, № 44, стp. 363-364.—503

М

Маpкс К. Гpажданская война во Фpанции. Воззвание ГенеpальногоСовета Междунаpодного Товаpищества Рабочих о гpажданскойвойне во Фpанции 1871 г. Ко всем членам Товаpищества в Ев-pопе и Соединенных Штатах. Апpель-май 1871 г.—311

— Капитал. Кpитика политической экономии. Т. I-III. 1867-1894 гг.—99, 146, 178, 180, 235, 317, 358, 487

— Письмо Ф. Энгельсу ом 1 Эевpаля 1858 г.—339, 352— Письмо Ф. Энгельсу ом 10 мая 1870 г.—378

Н

На pубеже. (К хаpактеpистике совpеменных исканий.) Кpитическийсбоpник. Спб., «Hame Вpемя», 1909, c. 38-75.—475-483


П

Писаpев Д. И. Пpомахи незpелой мысли.—371(Плеханов Г. В.) Бельтов, Н. К вопpосу о pазвитии м онистического

взгляда на истоpию. Ответ гг. Михайловскому, Каpееву и комп.Спб., 1895, 288 c.—275

— К шестидесятой годовщине смеpти Гегеля.—160— Cant пpотив Канта или духовное завещание г. Беpнштейна.—

Зapя, Шту тгаpт, 1901, № 2-3, декабpь, c. 204-225.—275— Кpитика наших кpитиков завещание. Спб., 1906, VII, 400 c.—275— Materialismus militans. Ответ г. Богд анову. Письмо пеpвое и

втоpое .— Голо с С оциа л-Дем окpата . Женев а-Паpиж, 1908 ,№ 6-7, май-июнь, с. 3-14; № 8-9, июль-сентябpь, c. 3-16.—275

— Н. Г. Чpeнышeвский. Спб., Шиповник, 1910, 537 c.—501-557— Н. Г. Чpeнышeвский.—Социал-дeмокpат . Лондон, 1890, кн. I,

zевpаль, с. 88-175.—503, 506-509, 512, 513, 514, 531, 532, 542,544, 547, 552, 553, 555, 556, 557

— Основные вопpосы маpксизма. Спб., Наша жизнь, 1908, 107 c.—270, 308, 403-406

— Ответ г. Богданову . Письмо тpетье.— В кн.: Плеханов, Г. В.От обоpоны к нападению. Ответ г. А. Богланову, кpитика италь-янского синдикализма и дpугие статьи. М., 1910, c. 70-111.—275

— От обоpоны к нападению. Ответ г. А. Богланову, кpитика италь-янского синдикализма и дpугие статьи. М., 1910, c. 70-111.—275

С

Совpеменник. Спб., 1861, № 5, c. 89-117.—524Социал-Детокpата . Лондон, 1890, кн. I, zевpаль, с. 88-175.—503,

506-509, 512, 513, 514, 531, 532, 542, 544, 547, 552, 553, 555, 556, 557

Ч

Чеpнов, В. Философские и социологические этюды. М., Сотpудниче-ство , 1907, 379 c.—257

Чеpнышевский. Н. Г. Июльская монаpхия.—В кн.: Полное собpа-ние сочинений в 10 томах. Т. VI. Спб., Чеpнышевский, 1906,c. 53-150.—538

Политика. Июнь 1859.—В кн.: Полное собpание сочинений в 10 то-мах. Т. V. Спб., Чеpнышевский, 1906, c. 209-250.—543

— Кpитика философских пpедубеждений пpотив общинного владе-ния.—В кн.: Полное собpание сочинений в 10 томах. Т. IV.Спб., Чеpнышевский, 1906, c. 304-333.—540

— О пpичинах падения Рима (подpажание Монтескьё).—Совpемен-ник, Спб., 1861, № 5, c. 89-117.—524

— Очеpки из политической экономии (по Миллю).—В кн.: Полноесобpание сочинений в 10 томах. Т. VII. Спб., Чеpнышевский,1906, c. 305-664.—547

607INDEX OF SOURCES

— Письма об Испании. В. П. Боткина. Спб., 1857 г.—В кн.:Полное собpание сочинений в 10 томах. Т. III. Спб., Чеpнышев-ский, 1906, c. 25-46.—523, 524

— Пpолог .—508, 509— Что делать?—513

Ш

Шекспиp, В. Все хоpошо, что хоpошо кончается, акт I, сценатpетья.—31

Шулятиков, В . Опpавд ание ка пит а лизма в з а падноевpопейс койфилософии. От Декаpта до Э . Маха, M., Московское кн-во, 1908,151 c.—484-500

— Из теоpии и пpактики классовой боpьбы. Издани е C. Доpова-товcкого и А. Чаpушникова. Моcква, 1907.—486

Э

Э нгельс, Ф. Анти-Дюpинг. Пеpевоpот в науке, пpоизведенныйгосподином Евгением Дюpингом. 1876-1878 гг.—117, 118, 251,262, 283

— Письмо К. Маpксу от 21 сентябpя 1874 г .—157— Письмо К. Шмидту от 1 ноябpя 1891 г .—157

materialism and idealism—90, 175, 181, 202, 248, 249,250, 255, 256, 258, 260, 261,266, 280-288, 294, 352, 357,359, 363, 365-372, 438, 439,521

Avenarius, Richard (1843-1896)—German philosopher, subjec-tive idealist, a founder ofempirio-criticism—58, 392, 396,399, 495, 496-499

B

Babeuf, Francois Noël (Gracchus)(1760-1797)—French revolu-tionary, prominent represen-tative of equalitarian utopiancommunism, organiser of con-spiracy of “Equals”—40, 44

Bacon, Francis Baron Verulam(1561-1626)—great English philo-sopher, founder of Englishmaterialism, naturalist, histori-an and statesman—43, 463, 521

Bail l i e , James Black ( 1872 -1940)—vice-president of LeedsUniversity, author of a bookon Hegelian logic; translatedHegel’s Phenomenology of Mindinto English—240

Balfour, Arthur James (1848-1930)—British statesman and

A

Aksakov , Ivan Sergeyevich(1823-1886)—Russian publicfigure, publicist, Slavophil—504

Alexander I ( 1777 - 1825)—Em-peror of Russia (1801-1825)—552

Alexander the Great (356 -323 B. C.)—famous soldierand statesman of antiquity,King of Macedon—280

Alio t ta , Antonio (b . 1881)—Italian philosopher, authorof works on experimentalpsychology and aesthetics;opponent of empirio-criticismand pragmatism—399

Anaxagoras of Clasomenae (c.500-428 B. C.)—ancient Greekphi losopher , inconsistent ma-terialist—266

Anaximander of Miletus (c.610-546 B. C.)—ancient Greekphilosopher, naturalistic ma-terialist and dialectician—2 4 7

Aristarchus of Samos (c. 320-(c. 250 B. C.)—ancient Greekastronomer and mathemati-cian—331

Aristotle (384-322 B. C.)—out-standing ancient Greek phi-losopher, vacillated between

NAME INDEX

609NAME INDEX

theoretician of utilitarianism—44

Bergson, Henri (1859-1941)—French idealist philosopher,irrationalist, considered intui-tion as the highest form of philo-sophical and aesthetic cogni-tion—399, 411, 439, 445, 448,462, 500

Berkeley, George (1685-1753)—English philosopher, Anglicanbishop, subjective idealist—360, 452, 476, 492, 498, 499

Berzelius, Jöns Jakob (1779-1848)—famous Swedish che-mist and mineralogist—123

Boehme, Jakob (1575-1624)—German pantheist philosopher,mystic, whose doctrine at thesame time contains profounddialectical and materialistideas—72

Bogdanov, A. (Malinovsky, A. A.)(1873-1928)—philosopher, so-ciologist and economist, Bol-shevik till 1907 when he leftthe Party; sought to reviseMarxism, distorting it froma Machist and vulgar mate-rialist viewpoint; foundedempiriomonism, a variety ofempirio-criticism—275, 485, 488

Bolin, Andreas Wilhelm (1835-1924)—Finnish historian andmaterialist philosopher, follow-er of Feuerbach; togetherwith Jodl published thesecond edition of Feuerbach’sworks—373

Bolland, Gerardus (1854-1922)—Dutch philosopher; neo-Hege-lian; translated several ofHegel’s works into Dutch—393

Boltzmann, Ludwig (1844-1906)—Austrian physicist, in philos-ophy adhered to mechanisticmaterialism; criticised theMachists subjective idealistand W. Ostwald’s “energetic”theory—58

diplomat, leader of the Conser-vatives; in his philosophicalworks was critical of Hegel’sviews—238

Barthez, Paul Joseph (1734-1806)—French physician andphysiologist, vitalist—438

Basil the Blind (1415-1462)—Grand Prince of Moscow—512

Bauer, Bruno (1809-1882)—Ger-man idealist philosopher, prom-inent Young Hegehan, bour-geois Radical, became a na-tional-liberal in 1866—23,28, 31-32, 34, 35-39, 41, 44,45, 49, 514

Bauer, Edgar (1820-1886)—Ger-man publicist, Young Hege-lian, brother of Bruno Bauer—26, 28, 29, 30

Bauer, Otto (1882-1938)—a lead-er of Austrian Social-Democ-racy and the Second Interna-tional, ideologist of revision-ism—397

Bayle , Pierre ( 1647 - 1706)—French sceptic philosopherand forerunner of the FrenchEnlighteners, author of Dic-tionnaire historique et critique,critic of religious dogmatism—43, 64, 255, 256, 373

Beaussire , Emile -Jacques -Ar-mand (1824-1889)—Frenchphilosopher, author of a num-ber of works on morals—3 2 4

Belinsky, Vissarion Grigoryevich(1811-1848)—Russian literarycritic, publicist, and philosoph-er, played an outstandingrole in the history of socialand aesthetic thought—503,506, 511, 529, 530, 542

Beltov—see Plekhanov, G. V.Bénard, Charles (1807-1898)—

French philosopher, translatedand published several of He-gel’s works in French—324

Bentham, Jeremy (1748-1832)—English bourgeois sociologist,

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Caird, Edward (1835-1908)—English philosopher, Hegelian,author of the book Hegel—240, 241

Carnot, Lazare Nicolas (1753-1823)—French mathematician,political and military figure,bourgeois Republican—118

Carnot, Nicolas Leonhard Sadi(1796-1832)—French physicistand engineer, made severalimportant discoveries con-cerning heat; was the first toformulate the thesis that workdue to a supply of heat can beobtained only through thetransfer of heat from a warmerto a cooler body—421, 431

Carstanjen, Friedrich—discipleof Avenarius, professor at Zu-rich University; editor ofthe magazine Vierteljahrsschriftfür wissenschaftliche Philoso-phie after Avenarius’ death—496

Chalcidius (4th century A. D.)—neo-Platonist; translated Pla-to’s dialogue “Timaeus” intoLatin and wrote commentsto it—349

Chamberlain, Houston Stewart(1855-1927)—philosopher, neo-Kantian, racialist sociologist,advocated world domninationby German imperialism, hisphilosophy was a forerunnerof fascist ideology—58

Chernov, V. M. (1876-1952)—aleader and theoretician ofthe Socialist-Revolutionaries,bitter foe of Marxism, eclecticand agnostic—200, 257

Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich(1828-1889)—outstanding Rus-sian revolutionary democrat,utopian socialist, materialistphilosopher, writer and liter-ary critic, leader of the revolu-tionary democratic movement ofthe sixties in Russia; developed

Bonaparte—see Napoleon Bona-parte.

Bourbons—royal dynasty, reign-ing in France 1589-1792,1814-15 and 1815-30—310

Bradley, Francis Herbert (1849-1924)—English philosopher,absolute idealist—239, 240,500

Brunetière, Ferdinand (1846-1906)—French critic andman of letters, tried to applythe methods of the naturalsciences, particularly the Dar-winian theory of evolution,to the history of literature—428

Bruno—see Bauer, Bruno.Büchner, Friedrich Karl Chris-

tian Ludwig (1824-1899)—German physiologist, expo-nent of vulgar materialism,opponent of scientific social-ism—55, 349

Buckle, Henry Thomas (1821-1862)—English liberal-bourgeoishistorian and positivist sociol-ogist, author of the History ofCivilisation in England—328

Bulgarin, F. V. (1789-1859)—Russian reactionary writerand journalist; bitter foeof progressive Russian writers,whom he denounced to thepolice—503

C

Cabanis, Pierre Jean George(1757-1808)—French physician,philosopher and politicalfigure, a forerunner of thevulgar materialists—42

Cabet, Etienne (1788-1856)—French publicist, representa-tive of utopian communism,author of Voyage en lcarie—44

Caesar, Gaius Julius (c. 100-44 B. C.)—famous Roman sol-dier and statesman—310

611NAME INDEX

Feuerbach’s materialist phi-losophy, sought to reviseHegel’s dialectics along mate-rialist lines; his philosophicalviews mark a high point in pre-Marxist materialist philoso-phy. “But Chernyshevsky didnot succeed in rising, or, rather,owing to the backwardness ofRussian life, was unable to riseto the level of the dialecticalmaterialism of Marx and En-gels” (Lenin)—77, 82, 502-514, 516-526, 528-533, 535,536, 538-547, 549, 550, 552,553-557

Chiapelli, Alessandro (1857-1913)—Italian bourgeois phi-losopher, neo-Kantian, authorof works on history of philoso-phy, literature, arts andreligion; criticised scientificsocialism—399

Cicero, Marcas Tullius (106-43B. C.)—Roman orator, states-man and philosopher, ec-lectic—346, 352

Clauberg, Johann (1622-1665)—German philosopher, professorof philosophy at Duisburg;Cartesian, was close to occa-sionalists—383

Clausius, Rudolf Julius Emma-nuel (1822-1888)—Germanphysicist, together with Car-not. Mayer and Joule laidthe basis for the science ofthermodynamics—442

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215 A. D.)—Christian theologian,idealist philosopher—347, 350

Cohen, Hermann (1842-1918)—German philosopher, subjec-tive idealist, headed Marburgschool of neo-Kantians—399

Collins, John Anthony (1676-1729) English deist philoso-pher, follower of Locke—43

Comte, Auguste (1798-1857)—French reactionary bourgeois

philosopher and sociologist,agnostic, founder of positiv-ism—323, 409, 436, 469, 513,514

Condillac, Étienne Bonnot (1715-1780)—French philosopher,deist, sensationalist, followerof Locke—42, 43

Copernicus (Kopernik), Nikolaus(1473-1543)—Polish astronomer,founded the heliocentric systemof the universe—270, 331 , 333 ,460

Cornu, Marie Alfred (1841-1902)—French physicist, knownfor his works on optics; refinedFizeau’s method of determiningthe velocity of light—333

Coward, William (c. 1656-1725)—English physician anddeist philosopher—43

Cratylus (5th century B. C.)—ancient Greek idealist philos-opher, disciple of Heraclitusand teacher of Plato; arrivedat sophism by drawing extremerelativistic conclusions fromHeraclitus’ dialetics—343, 350,351

Croce, Benedetto (1866-1952)—Italian philosopher, historian,literary critic and politicalfigure; in his works interpretedHegel’s dialectics in the spi-rit of subjective idealism;opponent of Marxism—399

D

Dannemann, Friedrich (b.1859)—German historian ofnatural science—399

Darmstaedter, Ludwig (1846-1927)—German chemist, au-thor of works on the history ofchemistry—333

Darwin, Charles Robert (1809-1882)—English materialist bi-ology, founder of a scientific

612 NAME INDEX

theory of the development ofthe organic world—141

Deborin (Ioffe), Abram Moiseye-vich (b. 1881)—Soviet philos-opher, Member of the U.S.S.R.Academy of Sciences; Bolshe-vik from 1903; Menshevik in1907-17; member of the C.P.S.U.from 1928; in the thirtiessupported Menshevik idealistviews; author of works onhistory of philosophy and dia-lectical materialism—4 7 5 , 4 8 2

Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-370 B. C.)—great materialistphilosopher of ancient Greece,one of the founders of the atom-istic theory—265, 280, 332,344, 352, 360, 518

Descartes, René (in Latin—Cartesins) (1596-1650)—Frenchdualist philosopher, mathe-matician and naturalist—41,42, 43, 321, 322, 360, 378, 421,427, 438, 484, 490

Destutt de Tracy, Antoine LouisClaude (1754-1836)—Frenchvulgar economist, sensatio-nalist in his philosophic views,protagonist of constitutionalmonarchy—25

Dewey, John (1859-1952)—American philosopher, soci-ologist and pedagogue, thechief representative of prag-maticism—399,445

Dézamy, Théodore (1803-1850)—French publicist, out-standing representative ofthe revolutionary trend in uto-pian communism—44

Diderot, Denis (1713-1784)—French materialist philoso-pher, atheist, one of the ideo-logists of the French revolu-tionary bourgeoisie of the 18thcentury, a leading Encyclo-paedist—520

Dietzgen, Josef (1828-1888)—German worker and Social-

Democrat; philosopher, indepen-dently arrived at some funda-mental principles of dialectical-materialism—72, 361, 4 0 3 , 4 0 6

Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833-1911)—German idealist philosopher,professor at Berlin University,a founder of the “Lebens odorErlebnis Philosophie” (lifeor experience philosophy), areactionary irrationalist trendin bourgeois philosophy dur-ing the epoch of imperialism;his works include a book onthe youth of Hegel (Die Jugend-geschichte Hegels)—58, 239

Diogenes, Laertius (3rd centuryA. D.)—ancient Greek histo-rian of philosophy, author ofa ten-volume work on ancientphilosophers—223, 255, 265,290, 291

Diogenes of Sinupu (c. 404-323 B. C.)—ancient Greekphilosopher, one of the foundersof the Cynic school of phi-losophy—224, 254

Dobrolyubov, Nikolai Alexand-rovich (1836-1861)—Russianliterary critic and publicist,materialist philosopher, revo-lutionary democrat—503, 530

Dodwell, Henry (1700-1784)—English materiallist philoso-pher—43

Druzhinin, A. V. (1824-1864)—Russian author and liberalcritic, advocated idealist theo-ry of “art for art’s sake”—511

Dudyshkin, S. S. (1820-1866)—Russian journalist and liberalliterary critic—521

Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie(1861-1916)—French theoreticalphysicist; philosopher and hist-orian of natural science—399,422, 423, 426, 427

Duns Scotus, John (c. 1265-1308)—medieval Scottish scho-lastic philosopher, repre-

613NAME INDEX

sentative of nominalism, theearliest expression of material-ism in the Middle Ages; authorof “Opus Oxoniense”—43

Durkheim, Emile (1858-1917)—French positivist sociologist—454

E

Ebbinghaus, Hermann (1850-1909)—German bourgeois psy-chologist, idealist, a leadingrepresentative of expirinentalpsychology; famous for hisresearch concerning the natureof man’s memory—326

Edgar—see Baiter, Edgar.Engels, Frederick (1820-1895)—

23, 24, 35, 36, 65, 67, 70, 77,104, 108, 109, 117, 118, 141,157, 169, 234, 251, 257, 262,283, 306, 311, 312, 339, 357,403-406, 479, 526

Epicurus (c. 341-270 B. C.)—famous thinker of ancientGreece, materialist philosopher,atheist—289, 295, 344, 518

Eratosthenes (c. 276-194 B. C.)—ancient Greek mathematician,astronomer and geographer; firstto determine the approximatesize of the meridian—331

Euler, Leonhard (1707-1783)—mathematician, physicist andastronomer; member of theBerlin and Petersburg Acade-mies of Sciences; spent mostof his life in Russia—118

F

Faucher, Julius (1820-1878)—German publicist, YoungHegelian—32

Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas(1804-1872)—German mate-rialist philosopher and atheist;Feuerbach’s materialism, in

spite of its limited contem-plative character, provideda theoretical source of Marx-ist philosophy—29, 30, 35,36, 41, 44, 45, 61-67, 70-80,82, 83, 123, 155, 169, 212,272, 283, 295, 309, 317, 326,327, 340, 344, 349, 360, 373,375, 377, 381-383, 387, 394,395, 403, 404, 406, 514, 516,517, 523, 528-530

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814)—German philosopher,subjective idealist, represen-tative of classical Germanphilosophy—95, 113, 236, 322,476, 492-493, 549

Fischer, Friedrich (1801-1853)—professor of philosophy atBasle—57, 372

Fischer, Kuno (1824-1907)—German historian of philoso-phy, Hegelian, author of thefundamental Geschichte derneueren Philosophie, profes-sor of philosophy at Jena andHeidelberg—157, 176

Fizeau, Armand HippolyteLouis (1819-1896)—French phy-sicist, known for his works onoptics, determined the veloc-ity of light in air by meansof a rapidly revolving gearwheel specially designed forthis purpose—333

Forel, Auguste (1848-1931)—Swiss neuropathologist, psy-chiatrist and entomologist—326

Forster, Friedrich Christoph(1791-1868)—German histori-an and writer, Hegelian, to-gether with L. Boumann editedVolumes XVI and XVII ofthe posthumous edition of He-gel’s works, containing arti-cles on various themes—87

Foucault, Jean Bernard Léon(1819-1868)—French physicist,known for his pendulum exper-iment by which he demon-

614 NAME INDEX

strated the diurnal motionof the earth; by means of a revolv-ing mirror, determined thevelocity of light in air andwater—333

Fourier, Charles (1772-1837)—French utopian socialist—32,33, 44, 48, 49, 50, 510, 512

G

Galilei, Galileo (1564-1642)—Italian physicist and astron-omer, a founder of classicalmechanics—122, 332, 421, 460

Gans, Eduard (c. 1798-1839)—professor of Roman law atBerlin University, Hegelian;edited Philosophy of Rightand Lectures on the Philosophyof History for the posthumousedition of Hegel’s works—46, 87, 305, 314

Gassendi, Pierre (1592-1655)—French materialist philoso-pher, elaborated the Epicureandoctrines of atomism andethics; also known for hisworks on astronomy, mathe-matics, mechanics, and histo-ry of science—42, 81, 360,521

Gauss, Karl Friedrich (1777-1855)—German mathemati-cian, author of outstandingworks on theoretical astrono-my, geodesy, physics and eaarthmagneticism—207

Gay, Jules (1807-c. 1876)—French utopian communist—44

Genov, Peter—Bulgarian histor-ian of philosophy—326, 327

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang (1749-1832)—German, poet and think-er—510

Gomperz, Theodor (1832-1912)—German historian of philoso-phy, philologist, positivist,

author of the three-volumeGriechische Denker—256

Gorgias of Leontini (a. 483-375 B. C.)—sophist philoso-pher of ancient Greece, partisanof democratic, slave-owningsystem—270-272, 464

Grech, Nikolai Ivanovich (1787-1867)—Russian reactionaryjournalist and man of letters,bitter foe of progressive Rus-sian writers, whom he de-nounced to the police—503

Grün, Karl (t817-1887)—Ger-man petty-bourgeois publi-cist, exponent of “true social-ism”—327

Guenther, Konrad (1874-1955)—German zoologist, professorat Freiburg University, comp-iled the atlas Vom Urtier zumMenschen—58

Guizot, François-Pierre Gulllaume(1787-1874)—French bourgeoishistorian and statesman—525

H

Haas, Arthur Erich (1884-1941)—Austrian physicist, specialisedin atomic physics—335

Haeckel, Ernest Heinrich (1834-1919)—German naturalist,professor of zoology at JenaUniversity, evolutionist andnatural-historical materialist,supported and popularised Dar-win’s teaching—56, 328, 394,395

Hammacher, Emil (1885-1916)—German philosopher, objectiveidealist and mystic—238, 239

Harbordt—German scientist—57Haring, Georg Wilhelm Heinr

ich—German philosopher, to-gether with Michelet wroteHistorisch-Kritische Darstel-lung der dialektischen MethodeHegels—239

615NAME INDEX

Hartley, David (1705-1757)—English physician, bourgeoispsychologist and materialistphilosopher—43

Hartmann, Eduard (1842-1906)—German reactionary idealist,mystic, militant defendant ofthe junker-bourgeois Germa-ny—58

Haym, Rudolf (1821-1901)—Ger-man historian of literature andphilosophy, positivist—387

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich(1770-1831)—German philos-opher, objective idealist anddialectician, leading repre-sentative of German classicalphilosophy; Hegel’s historicmerit was that he provided anexhaustive analysis of ideal-ist dialectics, which subse-quently served as one of thetheoretical sources of dialectic-al materialism—27, 31, 33, 35,39, 41, 44, 45, 46-49, 70, 81,86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 95-97, 103,104, 106, 110, 112-114, 116-118, 120, 121, 123, 129, 134-135, 137, 138, 146, 147,149, 151, 153-157, 160, 162,167, 169, 171-175, 177-181,182, 185-187, 189-193, 196,197, 203-207, 209, 210, 211,212, 217, 224, 228, 229, 232,234-236, 238, 239, 240, 241,243, 245, 247, 250, 251, 254-267, 269, 270, 273-257, 297-299, 303, 305, 307, 309-312,313, 314, 315-317, 319-324327, 339, 340, 341, 342-345,347, 348, 350, 352, 357, 359,360, 366, 370, 373, 387, 388,389, 393, 397, 404, 406, 427,492, 493

Hegesias (end of 4th-beginningof 3rd century B. C.)—Greekphilosopher of the Cyrenaicor Hedonistic school—276

Heinze, Max (1835-1909)—German historian of philoso-

phy, specialised in ancientGreek philosophy; edited, be-ginning with the 6th edition,Üherweg’s course of historyof philosophy—52, 256, 276

Helmholtz, Hermann von (1821-1894)—great German natural-ist; a founder of the law ofconservation of energy; hisphilosophical views were closeto the Kantians—420, 431

Helvétius, Claude-Adrien (1715-1771)—French materialist phi-losopher, atheist, an ideologistof the French revolutionarybourgeoisie of the 18th centu-ry—42, 43, 44. 522

Henning, Leopold (1791-1866)—professor of philosophy atBerlin University, Hegelian;edited Science of Logic andthe first part of Encyclopaediaof the Philosophical Sciences(“Logic”) for the posthumousedition of Hegel’s works—87

Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 530-470 B. C.)—ancient Greek ma-terialist philosopher, one of thefounders of dialectics—105, 259,262, 267, 335, 337, 3 3 9 , 3 5 2 ,357, 360, 366

Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776-1841)—German idealist phi-losopher, psychologist andpedagogue—387

Hertz, Heinrich Rudolf (1857-1894)—German physicist, spe-cialised in electrodynamics, in-consistent materialist—399, 445

Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich(1812-1870)—Russian revolu-tionary democrat, materialistphilosopher, author and pub-licist—503, 504, 511, 526

Hibben, John Grier (1861-1933)—American logician, professor atPrinceton University—241

Hilferding, Rudolf (1877-1941)—an opportunist leader of Ger-man Social-Democracy and

616 NAME INDEX

the Second International; inhis work Das Finanzkapitaldescribed imperialism froman anti-Marxist viewpoint,concealing its main contradic-tions—400

Hippocrates (c. 460-377 B. C.)—great physician and naturalistof ancient Greece, a founder ofancient medicine—353

Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679)—outstanding English philos-opher, representative of mech-anistic materialism—42, 43, 492

Hoffing, Harald (1843-1931)—Danish positivist philosopherand psychologist—497

Holbach, Paul Henri (1723-1789)—French materialist phi-losopher, atheist, an ideologistof the French revolutionarybourgeoisie of the 18th centu-ry—44, 360, 478, 489

Homer—great epic poet ofGreece, legendary author of theIliad and the Odyssey, isbelieved to have lived between12th and 8th century B. C.—308, 331

Hotho, Heinrich Gustav (1802-1873)—historian of the arts,professor at Berlin Universityaesthete of Hegelian school;edited Lectures on Aestheticsfor the posthumous edition ofHegel’s works—87

Hurne, David (1711-1776)—En-glish philosopher, subjectiveidealist, agnostic, historianand economist—53, 132, 203,360, 476, 478, 492

J

Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1743-1819)—German idealist philos-opher, metaphysician andtheist; opponent of rational-ism, advocated faith and

intuition, considering these themost trustworthy paths toknowledge—210

James, William (1842-1910)—American philosopher andpsychologist, subjective ide-alist, a founder of pragmatism—58, 399, 445, 446, 450, 452,453, 455, 457, 458, 468

Janet, Paul (1823-1899)—Frencheclectic philosopher—324

Jodl, Friedrich (1849-1914)—professor of philosophy atPrague and Vienna, follower ofFeuerbach; together with Bolinpublished the second editionof Feuerbach’s works—326

K

Kant, Immanuel (1724-804)—German philosopher, founderof German classical philosophy,subjective idealist and agnos-tic; Kant’s theory of knowledgeis characterised by contradic-tions, a conglomoration ofelements of materialism andidealism, resulting in thetheory of the objectively exist-ing “thing-in-itself”—47, 53,91, 92, 96, 98, 100, 113, 116,117, 120, 134, 168-174, 178,179, 186, 192, 193, 204-207,208, 209, 210, 223, 225, 232,233, 236, 239, 258, 269-271,273, 275, 281, 283, 319, 321-323, 360, 370, 382, 383, 393,409, 413, 414, 476, 477, 478

Kautsky, Karl (1854-1938)—opportunist leader of GermanSocial-Democracy and the Sec-ond International, ideologistof Centrisin and revisionism;in the eighties and nineties,when he supported Marxism,Kautsky wrote several workspopularising Marx’s teachings—487

617NAME INDEX

idealist and eclectic in hisphilosophical views—337, 339,352, 357, 526, 549, 550

Lasson, Adolf (1832-1917)—German philosopher, professorat Berlin University, promi-nent representative of neo-Hegelianism—238

Lavrov, Pyotr Lavrovich (1823-1900)—Russian sociologist andpubicist, ideologist of theNarodniks, advocated an anti-scientific idealist, subjectivemethod of sociology—514

Law, John (1671-1729)—Englishbourgeois economist and finan-cier; contrôleur général desfinances in France (1719-1720);known for issuing large amountsof paper currency which endedin financial collapse—42

Le Bon, Gustave (1841-1931)—French physician, psycholo-gist and sociologist, idealist—432

Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm(1646-1716)—German mathe-matician, versatile scientist,outstanding rationalist philos-opher, objective idealist; hisphilosophy, containing dia-lectical ideas, greatly influencedthe development of Germanclassical phiiosophy—41-43,64, 111, 114, 118, 131, 132,144, 156, 209, 322, 326, 373,375, 379-386, 438, 465, 491

Lemke, M. K. (1872-1923)—historian of Russian litera-ture and the Russian revolu-tionary movement, collectedhistorical and literary docu-ments—505, 506

Léon, Xavier (1868-1935)—President of Société Françaisede Philosophie, editor ofRevue de Métaphysique et deMorale, idealist philosopher,author of works on Fichte’sphilosophy—319

Kavelin, Konstantin Dmitriye-vich (1818-1885)—Russian pub-licist, historian and jurist,representative of feudal-bour-geois liberalism; supported thetsarist policy of reprisals andopposed the revolutionary-democratic movement duringthe preparation and carryingout of the Peasant Reform of1861—503, 504

Kepler, Johannes (1571-1630)—German astronomer, basinghimself on Copernican teachings, discovered the laws ofplanetary motion—122, 332

Kleinpeter, Hans (1869-1916)—Austrian philosopher, subjec-tive idealist, popularised em-pirio-criticism—496

Korolenko. Vladimir Galaktiono-vich (1833-1921)—Russian au-thor and public figure—513, 514

Krylov, Ivan Adreyevich (1769-1844)—Russian fabullist; sa-tirised various vices of society:bribery, servility, falsehood,hypocrisy, boasting—504

L

Lagrange, Joseph Louis (1736-1813)—French mathematicianand mechanic—118

La Metirie, Julien Offrey de(1709-1751)—French physician,philosopher, prominent repre-sentative of mechanistic ma-terialism—42, 44, 520

Lange, Friedrich Albert (1828-1875)—German philosopher, anearlier representative of neo-Kantianism—327, 393

Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825-1864)—German petty-bourgeois so-cialist, headed General Asso-ciation of German Workers;originator of opportunism inGerman labour movement,

618 NAME INDEX

Le Roy, Edouard (1870-1954)—French philosopher, mathema-tician, professor at Collègede France, pragmatist and neo-positivist, tried to achievean “organic synthesis” ofphilosophy, science and reli-gion, a leader of Catholicmodernism—452, 462

Le Roy, Hendrik de (De Roy inDutch, Regius in Latin)(1508-1679)—Dutch physician,philosopher, mechanistic ma-terialist and sensualist, found-er of a school of materialistfollowers of Descartes—42

Leucippus (5th century B. C.)—materialist philosopher ofancient Greece, founder of theatomistic theory—258, 263-265,281, 369

Liebig, Justus von (1803-1873)—German scientist, a founderof agricultural chemistry, Pres-ident of Bavarian Academyof Sciences—71

Lipps, Theodor (1851-1914)—German psychologist and phi-losopher, subjective idealist,supported phenomenologism—336

Locke , John ( 1632 -1704)—English philosopher, meta-physical materialist, workedout a sensualist theory ofknowledge—42, 43, 233, 292,321, 381, 382, 492, 521

Loria , Achi l l e ( 1857 - 1943)—Italian vulgar sociologist andeconomist, distorted Marxism—492

Lotze, Rudolf Hermann (1817-1881)—German physioloist andidealist philosopher—237

Loustallot, Elisée (1762-1790)—French publicist, revolution-ary democrat, active in theFrench bourgeois revolution—32

Lucas, Richard—author of Bib-liographie des radioaktiven Stof-fes—57

M

Mach, Ernst (1838-1916)—Aus-trian philosopher, subjectiveidealist, physicist; like Ave-narius, leading representativeof empirio-criticism—57, 59,71, 265, 270, 276, 328, 399,400, 410, 415, 416, 417, 422,423, 427, 445, 446, 474, 484,495, 498, 499, 500

MacTaggart, John M’TaggartEllis (1866-1925)—Englishphilosopher, neo-Hegelian; au-thor of the commentary toHegel’s Logic—238, 240, 241

Malebranche, Nicolas (1638-1715)—French idealist philos-opher, metaphysician, a re-presentative of occasionalism—41, 42, 43

Marheineke, Philip Konrad(1780-1846)—German Protes-tant theologist and historianof Christianity, professor atBerlin University, Hegelian;edited Lectures on Philosophyof Religion for the posthumousedition of Hegel’s works—87

Mariano, Raffaele (1840-1912)—Italian philosopher and pub-licist, Hegelian, professor ofchurch history at Naples—239, 324

Marx, Karl (1818-1883)—21-23,24, 26, 30, 32-35, 36, 37,36, 40, 44-47, 49-51, 65, 77,141, 147, 178, 180, 212, 235,238, 281, 310, 311, 312, 316,317, 339, 340, 342, 349, 352,358-360, 378, 387, 388-391,397, 404, 405, 487, 526, 528

Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Mo-reau de (1698-1750)—Frenchphysicist, astronomer and geo-desist, originated the principleof Least Action—421

Maxwell, James Clerk (1831-1879)—English physicist, ad-vanced the theory of electro-

619NAME INDEX

magnetic field and the electro-magnetic theory of light—439

Michelet, Karl Ludwig (1801-1893)—professor of philosophyat Berlin University, Hegeli-an; edited Philosophische Ab-handlungen, Part II of Ency-clopaedia of the PhilosophicalSciences (“Philosophy of Na-ture”) and Lectures on the Historyof Philosophy for the posthum-ous edition of Hegel’s works—87, 239

Mikhailovsky, Nikolai Konstant-inovich (1842-1904)—Russiansociologist, publicist and lit-erary critic, ideologist of lib-eral Narodniks, editor of themagazines Otechestvenniye Za-piski and Russkoye Bogatstvo—75

Montesquieu, Charles Louis (1689-1755)—French representative of18th-century Enlightenment, ide-ologist of constitutional mon-archy, author of L’Esprit desLois (The Spirit of the Law)—524

Müller, Iwan (1830-1917)—Ger-man philologist, professor ofclassical philology at Erlan-gen University—369

Münsterberg, Hugo (1863-1916)—German psychologist, profes-sor at Harvard University,advocated voluntarism in hisworks on psychology—399

N

Napoleon I. Bonaparte (1769-1821)—French Emperor (1804-1814 and 1815)—40, 310, 334

Nauwerck, Karl (1810-1891)—German publicist; member of“The Free,” a Young Hegel-ian circle in Berlin—24

Nemesius (c. 4th century A. D.)—bishop of Emesa in Phoeni-cia, author of the treatise “On

Human Nature” where he soughtto combine neo-Platonismwith the Christian teachingof immortality of the soul, fre-edom of will and divine provi-dence—344, 352

Nernst, Walter Hermann (1864-1941)—German physicist andphysical chemist—435, 436

Newton, Isaak (1642-1727)—Eng-lish physicist, astronomer andmathematician, founder of classi-cal mechanics—118, 332, 380, 427

Nietzsche Friedrich (1844-1900)—German philosopher, volun-tarist and irrationalist, hisideology was a forerunner offascism—58, 452

Nikolai Gavrilovich—see Cherny-shevsky Nikolai Gavrilovich

Noël, Georges (1856-1916)—Frenchidealist philosopher, professorof philosophy, author of LaLogique de Hegel—240, 241,319-324

Norström, Vitalis (1856-1916)—Swedish philosopher, subjectiveidealist, professor at Göteborg—59

O

Ostwald, Wilhelm Friedrich (1853-1932)—German natural scien-tist and idealist philosopher,founder of the “energetic” the-ory, a variety of “physical”idealism—58, 399, 422, 427,430, 445, 500

Owen, Robert (1771-1858)—greatEnglish utopian socialist—33,44, 510

P

Parmenides of Elea (end of 6th-beginning of 5th century B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher of

620 NAME INDEX

Phaedo—ancient Greek philoso-pher, disciple of Socrates—277

Philo of Alexandria (c. 25 B. C.-50 A. D.)—ancient philosopherchief representative of Judaicreligious philosophy at thebeginning of 1st century A. D.,sought to combine Judaic re-ligion with Platonism and stoi-cism; his mysticism greatly in-influenced Christian theology—301, 345, 348, 357

Pisarev, Dimitry Ivanovich (1840-1868)—Russian literary critic,materialist philosopher andrevolutionary democrat—371,513, 529, 536

Planck, Max Karl Ernst Ludwig(1858-1947)—German theoreti-cal physicist, founder of quan-tum theory, inconsistent ma-terialist—57

Plato (c. 427-347 B. C.)—ancientGreek philosopher, objectiveidealist, ideologist of slave-owning aristocracy—47, 90,107, 146, 218, 221. 222, 260,273, 274, 276-281, 283, 301,302, 321, 322, 346, 350, 351, 360,365, 370, 419, 438, 452, 490

Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich(1856-1918)—materialist phi-losopher, outstanding propaga-tor of Marxism, prominent fig-ure in world socialist movement,after 1903 became Menshevikand opportunist, in his philo-sophical works sometimes de-viated from dialectical mater-ialism—16O, 179, 275, 308,357, 360, 403, 479, 480, 482,501, 528, 544

Plenge, Johann (d. 1874)—Ger-man sociologist, economist andidealist philosopher, professorat Leipzig and Münster (West-phalia)—238, 388, 390, 391, 397

Pleshcheyev, Alexei Nikolayevich(1825-1893)—Russian poet, inhis poems expressed ideas of

the Eleatic school, disciple ofXenophanes—97, 105, 106, 107,302, 477

Pastore, Valentino Annibale (1868-1956)—Italian philosopher, mem-ber of Turin Academy of Scien-ces, specialised in mathematicallogic, contributed to the maga-zine Rivista di Filosofia—439

Paulsen, Friedrich (1846-1908)—German educationalist and phi-losopher, neo-Kantian, authorof works on ethics, pedagogyand history of public educationin Germany—53-55, 394

Pearson, Karl (1857-1936)—math-ematician and biologist, pro-fessor at London University,Machian approach to the theoryof knowledge—152

Peirce, Charles (Santiago) Sanders(1839-1914)—American idealistphilosopher, logician and psy-chologist; in 1878 enunciatedthe basic principles of pragma-tism—445, 455

Pelazza, Aurelio (d. 1915)—Ita-lian philosopher, author of thebook Riccardo Avenarius e l’em-piriocriticismo—58

Perrin, Jean Baptiste (1870-1942)—French physicist and physicalchemist; his works were mainlyconcerned with experimentalresearches in Brownian move-ment—325, 392

Perrotin, Henri Joseph Anastase(1845-1904)—French astronom-er, known for his observationof “canals” on Mars and ringsabout Saturn—333

Perry, Ralph Barton (1876-1957)—American idealist philosopher,professor at Harvard Univer-sity, neo-realist—398

Petzoldt, Joseph (1862-1929)—German philosopher, subjectiveidealist, disciple of Mach andAvenarius, opponent of scien-tific socialism—496

621NAME INDEX

R

Raab, Friedrich (b. 1890)—Ger-man economist and philosopher,from 1926 professor of politicaleconomy at Frankfurt—392

Rankine, William John Mac-quorn (1820-1872)—Scottish en-gineer and physicist, a founderof thermodynamics—422

Rau, Albrecht (1843-1920)—Ger-man philosopher and natural-ist; follower of Feuerbach—3 9 4

Renan, Joseph Ernest (1823-1892)—French philologist, ide-alist philosopher, author ofworks on history of religion—471

Renouvier, Charles Barnard (1815-1903)—French idealist philos-opher and eclectic, headed theso-called school of “neo-criti-cism,” conventionalist—324,399, 500

Rey, François Abel (1873-1940)—French philosopher, positivist,in questions natural sciencean inconsistent and spontane-ous materialist—325, 407, 428,430, 443, 452, 459, 465, 474

Ribot, Théodule Armand (1839-1916)—French philosopher andpsychologist, founder and edi-tor of the magazine RevuePhilosophique—399

Ricardo, David (1772-1823)—En-glish economist, leading rep-resentative of classical bour-geois political economy—25

Richter, Raoul Hermann (1871-1912)—German philosopher,neo-Kantian—58

Rickert, Heinrich (1863-1936)—German philosopher and socio-logist, subjective idealist andagnostic, one of the main rep-resentatives of the Badenschool of neo-Kantianism—399

Riecke, Eduard (1845-1915)—Ger-man physicist—57

revolutionary democrats of the1840s-1860s—536

Pliny the Elder (Gaius PliniusSecundus) (23-79 A. D.)—Romanwriter and scientist—525

P l u t a r c h (c. 46-126 A. D)—an-cient Greek writer, historianand idealist philosopher—341,342

Poincaré, Jules Henri (1854-1912)—French mathematicianand physicist, member ofFrench Académie des Sciences,in philosophy sided with Ma-chians, conventionalist—413,414, 424, 426, 445, 465, 474

Prantl, Karl (1820-1888)—profes-sor of philosophy at MunichUniversity, idealist, author ofworks on the history of phi-losophy and logic—372

Priestley, Joseph (1733-1804)—English chemist and material-ist philosopher—43, 517, 518

Protagoras of Abdera (c. 481-411 B. C.)—ancient Greek soph-ist philosopher; protagonistof democracy in slave-owningsociety—269, 270, 274, 352

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809-1865)—French publicist, vul-gar economist and sociologist,ideologist of the petty bour-geoisie, one of the foundersof anarchism—24, 25, 28-30

Ptolemy, Claudius (2nd centuryA. D.)—ancient Greek mathe-matician, astronomer and ge-ographer; founder of the doc-trine of the earth as the fixedcentre of the universe—334, 459

Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365-275 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher,founder of scepticism in ancientworld—296

Pythagoras (c. 580-500 B. C.)—an-cient Greek mathematician andphilosopher, objective ideal-ist, ideologist of slave-owningaristocracy—115, 247-249, 332, 370

622 NAME INDEX

Riehl, Alois (1844-1924)—Ger-man philosopher, neo-Kanti-an—239, 399

Ritter, Heinrich (1791-1869)—Ger-man theist philosopher, his-torian of philosophy—345

Robespierre, Maximilien FrançoisMarie Isidore (1758-1794)—lea-der of the French Revolution,Jacobin, head of the revolution-ary government (1793-1794)—40

Robinet, Jean-Baptiste René (1735-1820)—French philosopher, ma-terialist, deist—44

Römer, Ole Christensen (1644-1710)—Danish astronomer; wasthe first to determine the velo-city of light, invented a num-ber of astronomical instru-ments—333

Roscher, Wilhelm (1817-1894)—German economist, representa-tive of the so-called historicalschool of political economy—525

Rössler, Constantin (1820-1896)—German publicist, professor ofgovernment at Jena, neo-He-gelian—238

Rotta, Paolo (b. 1873)—Italianphilosopher, close to neo-scho-lasticism, Hegelian, professorat Milan Catholic University—241

Royce, Josiah (1855-1916)—Ameri-can philosopher, objectiveidealist, representative of Amer-ican neo-Hegelians—399, 445

Ruttmann, Wilhelm Julius (b.1884)—German psychologist,author of Die Hauptergebnisseder modernen Psychologie...—396

S

Saint-Just, Louis Antoine Léon de(1767-1794)—leader in the FrenchRevolution, Jacobin—40

Salignac, Fénelon—French scientist,author of Questions de physiquegénérale et d’astronomie—57

Sand, George (1804-1876)—Frenchauthuress—510

Schaden, Emil August (1814-1852)—professor of philosophyat Erlangen University, mys-tic; critic of philosophy ofHegel and Feuerbach—82

Schaller, Julius (1807-1868)—pro-fessor of philosophy at HalleUniversity, Hegelian; critici-sed Feuerbach’s materialist phi-losophy—82

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Jo-seph (1775-1854)—outstandingGerman idealist philosopher,representative of German clas-sical philosophy; developed ide-as of Kant and Fichte; elabo-rated objective idealistic “Iden-titätsphilosophie” (“philosophyof identity”); became an offi-cial ideologist of the Prussianmonarchy toward the end ofhis career, propagated the re-ligious and mystical “Philoso-phie der Offenbarung” (philo-sophy of revelation)—236, 301,387, 492-493

Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott(1864-1937)—English philoso-pher, prominent representativeof pragmatism—398, 399, 445

Schinz, Max (b. 1864)—Privat-docent, professor of philosophyat Zurich University—58

Schleiermacher, Friedrich DanielErnst (1768-1834)—German the-ologlist and idealist philosopher,romanticist—345

Schmidt, Ferdinand Jakob (1860-1939)—German philosopherand pedagogue, professor atBerlin University, fideist, inregard to the theory of knowl-edge was close to the Marburgschool of neo-Kantianism andto the immanents—238

623NAME INDEX

Schmitt Eugen Heinrich (1851-1916)—author of Das Geheimnisder Hegelschen Dialektik, bele-uchtet vom konkretsinnlichenStandpunkte, which he submit-ted in a contest arranged bythe Hegelian Berlin Society ofPhilosophers; the work wasrecognised as outstanding butwas not awarded a prize be-cause of its “materialism andsensualism”; subsequently heturned to mysticism and gnos-ticism—239, 399

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860)—German idealist philos-opher, ideologist of Prussianjunkers; his voluntarist andmisanthropic philosophy provi-ded a source of German fascistideology—496

Schulze, (Änesidem) Gottlieb Ernst(1701-1833)—German idealistphilosopher, agnostic, Humean;sought to restore and modernisethe argumentation of ancientscepticism—296

Schulze, Johannes (1786-1869)—German educationalist, Hege-lian; edited The Phenomenologyof Mind for the posthumousedition of Hegel’s works—296

Schuppe, Wilhelm (1836-1913)—German philosopher, subjectiveidealist, headed the so-calledschool of immanence—399

Schwegler, Albert (1819-1857)—German theologian, philoso-pher, philologist and histori-an—359, 365, 369, 371-372

Segond, Joseph-Louis-Paul (1872-1954)—French idealist philoso-pher and psychologist, author ofseveral works on aesthetics—399

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (c. 4 B. C.-65 A. D.)—Roman philosopher,stoic, political figure, writer,Nero’s tutor—78

Seth, Andrew (1856-1931)—En-glish philosopher, professor at

Edinburgh, author of workson philosophy—238, 239, 240

Sertus Empiricus (2nd centuryA. D.)—ancient Greek physi-cian and sceptic philosopher,author of historical and philo-sophical works: PyrronischeHypolyposen and Adversus Ma-themeticos—250, 252, 255, 261,265, 272, 297, 298, 299

Shakespeare, William (1564-1616)—great English dramatist—31

Shehedrin (Saltykov-Shchedrin),Mikhail Yevgrafovich (1826-1889)—Russian satirist, revo-lutionary democrat—503

Shulyatikov, V. M. (1872-1912)—Russian literary critic, Bol-shevik; criticised idealism fromthe viewpoint of vulgar sociolo-gy, thus distorting Marxism—484, 486, 492, 494, 499, 500

Sierakowski, Zygmunt (1827-1863)—Polish revolutionarydemocrat, one of the leaders inthe rising of 1863 in Poland;executed by the tsarist govern-ment on June 15, 1863—508

Sismondi, Jean Charles LenardSimonde de (1773-1842)—Swisseconomist, petty-bourgeois crit-ic of capitalism—25

Smith, Adam (1723-1790)—En-glish economist, leading repre-sentative of classical bourgeoispolitical economy—25

Socrates (c. 469-399 B. C.)—ide-alist philosopher of ancientGreece, ideologist of slave-hold-ing aristocracy—146, 223, 272,273, 274, 451, 522

Spaventa, Bertrando (1817-1883)Italian idealist philosopher,leading representative of neo-Hegelianism in Italy, professorat Naples University—58, 239

Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903)—English bourgeois philosopherand sociologist, one of thefounders of positivism—45, 428

624 NAME INDEX

Speransky, Mikhail Mikhailovich(1772-1839)—Russian states-man; early in the rule of Ale-xander I drafted state reformsdesigned to introduce elementsof constitutional government,while retaining feudalism andautocracy in Russia; the draftwas rejected and he was exiled—552, 553

Spicker, Gideon (1840-1912)—Ger-man idealist philosopher, au-thor of several works on thehistory of philosophy—393

Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict) (1632-1677)—Dutch materialist phi-losopher, rationalist, atheist—41, 43, 44, 64, 67, 06, 106, 108,156, 167, 168, 236, 321, 360,377, 378, 387, 491

Stahl, Georg Ernst (1660-1734)—German chemist and physician,formulated the theory of phlo-giston, vitalist in his works onphysiology and medicine—438

Stakhevich, S. G. (1843-1918)—participated in the revolution-ary movement in Russia in thesixties; in 1863 was arrested,sentenced to penal servitudeand exiled to Siberia for life;author of reminiscences aboutN. G. Chernyshevsky, withwhom he spent several years inSiberia—506

Stein, Ludwig (1859-1930)—Ger-man sociologist and philosopher,member of the Academies ofSciences in Berlin and Geneva,editor of the magazine Archivfür Geschichte der Philosophie,author of works on the historyof philosophy—58

Stirling, James Hutchison (1820-1909)—English philosopher, found-er of English neo-Hegelianism;physician by education—239

Stirner, Max (1806-1856)—Ger-man idealist philosopher,Young Hegelian, one of the

ideologists of anarchism; hisbasic work is Der Einzige undsein Eigentum—452

Stobaeus, Joannes (c. 5th centuryA. D.)—Greek writer, compilerof writings by Greek authors—345

Strache, Hugo (1865-925)—Aus-trian chemist and engineer, au-thor of Die Einheit der Materie,des Weltäthers und der Natur-kräfte—58

Strauss, David Friedrich (1808-1874)—German theologian andidealist philosopher, Young He-gelian, author of the book Lifeof Jesus, a historical criticismof the gospels—44, 45

Sue, Eugène (1804-1857)—Frenchwriter, author of cheap senti-mental novels on socialthemes—31, 46, 47, 49

Suter, Heinrich (1848-1922)—Swiss professor of mathematics—396

Szeliga—pseudonym of FranzZychlinsky (1816-1900)—Prus-sian officer, Young Hegelian,participated in the publicationof B. Bauer’s works—30, 31

T

Taggart—see MacTaggartTaine, Hippolyte Adolphe (1828-

1893)—French literary and artcritic, historian and positivistphilosopher—420

Tarde, Gabriel (1843-1904)—Frenchsociologist, criminalist and psy-chologist; a founder of a psy-chological trend in sociology;voluntarist—452

Thales of Miletus (c. 624-547B. C.)—ancient Greek materi-alist philosopher; founder ofMiletian (Ionic) school—223,246

Thomson, Joseph John (1856-1940)—British physicist, mem-

625NAME INDEX

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ber of the London Royal So-ciety, of which he was Presi-dent from 1915 to 1920; heldmechanistic materialist philo-sophical views—57, 335

Tiedemann, Dietrich (1748-1803)—German historian ofphilosophy, professor at Mar-burg University, author of thesix-volume Geist der Spekulati-ven Philosophie, which servedHegel as a source in his courseof lectures on the history ofphilosophy—270

Timaeus (4th century-3rd centuryB. C.)—ancient Greek histori-an, author of works on thehistory of Sicily and Italy,which have come down to us infragments—302, 347, 349

Trendelenburg, Friedrtch Adolf(1802-1872)—German idealistphilosopher and logician, pro-fessor at Berlin University;critical of Hegel’s philosophy,particularly his dialectics—238

Turgenev, Ivan Sergeyevich (1818-1883)—Russian writer, liberal inhis political views—503, 504, 531

U

Uberweg, Friedrich (1826-1871)—German philosopher and psy-chologist, professor at Königs-berg University, author ofGrundriß der Geschichte der Phi-losophie—52, 256, 276

Uhde-Bernays, Hermann Hans (b.1873)—German philologist, au-thor of works on the historyof literature and art—395

Uspensky, Nikolai Vasilyevich(1837-1889)—Russian democrat icwriter—534

V

Van’t Hoff, Jacobus Hendricus(1852-1911)—Dutch chemist, a

founder of modern physicalchemistry and stereochemist-ry—435

Véra, Augusto (1813-1885)—Ita-lian philosopher, forerunner ofItalian Hegelians, translatedHegel’s works into Italian andFrench—240, 324

Verworn, Max (1863-1921)—Ger-man physiologist, founder ofthe magazine Zeitschrift für all-gemeine Physiologie, eclectic inphilosophy, close to Machism—329, 330

Vissarion—see Belinsky, Vissa-rion Grigoryevich

Volkmann, Paul (1856-c. 1938)—professor of theoretical physicsat Königsberg, author of Er-kenntnistheoretische Grundzügeder Naturwissenschaften..., ide-alist, eclectic—328, 335, 360

Voltaire, (François Marie Arouet)(1694-1778)—French philosoph-er and writer of 18th centuryEnlightenment; deist andhistorian, opponent of abso-lutism and Catholicism—42

Volynsky, A. L. (1863-1926)—Rus-sian reactionary critic, deca-dent, advocated the theory of“art for art’s sake”—520

De Vries, Hugo (1848-1935)—Dutch botanist, anti-Darwini-an, founder of reactionary pangen-esis and mutation theories—440

W

Waals, Johannes Diderik, van der(1837-1923)—Dutch physicist,professor at Amsterdam Uni-versity; known for his works onthe kinetic theory of gases—435

Wallace, William (1844-1897)—leading representative of Brit-ish Hegelians; translated He-gel’s Encyclopaedia of the Phi-losophical Sciences into En-glish—239

626 NAME INDEX

Willy, Rudolf (1855-1920)—Ger-man philosopher, follower ofAvenarius, subjective idealist—496

Windelband, Wilhelm (1848-1915)—German philosopher,neo-Kantian, prominent histor-ian of philosophy—239, 369

Wiassak, Rudolf (1865-1930)—Austrian physiologist—498

Wolff, Christian (1679-1754)—German idealist philosopher,metaphysician, popularised andvulgarised Leibnitz’ philoso-phy, teleologist—96, 208

Wundt, Wilhelm Max (1832-1920)—German psychologist,physiologist and idealist phi-losopher—321, 494-500

X

Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 580-470 B. C.)—ancient Greek phi-losopher and poet, founder ofthe Eleatic school—252

Xenophon (c. 430-355/4 B. C.)—ancient Greek historian, wasnot in sympathy with Atheniandemocracy, protagonist of aris-tocratic Sparta—274

Y

Yurkevich, P. D. (1827-1874)—professor of philosophy, ideal-ist and mystic; entered intopolemics with Chernyshevskyon philosophical questions—516, 320, 521

Z

Zart, A.—German physcist, au-thor of the book Bausteine desWeltalls. Atome und Molekü-le...—395

Zeno of Elea (5th century B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher ofthe Eleatic school, disciple ofParmenides—252, 254-259

—in philosophy of Leucippus,Democr i ts and Epicurus—263, 265, 292

B

Becoming—105-107, 273Being

—actual history as basis, foun-dation, being followed byconsciousness—263

—Being-for-other and Being-in-itself (for-itself)—108, 1131 1 4 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 6

—“Being and nature”, “think-ing and man”—82

—Being outside ourselves=in-dependent of thought—69

—correctness and aptness of terms“in itself” and “for itself”—202

—existent being as concrete,determinate be ing—qual i ty105, 106, 107

Bourgsoisie—see Marx and Engelson classes and class struggle

Bourgeois democracy (politicaltrend)—75

C

“Capital” by Karl Marx—178,180, 235—induction and deduction in—146

A

Absolute and relative—107Abstraction—199, 370

—role of in cognition—91, 9299-100, 171, 178, 195, 199

Activity of man—see PracticeActuality—157, 196, 218Agnosticism—71, 301, 323, 428,

434, 452, 459Anarchy—39Anthropological principle in phi-

losophy—82Appearance

—and contradiction—221, 223,357-358

—and essence—173, 252, 318, 359—and law—150-151—as moment of man’s knowl-

edge of nature—153—world of apppearances and

world in itself—153Aristotle

—criticism of Plato’s “ideas”by—281

—difference between idealismof Plato and of—280

—logic of—366—and materialism—280, 285,

288Atheism—69, 76Atomism

—and Hegel’s thesis on theunity of finite and infinite—112

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628 SUBJECT INDEX

—logic, dialectics and theoryof knowledge of materialismin—178-179, 317, 358-359

Capitalism—318—contradictions of—179, 358-

359Categories—365

—of logic—see Logic—of possible and contingent—

310—of thought—see Thought

Causality—162, 178, 187-188, 222,497—cause and effect as moments

of universal connection—159-161

—movement of the relation ofcausality = movement ofmatter and history—161

—small particle of universal,objectively real interconnec-tion—160

—and theory of knowledge—347Chernyshevsky, N. G.

—“anthropological principle”,narrowness of term in—82

—philosophical views and dem-ocratism—544

—Plekhanov’s book on Cher-nyshevsky, shortcomings of

—528, 544Classes and class struggle—see

Marx and Engels on classes andclass struggle

Cognition—categories of logic, as mo-

ments of—93, 198—as series of circles—245,

277-278, 360—as coincidence of notion and

objectivity—194-195—concept of law as stage of—150—dialectical, essence of—87,

158, 171, 178-179, 222, 357-361—general course, steps, and

stages in—93, 153, 158, 168,171, 182, 194-196, 205, 206,207, 277, 278, 316, 317

—intelligence and understand-ing in—82, 143

—logic, dialectics and theoryof knowledge of materialism317

—path of—171—practice, as test of—191, 201,

202, 211-214, 217, 218, 278,316-317, 318as reflection of nature—182

—relativity of all knowledgeand absolute content in—180

—and sensation—276-277, 284—senses, and relation to—71

See also Abstraction, Thought,Sensuous representation, Con-sciousness, Theory of Knowl-edge

Commodity—179, 317-318, 358Communism (theory)

—18th-century materialismand 19th-century Englishand French—44

—and French Revolution—40Concept—176-179, 316

—abstract and concrete—208359, 370

—“art of operating with” (En-gels)—251, 262

—coincidence with sum of sen-sations, senses—283

—dialectic and materialist rootsof—199

—and essence of dialectics—257-258

—formation of—146, 178, 196, 254—of genus and law—266—highest product of brain, high-

est product of matter—167—and identity of opposites—

110, 146—not immobile—225, 251—and law-governed character

of objective connection ofworld—146, 178, 196, 254

—mutual connection of—196—nature dialectically reflected

in—283—subjectivity and objectivity

of—208—universal flexibility of—110,

146

629SUBJECT INDEX

Concrete—138—cognising of—277—in multifarious relations—

138Connection—103, 106, 151, 161-

163, 178, 202, 222, 226-227,346, 347, 359—all-sided character of, and

its expression in causality—159

—concept of, and history ofhuman thought—347

—and infinite progress—112—necessary, objective nature

of—97—reciprocal dependence of all

notions—196—universal, cause and effect

as moments of—159-161—universality of, and reflec-

tion in concepts—146—of world, objective—150, 151,

178—and transitions—103, 180,

227, 359See also Causality

Consciousness—and being—263—reflection of objective world

in—171, 180, 183, 201, 202,212

—and relation to nature—188

—subjective, and objectivity—204

Content—96-97, 144—and form—222

Continuity—116, 256

D

Democrats and Liberals—544, 550Development—221, 253

—two conceptions of—267, 3 58—of human thought—245—principle of, and unity

of world—254—“self-movememit” and theory

of knowledge—357-358

—as struggle of opposites—357-358

—of thing and phenomenon in-to its opposite—357-358

See also MotionDialectics—357-361

—and ancient Greek philoso-phy—224

—application by Marx to poli-tical economy—178, 317, 358,359

—two definitions and two fea-tures of—251

—elements of—221-223—essence of—99, 109, 110, 223,

226, 227, 250-252, 258, 357-361

—and “eternal life”—200—and history of human thought,

science and technique—147—of ideas, as reflection of dia-

lectics of things—196, 253—and individual sciences—351—kernel of—223—and logic, and theory of

knowledge of materialism—317

—of notions, materialist rootsof—199, 251

—objective and subjective—187-188, 223, 253, 259

—and sophistry—107, 110, 358—splitting of a single whole

and cognition of its contra-dictory parts as essence of—357

—as theory of knowledge—317351, 357, 360

—of things themselves, of na-ture itself—111, 271

See also Hegel, Logic, Theory ofKnowledge

Dialectical Materialism—290, 361See also Dialectics; Marx, En-

gels, MarxismDifference (distinction)

—between being and essence,between notion and objecti-vity—198

—immanent emergence of—97

630 SUBJECT INDEX

E

Eclecticism—flexibility of concepts ap-

plied subjectively—110Egoism—65, 76-77Electrons—112, 292, 379, 431Ends

—of man engendered by objec-tive world—189

—of man, and relation to na-ture—187-189

Energy—66, 240Engels

—on “art of operating with con-cepts”—251, 262

—on Hegel—104, 108, 169,234

—on natural sciences—262See also Marx, Engels, Marx-

ismEther

—conjectures of the ancientsabout—250

Essence—134—and appearance—173, 251,

318, 359—and being, relativity of differ-

ence between—198, 251—essential and unessential—

130—and form—144—and law—152, 316—and semblance (show)—130

132-133—and universal, ancient Greek

philosophers on—267Evolution—253-254, 358Experience—180

—James’ theory of experi-ence”—445

—A. Rey’s definitions of—447, 448, 472

F

Fantasy—370, 371Feuerbach

— agnosticism, criticism of—71

—“anthropological principle,”narrowness of term in—82

—arguments against God—68—on atheism and moral ideal—

69—belief in God, causes of—

71, 75—“Egoism” and its significance,

views on—65—germs of historical materi-

alism—73, 76, 77—versus Hegel and idealism—

81, 123—idealism of, in 1836—377—lag behind Marx and Engels,

1848-1851—77—Marx and Engels on—29, 30,

35-36, 41, 45—materialism of—67, 70, 72

76, 77—nature—a republican, God—

a monarch—72—objective, views on—75—quality and sensation, views

on—327—religion, attitude towards—

63-83—1848 revolution, attitude to-

wards—63—“sensuousness,” views on—

64, 66, 69, 75—“socialism” of—77—on specuiation—78—theory of “the copy”—70

Finite and Infinite—definition of—110—infiniteness of matter—112—in mathematics—117, 118—as parts, stages of world—

107—unity of, and connection

between—112Force—see PhysicsForm

—and content—222—essential—144

Formal Logic—93, 97, 176, 1 7 7Freedom and necessity—162, 164,

181, 186, 189, 324, 359,382

631SUBJECT INDEX

—on knowledge as knowledgeof God—-171

—Logic—92, 97, 180, 192, 217,234

—Logic, picture of world—147—materialism, attitude to-

wards—263, 264, 275, 279,280, 289, 290, 291-293

—materialism, on pros of—294—“mechanism,” views on—185,

186—most obsolete and antiquated

in philosophy of history—312

—mysticism in—175, 177, 204,279, 316

—philosophical system, Marx’sand Engels’ attitude towards—104, 108, 141, 169, 178, 234,281, 316, 317, 339, 340

—on Plato—280—on practice and objectivity

of knowledge—211—and question of dialectical

transition from matter tomotion, from matter to con-sciousness—281

—real is rational, formula of—280

—on relations of thought to in-terests and impulses—90

—transition from logical ideato nature—234

—on transition of quantity intoquality—116, 117

Heraclitus—elements of materialism, ex-

position of—347, 352—a founder of dialectics—

344Historical materialism—see His-

tory; Marx, Engels, MarxismHistory

—as basis, foundation, beingfollowed by consciousness—263

—categories of the possible andcontingent—310

—criticism of Plekhanov’sviews on—528, 544

G

God, gods—belief in God. causes of—

71, 75—Feuerbach’s argument

against—68—Hegel, views on—70, 170,

171, 184, 293, 301—in the image of man—252

295Gradualness and leaps—123-124,

282, 358

H

Hegel—on Aristotle—280, 281, 282,

283, 284-286, 287-288—on causality in history—160—concepts (notions) in—114,

122, 153, 267, 283—on concept of force in phys-

ics—89, 145—criticism of Kant—91, 92,

116, 117, 120, 134, 168-170, 171-174, 179, 186, 192-194, 204-208, 208-209, 232-234

—on Democritus—280—dialectics in—155, 192, 196,

229, 234, 247, 316—dialectics of nature, guess

of—196—on Epicurus—289-295—formal logic, tribute to—177—on French Revolution—310, 311—germs of historical materi-

a l i sm—158, 189 , 306, 309—god, re l ig ion, mora l i ty ,

views on—148, 170. 171, 246,293, 301, 307, 310

—grain of truth in mysticalintegument of—141, 153, 155,190, 264

—idea as truth, approach to—191

—idealism—108, 168, 228, 276,279, 285, 286, 301, 307, 310,370

632 SUBJECT INDEX

Identity—134, 357Identity and unity—see Unity

and struggle of oppositesImagination—see Sensuous repre-

sentationInfinite and finite—see Finite and

Infinite

K

Kant and Kantianism—130, 170,171, 258, 270, 370and Cartesianism—383—category of modality in—120—and faith—100, 170, 171—Hegel’s criticism of— 91, 116

117, 120, 134, 168-170, 171-174, 179, 186, 192-194, 204-207, 208-209, 232-233

—and knowledge, restrictionof—100, 170, 171

—Marxist criticism of (early20th century)—179

—and metaphysics—109—Plekhanov’s criticism of—

179, 275—subjectivism and objectiv-

ism—134, 205-207, 225, 258—Thing-in-itself in Kant—91

92, 205, 207—and transition of categories—209—and universal law of dialec-

tics—210Knowledge—see Cognition

L

Language—as expression of universal—

272, 275—history of—89, 351—and thought—89

Law—151, 175—and appearance—150, 151—concept of, as stage of cog-

nition—150, 151—and concept of genus—266—and essence—152, 316

—criticism of Shulyatikov’sviews on—490, 500

—Hegel on causality in—160—and Hegel’s thought of ideal

passing into real—114—Marx and Engels’ criticism

of idealist views on—23-51—world history as a whole—309

History of philosophy—bourgeois philosophy of mod-

ern times—53—criticism of Shulyatikov’s

views on—486, 487, 489, 492,499, 500

—Greek philosophy—351, 360366, 486, 487, 492

—materialism versus idealismin—53, 71, 279-280

—spiral development of—245360, 361

—struggle of bourgeoisieagainst feudalism in—489

Humists—Marxist criticism of (early

20th century)—179

I

Ideal—passing into real, Hegel’s

thought of—114—and real, difference be-

tween—114Idealism—361

—and clerical obscurantism—361—on concept and idea—370—epistemological roots of—

361, 370—intelligent, and material-

ism—274—metaphysical materialism

and dialectical materialismon—361

—objective, and materialism—169, 276, 294

—versus materialism in historyof philosophy—53, 71, 279,280

See also Hegel

633SUBJECT INDEX

Marx and Engels on history ofphilosophy—Cartesian materialism—42

44—English materialism—43, 44—Feuerbach—29, 30, 35-36, 41

45—French materialism—41-44—Hegel—31, 34, 39, 41, 44,

45, 46-49—Lassalle’s The Philosophy of

Heraclitus—339, 352—metaphysics of 17th centu-

ry—41, 42, 43—materialism of 18th-century

and 19th-century English andFrench communism—44

—nominalism—43—Young Hegelians—23-51

Marx and Engels on classes andclass struggle—bourgeoisie—27—proletariat, historic mission

of—27-28Marx and Engels—economic doc-

trine—political economy—24, 26,

29, 30—political economy, applica-

tion of dialectics to—178, 317,358-359

—private property—24-28, 29,30

—production, mode of—45, 46—production, social relations

of—30—value—24, 25, 30—wages—24, 25

Marx and Engels on equality—29Marx and Engels—philosophical

doctrine—criterion of practice in theory

of knowledge—211—Hegel’s philosophical sys-

tem, attitude towards—104,108, 141, 169, 178, 234, 281,316, 317, 339, 340

—materialism and idealism,distinction between in En-gels and Feuerbach—67

—essential, reflection of—152—and modern physics—151—narrowness, incompleteness,

approximation of—151—objective world, reflection

of—180—as relation—153

Leaps—123, 124, 266, 282, 358Liberals—532, 544Life—201, 202Limit—110-111Logic—88, 94, 98, 318

—applied, science as—201—categories of, and human

practice—90, 190, 217—categories of, as moments of

cognition of nature by man—93, 94, 198

—definition of—92, 93, 103—and dialectics and theory of

knowledge of materialism—103, 175, 182, 192, 317

—and dialectics and theory ofknowledge of materialism inCapital—178, 317, 358, 359

—figures of—177—and history of thought—316—laws of, as reflections of

objective in human con-sciousness—180, 183, 208

—main content of—196

M

Machism—71, 132, 134, 153, 179,265, 270, 276, 417, 445, 474

Macrocosm and microcosm—conjectures of Pythagoreans

on—249MARX, ENGELS, MARXISMMarx and Engels on state—38-40Marx and Engels on Declaration

of Rights of Man and Citizen—40

Marx and Engels on history—36,45, 46, 312—ideas, role of in history—39—idealist views, criticism of—23-51—masses, role of—32-36, 39

634 SUBJECT INDEX

Measure—120-123Mechanists—430, 431, 442Mediation—103Metaphysics of 17th century—42,

43, 44Moment—147, 157, 200, 257, 271,

278, 317Monads—378, 379, 380Motion (movement)—133, 141,

257, 258, 493—dialectical—343—in logic of concepts—110, 255,

256, 257, 258, 343—and moment—147, 200, 257,

258—and principle of unity of

world—150, 151, 254—and representation of by

thought and sensation—257,258

—and self-movement—141, 143357, 358

—and time and space—255—as unity of contradictions—

141, 256, 343—universal, and change, idea

of—141See also Development

N

Natural sciences—71, 262, 316,325, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332,333, 335, 336, 360

Nature—182, 188—concrete and abstract—208—dialectics of—111—material—72—and the “mental”—90—moment and relation—208—necessity of—72, 73, 74—phenomenon and essence—

208—primary primordial being—6 7—and principle of unity of

world—150-151, 254Necessity

—and contingent—359-360—definition of—263

—progress, from Feuerbach tohistorical and dialectical ma-terialism—340

—socialism, Marx’s advanceto in The Holy Family—24

Marx and Engels on religion—24,37, 38, 39

Marx and Engels on socialism—36, 37

Bourgeoisie on Marx and Marx-ism—238, 388

Masses—see Marx and Engels onhistory

Mathematics—41, 42, 103, 328—and anthropological prin-

ciple—82—Cartesian—42, 44—French mater ia l i sm—41 -44—French mater ia l i sm, two

trends in—42—and idealism, distinction be-

tween in Engels and Feuer-bach—67

—versus idealism in history ofphilosophy—53, 71, 279, 280

—and knowledge of matter—171—Material and ideal—114—18th-century materialism

and 19th-century Englishand French communism—44

—mechanistic, metaphysical—42, 43, 44, 360

—and naturalism—82—Shulyatihov’s vulgarisation

of—489, 492, 500—and socialism—44—against theology and ideal-

ism—71See also Marx, Engels, Marx-

ism; FeuerbachMathematics—371

—differential and integral cal-culus—118, 207, 208

—infinite in—117-118Matter—159

—infiniteness of—112—and principle of unity of

world—150-151, 254

635SUBJECT INDEX

Plato—303-304Plekhanov

—book on Chernyshevsky, short-comings of—528, 544

—Kantianism, criticism of—179, 275

—philosophical works of—275—unity of opposites, views on—357

Political econony—316—political economy of bour-

geoisie—210See also Marx and Engels—

economic doctrinePositivism—323, 328, 472Practice—187-188, 202, 217, 218, 318

—and categories of logic—90,190, 217

—and cognition—216—as criterion of truth—191,

201, 202, 211-214, 217, 218,228, 278, 317

—and path of cognition—171—practice and theory of knowl-

edge in Marx—212—and transformation of world—

187-189, 212, 213, 214, 218Pragmatism—468, 474Private property—see Marx and

Engels—economic doctrineProgress—113Proletariat—see Marx and Engels

on classes and class strugglePythagorean philosophy—247-250

Q

Quality—and sensation—317—and transition into quanti-

ty—113, 222Quantity—113, 222

R

Real—Hegel’s thought of ideal pas-

sing into real—114Reason—see Thought

—and freedom—162—of nature—72, 73, 74—as universal in being—263,

383Negation—226, 227

—as moment of development—226, 227

—of negation—97, 222, 226227, 229

—and the positive—97, 226, 227Neo-empiricism—162Nominalism—43Notion—see ConceptNumber—117

O

Objective, objectivity—68—and concept—170, 194—of concepts—176, 178—Feuerbach, views on—75—and idea (cognition of man)—

170, 194—objective reality and time—228—and practical activities—

187-191—of semblance (show)—98—subjective, relation to—204, 248—and subjective, relativity of

difference between—98, 198—and thought—187-191

Opposites—see Unity and struggleof opposites

P

People—see Marx and Engels onhistory

Phenomenon—see AppearancePhenomenologism—270, 276Philistinism—136, 253Philosophy—29, 119, 147, 275,

360, 361, 365See also Dialectics; History of

philosophy; Marx and Engelson history of philosophy; Ma-terialism

Physics—151

636 SUBJECT INDEX

Reciprocal action—162Reciprocal dependence—see Con-

nectionReflection of nature in human

thought—171, 180, 182, 183,195, 201, 202, 212, 283See also Cognition

Religion—and abstraction—370—Feuerbach on—63-83—Hegel on—148, 170, 171,

246, 293, 301, 307, 310—Marx and Engels on—24, 37,

38, 39See also God, gods

S

Scepticism—and dialectics—296, 358—and doubt—296—in history of philosophy—43

116, 224—of Kant and Hume—205—philosophy of—295-300—and semblance—130, 132

Science—99, 201, 233, 357Self-movement—141, 143, 357-358

See also MotionSemblance—98, 130-133, 134Sensation

—and cognition—276, 277, 283, 284—and quality—317—and thought—517

Sensuousness, senses—66, 75, 272Sensuous representation—143, 178,

228Separate, particular, individual—

see UniversalShow—see SemblanceSocialism—24, 36, 37, 44Social relations of production—30Something—109-110Sophistry—107, 110, 146, 269-

272, 343, 358Speech (Word)—272State—see Marx and Engels on stateStruggle of opposites—see Unity

and struggle of opposites

Subjectivism, subjectivity, subjec -tive—150, 194, 195, 210—and concrete—232—and object—202, 203—objective, relation to—248

269—and objective, relativity of

difference between—98, 198—and objectivity—269

Substance—161

T

Technique—188Theory of Knowledge—88, 129,

182, 317, 347—and causality—347—and dialectics—317, 351, 357,

360—and individual sciences—351—and logic and dialectics—

175, 182, 192, 317See also Logic; Cognition

Thing-in-itself—in Kant—91, 92, 205, 207—Hegel on cognisability of—

173—and phenomenon—113, 150—and thing for others—109

Thought—228—categories of—91, 93, 254—and contradictions—144—interests and impulses, rela-

tion to—90—and language—89—and man—82—and movement—257—and nature—284—and physical qualities of

organism—517—progress of, from concrete to

abstract and from abstract topractice—171, 316, 317

—and word—272See also Consciousness

Time and space—70, 228, 255Transcendent—192Transition—103, 177, 180, 227,

281, 282, 359

637SUBJECT INDEX

Unity of the world, nature, move-ment, matter—150, 151, 254

Universal—359, 360—essence—267—and necessity—263, 383—and the parlicular—90, 176

177, 178, 199, 274, 275, 277359, 360

V

Value—30, 172, 178, 179, 317,318, 342

W

Wager—see Marx and Engels—economic doctrine

Word (Speech)—272World—103, 106, 107, 112, 150,

151, 153, 160, 178, 187-191,256, 349

Y

Young Hegelians—criticism of, by Marx and

Engels—23-51

Truth—190, 195—absolute and relative in—180—criterion of—191, 201-202,

211-214, 217, 219, 228, 278,316, 317

—path of cognising of—171201

—as process—201—realisation of—196—stages of—201

U

Unity and struggle of opposites—97, 98, 177, 221-223, 256, 278,342, 343, 357-360—and develment—357, 358—development of thing, phe-

nomenon into its opposite—260

—as essence of dialectics—109, 223, 357

—and imagination—143—mobility of contradictions—

109, 110, 143—and motion—141, 256, 342,

343—and nodal points of cogni-

tion—277, 278—thing (phenomenon) as sum

and unity of opposite—221-223, 357, 358

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A Note on the Transcription This digital edition of Lenin ... · A Note on the Transcription This digital edition of Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks, the whole of Volume 38 of the