A. M. Ioppolo Presentation and Assent

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Presentation and Assent: A Physical and Cognitive Problem in Early Stoicism

Author(s): Anna-Maria IoppoloReviewed work(s):Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1990), pp. 433-449Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/639102 .

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ClassicalQuarterly0 (ii)433-449(1990)Printed n GreatBritain 433

PRESENTATION AND ASSENT: A PHYSICAL ANDCOGNITIVE PROBLEM IN EARLY STOICISM*The Stoic theory of knowledge was founded by Zeno on a perceptual and crudelymaterialistic base, but subsequently developed into an elaborate theory involvingAEK-d which has proved difficult to reconstruct. The evolution of the school,influenced not only by internal differences but also by interaction with the PlatonicAcademy, certainly contributed to this development. Hence any adequate re-construction of the Stoic theory of knowledge must take account of the differencesamong the positions of the different representativesof the school with respect to thecriticism put foward by the Academics. I propose here to clarify Zeno's position,showing how Arcesilaus' criticism helped to expose certain lacunae and thus to bringabout changes in doctrine on the part both of Zeno himself and of his immediatesuccessors.

In the first part I shall deal with Zeno's theory of knowledge, emphasising its closeconnection with physics and its total opposition to Platonic idealism. In thisconnection I shall examine Arcesilaus' arguments against the Zenonian concept ofKaTdA7lLs, comparing them with certain theories elaborated by Plato in theTheaetetusagainst the view of Protagoras.

Zeno set out from common sense, and from the conviction that the senses, if theyare whole and intact, lead to absolutely certain knowledge of the outside world.Presentation (Oavram'a) s the means which enables us to recognize external objects.Zeno conceived a presentation as an impression in the soul.1A cognitive presentationis free from error because it is 'stamped and reproduced and impressed fromsomething which is, exactly as that thing is' ('ex eo quod esset sicut esset impressumet signatum et effictum ).2 It is infallible because it is an imprintof the external objectin the soul, which is itself like a wax tablet. If the soul is like a block of wax andobjects make their imprint on it, there is no room for error.Various passages show that this was Zeno's conception of the commanding-faculty,though not his definition. The anonymous Theaetetus commentator says of theStoics: 'for they compare the commanding-faculty to mouldable wax of a naturesuchthat it can take every impression.' (That the reference is to Zeno's doctrine is clearfrom the citation of Aristo, which follows.) Indeed, the idea that the commanding-faculty has the properties of wax is implicit in Zeno's definition of presentation as71t7TaUL.4 According to Cleanthes Zeno had followed Heraclitus in defining the soul

* This paper is the result of two lectures delivered at Balliol College, Oxford in May 1989, aspart of the Erasmus Project. I would like especially to thank Jonathan Barnes for his help inmaking the English version of this text more intelligible, and the editors for their detailedsuggestions for improvements. They are not, of course, responsible for any mistakes which thepaper may still contain.1 SE Mvii 236, 230 (SVF I 58), in which the definition is explicitly attributed to Zeno; cf. alsoDL vii 46, 50; Cic. Luc. 18, 77; SE M vii 248, 400.2 Cic. Luc. 77 (SVF I59).

3 Cf. Anon. in Plat. Theat., xi 27-31 (ed. H. Diels, W. Schubart,p. 9). I follow the text kindlygiven to me by F. Decleva Caizzi and D. Sedley.4 SE M vii 373 (SVFII 56), El yap Kirpoo rpd7rov 4jXi qavaaUTLKwbs3rdaXovaa. DL vn 45(SVF 1 53), -T7VSavraala ELaLTrTWULVEVCOUXj,o!,vd&/La-o, olKET /.ETEV7?VEYEVOUd7rro CvrTVrWvWCV&TV Kqpl V7rW"'TO?)aK7TUALOLVOIEVWV.


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434 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOas a alaO)T7LK7i vaOv?uLaaUs:5He calls it perceptive because of the fact that in itsmain part it is susceptibleto being impressedby the outside world through the sensoryorgans and it receives the impressions.' A passage in Plutarch, although notmentioning Zeno, confirms that the soul, understood as a vaporous exhalation, is,according to the Stoics, capable of receiving impressions.6Plutarch observes that if thesoul is an exhalation it is difficult for it to receive the impressions because of itsfineness, and impossible for it to retain them. The physical aspect of the presentationdoes not lie in the metaphor of the impression on the soul as one in a wax tablet, sincethe soul is not really a block of wax but an exhalation,7 but rather in the fact thatZeno ascribes to it certain of the physical propertiesof wax. In the same way the effectof the presentation on it is similar to that produced by the seal of a ring. EvenCleanthes, when he explains his master'sdoctrine, tends to stress the aspect of imprintin presentation, when he states that the impression is determined according toeminence and depression as signet-rings make an impression on wax. This leaves noroom for doubt regarding the physical contact which establishes itself between theexternal object and the commanding-faculty through the mediation of the senses."Presentation for Zeno is, in fact, almost a blow from the outside.9

Although Chrysippus modifies the definition of presentation from Tr7TWUoLSoTEpOL'WULS he still maintains Zeno's idea that presentation is the result of a physicalimpact on the material soul. It is for this reason that he compared the commanding-faculty to air: 'For just as the air, when many people are speaking simultaneously,receivesmany and differentblows and at once undergoes many alterations too, so thecommanding-faculty by receiving a variety of images will experience something

analogous to this.'10The object then, through the mediation of the senses, physicallyproduces a real impact on the sensory organs and via the pneuma impresses a markon the soul."We do not trust every presentation, but only those which have a characteristicaspect ('quae propriam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur').125 Ar. Did. ap. Euseb. PE xv 20, 2 (SVF I 141): Z4vwv rivv'i)- v AEyEL lo0'qaLKq'Vdva0vptlauLv Thus Wellman followed by Diels and Arnim: aleO'qtLv71 va0vilhaov codd.],KaOdarEp 'HpaKAETOS9.OUVAdpEvoSap E/pavlaaLOTLUL L XaLdvaOUFpLwEvatL oEpalt daylvov-raL, EKaaEV ai3rs 'TOf~ wrOTaaoS.The text does not allow us to be sure whether thequotation dvaOvptLLwpEatLyLvo-rat should be attributed to Heraclitus or to Zeno. The

opinions of scholars on this point differ; for possible corrections of the text, see M. Conche,Hiraclite. Fragments (Paris, 1986), pp. 452-4, which, however, does not include the oneproposed by N. Festa, Iframmenti degli Stoici antichi,ii (Bari, 1935), pp. 119-20. It seems to me,however, hat a comparisonwiththePlutarchpassage seenote6) supports he attributionoZeno. Thisopinion,albeitfor otherreasons, s sharedby J. Barnes, Robinson'sHeraclitus',Apeiron13(1988),102-3.IndeedPlutarchobjects hatthe exhalation houldalwaysbe new,and,therefore,not ableto retain he imprints,KaLVqV EL 7TOLEdT7VdvaOupLaatLv.hiswouldconfirm the reading vEapalproposed by J. D. Meerwaldt, 'Cleanthea' I, Mnemosyne4 (1951),40-69, p. 54, insteadof voEpaln theAriusDidymuspassage.6 Comm. not. 1084f-1085a.7 See also DL vii 157 (SVF I 135).8 See SE M vii 228, 400 (SVF I 484).

Cf. Cic. Varro 40: 'de sensibus... quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsioneoblata extrinsecus.'10 SE M vii 231; cf. DL vii 50.1 Cf. Cic. defato 43: 'sic visum obiectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animosuam speciem.' This confirms that Chrysippus is defending Zeno's doctrine, as the argument indefato 40 also suggests; on this subject, cf. my 'Le cause antecedenti in Cicerone De fato 40',in Matter and Metaphysics, ed. J. Barnes, M. Mignucci (Naples, 1989), 399-424.12 Cic. Varro 41 (SVF I 60). Cf. SE M vII 232-5, in which the Stoics clearly distinguishbetween an affection such as an itching hand, or a scratch in the hand, and a presentation.


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A STOIC PROBLEM 435Zeno uses the special term qavraulat KaTaAr7/TLKaL for these presentations whichhave the power of revealing the external object. A cognitive presentation 'is thatwhich arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance withwhat is'.13 A cognitive presentation which, coming from what is, has the power ofrevealingit because it faithfullycarriesall its characteristics,is therefore discernedjustby itself because of its self-evidence and effectiveness."1 This presentation isKaTaAr7TTdv, capable of being grasped, comprehendibile, n Cicero's translation. Itwould seem then, that Zeno had not conceived presentation as active, but rather aspassive. In fact, Cicero, who explicitly poses the problem of the translation of theGreek term KarTaAr/7Tdv,ives it a passive sense.'5This, however, does not mean thatwe do not grasp the externalobject but only the presentation, because it is, as we haveseen, in a physical sense literally an imprint of the external object in the soul. 'So toosome impressorstouch, as it were, and make contact with the commanding-faculty tomake their printing in it.'16It is possible then, to say that a presentation is, in a certain sense, passive, becauseits cause is the external object which, by impressing its mark on the soul, determinesit. But in another sense it is active because it implies an operation of the mind, beinga vdro)Ls, thought process."It is however necessary to clarify in what sense we can speak of passiveness of apresentation. If by 'passiveness' we mean the fact that when faced with an externalobject, it is inevitable for the subject to get an impression and be affected by it, thenpresentation is no doubt passive.18If instead we mean that presentation dependsentirely on what produces it, then this does not exactly reflect the Stoic position. Theadjective KaTaApr7TTLK0das in fact first introduced by Zeno, in order to distinguishthat presentation which was capable of grasping and reproducing the characteristicsof the external object with absolute accuracy.19Thus presentation, if it is the result ofmental activity, cannot be reduced to a mere affection. It is, however, passive in itsrelationship with assent.20 For when Zeno distinguished the various cognitive phasesin a temporal sequence - presentation, assent, cognition, science - in his comparison

13 DL vii 46 (SVF In53); cf. Cic.Luc. 77 (SVF I 59): 'ex eo quodessetsicutesset mpressumet signatum t effictum.'14 Cic. Varro41: 'id autem visum cum ipsumper se cerneretur.'The meaningof Zeno'sstatement s made clearby SE M vii 257: 'This presentation eingself-evident nd striking

(?vapy7;1ouaa Kal 7rrKT-rLK), all but seizes us by the hair, they say, and pulls us to assent,needing nothing else to achieve this effect or to establish its differencefrom other presentations.'The passage refers to the younger Stoics, but since the definition of the cognitive presentationgiven at 247 is that of Zeno and at 253 it is said that older Stoics (dpXad`TEpot)nvoked it ascriterion of truth, we could reasonably assume that all the Stoics shared, on this subject, Zeno'sview.15 A. Bonhoeffer, Epictet und die Stoa (Stuttgart, 1890), p. 163, believes that if KaTaArjrrTdvhas to be given a passive sense 'unter visum aber nicht sowohl die Vorstellung, als vielmehr dasVorgestellte Object selbst zu verstehen.'1" SE M vII 409 (SVF 11 85).17 DL VII51: '7t al Ev ELUtAoLKa, aL S AoyoL.AoyLKat' v aL rV AOYLKCLVOV..... atpvvotv AoyLKaL o7ljEL El LV.is Cf. SE M vim397 (SVF n 91); see also Arcesilaus in Plut. Col. 1122b-d, which refers toZeno's position."9 Cf. Cic. Luc. 145; Numen, ap. Euseb. PE xiv 6, 13. Moreover the ambiguity of Zeno'sconception of presentation is to be found even in the adjective KaTaAr7TTLKd6S,hich in Greekcan be both active and passive in sense; on this subject,much discussed by critics, see E. Br6hier,Chrysippeet 'ancienStoicisme2(Paris, 1951),pp. 88ff; F. H. Sandbach, 'Phantasia Kataleptike',in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London, 1971), 9-21, p. 10.20 Cf. M. Frede, 'Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions', in The SkepticalTradition,ed. M. Burnyeat (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983), 65-93, p. 68.


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436 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOof knowledge, with the progressive closing of the hand, he was emphasising thepassiveness of presentation with respect to assent:"' the approval or non-approval ofthe presentation depends on assent, which is a voluntary movement of the soul.22

The ambiguity of the Zenonian conception of presentation is in fact stressed byZeno's opponents, who object that if presentation is an activity, it is no differentfromother modifications ('TEpoLCOA'ELS)of the commanding-faculty, such as impulse,cognition and assent.23It is precisely in order to distinguish it from other mental actsthat Chrysippus and the younger Stoics will be forced to specify that presentation isa ETEpoLWULaf the commanding-faculty Ka7dT TELULV.24When the soul recognizes apresentation as true by giving its assent to it, we have cognition or KaTdTrbLS.Allmen are able to recognize the outside world 'for nature has given the sensory facultyand the presentation which arises thereby as our light, as it were, for the recognitionof truth'.25 It is for this reason that cognition, which is assent to a cognitivepresentation, is common to all men and is a criterion of truth 26 it is founded on thetruthfulness of the cognitive presentation, which faithfully reproduces all thecharacteristics of the existing object.Apart from cognition, science (E17r'jMElr) also has its foundation in cognitivepresentation. Science is a firm cognition which does not allow itself to be changed byany kind of reasoning: it is a property that only belongs to the wise man.27 Thedifference between cognition and science does not lie in the fact that they havedifferentobjects, but rather in the stability with which science grasps the object. Thecomparison of the cognitive process with a hand, gradually closing itself into a fistwhich is then tightly and forcefully clasped by the other hand, indicates the greaterfirmness with which science possesses its object compared with cognition. Assent isstrong in both cases but in science it represents a possession which cannot be lost.The assent given to the cognitive presentation is firm as well, because it is foundedon presentations of simple sensory objects, which are at the basis of all conceptions,notions and prenotions.28Indeed the origin of our knowledge, even our intellectualknowledge, lies in the senses.29 All psychological states and processes are corporeal

21 Cf. Cic. Luc. 145 (SVF I 66).22 Cic. Varro 40 (SVF I 60): 'sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus,adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et voluntariam.23 Cf. SE M vII 237. The Stoics'opponentsuse -rTwroaUL and ETEpOLWatS indifferentlyoindicate the presentation, showing that there was no differencefor them between Zeno's positionand Chrysippus' interpretation (see 232). In fact, that this was in part legitimate, is confirmedby the definition of the cognitive presentation given by Zeno and never abandoned by the laterStoics, in which the characteristics of the presentation as an imprint are emphasized.24 Cf. SE M vii 239.25 Ibid. 259. Both Cic. Varro42, and Aristo's polemic against the Academics in DL vii 163(SVFI 346) might be adduced to confirmthat this was Zeno's position. Moreover the Epicureansalso accuse the Academics of ablepsia; on this subject, see my Opinionee scienza. IIdibattito traStoici e Accademici nel terzo e nel secondo secolo a. C. (Naples, 1986), pp. 187-9.26 Cf. SE M vii 152.27 Different interpretations and different translations have been given of the expression

diErd'TarTroWrToqr Aodyov n the definition of knowledge,dependingwhether 'reason','argument', or 'reasoning' is used to representAdyos. I prefer 'argument', because it allows usto distinguish the Kac-rda"qLSrom the imavu-ur4.For while reason represents the qualifyingelement in both (even in cognition the assent must be a strong assent if it is to be criterion oftruth), unchangeability by arguments is peculiar to that knowledge which only the wise manpossesses; see my review of A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley, TheHellenistic Philosophers,Elenchos 10(1989), 231-46, pp. 239-41.2s Cf. DL vii 53 (SVFII 87); Sen. ep. 120, 4, 5, 8; SE M Ix 393-5; xi 250-1; VIII 8-60; Ii 40-2.29 Aet. plac. IV 11 (SVF I1 83).


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A STOIC PROBLEM 437according to the Stoics, including virtue and vice. Correspondinglyall thecharacteristicsf objects,all theirpropertiesncludinggoodness,arecorporealandhenceperceivable.

For this reason the cognitive presentation,which is a criterion of truth, willnormallybe alr0'q-rtKuras well as AOYLK74.Some sensorypresentations rise fromwhat s and areaccompanied y yieldingand assent .. It is byperception...] thatwegetcognitionof whiteandblack,roughandsmooth,30but it is by reason hat wegetcognitionof conclusions eached hroughdemonstration,uch as thegods'existenceand theirprovidence.'3'Throughreason then we get cognitionof notions,but thisdoes not mean that theycan be acquiredwithoutexperience. ndeed everyvdrlToloccurseitherowingto sensationor not apartfromsensation ...] andin general t isimpossible o find in conceptionanythingwhich one does not possessas knownbyexperience.32 Thereforef it is truethatcognitionof notions occurs hroughreason,it is equallytrue that there are sensory presentationsat the foundationof thesenotions.33 here s a precise orrespondenceetweenour sensesandexternalobjects,becausenaturehasprovideduswiththemso that wemayunderstandt. In thissenseKaT-dAXorpL,whichis foundedon the senses, s able to graspeverythingeavingoutnothingcapableof confrontingt.34However, n man,sensorypresentations re alsorationaland,assuch,theyarethoughts.35herefore,hecognitivepresentation, einga voduts, involvesan operationof the mind.The self-evidence ndeffectiveness f the cognitivepresentation romptassent,akind of approvalor yielding.It is possible o say thatassent s voluntaryand at thesame timeinevitable.The soul yieldsto an evidentand strikingpresentationust asa scale pan necessarilygoes down when weightsare laid on it.36Zeno, therefore,conceivesassentas a necessary oncomitantof cognitivepresentation, ecause n ahealthycommanding-facultyt is natural o yieldto thosepresentationswhichhavethepeculiarpowerof revealingheirobjects'."'A presentations not aninterpretationof reality,but rathera faithful ranslation f it. Theexpressions varroptEptaypiEv7rKaEva7TrrEapayLU~LWV'7,sedby Zeno to distinguish he cognitivepresentation, elp toconveythemechanicalprocessof which t consists.Thedefinitionof a presentationmustbe understoodnthesameway,almostas a blowfromthe outside.Neverthelessassent is a voluntaryact, becausefor Zeno it was an axiom both of his theoryofknowledge ndof hisethicsthat assent s inman'spower."3Froma physicalpointofview assent to a KaTaAr7pTTK7)16avwramo'aconsistsof an immediate esponse o themovementwhich heimprintbringsabout in thecommanding-faculty.t is thereforepossible o explainwhatassent s from a physicalpointof view,in as muchas, likepresentation,t is a corporealpsychologicalprocess.But it is much moredifficult oexplain herelation roma cognitivepointof view. Bothpresentation ndassentare

30 DL vii 51 (SVFii 83).31 lb. 52 (SVF ii 84).32 Cf. SE M viii 56-8.33 Ib. xi 250.34 Cic. Varro42: 'quia nihilquodcadere n eampossetrelinqueret uodquenaturaquasi

normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset.'35 DL viI 51: AoyLKatKpv atr' v AoYLKtKV'wv, GAoyoL ~r'Tv dAodywv.3s The metaphor is present in Cic. Luc. 38, where Zeno is not explicitly quoted, butArcesilaus' polemical argument in Plut. Col. 1122c, r6 8' dpl7TLK" V - EV'ECJEWVYLVOJE/V-qV,attests the Zenonian origin of the comparison. In fact Zeno frequently made use of the scalesand weights comparison, cf. Epict. I 17, 10 (SVF I 48); Stob. 1122, 12 (SVF I 49).37 Cic. Varro 41.38 Cf. Cic. Varro40 and defato 39-43, where Chrysippus answers an objection put forwardby opponents against the Stoic claim, probably Zeno's, that assent is in man's power.


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438 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOcorporeal psychological processes. And assent is the recognition of the truthfulness ofthe presentation. But is it possible to recognize the truthfulness of the presentation ifit consists of a physical state of the soul?

The passage of Sextus Empiricus(M vii 151-7) which reports Arcesilaus' criticismof Zeno's theory of knowledge, brings out this particular problem. The second of histhree arguments is as follows: cognition is non-existent even by the definition whichZeno himself gives of it, that is, 'assent to a cognitive presentation', because assentcannot be given to a presentation, but rather to a proposition. As I shall try to show,this argument is of Platonic origin. The reason for the borrowing does not lie inArcesilaus' secretly upholding a Platonic epistemology - as was alleged against himby a hostile part of the ancient tradition39 -, but rather in the fact that Zeno took upthe view of perception as awareness of the external object against which Plato hadargued in the Theaetetus. Since Zeno did not separate psychological processes frompsychophysical ones, he did not distinguish between perceiving something with thesenses and getting to know something with the mind. Plato had brilliantlyrefutedtheclaim of aL'0u't9s to be knowledge in the Theaetetus,and this is the reason why hisarguments there can usefully be applied against the Stoics.40Let us add that Zeno himself, in defining presentation as rTlTWULS, was recallingone of the models of opinion illustrated in the Theaetetus(191cff.) as the linking ofa present image to the imprint of a past image on the soul, which is itself comparedto a wax tablet. This model is rejected there (195d), on the ground that it cannotaccount for purely intellectual errors of judgement. However if it is referred to thingswhich are perceived at the present moment, things which do not involve a memoryprocess, it is adequate, as we shall see shortly. Plato had in fact arguedthat in this caseerroris impossible (192a-b). Zeno too, had concentrated his attention on the fact thata presentation, in order to be reliable, had to spring from a currentlyexisting object,adro roj vndpXovuros,nd had to possess, as its own properties, all the characteristicsof the object, Ka7T a To0TTorrdpxov Eva7rrEOpayLaUElvr)aLtva7rro/LELay/LEvy7.ndsince he believed that the origin of all knowledge lay in sense perception, from whichsubsequently the conceptions (&vvoLaL)of things were elaborated, he found theTheaetetus' wax tablet model suitable for making the cognitive presentation as sureand as certain as possible. If, as seems probable, Zeno knew the Theaetetus,he knewPlato's refutation of the model of knowledge as an imprint in the soul, but he couldhave thought he had overcome it because of his differentconception of the soul.41Forwhereas Plato had established a distinct dualism between soul and body, betweensenses and reason, creating a rigid separation between the faculties of the soul, forZeno there is no dualism between a'9qrlatLs nd Adyos, because all psychologicalprocesses are empirically derived physical modifications of the commanding-faculty.This does not mean, however, that Zeno conceived the activity of the mind in

9 On thissubject, f. my Opinione scienza n. 25 above),pp. 34ff.4o Cf. Anon. in Theaet.152-III 15, whichtreats he firstpartof the Theaetetus s if it werea refutation f Stoicepistemology.41 At Theaet.209c6-7Socratesexpresseshe viewthat whoevermakes a judgementaboutTheaetetus asto possessanimprintedmemory raceof Theaetetus' istinguishingmarks.Thiscouldbetakenas Plato'supholding f thewax tabletmodelof knowledge.But,firstly,Plato hasalready ejectedhatmodel of knowledge,becauset cannotaccount ormathematicalrrors;and,secondly, t208b12-e6Plato snotsuggestinghata true udgementoncerning heaetetusamounts o a knowledge,because,as J. McDowell,Plato, TheaetetusOxford, 1973),p. 256,pointsout, 'anyjudgementoncerning particularhingrequireshat tsmakerhavea thought,andhence heability o producea formof words,whichdistinguishhatthingfromeverythingelse'.


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A STOIC PROBLEM 439exclusivelymechanicalerms,because hemind,which s identifiedwith theStdvota,is the centreof all psychologicalprocessesand is responsibleor everysensoryandcognitivefunction.

What Zeno particularlywanted to obtain was that the presentationshouldreproducefaithfullyall the characteristics f the externalobject. Although hiscomparisonof presentationso impressionsn wax,understood iterally, aterdrewthe objectionfrom Chrysippushat, like wax, the soul could then not hold manydifferent, uccessivempressions,Zeno could bethought o forestall hisobjectionbyadding o the waximagethe identification f the soul withanexhalation.Moreover,we must not forgetthat Plato, in the Theaetetus191c-e) had stated that memoryconsistsof the imprints eft in the wax tablet by past perceptions. t is thereforepossible hatZeno,takingup againfrom the Theaetetusheview of presentation san imprint,had not seriously onsidered heobjection hatmanysuccessivemprintsendupcancellinghepreviousones,thuseliminatingmemory, ince hishad not beena problem or Platoeither.42nanycasethe Platonicwaximage ends tselfto Zeno'sphysicalconceptionaccording o whichsenseperceptionswereconceivedn termsoftouch.Of courseZeno did not believe hateverypresentationwasreliable,butonlythosehavinga characteristicspectwhichenabled hemto reveal heirownobject.Inthis way Zeno adopted from the Theaetetus he argumentswhich ensured thecertaintyandinfallibility f sensation,and whichprevented ny possibilityof errorin perception. t is truethatin the Theaetetusheyare mprintseftin thesoulbypastimages nto whichpresentperceptionsneedto fit, in orderthatit be possibleto saythatwe know. ButPlato, in settingout examples n which falsebelief s impossible,had shown that it was sufficient or an accurate xisting mprint o be coupledwiththe corresponding resentperception o avoid any error.It is impossible to thinkthatsomethingone knows andperceives,havingthe memory-tracen correctorder,is something sc.else]one knows'.43n this case it is impossible hatanyoneshouldjudgesomethingalse.Adapting hisPlatonicexample,Zeno couldhavethought hatit is impossible o doubtthe truthfulness f theperceptionf it faithfully eproducesthecharacteristicsf theobject mpressinghemdirectlyonto the soul at thepresentmoment. Indeed if objects are as they are perceived,error is possible only inexceptionalcases in which the conditions for truth cannot be guaranteed.This,however,does not throwdoubt on the generalreliability f perception.Arcesilaus howstheeffectiveness f the Platonicarguments yusingthemagainstZeno'sclaim,which s foundedon senseperceptionbutdoes not take into sufficientaccountthe objectionsraisedby Plato againstthis theory.In fact in the Theaetetus latohad not foughtagainst he claimthatperceptionsinfallible.Althoughperceptionscontinually hanging nd s applied o objectswhicharecontinuallymoving, t does not stop beingperfectlyadequate o grasp ts objectat any instant.Fromthis point of view it is not deceitful,even if it can be nothingmore than a silentmeetingbetween he subjectandtheexternalobject(182a-b).Itslimit lies in the fact that it is not able to reachawarenessof its object,because tremainsbelowthe cognitive hreshold.44Theaetetus 84-7 sparticularlyignificant n thispoint.Perceptionannot dentify

42 Chrysippuswillnot maintain hedefinition f presentations an imprint,because t doesnot allow eithermemoryor the rrEXvatto take place;cf. SE M vii 373, and J.Mansfeld,'Intuitionismand Formalism:Zeno'sDefinitionof Geometryn a Fragmentof L. CalvenusTaurus', Phronesis 28 (1983), 59-74, pp. 67ff.43 192b6-7 (trans. McDowell).44 Cf. G. Fine, 'Plato on Perception: A Reply to Professor Turnbull', Oxford Studies inAncient Philosophy, Suppl. Vol. 1988, pp. 15-28.


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440 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOits object because no sense is able to reach being. This means that no sense has thepossibility of expressing judgements on its object. Sense perception is not adequate todistinguish that this particular object is red, because in order to be aware of the colourof this object the activity of the mind, thinking by itself, is necessary. To perceive redsimply means being affected by the colour red.45If perceiving an object means alsopassing a judgement on it, it must be possible to identify it as this or that thing. Butperception is not capable of expressing itself with propositional content. It does notsatisfy the necessary, though not sufficient, condition for knowledge that it identifyits own object as being something.48In short, perception andjudgement belong to twodifferentpsychological stages, one which is characteristicof the senses, and the otherof the mind. Even if we admit that perception is infallible, it is still incapable ofconceptualizing its object and it thus remains below the most elementary cognitivelevel. Perception cannot use the verb 'to be', even in its broadest sense, neitherspecifically existential nor specifically predicative.47Since perception cannot reachbeing, it cannot reach truth either, and it therefore cannot be knowledge.Arcesilaus' criticism follows much the same line as Plato's. Zeno defined cognitionas assent to a cognitive presentation. But assent - Arcesilaus objects - does not occurin relation to a presentation, but in relation to an d&twCua.rcesilaus' criticism wouldseem to make sense if Zeno, to whom the criticism is addressed, had claimed that theproper object of assent is not the ad&(w'abut the presentation itself. Now, as we haveseen, for Zeno a cognitive presentation is a TurrwaLsof the object in the soul. Assentis the recognition of the truth of the presentation, and hence of the truth of theimpression. Arcesilaus points out that if the cognitive presentation is intended in aphysical sense as an impression in the soul, assent, in as much as it is recognition ofthe truth, cannot recognize the truth of a T7;rwaLS,that is, of a mere affection of thesoul. Only a proposition can be recognized as true, and only to it can the attributesof true and false belong. In short, if assent is reason which recognizes the presentationas true, the content of the presentation must, first of all, be expressed in an articulateform, that is as a proposition: -6jv ydp detLW)dLav El'LVaal uavyKa-raGaELS7.Arcesilaus' criticism is veryacute. It expresseshis reservations about the recognitionof the external truth which, since it requires a propositional content, cannot beobtained through a bare Zenonian qaviracaa. It also shakes the foundations of theStoic theory of knowledge. If we admit that a presentation must have at least someminimal propositional content, what remains unexplained is the causal aspect ofperception, given the emphasis placed on body by the Stoics as the only thing able toact and to be acted upon. Eitherpresentation is an affection of the soul, a Tr7rTWoLS,ndassent in as much as it is a judgement of reason cannot recognize it as true, or it isa proposition, in which case, being a AEKT6V, it has no power to prompt assent. Itwould seem then, according to Arcesilaus' criticism, that Zeno had conceived

5 M. Burnyeat, 'Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', CQ 26 (1976), 29-51, p. 36, observes:'take away judgement and all that is left to perception is to be an unarticulated encounter withsensible things.'46 Cf. G. Fine, art. cit. (n. 44).4 That the Greeks found it difficultto distinguish these two senses of the verb 'to be' has beenpointed out by many critics, incuding C. Kahn, 'Why Existence does not Emerge as a DistinctConcept in Greek Philosophy', AGP 58 (1976), 323-34; J. Cooper, 'Plato on Sense Perceptionand Knowledge (Theaet. 184-6)', Phronesis 15 (1970), 123-46, pp. 123-4, Burnyeat, art. cit. (n.45), p. 45, excludes that o'at(a could ever have the meaning of existence in this section, because'no defence s offeredof the idea thatknowledge,et alonetruth,presupposes graspof beingin the specific sense of existence, reality or essence.' Nevertheless I believe that Plato ascribes to'being' the existential meaning as well, when he prevents sense perception from formulating anytype of judgement and from expressing itself in an articulate content.


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A STOIC PROBLEM 441presentation without stressing its propositional content, that is without worryingabout its semantic structure.48

IIIn this second part I shall discuss the relationship between presentation and assent inthe Stoic doctrine. As Arcesilaus' criticism has illustrated, the Stoics need to reply tothe problem of the duality of assent, understood on the one hand as a dynamicmovement towards another body, the presentation, and on the other as therecognition of the truth of a proposition, that is of an dua?raTov.I shall then examinethe evidence which may suggest that assent has the d&5'wouaas its proper object,emphasising some of the difficulties involved.I shall start by analysing the Stoic position as it emerges from Arcesilaus' criticismthat assent can only be to a proposition and not to a presentation, which cannot bearthe attributes of true and false. This objection seems justified, since Zeno, called thecognitive presentation 'true' when he defined it as ?) d&AqlOKaLTotLat7)OaOa KCVyEvo0T1 oe~vj3s (ibid. 152). The problem is whether by 'true' presentations Zenointends those 'of which it is possible to make a true assertion', following the positionSextus Empiricus (vii 244) ascribes generally to the Stoics; or whether he used theterm 'true' as belonging to the cognitive presentation in virtueof its coming from andrepresenting an existing object. It would seem that Arcesilaus' criticism could onlymake sense if Zeno had meant the latter. 'True' therefore, would be 'pictoriallytruthful', as in 'a true likeness'.Other passages of Zenonian origin confirm that the attribute 'true' is ascribed notto propositions, but either to external objects or to corporeal psychological processessuch as presentation and cognition. According to Zeno cognition effected by thesenses is true.49In the dispute between Zeno and Arcesilaus which Cicero reports inthe Lucullus 'true' and 'false' are applied both to external objects and topresentations: 'post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, qualevel falsum [...] neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale quale velfalsum. incubuit autem in eas disputationes ... nullum tale esse visum a vero ut noneiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse.'50 Moreover it is Arcesilaus who callspresentations true and false, emphasizing Zeno's use, when he asks Zeno, who hasjust supplied his definition of cognitive presentation, 'whether this was still valid if atrue presentation was just like a false one'. Even though Antiochus, who presumablyprovided Cicero with the account, is considered by many scholars an unreliablesource, the use of d&Aqo0einked with a presentation and not with a proposition seemsfully supported by documented evidence for Zeno. At all events, Arcesilaus is arguingprecisely against Zeno's claim to call a presentation true or false, when he objects'that assent occurs not in relation to a presentation, but in relation to Adyos(for assentbelongs to propositions)'. It seems therefore that it is Arcesilaus who stresses thedifficultyof calling a presentation true and false, since, according to Zeno's definition,it is a mere affection of the soul.

Besides, the ascription of truth to a presentation does not seem peculiar to theStoics and to Zeno in particular. Sources ascribe it to Epicurus as well,"5quite apart48 IndeedneitherArnim,nor Hiilser nclude SE M vii 154amongtheirStoic testimonia,because heyconsider hepositionexpressedhere,as reflectingArcesilaus'riticism otZeno'sposition.49 Cic. Varro42.50 Luc. 77-8; cf. also de nat. deor. I 70 (SVF I 63).51 Cf.SE Mviii 9;DL x 32;contraLongandSedley,op.cit.(n. 27), .85;G. Striker,'Epicuruson the Truth of Sense Impressions', AGP 59 (1977), 125-42.


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442 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOfrom the fact that in pre-Stoic Greek thought true and false, far from being limitedto propositions, were the attributes of things as well.52Zeno could then have appliedthe attribute 'true' to the cognitive presentation to indicate that it comes from anobjectexisting in the outside world and that it reproducesexactly all its characteristics,and not to indicate the truth appropriate to propositions.53If this interpretation isaccepted, Arcesilaus' criticism fits in perfectly with the evidence regarding Zeno'sdoctrine.Nevertheless a presentation for Zeno is not irrational, it is not an affection of thesoul without awareness of the external object, as Plato had conceived it in theTheaetetus.54Frede has already stressed that Plato in the Theaetetus limits themeaning of alaOdvEaOato one which is not found in earlier Greek thought, and isnot even used by Plato himself in previous dialogues."5The proof of this is thataLaOGlamss linked to 8d0a as opposed to

rtaTqLUvq,both in the Phaedo and in the

Republic,and 8da is judgemental. The association of sense perception with opinionis quite common even after Plato during the Hellenistic age, and we come across it notonly in Zeno, but also, for example, in Timon.56In the Theaetetus,however, Platomaintains that opinion is a dialogue of the soul with itself, and so denies thatperception has the capacity to judge.57In other words he refuses to admit that opinioncan arise without the specific activity of the mind thinking by itself.For Zeno, on the contrary, the cognitive presentation, being a criterion of truth,58is capable of recognizing things through the sense organs which grasp their specialobjects. So when we perceive white and black, hard and soft, etc., we classify thingssimply in virtue of seeing them, touching them, etc. Even Plato in the Theaetetus hadtried to prove that it is not the senses which are able to grasp the sense-propertiesdirectly, but the mind itself. Zeno, opposing Plato's view, claims that sense perceptionis the foundation of knowledge. Hence the KaT'aAIrTLK'tKO Vawv1'a has the sense-objects as its objects. For the senses are perfectly adequate for grasping everythingwhich is within their sphere: 'He regarded cognition effected by them (the senses) asboth true and reliable, not because it grasped all of a thing's properties, but becauseit left out nothing capable of confronting it.'59

52 Cf. M. Frede,Die stoischeLogik(G6ttingen,1974),p. 41. Moreover his use showsthepermanence f a linguisticpracticewhichhasits origin n theidentityof language,houghtandreality,heldbyearlierhinkers, s G. Calogero,Storiadella ogicaantica, (Bari,1967),haswellpointedout,andwhichcanstillbefound nPlatonic xpressionsuchas 'vrws 'v-rand 'A-;0rqcOV7ra." In myview it is not only Epicuruswhoused theattributes true'and 'false' in thissense,as LongandSedley,op. cit. (n. 27), i.85 believe,but Zenoas well.5 That Plato uses atoOe-qotcherethe Stoicsuse bav-rac'a is not a significantdifference.Besides, he Stoicsascribe o altoOalcseveralmeanings, f. DL VII52 (SVFn 71).55 'Observationsn Perceptionn Plato'sLaterDialogues', n Essays nAncientPhilosophy(Minneapolis, 987),3-8; cf. also Fine,art.cit. (n. 44), Burnyeat, rt. cit. (n.45),Cooper,art.cit. (n. 47),whoagree n emphasisinghedifferentonceptionof senseperceptionxpressed yPlatoin the Republic.56 Cf. Aristocles p. Euseb.PE (fr. 53 Caizzi).5 189e-190a; cf. also Soph. 236eff.; Phlb. 38c.58 Zeno namesKardArl0t~gs criterionof truthin SE M vii 152-3,and not the cognitivepresentation, ut we can assume hat he considered he latterthe foundationof the criterionbecauseof itsabsolute ruthfulness ndreliability, s in fact SE M vii 253reports orthe olderStoicsin general.5' Cic. Varro41. Scholarshavediscussed his passagea greatdeal, withoutcomingto asatisfactoryxplanation.Mypointof view is closestto thatof M. Frede,art.cit. (n.20),p. 76,but I disagreewithhimabout thepropositional spectof thepresentation;ee also LongandSedley,op. cit. (n. 27), ii.255.


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A STOIC PROBLEM 443'Notions' of things involve a more elaborate mental process, though they dependon the cognitive presentation. Indeed, according to Zeno 'nature has given the

cognitive presentation as the standard of scientific knowledge and as the naturalfoundation for the subsequent impression of conceptions of things upon the mind,which gave rise not just to the starting points, but to certain broader routes fordiscovering reason'.60 Now, a human's sensory presentation is AOytKL4also, and henceit is a vdotLs. This implies that it consists of a conceptualization of the object, becauseit is the thought of a rational being. But this conceptualization occurs at a minimallevel, not such as to be necessarily expressed in a proposition. Even the comparisonof the presentation with light suggests rather the immediacy with which thepresentation grasps the external object, being almost an illumination of it.8' This alsoexplains Zeno's claim that cognition has been given to us as the foundation for thesubsequent impression of conceptions.

We find a confirmationof this at Lucullus21, where the elaboration of presentationsinto conceptions is outlined: 'Those characteristics which belong to the things wedescribe as being cognized by the senses are equally characteristicof that further setof things said to be cognized not by the senses directly, but by them in a certainrespect, e.g. "This is white", "This is sweet", "That is melodious", "This isfragrant", "This is bitter". Our cognition of these things is secured by the mind, notthe senses'.62 It seems here that the capacity to express itself in articulate language ischaracteristic of the mind and not of the presentation as such.This is consonant with a controversial passage, DL vii 49: 7rpoqyEdTatLdpbavTraaa, E't 7 a&?VOLIaKAaApr-LK7)rndpxoua,

6I'TadXELn 0 q tavgaauaS, OVTOEKfE'pEL Adycp.Some scholars, startingfrom the fact that all presentationsare rationalin man, have concluded from this passage that for the Stoics all presentations havea propositional content and we assent to presentations by assenting to theircorresponding AEK7d,namely propositions, which are the proper objects of assent.83I prefer to see in the passage a sharp contrast between presentations and 'the mindwhich has the power of utterance'. No doubt what is intended here by qav-raa'a, isthe 'rational' type of presentation (which is mentioned shortly after, ib. 51, as a

60 Cic. Varro42. If the cognitivepresentations the foundationof cognition, t has to bealtUO-qrlK7 (cf. Zeno, ibid., 'comprehensio facta sensibus'). Besides, the distinction betweenalUrO-qtKLa( and O K altrUOrtLKa presentations in DL vii 52 presupposes that the latter havetheirorigin n sensorypresentationss well. In factonlythe presentationsf the incorporealsand the otherthingsacquiredby reasonare examplesof oiK alUO-'tKaL'presentations:hepresentationsf the incorporeals resuppose mimeticactivityof the subject n representingthem,whichcannotdo withoutprevious ensorypresentations,s is suggestedbytheexampleof the trainer tanding t a distance ndmoving o a certaindrill, o provide model or theboy(see SE M vIII409 = SVF 1185). Therefore they are conceived by a process of abstraction frombodilyentities;cf. Long,Sedley,op. cit. (n. 27), i.163,who refer o DL vii 53. Moreover hedefinitionof the cognitivepresentationmphasizeshe fact that its originlies in an existingobject,drn6rovT6rdpXOVroT,ut we cannotsay of the incorporealshattheyexist. As far asconcerns the otherthingsacquiredby reason',we learn fromDL vii 52 that they are 'theconclusionsreachedthroughdemonstration'.Therefore hey representa point of arrivalfollowing a more elaborate mental process, which starts from sensory presentations as well.Moreover, if the 8tdvota could do without aru'altsg, the Stoics would not be able to state thatall our knowledge comes from sense perception (SE M viii 56), or that the criterion of truth isthe aav'raoaa,which decides qdA-qOEta cv rrpayad'Trwv(DL vii 49; cf. also 46).61 Cf. Aetius iv, 12, 1-5 (SVF II 54).62 As Long and Sedley, op. cit. (n. 27), ii.240, point out, 'since the Stoics regarded allperception as taking place in the 'YEOVLKdV, the distinction between 'sensibus' and 'animo' ispotentially misleading.'63 Ib. i.240.

16 OCQ 40


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444 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOcharacteristic of all rational beings), but there is no indication that the actualpresentation has the capacity to express itself in language, which is, rather, proper to&dvowa.We cannot appeal to the fact that presentation occurs in the commanding-faculty and therefore involves an activity of the mind.84By claiming that presentationarrives first, the Stoics simply mean that its presence is necessary for the cognitiveprocess to take place. For 'assent cannot occur, unless it is prompted by apresentation', just as 'a sensation which is unmoved unaffected and unaltered is notsensation at all and is incapable of registering anything'."1Going back to Arcesilaus' criticism and the relation between presentation andassent, if the view that the proper object of assent is a proposition is ascribed to Zeno,we are faced with a series of problems. Stoic evidence shows that presentation isdefined in physical terms as an impression on the soul. No definition relates it topropositions:"66 not only are Zeno's definition and Cleanthes' specification ratherelementary and crudely materialistic, but even Chrysippus' definition in terms of~-EpoLWr also emphasizes the physical aspect of presentation, not taking intoaccount the propositional aspect. Moreover it is unlikely that Zeno, who consideredall psychological processes corporeal, could have looked on an d&6Lowas the properobject of assent, without providing an adequate justification for this view. Such ajustification is missing not only for Zeno, but also for Cleanthes and for Chrysippushimself. Even though an argumente silentio does not always have probative value, inthis case it is supported by the evidence which emphasizes the physical description ofpresentation. Finally, that assent must be given to a proposition appears to be aposition which arose from the dispute, rather than being Zeno's own. For Zenoconsiders assent a constituent part of cognition defined as assent to a cognitivepresentation,"6and cognitive presentation is a Trv'rwa in the soul. If we reflect thatit is Plato who believes that opinion is a dialogue of the soul with itself, and certainlynot Zeno, we can see that we are not authorised to ascribe to Zeno the idea that onlythose things which we say to ourselves are thoughts. In other words, for Zeno, thethought process does not necessarily involve its expression in words. It may insteadbe Arcesilaus who makes use of this Platonic theory in a polemical argument againstthe Zenonian claim of infallible and certain knowledge. For Zeno it is possible to havethe concept of red without it being necessary to say to oneself 'This is red', andwithout the involvement of a reasoning or deliberative activity of the mind.Only two passages attach assent to propositions. One is Sextus' reportof Arcesilaus'criticism, discussed above. The other, a passage by Arius Didymus, is doxographic,and controversial because of the incomplete state of the text.68It is possible that itcontains a modified theory put forward by one of Zeno's successors in response to theinadequacies revealed by Arcesilaus. But it contains so many difficultiesthat it wouldbe unwise to make it the basis for any general interpretation of the Stoic position:iTra'as r& op/La UVyKaTaOE'oELS ELtvaL, TaL & 7rpaKTLKaS Kat TO KLV-qTLKOV 7TEPLEXELV. 81qSE aAAw&AAw achsmuth: a'AAwvodd. et Arnim] tv lvat UvyKaTaOE'oUEL, n' aAAo&'

64 Cf. Aetius Iv 23, 1 (SVF 11 54).65 Cic. defato 43 (SVF I 974); SE M vii 160.66 The only passage that could suggest a relationship between assent and proposition is SEM vIII70. But see below, p. 446 with note 73.67 This definition is repeated twice in SE M vii 153-4.68 Stob. 11 8, 1 (SVF 111171); Wachsmuth's correction, accepted by Long and Sedley, doesnot seem necessaryto me, since avyKard76acL is constructed both with the genitive and with thedative. This wavering cannot be attributed to the fact that it depends on different contexts,because we find it within the same context, as Sextus M vii 154-7 shows; cf. the remarks by B.Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), pp. 101, 287 n. 271.


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A STOIC PROBLEM 445dp/lda.KaLayVTKaTra6cE"agLV deCLWLaouLOUv, pasd E' TLlKaTrq1yop'rllaraa7TrEPLEXdOLEvd7TW&vTOiLSdLwO/Lavw.9The passageis not without problems,partly because of the mention of a 6pji?)TpcaK-rLK'. Thiswould imply he existence f a '6pp4 ot 7TpaK-rLK-4,which eemshardlypossiblefor the Stoics. The dp-q' AoyLK4s no different rom the 7paKIrLK4,because n rationalbeings hesetwo formsof impulseare the same.The6p~i'AoyLK4is bydefinition a movementof 8LdvoLaowards omethingnthesphereof action(EvT- 7rpd--ELV)'.70 Henceit can be nothingbut "paKrLK', s is confirmed yChrysippuswhen he definesimpulseas the reason of man 'prescribingaction tohim'." Impulse hen,occursonly in relation o actingand is said to be 'rational' norder to distinguishhumanimpulsefrom that of non-rationalanimals,since6pJ1-q4belongs to the latter as well.7"Whereasassent is a cognitiveact directedto therecognitionof the truthof a presentation,mpulseoccurs when it is necessary otranslate nto actionthat which has beenapproved.Moreover,the Arius Didymus passage is barely intelligible f the relationshipbetween hatwhich s corporeal, ssentandimpulse,and thatwhich s not corporeal,propositionand predicate, s not made clear, given the absolutedenial that theincorporeal an act or be actedupon.Whatappears o be clearer s a passageof Seneca ep. 117,3) in whichhe openlydeclares hat he is not givinghis ownpositionon the problembut rather hat of theearlierStoics:There are bodily substances, .g. this is a man, this is a horse:They are accompaniedbynovementsof the soul whichcan make enunciations bout bodies.Thesemovementshaveapropertywhich speculiaro them,andwhich sseparaterombodies,as,forinstance, seeCatowalking: enseperception asrevealedt tome andmymindhasbelievedt. WhatI see sa bodyrnd t is to a bodythatI havedirectedbothmyeyesandmymind.ThenI say,Catois walking.WhatI now utter he says) s not a body,but a certainenunciation bout a body,whichsomecall a proposition,othersa thingenunciated, nd othersa AEKTdVdictum).

There s no doubt that Senecawiththewords'corpusest quodvideo cuiet oculosintendiet animum'wants to stress he fact thatnot onlydo the eyes,and hencethesenses, urntowards hat which s body,but so too, in assenting,does the mind. Forthemind,by assenting,believeswhat senseperception resentst with. Thecognitiveprocessseemscompleteas soon as the mind has believed he visualpresentation fCatowalkingwhich nvolves hebodiesalone.The movements f the soul whichcanmake enunciations bout bodies seem to performan additionalrole, limited o thelinguistic sphere.Senecadistinguishes he two stages, the cognitiveone and thelinguisticone, by saying: 'corpusest quod video .. dico deinde'. It is just to this'dicere'that themovementswhicharecapableof makingenunciations bout bodieslimitthemselves.Assent hen, saimed, nitsproper ense,at that which sbody.Whatemerges romSeneca'swordsis that the Stoicsconsiderassentprincipallya dynamicmovement

69 Cf. M. Giusta,I dossografi i etica(Torino, 1967), i.226,who believes hatthelacuna sbroader hanWachsmuth upposed.70 Stob. II 86, 17 (SVF I1 169).71 Plut. de stoic. rep. 1037f (SVF 111175).72 Stob. I86, 17, ravir'qS 8' v E8ELtOEWpEirOaL 7rVTE v70oi AoyLKOigYLYVOI4EV7rVp117'vKaLTriV&vrOC9 OYLKOi7,LVOLE"7V dpIL7v,KalTr7%vv roE dAodyoL,~o,.9 ,KaT(Wvo/Laarr/EVa'ELUrLV.

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446 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOtowards an external body, the presentation of which can be expressed in language.But the exhibition in language is an independent stage of a psychological processwhich is characteristic of man as rational being.

This interpretation may be confirmed by a passage of Sextus73which defines arational presentation as 'one in which the content of the presentation can be exhibitedin language (KaO' v 7iT avw-aauOvE'-L Ady'y 7TapaaT-7qa0L).ow 7o'avwaae0iv is nota regular term in Stoic epistemology. It cannot be identified with the object of thepresentation, which is standardly called Travraardv,74 nor can it be identified (assome scholars have proposed),75 with the AEKTdV, which is what can express thecontent of the presentation, but which is not identical to it. For if o6OaviraOEGv erethe AEK7'V,we would face the problem that a rational presentation would not havea content if it were not verbalized- something not allowed by its definition. The factthat To'avraa(uv' 'can be' expressed in language does not imply that it necessarilyhas to be.Thus the passages of both Cicero (Luc. 21) and Seneca (ep. 117), which we havediscussed, lead us to the conclusion that verbalization represents a distinct stage fromthat of presentation. But if the rational presentation exists independently of thepossibility of verbalisation, the requirementthat it be translated into language doesnot constitute its definition. In this sense the AEK7dv s strongly connected to rationalpresentation, qua capable of being expressed, but it cannot constitute the properobject of assent. It would seem then that thinking and expressing the content of thethought in language are two different operations of the mind.We can find evidence of this also in another passage of Sextus.76In illustrating thedisagreement among philosophers concerning what is true, he informs us that theStoics distinguished the signification (-pqtaLvdpLEvov),he signifier (-puatrvov) andthe name-bearer (r6 rvydvov):77Thesignifiers anutterance, or instance Dion'; the significations the actualstate of affairs(rTTrpdypta)evealed yanutterance,ndwhichweapprehends it subsistsnaccordancewithourthought,whereas t is not understoodbybarbarianslthough heyhear theutterance;hename-bearers the externalobject, or instance,Dion himself.

3 SE M VIII70 (SVFII 187).Thispassagehas beeninterpretedn differentways,accordingto whether hewordAdyogs translatedreason' or 'language'.In my opinionthe translation'reason' s problematic. orif it werereasonwhichmakesa presentationational,t wouldnotbe said that 'a rationalpresentations one in whichit is possibleto establishby reason thepresented bject'(see Bury's ranslation). his means hat reasonmayormaynot establish hecontentof presentation. ut nthe lattercase twouldbedifficult o call a presentationational.However he translation reason'has beenwidelyupheldby scholars inceZeller.It supportsthe thesis hata AEKTdVs thecontentof a thought ndependent f language.For a conciliationof this viewwiththe oneaccordingo whichAEKTdrethemeanings f words, eeM. Mignucci,II significatodellalogicastoica(Bologna,1967),pp. 88-96. It could be objectedagainsttheinterpretation which maintains that a AEKTdVs that which is said, that the effects of causes arealso AEK7d.ut the Stoics conceivedof the effectsas predicateswhichare true of the bodyaffected.Hencewhata causeproduces s not something xistent,but rathera semantic temsignifying a process undergone by the body. Thus the Stoic theory of cause and effect not onlydoes not help to clarify the position of AEKT-d,but complicates the problem considerably.4 Cf. G. Striker,KpLTrp1ov rj d&Aled'aS(Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften inG6ttingen, Phil. hist. KI., 1974, pp. 47-110), p. 94 n. 1.

7 Contra B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1953), p. 22, according to whom theAEK-TV'is what might be called "the objective content", rdavraauOv, of the presentation.'76 M viii 11-12 (SVF 1I166)." For the translation of rT rvyv dvovby 'the name-bearer', cf. Long, Sedley, op. cit. (n. 27),ii.197, i.201.


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A STOIC PROBLEM 447WhatSextuscalls ro'a-paLvdpLEvovs what s signifiedwhen omethingssaid; t is theAEKTdV.If themeaningwerenot referredo theverbalization,nd hence o theGreeklanguage, t would not be possibleto say that the barbarians,houghtheyheartheutterance, o not understandt. Nothingis said about a significationonnectedwithnon-verbalizedhought.In fact the regulardefinitionof AEKO7V-s 'what subsists naccordancewith a rationalpresentation'."Whenfacedwithanexistingobject,boththe Greekand the non-Greek eceivea presentationwhich s rational, n as muchasit belongsto rationalbeings: t is thereforea thoughtwitha presentationalontentin accordancewithwhicha AEK7dvubsists.Its presentationalontentmayor maynot beexpressednwords.Ifthemeaningwerereferredo thethoughtprocess,Sextuswould not be likelyto saythat the Greeksgrasp t and the barbarians o not, sincetheyareall rationalbeings.But if we view it as a dialogicalsituation n whichonespeaksandthe other istens,we see that theGreeksdiffer romthebarbarians ecauseof their capacity to speak the Greek language.This confirms that the Stoicsdistinguished etween he thoughtprocessand its linguistic xpression.A passage of Chrysippuscited in Galen's De placitis will help to clarifytherelationshipbetweenthinkingand speaking:"'For- he says- speakingmust befromthemind,andalsospeakingwithinoneself,andthinking,andgoing throughanutterancein oneself, and sending out.' This is followed by Galen's criticism,according o whichChrysippushas put forward he clearlyerroneous heorythatspeakingandspeakingwithinoneselfareactsperformed ythe samepart,the heart.It seemsto me that thispassage,rather hanfavouringan identitybetween houghtandlanguage, estifies o theirdiversity.We wouldotherwisehave to conclude hatChrysippus'doctrineclaims the identityof all the functions of the commanding-faculty,presentation,mpulse,assent,reason,because heyallcome from he tLdvoLa.If this identifications not possible,we shouldnot expectone between hinkingandspeaking ither.Thefact thatmen are rationalbeings mplies hat theyhavethoughtswhichtheythenmaytranslatento language.Thedefinitionof rationalpresentations s vojuaELsfitsinwiththislineof thought.Butthoughts,whicharebodies,arenot identicalwithincorporeal&t4Ltaraa.Nor mustwe forgetthatthe &tdvoLa,r vot3i,s corporeal.80Thusif we want to respect he foundationsof Stoicphysics,our understanding fpresentationmust take into account the bodily nature of psychic processes,andcannot,for the sake of brevity,consider he d(t'wia as the properobjectof assent.A furtherdifficulty, f we want to considerthe properobjectof assentto be aproposition,s the relationship etween rue andcognitivepresentation.nthe Stoicclassification of presentations,as Sextus reports it (M vII 242-8), cognitivepresentationsare a subdivisionof true presentations,which in their turn, are asubdivisionof convincingones. Thereforewhereascognitivepresentationsmustbetrue, not all true presentationsare cognitive.The truthfulnessof the cognitivepresentations due to the factthat froma causalpointof view t is theexternalobjectwhichstrikes hesenseorgans, mpressingtscharacteristicsn thesoulthrough heirmediation. f a perfectcorrespondenceetween heobjectandthepresentationmustbe guaranteed,he time at whichthe presentation ccursmust be the present.Nowa truepresentations that 'of whichit is possibleto make a trueassertion',as forexample,at present it is day', or 'it is light' (SEM vII244).It expresses, herefore,ina tensed orm,thepresented bject anobjectwhichexistsat thepresentmoment.

78 SE M viii 70 (SVF II 187); DL vii 63.79 III7, 313,p. 220, 42, 17ffDe Lacy.80 Cf. Stob. II 64, 18.


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448 ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLOIt is possible, however, that the true presentation, which can be expressed by a trueproposition, does not prompt assent (M vII 247). Moreover it can happen, albeitexceptionally, that a cognitive presentation is unconvincing (&1TrLalos)because ofexternal circumstances."8Presentations which are true and cognitive, yet unconvincing, pose the problem ofassent and of the assent-proposition-presentation relationship. For if assent isdirectedto propositions, a true presentation, being such because it is possible to makea true assertion of it, that is a true proposition, should also imply assent. Moreover,if assent is given to propositions, a true presentation and a cognitive presentationshould not differ since both of them are expressed by true propositions. Let us addthat a cognitive presentation is susceptible to being expressed not only by oneproposition, but by many.At this point a legitimate question arises: if assent has propositions as its object,what is the difference between the way in which cognitive presentations move it andthe way it is moved by merely true presentations? For if the possibility ofdistinguishing them does not lie in their different truth-value, since they are bothexpressed by a true proposition, they must be distinguishable by some othercharacteristic. It would seem that the answer to this question is again to be found inStoic physics. We have seen that for Chrysippus presentation is a &'rEpotwoLS,nalteration in the soul, and alteration is a movement according to quality."8The Stoicsdefine convincing presentations as those 'which produce an even movement (AdovKqvrpnLa)n the soul, e.g., at this moment, that it is day and that I am talking, andeverything which maintains a similar obviousness' (SE M vII 242). It is possible,therefore, that the Stoics considered the movement produced by the cognitivepresentation a particularly strong movement of this kind, and considered the assentwhich it prompts equally strong. It must not be forgotten, in fact, that the youngerStoics believed that the cognitive presentation 'being self-evident and striking, all butseizes us by the hair [...] and pulls us to assent, needing nothing else to achieve thiseffect or to establish its difference from other presentations' (M vII 253). The sameposition can be attributed to Zeno when he speaks of presentations which have 'apeculiar power of revealing their objects' and of the cognitive presentation as such asto 'be discerned just by itself'.83 If the self-evidence with which the cognitivepresentation imposes itself consists of a causal feature,because it induces a particularmodification in the commanding-faculty, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that iftrue presentations, and in exceptional circumstances cognitive ones, are not able toprompt assent, it is because the movement which they produce in the soul is too slight,whereas assent requires a strong one.Coming back to Arcesilaus' objection, it has certainly contributed to theclarification of the relationship between presentation and assent in the Stoic doctrineand to the development of the theory of the AEKIrdV.t is in fact Arcesilaus who firstspeaks of assent to presentation, understood as assent to an di&twa, and an d&Loain Stoic doctrine is a AEKIT-V. owever the theory of the AEK-7dvis problematic bothin its complexity and in the difficulty of establishing its origin and development. AsHuilser84 as already pointed out, our sources do not express the theory of the AEK-rdVclearly, probably because they describe it as it appears at the end of its development,

81 Cf. theexamplesof AdmetusandMenelausn SE M VII 54-5.82 Cf. SVF II429, 494.83 Cic. Varro41. Self-evidence rovokes n the soul the same effectas the one of weightsplaced n thebalance; f. Plut. Col. 1122c.84 Die Fragmentezur Dialektik der Stoiker (Stuttgart, 1987), Band 2, p, 832.


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A STOIC PROBLEM 449glossingover the difficultiesn a simplisticand superficialway.Moreover, t wouldseem hat nCleantheshe useof theAEKIT-Vsrestrictedo definingheKa7,rydpp-qta85and that its significancewas broadenedonly later. Fromall this it seemsdifficult oconclude hat the properobjectsof assentwere for Zenodet&wiaraa.Butif theproperobjectof assent s presentation nd not a proposition, anbodilyassentwhich s directedo anequallybodilymovement,egitimately e consideredherecognition f the truthof thepresentation? heproblemof thepresentation-assentrelationshipmust then be considered rom a psychodynamic oint of view,which,however,does not excludea rationalexplanation or this relationship.Zenoin factdescribespresentationas a physicalprocessnot becausehe wants to illustrateapsychologicalphenomenon, he explanationof which lies in psychologicalcauseswhich are distinctfromphysicalones with a physicalmechanism,but becausehe isreferringo a thoughtprocess,which s inrealitymechanical ndphysical.A rationalpresentations true when it originates rom a trulyexistingexternalobjectwhichphysically mpresses ll itspropertiesnthe soul ascharacteristicsf thepresentation.Laterthe Stoics,according o Sextus,86...calla truepropositionthatwhichs(o rdpXEL),nd scontradictoryosomething'...,utwhen heyareaskedwhat s 'thatwhichs', theysayit is thatwhich ctivates cognitivepresentation.ndthenwhenquestionedoncerninghecognitive resentation,heyagainretreato thatwhichs, .. sayinghatacognitiveresentationas tssourcen thatwhichs,inconformityith hevery hingt is.It is interestingo observe hat theyuse the same verb IrdpPXEtLo defineboth thetruthof apropositionandthe existenceof apresentation ndof the realobject, husstressinghecorrespondenceetween ruthandexistence.Thecognitivepresentation,therefore, xists forZenobecause t comes fromthat which s, andis truebecause trepresentshat which is as it is, in thought.University f Bari ANNA-MARIA IOPPOLO

85 Cf. Clem. Alex (SVF 11 88), and M. Frede, op. cit. (n. 52), p. 15 n. 15.86 SEM VIII 5-6: taai'yap &A~6lsv ELva d 6twLat oTrdpXXEL TE KaLaVTLKELTaL7LVL,...EPWTWrIEVOLE,7rLaL7drto dpXOv, IoveoarKa"TaAr7TTLKVLVOlOavTraarav.

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A. M. Ioppolo Presentation and Assent