A New US Defense Strategy for a New Era

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A New US Defense Strategy for a New Era:Military Superiority, Agility, and Efficiency

A Summary of the Findings of the Defense Advisory Committee

Sponsored by the Peter G. Peterson FoundationPrepared by Stimson

November 2012


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A New US De ense Strategy or a New Era:

Military Superiority, Agility, and E fciencyA Summary o the Findings o the De ense Advisory Committee

Sponsored by the Peter G. Peterson FoundationPrepared by Stimson

November 2012


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Copyright 2012

StimsonISBN: 978-1-939240-01-9

All rights reserved. No part o this publication may bereproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means

without prior written consent rom Stimson.

Stimson1111 19th Street, NW, 12 th Floor

Washington, DC 20036

elephone: 202.223.5956Fax: 202.238.9604www.stimson.org


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Executive Summary

Rapid and continuing changes in the international environment, weaknesses in the USeconomy, the worsening and unsustainable iscal outlook, and a better understandingo the comparative strengths and weaknesses o US-military capabilities create a needand an opportunity or the United States to rethink its de ense planning and budgets.

Internationally , threats to US interests are changing rapidly. he nations onepeer adversary, the USSR, was long ago replaced by Russia. hough neither riendnor oe, Russia is certainly more limited in capabilities and ambitions than itspredecessor. At the same time, a new power is emerging in East Asia. China, acountry with claims against many o its neighbors and whose long-term intentionsare uncertain, but which also has power ul economic and political interests inmaintaining cooperative relations with the US and other advanced nations. A ter10 years, the US is ending its involvement in long and bloody wars in the MiddleEast and South Asiawars that cost the nation more than 7,000 lives and trillions intreasure. Even so, the Middle East, North A rica, and South Asia remain unsettled,

with one sworn US adversary (Iran), civil con licts or unstable political situationsin many other nations, and the constant specter o terrorist attacks throughout theregion. Similarly unsettled situations characterize large swaths o A rica. Yet, a terIraq and A ghanistan, it is clearer today that these instabilities pose only indirectthreats to the United States, threats to be managed rather than resolved throughprotracted military involvement.

Fiscally , the struggles o the US and most o its allies include unprecedentedrequirements or reductions in government spending, including de ense spending.hese pressures are expressed most clearly in the sequester provision o the Budget

Control Act (BCA). I implemented at the start o 2013, the BCA would cut thede ense budget by 10 percent overnight. O more lasting signi icance, interest onthe nations projected long-term debt would crowd out investments that not only are needed to sustain the countrys superior military technologies, but, o at leastequal importance, are required i the US is to remain competitive in a rapidly evolving knowledge-based and technologically-advanced global economy.

he wars in A ghanistan, Iraq, and the several lesser con licts the United Stateshas ought since the end o the Cold War have clari ied the nations comparativemilitary strengths and weaknesses . he US has unsurpassed global lexibility,agility, and reach. Its joint and combined orces provide unprecedented intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR). Its air, naval, and ground orces


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4 | A New US De ense Strategy or a New Era

have the means to reach out promptly anywhere in the world and deliver power ulblows. hese same orces can sustain limited air and ground campaigns ar romhome, just as they can deliver military supplies to embattled allies or humanitariansupport to victims o disasters. No other nation will be able to match these capabilitiesor years to come. But US military power is not unlimited. he A ghan and Iraqwars demonstrated how di icult it is to stabilize distant nations, to provide security to their populations, and to acilitate e ective and honest governance. here may belimits, too, in the US ability to de end against unconventional weaponswhetherlethal biological or chemical agents, cyber-war are, or e orts to inter ere with the useo space or commercial or military purposeseither by governments or in the handso terrorists.

In view o these rapidly changing circumstances, the Peterson Foundation broughttogether a group o experienced, ormer military and civilian de ense o icials andexperts to discuss US de ense strategy over the course o a year. 1 his De ense Advisory Committee notes and endorses the changes already being taken by the Department o De ense to rebalance US orces toward an incrementally and proportionally greateremphasis on Asia and the Paci ic. hese include redeployments o naval orces and thegreater use o rotational deployments o ground and air orces in East Asia. However,we conclude that more ar-ranging changes should be implemented over time inUS de ense strategy and budgets. Our conclusions are ounded on 10 key operatingprinciples.

1. he US owes a huge debt to all those who have served in the nations wars,and particularly the men and women who have served repeatedly in Iraq andA ghanistan. We should ensure that they are provided superior medical care, aswell as the educational and vocational support necessary or success ul reentry intothe civilian economy.

2. he US should implement as a high priority long-standing proposals to utilizemanpower more e iciently, to re orm personnel compensation systems, and tostreamline the system used to acquire equipment, goods, and services.

3. he US should maintain space, air, and naval orces superior to those o any potential adversary.

4. he US should maintain robust and technologically advanced special operationsorces to counter terrorists and criminal enterprises, protect US citizens overseas,and or other contingencies.

5. Priority in research and development (R&D) budgets and additional unds shouldbe given to basic research and the pursuit o advanced military capabilities, with a

1 See page 9 or the membership o the De ense Advisory Committee. Independent statements by several members o the group are appended, beginning on page 63.


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Executive Summary | 5

particular emphasis on cyber-war are, space, de ense against biological weapons,and on many o the programs hidden rom view in classi ied portions o the budget.

6. he US should continue to exercise security leadership by working cooperatively with allies and riends to ensure their security, but should strive to ensure that thesenations contribute a proportionate share o the cost o these de ense preparations.

7. Over time, the US should shi t rom a mind-set that emphasizes static deploymentsoverseas, and instead rely on requent rotations o expeditionary orces home-based in the United States to exercise jointly with allies, to amiliarize themselveswith potential combat theaters, and to demonstrate US resolve and capabilities.Given the threat o war on the Korean Peninsula, however, and the uncertain utureo US-China relations, the US should maintain its currently planned ground, naval,

and air combat units in Japan and Korea, while it works to develop a more trustingrelationship with Chinese military and political leaders. he US also should retainthe smaller orces now planned to be based in Europe, until lingering uncertaintiesabout Russias intentions are resolved.

8. he US should strongly resist being drawn into protracted land wars, restricting itscombat deployments o ground orces to well-de ined and limited objectives.

9. he US should reduce the size o its nuclear orces as rapidly as possible, pre erably through a new treaty with Russia, and make commensurate reductions in planned

nuclear modernization programs.10. he US should de er additional deployments o Continental US missile de enses

until relevant technologies mature and seem assured o providing e ectivecapabilities, but continue to develop and deploy cooperative theater missile de ensesystems with partners in regions threatened by hostile states with short- and mid-range missiles.

ogether, these principles comprise a new de ense strategy, which takes advantage o theunmatched lexibility, agility, and reach o US air, naval, and ground orces to promote

US and allied interests in a rapidly changing international environment. We call thenew strategy Strategic Agility. We recommend that over time the US shi t to this new strategy, and away rom the more static mentality that has characterized the US posturesince the early 1950s. By implementing this new strategy, the US can protect its interestsand strengthen its global leadership in a wide range o possible budgetary scenarios.

he proposed strategy does not dictate a particular orce structure or modernizationprogram. Speci ic choices will depend on how much money is allocated to theDepartment o De ense, how much waste is reduced through implementation o thee iciency measures (mentioned in principle #2, above, and described in section V o

this paper), and on the politics o de ense decision-making within the Pentagon and inthe Congress. Obviously, the more that can be spent wisely on orces and modernization,the greater the hedges against an uncertain uture and the lower the risks to US interests.


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In the penultimate section o the paper, we illustrate a range o possibilities by examiningeight, 10-year budget scenarios. hese include our aggregate levels o spending: (i) anextrapolation o the budget proposed by President Obama or FY13 and beyond, whichcomplies with the requirements o the BCA (baseline); (ii) budgets that increasebaseline de ense spending by $230 billion over the next 10 years to match in lation;(iii) the 10-year budgets that would result i the sequester provision o the BCA wereimplemented, but its e ects distributed over the 10 years (roughly 10 percent below the baseline); and (iv) a budget envisioning a 15-percent cut rom the baseline overthe 10 years, which would con orm more closely to the size o the cut-backs in USde ense spending ollowing the end o the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Cold War.For each aggregate level o spending, we then illustrate possible reductions in orcesand modernization programs under two assumptions: (a) i $200 billion o the potential

nearly $1 trillion o e iciency savings were implemented, and (b) i $400 billion o thepotential were implemented.

he illustrative budgets show that by implementing the new strategy the US can de endand promote its interests with varying, but no more than moderate, risks in all thescenarios. hese scenarios also underscore the overriding importance o spendingde ense dollars more wisely, by implementing long-sought re orms in the ways theDepartment goes about its business.


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Foreword

he principal mission o our oundation is to promote solutions to our nationsundeniable and unsustainable long-term debts, which constitute a primary threat toour economic uture and economic security. he link between economic security andnational security is clear: Without a growing economy and a sustainable budget policy,we will not have the resources to adequately de end our nations interests at homeand abroad.

While securing America must always be a top priority, in these increasingly di iculttimes, policy makers must make some unusually tough choices i we are literally to getthe biggest de ense bang or the buck.

his makes it particularly important that de ense budget decisions be made in thecontext o a national security strategy that re lects todays threats and priorities, notyesterdays.

o help advance the discussion o de ense strategy in Washington, I asked Les Gelb,

President Emeritus o the Council on Foreign Relations and ormer Director o Policy Planning and Arms Control or International Security A airs at the Department o De ense, to suggest a balanced advisory group o ormer de ense and national security experts. Les also recommended Barry Blechman, a Distinguished Fellow at Stimson,which is devoted to national security studies, as project director.

I ind it very encouraging that such a diverse group o experts could achieve this levelo consensus on a de ense strategy in this new era.

We warmly thank them all or their good work, and we very much hope you will ind

their report help ul.

Peter G. PetersonChairman and CEOPeter G. Peterson Foundation


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Members o the De ense Advisory Committee

Barry M. Blechman, Chairman

Co-Founder and Distinguished Fellow Stimson

Gordon AdamsPro essor o International Relations,School o International Service, AmericanUniversity Distinguished Fellow, Stimson

Graham AllisonDouglas Dillon Pro essor o Government,Harvard Kennedy SchoolDirector, Bel er Center or Science andInternational A airs

Michael J. Bayer

President and CEODumbarton Strategies

General B.B. Bell , USA (Ret.)

Former Commander UNC / CFC / USFK,Republic o Korea

Richard K. BettsDirector, Saltzman Institute o War andPeace StudiesColumbia University

Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.ChairmanStimson

Members o the De ense Advisory Committee


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Ambassador Richard BurtManaging Director, McLarty AssociatesCo-Chairman, Global Zero

General James Cartwright , USMC (Ret.)Harold Brown Chair in De ense Policy StudiesCenter or Strategic and International Studies

Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman ,USA (Ret.)Senior CounselorUS Chamber o Commerce

Lieutenant General David A. Deptula,USAF (Ret.)Senior Military Scholar, Center or Character& Leadership DevelopmentUnited States Air Force Academy

Leslie H. GelbPresident Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations

Jessica T. MathewsPresidentCarnegie Endowment or International Peace

Admiral Bill Owens , USN (Ret.)Prometheus Partners Anne-Marie SlaughterBert G. Kerstetter 66 University Pro essor o Politics and International A airsPrinceton University


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Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Members o the De ense Advisory Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

II. US Interests and the Challenges Posed to Tem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

III. Moving oward a New De ense Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

IV. Priorities in US De ense Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

V. Getting More Bang or the Buck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

VI. Alternative Forces and Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

VIII. Individual Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

Project Sta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67


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I. Introduction

oday, the United States has the need and opportunity to reconsider its de ense strategy.he war in Iraq is over, the war in A ghanistan is winding down, al-Qaeda is greatly weakened, and the Cold War is an increasingly distant memory. here remain many unsettled civil and international con licts, particularly in the Middle East, SouthAsia, and A rica, but these seem more like problems to be managed than issues to beresolved through protracted military involvement. here also remain states hostile toUS interests, notably Iran and North Korea, but these nations have only limited military capabilities that can be addressed e ectively by the armed orces o the United Statesand its allies. Although new powers are emerging, especially China, which may threatenUS interests one day, they and the United States also share signi icant interests thatcould motivate diplomatic resolution o outstanding disputes, and cooperative relationsover the long term.

In short, the US now aces a less threatening international environment than it has sincethe early 1990s, enabling a review o US de ense planning. Lessons learned during recent

con licts about comparative US military strengths and weaknesses provide incentivesor a hard look at US de ense strategy, the orces necessary to implement it over thecoming decades, and the risks that accompany changes. Pressures on the ederal budgetstemming rom the nations iscal crisis add to the need to review military spending andde ense strategy.

o capitalize on this opportunity, the Peter G. Peterson Foundation empanelled us asits De ense Advisory Committee. Overall, we share a consensus about how the UnitedStates should proceed.

his report captures that consensus. It begins by examining US interests and thechallenges posed to them (Section II), and proposes a new strategy to de end thoseinterests in the emerging international environment (Section III). We then turn tothe priorities in US orces and modernization programs that are implied by the new strategy (Section IV), and describe ideas or reducing de ense costs through greatere iciency (Section V). We conclude by describing the changes in the de ense posturethat would be desirable at alternative budgetary and e iciency levels, along with therisks that might accompany such alterations in the military posture (Section VI). heinal section posits key observations that should be addressed by all those concernedwith US security and military capabilities.


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II. US Interests and the ChallengesPosed to Them

Americas interests encompass a wide range o issues, both domestic and global. Inconsidering de ense strategy, however, only a subset is important. Only some interestscan be protected or promoted through the use o military power; even ewer areimportant enough to warrant the shedding o American blood. When the Cold Warended and there was no longer a rival superpower threatening to escalate con lict into acatastrophic nuclear exchange, Americans saw lesser ultimate risk in the use o military orces. As a consequence, some Americans began to de ine interests worthy o riskingAmerican lives more broadly than be ore. Di erences over which interests are bothde endable with military power and worth ighting or have ueled much o the debateover American national security policy in the years since the Cold War.

Evaluating US interests using two categories highlights this distinction. he irst category are absolute or vital interests. hese are the interests thatin most circumstancesmost citizens would agree justi y military engagement. US de ense strategy should bedesigned with these interests in mind, and US orces should be adequate to ensure thatthese interests can be de ended with minimum risk. Other interests are conditional .he commitment o US armed orces to de end these interests will depend on a variety o actors, including: whether or not the nation is now, or recently has been, involvedelsewhere militarily; the willingness o other nations to join in the ight; and the speci icstakes in the situation in question.

In this section, we describe these vital and conditional interests, along with the potentialchallenges in the emerging international environment. Given the time required to

develop technologies and build military systems, it is essential to anticipate possiblechallenges to US interests at least 20 years in the uture. Furthermore, to pursue all o its goals and protect all o its interests, the United States must capitalize on all the toolso government and wield those tools in a more integrated way, not rely solely on themilitary. Yet integrating these tools to be most e ective in meeting challenges may havebearing on the military capabilities needed by the United States. hese are dauntingtasks, and such orecasts are more o ten blind-sided than not, making lexibility, agility,and the potential to be reconstituted valuable attributes o US military capabilities.


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US Interests and the Challenges Posed to Them | 17

Besides the use o cyber-war are by hostile governments, cyber-attacks could bestaged by individuals or terrorist groups. Where or when such terrorist threatsmight emerge is impossible to predict, but the potential damage may be widespread.

2. Protecting US allies from attack. he United States has committed itsel ormally in treaties to de end 34 nations rom attacksthe 28 members o NA O plusAustralia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, and hailand. Inaddition, American presidents have made verbal commitments to de end othernations, and have acted in ways that make clear those commitments are sincereand meaning ul. No one doubts the US commitment to de end Israel, or example,even though there is no ormal treaty between the two states. Every US presidentsince Franklin Roosevelt has reiterated commitments to de end Saudi Arabia, andthe US intervention to expel Saddam Husseins orces rom Kuwait in 1990-91 wasmotivated, in part, by concern that, unless stopped, Iraqs divisions would continueto the Saudi oil ields. he US also has a special relationship with aiwan, althoughthe legal status o the commitment is ambiguous.

In all cases, the US expects the nation to which it is committed to provide or itsown de ense to the degree possible, with the US (and other nations) coming to itsassistance when it is con ronted by superior orce. here is considerable controversy,however, about whether US allies are pulling their weight in these arrangements.his has been true particularly with regard to the European members o NA O,whose burden o de ense spending has declined rom 2.5 percent o their collectiveGDPs when the Cold War ended, to 1.6 percent in 2011.

Despite the decline in European military expenditures, NA O has undertakenadditional missions during the post-Cold War period. European members o NA O (and Canada) have long provided troops to keep the peace in Bosnia andKosovo, with a peak o 34,000. hey are providing 35,000 troops to help stabilizeA ghanistan and various orces to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Libya.Limitations on the Europeans capabilities were evident in both the latter situations,however, in part traceable to tight de ense budgets.

On the other hand, the primary threat that once motivated European de ensespending has declined sharply. Few think that Russia currently poses a seriousmilitary threat, though the Russian con lict with Georgia in 2008 gave pause toother bordering nations that have histories o con lict and continuing problemsdue to the presence o Russian minorities within their borders, such as Estonia.Moreover, some East European leaders remain concerned about the uture givenrecent bellicose statements by Russian o icials and recent increases in Russiande ense spending. Still, according to the World Bank, all o these countries havereduced the de ense share o their GNPs since 2008. As the economic slow-down inEurope and competing social programs make a reversal o de ense spending trendsunlikely, the East Europeans look to NA O and, particularly, to the United Statesor reassurance.


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For a new Russian military threat to emerge, it would require vast improvementsin Russias armed orces that, as demonstrated in the Georgia invasion, are arrom potent. Although Russia has increased its de ense spending somewhat, theamount o resources and degree o technological advances necessary to competewith Western capabilities make such a military resurgence unlikely or many years.Moreover, Moscow is also interested in developing the type o peace ul relationshipswith Europe that would encourage investment in Russia and access to Westerntechnologies. At this point, new military threats rom Russia appear unlikely in thenear- to mid-term.

Every US administration works hard to make its commitments credible to riendsand potential enemies. In addition to diplomacy, the US devotes considerable

resources to shaping military relationships in potential combat theaters. hiscommunicates to adversaries that US commitments are sincere, and thus dissuadesthem rom contemplating actions that might lead to con licts. For example, theUS has o ten stationed military orces in allied states, both as a symbol o itscommitment and as a trip-wire to ensure US orces would be involved in any con lict. An alternative means o shaping expectations is by rotating orces basedin the US through the potential combat theater to conduct exercises with riendsand allies, and to demonstrate US capabilities. hus, the US has long depended ondeployments o US air and naval orces, especially long-range bombers, aircra tcarriers, and amphibious Marine units to such regions as the Mediterranean andPersian Gul to make clear its ability to intervene quickly and power ully despite anabsence o permanent land bases in those regions.

a. In the near uture, rotational deployments to the Persian Gul remain importantgiven the bellicose stance o Iran, and the concerns o neighboring states.Looking to the more distant uture, the greater threats to US allies and riendsmay emerge in East Asia. he most salient threat is posed by North Korea toSouth Korea. Although the South Korean armed orces are ar superior to thoseo its neighbor, the military situation is complicated by the Norths ability to

in lict very high casualties on the Seoul area with conventional artillery and by North Koreas possession o a small number o nuclear weapons. Deterring waron the Peninsula is thus essential. Given the 62-year history o US commitmentto the de ense o South Korea, there should be no doubt that US armed orceswould become involved i there were serious con lict on the Peninsula. One USArmy brigade combat team (BC ) and two attack helicopter battalions werewithdrawn rom Korea during the George W. Bush Administration, reducingthe US presence in Korea to 28,500 US personnel. he upsurge in tensionsbetween North and South resulting rom two military encounters within thepast two years, as well as North Koreas continuing pursuit o nuclear weaponsand missiles and bellicose oreign policy posture, make it prudent to retainthese remaining orces, at least through the mid-term.


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b. In addition, as Chinas economic and military power grows, a continuing USmilitary presence in Japan and rotational deployments o naval, marine, and/or air units to the Western Paci ic may be important to reassure neighboring

states, and to encourage the peace ul resolution o Chinas di erences withsome o its neighbors. hese disputes, which sometimes have threatened toescalate into military con lict, stem rom disagreements over which nationowns certain islands in the South and East China seas, and the extent o eachcountrys maritime economic zone and resultant control o undersea resources,especially oil and gas reserves. One also could imagine circumstances leadingto an e ort by China to seize aiwan by orce, which would likely escalate toinvolve US military orces. his scenario increasingly appears unlikely giventhe islands tightening economic integration with the mainland. China remains

committed to the reuni ication o aiwan, but a peace ul resolution o the issueseems more likely now than reuni ication by orce.

c. Over the longer term, some observers are concerned that along with thegrowth o Chinas military capabilities, Chinese nationalism and assertivenessalso will increase. he concern is that China, eventually, will seek to drive USorces rom the region and dominate East Asia politically and economically.his possibility cannot be ruled out, particularly in view o Chinas advancesin military power, particularly in its space and cyber capabilities. However,China remains decades away rom attaining operational military capabilities

comparable to those o the US. I the US maintains its commitments andmilitary presence in East Asia, and devotes the resources necessary to keepits technological edge, this imbalance o military power will provide time orUS diplomatic strategy to pursue equitable and peace ul relations with China,building on our common economic interests.

3. Ensuring unimpeded access to the global commons. From the earliest days o independence, the US has been willing to ight to maintain reedom o the seas, aparticularly important interest with regard to the movement o energy resources. InJanuary 2012, or example, ollowing an Iranian threat, the US asserted it would nottolerate any attempt by Iran to close the entrance to the Persian Gul . Pirates, a ormo international criminal activity, also threaten reedom o the seas, especially in theArabian Sea and adjoining water. he US and many other nations have deployednaval and special operations orces to combat them. Control seems to have beengained over a similar problem that had been common in the waters adjoining theStrait o Malacca.

he US also maintains that all nations should be able to reely exploit resourcesunder the seabed in international waters. he Law o the Sea reaty established rulesto distinguish among territorial waters, national economic zones, and internationalwaters. One-hundred and sixty-six nations have rati ied the reaty, but not the US.he reaty provides a basis or resolving existing disputes that underlie current


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con licts in the South and East China seas. he US should encourage the diplomaticresolution o these disputes, and its military presence in the region providesencouragement along those lines. Similar con licts potentially could complicaterelations among Arctic nations and among countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.US rati ication o the Law o the Sea reaty would strengthen its ability to work orthe peace ul resolution o all these disputes.

he US also is devoting military resources to de end the use o outer space ormilitary and civilian purposes, another global commons that can be threatenedby nations, individuals, or groups. here is particular concern that Chinasdevelopment o counter-space capabilities might threaten US military advantages.he US is well aware o Chinas emphasis on such asymmetrical military tactics,

however, and there is no reason in principle why the US cannot compete e ectively in both the o ensive and de ensive components o space-war are.

Cyberspace is an increasingly raught commons, in which the De ense Departmentclearly has a role to play, along with civilian government agencies and privatecompanies in de ending electronic transmissions rom attacks by governments,individuals, or groups. Cyberspace is growing in importance because o thepossibilities it now makes real, including the ability to create physical e ects throughactions taken only in cyberspace, to say nothing o the sharing o in ormation.Recent reporting suggests the De ense Department also is already using cyberspace

or o ensive operations. here is little public in ormation available about the near-term impact o these operations and, clearly, their long-range consequences haveonly begun to be debated.

Conditional InterestsWhile one can oresee the emergence o challenges to conditional interests, predictingthe ones that will lead to the engagement o US military orces is impossible. Experienceshows the US should be cautious be ore becoming involved in these situations and

clearly limit its objectives. Nonetheless, one cannot rule out such contingencies and,there ore, the US should hedge against these possibilities by maintaining some relevantcapabilities and a basis or mobilizing greater orces. Determining the amount o suchinsurance is clearly a subjective matter and a major source o dispute over how muchthe US should spend or de ense.

4. Intervening in intra-state conflicts to enforce a governments responsibility to protect its own citizens from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, or graveand systematic war crimes. he history o past interventions suggests that the USshould be cautious be ore entering civil con licts and only do so with clear and

limited goalsand the discipline to stick to them. For example, the US sent military orces to Somalia in 1992-93 to acilitate the distribution o humanitarian aid. he


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mission was then trans ormed into an attempt to resolve the ongoing Somali civilwar, and ended poorly or US orces. Similar mission creep occurred in 1982-83, when the US sent military orces to Lebanon as peacekeepers, but eventually

took sides in the ongoing civil war. he resulting attacks on the US Embassy andMarine Corps barracks orced a hasty withdrawal. A happier outcome attendedUS participation in the NA O interventions into con licts among the states o theormer Yugoslavia, but the activities o US ground orces were tightly limited toavoid casualties, which also limited their e ectiveness. he US intervention intothe recent Libyan civil con lict was conducted primarily with air missions, andalso seems to have been success ul.

he US government has a variety o instruments to try and prevent humanitariancalamities in oreign nations, including, among other things, diplomacy, economicand political sanctions, covert operations, and a variety o military capabilities.Based on our historical experiences, it seems clear that the US should be hesitantto commit ground orces into these con licts. he circumstances must be quitepower ul to justi y intervention on the ground, and US authorities should have clearknowledge o the underlying issues, the key parties, and reasonable expectationsor the outcome. Even then, the possibility o unintended consequences shouldcause decision-makers to think twice be ore acting.

Decisions not to intervene in these kinds o situations are not without consequences,

o course. Many Americans regret the Clinton administrations re usal to interveneto stop the Rwandan genocide, or example, and there is controversy as to whetherthe US should continue to stand aside as the Syrian government kills thousandso its own citizens. I the situation is well understood, and i distinct and limitedgoals requiring relatively small increments o military power can be identi ied,then interventions can sometimes be justi ied. Serious questioning o the potentialconsequences is always required, however. Weighing US-humanitarian valuesagainst the potential military and political consequences o interventions into civilcon licts, to say nothing o its costs, presents di icult issues or any administration.Even so, it is evident that when such interventions are conducted, policymakersshould have clear and limited goals in mind and the discipline to stick to them.

5. Stabilizing governance in nations to avoid the emergence of new threats to USinterests, such as the establishment of terrorist groups. While neither operation wasmotivated initially by this goal, the severe problems aced by US orces in Iraq andA ghanistan make clear that this mission is perhaps the most di icult o all or USarmed orces. he US invaded A ghanistan to depose the aliban government andend the sanctuary it had provided or al-Qaeda. Although that goal was quickly accomplished, the mission evolved into establishing stable governance throughoutthe country so that conditions would not revert to those prior to the intervention.Similarly, whatever the reasons or the initial US decision to attack Iraq anddepose Saddam Hussein, the situation soon evolved into a civil con lict in which


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US orces attempted to establish a stable and democratic government capable o controlling the situation. he high cost in blood and treasure o these interventionsand their long duration should make uture administrations extremely reluctant toundertake these kinds o missions. Although similarly chaotic situations currently characterize parts o A rica (Sahel, Central A rica) and the Middle East (Syria,Yemen), US leaders clearly are reluctant to become involved on the ground in asigni icant way. he better course is to narrowly target speci ic adversaries thatmay be trying to take advantage o the situations, and rely primarily on specialoperations orces and air power or this purpose, pre erably within an agreed legalramework. We do not believe it would be prudent to intervene with large groundorces with the goal o re-establishing stable governing authorities.


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III. Moving Toward a New De ense Strategy

Since the end o the Second World War, the US has sought to prevent attacks on itsriends and allies by basing large military orces on their territory. As shown in igureIII-1 below, the US maintained roughly 400,000 military personnel in Europe and theWestern Paci ic or most o the period between the end o the Korean War in 1953and the end o the Cold War in 1991, three- ourths o which were based in Europe tocontain the USSR. With ew exceptions, these military personnel were accompaniedby their amilies, meaning that extensive in rastructures (housing, schools, etc.) wereconstructed, making clear the permanence o the US commitment.

Figure III-1. US Forces Deployed Abroad

Source: US Department o De ense Military Personnel Statistics 1953-2011

A ter the drawdown rom the war in Korea, the total number o troops deployed toEurope, Japan, and Korea ranged narrowly between 350,000 and 430,000 during thisperiod, regardless o other demands or US orces (depicted as other deployed orcesin the chart above). At the height o the Vietnam War in 1968, or example, 318,000US troops were still deployed in Europe. he Soviet military threat rose and ell; theUS economy boomed, shrank, and boomed again; Republicans and Democrats traded

dominance o the White House and the Congress. Regardless o these events, the USoverseas presence remained nearly constant.


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Overseas basing o US orces has both advantages and disadvantages. he placemento US troops (and their amilies) in harms way virtually guarantees US ul illmento its de ense commitments to allied nations, reassuring their governments andpresumably deterring nations believed to pose threats to them. he reassurance o suchtechnologically advanced nations as Japan and South Korea may have been important,moreover, in persuading those states to orego developing nuclear weapons, thusbolstering US e orts to stem proli eration. In the early years o the Cold War, when USorces did not nearly have the reach they have today, orward deployments also werean essential element o military readiness. With 22 Soviet divisions poised on the intra-German border, in the absence o orward deployments, it would have taken months tomove US ground orces and their equipment to Europe, and the ight would have beenover be ore signi icant US participation became possible. A similar situation existed on

the Korean Peninsula.

Forward deployments also saved money or the United States, as some governments,especially West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, o set some o the in rastructure andoperational costs o the deployed orcescosts the US would have had to pay i the orceswere based in the United States. (Although Germany no longer makes such payments,Japan and Korea continue to o set the costs o orces deployed on their territory.) Atthe same time, though, many would argue that the allies, reassured by the US- orwardmilitary presence, decided to reduce spending on their own de enses in avor o socialprograms. More importantly, the US presence abroad causes political problems. Whilereassuring to governments, a large-scale US military presence o ten causes resentmentsamong local populations, either because o the disruptions to civilian li e resultingrom military equipment, the misbehavior o some US servicemen, or simply localdesires or alternative uses o the land devoted to the US armed orces. hese types o issues continue to be problems, particularly in East Asia. More serious problems haveemerged in the Middle East. Radical Islamists maintain that the US military presence isan a ront to their religion, and use it to rally support to their causes and to underminegovernments riendly to the United States. As a result, all governments in the regionattempt to limit interactions between US servicemen and women and local populations,

and insist that any American presence be kept as discreet as possible.he US continues to cling to its overseas garrisons despite radical changes in theinternational environment and in the capabilities o US military orces. Eighty-thousand US troops remain stationed in Europe 20 years a ter the end o the Cold War,and another 70,000 military personnel are still based in Korea and Japan. At the sametime, contingencies in the Middle East have led to the deployment o additional orcesin Southwest Asia. Beginning with the 1991 intervention to liberate Kuwait rom Iraqioccupation, US orces in South Asia and the Middle East grew substantially, reaching apeak o about 250,000 in 2007, and now total approximately 100,000. he wars in Iraqand A ghanistan have already had direct costs o more than $1 trillion.


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Moving Toward a New De ense Strategy | 25

oday, the US and its allies no longer ace a signi icant threat in Europe. he war inIraq is over, the war in A ghanistan is drawing down, and other threats to US interestsin the Middle East are posed by nations with only limited military capabilities. Our

relationship with China in East Asia has not yet turned, and may never turn, into amilitary con rontation. Given these circumstances, we believe there is opportunity toreassure riends and deter potential adversaries abroad by taking more advantage o thelexibility, agility, and reach o US military orces.

US taxpayers have invested heavily in de ense capabilities or many years, particularly when compared to military spending by other nations. All told, the US accounted or44 percent o world-wide de ense spending during the 58 years shown on igure III-2below, and remains around that proportion today. he investment has paid substantialdividends. US military orces are now overwhelmingly superior to those o any potentialadversary, or combination o adversaries, and will likely remain so or years to come.

Figure III-2. World Military Expenditures

Source: Correlates o War and SIPRI Military Expenditures

Military superiority, however, does not translate into military omnipotence. he USarmed orces are extremely capable o some missions, but struggle to accomplishothers. In particular, space, air, naval, and special operations orces make it possible orthe US to reach virtually any spot on the globe in a timely manner. hese orces haveunprecedented lexibility, agility, reach, precision, and lethality, providing capabilitiesthat seemed like distant visions not many years ago. At the same time, US capabilitiesto ight unconventional wars on the ground, to de eat insurgencies, to stabilizegovernance, and to ensure security or societies in distant regions is limited, at best.his is not because o any de iciencies in, nor malpractices by, the US armed orces. he

task o imposing order, providing good governance, and inculcating democratic valuesin oreign, undeveloped societies riven by internal con licts is simply too hard a task,and not one or which military orces are particularly well-suited.


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Given the emerging international environment, the history o the United States recentinvolvements in the Middle East and South Asia (to say nothing o earlier experiencein Southeast Asia), and the comparative strengths and weaknesses o US military technologies, it seems clear that the US, over time, should shi t to a new de ense strategy,one built on the ollowing 10 operating principles.

1. The US owes a huge debt to all those who have served in the nations wars, and particularly to the men and women who have served repeatedly in Iraq and Afghanistan. he nation should ensure that these men and women are providedsuperior medical care, as well as the educational and vocational support necessary or success ul reentry into the civilian economy. Ful illing these obligations shouldbe the highest priority in decisions on US de ense spending.

2. The US should implement as a high priority long-standing proposals to utilizemanpower more efficiently; to reform personnel compensation systems; and tostreamline the system used to acquire equipment, goods, and services. he meansto achieve these greater e iciencies are described in Section V o this report.Inertia and vested interests have blocked implementation o these measures, despitetheir widespread support by experts. he United States long-term iscal challengeand its potential impact on the viability o any ambitious national security strategy,however, provide both the imperative and the potential political leverage to overrideopponents o greater e iciency.

3. The US should maintain space, air, and naval forces superior to those of any potential adversary. hese are the United States comparative advantage and, or the new de ense strategy to be e ective, they must remain capable o reaching any portiono the globe, penetrating enemy de enses, and carrying out the ull spectrum o combat missions. Other nations are pursuing means o countering the US ability topenetrate their territory, and the US should place a high priority on staying aheadin this competition.

4. The US should maintain robust and technologically advanced special operations

forces to counter terrorists and criminal enterprises, protect US citizens overseas, and for other contingencies. In particular, the US should rely primarily on its techno-logically advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities,airpower, and special operations orces to combat terrorist organizations. It shouldseek whenever possible to work cooperatively with governments upon whose ter-ritory the terror organizations might be based in carrying out such operations, butit should be prepared to conduct such operations unilaterally i they present a clearand present danger to this nation or its citizens. Special operations orces may beparticularly important to secure weapons o mass destruction in ailing states orduring civil con licts involving organizations hostile to the US.


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5. Priority in research and development (R&D) budgets, and additional funds, should be given to basic research and the pursuit of advanced military capabilities. In additionto shi ting unding rom advanced development to more basic research within the

De ense budget, accomplishing this change requires supporting the US science andtechnology base through civilian programs. Particular emphasis should be placedon cyber-war are. Ways to acilitate military support or the de ense o key civiliannetworks without compromising privacy and other concerns need to be addressed.De ense against biological weapons is another problem that should receive a highpriority. In addition, many o the so-called black programs hidden rom view in classi ied portions o the budget represent the more advanced US military capabilities and should be protected rom budgetary pressures.

6. The US should continue to exercise global leadership by working cooperatively withallies and friends to ensure their security, but should strive to ensure that thesenations contribute a proportionate share of the cost of these defense preparations.he possibility that a US ally might be threatened in a way that could lead tomajor ground war cannot be ruled out, even though no such contingency seemslikely in the 20-year time rame examined in this study. In thinking about suchcontingencies, the US should work actively with allies to identi y joint interests, to jointly plan how to deter and, i necessary, de eat the potential adversary, and toidenti y the speci ic contributions that would be made by each. US leaders shouldmake clear that allies are expected to make air and proportionate contributions

to their own de ense, rather than relying excessively on US capabilities. Commonplanning among allies can maximize their contributions through specializationand greater inter-operability. he US should jointly plan, train, and acilitatethe arming o allies or such contingencies, and provide such advanced military capabilities as nuclear deterrence, ISR, air and naval support, and logistics rom theoutset o the crisis.

he US also should be prepared to intervene on the ground, i necessary, to de endthreatened allies. his requires the US to maintain robust and capable groundorces that are sized and structured to deliver overwhelming capabilities or limitedperiods o time, but not ground orces sized and designed or long-term stabilizationor constabulary duties. I implemented, over time this principle could lead to aone-third reduction in US ground orces. Under such conditions, it is particularly important to care ully control the number o uni ormed personnel assigned tosta , overhead, and administrative jobs in order to maximize the number o peopleavailable or deployable combat units.


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7. The US should shift over time from a mind-set that emphasizes static deploymentsoverseas, relying instead on frequent rotations of expeditionary forces home-based inthe United States in order to exercise jointly with allies, to familiarize themselves with potential combat theaters, and to demonstrate US resolve and capabilities. Utilizinga basing structure consisting o a ew key logistical nodes and a network o moreaustere bases, US orces can deploy requently to troubled regionsboth throughregularly scheduled exercises and as necessitated by world eventsto work jointly with riendly nations. he De ense Department is already beginning to shi t inthis direction through the replacement o some Marine Corps units now basedon Okinawa with rotational deployments o Marine Corps units rom the US toAustralia and, perhaps, to US islands in the Paci ic. he great lexibility, agility,and reach o US orces make such a strategy eminently doable, eliminating the

complications associated with permanent bases and the resulting interactionsbetween US service personnel and oreign populations, particularly in Islamicnations.

Given the threat o war on the Korean Peninsula and the uncertain uture o US-China relations, however, the US should maintain currently planned ground,naval, and air combat units in Japan and Korea, while it works to develop a moretrusting relationship with Chinese military and political leaders. he US also shouldretain the smaller combat orces now planned to be based in Europe until lingeringuncertainties are resolved; reductions can be made in manpower, however, by streamlining the command structure in Europe.

8. The US should strongly resist being drawn into protracted land wars.US leaders shouldthink long and hard be ore committing US ground orces into contingencies thatmight lead to lengthy commitments o sizable scale, particularly when the goal isto stabilize ailing states or to unseat despotic rulers. At a minimum, the US shouldonly participate in such interventions when they have the active support o riendly states with a clear stake in the situation, such as neighbors o the troubled nation.Ground orce deployments may be necessary to ul ill commitments to allies, but

such deployments should be conducted only as part o joint operations to achievethe rapid de eat o the enemys orces and the equally rapid withdrawal o US orces,as was done in the irst Gul War. In all cases, when undertaking the deploymento ground orces with the potential to lead to protracted involvements, US politicaland military leaders should agree on clearly de ined and realistic objectives andhave a workable strategy or its implementation. Most importantly, political leadersshould maintain the discipline to adhere to these planning parameters and avoidgetting drawn into more ambitious and unrealistic goals.


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9. The US should reduce the size of its nuclear forces as rapidly as possible, preferably through a new treaty with Russia, and make commensurate reductions in planned nuclear modernization programs. he size o US strategic nuclear orces is driven

by perceived requirements to deter nuclear attacks on the US or its allies by Russia; no other nation has a comparable nuclear arsenal. Determining what isrequired or deterrence is subjective and uncertain. US nuclear planning remainsdominated by the Cold War assumption that deterrence requires an ability todestroy Russian strategic and conventional orces, and supporting war industries,with a high level o con idence. he number o weapons could be reduced i theperceived requirements or deterrence were assessed on the basis o contemporary international relationships, on current Russian economic and military capabilities,on the nature o Russian society, and/or by taking advantage o the greater accuracy

o modern weapons to cut back the redundancy in targeting. Some observers arguethat, in a crisis, deterrence also would depend on the relative size o the US andRussian arsenals. his view seems to carry political weight, as most presidentspre er to make nuclear reductions together with Moscow through arms controlagreements. Nevertheless, unilateral reductions should not be ruled out. I signi icant reductions were made in the size o US nuclear orces, it also would bepossible to reduce and delay the costly modernization program now planned orboth the nuclear in rastructure and or delivery systems.

10. The US should defer additional deployments of Continental US (CONUS) missile

defenses until relevant technologies mature and seem assured of providing effectivecapabilities, but continue to develop cooperative theater missile defense systems with partners in regions threatened by hostile states with short- and mid-range missiles. he technology required to intercept intercontinental range ballistic missilesis daunting, and the capabilities o the 30 interceptors now deployed to de endCONUS are questionable. More progress has been made in developing interceptorscapable o de ending limited areas rom shorter-range missiles. hese interceptorsare inter-netted with land-based and space-based radars into so-called theatersystems. An integrated system to de end US orces, Japan, and South Korea rom

North Korean missiles is operational in East Asia. A similar system to de end againstIranian missiles is being developed or Europe. he US and members o the Gul Cooperation Council are also planning a theater system to de end against limitedrange Iranian missiles. he theater systems have the advantage o necessitatingclose cooperation between the armed orces o the United States and local states,thus tightening ties among allies and providing the basis or closer cooperationon other matters. Given the contrast in the capabilities o theater and long-rangemissile de ense technologies, it seems evident that priority in deploying missilede enses should be given to theater systems. CONUS de enses should be deployedonly i necessary technologies mature to the point at which o icials are con identthey could provide meaning ul capabilities.


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aken together, these 10 principles constitute a new strategy, which we call StrategicAgility. We recommend that over time the US shi t to this new strategy rom the morestatic mentality that has characterized the US posture since the early 1950s. UnderStrategic Agility, the US would use its global reach to project orces abroad where andwhen they could most strongly a ect circumstances, and then return them to theirhome bases in the US to prepare or the next deployment. he US would rely on space,air, and naval orces, and on technically superior special operations orces, to interveneanywhere around the world quickly and e ectively. he US would preserve its groundorces to bring to bear overwhelming capabilities when necessary, while avoidinginvolvement in protracted land wars that would impede their ability to respondelsewhere. Special operations orces would continue to receive high priority as the eliteorce that can strike surgically anywhere in the world, at any time. US air orces would

continue to emphasize the global reach, penetrability, and precision strike that they have developed over the last 20 years, based primarily on sovereign US territory butable to deploy abroad at a moments notice. US naval orces would continue to projectpower around the world with only ew permanent acilities overseas, providing bothbacking or US oreign policy in peacetime and decisive strikes when required. USground orces would be scaled to provide a power ul punch when needed, withoutbecoming tied down as constabulary orces. he US would maintain key logisticalnodes, like Ramstein AFB in Germany, and a skeleton structure o austere bases in key regions, and deploy all relevant orce elements to them routinely, to exercise with the

orces o riends and allies, to amiliarize themselves with potential combat theaters,and to reassure allies o our continuing commitment and capabilities. Most overseasdeployments, however, would be temporary rotations, unaccompanied by amily, andthus not requiring the sustainment o large, costly in rastructures.

Obviously, any signi icant changes in US de ense strategy and military deploymentsshould be implemented gradually, accomplished in consultations with riends andallies, and their pace tailored to the low o world events.

he US is currently planning to withdraw two o the our Brigade Combat eams

(BC s) now deployed in Europe. Additional reductions in military personnelbased in Europe are possible through the streamlining o command structures, buttwo BC s should remain deployed there or now to provide reassurance to EastEuropean leaders that the US will continue to exercise security leadership on thecontinent. Further reassurance should be provided through rotational deploymentso US air and ground units to the existing structure o austere bases and ranges orexercises and joint operations. US orces and acilities in Europe also can be used tosupport rotational deployments to the Middle East.

US NA O allies should be encouraged to increase their de ense spending as their

economic situations permit but, in any case, to develop their de ense capabilitiesin a complementary way, with greater specialization among nations, larger stocks


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o key munitions, and more attention to inter-operability. he intervention inLibya demonstrated serious problems in the Europeans capabilities that could becorrected even with small budgets, i they planned more like a joint entity.

As US orces and the war draw down in A ghanistan, care should be taken to avoiddeveloping permanent acilities in the Middle East/South Asia. Any threats posedby Iran can be handled by US expeditionary orces. Friends in the region can bereassured by joint planning and requent rotational deployments or joint exercisesto demonstrate capabilities. Development o cooperative theater missile de ensesystems would be help ul or both military and political reasons, as well.

he transition to a more dynamic engagement strategy should proceed only slowly in East Asia, where ongoing risks o con lict in Korea and the seas bordering China,

as well as uncertainties concerning Chinas uture goals, risk misperceptions by riends and adversaries i reductions are made too hastily. Here, the replacemento the Marines now based in Okinawa with rotational deployments to Australiaand US Paci ic islands can proceed as planned. US orces now based in Korea andelsewhere in Japan, however, should not be reduced until progress is made towardresolution o ongoing con licts, and the US and China develop a more cooperativerelationship.

Strategic Agility is an evolutionary change in US de ense planning, continuingand enlarging departures already in motion, made possible both by the changinginternational environment and, importantly, by the unmatched capabilities o USmilitary orces. It represents the best means o ensuring US security as the De enseDepartment weathers the pressures certain to result rom the emerging iscal crisis.


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IV. Priorities in US De ense Choices

Implementation o Strategic Agility would provide guidance or priorities in USde ense budgetary decisions regardless o the level o unding provided to the De enseDepartment. O course, choices among orces and modernization programs would beless di icult the more e iciency re orms described in Section V could be implemented.We illustrate such choices at alternative budgetary levels in section VI o this paper. Inthis section, we discuss the priorities that are implied by the new strategy. he sectionis organized primarily by Service, but it should be noted that the individual Services donot ight Americas warsthey organize, train, and equip the orces. It is the combatantcommands that ight, using these orces. Jointness means that an array o capabilitiesis provided through Service or unctional components to a joint orce commander.His or her job is to assemble a plan rom among this menu o capabilities, applyingthe appropriate ones or the contingency at hand. he shi t to joint operations is arrom complete, however. In the uture, US de ense planning and command structurescould more closely integrate unctions and capabilities across service lines whilesimultaneously eliminating unneeded redundancies, yet still retain the separatenessand unique contributions o the Services. Adjustments to Service budgets in the utureshould be made with the intent to create synergies through greater interdependency.

he Navy is a key component o Strategic Agility. It can project orces ar rom USshores in a rotational, expeditionary manner without requiring permanent baseson other nations territory. he Navy thus provides lexible sur ace, air, and sub-sur ace orces without becoming entangled in con licts and political circumstanceson the ground. he Navy does use acilities maintained by oreign nations as anexpedient way to provide support or its ships, such as the arrangements now being worked out with Singapore, but they are not actually necessary to maintainthe Navys presence overseas. Port visits or re ueling and replenishing are use ul,however, as relationship-building and presence-establishing opportunities, just asthe new strategy envisions.

While Strategic Agility relies on naval orces, it o ers minimal guidance oruture choices within the Navy. he Navy operates under a three-tier readinesssystem, deploying some orces orward, resting and maintaining other orces, andreadying the remainder. he Navys current orce o aircra t carriers and large-deck amphibious ships should be preserved, although they should be emphasized as

plat orms or power projection and presence, and less as ighting orces themselves,as there is so little challenge to the Navy on the open seas. he exception tomaintaining the current orce is the aging Ticonderoga cruisers. he Navy has


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already proposed accelerating their retirement in the FY13 budget, and under thenew strategy urther retirements o this class should be implemented.

he Navy has pursued a modernization strategy that also aligns well with StrategicAgility, which emphasizes relying on more advanced technologies to preserve USmilitary dominance, even while saving money. he Navy already ields a orce thatwill be dominant in the near- to mid-term, without acing aging problems that coulddegrade its capability be ore uture investments come to ruition. his is especially true or strike aircra t, where the Navys current orce o F-18 Super Hornets willremain capable aircra t or the next decade or so, giving the Navy the time todevelop the FA-X or more distant threats. I necessitated by budgetary reductions,planned purchases o F-35s could be cut back or cancelled i the program continues

to experience development problems. he same is true or the Navys sur ace andsubmarine combatants. he DDG-51 missile-armed destroyers and Virginia-classsubmarines are dominant plat orms that will long outpace anything the rest o theworld could put to sea, easing the need or near-term replacements.

he Air Force has executed a wide array o missions in recent years, but its strengthlies in dominating the air and space domains. Strategic Agility takes advantage o this US dominance, and relies heavily on the great mobility and reach o the AirForce, and the US lead in space. he Air Force provides the capabilities to strikeand destroy targets, as well as to provide either military or humanitarian support,

anywhere in the world, on very short notice. he Air Force also is essential todeliver US ground orces to distant regions on short notice. Strategic Agility relieson airpower to provide unstoppable striking power to ensure a military optionregardless o the opposition.

Under the new strategy, the Air Force would resume a shi t to the expeditionary deployment model it began in the 1990s. On a pre-planned rotational basis, someorces would be deployed orward to conduct operations, exercises, and presencemissions; recently returned orces would be set aside or personnel training andequipment re its; while still others would be readying or deployment. Such a modelprovides presence and reassurance, while maintaining reserve units at a high levelo readiness, and yet still makes possible signi icant savings.

he Air Force maintains a worldwide network o bases, with a ew key nodes o signi icance like Ramstein Air Base in Germany. In recent years, the Air Forceestablished a network o more austere acilities in Eastern Europe and the MiddleEast to support temporary, rotational deployments. Under Strategic Agility, mostAir Force units would be home-based in the US and deploy routinely to theseoperational bases overseas. his basing structure and rotational deploymentswould make possible a continued high level o engagement with riends and allies,while also providing the means to surge orces and conduct operations or speci icperiods o time. Even single-seat ighters, supported by re ueling and cargo aircra t,


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he Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard provide key capabilities to hedgeagainst unexpected developments in the international environment. he largernumber o less capable ighter aircra t, like the F-16s, and additional li t and tankeraircra t should be maintained in these reserve components. his ensures that i theUS becomes involved unexpectedly in a protracted con lict, the country would stillbe prepared. hese capabilities would be a crucial complement to reserve groundorces, as well as providing a robust hedge or the unknown uture, at a lower costthan i they were maintained in the active orce.

Strategic bombers have proven use ul in supporting ground orces in the pastdecade, but since such protracted ground campaigns would be avoided underthe new strategy, planning or bombers should ocus on long-range strike, which

depends on their continuing ability to penetrate heavily de ended areas. Because o this re ocus, i budgetary pressures required cuts, older B-1 bombers, which havecarried the burden in the permissive environments o Iraq and A ghanistan, couldbe retired. he stealthy B-2 and a small number o B-52s could provide su icientlong-range striking power in the mid-term, while accelerated development andielding o the next-generation bomber is necessary to ensure that US long-rangestrike capabilities remain ahead o developments in air de enses.

In the past three decades, the US has developed an extremely e ective capability touse military orce in a surgical way through its Special Operations Forces . hese

orces are a critical part o Strategic Agility. hey have proven a viable alternativeto protracted land war, especially to counter the threat posed by small cells o terrorists, criminal enterprises, or other non-state actors. he new strategy rules outprotracted military operations that have proven ine ective at changing underlyingconditions on the ground, but it cannot discount the threats that ailed states andother local issues might incubate. here ore, Strategic Agility relies on the ability o special operations orces to deal with these threats a ter they have come intoexistence, but be ore they can harm the US, its citizens, or its allies. Un ortunately,e ective Special Operations Forces take a great deal o work to create and maintain,

and their commanders have emphasized that they cannot be simply expandedand replicated on a larger scale. Funding or Special Operations Forces would beprioritized under the new strategy regardless o budgetary constraints, but e ortsto expand the size o these orces would be tempered to ensure they remain elite.

It has become clear the United States is already involved in o ensive cyber-warfare ,although many still express concern about the de ensive preparedness o the USin cyberspace. Strategic Agility would prioritize both o these missions. O ensivecyber-operations provide the US another means to strike anywhere in the world,without maintaining the physical presence o troops on oreign lands. hese

missionsthough highly classi iedappear to o er real alternatives to physicalstrikes in mitigating the threats the United States aces in the 21st century. In turn,


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Priorities in US De ense Choices | 37

de ensive cyber operations become even more important as US military dominancedoes little to protect the United Statesespecially its civilian in rastructure romboth state and non-state actors in cyberspace. Clearly, both the private sector and

civilian government agencies have roles to play in de ending the nation againstcyber-attacks, which could have devastating consequences or the US economy.Under Strategic Agility, the military would have roles to play in both cyber-o enseand -de ense, which would receive high priority and greater resources.

he Marine Corps traditionally has ollowed an expeditionary model that also itswell with the proposed strategy. Requirements o the wars in Iraq and A ghanistanbroke this pattern, but the Marines are re ocusing on it as the wars draw down.Under the new strategy, the Marines would continue to serve as the nations ready ground combat orce. Along with particular Army units, such as the airborneReady Brigade, the Marines would constitute the nations leading componentor short-term operations, especially missions like non-combatant evacuations,which can require signi icant orces on landbut only or short periods o time.Ready Marine orces would be both deployed at sea as part o Amphibious Ready Groups and rotate through a skeleton structure o bases, as they have already begunto do in Australia and are rumored to begin on inian. he planned drawdowno Marines rom Okinawa would continue under the strategy, and gradually becompleted in consultation with the government o Japan. he Marines commandelements would be strictly based in CONUS in order to emphasize the out and back

nature o Strategic Agility. Structurally, the Marines are already well-suited to thenew strategy. he Marines operational and administrative command structuresare split and align with the concepts o ready orces deployed, contingent orcesprepping to deploy, and resting orces having returned rom deployment.

Current planning already calls or reducing Marine end-strength to 182,000 romits current level o 202,000. I necessitated by budgetary pressures, the Marinescould be reduced urther, perhaps to as ew as 150,000 personnel. At this level,the Corps could continue to exercise its expeditionary model, with roughly 50,000personnel in the deployed category at any one time. I orward-deployed orcesollow the model currently planned or the Australian deployments, that level o personnel would enable the Marines to maintain a rotational presence at dozens o locations throughout the world, including sea-based Marine Expeditionary Units.Even while maintaining orces at these orward-based locations, the Corps wouldbe su iciently large to maintain a ready orce to respond to contingencies and are itting orce to care or people and equipment. A cut o this magnitude would beaccomplished most e iciently by disestablishing one o the three Marine divisions,which would require legislative authority.

he new strategy provides clear guidance or trade-o s about uture MarineCorps equipment to emphasize leap-ahead technologies. Equipment purchasedto sustain the lengthy deployments o Marine orces to Iraq and A ghanistan, like


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Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs), could be mothballed. Per ormancerequirements or the Marines ollow-on to its current Amphibious Assault Vehiclecould be reduced, as the greater armor and irepower now envisioned is more suitedor sustained ground combat than the missions planned or the Marines under thenew strategy. For aircra t, planned purchases o V-22 Ospreys should be continuedas the aircra t provides greater mobility, especially in unopposed landings. he F-35short take-o and vertical landing (S OVL) aircra t in development may no longerbe required, and i budget reductions necessitate cuts, the Marines may want toorego acquiring this aircra t to ree resources to invest in the system a generationbeyond this manned aircra t, much as the Navy is doing.

he Army maintains a diverse range o capabilities that respond to many situations.

As the current Army Chie o Sta has said, Our Army is the Nations orce o decisive action, a relevant and highly e ective orce or a wide range o missions.he Army not only provides the orces that deter aggression worldwide, but alsohelps shape the uture environment through military-to-military contacts, andhelps our partners build the capacity to de end themselves. Not least amongthese capabilities is the Army National Guards State Partnership Program, whichhas cultivated relationships with partner militaries or years now, and in somecases, decades.

Under Strategic Agility, the Army would remain capable o many tasks, but its

ocus would be to provide the punching power to conduct a ground campaign o maneuver war are or speci ic and limited objectives. his mission its well withthe Armys long-time ocus on developing the structure, equipment, and doctrinenecessary to ight a decisive campaign. Even during the Cold War with the SovietUnion, especially in the early 1980s, the active Army was preparing or a violentbut limited engagement, rather than a protracted struggle. I the con lict could nothave been quickly and decisively concluded, the Army was intentionally structuredto require mobilization o the Reserve Components. During the past decade, theArmy has responded admirably to demands placed on it by the nations political

leadership by reorienting itsel or counterinsurgency and stability operations.hese kinds o operations are clearly di icult to constrain in time or space, and havecreated great stress on the Army as an institution and on the soldiers themselves.In contrast, the Army has excelled in recent decades in those limited, conventionalcon licts in which it has been able to bring its ull orce to bear, as in the openingweeks o the 2003 Iraq War, Desert Storm in 1990, and Panama in 1989.

Although the US would resist involvement in protracted ground wars underthe new strategy, the possibility o such contingencies cannot be ruled out. As aresult, preparing or con licts like the continuing war in A ghanistan would be

a secondary priority, though Army doctrine and training rom the past decadewould be preserved in Army schools. he primary responsibility or this mission


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would be assigned to the Reserve Components. Depending upon the overall sizeo the Army made possible in the budgetary environment (see Section VI), someactive Army elements could be given this role, as well. Moreover, planning or

protracted campaigns would allow or mobilization beyond the capabilities o theReserve Components, relying on expanding active orces through recruitment.Both options, however, require the time to mobilize, expand, and train a competentorce. Given the prospective international security environment, this is a reasonablerisk. In the event that the international environment began to deteriorate and riskso large-scale protracted ground war are re-emerged, the strategy would permitexpansion o the Army to meet these heightened risks.

In terms o orce structure, the new strategy would continue the Armys transitionto modular brigades as the basic combat unit. Army planning would emphasizeuse o these ewer units concurrently in limited operations, rather than their use asrotational replacements or one another in protracted con licts, as is currently thecase. Moreover, although it has transitioned to a brigade combat team-based orce,the Army still maintains division and corps level headquarters, as well as theater-level army headquarters. hese capabilities are necessary to execute protractedwars. Given the lesser emphasis on these contingencies under the new strategy,many o these headquarter units could be abolished. Instead, the Army wouldincrease its reliance on joint headquarters created under combatant commandersor speci ic operations.

By circumscribing contingencies in which ground orces would be committed,Strategic Agility would make possible signi icant reductions in Army orces i necessitated by budgetary pressures. In the initial phase o Operation Iraqi Freedom,only eight Army brigades and our Marine brigade-equivalents cut through muchlarger Iraqi orces and ended major combat in a matter o days. Although exactanalogies are di icult, todays Army provides even greater combat power with itsbrigade combat teams. he Obama administration has already stated it will nolonger size the Army to conduct long-term stability operations; it will reduce Army manpower by 13 percent; and it will cut some o the current 45 brigade combatteams, though a inal number has not been announced. I necessary because o budget constraints, under Strategic Agility the Army could be reduced to as ew as30 brigade combat teams and retain su icient capabilities or e ective maneuverwar are in oreseeable contingencies and the Armys many other tasks. Withreductions o this magnitude, however, it is imperative that remaining units arehighly trained, and ully manned and equipped. he country cannot a ord a returnto the Hollow Army that resulted rom the build-down ollowing the VietnamWar.

US nuclear forces play an important role in relations with allies, largely reassur-ing these nations o our capability to deter nuclear attacks on them. However, thenuclear arsenal is sized and structured primarily by perceived requirements to


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deter attacks on the US itsel . As Russian nuclear orces pose the greatest potentialthreat to the US, perceived requirements to deter a Russian attack dominates plan-ning or US nuclear orces. As Russian operational strategic orces are already wellbelow the limits established by the New S AR reaty, the US could accelerateimplementation o necessary US reductions to meet those restrictions as well.

Moreover, the operational orces permitted by New S AR , as well as the evenlarger number o nuclear warheads retained in a reserve status, appear to be morethan necessary to deter a Russian irst strike on this country. here ore, the UScan make deeper cuts in both operationally deployed and reserve strategic orces,as well as in shorter-range nuclear systems. Pre erably, these reductions wouldresult rom a new agreement with Russia, but the possibility o unilateral cuts in

excessive nuclear orces should not be ruled out i political circumstances permit.In terms o orce structure, under the new strategy the next-generation bomberwould not be given a nuclear mission, but would retain its high-end penetratingcapabilities or conventional strikes. (B-2s would continue to have a residualnuclear mission, as would a small number o B-52s.) A new look at deterrencerequirements also would make possible the retirement o some Minutemanintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), as well as a reduction in the numbero next-generation ballistic missile submarines. he latter would be particularly important to ease budgetary constraints, as the submarine modernization program

is currently estimated to cost as much as $90 billion. In the prospective internationalenvironment, 300 Minuteman ICBMs, a orce o 10 submarines, and a small numbero B-2 and B-52 bombers would provide more than enough capability to deter any nuclear strike on the US or its allies.

As has been noted, Strategic Agility would prioritize theater missile defenses overnational missile defenses , primarily because the ormer is demonstrating e ectivecapabilities against existing threats, while both the latters capability and the threatsit is supposed to de end against are proving more di icult to develop than had beenexpected. Under this approach, the US would continue to depend on the threat o devastating retaliation to deter attacks on CONUS, whether rom Russia, China, orany hostile nation with a newly developed capability to strike the US with nuclear-armed missiles. As a result, savings could be ound in the operation and advanceddevelopment o national missile de enses. Basic and applied research in relevanttechnologies would be continued until technological advancements convincingly promised greater capabilities than are characteristic o existing systems. Such anapproach might save one-hal o the more than $8 billion that the US spends onmissile de ense development each year.

he development and deployment o theater de enses would continue as a highpriority, including the Navys plans to modernize its leet o Aegis-equippeddestroyers. Land-based theater missile de enses should be provided a higher


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priority within the Armys port olio. In addition, the Army orce structure may need to be adjusted to more easily deploy Patriot and HAAD missile de ensesystems as stand-alone units, rather than as part o larger orces. Programs to

counter potential threats o terrorists armed with weapons o mass destruction,such as radiological and biological weapons, as well as to secure issile materials,also would receive a high priority.

With respect to the research and development (RDT&E) budget overall, thenew strategy would prioritize programs that prepare US orces or the uturethe science and technology components o broader research and developmente orts. As de ense programs have become more complex, unding that is requiredto bring soon-to-be- ielded systems to maturity has taken a larger and larger shareo RD &E budgets. Most notably, this unding is captured in Budget Activity 5,System Development and Demonstration, a phase that occurs a ter prototypingbut be ore ull production. O the $38 billion o RD &E not addressed previously,$15 billion is currently spent on this phase. Strategic Agility would place a lowerpriority on such near-term development e orts, permitting considerable savingsi budgetary constraints made such cuts desirable. Conversely, the new strategy would increase unding or science and technology development, and basic andapplied research. (It would also encourage civilian agency programs to promoterelevant technology development in the private sector.) Finally, black or classi iedprograms, we would presume, represent the true cutting edge o US military

technology. hese would receive a high priority under Strategic Agility as they keeppotential adversaries rom knowing easily how capable US orces are now or willbecome shortly, and provide a hedge against an uncertain uture.


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V. Getting More Bang or the Buck

Regardless o the de ense strategy the United States pursues, it should seek to get thegreatest possible return or its investment. It has been evident or decades that greatere iciency could be gained in de ense spending rom better business practices. heDe ense Business Board (DBB) in 2011, or example, determined that, substantialbudget cuts ( ive to 15 percent) can be achieved without a ecting uture missionreadiness i there is an intense ocus on reducing ov

Documents

A New US Defense Strategy for a New Era