A Neutralization Plan for the Pacific Roosevelt and Anglo-American Cooperation 1934-1937

8/7/2019 A Neutralization Plan for the Pacific Roosevelt and Anglo-American Cooperation 1934-1937

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A Neutralization Plan for the Pacific: Roosevelt and Anglo-American Cooperation, 1934-1937Author(s): Richard A. HarrisonSource: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 47-72Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3639674 .

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A Neutralization Plan for the

Pacific: Roosevelt and Anglo-

American Cooperation, 1934-1937

RICHARD A. HARRISON

The author is a member of the history department at

Pomona College.

On November 16, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt sug-

gested to his Cabinet that most of the western Pacific might be

"neutralized" to maintain peace with Japan. The idea elicited

a long, negative memorandum from the State Departmentthat Roosevelt found infuriatingly "defeatist."l Yet neutrali-

zation continued to pique the President's interest until 1937,

when the Sino-Japanese conflict escalated into a major war.At most, historians have seen in this brief episode evi-

dence either of the administration's eagerness to "avert trou-

ble with Japan," of the President's disappointment with the

State Department, or of FDR's personal frustration because

he could come up with no solution to the crisis in the Far

East.2Following Harold Ickes's report that Roosevelt wanted

topromote "hemispheric neutrality"

at theupcoming

Pan-

American Conference, they have regarded his proposal for

the Pacific more as a hint of what the United States intended

to promote in Buenos Aires than as an initiative for Asia.

1. Roosevelt's original suggestion is recorded in Harold L. Ickes, TheSecretDiary ofHaroldIckes(2 vols., New York,1954),II, 7.For StateDepartment'sviews, see "DraftMemorandum... on the Neutralization of the Islands of the

Pacific," Feb. 16, 1937,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,1937(Washington,D.C.,

1954),III, 954-972.The President's reaction to that memorandum is FDR

to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, March 1, 1937,ibid.,973-974.2. See Dorothy Borg, The United Statesand the FarEastern Crisisof 1931-1938:

From the ManchurianIncident throughthe Initial Stagesof the UndeclaredSino-

JapaneseWar(Cambridge, Mass., 1964),252-253;James C. Thomson, Jr., "TheRole of the Department of State," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto,eds., Pearl Harbor as History:Japanese-AmericanRelations,1931-1941(New York,

1973), 99; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,1932-1945 (New York, 1979), 132, 138-139.

Pacific Historical Review ? 1988by the Pacific Coast Branch American Historical Association 47



48 Pacific Historical Review

These are plausible but incomplete analyses. Noting the

domestic preoccupation of the Roosevelt administration, the

increasingly "isolationist" political climate, and the patternof cautious noninvolvement found in diplomatic records,

analysts have tended to dismiss American foreign policy in

the 1930s as irrelevant, or even conducive to the success of

aggressors,3 characterizations that are contradicted by other

ideas FDR espoused in 1936 and 1937.4A close examination

of his personal diplomacy, which was sometimes kept secret

from the Department of State, reveals a President who

vigorously tried to assert American influence in the worldfrom his earliest months in office.

To keep the United States out of another war, Roosevelt

believed that war itself had to be prevented by the active

cooperation of governments devoted to peace. Joining the

League of Nations was out of the question, but FDR did

everything possible to align American policy in support of

the League when it tried to enforce collective security. More

important, from his inauguration until his death, Roosevelt

worked to create a partnership between the United States and

the United Kingdom that would deprive aggressors of the

successes that fed their ambition.

Rather than trying to establish a Pax Americana, the

President relied upon a relationship among "peace loving"

great powers, each of which was to assume its full share of

responsibilityto maintain order and

shepherdthe

peacefulevolution of the international system. The fulfillment of this

grand policy meant that London's propensity to "appease"

aggressors in ways that rewarded aggression had to be

checked; thus the thrust of Roosevelt's policy was to reassure

the National Government in London of America's sympa-thetic support. He was immensely handicapped by the politi-cal climate in the United States, which not only limited his

3. Dallek's Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, a prodigious attempt to

embrace the full scope of its subject, implicitly follows most earlier accounts in

discounting the importance of the early to mid-1930s.Arnold Offner, in Ameri-

can Appeasement: United StatesForeign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938 (Cambridge,Mass., 1969),concludes that American policy early in the decade encouragedNazi aggression.

4. For a discussion of FDR's activities in that period, see Richard A.

Harrison, "APresidential Demarche: Franklin D. Roosevelt's Personal Diplo-macy and Great Britain, 1936-1937,"DiplomaticHistory,V (1981),245-272.



Neutralization for the Pacific 49

freedom of action but also persuaded the British that, even if

Roosevelt was sincere, he would not be able to fulfill his

promises. FDR therefore worked hard to "educate"the Amer-ican people about the importance of cooperation with other

states in defending American national interests and principles.He also had to convince British leaders that Washington

was a useful partner. By 1933, Britons cherished a long list of

grievances against American foreign policy dating back at

least to the Paris Peace Conference. Even those in Whitehall

who did not hold grudges were understandably impressed by

the differences between their own and U.S. interests aroundthe world. Americans also saw those differences, and the

State Department conducted its affairs with all appropriate

regard for them. But Roosevelt's personal diplomacy concen-

trated on the overarching interest that the United States and

Great Britain shared: the protection of a world order which

served their needs and guarded their values.

The

many

obstacles to that

partnership shaped

FDR's

diplomacy. It was subtle-sometimes far too subtle-and grad-ual. Incremental approaches to Britain left the two govern-ments closer for the next approach; meanwhile, the American

people could be brought along, step by step. It was also

secretive; Roosevelt did not want to risk the domestic conse-

quences of too much public attention on world affairs. It was

comprised, therefore, less of sweeping departures than of

small initiatives. Although its full story is difficult to collect,since the record is scattered and fragmentary, it was a diplo-

macy of consistent objectives and persistent efforts.

The President's greatest concern was always the threat

posed by Nazi Germany. Yet America's direct interests in the

Pacific were more obvious to most citizens, whose worry"over the dangers of involvement with Japan weakened

Roosevelt's power to back European nations confronting the

Nazi menace."5 Similarly, British policymakers throughoutthe 1930s feared having to fight a war against both Germanyand Japan. Anglo-American relations during the pre-wardecade were beset by differences over how to deal with Japanand by mutual recriminations about the absence of coopera-tion. Some in London concluded that "Britain could have no

5. Frank Friedel, FD.R.: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973), 455.




firm policy in the Far East until the American attitude could

be determined."6 But others rejected a "firm policy" regard-

less of (or perhaps despairing of) Washington's position. Chan-cellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain, who had

immense influence in strategic planning, insisted that Brit-

ain's limited resources be spent defending the homeland,and even the less cautious members of the government tended

to agree. Some who blamed American policy for tensions

between Japan and the West concluded that London should

seek a rapprochement with Tokyo, "even at the risk of

offending the United States."7Roosevelt's "neutralization"proposal, especially if it is seen as a version of nonfortification,is best understood as an effort to keep London from sacrific-

ing Anglo-American relations in order to gain better Anglo-

Japanese relations.

Chamberlain regretted the end of the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance in 1922 and hoped for its renewal in some form,8 but

few of his colleagues were as certain about its benefits. Torn

by the competing demands of home defense and imperialdefense, wary of both Japan and the United States, theyavoided making choices. Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon

boasted that his "middle course" during the Manchurian

crisis had forced Washington to take the brunt of Japaneseresentment, but he did not brag about the effect on relations

with the United States. Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent

Undersecretaryof State at the

ForeignOffice, warned

againstrelying on the Americans, for "the U.S.A. will always disap-point us;... [they will] let us down or stab us in the back after

having thrust us forward to our cost." He wanted to keep

Japan "asfriendly, i.e., as nondangerous," as possible in order

6. Wm. Roger Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 (Oxford,

1971),189.7. See, for example, Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the

Committee on Imperial Defence, March 31, 1933,#1103 and memorandum bySir Francis Lindley, May 20, 1933, #1111, CAB 4/22, British Cabinet Papers,Public Records Office, London (hereaftercited at PRO); Brian Bond, ed., Chiefof Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall (2 vols., Hamden,

Conn., 1973), I, 45-47; Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars

(Oxford, 1980), 97, 195; and Bradford A. Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War,1937-1939:A Study in the Dilemma of British Decline (Stanford, Calif., 1973), 7-8,nn.

8. Cabinetminutes, 57(33),Oct. 26, 1933,CAB 23/77, minutes, Committeeon Imperial Defense, #261, Nov. 9, 1933,CAB 2/6, Cabinet Papers, PRO.




to meet the threat from Germany. In March 1934 the cabinet

spent a week discussing a possible bilateral political settle-

ment with Tokyo before Prime MinisterJ. Ramsay MacDonalddeclared the risk to Anglo-American relations too great. But

Chamberlain refused to be satisfied, and the issue was not

closed.9 The uncertainty of British policy could not escapenotice in the United States, where rumors of imminent Anglo-

Japanese agreements, plentiful from the beginning of the

Roosevelt administration, were bound to poison relations

with the National Government.10

Naval issues were often at the center of Anglo-Japanese-American affairs in the 1930s, and Roosevelt was especiallyalert to their potential for furthering cooperation with Brit-

ain. Under provisions of the Washington and London Naval

Treaties, a conference was scheduled in 1935, and Japan

clearly intended to renounce the ratio system, or quantitativelimits, imposed by those treaties and demand parity. Ameri-

can policymakers wanted the ratios maintained and sought

Whitehall's support. MacDonald and others in London were

sympathetic, but some British leaders branded American

interests "deadweight" and were prepared to denounce Amer-

ican policy in furtherance of rapprochement with Tokyo.1In a conversation with the American ambassador to

London, Robert W. Bingham, in February 1934, Roosevelt

insisted upon cooperation with the English in opposing

Japanese

demands. If

Tokyo proved unyielding,he was con-

fident that Britain and the United States could "absolutelycontrol the situation by giving the Japanese to understand

9. Cabinet minutes, 57(33), Oct. 26, 1933, CAB 23/77; 9(34), March 16,1934;10(34),March 19, 1934, /78; Cabinet conclusions, 77(34),March 15, 1934;

80(34),March 16,1934, CAB 24/248, CabinetPapers, PRO. Minute by Vansittarton Sir Ronald Lindsay to Sir Robert L. Craigie, Dec. 15, 1933, F.0.371,16612/A9235/252/45, PRO. Entry of March 25, 1934, Diary of Neville Chamberlain,NC2/23a, Neville Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham Library

(with permission of the University of Birmingham Library).10. See, for example, Hull to Ray Atherton, April 12, 1933, 741.9411/204A,

Decimal Files, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, National

Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereaftercited as NA).11. Moffat to Stanley K. Hornbeck, Dec. 15, 1933, 500.A15A5/16, RG 59,

NA. Atherton to Hull, Jan. 29, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 15-16.Admiral A.Ernle Chatfield to Vansittart,Jan. 23, 1934,F.0.371,17596/A1978/1939/45;min-ute by Vansittart,Feb. 9, 1934, /A2060/1938/45; Admiralty to FO, Feb. 10, 1934and minutes by Craigie, Feb. 15, 1934, /A1979/1938/45, PRO. Bond, ChiefofStaff,I, 35-36.




that every time they built one ship, we would build two."

Based upon that sort of partnership, he was eager to "engage

in wholly confidential contacts" with the National Govern-ment to explore possibilities of "united action" in case of war

"in Europe or elsewhere." Together, he thought, the two

democracies might be able to prevent war "or, failing in that,to localize its area."12

One day later, Roosevelt elaborated on that theme to

Dame Rachel Crowdy, an English official of the League of

Nations. Anticipating Japan's renunciation of the treaties,

FDR talked about offering to pay half the cost of completingthe Royal Navy base at Singapore and contributing to the

fortification of Hong Kong. Further, he wanted a concrete

bilateral agreement on naval parity with Great Britain, per-

haps providing for "exchangeable personnel on their ves-

sels."l3Whether and how these ideas of February 1934would

enter into substantive negotiations with London would

depend upon

Britain's attitude toward the naval

question,and that was in doubt.

The President's suggestion of a common front against

Japanese demands was dismissed by the Foreign Office as "a

little too naive and simplistic." And British policymakerswere no more enthusiastic about his ideas on how to preventor limit war. Clearly the National Government was not about

to enter into any agreement that might offend Japan during

the preliminary Anglo-American naval conversations of early1934.In fact, Americans and Britons tripped over one another

trying to ascribe the initiative for those talks to the other

side,14and their differences were made worse by the so-called

12. Entry of Feb. 20, 1934, Diary of Robert W. Bingham, vol. 1, 69-70,Robert W. Bingham Papers, Manuscripts Division, Libraryof Congress,Wash-

ington, D.C. (hereafter cited as LC).13. Wilmott Lewis to Geoffrey Dawson, Feb. 21, 1934, Wilmott Lewis

Papers,Archives of The Times,London.

14. R.W.A. Leeper to Lindsay, March 5, 1933,F.0.115/3405/510/1; memo-randum by MacDonald, March 5, 1934, F.0.371,17596/A1938/1938/45, PRO.

Bingham to Hull, March 5, 1934, 500.A15A5/29; March 8, 1934, /30 and /33,RG 59, NA Hull to Davis, March 28, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 35. Entryof March 2, 1934, Diary, vol. 1, 74, Bingham Papers. Davis to FDR, March 6,

1934, box 12, Norman H. Davis Papers, LC; and President's Secretary'sFile

(PSF): London Naval Conference, 1934, Presidential Papers of Franklin D.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereaftercited as

FDRL). Memorandum by MacDonald, March 5, 1934, CAB 29/149, Cabinet




Amau Doctrine of April 17, 1934, in which Japan claimed

Asia as an exclusive sphere of influence. This ultimately

prompted Whitehall's rejection of a united front with theUnited States in favor of a soft line designed to appease

Tokyo. The result was a marked cooling in Anglo-Americanrelations.15

Roosevelt regarded technical naval differences with

England as unimportant, so long as the two democracies

pledged to maintain parity between themselves and to respondin tandem to any Japanese naval increases. He wanted it

made clear to the world that the responsibility for scuttlingnaval disarmament was Japan's-and Japan's alone.16 Isolat-

ing nations that threatened the peace would permit Ameri-

can participation in collective security without joining the

League of Nations -another of the President's constant goals.And the idea was also part of Roosevelt's battle against isola-

tionism. His frequent suggestions of collective pledges to def-

inite

principles,which were

usuallyreceived

contemptuouslyin Whitehall because they entailed no specific commitments,were designed to identify beyond question what FDR called

the "bandit nations"; he hoped popular opinion at home

would support real cooperation with other states trying to

keep the peace. The failure of any of these proposed schemes,because of the aggression or the intransigence of the dictator

powers, would thus have the "negative advantage"of loosening

domestic restrictions on his administration's active role inworld affairs.17

Officially, the United States wanted navies reduced byone-fifth or, failing that, the renewal of existing treaties. But

these formal positions were aimed primarily at American

public opinion. Roosevelt's real purposes in the naval negoti-

Papers, PRO. Bingham to FDR, March 8, 1934,in EdgarB. Nixon, ed., FranklinD. Roosevelt and

Foreign Affairs(3 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1969),II, 17-18.

15. Bingham to FDR, April 23, 1934, Nixon, ed., FDR andForeignAffairs,II, 78-79;May 8, 1934,89;Hull to FDR, April 26, 1934, ibid.,82-83.Bingham to

Hull, April 24, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,III, 131-132;April 25, 1934,135-136;

April 30, 1934,164-165;May 7,1934, 165-171;Joseph C. Grew to Hull, April 26,1934, ibid.,141;memorandum by William Phillips, April 26, 1934, ibid.,142.

16. Memorandum by Davis, April 28, 1934,box 9, Davis Papers.17. FDR had considered putting Japan in the dock with just such a scheme

at the very beginning of his presidency. See Breckenridge Long to FDR, July17, 1933, Nixon, ed., FDR and Foreign Affairs, I, 318.




ations of 1934-1936 were to make clear the danger from

Japan and to cement U.S. cooperation with England,18 and

the finalagreement,

afterTokyo defiantly

left thenegotia-tions, conformed to the President's personal agenda.

At the time of the Amau Doctrine, however, prospects for

Anglo-American unity seemed remote because of what one

American called the "jerkiness of recent British policy." Am-

bassador Bingham reported that there was an "element" in

London that would rather abandon the naval talks than joinin confronting Japan. Even Norman H. Davis, the inveterate

Anglophile who represented FDR in the naval discussions,agreed that the British reaction to events in Asia warranted

caution and delay. Reluctantly, "in view of [Britain's] lack of

response" to American overtures, the President decided to

let the matter of cooperation against Japan "rest where it is."

That pleased Americans who preferred that the United States

go its own way. The technical differences with the British,which FDR weighed so lightly, led them to predict that in the

end England would turn to Japan.19Nevertheless, the two delegations parted in July with

what seemed to be an agreement that Japan was not entitled

to naval parity. Apparently decisive in Britain's coming to

that position was Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty,which banned increased fortification of most Pacific islands

west of Hawaii, except for Singapore, the Japanese home

islands, and the islands adjacent to Australia and New

Zealand. Article XIX had been included in the treaty overthe objections of American naval officers in order to compen-sate Japan for the ratios that limited the Imperial Navy.20In

18. FDR apparently let Davis know his thoughts, see Davis to Moffat,July4, 1934, vol. 5, Papers of J. Pierrepont Moffat, Harvard University Library(with the permission of Harvard University Library). Tom Jones to StanleyBaldwin, July 8, 1934, vol. 131, Baldwin of Bewdley Papers, Cambridge Uni-

versity Library.

19. Moffatto Hull, May3, 1934,500.A15A5/42;memorandumby Hornbeck,May 24, 1934, /159; memorandum by Moffat, May 8, 1934,500.A15A4General

Committee/914, RG 59, NA. Bingham to Davis, May 2, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 232-233;Hull to Davis, May 24, 1934, ibid.,238-239.Davis to Bingham,May 23, 1934, box 3, and Moffat to Davis, July 2, 1934, box 12, Davis Papers.Memorandum by Hornbeck and Noel H. Field, April 24, 1934;memorandum

by Hornbeck, Aug. 10, 1934,box 307;Oct.31, 1933,box 12, StanleyK. Hornbeck

Papers, Hoover Institution on War,Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif.20. Memorandum by Moffat, July 14, 1934, 711.41/275, RG 59, NA.

Bingham to Edward M. House, July 19, 1934, box 15, Edward M. House




1922, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had also

obtained a separate pledge from Tokyo that the islands held

by Japanunder a

Leagueof Nations

mandate,which con-

trolled the sea lanes between Hawaii and the Philippines,would be open to inspection by Americans. According to the

mandate these islands were not to be fortified; the Japanese-American agreement and Article XIX were additional guar-antees that the region would remain demilitarized.21

The United States regarded nonfortification and naval

ratios as inseparable, and in the spring of 1934 the British

seemed to agree that Japan could not continue to enjoy thebenefits of one if it insisted on eliminating the other.22 But

the very principle of nonfortification was already under a

cloud because Tokyo had constantly refused to allow inspec-tion of the mandated islands. American statesmen almost

inevitably concluded that the islands were being fortified for

sinister purposes,23which made the connection between Arti-

cle XIX and the naval ratios all the stronger.

When the British sent a trade mission to Manchukuo,Japan's puppet state in Manchuria, during the hiatus between

naval conversations, doubts about London's foreign policyand rumors of an Anglo-Japanese alliance circulated once

Papers,YaleUniversity Library(withpermission of the YaleUniversity Library).Davis to Hull, July 17, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 296;Hull to Davis, July 17,

1934, 296-297.Chatfield to Warren Fisher, July 16, 1934, vol. 131, Baldwin

Papers. For the negotiation of Article XIX, see Raymond Leslie Buell, TheWashingtonConference(New York, 1922), 163-171; Thomas H. Buckley, TheUnited States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville, Tenn., 1970),

90-103; Harold and Margaret Sprout, Towarda New Order of Sea Power: American

Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922 (Princeton, N.J., 1943), 164-180.

21. Borg, United States and Far Eastern Crisis, 235-236; Merlo J. Pusey,CharlesEvansHughes(2 vols., New York,1952),II, 449.

22. Borg, United States and Far Eastern Crisis, 242-243. Moffat to American

delegation, Nov. 17, 1934,box 307,Hornbeck Papers.23. Richard Dean Burns, "Inspecting the Mandates, 1919-1941,"Pacific

HistoricalReview,XXXVII (1968),450-455.Hornbeck to Grew,May 20, 1933,box184;memorandum by Hornbeck, June 26, 1934;Nov. 5, 1934;press conference

by Phillips, Nov. 5, 1934,box 293; Arthur Sweetser to Hornbeck, Nov. 16, 1934,box 405, Hornbeck Papers. FDR to ADM J. M. Reeves, Nov. 8, 1934, Nixon,ed., FDR and ForeignAffairs,II, 262. Memorandum by Davis, April 28, 1934,box 9, Davis Papers. Pusey, Hughes, II, 450-451; Borg, United Statesand Far Eastern

Crisis, 235-241, 252, 605-607; Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The

United StatesNavy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia, Mo., 1968), 82-88; Paul

B. Haigwood, "Japanand the Mandates,"in Wm. Roger Louis, ed., National

Security and International Trusteeship in the Pacific (Annapolis, Md., 1972), 97-109.




again.24No one in Washington was prepared to dismiss such

rumors too quickly, for Neville Chamberlain had returned to

the charge. At first he found little support in the cabinet, but

after the testy naval discussions with the Americans, he pro-

posed a nonaggression pact with Tokyo, exchanging a guar-antee that Japan would not be attacked from Singapore for

promises about the integrity of China and the protection of

British interests in Asia.

Chamberlain argued that the tacit agreement with the

United States to oppose parity for Japan had been a colossal

error,a "concession" for which

Washingtonhad offered noth-

ing in return. The Japanese, on the other hand, would be

"willing to pay a price" for an agreement with London, and

the price he expected was an end to their demand for naval

parity. That, he predicted, would lead directly to a new naval

treaty based on qualitative limits--separate limits upon each

class of naval vessel--which would permit Britain to increase

its fleet of cruisers, something the Americans had thus far

opposed. Chamberlain believed that if Japan regarded GreatBritain as its "special friend," it would be more considerate of

British concerns. When the Japanese foreign minister spokeof an Anglo-Japanese nonaggression pact in September, he

knew that Chamberlain was trying to persuade the National

Government to move in that direction.25

Some people in the State Department also doubted the

need for Anglo-American cooperation. While Roosevelt had

already decided that the United States could live with anincrease in Britain's cruiser strength, Secretary of State Cordell

Hull and most of his associates believed that reduction was

the sine qua non of any naval agreement. As naval conversa-

tions resumed in London, therefore, the distance between the

department and the President was real, although everyone in

24. Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Victor A. Wellesley, Aug. 10, 1934,add. mss.

51083,Cecil of Chelwood Papers,ManuscriptsDivision, BritishLibrary,London.Grew to Hull, Aug. 17, 1934,box 12, Hornbeck Papers. Davis to FDR, Aug. 20,1934,President'spersonal file (PPF): 33, FDR Papers. Atherton to Hull, Oct. 3,1934, 862.00/3434, RG 59, NA. Moffat to Davis, Aug. 22, 1934, box 41, Davis

Papers.25. Diary entries of April 20, 1934,Oct. 9, 1934, NC2/23a; memorandum

of Sept. 1934, NC8/19/1, Chamberlain Papers. Vansittart to Simon, Sept. 19,1934, vol. 109, Baldwin Papers. Cabinet Minutes, 32(34), Sept. 25, 1934, CAB

23/79, Cabinet Papers. Sir Robert H. Clive to Simon, Aug. 30, 1934, F..371,19803/F5303/591/23;Simon to Clive, Sept. 25, 1934, /F5808/591/23, PRO.




Washington worried most of all about an Anglo-Japaneserapprochement.26

WarningsfromAmbassadorSir Ronald Lindsayin

Wash-ington that there would be hell to pay if Britain tried toohard to make a deal with Tokyo produced enough caution

among members of the National Government to "frighten"Chamberlain,but it was not enough to stop the approachto

Japan.27At the same time, the Marquess of Lothian, whofloated around the circles of power in London, implicitlywarned influential Americans that only Washington'sfirm

guaranteeof British interestsin Asia would changethe direc-tion of Whitehall'spolicy. The President,who Lothianinvar-

iably managed to annoy, took pains to explain that Britain'sconcerns could best be satisfied through Anglo-Americancooperation,the "essenceof which,"he said, "wasagreementon political objectives rather than on technical questions."When that did not register in Whitehall,28Rooseveltcoupledhis conciliatory attitude on cruisers with a threat: if Britain

insisted on "play[ing]withJapan,"he waspreparedto appealdirectly to public opinion in the Dominions "in a definiteeffort to make [them] understand clearly that their future

security is linked with us in the United States."Hull consid-ered pulling the American delegates out of London beforeBritain andJapanmade a "politicaldicker... right under our

very eyes."Combined with indications thatJapanwould not

budge fromits demand for parity,the stiff Americanpositionshook the National Government.29Some new Britishstrategywasrequired.

26. Memorandum by Moffat, Sept. 11, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 305.Moffat to Davis, Sept. 18, 1934,box 41; unsigned minutes of meeting in Hull's

office, Sept. 26, 1934, box 35, Davis Papers. FDR to Nicholas Murray Butler,

Sept. 26, 1934, Nixon, ed., FDR andForeignAffairs,II, 222-223.27. Lindsayto Vansittart,Oct. 8, 1934,F..371,17603/A9942/12280/45, PRO.

Diary entries of Oct. 9, 17, 25, 1934, NC2/23a, Chamberlain Papers.28. Memorandum

byLothian, Oct. 11, 1934, GD 40/17, vol. 285, Lothian

Papers, Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh. Lindsay to Simon, Oct. 12, 1934,F..371,18184/F6784/591/23, PRO.

29. FDR to Davis, Nov. 9, 1934, Nixon, ed., FDR and ForeignAffairs,II,263; Davis to FDR, Nov. 6, 1934, 258-261. Memorandum by Moffat, Nov. 10,1934, 500.A15A5/249, RG 59, NA. Memorandum by Chamberlain and Simon,Oct. 16, 1934, C.P. 223(34), CAB 24/250; minutes, Oct. 29, 1934, NC(USA)5,Nov. 8, 1934;NCM(35)26,Nov. 15,1934;NC(USA)6, Nov. 12, 1934,CAB 29/149;Cabinet minutes, 39(34)2, Nov. 6, 1934, CAB 23/80; Cabinet memorandum,247(34),Nov. 7, 1934,CAB 24/251, Cabinet Papers. Davis to Hull, Oct. 25, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 312;Nov. 13, 1934,329-331.




It was embodied in another "middle course," based upon

qualitative limits, including a requirement that all plans for

naval construction be announcedin

advance, and continuingthe nonfortification provisions of Article XIX. Simon, who

authored the plan knowing it would be rejected by both

Tokyo and Washington, could hardly have been surprised bythe American refusal to "reward"Japan for denouncing the

treaty. The "middle course" did not confront the Japanesewith a choice between ratios and accepting full responsibilityfor wrecking naval disarmament. The United States held out

the prospect of closer trans-Atlantic cooperation, includingthe satisfaction of some of Britain's naval demands, but not if

Simon's "middle course" was London's last word.

Most members of the National Government were grad-

ually persuaded to go along with the Americans. Even Neville

Chamberlain, who by late November found Japan's obsession

with parity discouraging, went along. "Perhaps," he mused,the Americans' "more cordial attitude is due to their relief at

our not having come to any understanding with the Japs."Inpart, of course, he was right. But there was also some truth in

Ambassador Bingham's conclusion that once Washingtonforced the English to decide, they had to side with the United

States.30

The "middle course" was thus retired, but each of its

elements survived. While qualitative limitations would never

satisfy official American demands, Roosevelt was willing to

make allowances. The President himself advocated some sort

of "gentlemen's agreement" under which the three powerswould notify one another of future construction.31 The

"middle course" also made Americans such as Davis view

Article XIX less as a concession to Japan, and thus unreason-

able without ratios, than as a topic for negotiations, duringwhich some of the flaws in the current agreements could be

corrected. Andmilitary

leaders had come toregard

nonfort-

30. Minutes by Field, Nov. 14, 1934, ForeignRelations,1934,I, 334-350;Davis to Hull, Nov. 16, 1934, ibid.,351-352;Nov. 21, 1934,356-358,358-359;Hullto Davis, Nov. 17,1934,353-355.Minutes, NC(USA)7,Nov. 14, 1934;NC(USA)8,Nov. 23, 1934, CAB 29/149, Cabinet Papers. Atherton to Hull, Nov. 20, 1934,500.A15A5/291;Hull to Davis, Nov. 22, 1934, /280A, RG 59, NA. Diary entry ofNov. 24, 1934, NC2/23a, Chamberlain Papers. Bingham to House, Nov. 15,1934,box 15, House Papers.

31. FDR to Hull, Nov. 14, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 333-334.




ification mainly as a check on Japan, which was, after all, the

only power willing to bear the cost of fortifying the Pacific

region.32The naval conversations drifted on until the end of 1934,when Japan officially renounced the treaty, effective two

years later. This act, as Roosevelt wanted, placed the onus

squarely on Tokyo, although the State Department would

have preferred an earlier recess so that talks could resume

before the conference began. For that reason and others,

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., fumed

over what he believed was Hull's "undue sensitivity toJapanese opinion."33Some of Hull's subordinates sensed that

the negotiations had produced closer ties with England, but

Britons who resented the wedge the United States had driven

between London and Tokyo were simply waiting for another

chance to change course. As Davis pointed out, the pro-

Japanese group in the National Government would still "have

to be reckoned with."34

When Davis revealed the substance of the "middle course"proposal at a press conference, the British accused Hull

of trying to sabotage compromise, and Japan promptly an-

nounced it would discuss nothing without parity. Tensions

among the three powers were thus being heightened when

the Senate rejected Roosevelt's bid for the United States to

join the World Court, thereby emphasizing American isola-

tionism to the pro-Japanese group in London.35

Whitehall's desire for a qualitative naval agreement anda political settlement with Japan intensified as the situation

in Europe became critical in 1935. After Germany announced

32. Minutes by Field, Nov. 14,1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 335-336;Hullto Davis, Nov. 16, 1934, 351-352.Minutes of CID #266(2), Nov. 22, 1934, CAB

2/6, Cabinet Papers. Bond, ed., ChiefofStaff,I, 45-47.33. FDR to Davis, Dec. 7, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 390;Hull to Davis,

Dec. 8, 1934, ibid., 392-393. John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries

(3 vols., Boston, Mass. 1959),I, 205-206.34. Nancy Harvison Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers: Selections from the

Diplomatic Journals off. Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943 (Cambridge, Mass., 1956),122.Grew to Hull, Dec. 27, 1934, 500.A15A5/372;G-2 Report by LTC Cortlandt

Parker, Dec. 14, 1934, 711.41/290, RG 59, NA. Bond, ed., Chiefof Staff,I, 55-56.Clive to Simon, Jan. 7, 1935,C.P. 80(35),CAB 24/254, Cabinet Papers. Minutesof meeting of Jan. 8, 1935, Foreign Relations, 1935, I, 66.

35. Lindsayto Simon, Jan. 10, 1935and minutes, F.0.371,18731/A343/22/45,PRO. Grew to Hull, Jan. 21, 1935,ForeignRelations,1935,III, 12-13.Atherton to

Bingham, Feb. 5, 1935,Bingham Papers.




its rearmament plans in March, London negotiated, first, a

watery security pact with France and Italy at Stresa, and then

in June a naval agreement with Germany that licensed Ber-lin's violation of the Versailles Treaty.

Roosevelt, who took a dim view of the Anglo-German

agreement, considered more dramatic replies to the German

move.36 Since October he had pondered proposing a new

disarmament treaty with sanctions against violators. State

Department officers did not approve, but the President raised

the idea with Morgenthau in March, speaking now of a

"blockade" of Germany. He also thought the pact could beextended to Japan, which would be permitted to have a navy

equal to the United States Pacific Fleet, but not parity, and

could be blockaded if it refused to cooperate.37A disarmament or nonaggression pact "with teeth" was a

recurring theme in FDR's program to stifle aggression, but

he did not propose it, or anything like it, to London for

several months.Meanwhile,

heshaped

Americanpolicy

for

the upcoming naval conference in a way designed to reassure

the British. In particular, he was ready to allow Britain to add

to its cruiser strength, which Whitehall hoped to do under

qualitative limits.38 Still, England's advocacy of qualitativelimits, without quantitative limits if necessary, was too far

from formal American demands to suit the State Depart-ment. Even if Britain obtained its new cruisers, the depart-

ment would insist on keeping some ceiling on the overall sizeof navies.39 Moreover, England had opened bilateral discus-

sions with other European naval states, raising fears in Wash-

ington of having to confront a "European bloc" at the

conference. That Japan would insist upon parity before agree-

ing to anything else, and that France, in its bitterness over

36. FDR to Bingham, July 11, 1934, Nixon, ed., FDR andForeignAffairs,II, 554.

37. Phillips to Moffat, Oct. 22, 1934,ForeignRelations,1934,I, 170;Moffat toPhillips, Oct. 23, 1934,ibid.,170-172.Entryof March 18, 1935,manuscriptdiariesof Henry Morgenthau, Jr., book 3, FDRL.

38. FDR to Secretary of Navy Claude Swanson, July 20, 1935, Nixon,ed., FDR and ForeignAffairs,II, 573. Memorandum by Field, Aug. 7, 1935,500.A15A5/460, RG 59, NA.

39. Bingham to Hull, July 25, 1935,ForeignRelations,1935,I, 81-82.Memo-randum by Phillips, July 31, 1935, 500.A15A5/455;Atherton to Hull, Aug. 9,1935, /450; memorandum by James C. Dunn, July 26, 1935, 811.04418/76,RG

59, NA.




the Anglo-German naval treaty, would refuse to cooperatewith the British initiative-these only seemed to prove the

"unreality" of Whitehall's position.40Roosevelt tried to bridge the gap with gestures and initi-

atives in several areas. For example, he deputized Morgenthauto create a channel of communication with London, treasuryto treasury, aimed at an agreement on currency stabilization.

Statesmen in Whitehall finally recognized that the Presi-dent's interest in financial and economic questions depended

entirely on "their bearing on the maintenance of peace" and

that Morgenthau was much closer to FDR than Hull. But in1935 only Ambassador Lindsay seemed to understand thatthere was a "big fish moving at the bottom of the pond,"and that there might be some connection with the naval

conference.41

So long as quantitative limits on navies were not categor-

ically renounced, Roosevelt was prepared to find a joint

position with the

English.

With or withoutJapan's

adher-

ence, the United States was willing to sign a multilateral

agreement renewing as many provisions as possible of the

current treaties, including an updated version of Article

XIX. Since a bilateral pact was politically impossible, the

President favored a public exchange of notes with London

maintaining parity between themselves and reiterating their

joint opposition to parity for Japan.42 He waited for some

indication that British interest in trans-Atlantic cooperationwas sufficient to justify his plans.Britain's commitment to the League of Nations at the

beginning of the Italo-Ethiopian War compelled London to

40. Bingham to Hull, July 29, 1935,ForeignRelations,1935,I, 82-85;Hull to

Atherton, Aug. 14, 1935, ibid., 91-92; Atherton to Hull, Sept. 12, 1935, ibid.,110-112.Sir Samuel Hoare to Lindsay, July 29, 1935,NCM(35)60,CAB 29/149,Cabinet Papers. Atherton to Hull, Aug. 21, 1935, 500.A15A5/464; Aug. 27,

1935, /472; Sept. 12, 1935,/486; /487, RG 59, NA.41. Walter Runciman to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Feb. 8, 1937,

PREM 1/291, Prime Minister's Papers, PRO (hereafter cited as PM Papers).Memorandum by T. Kenneth Bewley, Feb. 23, 1937,T160/692/F15213;Lindsayto Vansittart, Aug. 8, 1935, /750/14239/1, Treasury Papers. Memorandum byDavis, Aug. 8, 1935,500.A15A5/459,RG 59, NA.

42. Memorandum by Field, Sept. 17,1935,ForeignRelations,1935,I, 112-113;Nov. 23, 1935, 144-49;Hull to Davis, Nov. 26, 1935, ibid.,150-156.Bingham to

Hull, Sept. 27,1935,500.A15A5/497;Oct. 1, 1935, /500; Memorandum by Field,Nov. 19, 1935, /564, RG 59, NA.




try to reduce the peril in Asia. Since Italy had forced the

issue, Japan's demand for parity could not be dismissed

peremptorily. Nor would there be any promises of specialagreements with the United States. Britons suspected a gen-eral American disinterest in the future of the Far East, which

meant the only sensible path for England was to achieve a

settlement with Japan, perhaps through a nonaggression pactthat might or might not include the United States. Although

they knew the Americans opposed the idea for three reasons-

because Japan could not be trusted to abide by its promises,

because to achieve such a pact would virtually require theabandonment of China, and because Japan's price would

almost certainly include dejure recognition of Manchukuo-

interest in such a pact was high among British statesmen

when the Naval Conference of 1935 got underway.43Events in Europe intervened. In December the govern-

ment was profoundly embarrassed by publication of the

Hoare-Laval plan, a scheme concocted secretly by the British

and French foreign ministers to end the Italian invasion of

Ethiopia by ceding to Mussolini more of the African countrythan he could have conquered. Discredited in its protestationof loyalty to the League and collective security, Whitehall

was once more very solicitous of American goodwill, mean-

ing that a British approach to Japan was impossible. London's

one concrete desideratum at the conference, aside from its

technicalproposals,

was for the renewal of Article XIX. In

general, the government had decided that staying in touch

with Washington was wiser than seeking Japan's cooperation.44After the Japanese left the conference in mid-January,

empty-handed as he had intended, Roosevelt proposed his

"gentlemen's agreement" on future construction. More impor-tant, he also directed the drafting of the "incidental notes" to

be exchanged by Washington and London after the treaty

was signed. The greatest resistance to that device came not

43. Minutes by Craigie, Oct. 5, 1935, F.0.371,18739/A8599/22/45; notesof Nov. 5, 1935, F..371,18741/A9338/22/45; minutes of Nov. 7, 1935 on mem-orandum by P.H. Gore-Booth, Oct. 12, 1935, F.0.371,18760/A8993/53/45;memorandum by Gore-Booth, Dec. 18, 1935, F.0.371,9803/A88/4/45; Clive to

Hoare, Dec. 17, 1935, F.0.371,18744/A10617/22/45; Dec. 21, 1935; F.O. 371,

19804/A400/4/45, PRO.44. Phillips to FDR, Dec. 20, 1935,Nixon, ed., FDR andForeignAffairs,III,

134.Cabinet conclusions 238(35),Dec. 17, 1935,CAB 24/257,Cabinet Papers.




from Whitehall but from Hull, who feared that the notes

might provoke Japan. In spite of the long-standing official

American insistence upon reductions in naval forces, thetreaty of 1936 was based entirely on qualitative limits. This

departure from what had been America's minimum demands,and even more the "informal" pledges to maintain naval

parity, showed clearly that a united front with England was

what Roosevelt really wanted.45

The Naval Treaty of 1936, which is generally regarded as

a symbol of the failure of disarmament,46 was instead a suc-

cess for FDR, enabling him to move forward with a series ofinitiatives to increase Anglo-American cooperation.47 In late

March, the American naval attache approached the Admi-

ralty to propose exchanging classified information about the

Japanese mandated islands, the movements of Japanese ships,and other matters. This remarkable offer, which echoed

Roosevelt's conversation with Dame Rachel Crowdy and

foreshadowed the naval staff talks he initiated later, was too

much for London at the time. Fearing that Japan would getwind of the exchange, the Foreign Office rejected it.48A few

days later, in a conversation with Sir Arthur Willert, the

President personally urged a full exchange of information

on armament programs. Whitehall's attention, however, was

drawn to something else that Roosevelt suggested: a newdoctrine of effective blockade to be used against violators of

thepeace

without a declaration of war. This theForeignOffice found "somewhat dangerously jejune," and for the

moment the idea of exchanging information on armaments

was lost.49

45. FDR to Phillips, Feb. 28, 1936,500.A15A5/697,RG 59, NA. Memoran-dum by Craigie, March 4, 1936,F.O.371,19809/A2021/4/45,PRO. Davis to Hull,March 10, 1936, ForeignRelations,1936,I, 88-89; March 19, 1936, 97; Hull to

Davis, March 23, 1936, ibid., 98; Phillips to Swanson, March 28, 1936, ibid.,98-99.Phillips to FDR, March 19, 1936,Official File (OF)20:State Department,FDR Papers.

46. See, Stephen E. Pelz, Race to PearlHarbor: The Failureof the SecondLondonNavalConferenceand the Onsetof WorldWarII (Cambridge,Mass., 1974),especially 163-164.

47. See Harrison, "PresidentialDemarche."48. Admiralty to FO, March25, 1936,F.0.371,19836/A2494/2494/45;mem-

orandum by Gore-Booth, March 30, 1936, and minutes, FO. to Admiralty,April 24, 1936,/A3291/2494/45, PRO.

49. Willert to Craigie, April 9, 1936, and minutes, F.0.371,19828/A3150/170/45, PRO.




Increasingly prone to ignore Hull,50 Roosevelt relied

upon Morgenthau's contacts with the British Treasury, which

provided significantly more forthright American support forthe European democracies than anything the State Depart-ment undertook. They were regarded with real hostility byHull and his staff.51In September and October, FDR used

the War Department to propose an exchange of top secret

information on industrial mobilization with London.52

The President's cooperative interest was especially evident

when Britain asked American approval for the retention on

active duty of some overage vessels. Since the United Stateshad no superannuated tonnage it could retain as compensa-tion, some members of the State Department wanted to object,and both the State and Navy departments expressed concern

that London's move might inspire Japan to increase its fleet.

But Roosevelt overrode such reservations and agreed to

London's request in November. "The important element

throughoutthe discussions," noted the Committee on

Impe-rial Defence, "has been...the friendly spirit displayed [bythe United States] Government in acceding to our wishes."53

That was precisely the impression Roosevelt wanted to convey.There was more to FDR's demarche to Great Britain,

including the famous interview with Arthur Krock in which

50. See Adolph A. Berle, Jr. to FDR, June 30, 1936, PSF:State Depart-ment, box 94, FDR Papers.

51. Entry of May 18, 1936, Morgenthau manuscript diaries, book 24, 185-185B; Sept. 18, 1936, Book 33, 18A-18R. R.V.N. Hopkins to Sir Frederick

Phillips, Aug. 10, 1936; Bingham to Chamberlain, Oct. 18, 1936, T160/845/

13640/2, Treasury Papers. Blum, MorgenthauDiaries, I, 228. Hornbeck to

Atherton, April 2, 1936;Feb. 26, 1937;Atherton to Hornbeck, Feb. 9, 1937,box

21, Hornbeck Papers.52. See Richard A. Harrison, "Testingthe Water:A Secret Probe towards

Anglo-American Military Co-operation in 1936," The InternationalHistory Review,VII (1985),214-234.

53. Atherton to Hull, May 2, 1936, 500.A15A3/1777;May 6, 1936, /1779;

July 2, 1936, /1793; ADM William H. Standley to Hull, July 14, 1936, /1797;Bingham to Hull, July 15, 1936, /1798; July 20, 1936, /1800; Sept. 25, 1936,

/1824; Nov. 19, 1936, /1842; memorandum by Robert T. Pell, July 21, 1936,/1803; Aug. 26, 1936, /1826; memorandum by Eugene H. Dooman, Aug. 28,1936, /1813; Hull to Bingham, Sept. 8, 1936, /1817; Oct. 28, 1936; /18833A; R.W. Moore to Bingham, Nov. 20, 1936, /1842; Bingham to Hull, Nov. 20, 1936,641.0031/77,RG 59, NA. CID memorandum #1233-B by Chatfield, May 8,1936,CAB 4/24; minutes of CID #278, May 12, 1936, CAB 2/6; CID memorandum

#1283-B, Dec. 22, 1936,CAB 4/25, Cabinet Papers, PRO. Davis to Bell, July 16,1936,box 47,Davis Papers.




the President floated as a trial balloon his idea of a greatpower summit conference,which like his earlier suggestions

carried potentialy "negative advantages."Importantpolicy-makers in London, especially Foreign Secretary AnthonyEden and Vansittart,were impressed by what the Presidentwasdoing.54But distrustof the mercurialAmericansspurredothersin Whitehall to look again for a settlement withJapan.

By the summer of 1936,American observerswere reportingnew evidence of an Anglo-Japanesedeal,55and it was in thatclouded atmosphere that London proposed the renewal of

Article XIX.Whitehall had set aside a Japanese suggestion to renew

nonfortification in February, when the naval conference

required Anglo-American cooperation. By September,how-

ever, the National Governmentthought thatrenegotiationofArticle XIX would allow it to improve the defenses of HongKong. State,War,and Navy departmentofficers reviewedthe

proposal

on September 16 in a meeting dominated by suspi-cion of Britain'smotives. Norman Davis recalled that he haddiscussedArticleXIX in London at the end of 1935,when the

Foreign Office wanted renewal so that it would not have to

strengthen Hong Kong. Now the idea was being revived inorder to do just that. The Americans did not want nonfort-ification divorced from other issues on which the Japanesewould be asked to make concessions.Furthermore,liberaliz-

ing Article XIX held no allure for American naval andmilitary experts, who had determined the Philippines couldnot be defended even with new fortifications. Concludingthat London was trying to trap the United States in somedevious negotiations with Tokyo, the State Departmentdeclined to have anything to do with the British proposal, adecision that London'scharge put down to "pique."56

54. See memorandum by Vansittart, Dec. 16, 1936, F.0.371,19787/A9996/9996/51, PRO.

55. Memorandum by Hornbeck, June 2, 1936,ForeignRelations,1936,III,220-223;Aug. 6, 1936,box 12, Hornbeck Papers.

56. CID memorandum#1266-B,Oct.1936,CAB4/25, CabinetPapers.Mem-orandum by John D. Hickerson, Sept. 11, 1936,ForeignRelations,1936,I, 122-123;memorandum by Pell, Sept. 16, 1936, ibid., 124-129;Hull to Bingham, Sept. 25,1936, ibid., 131. Herschel V. Johnson to Hull, July 10, 1936, 500.A15A5/806;Hull to Bingham, July 24, 1936, /809A; Bingham to Hull, July 31, 1936, /812,RG 59, NA.




In mid-October, Lord Lothian was back in Washington

explaining that the proposal sprang from a major shift in

British public opinion in favor of improving Britain's defenses

everywhere. While it did not cause the administration to

reverse itself, this explanation, like recent assurances from

the Foreign Office that the National Government would

defend its interests in Asia, must have impressed Roosevelt.

Having resumed personal diplomacy with vigor after his

re-election, he was heartened by British rearmament, which

seemed to betoken London's agreement that strength was

more effective than irresponsible appeasement in pacifying

aggressor states.57

If Roosevelt's policy can be understood as an effort to

encourage Britain along that road, then his surprising sug-

gestion of November 16 to neutralize the Pacific may be

regarded as part of that policy. In the first place, it was

obvious that nonfortification was an important issue to the

British at that moment, and one on which London had justbeen rebuffed by the State Department. "Neutralization"

seemed, at first, to be an expansion of Article XIX awayfrom

Britain's security interests, for it would have banned fortifi-

cation of Hong Kong. But as a basis for study and negotiationit might have produced an agreement satisfactory to both

Washington and London. Roosevelt regularly put forward

broad proposals designed to stimulate more specific responses.

Even in the unlikely event that neutralization was acceptedwithout substantial modification, it would address the ongo-

ing American concern about Japan's mandated islands, for

the President certainly appreciated the importance of provi-sions for inspection.

Given Japan's lack of respect for its commitments, Roose-

velt could not have expected a new agreement to fare anybetter. Neutralization was thus consistent with his earlier, and

later, trial balloons, since it carried a promise of distinct

"negative advantages" if rejected or violated by Japan. Public

opinion in the United States was already souring on Tokyo'sbehavior, and there was a small but vocal group in the Senate

57. Memorandum by Hornbeck, Oct. 14,1936,ForeignRelations,1936,I, 131.Hornbeck to R. W. Moore, Dec. 31, 1936,box 8, R. W. Moore Papers, FDRL.

Bingham to Hull, Nov. 19, 1936, 500.A15A3/842,RG 59, NA.




advocatinga stern American attitudetowardthe Japanese.58The President knew that a general awarenessof the differ-

ences betweenaggressorsand "peace loving states"waslikelyto increase public support for a more active foreign policy.Likemany of his proposals,neutralizationmight help in thatcause.

Of greatest importance, of course, was the creation of a

partnership with England. The fall of 1936 seemed a goodtime to move toward that goal in Pacific affairs.Japan had

joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, stirring new rumors of

British desperation to reach an accord with Tokyo.59Rooseveltwanted both to reassure the British and to offer them more

than the Japanese would put forward. While it is true that the

State Department tended to want to avoid trouble with Japan,Roosevelt's use of appeasement was limited and aimed more

at London than Tokyo. The formalistic and negative responsefrom Hull's staff to FDR's neutralization plan, along with the

department's unimaginative reaction to other activist ideas

that interested the President,60reinforced Roosevelt's prefer-ence to call upon the Treasury, War, and Navy departmentsrather than State and to seize every opportunity for personal

diplomacy.

Early in 1937,for example, he met with Walter Runciman

of the British cabinet, whose visit he had secretly arranged.

Among the topics that the President wanted to discuss in pri-

vate was neutralization of the Pacific. Probably at Roosevelt'srequest, Runciman did not include that subject in his official

account of their talks, but he did report on it to Sir Maurice

P. A. Hankey, influential secretary to both the cabinet and

the Committee on Imperial Defence. Hankey noted the obvi-

ous advantages to Japan should the United States and Britain

forswear Pacific bases, but he also pointed out that British

policy was opposed to building new bases, and thus there

were "strong reasons in support of the President's idea." Hewas struck by the closeness of this proposal to his own gov-

58. Thomson, "Role of the Department of State,"97.Steven Early to FDR,

Jan. 13, 1936,Nixon, ed., FDRandForeignAffairs,III, 163.59. Bingham to Hull, Nov. 19, 1936,762.94/88; Nov. 25, 1936, /97, RG 59,

NA.60. See FDR to Hull, Feb. 8, 1937,OF20:StateDepartments, FDR Papers.




ernment's recent suggestion, which had been turned down bythe State Department.61

The President kept the topic alive when he sent NormanDavis as his delegate to the International Sugar Conference

in London in March 1937, a selection that made it obvious

that sugar was not what Roosevelt most wanted to discuss. He

had in mind nothing less than a plan to replace the failed

League of Nations,62 but Davis was also directed to raise

neutralization of the Pacific in talks with British leaders.63

This sudden reversal of the recent refusal to renew Article

XIX made the British suspicious. Except for Eden, whose

receptivity was sparked by his impression that neutralization

was a "favourite project" of the President, members of the

Foreign Office did not take the proposal too seriously. Noting

especially the absence of any American commitment to pro-tect British interests, they reminded Davis it was the United

States which insisted that Japan would not abide by its prom-ises. Davis

quickly agreedit was not the time to

proceedwith

neutralization.64

This negative response, combined with Hankey's decla-

ration to Runciman that his government was not interested

in additional fortifications, raises a question: Was London's

earlier plea to renew Article XIX truly related to the defense

of Hong Kong or was it, indeed, a ploy to open negotiationswith Tokyo? The National Government was at the moment

preparing for bilateral conversations with the Japanese, andas usual those preparations tickled the antennae of Ameri-

61. Hankey to Runciman, Feb. 22, 1937,WR 284, Runciman of Doxford

Papers, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. For a broader examination of the

episode, see Richard A. Harrison, "The Runciman Visit to Washington in

January 1937:Presidential Diplomacy and the Non-Commercial Implicationsof Anglo-American Trade Negotiations," Canadian Journal of History/AnnalesCanadiennesd'Histoire,XIX (1984), 217-239. Runciman's formal report is inRunciman to

Baldwin,Feb.

8, 1937,PREM

1/291,PM

Papers.62. This was an idea he had already discussed with Prime Minister W. L.

Mackenzie King of Canada. See King to FDR, March 8, 1937 and end.,PSF:Canada,FDR Papers.

63. Memorandum by Davis, March 19, 1937,box 55; Davis to Hornbeck,March 23, 1937,box 27,Davis Papers.

64. Eden to Lindsay, April 16, 1937; May 3, 1937; minute by J. M.

Troutbeck, April 22, 1937; minute by Sir Alexander Cadogan, April 27, 1937,

F.0.371,21024/F2214/597/61; May 3, 1937,/F2586/597/61, PRO. Davis to Hull,

April 29, 1937,740.00/154,Sect. II &III, RG 59, NA.




cans who noted rumors of forthcoming British concessions.65

At the Imperial Conference in London in May 1937, more-

over, Prime Minister Joseph A. Lyons of Australia urged theconclusion of a nonaggression pact with Tokyo. In spite of

Foreign Office assurances that the idea was unlikely to bear

fruit, American diplomats believed the British saw Lyon's

suggestion as a way to open discussions with Japan on "issues

in the Far East which are awaiting settlement."66

Because Lyons was a well-known champion of a regional

nonaggression pact, his speech at the Imperial Conference

came as no surprise and made only a small impression. Butthe Australian added some weight to his argument by tellingEden that Roosevelt knew of his idea and that the President

was prepared "to make common cause with the members of

the British Commonwealth concerned if serious trouble arosein the Pacific."67Prudently, Eden declined to take the state-ment as a commitment, but in any case Roosevelt's words to

Lyonscould

hardlybe construed as an endorsement of a

nonagression pact. Indeed, FDR had taken special exceptionto the equation of "neutralization" with "nonaggression" in

the State Department's original critique of his idea. If Lyons

reported the President's words accurately, they might more

properly be regarded as a complement to what he was tryingto accomplish by proposing neutralization.

Roosevelt was deeply concerned that British concessions

made during negotiations with Tokyo would encourageJapanese aggression. A "Hoare-Laval plan" for Asia woulddo incalculable damage to Britain's attractiveness as an inter-

national partner for the American people. Equally importantfrom Roosevelt's perspective, such bilateral talks would rele-

gate the United States once again to the sidelines of the world

arena. Knowledge that Lyons would raise the nonaggression

pact in London might well have inspired FDR to press for

neutralization, a plan intended to divert London back to an

65. Hull to Bingham, May 14, 1937, 741.94/97A; May 24, 1937,/101A,RG

59, NA.66. Dominions Office to High Commissioner of Australia, May 25, 1937.

EO.371,21025/F3001/597/61, PRO; Atherton to Hull, June 17, 1937, ForeignRelations, 1937,III, 988.

67. Dominions Office to High Commissioner of Australia, May 25, 1937,F.0.371,21025/F3001/597/61,PRO.




Americanstrategythat both nationscould later refine. Knowl-

edge that the British werecontinuing their bilateralcontacts

with Japan certainly would have inspired him. If London'searlier plea to renew Article XIX had been a snare for theUnited States,the neutralizationplan outflankedthe British.

Both neutralization and the anticipated Anglo-Japanesetalks were swamped by events in the summerof 1937,and soHull's decision to stand aside while London and Tokyonego-tiated,68which otherwise would have flown in the face ofRoosevelt'sobjectives,was moot. Neutralization died a quietdeath thatspring. Its history is more complex than is usuallyportrayed, and its significance lies less in its specifics thanits role as a diplomatic tactic. FDR's personal diplomacywasrarely simple and straightforward.As in domesticaffairs,in foreign affairs he was the great experimenter-testingideas,playing with them, hoping for results.Suchdiplomacyrarely left a pattern, and it is all too easy to dismiss as

erratic, inconsistent, superficial,and

even dangerous. LikeBritish statesmenat the time, historianssince have noted theabsence of commitment in his schemes and his failure to"follow through,"but those criticisms miss the inextricable

requirements in Roosevelt's diplomacy for gradualism and

reciprocation.A more direct attempt to assert American leadership

would have foundered at once on the rock of isolationism,

much of which arose from distrust of other countries. ThePresident aimed to bringthe nationalong with him in takinga greater role in world affairs; he was determined not tosuffer the fate of Woodrow Wilson. Such intermediate goalsas the "negativeadvantages"to be gained from the behaviorof aggressorswere fundamental to his efforts.It was essentialthat those governments with which he meant to cooperate,and most of all the British government, respond to his pro-

posals with ideas of their own before effective cooperationcould begin.

The war in Asia derailed all attemptsto reach a modus

68. Hull to Bingham, July 14, 1937,ForeignRelations,1937,III, 990-991.




vivendi with Tokyo and left Washington and London uncer-

tain once again of each other. But as Roosevelt renewed his

quest for Anglo-American cooperation, his previous effortshad succeeded at least in making more Britons receptive to

his message. In October the President called for a "quarantine"of aggressors in a speech that many have seen as a turning

point in his foreign policy,69although its novelty was only in

the public expression of ideas he had had for many months.

The Quarantine Speech elicited no comparable gesture from

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's government, but it

aroused expectations for Anglo-American cooperation at aconference in Belgium that November. The United States

and Britain were still too far apart, each too reluctant to take

the lead and too eager for the other to do so, for the Brussels

Conference to produce a joint policy, however. The meetingis cited as another in the parade of failures of Western

diplomacy.70 Yet it did produce the declaration of principlesRoosevelt had

long sought,and so it constituted a kind of

victory. Indeed, Eden understood before the conference beganthat Roosevelt's hopes for Brussels were more related to

improving Anglo-American cooperation than to solving the

crisis in Asia.71

The greatest obstacle to the President's further success

was Chamberlain's insistence upon going his own way, in

large part to prevent the United States from "meddling in the

affairs of Europe."72The Prime Minister's control of Britishpolicy simply overwhelmed Roosevelt's growing influence

among other Britons, and those most interested in workingwith FDR were forced out of the shrinking circle of power in

London. Chamberlain always concentrated on the differences

between British and American interests. He was unable or

69. See William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challengeto Isola-

tion: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1952),19; Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the

Struggle over the Arms Embargo (Chicago, Ill., 1968), 211.

70. See Borg, United Statesand the FarEastern Crisis,440-441.

71. Eden to Lindsay, Oct. 28, 1937.F..371,20663/A7748/228/45, PRO.72. David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941:

A Study in Competitive Co-operation (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), 18.




unwilling to see, as Roosevelt saw, that Anglo-American coop-eration was urgent.73

In such subtle and complicated diplomacy, the clarityand consistency of Roosevelt's purpose--and especially of

Roosevelt's principles-emerge from a jigsaw puzzle of presi-dential initiatives. No one piece, such as the proposal to

neutralize the Pacific, can reveal the whole, and yet each

must be examined for its fit with the others before the true

picture can be seen. For all of the apparent changes of direc-

tion, for all of the ideas left undeveloped, for all of the

frustrating ambiguity of detail, there is in FDR's efforts the

constant striving for a trans-Atlantic connection that mightdeter aggression and thus sustain peace. It is doubtless true

that the Pacific could not have been neutralized as Roosevelt

proposed. But Anglo-American collaboration, generated bythe proposal and shaped by the understanding that coopera-tion in the Pacific would affect the situation in Europe, might

have produced something more important.

73. Recent studies of Anglo-American relations in the late thirties havetended to follow Chamberlain's lead in this. C. A. MacDonald, in The United

States,Britain and Appeasement, 1936-1939 (New York, 1981), for example, empha-sizes the competition betweenWashington and London. Blindness to the largerdimension of Anglo-Americanrelations was not uncommon in the StateDepart-ment, which was much more interested in competition and less in cooperationthan FDR. See Warren F. Kimball, "Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The

Temptation of British Opulence, 1937-1942,"PoliticalScienceQuarterly,LXXXVI

(1971),232-259.

Documents

A Neutralization Plan for the Pacific Roosevelt and Anglo-American Cooperation 1934-1937