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A Muslim lobby at Whitehall? examiningthe role of the Muslim minority inBritish foreign policy makingLiat Radcliffe aa St Anthony‘s College, OxfordPublished online: 14 Oct 2010.

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Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations,Vol. 15, No. 3, 365–386, July 2004

A Muslim Lobby at Whitehall?Examining the Role of the MuslimMinority in British Foreign PolicyMaking

LIAT RADCLIFFESt Anthony‘s College, Oxford

ABSTRACT While much has been written on the role of ethnic and religious pressure groups inUS foreign policy making, little has been noted of the participation of these groups in the Britishcontext. This paper examines the role of the British Muslim community in the making of Britishforeign policy. In particular, it examines the lobbying activity of the Muslim Council of Britain(MCB), which, though only established in 1997, has achieved prominence in political and mediacircles. This study reveals a disparity between the MCB’s regular access to government ministersand officials under the New Labour tenure and its only limited influence in foreign policy making.More generally, it seeks to show the complexity of the relationship between domestic and foreignpolicy as well as between culture and politics.

Introduction

Controversy surrounded Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin’s first state visitto Britain in April 2000. He was greeted by dozens of demonstrators outsideDowning Street, including many British Muslims, protesting against Russianmilitary actions in Chechnya and shouting slogans that included ‘Putin is amurderer’, ‘Shame on Blair’ and ‘What do we want? Jihad!’ (Sengupta, 2000).In a letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)expressed dismay at Putin’s visit, saying: ‘We regret that the British Governmentfinds it so easy to do business with a man with so much blood on his hands.When doing business comes before concern for basic principles of internationallaw and the appalling suffering of innocent people, we have reason to be deeplydistressed’ (MCB, 2000a). A month earlier, the MCB expressed alarm at a reportin The Times that suggested the British government was cooperating with theRussian secret service and the Russian embassy in London to identify BritishMuslims with pro-Chechen sympathies (MCB, 2000b).

At a press conference at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)that was intended to mollify the naysayers, Putin announced the establishment ofan independent commission to investigate claims of human rights abuses by the

Liat Radcliffe, Email: liat radcliffe@hotmail.com

0959-6410 Print/1469-9311 Online/04/030365-22 2004 CSIC and CMCU

DOI: 10.1080/0959641042000233282

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Russian military in Chechnya, adding that Blair had influenced this decision(Percival, 2000; Sengupta, 2000). However, Putin then turned to rail againstWestern policy, blaming the West’s Muslim minority: ‘We have seen theEuropean countries and leaders are not able to support the Russian fight [inChechnya] because they are afraid of a reaction among the Muslim inhabitantsof Europe, but that is the wrong conclusion’ (Sengupta, 2000). In a curiousirony, Putin was decrying the power wielded by British Muslims over theircountry’s foreign policy at the same time as some community members werefeeling betrayed by their Prime Minister, impotent to change British foreignpolicy, and insecure at the possibility that they were being spied on by their owngovernment.

This article seeks to explore this interdependence between foreign policy anddomestic politics by examining the context surrounding the event describedabove, namely, the role that the British Muslim minority has played in themaking of British foreign policy. The aim of this paper is not to describe howa particular foreign policy outcome came to be but, rather, to focus on how oneethno-religious pressure group,1 the MCB, has participated in the making ofBritish foreign policy. The MCB is a relatively young organization but hasquickly achieved prominence as a community representative in governmentcircles as well as with the press, particularly since 11 September 2001. Theinterdependent but often conflictual relationship between the MCB and thegovernment is particularly interesting as an example of the complex role playedby ‘insider’ pressure groups in British foreign policy making.

The Role of Ethno-religious Pressure Groups in British Foreign Policy Making

There is very little work directly related to the study of the role of pressuregroups in British foreign policy making.2 This could be explained by thelong-held perception that pressure groups—indeed, domestic politics as awhole—play no role in British foreign policy making; rather, decisions are madeby an executive body of tightly knit and insular senior bureaucrats and politi-cians reacting to international events and trends. However, there is evidence thatcertain groups have succeeded in infiltrating the black box. Amnesty Inter-national, for instance, developed a close relationship with the FCO, such that inthe 1990s it was briefing new ambassadors on the human rights situation in theirrespective countries and participating in human rights training courses for civilservants, in addition to meeting with the Foreign Secretary several times a year(Christiansen & Dowding, 1994, pp. 20–21; Theakston, 2000, pp. 115–116).

The Muslim Community in Britain

The Office of National Statistics (ONS) published last year (2003) for the firsttime ever details of the religious affiliation of British citizens, in which just lessthan 1.6 million people declared themselves to be Muslim out of a totalpopulation of almost 59 million (ONS, 2003a).3 The Muslim community in 2001therefore comprised 2.7% of the British population, making it the second largestfaith group in Britain after Christianity.4

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The British Muslim community is relatively new, the vast majority of itsmembers having arrived in Britain after World War II, largely from South Asia.5

However, the community is highly divided religiously and socially with sectar-ian, linguistic, ethnic, clan and class differences impacting upon patterns ofsocial interaction and political organization. Some scholars even suggest that itis problematic to discuss ‘the Muslim community’ in Britain; as Philip Lewisargues, ‘I have deliberately spoken of Muslim communities in the plural tounderscore the empirical fact that Muslims belong to a variety of linguistic,regional, and sectarian groups. The making of a British Islam is an ongoing,unfinished process of experimentation, diversity and debate’ (Lewis, 2002, p. 8).

Finally, it is important to note that British Muslims are one of the mostdeprived communities in Britain. The latest statistics show that Pakistanis andBangladeshis, who represent approximately 60% of the Muslim community(ONS, 2003b), have the highest rates of unemployment and the lowest incomelevels of all ethnic minorities in Britain (ONS, 2002a, b). Moreover, prospectsfor the future are not encouraging with only 22% of Pakistani and Bangladeshisixteen-year-old boys achieving good grades in five or more secondary schoolexams, again the lowest proportion of all ethnic groups in Britain (ONS, 2002c).While there is certainly a British Muslim professional and business class, as wellas numerous socio-economic ‘success stories’, the bulk of the communityremains mired in poverty with poor prospects for rapid improvement.

Political Representation

The diversity and divisions within the Muslim community, as well as what oneMuslim leader describes as its ‘insatiable’ needs (Rahman, 2003), give rise to amyriad of religious, ethnic, social and political organizations. A survey carriedout in the mid-1990s suggested there were 950 Muslim organizations in Britain,most dealing with local issues (Vertovec, 1996, p. 175).6 Nevertheless, therehave been efforts to organize at the national level since the 1970s. Thisdevelopment was initially related (as it was elsewhere in Europe) to the changingcharacter of the community from male ‘guest-workers’ to families. This trans-formation led not only to a sense of permanence of settlement but to a greaterdegree of interaction with the state in areas such as education and health, whereMuslims sought to protect and promote their cultural mores, particularly withregard to women and children (Nonneman, 1996, p. 5; Hunter & Serfaty, 2002,pp. xiii-xiv). Moreover, by the 1970s, a new generation of Muslims were beingborn and/or raised in the West, thus establishing their own notions of identityand ideas about participation in the wider society.

Efforts to unify the Muslim community under a single umbrella organizationhave repeatedly failed. The reporting of one such attempt in the early 1990sreads like a satire:

Muslim leaders in Bradford have launched an initiative to establish anational consultative body…‘The idea behind the unification meeting wasfor Muslims to be able to act with one voice on major issues,’ said SherAzam, President of Bradford Council for Mosques…but the initial meeting,

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scheduled for 29th January clashed with two other major conferences ofMuslims organised for the same weekend. (British Muslims MonthlySurvey, 1994a, p. 23)

Political Representation and International Affairs

International affairs are intertwined with the aims, organization and effectivenessof British Muslim political groups, given the immigrant background of the vastmajority of the community as well as the universality of the religion. Establish-ing international links and affecting international issues are part of some ofMuslim organizations’ explicit aims and activities. British Muslim activity inthis respect ranges widely, as can be seen in the self-reporting of the Union ofMuslim Organizations of UK and Ireland’s (UMO’s) international participationon the occasion of its 25th anniversary: urging a peaceful resolution to the1990–91 Gulf Crisis and relief for Iraqis’ suffering during the sanctions;advocating Western military intervention on behalf of Bosnian Muslims; andsending delegations to Baghdad to participate in the International Peace Confer-ence after the Iran–Iraq War, to Tunis to meet with Palestinian leaders, toWestern Thrace to ‘monitor the situation of Muslims’ in 1991 and to TurkishCyprus to establish trade links with the British Muslim community (UMO, 1995,pp. 43–52).

Lobbying is directed not only at the British government but also at the UnitedNations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization of the IslamicConference (OIC) and foreign governments. The Muslim Parliament, for in-stance, organized a demonstration outside the European Foreign Ministers’Conference in London in July 1995 to demand the withdrawal of the UN fromBosnia and an end to the arms embargo (British Muslims Monthly Survey, 1995,p. 1). British Muslims have also attended OIC meetings and have even sought togain permanent representation. As one lobbyist explains:

I attend the OIC Foreign Ministers’ Conference most years as part of theIslamic Council of Europe, which has a seat as an observer. We want themto create a committee of Muslims in Europe. They have created acommittee that deals with cultural and legal aspects of Muslims in Europebut there is no proper representation of Muslims in Europe. EuropeanMuslims have a little different attitude than the [rest of the] Muslim Worldthat may be helpful for the development of the Muslim World. (Wasti,2003)

The foreign policy efforts of different organizations have sometimes worked atcross-purposes. For example, while Kashmiri groups demonstrated against theIndian Prime Minister’s visit to Downing Street in 1994, Indian Muslims boughta half-page advertisement in the Guardian newspaper offering their support forhis government’s efforts to manage inter-communal tensions in India (BritishMuslims Monthly Survey, 1994b, p. 9). More recently, in the lead-up to the 2003war in Iraq, some British Muslims, notably the Iraqi Shı�a organization theAl-Khoei Foundation, publicly supported the war and British participation in it,

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whereas the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) co-organized major streetdemonstrations in London with the Stop the War Coalition.

Influence is also sought in the reverse, with foreign governments seeking tosway British Muslim opinion and to encourage particular political stances.Foreign Muslim politicians often make a point of meeting with British Muslimson their visits to Britain. Some foreign Muslim leaders have even appealed to thecommunity to put pressure on the British government on their behalf, as didPresident Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1997, when heimplored British Muslims to prevent Britain (then-EU president) from acceptingthe Greek half of Cyprus into the EU (Versi, 1997).

On the logistical level international links are evident as well. Foreigngovernments and sister organizations abroad often provide funding, infor-mation and personnel for Muslim organizations. Many groups receivefinancial support from abroad, particularly from Saudi Arabia. John Rexasserts that all the major Middle Eastern states provide support to BritishMuslim organizations (Rex, 2002, p. 68). Many Muslim organizations (andindividuals) also obtain information from abroad. For example, news about thepublication of The Satanic Verses in 1989 first spread to Britain from India,when Jama’at-i-Islami sent word to one of its sister organizations, the IslamicFoundation in Leicester (Ruthven, 1990, p. 90). The flow of information fromrelatives, friends and colleagues abroad also has a significant impact upon theviews held—and thus policies advocated—by British Muslim organizations.Indeed, the ease of accessibility to ‘local’ information abroad has increased inrecent years with the consistent lowering of prices on transportation andlong-distance communication, with the development and increasing usage ofthe Internet and with the projection of foreign satellite television into BritishMuslim homes. Finally, personnel come from abroad as well, although thisphenomenon is most evident among mosque-based organizations which oftenbring foreign imams or preachers to Britain from South Asia or the MiddleEast.

The impact of these transnational ties is difficult to measure and is thereforecontested. The Economist magazine in a ‘special report’ on the EuropeanMuslim community wrote: ‘Europe’s Muslims are represented by umpteendifferent groups, often squabbling and often as concerned with the interests ofa government abroad as with those of the people they say they want to help’(The Economist, 2002, p. 9 (emphasis added)). Jørgen Nielsen suggests, bycontrast, that the correlation between the interests of the Muslim countryproviding funding and the policies adopted by the recipient being often positiveis either a coincidence or merely evidence of an ‘initial mutual sympathy’(Nielsen, 1995, p. 124). However, it is not a given that the patron’s wishes arereflected in British Muslim politics. For example, in the 1990–91 Gulf War,efforts by Saudi Arabia to rein in outspoken British Muslim anti-war campaign-ers (by summoning a group of British imams to Mecca for a conference inSeptember 1990) largely failed (Donkin, 1991; Werbner, 1996, p. 155). Finally,Rex suggests a broader perspective on these foreign connections, taking intoaccount the diversity of political views held within the community: ‘MiddleEastern states use the Muslim community in Britain to serve their interests.

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Meanwhile, these communities sometimes offer a base to their radical oppo-nents’ (Rex, 2002, p. 69).7

Whereas the above-mentioned transnational links involve a conscious decisionto be ‘plugged in’ to the umma, another way in which the international isintertwined with community politics is less voluntary—what Dale Eickelmanand James Piscatori refer to as the transnational ‘conveyer belt’ (Eickelman &Piscatori, 1996, pp. 154–155). In this sense, international ideas and eventsimpact upon the course and effectiveness of Muslim political activity in Britainfor better or for worse. Fred Halliday, for example, shows how Yemeni politicsin the 1960s–1970s split one British Yemeni organization into two; similarly, theunification of Yemen in 1990 brought about a merger (Halliday, 1992, chs 4–5).Less concretely, international events can affect the perception of Muslims inBritain by the wider society and thus restrict their political room to manoeuvre.Events such as the Iranian revolution, the Lebanese Civil War and more recentlyinternational terrorism in the name of Islam have negatively impacted upon theBritish public’s views of the Muslim community and what constitutes ‘legit-imate’ concerns.

The MCB and British Foreign Policy Making

The MCB has gained great prominence among government officials and in themedia, despite being a very young organization in competition with a host ofother groups for the title of community representative. The position it hasachieved within establishment circles can be explained in part by its insiderstrategy and mainstream messages, not necessarily its agreement with thegovernment’s foreign policy. However, the influence wielded by the MCB doesnot match its high standing; the MCB (and other British Muslim groups) haveas yet been unable to make a significant difference in British foreign policy.

The MCB’s History and Composition

The MCB was the outgrowth of community consultation and coordination fromMarch 1994 when Home Secretary Michael Howard (in John Major’s Conserva-tive government) called on Muslim leaders to establish a unified voice in theirdealings with government. The establishment of the MCB in November 1997was the end result of one of several competing initiatives in this regard, ledprimarily by the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs under the leadershipof Iqbal Sacranie, who subsequently became the MCB’s first (and third)Secretary-general.8 Although garnering the support of more than 250 national,regional and local organizations at the time of its launch, several prominentorganizations and individuals refrained from accepting invitations to participate.Britain’s first Muslim umbrella organization, the UMO, was explicit in itsrejection of the MCB, arguing that no new body was needed, as it had itselfrepresented the community for decades. By contrast, the Muslim Parliamentexplained its refusal to participate by suggesting that the new organization wouldact as the government’s mouthpiece, given the catalyst for its formation (MuslimNews, 1996).

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As of May 2003, the MCB claimed to represent 381 ‘national affiliates’,‘regional affiliates’ and ‘local/specialist bodies’ (MCB, 2003a).9 The list ofmember organizations appears to be wide, ranging across ethnic, linguistic,gender and generational lines as well as organizational purpose. Nationalaffiliates under the MCB umbrella include, for instance, the Council of NigerianMuslim Organizations, the Indian Muslim Federation, Muslim Women’s Associ-ation and Young Muslims UK; additionally, numerous mosques, charities andeducational institutions from Edinburgh to Sheffield to Cardiff are listed as‘local/specialist’ bodies. The MCB has also suggested that it represents the viewsof Muslims abroad. Emphasizing the large amount of exchange between theMCB and Muslims overseas by email and telephone, former Deputy Secretary-general Dr Basil Mustafa asserts: ‘the MCB also reflects the mood within theMuslim world, not just how we feel here’ (Mustafa, 2003a).

Nevertheless, the MCB has been accused of being unrepresentative, comprisedof ‘primarily Pakistani and Indian males’ (Q News, 2000) , with little represen-tation from groups such as women, youth and Shı�a Muslims. The MCB has alsobeen criticized for not consulting with the community it claims to representwhen determining its agenda. Lord Ahmed, one of the first Muslim peersappointed by New Labour, chastises the MCB as being ‘elitist’ and lackingmechanisms for consultation with the average British Muslim (Ahmed, 2003).The MCB itself has admitted this problem in the past and has pledged reform;in 2002, Secretary-general Yousuf Bhailok remarked: ‘The MCB must in futurebe more active at [the] regional level and hold more meetings away fromLondon. We are too London focused and at some stage should have regionalMCB offices’ (MCB, 2002a). Evidence of a step in this direction of greatercommunity consultation came in September 2002 when the MCB conducted itsfirst-ever telephone survey of its affiliate organizations to determine the BritishMuslim community’s views on the then-impending war on Iraq—opinions thatwere then presented to FCO Minister Mike O’Brien (MCB, 2002b, c).

Inadequate funding has plagued the organization, with its leaders often payingfor their business expenses, such as transportation and accommodation, out oftheir own pockets (Bhailok, 2003). The MCB’s funding derives partly fromsubscriptions paid by affiliate organizations, which cover approximately one-third of the annual budget (Mustafa, 2003a). Another significant proportioncomes from donations, largely from individuals in the British Muslim com-munity, although the Home Office has partly funded at least one special project,the Muslim Help (telephone) Line (Rahman, 2003). The MCB is not in principleopposed to receiving funding from abroad, as other community organizations do,‘as long as there are no strings attached’, but so far this stream of revenue hasnot been tapped (Mustafa, 2003a; Rahman, 2003).

The MCB’s ‘Insider’ Strategy

The MCB’s rapid rise in British government circles is due in part to itspresenting itself as an organization that would work with government, that is,pursuing an ‘insider’ role. The MCB’s Secretary-general justified the politicalstrategy of insider participation by highlighting the undesirability of other

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options: ‘The alternative to participation in society is either 1. agitation from theoutside and being nothing more than an irritant or a fly in the ointment, or 2.opting out (if this is possible) and being a totally ghetto[ized] community,inward looking, and isolated’ (MCB, 2003b). While the government recognizesthat the MCB does not represent the whole community,10 the organization’semphasis on cooperation clearly makes it a group the government hopes to seegain further credibility within the community. Moreover, although the MCBoften disagrees with the government’s foreign policy, its views are certainly less‘radical’ and its language more ‘mainstream’ than those of other groups.

‘Insider’ groups usually work behind the scenes and not in the public sphere.However, the MCB has managed to pursue both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’strategies, meeting regularly with government as well as issuing critical, albeit‘moderately’ worded, press releases. In this respect, the MCB’s policy state-ments are designed to appeal to the widest possible audience in British societyand government. Special Advisor to the Secretary-general Mohibur Rahmanexplains: ‘There is a lot of deliberation about the press releases. They need tobe professional. They need to be balanced…The need to consider the non-Mus-lim reader influences the language and tone’ (Rahman, 2003).

The MCB points to its often critical stance towards the government’s foreignpolicy with reference to principles such as human rights, international law andthe will of the international community. According to Eva Østergaard-Nielsen,it is not uncommon among ‘migrant’ political groups to ‘appropriate global(western liberal) norms of democracy and human rights’ as part of their politicalstrategies (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 17). Thus the MCB’s first press releaseon an issue of international concern, condemnation of the US bombing ofAfghanistan and Sudan in August 1998 in retaliation for the terrorist bombingsof their embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was couched in the language ofinternational law and diplomacy: ‘The American action is a clear violation ofinternational law and takes us back to the days of gunboat diplomacy whenmight was right, and the law of the jungle prevailed’ (MCB, 1998a).

The MCB also considers the implications of particular policies for Britain’sreputation and its ability to conduct foreign policy, particularly in the MuslimWorld. Mustafa explains: ‘politicians sometimes fall short of assessing theimpact of policy on the perception of Britain abroad or on its links abroad’(Mustafa, 2003b). Thus in the MCB’s second press release on foreign policymatters, in response to the bombing of Iraq by US and British forces inDecember 1998, the MCB emphasized the importance of international consen-sus, warning against the decline of Britain’s international stature and, implicitly,its ability to conduct foreign policy in other realms if it continued to deviatefrom consensual international politics:

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) has expressed its grave concernover the unilateral US/British bombardment of Iraq…the MCB notes withgreater regret its own government’s uncritical support for the Americanaction, which has left it isolated in the international community. TheCouncil particularly notes the haste with which the whole operation wasundertaken while the UN Security Council had yet to debate the UNSCOM

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[United Nations Special Commission] Report and decide on any futurecourse of action. The scale and swiftness of the action is in marked contrastwith the other serious violations of international legality in, for example,Kosovo, Kashmir and Palestine. Regrettably, this policy of double stan-dards does not bode well for the future of International Order. (MCB,1998c)

The MCB’s message of political participation in the formal corridors of power isalso likely to endear the group to the government. Bhailok explains the MCB’sstrategy as seeking to work with the ‘mainstream’ to secure British Musliminterests: ‘Instead of shouting or protesting from outside we need to learn to workthe system. That has been our [British Muslims’] main deficiency to date’ (QNews, 2000). Thus the MCB encouraged the active participation of BritishMuslims in the elections of 1997 and 2001, calling on Muslims to vote strategi-cally to elect Members of Parliament who were responsive to Muslim concerns.11

Another reason for the MCB’s prominent status is its media savvy and thepriority it gives to public relations; its media committee was one of the three‘specialist committees’ mandated in the organization’s constitution (MCB,1999a). The MCB regularly issues press releases, virtually half of which areconcerned with international affairs,12 and supplies information and interviews tothe national and local media. The organization also maintains, and regularlyupdates, a comprehensive and easily navigable website that includes both currentand historical information about what it has done to further various causes ofconcern to British Muslims, including meetings held in government and mediacircles. As Gary Bunt wrote in 1999, the website ‘presents an impression of“unity” within the British Muslim community’ with the MCB at the helm,emphasizing the number and diversity of the MCB’s affiliate organizations aswell as (at the time of his research) highlighting a recent visit by Prime MinisterBlair to a MCB reception (Bunt, 1999, pp. 354–355). Finally, the MCB’s successis also due to the fact that MCB leaders came from other British Muslimorganizations; that is, they had already cultivated ties with the establishment andgained some experience of lobbying.

Not everyone in the community agrees that this insider strategy is the mosteffective. Faisal Bodi of the English-language monthly magazine Q News sug-gested in 2000 that the MCB ‘suffer[ed] from an image problem especially amongthe youth who consider the MCB to be more concerned with hobnobbing withministers than securing Muslim interests’ (Q News, 2000). Lord Ahmed echoesthis criticism: ‘It suits the Foreign Office and 10 Downing Street to have peoplelike that [the MCB] who will go, who love to have photographs taken. They willhave a nice photograph and then the Foreign Office or Downing Street can issueany statement, whatever they like and get away with it’ (Ahmed, 2003).

Perhaps most interestingly, the MCB’s affiliate organizations do not alwayssupport this insider strategy either. It is notable that MCB affiliates haveemployed outsider strategies to deal with issues on which the MCB has chosento remain low-key. Recently, this occurred in the lead-up to the 2003 war on Iraqwhen the MAB co-organized anti-war demonstrations with the Stop the WarCoalition while the MCB restricted itself to critical press statements. The MCBexplains these seemingly conflicting strategies by suggesting that its affiliates

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take more active roles than the umbrella organization because they have greaterresources (e.g. funding, staff) and a more direct interest (Wasti, 2003). Thus inthe case of the Iraq war, the MAB, comprised almost entirely of Arab profes-sionals, had a closer connection with the issue than the MCB as a whole (Wasti,2003). While resources may be a factor, no doubt another consideration is themaintenance of the MCB’s insider status. Thus the Muslim News editor AhmedVersi claims that the MCB refused the Stop the War Coalition’s entreatiesbecause ‘they [MCB leaders] are very sensitive about which organizations theyjoin with’ (Versi, 2003a). It should be noted that in March 2003, three weeksafter the MAB’s co-sponsored demonstration in London was attended byapproximately a million marchers, it was members of the MCB, not the MAB,who were invited to Downing Street to discuss the war.

The MCB Relationship with British Policy Makers

Using this ‘insider’ strategy, the MCB quickly rose to prominence. Only sixmonths after its launch, MCB members attended a meeting with Home SecretaryJack Straw (MCB, 1998c), and by the end of its first year, The Times reportedthat the organization had established regular contact with Straw and FCOministers (Grove, 1998). This relationship continued to develop, such that in its2002 annual report, the MCB claimed to conduct regular meetings with ‘govern-ment ministers and other politicians and “movers and shakers” ’ as well as seniorcivil servants (MCB, 2002a). The FCO corroborated this claim in 2003,suggesting that Minister O’Brien, responsible at the time for the Middle East andSouth and Central Asia, held meetings with Muslim community leaders, includ-ing the MCB, every three or four months on a wide range of issues (Ali, 2003).

The MCB soon gained the reputation of being ‘first among equals’ among thevarious Muslim leaders: Straw became the first Cabinet minister to attend aluncheon meeting with British Muslims at an event organized by the MCB inNovember 1998 (Versi, 1998), and Prime Minister Blair became the first servingprime minister to address the Muslim community, again at a function hosted bythe MCB in May 1999 (Adil, 1999a). In his speech at this event, Blaircommended the MCB’s efforts over its first year and a half: ‘I am delighted tobe the first Prime Minister to attend a Muslim Council of Britain event. Yourorganisation, bringing together more than 250 local, regional, and nationalinstitutions, is doing a lot of impressive work making the voice of the Muslimcommunity heard’ (Muslim News, 1999). Evidently aware of this close relation-ship between the MCB and the Blair government, the Observer voted Secretary-general Sacranie as one of the 300 most powerful people in Britain in 1999—ayear, the paper noted, when the Archbishop of Canterbury did not even make thelist (Observer, 1999).

The MCB’s Participation in British Foreign Policy Making

Insider strategies are by their nature subtle and behind-the-scenes, making theirefficacy very difficult to assess. Yet a clear delineation of the effectiveness of theMCB’s lobbying can be drawn between issues that the government views as

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technical or uncontroversial on the one hand, and issues of greater politicalimportance that engender public debate. It then becomes clear that the MCB ismost influential on the former uncontroversial issues and feels its voice drownedout in the latter debates.

There are two instances in particular which demonstrate the nature of theMCB’s participation in Britain’s foreign policy making: the formation of theBritish Hajj Delegation; and the detention of several British Muslims in Yemen.Perhaps the most notable instance of the British Muslim community affectingchange in British foreign policy in the last five years has been the creation of aspecial British consulate in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, during the h�ajj or annualpilgrimage. Establishing a consulate to manage the affairs and concerns of theh�ujjaj (pilgrims) was of high importance to the community, which had witnessedboth minor aggravations and fatal calamities over the years.

The MCB did not influence the government’s decision to authorize the HajjDelegation but was invited by government to participate in the discussions andnegotiations leading up to its establishment (Mustafa, 2003a; Adil, 2000).Sacranie participated in a delegation of three British Muslims who went to SaudiArabia to arrange (together with British consular and embassy staff) the logisticsof the consulate with the Saudi government (British Muslims Monthly Survey,1999c, p. 7; Adil, 2000). The MCB has also participated in the selection of theHajj Delegation (those British Muslims who would act as consular staff)(Rahman, 2003). Recognizing these efforts (and furthering the MCB’s reputationas a successful community representative), FCO Minister Peter Hain announcedthe establishment of the consulate at a MCB reception (Adil, 1999b; Sheriff,1999). Some in the community were less pleased with MCB participation,suggesting that the MCB had ‘hijacked’ the initiative (British Muslims MonthlySurvey, 2000, pp. 2–3; Ahmed, 2003).

A second instance in which the MCB played a role in foreign policy makingwas in reaction to the detention of several British Muslims in Yemen, accusedby the Yemeni government of conspiring to commit terrorism. The MCB actedon this occasion to liaise between the government and the community. Itorganized meetings with FCO ministers to ensure that the detainees werereceiving full consular attention, and wrote letters to Prime Minister Blair,urging him to intervene personally with the Yemeni President to ensure fairtreatment of the detainees and due process in the planned trial (BirminghamPost, 1999; MCB, 1999b). The MCB also acted as a channel for governmentcommunication with the British Muslim community. No doubt responding topublic criticisms made by the families and other members of the communityabout the government’s delay in intervening on behalf of the detainees, Blairwrote to Sacranie stating that he expected the Secretary-general to explain to hisown organization as well as to the families involved and the community as awhole that the government was ‘actively engaged in defending the consularinterests of these eight British nationals from the outset’ (British MuslimsMonthly Survey, 1999b, p. 3; Versi, 1999).

Other issues on which the MCB has been consulted include setting targets forglobal poverty eradication with the Chancellor and the Secretary of InternationalDevelopment (MCB, 2002d),13 and eliminating the practice of forced marriages

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with the FCO’s dedicated-group, the Community Liaison Unit (MCB, 2003d).14

The MCB is able to play a prominent role in such issues because the organiza-tion is reacting to specific problems in coordination with—or at the behest of—agovernment already sympathetic to its concerns. In these cases, the MCB isunlikely to be competing with (non-Muslim) pressure groups or other domesticactors as regards the policies’ future direction. Moreover, these issues have littleramification for other foreign policy interests. Finally, they are issues withlimited scope, requiring little effort and few resources to further. This expla-nation of the MCB’s effectiveness is in keeping with the literature on externalinfluence on British foreign policy making and on the role of domestic interestgroups in British politics, which suggests that pressure groups are most effectivewhen the government perceives the issue as a low priority or is not firmlycommitted to a particular position (Barber, 1976, p. 71). However, intra-com-munity competition probably decreases the effectiveness of British Muslimlobbying as a whole.

Despite the successes mentioned above, members of the Muslim community,both within and outside the MCB, argue unequivocally that the MCB (and theMuslim community as a whole) have failed to effect real change in Britishforeign policy.15 Mustafa states bluntly: ‘We [the MCB] have not managed toinfluence foreign policy, and we won’t be able to in the short term or even inthe medium term’ (Mustafa, 2003a). Zaki Badawi, a regular participant inmeetings at the FCO and Downing Street, concurs: ‘That the small BritishMuslim community influences British foreign policy is a joke. The wholeMuslim world can’t influence US policy, and British foreign policy is made inthe US’ (Badawi, 2003).

Ongoing government policy toward conflicts in Kashmir, between the Israelisand Palestinians and in Chechnya in particular are seen as favouring thepowerful (India, Israel and Russia, respectively) in disregard of the human andpolitical rights of Muslims. Similarly, Britain’s active support for sanctions andmilitary action against Iraq and the post-11 September ‘war against terrorism’ isperceived as detrimental to Muslims around the world. While many in theMuslim community applaud former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s emphasison promoting an ‘ethical foreign policy’, they also suggest that it was no morethan rhetoric. Bhailok, for instance, dismisses the initiative, saying: ‘Despite nicewords, it became apparent that policy continues as is’ (Bhailok, 2003).

Even the regular consultation between the government and the MCB (andother British Muslim leaders) is viewed pessimistically as ineffectual. Forinstance, Rahman asserts:

Initially that [regular consultation] was very helpful and that was positive.But we were asking ourselves at that early stage, we thought, well this isgood, but [to] what extent is this exercise … is it a bunch of Muslimssitting in front of the Foreign Minister saying this is what we thought ofpolicies XYZ that you’ve already implemented? And generally talk[ing]about things that were already happening, are we commenting on faitsaccomplis or are we helping in a way to influence the shape and directionof future policies as well? We very much hope that the latter was the case

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though I think mostly we were probably…if you push for an opinion,Muslims would go for the former: that it was largely one way. (Rahman,2003)

Explaining the Paradox

Regular consultation with only relatively minor influence is the paradox thatemerges from this overview of the rise of the MCB and its relationship with theBlair government on matters of foreign policy. Several reasons relating to Britishforeign policy, New Labour’s ideology of ‘inclusiveness’ and the MCB itselfexplain why the government might seek to speak with the MCB (and otherBritish Muslim leaders) on a regular basis, despite not translating these consul-tations into practical policy changes.

‘British Muslim Diplomacy’

At the level of foreign policy, the government has sought consultation withBritish Muslims in part to gain acceptance of its foreign policies. It is a way ofinforming and (hopefully) convincing British Muslims, through their leaders, ofthe correctness of government policy—as the term ‘multipliers’ in FCO jargonhints at (see below). Badawi describes this process in a negative way: ‘[govern-ment ministers] have tried to persuade us of their opinion. I am a very cynicalman. I think they are trying to use us as their own conduit, to sell their ownpolicy to us so we can sell it to our own community. But we don’t buy veryeasily. We argue with them’ (Badawi, 2003). To some extent, however, thediscussion has proven fruitful both domestically and internationally, as Bhailok’sdiplomacy described below shows:

The Prime Minister said to me: what about Kosovo [as an example ofBritish policy beneficial to Muslims]? I said the same thing in a meetingin Mecca…I’ve batted for Britain many times. I’m quite critical here butabroad, I bat for Britain and democracy. I was booed down at one of theconferences. (Bhailok, 2003)

Consultation may also be useful to coopt various organizations and communityleaders; that is, to gain support for policies they have contributed to and/or togarner help in the implementation of these policies. The MCB’s contribution tothe Hajj Delegation planning is one such example.

Consultation is also valuable for the government because British Muslims’expertise and intimate contacts abroad can aid British foreign policy objectives.Sacranie suggests: ‘we, too, can help open doors which are too heavy forgovernments to open on their own…there exists something called ‘BritishMuslim diplomacy’, which can help better both trade and political relationsbetween Britain and the Muslim world’ (MCB, 1999b). Delegations of BritishMuslims have been sent on trade and political promotion missions to the Muslimworld. British Muslims are sent abroad to build trade links, using commonlanguages and local expertise as well as the more abstract notion of community

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solidarity to encourage international trade. As one delegate on a trade mission toIndonesia explains:

They want good relationships with these [Muslim] countries and these goodrelationships will help with British trade and British influence, in away…We actually help them because we are working as a bridge betweenBritain and the rest of the Muslim world…A bridge in terms of culture, interms of trade, in terms of policies as well. (Badawi, 2003)

In the post-11 September era, the FCO has also sponsored delegations of Muslimleaders to tour Muslim countries, including Muslim parliamentarians and othercommunity leaders, such as MCB members (Bhailok, 2003).16 According to oneparticipant, the purpose of one such delegation to Egypt and Saudi Arabia inJanuary 2002 was to ‘highlight the role British Muslims play in the social, civicand political life of Britain’ (Khanbhai, 2002)—a message that encourages amore sympathetic view of Britain in the eyes of Muslim majority states andsocieties, as well as promoting democratic values by example and encouragingdebate about the relationship between Islam and politics.17

New Labour’s Outreach

Government consultation with the British Muslim community on foreign policyissues seems to be part and parcel of a larger campaign of outreach between NewLabour and the Muslim community. Perhaps the most obvious indication ofthese efforts was the appointment of the first Muslims to the House of Lords.Less dramatically, the Blair government has made a concerted effort to establisha more regular level of interaction with the community. New Labour has madea point of giving regular interviews and writing letters to the Muslim press, onissues of both domestic and foreign policy. In the Muslim News, for example,government ministers gave ten interviews and contributed four articles from thebeginning of New Labour’s first term of government to October 2003;18 thiscompares with the Conservative government’s one interview and zero contribut-ing articles in the two years prior to the 1997 election (Muslim News, 26 May1995–31 October 2003).19 The government has also made a point of sendingministers, including the Prime Minister, to speak to Muslim audiences as well asinviting Muslim delegations to Whitehall.20

The FCO has also made efforts to reach out to the British Muslim community.In addition to developing relationships with British Muslim leaders, the FCO hasimplemented reforms to increase interaction with the community and bringBritish Muslims into its organization. In a speech at the Ismaili Centre in Londonin October 1998, Foreign Secretary Cook summarized the various FCO initia-tives designed to encourage British Muslim participation in the making offoreign policy:

My colleague Derek Fatchett, the Minister of State, holds regular briefingswith leaders of Britain’s Islamic community.21 We are sponsoring studentexchanges, seminars and conferences designed to break down the barriers.And the Foreign Office is modernising so it can be genuinely effective in

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this area. It needs to become more representative of all the richness anddiversity that modern Britain has to offer. So we are encouraging brightyoung British Muslims, of all walks of life, to consider the DiplomaticService as a career. They will find a ready welcome. For it will only bewith the active participation and support of dedicated British Muslims thatwe will be able to claim we have properly included the Islamic dimensionin our foreign policy. (Cook, 1998)

The final initiative mentioned in Cook’s speech above—to recruit more Muslimsinto the diplomatic corps (as well as to promote them to senior levels)—is partof a wider effort to incorporate ethnic minorities into the FCO, and Civil Servicein general.22 The purpose of this equal opportunity employment is said to extendbeyond political correctness; as the Permanent Under-secretary of State at theFCO emphasized: ‘real success will come when there is a strong enough criticalmass of ethnic minorities in the FCO to advance the agenda itself’ (Weston etal., 2003, p. 10).

Additionally, two notable units have been created since 2001 to institutional-ize the links between the FCO and British Muslims. The first, the Islamic MediaUnit, was created after 11 September to ‘strengthen support among Muslims forthe objectives of the campaign [against terrorism]’—both at home and abroad(FCO, 2002, p. 40). One example of these efforts was a ten-page glossypamphlet called ‘Never again’ that sought to justify British participation in thewar in Afghanistan. The brochure contained quotes of Muslim leaders’ condem-nations of the attacks of 11 September, evidence against the alleged mastermindof the attacks Osama Bin Laden, reference to the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s successful campaign to protect Kosovar Muslims and photo-graphs of Prime Minister Blair with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (BritishMuslims Monthly Survey, 2001, p. 14).

A second outreach group, the Partnerships and Networks Development Unit(PaNDU), was launched in February 2003 with the mission to ‘act as a catalystwithin the Foreign Office to help it engage in [sic] more effectively with externalcommunities’ (Weston et al., 2003, p. 2). Specifically, Unit Head Fraser Wheelerexplains that the group intends to:

…make engagement with them [non-governmental organizations, business,and minority ethnic communities] rather more systematic and stra-tegic…We’ll be looking to fill gaps. For example to engage with communi-ties that cross-cut geographical divisions in the Foreign Office. We havebeen engaging with British Muslims, for example, for some months now.(FCO, 2003)

According to Wheeler, PaNDU will be seeking to liaise with ‘multipliers’—thatis those organizations and individuals that ‘have good connections, who can havea disproportionate effect’ (FCO, 2003).

The reasons for this outreach derive in part from domestic political consider-ations. British Muslims are the largest religious minority in Britain, and as LordAhmed explains, ‘the Foreign Office has no choice but to embrace the [approx-imately] two million Muslims who are part of the British society” (Ahmed,

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2003). These numbers are important both politically and socially. Labour’soutreach to British Muslims certainly has something to do with rewarding itstraditional political supporters and ensuring their vote in the next election.23

Moreover, these meetings can help assess Muslim reaction to certain policyoptions, thus allowing the government to prepare the most effective presentationof their chosen policy. As Rahman suggests: ‘So [do] they [governmentministers] take into account our feelings when they formulate foreign policy oris it a kind of an intelligence show, in other words, does it provide the ForeignOffice a convenient platform to gather views of people and for them to assessthe [domestic] impact of [that policy]?’ (Rahman, 2003).

Consultation may prevent the worst-case scenario at home—violence andradicalism—by constructing a reputation for the government among communitymembers as receptive and inclusive. Moreover, meeting with certain groups suchas the MCB (but not, say, the Muslim Parliament) may help to advance thereputation of the government’s preferred groups at the expense of organizationswhich pursue more radical agendas and/or pressure strategies.

Thus the Blair government has consulted specifically with the MCB becauseit offers a ‘mainstream’ interpretation of international (and domestic) events andbecause the group represents a sizeable portion of the British Muslim population.Mustafa also believes that the MCB’s cooperation with the government ondomestic issues impels consultation on other issues such as foreign policy: ‘TheBritish government are happy about the MCB because they represent a widesection of the community on internal issues. They can’t say, we will meet youon domestic issues like health, but not on foreign policy’ (Mustafa, 2003a).

Competing Foreign Policies

With numerous reasons for consultation, what explains the MCB’s lack ofdecisive influence? First, on the level of foreign policy, Britain’s objectivesinternationally are numerous and, at times, conflicting. While the governmentmay share similar foreign policy goals with the British Muslim community—is-sues about which it asks for advice and expertise—these are often not prioritizedin the same way. Lord Ahmed describes the competing policy objectives of theFCO as follows:

They [the government] are very strong about human rights. But the veryfact that they openly criticize Pakistan about cross-border terrorism, [while]they cannot openly criticize India for abuses of human rights, and themurder and the rape and the torture of the Kashmiri people. Similarly, theycan talk about the suicide bombers, but what they don’t talk about is themassacre of Jenin and also what happens to the ordinary Palestinian people.They can talk about the so-called Chechen terrorists, but what they don’ttalk about is the Russian soldiers that are engaged in torture, killing, rape,and which is all recorded by human rights organizations around the world.

I think [they do this] because they need Russia for bigger things, in theinterest of UK or international politics and if they criticize Russia, forinstance, then they will upset the Russian government…Similarly they need

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India for exactly the same purposes, but more importantly, five billionpounds worth of contracts that have come per annum in recent years. Andwith Israel, the American lobby which is so strong, the Jewish lobby…it’sa very strong lobby and that [going against them] does not go in the interestof the UK, and that’s why they have to back off. (Ahmed, 2003)

Indeed, Prime Minister Blair confirmed this perception in January 2003 to aconference of British diplomats when he said Britain’s first priority was to‘remain the closest ally of the US’ whereas ‘reach[ing] out to the Muslim World’was the seventh and final foreign policy objective after strengthening Britain’srelationships with Europe, large countries, including Russia, China and India,and Britain’s former empire, as well as alleviating world poverty and bolsteringinternational institutions (Blair, 2003).

Domestically, the British Muslim community is only one voice seeking to beheard on foreign policy. Muslim leaders believe they are fighting an uphill battleagainst the entrenched views and policies in the FCO. As Bhailok asserts: ‘TheForeign Office is a department in government which has a policy which actuallycontinues quite often irrespective of their political masters’ (Bhailok, 2003).Moreover, British Muslims must ‘compete’ with other pressure groups. TheJewish and Hindu lobbies, in particular, are most regularly identified by BritishMuslims as opponents more powerful than themselves; for instance, Versi states:

The Jewish lobby and the Hindu lobby are very strong…The Hindu lobbyis richer than the Muslims and they have contributed to the Labour andConservative parties, which is very important. The Jewish community isalso richer, but it is also older—it’s been here for more than 100years—and it is more assimilated, more integrated into government. Theyhave 25 MPs. (Versi, 2003a)

These observations about the strength of other ethno-religious groups’ lobbiesnevertheless overlook the many structural limitations to influencing foreignpolicy in Britain—such as the relatively insular foreign policy decision-makingstructure—that are, of course, equally applicable to all foreign policy lobbies.

The MCB has at times tried to build coalitions of like-minded groups, inparticular associating itself with other faith groups. In 2002, for instance, theMCB organized a meeting of leaders of the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communi-ties to appeal for peace in the subcontinent (MCB, 2002e). However, coalitionbuilding on foreign affairs has not been attempted regularly, has been unsuccess-ful or has failed to find ‘acceptable’ partners.

British Muslim Political Weakness

Secondly, the British Muslim community is still weak politically. Although thelargest religious minority in Britain, the community still only makes up 2.7% ofthe total population. Moreover, despite the political advantage of being geo-graphically concentrated into a handful of urban areas, ethnic, linguistic, gener-ational and political divisions have hindered a strong and unified voice as well

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as an agreed focus on a limited number of international issues. The competitionbetween organizations and individuals for the role of representative means thatthe British Muslim voice is weakened in the corridors of power. Competingpolicy positions and recommendations dilute the potential strength of thecommunity’s voice. Additionally, the number of representative groups weakenthe potential power of the community’s numerical strength, since each group’scredibility is lowered by representing fewer people.

British Muslim political strength has also suffered from a negative imageof Muslims in the larger British society. In 1997, a government reportflagged ‘Islamophobia’ as a serious concern. Recent events, including domesticriots involving ‘Asian youth’ in cities such as Bradford and Oldham in thesummer of 2001 as well as international terrorism committed by extremists inthe name of Islam, have undoubtedly exacerbated the problem. At the timeof the Iraq war, for example, the Muslim News reported an increase in attacksagainst Muslims and Muslim property, including mosques, cemeteries andbusinesses, although government figures (of racial attacks) showed a decrease(Versi, 2003b, c).

Institutional Weakness

Thirdly, in addition to these larger difficulties faced by the British Muslimcommunity leadership as a whole, the MCB’s efforts have been hampered byinstitutional weakness. Mustafa expresses dismay at the MCB’s lack of strategicplanning and long-term initiative; the organization, he says, only reacts to events,thus limiting its potential influence (Mustafa, 2003a, b). This predilection ispartly to do with the MCB’s lack of resources—particularly of full-time staff(although the MCB recently hired four dedicated employees) (MCB, 2003b),lobbying expertise and the financial resources required to support its lobbyingactivity and community representation.

Conclusion

This study has sought to delineate the not insubstantial participation of BritishMuslims in British foreign policy making while also highlighting the numerouspolitical constraints the MCB and the community as a whole still face withregard to foreign policy lobbying. With an increasingly politically active andvocal community, galvanized in particular by the perceived ‘anti-Muslim’post-11 September course of world events, the power of the MCB (and otherBritish Muslim lobby groups) should grow. Indeed, there is an interestingphenomenon of increasing political participation by British Muslims at the sametime as the community is feeling a heightened sense of alienation from the widerBritish society, as they perceive themselves as being under suspicion and blamedfor international violence committed in the name of Islam. Further study isrequired to analyse the compatibility and importance of these seemingly diver-gent trends.

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Acknowledgement

The author wishes to express thanks to Dr James Piscatori for his help andsupport throughout this project.

Notes

1. The term ‘ethno-religious pressure group’ is used advisedly to describe the complex self-identification anddiverse lobbying activities of organizations seeking to represent communities such as British Muslims,whose identities and interests derive from both ethnicity and religion. As such, this term makes a subtlebut important distinction from ‘ethnic’ lobbies, a term more commonly used, particularly when discussingUS politics.

2. Pressure groups are defined here as non-governmental organizations that seek to influence public policy.3. The 2001 census question on religious affiliation was voluntary; 7.3% of respondents did not answer the

question. Also, 15.5% ticked the box ‘no religion’. The inclusion of this question is in itself illustrativeof the changing perception of minority affairs in government circles and may reflect the growing influenceof ethno-religious pressure groups. The MCB was one of the groups that campaigned for a question onreligious affiliation to be included in the census.

4. This percentage is lower than the estimated proportion of Muslims in the European Union, suggested tobe 4–5% or approximately fifteen million of a total population of 370 million (Cameron, 2002, p. 258;Hunter & Serfaty, 2002, p. xiii).

5. The 2001 census suggests that 73.65% of Muslims are ‘Asian’ or ‘Asian British’ (ONS, 2003b).6. The multitude of organizations also reflects the decentralized nature of British government, with many

issues of concern to British Muslims handled at the local level of government (Nielsen, 1995, p. 47).7. One notable example is that of Mohammad al-Masari, a Saudi dissident who uses London as his base to

undermine the Saudi regime. The British government’s efforts to extradite him at the behest of the Saudigovernment were blocked by the courts.

8. Unfortunately, numerous efforts to arrange an interview with Mr Sacranie were unsuccessful.9. This number, however, may be exaggerated as there seem to be numerous overlaps in each category. For

example, the UK Islamic Mission (National) is counted as one of 26 ‘national affiliates’ but there are also35 branches of the UK Islamic Mission listed as ‘local/specialist bodies’.

10. The FCO’s Ethnic Minorities and Faith Groups Advisor asserts: ‘the MCB is an important part of theMuslim community. They represent a large number of organizations, and a large number of interests inthe Muslim community. But it is not the sole voice of the community. They don’t represent all the viewsof this heterogeneous population’ (Ali, 2003).

11. A special election supplement written by the MCB was included in the Muslim News, 30 March 2001. Itincluded an article entitled ‘Why vote?’; a ‘Muslim VoteCard’ to be sent to parliamentary candidatesasking them to declare their position on five issues of concern to Muslims, including ‘Justice for sufferingMuslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and Iraq’; and a chart listing constituencies with outcomes thatcould potentially be affected by the voting of its Muslim electorate.

12. From November 1997 to September 2003, the MCB issued 151 press releases of which 73 (or 48%) wererelated to international affairs (MCB, 2003c).

13. The ‘Target 2015’ programme has sought partnerships with each of the religious communities in Britain.14. This unit is controversial within the Muslim community as it is perceived as stigmatizing them (Ahmed,

2003).15. This is not the case with domestic policies. Home Secretary Straw suggested that the MCB had influenced

government policy as early as 1998: ‘Following representations for Iqbal Sacranie’s group (MuslimCouncil of Britain), we made changes at the last minute to the sections of the Crime and Disorder Act onthe racially aggravated offences’ (Muslim News, 1998).

16. As members of these delegations, Bhailok went to Pakistan and MCB member Councillor Azfal Khanwent to Uzbekistan.

17. This marketing strategy is not wholly a Labour innovation. One example of a similar ‘sales pitch’ toMuslim countries came in 1994, when the FCO assembled a ‘travelling exhibition’ about the BritishMuslim community as well as information about Britain’s relations with Bosnia and about opportunitiesfor Islamic study in Britain (British Muslims Monthly Survey, 1994c, p. 11).

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18. The vast majority of interviews and articles were published between May 1998 and April 2001. This aspectof Labour’s outreach to the community, therefore, began in its second year in power, and was pursued onlyperipherally in the post-11 September period, where there was only one article contributed and oneinterview granted by government ministers to the Muslim News despite the increased domestic insecurityfelt by British Muslims as well as their unease at British participation in the wars against Afghanistan andIraq. The Muslim News’s editor claims he was refused interviews with government ministers during thistime, suggesting: ‘Maybe they were worried that something might be said by Straw that would bemisinterpreted by the Muslim community’ (Versi, 2003a) . The FCO’s Islamic Media Unit could notexplain why the Muslim News had not been granted an interview for nearly a year and a half after 11September, but claimed that other Muslim media such as the Eastern Eye and the Nation had receivedinterviews during this period (Member of FCO’s Islamic Media Unit, 2003).

19. Labour’s outreach in this respect has been adopted as best practice by the Conservatives and the LiberalDemocrats, with Conservative politicians giving five interviews and the Liberal Democrats one since 1997.All party leaders participated in pre-election written interviews in 1997 and again in 2001 and sent theirbest wishes on the occasion of the holy month of Ramadan in 1999 and 2000.

20. This strategy has also been adopted by opposition parties, with the Leader of the Opposition, in particular,holding regular meetings with the MCB and other British Muslim organizations.

21. Tellingly, Fatchett’s sudden death in 1999 prompted numerous open letters of condolence and praise forhis efforts to reach out to British Muslims from Sacranie and others (British Muslims Monthly Survey,1999c, p. 8; Q News, 1999).

22. The first British Muslim high commissioner was appointed to Bangladesh in September 2003.23. British Muslims vote overwhelmingly for the Labour party, although there are indications that this support

has been eroded in recent years (Ansari, 2002, p. 19) and in reaction to the 2003 war in Iraq (The Times,2003). Nevertheless, political parties are elected for more than their foreign policies and many Muslimsmay have difficulty voting for the perceived ‘anti-immigrant’ Conservative party.

References

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Advisor.Ansari, H. (2002) Muslims in Britain (London: Minority Rights Group International).Badawi, Z. (2003) Interview with the author, London, 3 March. Dr Zaki Badawi is Principal of the Muslim

College (London), Chairman of the Council of Imams and Mosques and former Director and Chief Imamof the Islamic Cultural Centre and London Central Mosque.

Barber, J. (1976) Who Makes British Foreign Policy? (Milton Keynes: Open University Press).Bhailok, Y. (2003) Telephone interview with the author, 8 April. Yousuf Bhailok is the former MCB

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