A National Debate on Defence – A Dire Necessity

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A National Debate on Defence~ A Dire Necessity

National security is the rst duty of Government. Britain asa country continues to have global responsibilities and

global ambitions. We will remain a rst rate military power.

Current Cabinet Office Brieng Note

We are agreed that the rst duty of government is to safeguard our national security and support our troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere and we will full that duty.

David Cameron and Nick Clegg

Foreword to the Coalitions 2010 programme for government

% of UK GDP

A UKNDA Report / 17 September 2012


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AUTHORS

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael GraydonGeneral Sir Michael Rose

Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy BlackhamAir Commodore Andrew Lambert

Allen SykesAntony Hichens (Coordinating Editor)

FOREWORD BY ANDREW ROBERTS

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors,and not necessarily those of the UKNDA.


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Table of Contents

Foreword ..................................................................................................................4

Executive Summary ..............................................................................................7

Introduction..............................................................................................................9

Security and Defence ........................................................................................10

Budgetary Considerations:Defence is not the cause of the nancial decit ............................14

Strategic Choices..................................................................................................17The American or Special Relationship ......................................................19

The European Relationship ............................................................................20

The Global Dimension ........................................................................................21

Going it Alone ......................................................................................................23

The Defence Calculus ........................................................................................24

Conclusions............................................................................................................29

Annexes....................................................................................................................31

A: Force ComparisonsUK Forces 1990~91/2011~12/post SDSR ......................................31

Forces by C ountry in 2012 ..............................................................32

B: The Armed Forces: Our country needs themby Gwythian Prins ..............................................................................33

C: Questions the Government Must Answer:

On Relations with America ............................................................36

On Relations with Europe ................................................................36

On the Global Dimension ................................................................37

On Going it Alone ..............................................................................37On UK Defence ....................................................................................37

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity

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Foreword

By Andrew Roberts

Nothing can ruin a British statesmans reputation quicker or more completely thanbeing suspected of having neglected the nations defences. The witness of ourpolitical history is testament to this so often as to make it a truism. Yet still BritishGovernments slice defence budgets through the muscle right down to the bone,despite the possible future danger to their own legacies. The fact that they couldescape this threat to their own reputations simply by spending a mere 1% of GDPmore on defence seems not to have occurred to them. These two excellent papers

by the UKNDA are no Cassandra-like warning, rather they are a whisper in the earof the decision-makers, made more in sorrow than anger, a nal plea to them tosave their own reputations whilst yet there is time.

In his day, Stanley Baldwin was considered one of the most adroit politicians of thepost-Victorian era. The man who steered Britain through the General Strike and theEmpire through the Abdication Crisis nally resigned in May 1937 after threepremierships to paeans of praise from both sides of the parliamentary aisle. Yetonly three years later he was a Guilty Man, whose constant paring down of thedefence budget in the interwar years was rightly seen as leaving Britain woefullyunder-armed when the war broke out. He died a broken and widely-reviled man,whose many great political achievements were largely forgotten because of hisfailures over defence.

Lord Aberdeen was forced to resign during the Crimean War due to defencefailures; William Gladstone lost the premiership in 1885 after the death of GeneralGordon; Herbert Asquith was forced to resign during the Great War over a

perceived lack of grip over defence; Neville Chamberlain was brought down in May1940 after a debate over the defeat in Norway. How many more times do Britishpoliticians need to be reminded that however well they do in the areas of nancialretrenchment (Gladstone) or old age pensions (Asquith) or public health andmunicipal reform (Chamberlain), they will never be forgiven if they fail the nationover matters of defence?

This paper and its companion have not been written in the spirit of the Fat Boy in

The Pickwick Papers who wants to make yer esh creep. Rather they includeperfectly believable scenarios and clear questions drawn up by some of Britainsmost distinguished generals, admirals, air chief marshals and military commentators


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showing why Britain needs to have a larger defence establishment than is presentlyposited in the Coalitions plans. In this paper the questions asked cannot be ignored.In its companion, readers can choose for themselves which scenarios they feel more

or less likely to take place over the next 15 years or so, but can any single one of ustruly say that they dont believe that one could? Yet the armed services that wewill be left with once the Coalitions plans go through will simply not be large andcredible enough to deal with such a situation, even if we are fortunate enough thatthey come singly, rather than in multiples, as is often the way with internationalcrises, especially where weakness is perceived by antagonists.

Lord Salisbury whose own defence policy was always to envisage the worstpossible scenario and then ensure the British Empire had the wherewithal to meet

it used to say that the four cruelest words in the British tongue were I told youso. These papers leave the UKNDA in a prime position to unleash that phraseshould any of these scenarios materialize with Britain unable to respond powerfully.Needless to say, none of its authors want to indulge in such scapegoating, but thefact is that the British Parliament, media and people will castigate severely thosewhom it holds responsible for leaving us open to embarrassment and humiliation.The most mortifying moment in recent international affairs arose during the Brownpremiership in March 2007 when Iran kidnapped a detachment of naval personnel

from HMS Cornwall. Does anyone imagine that such shame and disgrace wouldhave been visited upon the United Kingdom had the Royal Navy not by then beensliced back to little more than a home waters defence otilla?

Reducing the amount spent on defence as a percentage of GDP by almost one-halfsince 1991 might have been understandable had a New World Order genuinelyemerged from the ashes of Western Communism, one that justied that mostchimerical of Nineties concepts, the peace dividend. Instead the world has becomea place of multifarious threats rather than a single huge one with the result thatthe British armed forces have been busier than ever, only with just over half theresources of 1991. Politicians who wriggle and squirm when having to justify cutsto social programmes, disability benets, and the multifarious entitlementprogrammes that go to make up our ever-increasingly-ravenous Welfare State,nonetheless happily slice back the armed services, knowing that the senior officerswill not leak state secrets and the non-commissioned servicemen and women haveno trade unions and cannot (and would not) go on strike.

It seems astonishing that politicians themselves should not want a stronger military,as that and only that gives them a voice worth listening to in the councils of theworld. Britain is an active participant in and indeed often a founder member of


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the United Nations, NATO, the Commonwealth, the G7, the European Union, theG20, the World Trade Organization, OECD, OESC, and the Special Relationship, yetBritish politicians are increasingly being sent naked into the Conference chamber,

in Aneurin Bevans crushing rejoinder to the unilateralists at the 1957 Labour Partyconference. Why do they themselves not revolt over this? Answering the questionsposed in this paper might just begin this revolution.

Even if our politicians wanted Britain simply to become another Holland or Belgium,our insular geographical position precludes this. If our overseas trade routes wereever seriously disrupted, let alone cut off, we would starve very quickly, as theChiefs of Staff assessed at a time when more of the country was under cultivationthan today and the numbers of mouths to feed far smaller. Simply becoming a

social democratic fourth-rate power is not an honourable position for apost-imperial power like Britain with global responsibilities and trading interests.

Further disarmament on the scale to which the Coalition is proposing 20% of theinfantry, 14% of the Royal Navy; 13% of the RAF mig ht possibly be justiable if therest of the world was disarming too, although even then it would require cautionand the minimization of risk. Yet in fact the exact opposite is the case. Russia isbuilding aircraft carriers; what on earth does a country with such little overseastrade need them for? China is sabre-rattling in the South China Seas and buildinga drone force of terrifying capability (as well as launching cyber-attacks against usevery single week of the year). Iran is building a nuclear bomb and thereafter willdevelop the capability to deliver it deep into Europe, to name but three foes ofdemocracy in general, and potential foes of Britain in particular.

The only rational thing to do under these increasingly perilous circumstances islook to the oft-repeated lessons of history, as well as to the politicians ownreputational best interests, and halt the potentially disastrous disarmament

programme as presently envisaged. Any other course would be illogical, dangerousand ultimately self-defeating. A loyal Tory to the marrow of my being, I do not wantthe present Cabinet to be arraigned at the bar of public opinion as tomorrowsGuilty Men. For on present showing, on issues ranging from aircraft carriers toHawker Harriers, they would be found culpable. Even though individually eachConservative minister is as patriotic and well-meaning as any of the authors ofthese papers, together they have been corralled by the Treasury just as StanleyBaldwins Cabinet was.

It is not too late: Stop the defence cuts.

Andrew Roberts


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Executive Summary

Prime Ministers acknowledge that defence is the rst priority of government; yet

they also believe that there are few votes in it. The result in practice is to assign alow priority to defence expenditure so that, when total state budgets must be cut,defence suffers. Yet, of all the forms of state expenditure, it is defence whichrequires the longest term outlook. Decisions taken now will largely determine thesecurity options available to a prime minister in 2030. The introduction of newsystems and the restoration of lost capabilities take that long.

The 2010 National Security Strategy Review asserted as our national aspiration tobuild Britains prosperity, extend our nations inuence in the world and strengthenour security. Defence is not the only tool with which to assure a reasonable levelof security, but soft power always needs hard power to back it. Britains securityhas been seriously compromised by SDSR 2010 which used arbitrary budgetarytargets to determine its outcome. It is now clear that decisions made then haveincreased the risks we run in an ever more uncertain world. Capabilities have beendiscarded, numbers of men, ships, aircraft and weapons have been reduced withoutconcern for the consequences.

Defence expenditure did not cause the budgetary crisis. At close to a 2% share ofGDP it has almost halved since the end of the Cold War. During that period themilitary have been constantly deployed. Yet the services have endured redundancyprogrammes far greater than any other government department.

The Government faces substantial nancial challenges. Nevertheless, choices havebeen made. Money has been poured into welfare, health and education. It is not forus to tell the Government what it can afford. It is the duty of government to makepriority choices that maximise our prosperity, inuence and security. Given the stateof the world and the high priority that successive prime ministers have said shouldbe accorded to defence, how can this Govern ment jus tify the low priority itcurrently receives?

Britains defence relies on two alliances, the special relationship with the UnitedStates and mutual defence arrangements in Europe, principally through NATO. Thepower of the United States has been key to Britains security. An ally is only worthwhat he contributes to a joint endeavour. Britain in the past has earned its place asAmericas closest ally but it is now in danger of being able to contribute no more

than token forces. This irreplaceable alliance is at risk. In Europe, Britains leadershipin security has underpinned her inuence, in spite of her ambivalence over fullintegration into the EU. At a time when America is re-orientating her defence efforts


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towards Asia Pacic, Britain is discarding that leadership. In addition, Britain hasits part to play in the maintenance of global security, at least where the interests ofthe West and global trade are threatened, as well as retaining the capacity forindependent action where only our own interests are at stake. Do we still have thenumbers for all these tasks?

We can still contribute to the American alliance valued capabilities such asintelligence, diplomacy and some aspects of defence such as Special Forces.However, the reduction in the scale of the army, navy and air force makes anythingmore we can offer merely symbolic. For enduring tasks current force levels leaveus able to deploy only six destroyers or frigates, an army brigade and little morethan two Offensive Support squadrons.

We believe that our armed forces have reached a watershed in their ability torespond to the threats we may face. The world around us is more, not less, unstable.In our view, the issue is not whether we can afford adequate defence, but ratherwhat is the minimum level of strength required to meet our national objectives?We call on the Government to answer the questions we have posed and enter intoa serious national debate on the priority Britain should accord defence within atotal budget the nation can afford.


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A National Debate on Defence

~ A Dire Necessity

Introduction

Defence decisions taken now will largely determine the security options availableto a Prime Minister in 2030. Adequate defence is a long term commitment; it hasfew champions, yet failure to provide it can be catastrophic. The decision materiallyto reduce our already stretched defence capability is an awesome responsibilityand not one that should be taken without the risks being analysed and exposed,and unquestionably not without a public debate.

Defence lies at the heart of what government is for: if the realm cannot be defended, it cannot perform its other functions 1

Hence, by denition, defence is the rst priority for government.

It is all too easy to hide behind the nancial challenges facing us, but we aresleepwalking into a time when a Government could be confronted by its ownimpotence in the security eld. Our accompanying paper Disarmament &Consequences 2 suggests a number of scenarios in which this could be the case.Whilst some of these conjectures may seem far-fetched, they are not impossibleand what is certain is that when the next situation arises requiring a militaryresponse it will be generated externally and be a surprise. It always has been andalways will be; that is the way of the world.

While we only look forward in that paper 13 years, the reality is that what is decidedby the Government today will affect our security posture well beyond that timeframe. The introduction of new systems takes that long; the restoration of lostcapabilities and the expertise that goes with them is a lengthy process. Our DefenceIndustrial capacity is a shadow of its former self, and shrinking. We shouldremember that our armed forces are ghting now mainly with equipment designedand developed in the 1990s; in the case of a number of capabilities well before that.

1 Charles Moore, Daily Telegraph , 30th June 2012.2 Disarmament and Consequences , published by the UKNDA, 17th September 2012.


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There is a need for a full and informed debate on defence in this country, somethingthat has simply not happened. Our security is too important to be considered as

just another aspect of state expenditure.

Security is also far too important to be just a party political issue. In opposition,political parties welcome reports on defence from independent sources such asourselves; in power they ignore them. We hope that this paper, posing questionsas it does, will promote both responsible answers and the non-partisan debate sourgently required.

Security and Defence

In any enterprise, it is advantageous, if not essential, to have clear strategic goals.

For a nation, this may be problematic; overt ambitions in a complex world may bemisunderstood or misinterpreted. External events, over which a nation has little ifany control, have a nasty habit of changing the assumptions unexpectedly, andcompelling reactions often at odds with long term goals.

Thus, if American ambition to remain the sole superpower were to be publicly

stated, its relations with China and possibly Russia would suffer. Nevertheless, thatis surely what drives the USA. Of course America recognises that China in particularwill in due course challenge this ambition; but staying at Number 1 ts the Americanpsyche and excites national endeavour. Strategies to achieve this will include avariety of activities using a number of tools, from aggressive world trade to supportfor alliances both of which enhance security and inuence. The essentialunderpinning of all this are strong and capable armed forces.

One can conjecture that other nations, too, have very clear strategic goals andstrategies to effect them.

In contrast, the United Kingdom has evolved, as its nature has changed over thelast century, from the hub of British Empire and world leader to second class statusand a leading alliance member. Our strategic goals have changed, indeed withered.We are now becalmed in a pragmatic web which avoids ambitious strategies andgoals but enables, in fact encourages, actions in response to events at the time andas we choose.

This approach served us well throughout the Cold War. It enabled us to positionourselves mid-Atlantic with strong connections to America and adequate links to



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Europe, a foot in both camps, without committing ourselves to any sphere totally.And yes, we could persuade ourselves that we were the perfect link between theUS and Europe, the great bridge of common sense and persuasion.

In looking for guidance to inform this paper on security and defence, we will notbe able to harness a clear statement of British national ambitions as perhaps mightbe possible in the United States or China, or indeed India. We can do no bettertherefore than to look at the review of National Security Strategy in 2010 whichgave as its backdrop: 3

to use our national capabilities to build Britains prosperity , extend our nations inuence in the world and strengthen our security .

We cannot achieve the absolute in any of these three elements, prosperity ,inuence or security , but we suggest that they represent useful aspirations againstwhich to examine our strategic objectives and their value, and from this attempt toidentify the resources needed for their achievement.

However, we should rst remind ourselves of the relationship between security anddefence.

Security, like Inuence and Prosperity, is an objective. Defence is not the only toolto achieve it. Soft power, in the form of diplomacy and foreign aid, makes a majorcontribution to achieving security. There are other tools too. In the post-modernworld, there are those who consider that defence is the least important of thesetools. It is not however a point that stands serious analysis. For example, in the caseof Russia they have announced that they will continue the increase of their militaryspending by 53 percent in real terms up until 2014. 4 In the Middle East, the Gulf andmost especially in the Far East, something closely akin to a conventional arms racewith nuclear overtones is taking place. Thus the idea that military capability is indecline is questionable. Let us be clear too that capability can turn into threatovernight, and that this is more likely when the military risks involved are low.

Security is a state, not a tool. Defence, as we have said, is one of the tools by whichthis state is to be obtained. Often, ideologically-motivated or extremist activity will

3 Cm 7953, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,October 2010, p9.

4 SIPRI: 17 Apr 2012, Carina Solmirano is a researcher with the Military Expenditure and ArmsProduction Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) .http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/5560



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need to be dealt with by military action; consider the growth of Al Qaeda in WestAfrica for example; it is hard to see any immediate role for soft power there.Moreover, strategy is not a vision, nor a policy, still less a series of pious hopes; it is

a set of principal actions by which the desired end can be achieved. It is forGovernment to decide which tools to use in pursuit of a strategic aim. It was notthe Army who asked to go to Afghanistan, nor the RAF and Navy who asked to goto Libya; it was the government who, with all other levers untenable, choseconventional military force to carry out its aims.

Co-ordination between the various tools, the hard and soft power levers, is crucialin pursuing the goal of security. For now let us agree that security is an objectiveand that defence wi ll make its unique contribution to its achievement.

Why are we now putting forward the need for a national debate on defence ? Wesubmit that there have been only two intellectually sound strategic defencereviews in the last 50 years. Both, as it happened, were conducted under LabourGovernments, Denis Healey was Defence Secretary for the review in 1966/67, andGeorge Robertson for that in 1998. The N ott review 5, a classic example of a reviewled primarily by budget considerations, without clear assessment of the strategicconsequences, was fortunately sunk before it had taken hold by the Falklands

campaign. Nothing could better demonstrate the fragility of assumptions whichcharacterise most such reviews. External threats outside Government controldictate defence needs; the provision of balanced forces is the best response tothis reality.

There has been sufficient criticism both from Parliamentary committees andindependent experts of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010to justify the conclusion that this review, in which arbitrarily applied budgetarylevels were used to determine the outcome, fails on all counts to meet the challengeof intellectual honesty. At best it conforms to the cost cutting exercises carried outunder a number of fancy titles by the Conservative Government in the 1990s. At itsworst it ies in the face of the words of David Cameron at the Sovereigns Parade,Sandhurst on 13th August 2010, some three months after becoming Prime Minister,

5 The aim of the review was to reduce expenditure during the early 1980s recession and tofocus on supporting NATO rather than out of area operations. This review proposed extensivecuts to the Royal Navy including the sale of the new aircraft carrier Invincible to Australia.

Any out-of-area amphibious operations were considered unlikely. The entire Royal Marineamphibious force was in jeopardy of being disbanded and the sale of Intrepid and Fearlesswas mooted. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Defence_White_Paper



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There are difficult decisions ahead but I will never forget that the defenceof the nation is the rst duty of any government.

What is now clear is that the decisions made by the SDSR, and subsequently, haveincreased the risks associated with our security. Capability Holiday has becomepart of the lexicon of defence jargon, and numbers have been reduced across theboard. These may be rectied by 2020 the assumption being that an expandingeconomy will allow a small increase in the defence budget from 2015 but that isfar from certain. However, without positive action, Capability Holidays will soonbecome permanent capability gaps, and depleted forces are weakened forces,creating permanent risks. No unit however capable can be in two places at once;reduced numbers severely impact on our a bility to deal with short notice andconcurrent operations. It is of interest that in the Libyan operation all the shipsinitially employed were available because they happened to be transiting fromother tasks. As it was, they were on their way to the scrapyard and would not havebeen available a couple of months later.

This reduction in capability (see Annex A) and the associated risk should then havegenerated a national debate.

Since 2010, worryingly, the risks to our security have increased, as the ForeignSecretary has admitted.

The range of threats and dangers is, if anything, increasing. 6

The SDSR removed capabilities from the nations defence that could present thisGovernment or future Administrations with no serious options to deal with a rangeof crises. But, if this alone were not bad enough, we now face the USAdministrations decision 7 that from now on Asia Pacic will be the main focus ofAmerican defence activity. The implication is clear, the days of European freeloadingon US military might are numbered. All of this reinforces the need to think again.

There has been no serious debate at the highest level on defence since Tony Blairsaddress to RUSI in 2007 on board HMS Albion a few months before he resigned asPrime Minister. Let us remind ourselves of the points he made then:

6 William Hague, 30 Apr 12, Evidence to the House of Lords and House of Commons JointCommittee on the National Security Strategy.

7 New US strategy document Sustaining US Global Leadership . Accordingly, ... while the U.S.military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacic region .



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In foreign policy values are as important as interests. Britains foreign policy is founded on two major alliances, America and NATO. Hard and soft power are combined in these alliances which employ both force and

diplomacy. Then 11th September 2001 changed everything. The new frontiers for our security are seen to be global. Hard and soft power wereand are driven by the same principles; we need both. Soft power alwaysneeds the back-up of hard power to be effective. Setting aside hard power will lead inexorably to the weakening of all power.

The new situation for Government requires increased expenditure onequipment, personnel and training, and the need for better conditions for our Armed Forces; not just in the short term but for the long term. The

world has changed. We must change with it.

Tony Blair set out cogently the choices and looked forward to the debate. Of courseit never happened as his resignation shortly thereafter, and the new Prime Ministerslack of interest, combined to condemn this seminal address to history.

In this paper we hope to stimulate the debate Blair called for. We will do this byposing clear questions to the Government and suggesting that there areimplications for our security and defence in the answers which must be placed in

front of the nation. Of course, none of this can be done in a budgetary vacuum. So,let us briey address the issue of Britains considerable decit which theGovernment quite rightly must abate.

Budgetary Considerations:Defence is not the cause of the nancial decit

The graph overleaf shows conclusively that Defence has not contributed to thecurrent massive decit. Indeed, one might easily argue the opposite. There has beena welcome increase in money allocated to Public Order and Safety in recognitionof the increased internal threat, but Defence has at lined with its share of GDPvirtually halved (see cover page); all this in the face of a marked increase in externalthreats, and a huge increase in operational commitments. Although Ministers clingto the sound bite that we are spending the fourth greatest amount in the world ondefence, in the same breath they argue that other European nations are not

spending enough. Yet we are palpably not achieving anything like the fourthgreatest amount of military capability France, of at least equivalent capability inmany areas, has larger forces, Italy has more combat aircraft (see Annex A), and



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we have the smallest army amongst Western nations of comparable size. Moreover,

the proper measure is surely, are we spending enough for our safe defence , notare we spending more than someone else ?

It is true that there have been too many cases of equipment overspend, althoughthe MoD is hardly unique in this area; almost every major public project has sufferedthe same fate. Indeed the whole governm ental system of conducting major projectslends itself to such failure and we have seen it in the NHS, HMRC, ScottishParliament, London Underground and many others. Nonetheless it is reprehensibleand a waste of resources. The causes are many. They include insufficient nancialexpertise in the Civil Service, poor nancial control by Accounting Officers,inordinate bureaucratic delays in approvals, politically inspired sourcing of productsfrom inefficient industries, changes of mind and delays often forced from outsidethe MoD, short term savings measures which have increased costs, and a failure tosupport the defence industry with the work necessary to keep it skilled andefficient. There has been a lack of honesty in identifying these causes and a rush tond scapegoats conveniently amongst those who cannot defend themselves andare anyway not nancially accountable the Chiefs of Staff.

Today there is little understanding of defence in Parliament; indeed it is viewed asan optional extra by some, having themselves had the luxury of being brought up


Government Spendingin 2012Bn


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in a world made relatively peaceful by strong defence and deterrence. Thus thedefence budget, not responsible for the nations budgetary problems, has beenseen both as part of the problem and solution, and cut accordingly. Governments,

who claim that the electorate are indifferent to defence concerns, have chosen toneglect their duty to explain the nature of the world around us which justiesexpen diture on defence. This is the responsibility that comes with high office andit should not be shirked.

While presiding over the reduction of the defence share of national revenues,governments have still felt able to commit service personnel and equipmentsalmost continuously in a series of operations since 1991; and, as is always the case,the Services have delivered a unique record no other governme nt department

can match. But the cost of this has been a tragic expenditure of human life, a lossof wider operational training, a shortening of the life of expensive equipment anda severe running down of equipment stocks, ammunition and spares. Industry nolonger has the capacity, as it did in the 1930s, even in the 1960s, to recover thissituation quickly, and will shrink further if not supported.

In the context of balancing the use of homebased industry against offshoreacquisition, it is worth remembering that a signicant proportion of money spent

on acquisition in the UK returns to the treasury in the form of VAT. Money spentabroad results in VAT (or equivalent) being paid to the Treasuries of thosecountries a transfer of UK taxpayers money to the taxpayers of another country,possibly at the cost of their own jobs. There seem to be good nancial argumentsfor support to UK industry.

Simultaneously over the last two decades, the Services have endured redundancyprogrammes, one after another, far greater than any other government department;it is doubtful whether the military cover for national emergencies, so often called

on, will be available in the future. The next generation, our childrens generation, towhom the Government owes a clear duty, are at risk of being left dangerouslyexposed to even relatively minor increases in threats.

The defence decisions of the present Government and its Labour predecessorsstem from an insufficient appreciation of why defence is so different from all othercalls on the public purse. Defence needs are dictated by existing and potentialexternal threats outside government control against which government must be

prepared. A sound economy is dependent on a sound defence, as Gwythian Prinsargues in his article (see Annex B). Defence requires steady, committed long-termfunding for two reasons: rst to provide long-term defence projects at minimum



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cost; and second to attract, motivate and retain well qualied service personnelwhich high technology defence systems require. The belief in attractive long-termcareers in the armed forces is fading, as officials have admitted. This dangerously

compromises future security.We fully appreciate that the government faces a substantial nancial challenge.Nevertheless, we have shown that choices have been made over the last 20 years;money has been poured into Welfare, Health and Education. It is not for us to tellthe Government what it can afford; but the duty of a government is to make prioritychoices that maximise our prosperity, inuence and security; the last being anecessary condition for achievement of the rst two.

At present we spend about 2% of GDP on core defence. This might well need torise but it would take a number of years to do so. Even in todays difficult economicclimate, it need not be unaffordable, and this must be borne in mind when thechoices are made.

The key question that the government has to answer is:

In the light of the state of the world, the threats facing us, and the high priority publicly stated by successive Prime Ministers, how canthe Government justify the lower priority now accorded to Defence?

Strategic Choices

As we have said, there are no absolutes in prosperity , inuence and security , butwe can make improvements. If it is accepted that the NSS objectives of buildingour prosperity, extending our inuence and strengthening our security representBritish strategy, how should these objectives be achieved?

Historically, our mid-Atlantic posture has enabled us to retain a foot in two camps America and Europe and our leading role in the Commonwealth has allowedvaluable global relationships to be maintained. Will this philosophy serve us for thefuture? Will we still want it in 20 years time?

We can answer this best by asking some fundamental questions of these key

relationships which have helped deliver our aims in the past. As background, thediagram on the following page shows the relative importance of the markets withwhich we trade. Though it is only a snapshot for Q4 at the end of last year plotting



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export share against export growth it indicates the importance of America andEurope to our prosperity , whilst indicating likely trends for the future. 8 This pointwas conrmed by the BIS in 2010:

The top ve markets for both goods and services exports from the UK have remained the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Ireland for decades. However, other markets have changed substantially in their importance for UK exporters, with emerging markets such as China and India overtaking many historically important trading partners. 9

Our inuence in the world is a function of our prosperity and our diplomatic andmilitary strengths. Our permanent membership of the UN Security Council, our

leading role as a member of the G8, G20, NATO and the Commonwealth, are all keyto our ability to make our pre sence felt.

Our security is bound up in our membership of NATO and in our relationship withAmerica, Europe and our residual commitments around the world. We now examinethese relationships.

8

Cm 8303 Office for Budget Responsibility: Economic and scal outlook Mar 2012-07-31 p 67http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/category/topics/public-nance-forecasts-topics/ 9 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, November 2010


Figure 1 UK Export Markets


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The American or Special Relationship

For America, the relationship with the United Kingdom brings a staunch ally in

diplomacy, a good market for American goods, and a military and Intelligencecontribution historically valued. In the important international forums the UK cannormally be relied on for support

We have shown the importance of the USA to us as a trading partner. In securityterms, our relationship with America brings a powerful ally and an opportunity toinuence American thinking. Yet, our inuence in America should not be overstated.However much Britain wants a strong Special Relationship, it means muchless to the American Government and military than it does to us. And, as Sir MaxHastings 10 and others have pointed out, the relationship has always been based ona hard-headed assessment of benets to America rather than sentiment.

Nevertheless, it can be said with some condence, that for a relatively small nationwe have had more inuence on America than most if not all others, and thatworking with us in a complex world has been the normal and often preferred courseof action for Washington.

That this relationship has been built on common language, shared values andexperiences in WW2 and thereafter, is certainly true; that the closeness of ourDiplomatic, Intelligence and Military communities has been at the root of this is alsonot contestable. The US has often offered assistance to us even when we operatedindependently (the Falklands) and it is clear that our security has been massivelyenhanced by our relationship with America in NATO and in other arrangements.This relationship has not gone unnoticed by other nations, mostly to our benet.

Now, as America increasingly looks to Asia Pacic for her prosperity, inuence and

the source of potential threats, we have to ask ourselves whether this historicbenet can be maintained.

Our weaknesses in post-conict Iraq, and in Afghanistan, have damaged ourcredibility, particularly with the American Military. We may have some world classcapabilities but our numbers have been depleted to the extent of appearing tokenin many cases. As an example, just one Wing at a USAF Main Operating Base canbring to bear close to the offensive air power of the whole of the Royal Air Force

10 See Defending the Essential Relationship: Britain and the United States Fighting Together inthe 21st Century, Centre for Policy Studies, 12th July 2011.



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Tornado Fleet of today. 11And in terms of surface eet, one US Naval Task Force (ofwhich they have eleven) would be similar in tonnage and numbers to the entirereadily deployable Royal Navy.

If we accept, as we surely must, that we get much more from the Americanrelationship than we put in and that it is irreplaceable for our security, then we mustconclude that we should retain it at all costs. Th e questions that arise therefore are:

What armed forces do we need to have, and what do we need to do,to ensure that America continues to see the UK as a worthwhile ally?

Should we now support America in her Pacic interests? Would thisalso be in the UKs interests bearing in mind our trade with the AsianTigers and our Common Security Interests?

The European Relationship

For Europe, the UK is not just an important market for goods. Despite ourambivalence over full integration into the European Union(EU) and its monetaryarrangements, our membership of the EU is important to most if not all the othermembers. If we were outside the EU, Europes relationship with the rest of the worldwould suffer. As for the security of Europe, we have hitherto contributedsignicantly in capabilities, experience and also in credibility. For the smallernations, we are an important security counterbalance to larger nations domination.With declining military strength, all these may now be at risk.

The 27 nations which make up the EU are Britains largest trading market, with 31%of our exports going to Europe. Our prosperity is therefore signicantly depend enton this trading relationship. However, globally, the EU is in relative economic decline.It once accounted for 30% of global trade. Now it is only 16% and falling. 12 Thecentre of economic growth is moving to Asia, Africa and South America. Despitethis Europe will remain our major trading partner for decades to come.

Whilst our values and concepts of democracy link us to the Continent, our inuencein Europe rests less on our trading relationship as on our position in the wider world.Our seat on the UN Security Council has seen us take the lead in Europe on security

11

The RAF has 5 Operational Tornado Sqns of 12 aircraft each (60);a US Base has 3 Sqns of 24 aircraft (72).12 CIA World Factbook.



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matters, often in concert with the French. Our defence capabilities, in contrast tomost European nations, have been a clear foundation for strong links to the US anoutcome of some benet when Washington has become exasperated with Europeanfree-loading on defence. All this buys us inuence on both sides of the Atlantic.

We share a number of key security concerns with other European countries,particularly those emanating from a resurgent Russia, the Middle East and Iran.Thiscloseness for security and defence will remain whatever our future within the EU.But, there are tensions; only France appears to take defence seriously. Most nationsare spending around 1% GDP on defence and, despite much talk, collaboration androle specialisation, paths which might deliver more bang for the buck, have madelittle progress. The money spent on defence by Europe produces a poor return, and

reductions in the United Kingdom budget will add to the problems.

The conclusion must be that on all three counts, Prosperity, Inuence and Security,we have very important links to Europe and, whilst the relationship may blow hotand cold, it will remain important.

The questions that follow are:

What defence capabilities should Britain maintain if we wish to

remain a leader in European defence? What will we need to do to compensate for the pending reduction in

Americas commitment to Europe?

The Global DimensionBritain is nothing if not a trading nation, and our trade is fundamental to ourprosperity. In turn, successful trade hinges on security, on secure workplaces, onsecure lines of communication, not only over the oceans, but across overlandcorridors and through pipelines, via air routes and now even along bre-optic andradio electronic links. As the Chinese have shown across Africa and elsewhere,hand-in-hand with trade comes inuence and together they require nurturingthrough a secure environment in which they can prosper.

As we have shown in the graph above, our trade with the so-called BRICS nations

is in most cases increasing substantially. Recent visits abroad by the Prime Ministeraccompanied by large business delegations would indicate this opportunity isrecognised by the Government. Of course our interests are not just focussed on



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the BRICS; we must also look around the world for markets which underlines theneed for global stability and security.

It is in the global policing role, in support principally of America, that our inuence

is mainly felt. Historically, Britain has made a signicant contribution to the securityof the world. It was once able to enforce the freedom of the seas almost singlehandedly. For over half a century Britains global role has been as a leading ally ofthe United States deterring aggression, at least where it could threaten the interestsof the democratic west and, particularly, in providing the security context forsustaining global trade. With increased instability since the end of the Cold Warand ever greater globalisation of developed economies, this task has become moreonerous but esse ntial.

Our history is important. The leading role we play in the Commonwealth, the treatyobligations we have to assist in defence of countries once part of our empire,together with the less tangible obligations of the ex-colonial power, all add to therange of emergencies to which we may have to respond. Sierra Leone is an obviousexample. Beyond these historic ties, as a nation we have stood for fre edom fromtyranny and for humanitarian intervention, seldom alone but as part of the richworlds need to help with the problems of the weak, the poor and the oppressed. Allthis has enhanced our moral authority and inuence. We have been a force for good,

even for nations for whom we have no treaty or legacy obligation; Bosnia and Kosovofor example. Military intervention is by no means the only solution in this arena butit nearly always has a role to play; in the case of Sierra Leone, a leading role.

The military capabilities required to be an effective ally of the United States, as aleader in Europes defence, and of course in the defence of our own specialinterests, are likely to cover almost any capability we may be asked to contributeto international policing, but ships, aircraft and battalions cannot be in two placesat once. Our share of global policing affects any responsible calculation of theadequacy of resources. Only one example of present overstretch may suffice. TheRoyal Navy averages over 200 days a year away from home ports, in contrast toless than 100 days for the French navy.

In addition, we must look to the future. In the volatile world in which we live thereis clear merit in strengthening security ties through Alliances such as the Five PowerDefence Arrangement (FPDA) 13 between UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singaporeand Malaysia. It is reasonable to assume that the UK military presence of the right


13 For a description of thee Five Power Defence Arrangements see:http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/treaties/


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sort and right frequency can assist in promoting our inuence, and adding to oursecurity and prosperity.

If our conclusions are right, then the questions for the Government are:

Do we wish to continue our force for good interventions around theworld? What are the benets of maintaining a Global capability;what are the implications if we do not?

Can we meet these requirements and any other likely security needsfrom the forces available from other commitments, or do we need toadjust our force levels?

Going it Alone

Independence of action is always important to a nation; indeed, for this very reasonwe preserve an independent nuclear deterrent. Of course, in the great majority of caseswhere Britain might be involved in conict in the future, we will be acting in concertwith other allies such as NATO or a coalition of the willing. But there are times whenBritain must act alone to protect purely British interests, in situations where we couldnot rely on allies and friends, such as across our littoral and Exclusive Economic Zones,in Gibraltar, the Falklands, the Cyprus Sovereign Bases, in providing Military Aid to theCivil Power, on specic piracy patrols, and even for evacuation of British nationals froma state in collapse. Moreover, given the global uncertainty, there will be many occasionswhen the Prime Minister would need to have the freedom of action of operatingindependently against unforeseen problems in locations where we had no plannedcommitments. In such cases we may well not have to commit military forces to ghtingas long as we have the right defence capabilities to deter aggression; just the presence

of British military forces can suffice. This is always the best outcome .The forces needed for Britain to act in specic circumstances is a matter for MoD.In general, it is likely to require an army rapid reaction force, as well as air power including aircraft carriers with the right aircraft amphibious shipping, sufficientdestroyers and frigates and submarine escorts. This would be complemented bylong-distance supply ships and tankers, Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) ai rcraft and verylong range maritime patrol aircraft 14. This, of course, does not inevitably mean a


14 These same aircraft are equally necessary to protect our nuclear deterrent, submarinesentering or leaving shallow British waters.


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separate range of forces for independent operations, because most of thosecapabilities will be needed anyway if Britain is to be a credible military ally ofAmerica, in NATO, and with Europe. We need then to ask:

Is it essential that the UK has the capability to operateindependently?

What military capabilities are required?

The Defence Calculus

Our review so far has suggested that our future defence posture will have a keypart to play in our dealings with America, Europe and in the wider global arena,including independent action on occasion. We can achieve our objectives if we havethe necessary military capabilities and sufficient force levels to support our alliesand defend our interests.

How can we do this? First, we m ust take into account that our Defence Industrialbase has become gravely reduced, which, at its current level, means that it enjoysfew economies of scale and has a low regeneration capacity. Taken together, thesefactors argue that there is a good economic and security case to consider for astimulus to our defence industry.

Secondly, in calculating necessary force levels, we can be reasonably certain that Ifour armed forces are able to serve effectively alongside the United States both innumbers and prociency then, from them, we should be able to meet (most of) ourobligations in Europe and our interests world wide. These numbers must, of course,recognise our independent operating requirements elaborated above, including the

need to police and defend UK airspace and maintain a sufficient presence in theFalkland Islands.

We can be reasonably certain that, historically, our Intelligence and Defencecontribution to the Special Relationship with America has been valued and broughtus great benet. But, how strong are these ties now? The cuts to our front line andthe loss of capabilities have not gone unnoticed. In Libya, over 70% of the supportsorties own in the air campaign were by the USA. Moreover, it was the USA, almost

alone, who conducted the Day 1 campaign to suppress enemy air defences, allowingus to operate more safely thereafter. This relatively modest air campaign shouldnot be trumpeted as a demonstrable British success despite its crucial contribution



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to the rebel victory and the ne performance of units taking part. In fact it shouldhave prompted serious thought on the deciencies of European air power. It shouldhave been a wake up call. We may delude ourselves, but we do not delude the

Americans, and we may not have fooled the rest of the world.Annex A shows just how much we have reduced our front line numbers since 1991.Whilst there is no doubt that capabilities have improved technically, some superbly,the harsh fact is that most nations capabilities have improved equally. It is in thenumbers game that our drawdown is most telling. With about 50 ships andsubmarines of all types, of which 19 are Destroyers and Frigates, the RN can onlymeet a new contingency by withdrawing from an existing commitment; a pointmade by the CNS and for which he was reprimanded. The facts speak for

themselves; he was correct and it should not go unacknowledged.

We must remember that it is not possible for all forces to be deployed andoperational all the time. Partly this is because of the sheer stress of deployment,partly the need for maintenance and restoration of both people and equipment,partly the need to retain an uncommitted reserve against emergency or surgerequirements, partly the need to offer a lifestyle which allows people to spend atleast some time with their families in the Navy this is expressed as an aspiration

for ships to be in their base ports for 40% of the time averaged over three years and partly it is the need for continuous training to develop and enhance core skillsthat are not in demand on a particular task. There is also a need for around 10-15%of ships to be in major repair and capability update at any one time to prolong theiruseful lives as threat systems are enhanced. This has allowed ships to be extendedwell beyond their original design lives, in the case of the T23 frigates from 18 yearsto well in excess of 30 years. Although we consider the Navy in detail, theseprinciples apply equally across all three Armed Forces.

In each Service, this results in a one to three ratio for enduring tasks: one unitdeployed operationally; one preparing, training and deploying (and deploying maytake three or four weeks to distant places); and one returning, having leave,undertaking maintenance and preparing to deploy again. It was this calculationwhich led the Defence Review in 1998 to conclude that the Navy required a minimumof 32 destroyers and frigates. For the same scale of tasks, we now have 19.

For an emergency or surge around 80% of the eet can be sailed, as 1982

demonstrated. If this happens, however, there will be a corresponding recoveryperiod at the end of the emergency. If only single ships are used, then 19 destroyersand frigates can support perhaps only 5 or, occasionally, 6 enduring tasks at once.



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In the much more likely case of several ships together being needed for someoperations, the number if concurrent tasks that can be undertaken will besignicantly reduced.

Today, the British Army, with an established manpower of 102,000, nds it difficultto maintain one continuous brigade size operation in Afghanistan withoutsignicant support from the Reserve Force. Indeed, during the past decade some25,000 members of the Reserve have served both in Iraq and Afghanistan including 18,000 members of the TA. However, the proposal in Future Force 2020to place even greater reliance on the TA by increasing its strength to 30,000, andthereby further to reduce the strength of the Army to 82,000, raises somefundamental concerns.

First, excepting specialist trades, TA soldiers, serve on average only 3 years beforeleaving. Therefore, the expectation that TA soldiers especially in the infantrywhere manpower cuts have been the greatest will be as combat capable asregular soldiers cannot be met. Second, the number of fully trained TA soldiersneeded to produce a soldier in the front line historically is 15:1. This ratio is basedon a six month tour of duty. The calculation in Army 2020 however has been basedon a ratio of about 8:1 requiring a far greater frequency of operational deploymentfor each TA soldier. This inevitably will place a great strain on the individual, hisfamily, and his employer, and is almost certainly unsustainable in the long term. Arealistic assessment, therefore, is that the future TA will actually only produce anin-theatre force of just 2,000 far short of t hat planned.

The RAF has 5 Sqns of Tornados and 2 Typhoon Sqns capable of Offensive Support(OS). Like the Navy, the RAF could produce a surge of 70%, perhaps more, for ashort-duration campaign of less than 30 days but, given the current aircrew to

aircraft ratios and aircraft modication states, even this would be in doubt. It would,however, be at the expense of most if not all other training, and with damagingconsequences to the through life cost assumptions on which aircraft service lifedepends. For prolonged operations, planners have to assume that little more than2 squadrons would be available for all air-to-ground attack tasks. This, we suggest,is far short of what is required for even the most limited conict.

Moreover, if 2 or more British operations were to occur simultaneously, the

problems for all the armed forces would be compounded, with considerable doubtsover our ability to support 2 theatres, each with separate lines of communication,and entailing a duplication of all other support and logistic functions.



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That we need armed forces that are Agile, Adaptable and Capable, as describedby Ministers, is clear. It meets the requirement for deployment in support ofAmerica, Europe, our overseas territories and in the wider world. But what exactly

are these forces and in what numbers are they required?We assume that the US will not deploy large numbers of ground forces again inpursuit of nation building. That must be the conclusion in light of the commentsof the US Administration. But of course, Presidents change, so do policies and sodo circumstances. But, we too have learnt some lessons and the Defence Secretaryis positioning us away from campaigning towards contingencies, as Gwythian Prinshas reminded us (see Annex B). We suggest that the belief so widely peddledbefore the SDSR that military actions of the future would predominantly beland-centric has also been shown to be seriously misguided.

So, let us consider how we would be likely to contribute to a campaign alongside theUSA. Any forces we deploy with the US Forces must be seen as a positive asset tothe campaign, not a liability. To ensure our inuence, they would be need to be fullycapable combat forces, not just reserve or support units. For the foreseeable futurethese operations are likely to be limited to a strong naval presence and air power.Our Special Forces, already greatly respected by the Americans, would also likely

have an increasing part to play. To contribute effectively we will need to plug in tothe American hi-tech infrastructure, such as the Intelligence, Surveillance, TargetAcquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), which will be the base line for US forces.

As Sir Max Hastings has suggested we will be valued by what we provide:

In international relations, an ally is worth as much as, and no more than,the resources and specically military resources it is capable of contributingtowards implementing a shared purpose by force or threat of it. 15

This begs a number of questions:

Can we maintain the privileged and inuential positionwe have held in the US operational HQs in every allied campaign since the rst Gulf War?

Is todays combat eet capable and large enough to retaina place at the US table?


15 Sir Max Hastings. Centre for Policy Studies, 12th July 2011.


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Operationally will our Offensive Support capabilities beany more than a useful token when taking part in an

American led No-Fly Zone or air campaign in future?

Do we have enough Special Forces to meet demands today? Can we recruit and train more with an Army of just 82,000?

Can we adequately protect our Overseas Territories?

Turning to our European role; here our Navy is now smaller than that of France; ourArmy too is the smallest of similar Western Powers, and the RAF combat aircraftnumbers are notably lower than those of both France and Italy and only just a fewmore than Spains. Most Air Forces on the Continent have a Maritime Patrol Aircraftcapability; we do not. Our Transport and AAR eets are very old but will be the mostup to date in Europe in due course, albeit with smaller numbers. Our helicoptercapabilities have improved although numbers have also suffered. The GR4 Tornadowith its excellent weapons suite, and the Typhoon with Paveway and impressive airto air weapons, command respect. But when Italy (See Annex A) and France havemore combat aircraft and larger armies than do we, and with a Royal Navy smallerthan Frances and only just larger than Italys, we should have some concerns forour inuence in European military matters. Even Spain has virtually the same numberof combat aircraft and, when fully mobilised, her army dwarfs ours.

Further cuts to our capability outlined in SDSR, and due to take effect over the next5 years, take no account of an increasingly unstable world. Of great importance isthe message we send to our European allies. Britains decline is having a profoundeffect on European efforts to do better in the defence eld. We should recall thatmuch of the European force is hollow and incapable of even modest operations.

For example, to the dismay of the USA, several NATO nations actually ran out ofweapons in the very small-scale Libya campaign of last year. Moreover, there is amarked reluctance by some nations to deploy for combat at all. The Prime Ministerhas urged Europe to do more, and so too repeatedly has the US Administration.Yet the United Kingdom is doing less. We have therefore to ask:

What must be done to ensure that Europe will face up to itsobligations under NATO and the EDF?

Have the risks already taken with our defence posture reduced our credibility in Europe?



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Should we role-specialise, or do we need balanced forces with sufficient numbers across all three services in the absence of real signs of European convergence in defence?

How can we regenerate our armed forces, now that we no longer have the defence Industrial base to do so in less than a decade? Isthere a case for an economic stimulus to the Defence Industries?

Does the Government agree that soft power needs hard power to back it?

Conclusions

The defence budget has been raided in one way or another since the end of theCold War. Defence is the irreplaceable insurance which guarantees that everythingelse in national life can be enjoyed in safety. Defence has not been responsible forthe nations budgetary problems. The military has delivered constantly in anunrelenting series of military engagements from Gulf War 1 through Form er

Yugoslavia, the 9/11 aftermath, to Libya.It is our contention that the armed forces have now reached a watershed in theirability to respond to the critical contingencies we may face in the next 10 years andmore. We have suggested possible scenarios in our companion paper, Disarmament and Consequences ; nowhere have we tackled concurrent operations but thispossibility cannot be ruled out. It has happened all too recently.

There are clear indications that the struggle for diminishing resources will intensify;

the Middle East, vital for our energy supplies, is poised once again for conict, withIran and Israel at centre stage. Russia is exing her muscles under Putin, and theproblems in SW Asia and relations with China could easily take a turn for the worseover the next decade. The Arab Spring has a long way to go and the establishmentof new governments by no means guarantees an improvement in the stability ofthe Middle East. Terrorism is moving its base to Africa, a Continent far from stable.Argentina is openly gathering friends in her historic claim to the Falklands.

Against this background, if hard power, as Tony Blair has suggested, is thefoundation for effective soft power, should we really run the risks inherent in ourpresent weakened defence posture?



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To the authors, the national debate we ask for on this subject should not be aboutthe affordability of defence but a clear headed analysis of our national objectivesand the role of defence in their support. The Questions we have posed should be

answered. These are assembled for ease of reference at Annex C .If, as we believe, that where we are now, and will be for at least the decade ahead,is puttin g at risk our relationship with America, in danger of reducing our inuenceon the Continent of Europe at a critical moment, and sending unclear signals onthe wider global stage, then this should be of concern to the whole nation.

The legacy of this Government at the next election may yet be an economy on themend; but history may judge that its real legacy was a failure to understand its long

term responsibilities for the defence of the realm and the security of futuregenerations.

If we are wrong, then let us learn publicly why so that all can hear.

However, if we are right, then the national debate we seek needs urgent attention.Governments have a duty to inform the public about security matters in anincreasingly dangerous world; this is the fundamental responsibility of high office.The common sense of the British public should not be underestimated; Ministers

may yet nd that there are votes in defence.



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ANNEXES

ANNEX A TO UKNDA PAPER

A NATIONAL DEBATE ONDEFENCE A DIRE NECESSITY

Force ComparisonsUK Forces 1990~91/2011~12/post SDSR


Main Source data from IISS

By 2011/12 RN had alreadyreduced from pre-SDSRestablishment of 38

Post-SDSR data for 2018


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Forces by Country in 2012


Combat aircraft (FJ)includes naval ac

Army manpower inthousands, Reservesshown separately


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ANNEX B TO UKNDA PAPERA NATIONAL DEBATE ON

DEFENCE A DIRE NECESSITY

Gwythian PrinsExtracts from Daily Telegraph

8th June 2012

The Armed Forces: Our country needs themby Gwythian Prins

These (Iraq and Afghanistan) ... were campaigns that morphed as they draggedon, radically so in Afghanistan; campaigns that puzzled, strained and poisonedpublic trust. Above all, they were campaigns where the lack of clear strategic aimand mismatch of scale to task placed our Armed Forces under extreme stress.

... Finally closing that book was the main message of Philip Hammonds speechyesterday (7 June 2012). In describing how the regular strength of the Army willbe cut from 102,000 to 82,000, the Defence Secretarys intent was plain: to shiftthe focus from campaigns to contingency.

Mr Hammond did a workmanlike job of stating his case in his terms; but it is histerms that should worry us. Mr Hammonds terms in effect, the prevalent culturein Whitehall and the Ministry of Defence reveal no sense of what makes thedefence of the realm an activity unlike any other that governments conduct with

public money.... military professionals worry about the loss of critical mass in key skill areas wherethe whole is always more than the sum of the parts; and while Mr Hammond hadwarm words for those who will be made redundant, arguing that it is more humaneto tell them now so that they can get on with their lives, there is and will be anundeniable impact on morale, especially if people dont really know why they areserving, and if the country at large doesnt understand what the point of armedforces is nowadays.

But maybe this doesnt matter? Well, it doesnt if you hold the three key submergedassumptions that , over the past 15 years especially, I have observed becoming



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widely absorbed into the unspoken consensus of Whitehall. They underpin theCoalitions infamous Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), upon whichcurrent policy still stands, yet which two select committees of Parliament (Defence

and Public Administration twice) found to be so axiomatically awed as to beunsafe. So lets haul them up and look at them.

The rst assumption is that something wonderful has happened. For the rst time,since the end of the long, intermittently Hot and Cold European civil war of 1914-91,peace has become the default condition of modernity.

... the second assumption: that at last soft power has become more powerful thanhard power. This means that it is more cost effective to put defence money into

the conict prevention programmes of the Department for InternationalDevelopment than into regiments or frigates.

... And the third assumption, which facilitates the other two, is that the purpose ofstrategy is principally one of management. Strategy for defence is no different fromstrategy for any large business, the thinking goes; it is about delivering the CEOstop-line objective.

... The problem is that each of these three unspoken assumptions is dangerous and

wrong. We have not escaped history. The role of all armed forces today remains toprevent bad things from happening; and they do this by projecting an aura of powerthat comes from a combination of capability (procured against the certainty ofuncertainty) with perceived national will.

That was the enduring Falklands effect that helped keep us safe for a generationand that materially helped to persuade Gorbachev to end the Cold War.Paradoxically, it is usually cheaper to pay for this up front because the logic ofrealpolitik is that those with the aura of power do not need to use it; while thosewho erode it, as we have, are more likely to have to do so.

The second fallacy is that soft power is autonomous. It isnt. Without hard powerbehind it, soft power is just limp. But central to the failure of the SDSR, and theNational Security Strategy behind it, is the loss of understanding that operationalstrategy is different from and subordinate to national or what we used to callgrand strategy.

Grand strategy understands all those geopolitical factors that affect our nationalsecurity, both as risks and as threats, but which it is beyond the power of anygovernment to control; and then it is about strategies to project our enduring



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ANNEX C TO UKNDA PAPERA NATIONAL DEBATE ON

DEFENCE A DIRE NECESSITY

QuestionsQuestions the Government Must Answer:

On Relations with America

What armed forces do we need to have and what do we need to do toensure that America continues to see the UK as a worthwhile ally?

Can we maintain the privileged and inuential position we have held in the US operational HQs in every allied campaign since the rst Gulf War? Is todays combat eet capable and large enough to retain a

place at the US table?

Operationally will our Offensive Support capabilities be any morethan a useful token to take part in American led No-Fly Zone and air campaigns in future?

Should we support America in her Pacic interests? Would this alsobe in the UKs interests bearing in mind our trade with the AsianTigers and our Common Security Interests? If so, what are theimplications for our forces bearing in mind that rotating force levels

becomes more demanding with distance.

On Relations with EuropeWhat defence capabilities should Britain maintain if we wish toremain a leader in European defence? Have the risks already takenwith our defence posture reduced our credibility in Europe?

What must be done to ensure that Europe will face up to itsobligations under NATO and the EDF? Can Britain credi bly demand greater European effort as we reduce our own?



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What will we need to do to compensate for the pendingreduction in American commitment to Europe?

Should we role-specialise, or do we need balanced forces with sufficient numbers across all three services in the absence of real signs of European convergence in defence?

On the Global DimensionDo we wish to continue our force for good interventionsaround the world?

Can we meet these requirements and any other likely security needs from the forces available from other commitments, possibly concurrently, or do we need to adjust our force levels?

On Going it AloneIs it essential for the UK to have the capability to operateindependently?

On UK DefenceDo we have enough Special Forces to meet demands today? Can we recruit and train more with an Army of 82,000?

Does the Government agree that soft power needs hard power to back it?

How can we regenerate our armed forces now that we no longer havethe Defence Industrial base to do so for at least a decade? Is there acase for an economic stimulus to the Defence Industries?

In the light of the state of the world, the threats facing us, and the high priority publicly stated by successive Prime Ministers, how does this justify the lower priority accorded to defence in the last twenty years?



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AUTHORS

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon. Retired as Chief of the Air Staff after 40years in the Royal Air Force in 1997. In that time he ew as ghter pilot and as anInstructor at a number of venues home and overseas. Staff tours in 11Gp, MOD JointWarfare, Holland and Belgium with NATO. Commander-in-Chief of both Supportand Strike Commands of the RAF. Has been Non Executive Director of Thales plc2000-2010, Advisor and Consultant EADS Germany, Chairman Symbiotics.Chairman of United Church Schools Group since 2012, Council member since 1997.Active in Air Cadet Council, Vice-President RNLI, Chairman Suttons Hospital inCharterhouse, President Battle of Britain Memorial Trust, Vice-Chairman CouncilWycliffe College, Governor of ESU, Chairman Lincolnshire Branch ESU. A longstanding interest i n Turkey and Cyprus since living on the island of Cyprus in the1960s. Vice-President of UK National Defence Association.

General Sir Michael Rose. As well as commanding 22 Special Air Service Regiment,he was Commander UNPROFOR Bosnia in 1994 during the Yugoslav Wars. He

joined the Coldstream Guards in 1964. After attending the Staff College, Camberley,Rose was Commanding Officer of 22 SAS Regiment from 1979 to 1982, as part ofwhich he was in control of the operation to free the hostages of the Iranian Embassy

Siege in 1980. He commanded Special Service operations in-theatre during theFalkland Conict. He then served as the commander of the 39th Infantry Brigadefrom 1983 to 1985. In 1987, Rose was the Commandant of the School of Infantryuntil 1988, when he became the rst Director Special Forces until 1989. After theRoyal College of Defence Studies, Rose was General Officer Commanding NorthEast District and Commander 2nd Infantry Division based in York. Between 1991and 1993 he served as Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley. Then, from1993 to 1994, Rose was Commander UK Field Army and Inspector-General of theTerritorial Army. Finally, from 1994 to 1995 he was Commander, United NationsPro tection Force, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rose became Adjutant-General andAide-de-Camp General to The Queen in 1995 until he retired in 1997.

Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham is a former Captain of Ark Royal , Deputy CINCFleet in 1999, and from 1999 to 2003 he was the rst Deputy Chief of the DefenceStaff (Equipment Capability) and a member of the Navy Board. Now anindependent consultant in Defence and other elds, he is a former Vice Presidentand an Associate Fellow of RUSI, and Editor of the Naval Review and a lecturer in

Public Management at Kings College, London. He is the co-author of three previousUKNDA Reports with Andrew Lambert and Allen Sykes including the September2011 report Inconvenient Truths .



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Air Commodore Andrew Lambert is a writer and commentator on Defence,particularly air power. A late Fellow Commoner of Downing College, Cambridge,he has written widely on the psychological aspects of warfare and is the author ofseveral monographs on coercion. He has been Commander British Forces for theNorthern No-Fly Zone of Iraq, Air Commander British Forces Falkland Islands, andDeputy Commander for NATO Air Operations in Norway. His most recent post wasas Assistant Commandant (Air) at the Joint Services Command and Staff Collegeat Shrivenham. He is the co-author of ve previous UKNDA Reports with AllenSykes, including the September 2011 report Inconvenient Truths .

Allen Sykes is a retired international businessman and a Vice President of theUKNDA. He was the principal author of the UKNDAs rst discussion paper,Overcoming the Defence Crisis , in September 2008; co-author with the historian,Andrew Roberts, of the UKNDAs third paper, A Compelling Necessity the casefor increasing the defence budget despite the present severe economic crisis , inJuly 2009; and co-author with Air Commodore Andrew Lambert of UKNDAs fourthpaper, UK Defence Needs , in February 2010. He is the co-author with Sir JeremyBlackham and Andrew Lambert of the September 2010 UKNDA Report, Submissionto the Government and the Nation on the Strategic Defence and Security Review and the September 2011 report Inconvenient Truths .

Antony Hichens. After a career working in the international mining industry, rst inRio Tinto and later as a managing director of Consolidated Goldelds, separatedby a decade in Redland, the building materials manufacturer, he was chairman of anumber of public companies, including Caradon, LASMO and DS Smith. He wasalso a non executive director of several companies including South West Electricity,The British Coal Corporation, Courtaulds Textiles, Candover Investments and the

London Insurance Market Investment Trust. He was a member of the TakeoverPanel. He was Chairman of the Magdalen College Development Trust and is amember of the Oxford Court of Benefactors and the Coastal Forces Heritage Trust.



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Documents

A National Debate on Defence – A Dire Necessity