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A New Era for Armoured Fighting Vehicles

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This article looks at the current trends in AFV procurement, with an emphasis on comparing the 'West' with the countries of East Asia.

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A New Era For Armoured Fighting VehiclesDefence spending levels and priorities may differ between Eastern and Western countries. But current trends in armoured fighting vehicle procurement suggest that in both regions, there is a move towards procuring lighter, more specialised vehicles that can support demand for agile and more mobile forces.

By Peter Antill and Jeremy Smith

A ChAllenger 2 MBT (lefT) wiTh A Polish leoPArd 2 TAnk

(Mod Crown CoPyrighT ssgT MArk nesBiT rlC)

If an Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) can be defined as “a combat vehicle, protected by strong armour and

generally armed with weapons, which combines operational mobility, tactical, offensive and defensive capabilities,”1 then as such, AFVs have been a feature of land warfare since the introduction of the chariot in around 2,000BC.2 The modern AFV first saw service on the Western Front in 1916 at the Battle of the Somme.3 Since then, they have become an important component in most major armed forces—a vital part in what’s known as the “combined arms team”. This article will look at current trends in modern AFV procurement, with particular emphasis on Europe, North America and Asia.

POLITICAL DRIVERSFor the West, the current strategic

environment is a huge change from the days of the Cold War. By the late 1980s,

the two alliance blocks led by the United States (NATO) and the Soviet Union (the Warsaw Pact) faced each other in Europe across the “Iron Curtain”.4 Even discounting nuclear weapons, any potential conflict would have been enormously destructive given the huge conventional arsenals both sides deployed, including tens of thousands of AFVs.

For example, in 1989 the British Army had three armoured divisions (1st, 3rd and 4th) with around 900 tanks (Chieftain and Challenger I) deployed in West Germany (with another 400 in storage), along with around 5,300 other AFVs including the Warrior and FV432. Immediately facing the British Army was the Soviet 3rd Shock Army with four tank divisions (one of five Soviet armies in East Germany), with around 1,300 T-80s and 1,200 BMP (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty) AFVs.5

With the end of the Cold War, there

was pressure to redirect public money towards other areas of government spending. With the lack of a single threat to focus on, there was a need to reorientate Western armed forces towards a more expeditionary focus, given that in the future, they would have to go to the conflict rather than the conflict come to them.

Apart from the war in the former Yugoslavia, recent campaigns undertaken by the British Army were mostly outside Europe. The two longest campaigns; those in Afghanistan and Iraq; saw Western military forces involved in intense counter-insurgency operations far from the home base.

This required them to not only alter the way operations were supported logistically, but also to upgrade existing vehicles and procure specialist vehicles more quickly than the normal acquisition cycle would allow. In many cases, these specialist vehicles were very

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different from those designed to fight a conventional war in Europe. Examples have included the Jackal, Mastiff and Ridgeback Mine Resistant Ambush Protected /Protected Patrol Vehicles (MRAP/PPV).6

In Asia, the situation is very different with a number of factors affecting AFV procurement:● Geostrategic Imperatives – At the centre of this lies the uncertainty as to where exactly the regional distribution of power will be in the coming years. To complicate matters, there is firstly the expanding power and ambition of China.7 Secondly, there is the United States, which since 2011 has refocused its strategic gaze on the region, partly as a result of Chinese moves.8

● Territorial and Border Disputes – The region is rife with territorial and border disputes, many of which go back decades. ● Protection of Offshore Territory or Installations – The geography of much of the region means that many states have territory, claim territory or have offshore installations (such as oil and natural gas) that are geographically separate from the mainland and require garrisons.● Regional Arms Race – The factors above have led to evidence of “action-reaction dynamics taking hold and influencing regional states’ military programmes.”9 This has led to increasing materiel proliferation as Asia-Pacific states seek to achieve parity with near neighbours.”10

● Criminal and Terrorist Activity – There is continued concern over the threat posed by piracy. While the guarding of shipping and interception of sea-borne criminals and terrorists is primarily the realm of naval and air forces, ground troops are still required to conduct boarding actions or amphibious operations against their bases.11

● Humanitarian Aid / Disaster Relief – Ground forces can prove invaluable in working with local officials and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to help distribute aid in country and in certain cases, re-establish law and order and provide local security.

ECONOMIC DRIVERSSince the end of the Cold War, defence

budgets in the West have been in decline, a trend exacerbated by the financial crisis of 2008, which sparked a serious economic recession. This forced many states in Europe and North America to cut government spending (including defence spending) in order to deal with budgetary deficits and sovereign debt problems.12 For example, the UK’s defence budget, as a percentage of GDP, has declined from 5.28% in 198513 to 2.4% in 2013.14 This however, seems to have stabilised, as the Chancellor gave a commitment in Budget 2015 to meeting the NATO 2% (of GDP) target in 2015 and then increasing it in real terms by 0.5% above inflation every year of this Parliament.15

Elsewhere, across Europe as a whole, defence spending has fallen as a percentage of GDP from 2.42% in 199516 to 1.45% in 201417, prompting calls from various US officials for Europeans to do more to meet NATO targets, the latest being US Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James during a visit to Brussels in June 2015.18 Meanwhile, the US defence budget has

‘see-sawed’, falling to 2.97% in 1999,19 rising to 4.88% in 2008,20 and then falling again to 3.37% in 2014.21

In contrast to what has happened in the West, the majority of Asian states have actually increased their spending on security and defence. The picture in Asia has seen defence spending rising steadily since 2000, a trend that continued even during the recent recession.22 While a significant proportion of defence spending goes on naval procurement,23 given the strategic geography of the region, ground forces and their associated equipment are still seen as an important part of a state’s armed forces.

POLICY IMPLICATIONSFor both regions, these include:

● Interoperability – For many Western countries, interoperability with US forces has always been important, especially with the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. But with the rebalancing of US strategic priorities towards the Pacific and the likelihood of increasing US combat power being

A foxhound lighT ProTeCTed VehiCle (Mod Crown CoPyrighT sergeAnT ross Tilly rAf)

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based in the region, it is now becoming an important consideration for Asian countries as well, along with their ability to operate with one another. ● Network-Centric Warfare – Information Technology (IT), high-speed data links and networking software link widely separate personnel, assets and combat units into integrated local- and area-wide networks. All those linked to the network can share critical information on a continuous basis in real time, which leads to improvements in both combat capability and efficiency.24

● Logistic Support – Any military force, as part of its overall capability needs to have an effective, sustainable and resilient logistic support system in place so it can carry out its operational tasks. This includes a supply chain anchored in the home base (linked to industry) but that is flexible enough to be projected across the sea using at-sea replenishment. An alternative to this would be to establish foreign basing rights.● Mobility and Flexibility – Ground forces that have traditionally relied on heavy equipment such as tanks and AFVs, are at a disadvantage. There are limits to how quickly and in what quantity these can be deployed away from the home base and such

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deployment is dependent upon having a suitable air and sea transport capability. For example, the C-17 Globemaster can carry one M1 Abrams MBT, three Strykers (or Boxer Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle) or six M1117 Armoured Security Vehicles.25

FORCE STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONSFor the West, economic and political

circumstances have led to a downsizing and reconfiguration of their armed forces. With most governments having “cut defence spending amid low threat perceptions and a focus on general budget consolidation after the 2008 financial crisis . . . the sense prevailed that Europe’s armed forces were more likely to be used in international crisis management missions than tasks related to national and collective defence. Related to this, most countries have concentrated on developing small, agile, professional and deployable armed forces.”26

This in turn led to a decline in the number of AFVs held in national fleets, especially tanks, but an increase in certain specialised vehicles, such as MRAP/PPV vehicles. For example, the British Army currently has 227 Challenger II MBTs27, while in 1997 it had 541 tanks (Chieftain, Challenger I and Challenger II).28 The United States

has seen a similar decline.The US Army currently operates 2,338 M1 Abrams MBTs (with around 3,500 in storage)29, while in 1997 it had 7,836 tanks (M1 Abrams and M60).30

The move towards procuring specialist vehicles that can be rapidly transported by air (if necessary) for states in both Asia and the West has meant the emphasis in vehicle fleets has moved towards agility, rather than higher levels of armoured protection. Light armoured vehicles (LAVs) have found increasing favour with many militaries. As NATO forces in Afghanistan discovered, such vehicles “not only provide highly flexible solutions for ground operations, they are less expensive to acquire and maintain than heavier armoured vehicles, making them more cost-effective and attractive to governments with pressing budgetary constraints to consider.”31

CURRENT AND FUTURE PROGRAMMES

The move towards lighter (usually wheeled) vehicles, especially in the amphibious vehicle market, can be seen in the proportion of the market such vehicles represent. Globally, out of a total military vehicle market worth $449 billion, the amphibious market is valued at around $63 billion, with Asia

M1A2 ABrAMs TAnks (us ArMy PhoTo By sTAff sgT. kenneTh uPsAll)

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accounting for around $26.8 billion. Of the global total, wheeled vehicles account for $30.8 billion (48%), whereas tracked vehicles only account for $23.4 billion (37%). Over the next 10 years, new production is forecast at $43.8 billion while modification and upgrading is forecast at $5.2 billion. But given that it’s cheaper to modify / upgrade existing vehicles when compared to building new vehicles, a better measure is the overall breakdown of production units, which in this case totals 19,407 new vehicles and 8,079 modified vehicles over the period. The only downside of this emphasis on wheeled (amphibious) vehicles is that they are not as suited to landing on a contested beach as their tracked brethren.32

CONCLUSIONAFV procurement varies widely

according to the political, economic and strategic circumstances of the individual country concerned. This article has attempted to highlight some general trends by focusing on two particular regions that are different in terms of the aforementioned circumstances. For the West, decades of preparing for a high-intensity conventional conflict came to an end in 1991 with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and USSR. Since then, AFV procurement has had to cope with declining budgets and force structures,

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changing operational requirements, the need to focus on force projection, as well as the need to upgrade legacy fleets and procure specialist vehicles in light of the campaigns that have been fought in the Middle East.

Such a change in emphasis is now being called into question with Russia having become “a fundamental test for Europe’s security architecture” and “Western governments struggling to recognise that the two-decade policy of courting Russia as a partner in building Euro-Atlantic security had failed”.33 Asia has seen steadily increasing levels of expenditure as the economies of the region have grown. The size of future AFV procurement budgets and how

they’ll be spent, depend on a number of complex, yet interdependent variables. These include geographic concerns, evolving foreign and defence policies, strategic considerations, international relations, territorial / border disputes as well as local, regional and global security concerns tied up with such activity as insurgencies, terrorism, as well as the trafficking of people and drugs. What complicates an already complex picture will be the interaction of the region’s major powers such as China, India, Japan and the United States. n

ABOUT THE AUTHORSPeter Antill and Jeremy Smith

work in the Centre for Defence Acquisition, part of Cranfield University, at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Peter is a research assistant while Jeremy is a lecturer and course director on the MSc Defence Acquisition Management. Peter graduated from Staffordshire University in 1993 with a BA (Hons) International Relations, followed by an MSc Strategic Studies from Aberystwyth in 1995 and a PGCE (Post-Compulsory Education) from Oxford Brookes in 2005. Jeremy spent 25 years as an army logistician and Ammunition Technical Officer. He served on the staff of the Quartermaster General and the Defence Logistics Organisation, managing support to a variety of weapon systems and developing through-life support policy. He left the army in 2008.

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A MAsTiff ArMoured VehiCle Being loAded onTo An rAf C17 (Mod Crown CoyrighT CPl dAniel wiePen)

sTrykers Being unloAded froM A rAilCAr (PhoTo By sTAff sgT. keiTh Anderson)

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FOOTNOTES1) Wikipedia. (2015) ‘Armoured fighting vehicle’ webpage, last updated 9 July 2015, located at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_fighting_vehicle, as of 9 July 2015.

2) Carney, R. (2012) The Chariot: A Weapon that Revolutionised Egyptian Warfare, May 2012, located at http://historymatters.appstate.edu/sites/historymatters.appstate.

edu/files/egyptchariots_000.pdf, as of 9 July 2015.

3) The History Channel. (2010) ‘Tanks introduced into warfare at the Somme’ on This Day in History: 15 September webpage, located at http://www.history.com/this-day-in-

history/tanks-introduced-into-warfare-at-the-somme, as of 10 July 2015.

4) A phrase coined by Winston Churchill during a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946.

5) International Institute of Strategic Studies. (IISS) (1989) The Military Balance 1989-1990, Brassey’s: London, Autumn 1989, p. 79; Johnson, A. (2001) Warsaw Pact Order

of Battle June 1989, updated 28 January 2001, located at http://www.societaitalianastoriamilitare.org/libri%20in%20regalo/2001%20JOHNSON%20Warsaw-Pact-Order-of-

Battle-June-1989.pdf, as of 20 July 2015.

6) Mine Resistant Ambush Protected / Protected Patrol Vehicle. See Antill, Peter D., Smith, Jeremy C. and Moore, David M. (2012) ‘UK AFV and PPV Procurement Using

Urgent Operational Requirements’ in RUSI Defence Systems, Volume 14, Issue 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 46 – 50.

7) See Branigan, T. (2013) ‘Airlines ‘Must Warn China’ of Flight Plans Over Disputed Islands’ in The Guardian, posted 25 November 2013, at http://www.theguardian.com/

world/2013/nov/25/china-air-defence-zone-japan-islands-diaoyu-senkaku, as of 20 July 2015; Lewis, P. and Ackerman, S. (2013) ‘US Calls on China to Rescind Air Defence

Zone to Avoid Japanese Confrontation’ in The Guardian, posted 3 December 2013 at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/us-china-rescind-air-defence-zone-

confrontation-japan, as of 20 July 2015.

8) Sutter, R. et al. (2013) Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability, August 2013, at http://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.

pdf, as of 21 July 2015.

9) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2013) The Military Balance 2013, Routledge: London, 14 March 2013, located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2013.7

56999, p. 245, as of 20 July 2015.10) Anderson, G. (2012) ‘Briefing: Asia-Pacific Emerging Markets – Growing and Evolving’ in Jane’s Defence Weekly, posted 3 July 2012

at www.janes.ihs.com, as of 21 July 2015.

11) Arthur, G. (2014) ‘Asian Ambition’ in Land Warfare International, Volume 5, Number 2 (April / May 2014), pp. 8-11, currently located at http://mags.shephardmedia.com//

LWI/2014/LWI_AprMay14_webmag42985/pubData/source/LWI_AprMay14_webmag.pdf, as of 16 July 2015.

12) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (IISS) (2013) ‘Chapter Four: Europe’ in The Military Balance 2013, 14 March 2013, Routledge: London, located at http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/04597222.2013.756999, pp. 59-66 and 92-94, as of 9 July 2015.

13) UK Public Spending Website. (2015) ‘Public Spending Details for 1985’ webpage, located at http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_year1985_0.html, as of 16 July 2015.

14) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2015) ‘Chapter Four: Europe’ in The Military Balance 2015, 10 February 2015, Routledge: London, located at http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996348, p. 147, as of 16 July 2015.

15) BBC News. (2015) ‘Budget 2015: UK to Meet NATO’s Defence Spending Target’ webpage, dated 8 July 2015, located at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33448383, as

of 16 July 2015.

16) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2006) ‘Europe’ in The Military Balance 2006, 26 April 2006, Routledge: London, located at http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/04597220600782820, p. 56, as of 16 July 2015.

17) Op Cit. IISS, 2015, p. 63.

18) Banks, M. (2015) ‘James: Allies Should Boost Defence Spending” webpage, on the Military Times website, dated 17 June 2015, located at http://www.militarytimes.com/

story/defense/policy-budget/2015/06/17/nato-spending-increase-russia-islamic-state-china-hackers-deborah-lee-james/28862565/, as of 17 July 2015.

19) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2006) ‘North America’ in The Military Balance 2006, 26 April 2006, Routledge: London, located at http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/04597220600782788, p. 17, as of 17 July 2015.

20) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2011) ‘Chapter Three: North America’ in The Military Balance 2011, 7 March 2011, Routledge: London, located at http://

dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2011.559834, p. 56, as of 17 July 2015.

21) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2015a) ‘Chapter Three: North America’ in The Military Balance 2015, 10 February 2015, Routledge: London, located at http://

dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996344, p. 35, as of 17 July 2015.

22) Hofbauer, J., Hermann, P. and Raghavan, S. (2012) Asian Defense Spending 2000-2011, October 2012, Center for Strategic & International Studies, currently located

at http://csis.org/files/publication/121005_Berteau_AsianDefenseSpending_Web.pdf, as of 20 July 2015; Op Cit. IISS, 2013, p. 249.

23) See Antill, P. and Young, S. (2013) ‘Powering Up Naval Procurement’ in Defence Procurement International, Winter 2013-14, pp. 28-35.

24) Folks II, Lt Col R. (2011) Network Centric Warfare in the Age of Cyberspace Operations, 22 May 2011, Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, PA, located at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=744280‎, as of 19 July 2015; Wikipedia. (2013) ‘Network Centric Warfare’ webpage, located at http://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare as of 21 July 2015.

25) Antill, P. (2014) ‘European Collaborative Procurement – The Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle Programme’ in Moore, D and Antill, P. (2014) Case Studies in Defence

Procurement and Logistics – Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge Academic Press, pp. 329 – 346.

26) Op Cit. IISS, 2015, p. 59.

27) Ibid. p. 149.

28) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1997) ‘Europe’ in The Military Balance 1997, 1 January 1997, Routledge: London, located at http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/04597229708460105, p. 70, as of 21 July 2015.

29) Op Cit. IISS,2015a, p. 42.

30) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1997a) ‘United States’ in The Military Balance 1997, 1 January 1997, Routledge: London, located at http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/04597229708460104, p. 19, as of 21 July 2015.

31) Apthorp, C. (2011) ‘Light Armoured Vehicle Procurement in Asia’ in Defence Review Asia, located at http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/133/Light-armoured-

vehicle-procurement-in-Asia, as of 19 July 2015.

32) Wasserbly, D. (2014) ‘IHS Jane’s Insight Report – March 2014’ in Defence Insight Reports, posted 17 March 2014 at www.janes.ihs.com as of 10 July 2015.

33) Op Cit. IISS, 2015, p. 57.