A Neglected Influence on C G Jung

8/14/2019 A Neglected Influence on C G Jung

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Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2001, 46, 591611

00218774/2001/4604/591 2001, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, O xford OX4 1 JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

The Baldwin effect: a neglected influenceon C. G. Jungs evolutionary thinking

George B. Hogenson, Chicago

Abstract: This paper considers the claim that C. G. Jung used a Lamarckian model ofevolution to underwrite his theory of archetypes. This claim is challenged on the basis

of Jungs familiarity with and use of the writings of James Mark Baldwin and ConwayLloyd Morgan, both of whom were noted and forceful opponents of neo-Lamarckiantheory from within a neo-Darwinian framework. The paper then outlines the evolu-tionary model proposed by Baldwin and Lloyd Morgan, which has come to be knownas Baldwinian evolution or the Baldwin effect. This model explicitly views psychologicalfactors as central to the evolutionary process. Finally, the use of Baldwinian thinkingin contemporary theorizing regarding language and other symbolic systems is reviewedand suggestions are made regarding the implications of Baldwinian models for theorybuilding in analytical psychology.

Key words: Baldwin effect, computer simulation, evolution, Lamarckism, language

systems.

[An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the National Conference ofJungian Analysts, Santa Fe, New Mexico, October 18 , 1999, under the title,Evolution, psychology, and the emergence of the psyche.]

Introduction

In 1919, C. G. Jung presented a paper, entitled Instinct and the Unconscious(Jung 1960), at a symposium in London jointly sponsored by the AristotelianSociety, the Mind Association, and the British Psychological Association. Atthe symposium, several papers, all with the same title, were presented byprominent figures in British psychology. Jung alone represented the cont inent.Generally speaking, this paper is referenced for one of two reasons; it repre-sents Jungs first public use of the terms archetype and collective unconscious,and it is the first instance where Jung refers to the archetypes as being engraved

on the human mind. This latter expression is taken by some commentators tobe indicative of Lamarckian tendencies in Jungs thought (Stevens 1990). Jung


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more famously repeats the engraving metaphor in volume 9 part 1 where hewrites:

There are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life. Endless repetitionhas engraved these experiences into our psychic constitution, not in the form ofimages filled with content, but at first only as forms without content, r epresentingmerely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action.

(Jung, 1959, para. 99 , emphasis in original)

Was Jung actually endorsing, or even thinking in terms of a Lamarckian basisfor his theory of archetypes? Did he believe that the archetypes existed byvirtue of the transmission of acquired characteristics wherein a trait or ability

developed in the life time of one organism is passed directly to its offspring, asa Lamarckian would argue? (Lamarcks position will be discussed in greaterdetail below.) This is an important question regarding our understanding ofJung, and his place in the history of thought, insofar as a Lamarckian argu-ment for the origins of the archetypes would jeopardize Jungs repeated claimto have grounded his theory in sound scientific method and doctrine. Indeed,Freuds unwavering commitment to Lamarckism stands as one of the moreperplexing elements of his programme, and Freuds followers went to somelengths to blame Jung for Freuds errant theorizing. However, as the phil-

osopher of science, Patricia Kitcher, demonstrates in her superb study ofFreuds uses of late 19 th Century scientific concepts, Freuds Dream: A Com-plete Interdisciplinary Science of Mind(Kitcher 1995), Freuds system restedheavily on Lamarckian concepts. Even in the thirties, she writes:

Freud clung to Lamarckianism and recapitulationism. In noting that he could notdo without Lamarckian inheritance, he was not announcing the fall of his theory.Despite the difficult position he had been placed in by the present attitude of bio-logical science, which refuses to hear of the inheritance of acquired characters [he]must, however, in all modesty confess that [he] cannot do without [it] (Moses andMonotheism, 1939, SEXXIII:100).

(Kitcher 1995, p. 177)1

Similarly, Frank Sulloway concludes his assessment of Freuds Lamarckiancommitment by showing that it was not a peripheral or incidental concomitantof his theory as his followers maintained following his death. Rather:

From the discovery of spontaneous infantile sexuality (1896/97 ) to the very end ofhis life, Freuds endorsement of biogenetic [recapitulationist] and Lamarckian view-points inspired many of his most controversial psychoanalytic conceptions. Moreespecially, these premises bolstered the heart of his developmental theories, legitim-

ating their controversial claim to universality amidst a storm of skeptical opposition.Furthermore, these assumptions prevented Freud from accepting negative evidenceand alternative explanations for his views. All in all, it is easy to see why Freudserroneous biological assumptions prompted such elaborate steps by his followers todeny their importance in Freudian theory.

(Sulloway 1979, p. 498)

592 George B. Hogenson


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to Lamarckism, which has since come to be called Baldwinian evolution or theBaldwin effect, with which Jung was familiar, provides the basis for the develop-

ment of Jungian theory today to an even greater degree than it did when Jungproposed his theories of the collective unconscious and of archetypes nearly100 years ago. Thus, I intend to show that an argument Jung advanced in1919 regarding inheritance, and his reiteration of that position throughout hislife, sheds important light on our understanding of the relationship between thetheory of archetypes and evolutionary theory. Additionally, I believe thatJungs 1919 paper points to a variety of other possibilities for theory buildingand research in analytical psychology. To make these arguments, however, itis first necessary to briefly sketch some controversies regarding the relation-

ship between evolution and the mind that were current at the end of the 19 thCentury.

Lamarckism

Jean-Bapt iste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck (17441829), isoften imagined as some sort of flat earther or equally benighted crank whoseghost Darwin decisively laid to rest with the publication ofO n the O rigin ofSpecies (Darwin, 1859/1964). In reality, Lamarck was one of the leading

zoologists of his time and was decisive in setting in motion research into howlife on earth had changed over time. He was a vigorous opponent of creation-ist views, and in that degree helped set the stage for Darwin. The essence ofhis theory was that characteristics acquired by an organism in response toenvironmental imperatives were directly passed on to that organisms offspring.This is the so-called doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.Additionally, Lamarck viewed the transformation of life as fundamentallyprogressive. In other words, life was moving toward ever-higher degrees ofsuccess and well-being. Although Lamarck was opposed to traditional religiousviews of creation, this progressivist point of view did reflect his own deisticinclinations.

Although Darwin disliked any association between his theories andLamarcks, their actual differences had less to do with the inheritance ofacquired characteristics than with the idea of progressive change. Darwinsinnovation in thinking about change was the theory of natural selectionapplied to variation among organisms. But we must keep in mind that untilthe work of Gregor Mendel was rediscovered in 1900, no one had any ideawhat the unit of variation was. Indeed, Darwin himself proposed that thesomatic cells of adult individuals all contributed, by way of particles he called

gemmules, to the constitution of the reproductive cells. This notion, whichDarwin termed pan-genesis, was nothing more nor less than straightforwardLamarckism. What mat tered to Darwin was that there was no inherent d irec-tionality to his theory. If two animals both acquired the ability to stretch theirnecks to eat leaves higher up, pan-genesis would allow both of them to pass that



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characteristic along to their offspring. But it was natural selection that woulddetermine which variation would be most successful, and thereby determine

which bit of stretching would enjoy the greatest success in reproduction. Andthat determination was entirely dependent on the circumstances of the moment.There was no deistic incline toward ever-higher levels of organization.

Thus as late as the 1890s, the Lamarckian dimensions of Darwins theorystill formed an essential aspect of the theory of evolution. Indeed, some ofDarwins closest and most devoted followers, notably George John Romanes,were open exponents of what had come to be called neo-Lamarckism, advocatingthe inheritance of acquired behavioural, if not morphological, characteristics.Romanes, for example, in his book Mental Evolution in Animals, proposed

that a hen, who had raised several broods of ducklings and had becomehabituated to their taking to the water, had in fact acquired a new instinctualresponse when she would fly to a rock in the middle of a pond and wait forher charges (Romanes, 1884/1969). Freud, Sulloway recounts, was an avidreader of Romanes, particularly of his subsequent book, Mental Evolution in

Man (1888 in Sulloway 1979, p. 247f).A contrary point of view, however, was emerging. In Germany August

Weismann debunked Lamarckian views of morphogenesis by amputating thetails of several generations of rats and demonstrat ing that all of their offspring

were nevertheless born with tails. In the United States and England, twofigures will concern us, James Mark Baldwin and Conway Lloyd Morgan.Baldwin was the leading child psychologist in the United States and one of thefirst social psychologists until a sexual indiscretion lead to his academic exilefrom Johns Hopkins University in 1909. He subsequently took up residence inParis where, until his death in 1934, he continued to write and met regularlywith his long time friends Pierre Janet and Thodore Flournoy, through whomhe influenced the young Jean Piaget (1982). Jung, of course, was deeply influ-enced by Janet, and personally close to Flournoy, and thus we may imaginethat he became familiar with Baldwins work under their influence. C. LloydMorgan was the leading comparative psychologist in the United Kingdom,working primarily at Glasgow University. He was also a close friend and theliterary executor of George Romanes, although he was intensely critical ofRomanes neo-Lamarckism. These researchers, Weismann, Baldwin, Morgan,and others became known as the neo- or ultra-Darwinians. For them, the notionof the inheritance of acquired characteristics was anathema (Richards 1987).

While Baldwin and Morgan were committed neo-Darwinians, as psycho-logists they were also concerned with the relationship of mind to the processof evolution. Baldwin and M organ took seriously Romanes questions regarding

the influence of learning and habit on the inheritability of behaviour.Evolution under natural selection is a slow process, Romanes argued, butsome environmental demands require quite rapid adaptation if survival isgoing to be insured. This means, Romanes went on, that intelligent action willbe engaged to solve the problem, and in so doing natural selection, which is

The Baldwin effect 595


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predicated on differential responses to environmental conditions, would notfunction as Darwins theory demanded. In consequence, Romanes went on, in

the absence of Lamarckian transmission, the germ material would not carrythe trait to subsequent generations, because evolution by natural selectionwould not have taken place.

Baldwin, and independently Lloyd Morgan, argued, to the contrary,that one result of evolution is the organisms ability to alter the environmentand thereby shape the circumstances of evolution by natural selection. Inthis regard, then, mind does indeed play a role in the evolutionary process, butnot in the way neo-Lamarckians like Romanes proposed. Rather, behaviouralplasticity, the ability to learn how to deal with a situation, allows a species to

survive, and even create the circumstances that shape the selection process,until its genetic makeup evolves to deal with the environment independently.Behavioural plasticity can define a pathway along which natural selectionruns, thereby solving the adaptive problem quicker and more successfully thanthrough purely random variation and selection (Baldwin 1896/1996, p. 77).

This process, proposed by both Baldwin and Lloyd Morgan in separatepublications in 1896, was originally called Organic Selection and only latercame to be known as the Baldwin effect (Baldwin 1896/1996; Morgan 1896b).Baldwins seminal paper was titled A New Factor in Evolution, and the new

factor was consciousness. As Baldwin remarked near the end of this paper,We thus reach a phylogeny of mind which proceeds in the direction set by the ontogenyof mind, just as on the organic side the phylogeny of the organism gets its deter-minate direction from the organisms ontogenetic adaptations. And since it is the oneprinciple of Organic Selection working by the same functions to set the direction ofboth phylogenies, the physical and the mental, the two developments are not two,but one. Evolution is, therefore, not more b iological than psychological.

(Baldwin 1896/1996, p. 74 emphasis in original)

The Baldwin effect

What exactly is the Baldwin effect, how does it work, and, above all, whatdoes it have to do with Jungs theory of archetypes and the collective uncon-scious? A simple example will help to tie these issues together. One unusualcharacteristic that distinguishes humans from other mammals is the ability ofadults to metabolize the lactose in raw milk. Virtually all juvenile mammalspossess this ability, but adult mammals other than humans universally losethe ability and can become quite intolerant to lactose. However, this capabilityis not identical in all human populations. Rather, almost all human populations

retain some ability to use lactose in adulthood, but not a ll human populationsretain the ability in the same degree. Take two population groups as examples:Among dairying populations of northern Europe (above 40 degrees north) anaverage of91 .5% of the adult population retains the childhood ability to absorblactose. Among dairying peoples of North Africa and the Mediterranean the



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average is 38 .8% (Durham 1991). Why is this the case? As it happens, theability to absorb lactose plays an important role in the ability to fix vitamin D

in the absence of sunlight, and, in consequence, to retain calcium. Hence, theability to absorb lactose has distinct survival value in northern latitudes wheresunlight is at a premium. But how is this capability acquired? Both populationshave long traditions of animal husbandry they raise a lot of cows. So we havethe first step in a cultural pattern that underlies a biologically evolved trait.But cows alone are not enough, you have to do something with the milk.In the Mediterranean, India, and other warm climates, it is common to reducemilk to one or another cultured form, such as butter, yogurt or cheese. Theseforms of milk product are more readily stored in warm climates, but they also

have greatly reduced levels of lactose in them, as the bacteria used to culture themilk digests most of the lactose. In Northern Europe, on the other hand, largequantities of raw milk are consumed, with lactose constituting an importantelement in the diet.

What probably happened was that as Indo-European populations migratednorth, those members of the population who could absorb lactose enjoyedhigher rates of survival and prospered enough to pass along more genes forlactose uptake than other members of the population. However, this evolu-tionary process presupposed a variety of cultural innovations, beginning with

animal husbandry itself, which allowed migration to take place at all. In otherwords, natural selection was no longer natural in the sense of simply respond-ing to the natural environment. It was now a culturally driven natural selection.Biologically, the entire process still took place by means of natural selection,but the human cultural ability to learn animal husbandry, and consequentlyalter the environment to meet the needs of the organism, i.e., to cultivate ameans of overcoming vitamin D deficiencies in Northern climates, meant thatnatural selection was going on under the supervision, if you will, of the humanpsyche. Processes such as this are often referred to as co-evolutionary, butthey are in fact examples of the Baldwin effect because an element of behav-ioural plasticity is involved in the process of setting up the environment ofbiological evolutionary adaptation. H uman plasticity and the ability to learnways to cope with or alter the environment, thereby altering the contextwithin which natural selection operates, established a place for the workingsof the mind in the evolutionary process, without giving in to the neo-Lamarckian commitment to the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Thegenome, in the Baldwinian model, is still only affected by variation andnatural selection. But the environmental conditions under which the selectionis taking place are at least partly shaped by the human psyche.

Jung and Baldwinian evolution

Where does Jung fit into this story? While Jung appears to have been betterinformed about the controversies surrounding evolution than he is often given



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credit for, it would be a mistake to claim that he was deeply informed or thathe cared a great deal about controversies in the field of evolutionary theory.

Nevertheless, he was familiar with the work of both Baldwin and Morgan,and this familiarity appears to have helped form the basis for what he doeshave to say about evolution. He cites Baldwin in W andlungen und Symbole der

Libido (The Psychology of the Unconscious) (Jung 1991), regarding Baldwinswork on the social foundations of language, and Morgan is cited in bothInstinct and the Unconscious and On the Nature of the Psyche. After 1896Baldwin introduced his evolutionary thinking into most of his works, if onlyin a tangential manner. Jungs reference in W andlungen is to Baldwins threevolume Thought and Things or Genetic Logic, published between 1906 and

1911 (Baldwin 1906), which, while it is does not provide an explicit discussionof the 1896 thesis, is nevertheless clear on Baldwins evolutionary commitments.Jungs references to Morgan are to his book of1896,Habit and Instinct(Morgan1896a), which is a sustained critique of neo-Lamarckism culminating in hisown rendering of the evolutionary mechanisms that would later be referred toas the Baldwin effect.1

Returning then to 1919, what can we say about Jungs supposed Lamarckismin light of what we can infer about his familiarity with Baldwin and Morgan?One striking aspect of this short paper is that Jungs arguments run counter to

a nave endorsement of Lamarckism, and, read as examples, in fact come acrossas a rather clearly worded rejection of the inheritance of acquired character-istics. How so? Jung actually proceeds on two fronts, one having to do withthe nature of instinct and the other having to do with the situatedness of theorganism, what Jung comes to call its image.

To argue his first point, Jung draws a distinction between genuinely instinctualbehaviour, which he sees as compulsive in nature, but shared by all membersof a species, and the compulsive behaviour associated with phobias and neuroses.The definition of instinctual behaviour as behaviour that has an all or nothingquality to it, a definition advanced by W. H. R. Rivers, a strong advocate forFreud and another participant in the symposium, is too broad because com-pulsiveness is also associated with individual phobias. Indeed, Jung points outthat we naturally make this distinction when we recognize that a compulsivefear of snakes is not only shared among humans, but also among other primates,while a compulsive fear of chickens would immediately be recognized as aphobia unique to a given individual. What is important here is that undera neo-Lamarckian interpretation a phobic response to chickens on the part ofone individual should be no different from the chicken which raised ducks,thereby acquiring, as Romanes commented at the time, the basis of a new in-

stinct (Romanes 1884/1969, p. 215). This was precisely why Lamarckism wasso important to Freud; he had to have a means by which a singular historicalevent the primordial killing of the father by the band of brothers, postulatedin Totem and Taboo could give rise to the elaborate apparatus of theOedipus complex. But this is not the position taken by Jung. To the contrary,



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Jung distinguished between genuine instincts and compulsions that are notinstinctual. A Lamarckian, on the other hand, would have argued that the

children of a person with a chicken phobia would inherit a chicken phobia, just as Freud argued that subsequent generations have inherited the anxietyassociated with the primal killing of the father.

Jungs second argument, which also conflicts with Lamarckism but plays arole in the development of Baldwinian theory, is the case of the yucca moth.In Habit and Instinct, C. Lloyd Morgan describes the breeding behaviour ofthe yucca moth. The moth emerges from its chrysalis state on the one nightthat the yucca plant opens its flower for pollination. The female moth matesand then gathers a bit of pollen from one plant, flies to another plant and

makes a small incision into which it lays its eggs. It then closes the incisionwith the pollen ball and dies. The flower closes and the fertilized eggs and thenow fertilized ova of the plant develop together. Upon hatching, the moth larvaeeat some of the plant ova, but leave behind many more, thus allowing forthe propagation of the plant. On Morgans account, experiments conductedwith the plant demonstrated that the moth was the only natural means bywhich the yucca plant could be fertilized, and the yucca plant was essential forthe development of the moth larvae (Morgan 1896a, p. 14)

Both Morgan and Jung point out that the reproductive behaviour of this

moth is instinctual, but could not be the result of learning turned into instinctby Lamarckian transmission because the entire reproductive sequence takesplace in only one day. Morgan does not go much further with his analysis ofthe behaviour of the moth, but Jung does. Invoking Henri Bergson, Jung pro-poses that in addition to the instincts one may posit the functioning of intuitionwhich, he argues, allows for the workings of a hunch, by means of which theorganism apprehends a complex situation, in the development of the organism(Jung 1960, para. 269). Jung goes on to argue that it is the combination of thiskind of intuition, namely the archetypes of perception and apprehension withthe instincts that comprise the collective unconscious (Jung 1960, para. 270 ).

Baldwin knew Bergson, and appreciated his work in philosophy and thetheory of evolution. He also correctly distinguished Bergson from vitalistssuch as Hans Driesch, pointing out, in Thought and Things, that Bergsonstheories are perfectly compatible, in their actual application, with Darwinianevolution (Baldwin 1906, vol. 3, p. 275). Indeed, as we will see shortly, the notionthat a hunch or guess plays a role in the later development of Baldwinian theory,as proposed by Jung albeit without direct reference to Baldwin; the role ofintuition, or having a hunch about a situation, may have been unusuallyprescient on Jungs part. But Jungs concern regarding the yucca moth has

more to do with the way in which he views the situatedness of the organism.Although th is point is often missed by his followers and critics alike, Jungs

original thinking regarding the theory of archetypes, which actually originatesin his reflections on the word association test and the theory of the complex,falls within the frame of what we would now call cognitive neuroscience



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(Spitzer 1992). As Jung remarks near the end of Instinct and the Unconscious, Archetypes are typical modes of apprehension, and wherever we meet with

uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension we are dealing withan archetype (Jung 1960 para. 280 , Jungs emphasis). At this point Jungassociates the archetype with the behavioural role of the instincts, and remarks,

just prior to the last passage that the primordial image might suitably bedescribed as the instincts perception of itself (Jung 1960, para. 277, Jungsemphasis). In the case of the yucca moth, Jung remarks that there must be someimage of the yucca plant that triggers off the instinctual response that leadsto the moths reproductive behaviour (ibid.). What does he mean by image?Jung repeats this nearly thirty years later in his important essay, On

the Nature of the Psyche where he uses another interesting insect example,that of the leaf-cutting ant. Beginning with a comment on evolution, Jungremarks:

In view of the structure of the body, it would be astonishing if the psyche were theonly biological phenomenon not to show clear traces of its evolutionary history, andit is altogether probable that these marks are closely connected with the instinctualbase. Instinct and archaic mode meets in the biological conception of the pat tern ofbehaviour. There are, in fact, no amorphous instincts, as every instinct bears in itselfthe pattern of its situat ion. Always it fulfils an image, and the image has fixed qual-ities. The instinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfils the image of ant, tree, leaf, cutting,

transport, and little ant-garden of fungi. If any one of these conditions is lacking, theinstinct does not function, because it cannot exist without its total pattern, withoutits image The same is also true of man: he has in him these a priori instinct-typeswhich provide the occasion and pattern for his activities, in so far as he functionsinstinctively. As a biological being he has no choice but to act in a specifically humanway, and fulfil his pattern of behaviour They [the primordial images] are not justrelics or vestiges of earlier modes of functioning; they are the ever-present and bio-logically necessary regulators of the instinctual sphere, whose range of action coversthe whole realm of the psyche and only loses its absoluteness when limited by therelative freedom of the will. We may say that the image represents the meaning ofthe instinct.

(Jung 1960, para. 398, Jungs emphases)

The example of the leaf-cutting ant derives from C. Lloyd Morgans bookHabit and Instinct(Morgan 1896a), which Jung apparently continued to useas a touchstone for his reflections on evolution. That said, what impressiondoes this passage make on us, and what are the theoretical implications of Jungsposition? On the face of it, one is tempted to assume, as I believe many do,that Jung is proposing that the all important governing images, or archetypes,are really rather complete inner or mental representations of various states of

affairs encountered over evolutionary time. But this would be mistaking. Rather,it seems to me that Jung takes very seriously the notion that the archetypal isalways imbedded in a context, and that the context is equally as important asany structure that may be provided by the archetypes. To understand how thiscould be the case I want to now move to an examination of the ways in which



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the works of Baldwin and Morgan have come into play in contemporarytheorizing.

The return of Baldwinian thinking

To make this transition I will first have to connect the controversies that arosearound the turn of the last century with developments in evolutionary th inkingthat are taking place at the turn of the new century. And here a question mightbe asked: Whatever became of Baldwin and M organ, or at least of their theory?Baldwin, as I have noted, was forced into a gentlemans exile in Paris after1909, where he continued to write and collaborate with Janet and Flournoy.

Morgan continued to lecture on problems in evolution, and championed aposition which he termed emergent evolution, in which he argued for a pointof view on the development of organisms that would later find new life in thework of other theoreticians working outside the rapidly developing modernsynthesis of Darwinian natural selection and Mendelian genetics. But discussionof the Baldwin effect largely dropped out of the evolutionary discourse. Somepeople remembered it was there, but it had little effect on developmentsin theory because it did not fit comfortably into the research programme inevolutionary theory that came to be known as the new synthesis of Darwinian

natural selection and Mendelian genetics.This state of affairs began to change in the 1980s, with the rise of thecomputer as a research tool, in particular as a means of simulating complexprocesses that in nature require either very long or very short periods of timeto complete. In 1987 two researchers, Geoffrey Hinton and Steven Nowlan,conducted a simple computer simulation in which they added a learningvariable to a 20 segment simulated genetic code, and demonstrated that if anorganism could set some of its alleles, that is its actual genetic variables, byguessing at an optimal fitness, it stood a better chance of actually meetinga simple fitness criterion than did an organism that relied entirely on randomvariation and natural selection. The title of their paper was How Learning CanGuide Evolution, and the story of its publication is that when they sent it to the

journal Complex Systems the editor had to write back telling them that theirfundamental insight had been anticipated by nearly one hundred years (Pinker1997). The insight, of course, was into the workings of the Baldwin effect. Thispaper had a profound impact on a new group of theoretical biologists, and ahost of papers subsequently appeared that used computer simulations to examinehow learning could affect evolution. By and large, these initial computer simu-lations addressed very simple models, but they opened up a way of studying

evolution that jumped over the constraints of the new-synthesis to examine thepossibility of theoretical variations on the derived neo-Darwinian orthodoxy.

One such study was presented at the second international conference onartificial life in 1990. The paper, entitled Learning in the Cultural Process, waswritten by Edwin H utchins and Brian Hazlehurst, at the University of California



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at San Diego (Hutchins & Hazlehurst 1990). Basing their work on that ofHinton and Nowlan, Hutchins and Hazlehurst asked how an evolutionary

process might lead the individuals in a culture to know more about a naturalphenomenon in this case the relationship between the phases of the moonand the level of the tides than any individual would be able to learn in theirlifetime. The crucial insight in this paper was that cultures produce artefacts myths, rituals, and objects of various kinds and that these artefacts have tobe taken into account when viewing evolution in that culture. Put anotherway, once you have culture, no matter how simple, evolution under naturalselection no longer takes place in relation to the natural environment alone,but also in relation to the artefactual environment. This is precisely the situation

outlined above in relation to lactose absorption. But it is also the case thatin a world of artefacts, there are some artefacts that work better than othersin relation to the task at hand and the cognitive capabilities of those whoemploy the artefacts. In their simulation, Hutchins and Hazlehurst createdcomputer citizens of a culture concerned with moon and tide variation.Each citizen was allowed to create an ar tefact that predicted these variations,then create an offspring and then die. The result of the simulation was thatif a genetic learning bias was introduced into the process, successivegenerations were increasingly able to judge which artefacts worked the best in

making the predictions, and were thereby able to learn to predict the moon-tide relationship far faster than would have been the case without the learningprocess. Importantly, however, the connectionist networks that were used torun this simulation were not learning the phases of the moon or the level ofthe tides. They were learning, or adapting, to making judgments regardinghow well an artefact created by an individual in the previous generation hadperformed in making the prediction. Although Hutchins and Hazlehurst wereless concerned with biological evolution than H inton and Nowlan, one canimmediately see how this process of cultural learning would influence geneticevolution under the conditions associated with the Baldwin effect.

So, by the early 1990s Baldwin and M organ had been resuscitated in at leastsome research circles where the importance of their insight was recognized andapplied to a variety of situations. I am even tempted to say that the simulationof Hutchins and H azlehurst provides a model for the emergence of archetypes,but that would be to jump too fast in the direction of interpretation. We firstneed to examine a more complex cultural and evolutionary process. Just suchan examination has recently been undertaken by Terrence Deacon, professorof neuroscience and evolutionary anthropology at Boston University, in hisbook, The Symbolic Species (Deacon 1997).

Why Baldwin matters: the crisis of the Chomskian paradigm

The sciences advance, in part, by drawing analogies and metaphors from otherdisciplines. This is particularly the case with interdisciplinary sciences such



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as psychoanalysis, and Jungian theory is no exception. But, just as PatriciaKitcher makes clear in her study of Freuds attempts at interdisciplinary theory

building, this process has a number of inherent dangers, not the least beingthat the disciplines one draws on for insight may, in the course of their owntheoretical and empirical development, suddenly conclude that things arenot what they once seemed to be. Thus, to the degree one discipline hitches itstheoretical wagon to findings in some other field, it runs the risk of having toexplain itself all over again when the borrowed theory begins to break down.A case in point is the frequent invocation of Noam Chomskys generativegrammar as an analogue to Jungs theory of archetypes. Anthony Stevens,for example, is quite categorical when he remarks that Chomskys theories

support the notion that the acquisition of speech is archetypally determined(Stevens 1990, p. 82). Chomsky was, and remains, an enormously importantfigure in modern linguistics, and in the 60s and 70s his ideas swept the field.The core of his argument, and what makes him appealing to Jungians, wasthat there had to be innate structures in the brain that defined a set of syntacticalrules a deep grammar common to all languages. Absent such structures, heargued, we could not account for the apparent ease and rapidity with whichyoung children in all cultures learned their native language (Chomsky 1965).What Chomsky did not do is offer an evolutionary account of how these brain

structures came to exist. Chomskys student, Steven Pinker, has undertaken tomake this case, and, in collaboration with Paul Bloom, has probably done thebest job one could within the neo-Darwinian framework (Pinker & Bloom1990; Pinker 1994). However, there are problems, and they have to do notonly with language but also with the genetic assimilation of any system ofsymbols. In what follows, therefore, I want to present a critique of Chomskysposition from an explicitly Baldwinian point of view. By focusing on the workof Deacon it is not my intention to give Deacon unique standing in the debateregarding evolution and language. A host of other commentators are increas-ingly critical of Chomsky, and have proposed alternatives to his notion thatthe acquisition of language requires preexisting syntactic knowledge lodgedin some organ of the brain (see for example Elman et al., 1996; Karmiloff &Karmiloff-Smith 2001; Kaye 1979). Deacons use of Baldwin, however,provides the particular kind of traction that will allow us, I believe, to betterunderstand the uses that may be made of Baldwinian thinking in relation toJung. Similarly, by focusing on a dispute in linguistics it is not my intention toneglect other areas where evolutionary theory plays a role in understandinghuman behaviour. But the importance of the symbolic in psychoanalysis andanalytical psychology does privilege issues in linguistics. One does not need

to be a Lacanian to believe that there is an important link between our under-standing of language and our understanding of the unconscious.

Although Chomskys theories have been the subject of controversy fromthe beginning, notably by other former students such as George Lakoff(Lakoff1987), it has taken Deacons astute analysis to bring home the most



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fundamental problem with Chomskys innatism. Deacons argument is simple.If a trait is going to establish itself in the genome under natural selection,

particularly in the genome of the entire human race, then the environmentalconditions that drive selection must be stable over long periods of time.Natural selection does not take place in relation to abstractions derived froman academic analysis of the environment, but rather in relation to the actualregularities encountered in the world. But, Deacon points out, the mostfundamental elements of language, insofar as they are actual aspects of theenvironment and not linguistic abstractions, do not meet this criterion, and itis therefore impossible for evolution to assimilate fundamental syntacticstructures as traits coded in the genome. Simply put, there are just too many

different ways in which various languages express something as fundamentalas the noun part/verb part distinction for the brain to contain neurologicalstructures that can account for them all. Additionally, languages change veryrapidly compared to evolutionary time scales, and so even if we posit acommon proto-language, it is unlikely that it would have been stable enough,long enough, to work its way into the genome. As Deacon remarks:

The universal attributes of language structure are by their nature the most variablein surface representation, variably mapped to processing tasks, and poorly local-izable within the brain between individuals or even within individuals. Therefore,

they are the leastlikely features of language to have evolved specific neural supports.Those aspects of language that many linguists would rank most likely to be partof the Universal Grammar are precisely those that are ineligible to participate inBaldwinian evolution! If there are innate rules of grammar in the minds of humaninfants, then they could not have gotten there by genetic assimilation, only bymiraculous accident.

(1997, p. 333)

Deacons alternative to Chomsky is explicitly Baldwinian. Rather than positthe existence of innate structures in the brain that generate grammaticallyformed languages in children, he argues, we should first look for brain struc-tures that have the level of generality necessary to support the surface structuresof any language. These structures largely have to do with the neurophysiologyof the speech and auditory faculties, and the peculiarities of memory thatsupport the learning of complex and idiosyncratic systems of signs. Ironically,for example, poor short-term memory in children seems to fit th is requirementbetter than the developed short-term memory and fairly accurate transfer tolong-term memory characteristic of adults. We should then look at language,and the actual processes of learning language, to see how they have co-evolvedto work well with the evolved brain structures. Indeed, Jerome Bruner, another

pioneer, along with Chomsky, in the anti-behaviourist development of cog-nitive science, has pointed out that children do not simply begin to spontan-eously generate grammatical language but rather go through a very particularlearning process heavily dependent on stereotypical interactions with theirparents or care-givers (Bruner 1990). Deacon, along with researchers from a



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variety of other fields, such as theoretical roboticist Horst Hendriks-Jansen(Hendriks-Jansen 1996) and developmental psychologists Ester Thelen and

Linda Smith (Thelen & Smith 1998), argues that it is really these stereotypicallearning processes that are more likely to be stable over time and space, andthat the Baldwinian co-evolution of language and brain relies on them to estab-lish our linguistic abilities. Languages do in fact exhibit the deep structuresof grammar that Chomsky attributes to them. But those structures are not tobe found in some specifiable neurological structures in the brain. Rather, lan-guages have structures like the noun/verb distinction because the brain doeshave structures that make this form of categorization more efficient for learningand using the language. In fact, Deacon continues, different language groups

may well have developed the distinction independently of one another becausethey had to if they were going to survive in the Baldwinian co-evolutionaryprocess of adapting to the environment created within the human brain.Deacon explains this point as one of convergence in evolution:

I believe that recognizing the capacity of languages to evolve and adapt with respectto human hosts is crucial to understanding another long-standing mystery aboutlanguage that theories of innate knowledge were developed to explain: the source oflanguage universals. Grammatical universals exist, but I want to suggest that theirexistence does not imply that they are prefigured in the brain like frozen evolution-ary accidents. In fact, I suspect that universal rules for implicit axioms of grammar

arent really stored or located anywhere, and in an important sense, they are notdetermined at all. Instead, I want to suggest the radical possibility that they haveemerged spontaneously and independently in each evolving language, in responseto universal biases in the selection processes affecting language transmission. Theyare convergent features of language evolution in the same way that the dorsal finsof sharks, ichthyosaurs, and dolphins are independent convergent adaptations ofaquatic species.

(Deacon 1997, p. 115f)

Conclusion

Baldwinian theory and Jungian psychology

I began this paper by arguing that it is a mistake to view Jung as a Lamarckianin his thinking about evolution. The basis for this argument was the recog-nition of Jungs familiarity with and uses of two of the most prominent anti-Lamarckians of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, James Mark Baldwinand Conway Lloyd Morgan. I then showed that Baldwin and Lloyd Morganovercame the arguments of the neo-Lamarckians by explicitly integratingthe workings of mind, or consciousness, into the evolutionary process. Given

Jungs already established theoretical commitments regarding a phylogeny ofthe mind the object of complaints by Freud we would expect him toembrace this point of view, which I believe he did. That much said, it is stillworth reiterating a point made above: I do not want to argue that Jung wasnecessarily a consistently self-conscious Baldwinian in his evolutionary th inking.



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Indeed, Jungs interest in and familiarity with the intricacies of evolutionarytheory was relatively limited, in large measure, I suspect, because a fully

developed evolutionary theory was not essential to the elaboration of hissystem of psychology. This again in contrast to Freud, who consistentlyrecognized the central role Lamarckism played in the development andelaboration of his system. Jung did, however, believe that evolution played animportant role in the development of the psyche, and, to the extent that he wasfamiliar with both Baldwin and Lloyd Morgan, his thinking on evolutionshould not be peremptorily confused with Lamarckism simply because he sawa conjunction between the psychological and the material. To the contrary, itwas precisely this conjunction that would have been underwritten by his

reading of Lloyd M organ and Baldwin.Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory has, of course, become an issue ofcentral concern in contemporary psychology and psychiatry (see for example:Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby 1992; Stevens & Price 1996; McGuire & Troisi1998; Pietikainen 1998; Hogenson 1998; Stevens 1998), thereby making theinterpretation of Jungs relationship to evolutionary theory of far more centralconcern than it was in Jungs time. In this context, this paper may be read asan introduction to a Baldwinian understanding of Jung that seeks to make useof his familiarity with Baldwin and Lloyd M organ as a point of departure for

further developments in theory and practice.But there are consequences that derive from a Baldwinian reading of Jungthat Jung may not have fully appreciated, given the relatively limited attentionhe paid to the details of evolutionary thinking, and that call into questioncertain assumptions about the nature of the archetypes and the collective uncon-scious commonly shared by Jungians. Recalling Terrence Deacons commentthat the universal rules or implicit axioms of grammar are not really stored orlocated anywhere, I believe that it is possible that the same may be said of theevolutionary foundations of the archetypes. Put boldly, the argument in thispaper leads one to conclude that the archetypes of the collective unconscious,as either modular entities in the brain or as neo-Platonic abstractions in somealternative ontological universe, do not exist, in the sense that there is noplacewhere the archetypes can be said to be. Innate modularity for the meaningful-ness of myths and symbols, the notion that archetypes fall within the sameframe as Chomskys language learning module, falls to the same criticism asDeacon brings against Chomsky. The surface manifestation of symbols andmyths, of the narratives, which form the basis for the human sense of meaning,are as variable over time and space as the languages in which they are trans-mitted. As Dumezil, Eliade and many other comparative mythologists have

acknowledged, there are indeed deep structural resemblances in many of theworlds myths. But the same scholarship that provides this confirmation ofJungs fundamental insight also presents us with such a welter of differenceson the surface that claims for a straightforward evolutionary basis for thecommon structure is rendered extremely problematic, if not impossible of



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realization. By the same token, highly abstracted models of the archetypes neo-Platonic or otherwise fall prey to the fact that abstract structures derived

from the analysis of form do not provide the environment necessary forevolutionary assimilation. The world is not made up of logical structures, butrather of concrete instances of actually occurring entities that place adaptivedemands on the organism.

So does this mean that we should give up the battle and join the forces thatthink that Jungs archetypes are nothing more than the mystical mumbo-

jumbo of a deluded cult leader? To the contrary. Let me again be bold. Dothe archetypes of the collective unconscious exist? Of course they do. Theyhave to, or we truly would inhabit N imrods kingdom after Yahweh destroyed

the tower and confused the languages. For the confusion of languages wouldalso be the confusion of stories, of our basic human narratives, and we can,however imperfectly, understand one anothers stories. But the archetypes donot exist in some particular place, be it the genome or some transcendentrealm of Platonic ideas. Rather, the archetypes are the emergent properties ofthe dynamic developmental system of brain, environment, and narrative. Thetheoretical roboticist, Horst Hendriks-Jansen, captures the spirit of this pointof view when he writes:

The synthesis of activities, producing the emergent pattern, cannot be paralleled

in a corresponding synthesis of neurological correlates or mathematical character-izations. Interactive emergence means there exists no overall formal description ofthe h igh-level phenomenon, though its pat tern will be clearly recognizable within thecontext of the creatures environment.

(Hendriks-Jansen 1996, p. 228f)

What does this point of view indicate for theory building in analytical psy-chology? To me, it is precisely in the work of Terrence Deacon, HorstHendriks-Jansen, Ester Thelen and others, that the opportunity presents itselfto move forward in our understanding of the theory of archetypes. A revolu-tion is taking place in cognitive science, in the movement away from ever morecomplex and intricately ramified modular or programme based models of themind, and toward models based on the emergent properties of dynamic, com-plex, interactive systems. This process parallels important changes taking placein our understanding of evolution, and the mechanisms that actually shape ourbiological being in the world (for a discussion of this point of view in relationto the theory of archetypes see the recent paper by Saunders and Skar [2001],Archetypes, complexes and self organization). It is my expectat ion that thesenew avenues of research situated robotics, dynamic systems theories of

development, the neuro-anatomy of symbolic processes all of which shareimpor tant affinities with Jungs interest in Baldwinian evolution, will radicallyalter what we see in human development and psychopathology, therebyproviding us with new insights into Jungs theories about the nature of thehuman psyche. We may then find, for example, that archetypal theory really



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is compatible with evolutionary and developmental theory, even that both atheory of evolution and a theory of development are necessary to sustain the

theory of archetypes. But it will not be development as we have been taught tothink of it either in largely Freudian terms or by classical infant observation.Nor will the evolutionary processes that underpin the theory be thoseembraced by evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists. Rather, thepresence of simple patterns of perception and action, and species typical formsof interpretation, embedded in the typically human environment of symbolic,narrative interaction will be seen to give rise to the immense beauty andcomplexity of the great myths of our species.

TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT

Cet article interroge lide que C. G. Jung aurait appuy sa thorie des archtypes surle modle de lvolution de Lamarck. Cette ide est mise en cause partir du fait queJung connaissait et sappuyait sur les crits de James Mark Baldwin et Conway LloydMorgan, qui taient tous les deux des opposants connus et fervents de la thorie no-Lamarckienne part ir dun cadre de rfrence no-Darwinien. Larticle donne ensuiteles grandes lignes du modle de lvolution propos par Baldwin et Lloyd M organ, quiest maintenant connu comme lvolution baldwinienne ou effet Baldwin. Dans ce modle

les facteurs psychologiques sont explicitement vus comme essentiels au processusdvolution. Pour finir lauteur passe en revue lutilisation de la pense baldwiniennedans les thorisarions contemporaines relatives au langage et autres systmes sym-boliques, et avance des hypothses quant aux implications quont linfluence desmodles baldwiniens sur la construction thorique en psychologie analytique.

Diese Arbeit stellt berlegungen an zur Behauptung, da C. G. Jung ein LamarckschesEvolutionsmodell verwandte, um seine Archetypentheorie zu untersttzen. DieserBehauptung wird widersprochen auf der Grundlage von Jungs Vertrautheit mit und

der Verwendung der Schriften von James Mark Baldwin und Conway Lloyd Morgan,die beide auf neo-Darwinistischer Grundlage bekannte und machtvolle Gegner derneo-Lamarckschen Theorie waren. Die Arbeit beschreibt dann in Umrissen dasEntwicklungsmodell, das von Baldwin und Lloyd Morgan vorgeschlagen wurde,bekannt geworden als Baldwinsche Evolution oder der Baldwin Effekt. Dieses Modellverwendet explizit psychologische Faktoren als zentral fr den evolutionren Proze.Schlielich wird ein berblick gegeben ber den Gebrauch Baldwinschen Denkensin zeitgenssischer Theoriebildung hinsichtlich Sprache und anderer symbolischerSysteme. Vorschlge hinsichtlich der Implikationen Baldwinscher Modelle fr dieTheoriebildung in Analytischer Psychologie werden unterbreitet.

In questo lavoro viene presa in considerazione laffermazione che C. G. Jung abbiausato un modello evolutivo Lamarkiano a sostegno della sua teoria degli Archetipi.Tale affermazione viene contestata sulla base della familiarit con e delluso degliscritti di James Mark Baldwin e di Conway Lloyd Morgan, entrambi noti e accaniti



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oppositori della teoria neo-Lamarkiana, a partire da e allinterno di una impostazioneneo-Darwiniana. Il lavoro delinea quindi il modello evolutivo proposto da Baldwin e

da Lloyd Morgan, divenuto noto come evoluzione Baldwiniana o come leffettoBaldwin. Tale modello considera esplicitamente i fattori psicologici come centrali nelprocesso evolutivo. Viene infine riesaminato luso del pensiero di Baldwin nelleteor izzazioni contemporanee sul linguaggio e su altr i sistemi simbolici e si suggerisconopossibili implicazioni dei modelli Darwiniani sulla costruzione teorica della psicologiaanalitica.

Este papel considera la afirmacin de que C. G. Jung us el modelo evolutivoLamarkiano para escribir su teora de los arquetipos. Este es retado sobre la base de

que Jung estaba familiarizado y usaba los escritos de James Mark Baldwin y ConwayLloyd Morgan, que eran ambos connotados oponentes de lateora neo-Lamarckianadesde un marco neo-Darwiniano. El trabajo por lo tanto destaca el modelo evolutivopropuesto por Baldwin y Lloyd Morgan, el cual ha venido a ser conocido como laevolucin Baldwiniana o el efecto Baldwin. Este modelo explcitamente observa a losfactores psicolgicos como centrales para el proceso evolutivo. Finalmenmte, se revisael uso del pensamiento Baldwiniano en la teorizacin contempornea en relacin allenguaje y otros sistemas simblicos y se hacen sugerencias en relacin a las implica-ciones de los modelos Baldwinianos en la construccin de la psicologa analtica.

Note

1. Around the turn of the century there were two lines of thought in biology that havesince fallen into disrepute. One was Lamarckism, or more correctly neo-Lamarckism,and the other was recapitualsionism, proposed in particular by the German biologist,Ernst Haeckel. Recapitulationism is unquestionably an important issue in understand-ing Jungs thinking and even more so that of some of his close followers such as ErichNeumann but requires its own detailed examination. The present paper confines itselfto the question of Lamarckism in Jung. For a detailed discussion of recapitulationismsee Gould 1977. For a discussion of Neumanns recapitulationism, and the problems itposes for Jungian theory see Giegerich 1975.

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[MS first received November 2000; final version April 2001]


Documents

A Neglected Influence on C G Jung