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A Lesson of International Accounting from Railroad Regulationin the United States in the Nineteenth Century
Hidetoshi YamajiResearch Institute for Economics & Business Admin.
Kobe University
Content
Chapter One American Railroad Regulation in the Nineteenth Century and Emergence of
Modern Accounting Information Disclosure
I Preface
II Railroad Regulation in the State of Illinois in relation to the Granger Movement
II-1. Introduction
II-2. Conditions of the States in the Mid-West
II-3. Analysis of Railroad Regulation in the State of Illinois
III Railroad Regulation in the State of Massachusetts
III-1. Introduction
III-2. Conditions of the State of Massachusetts
III-3. Analysis of Railroad Regulation in the State of Massachusetts
IV Conclusion
Commission System and Accounting Information Disclosure
Chapter Two Accounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprises in Contemporary
Times —in relation to Earlier Reports of the United Nation—
I Introduction
II Emergence of Accounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprises
III Development of Accounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprises
IV Turn of Accounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprises
V Some Emerging Issues Conclusion
Chapter Three General Conclusion
I Adaptation of Accounting Information Disclosure to Problem of Multinational Corporations
II Adoption of Commission System by the United Nations
Chapter OneAmerican Railroad Regulation in the Nineteenth Century
and Emergence of Modern Accounting Information Disclosure
I Preface
I-1. IntroductionThe purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the relation between the railroad regulations
in the 19th century in the Unites States and the emergence of modern accounting information
disclosure. This analysis would be the base for searching the social foundations of modern accounting
information disclosure conducted in mass democratic society by the big enterprises. Concretely the
two ways of railroad regulation will be recognized in the variety of states' railroad regulations. The
one is the way in which the accounting information disclosure was adopted and the other is the way in
which it was invalid and the direct railroad business regulation by the state was employed. Moreover
the reason why there emerged such differences in railroad regulation is attributed to the differences in
the social and economic structure among states.
The railroad appeared in the 1830s was a catalyst for the social and economic development of the
United States in the nineteenth century. The many securities issued by the railroad corporations
established modern securities markets and communication and transportation systems were developed
along with railroads. As R. W. Fogel pointed out(1), it might have been followed at least a different
course of development of the steel industry, if there was no demand for the steel rails by the railroads.
With regard to the agriculture treated in the section II, this was also the case. The existence of the
railroads enabled to bring together agricultural products, in particular, wheat harvested in the inland
areas to the ports of the Pacific Ocean and to export them to Europe. In other words, the development
of railroads to the west in the United States was accompanied by the advancement to the west of
agricultural frontier so that the mid-western states became progressively the granary not only of the
United States but also of Europe.
The American railroad corporations in the 19th century adopted some kinds of business strategies
in the above-mentioned socio-economic conditions for accumulating their own capitals. On the other
hand, however, the bases of living for the farmers, merchants and mediate and small producers were
considerably influenced by business strategies selected by the relatively large railroad corporations.
This excessive influence caused the necessity of railroad regulations(2). In addition, the accounting
information disclosure was necessitated in certain conditions. Particularly it was adopted and became
important policy only in some states of the earlier period.
Section II will offer the case study in which the accounting information disclosure was adopted as a
means of regulating railroad corporations in failure and direct business regulation by state was
employed instead. Section III will provide the case study in which the accounting information
disclosure was a valid means. The former study was on the case of the state of Illinois and of some
Mid-Western states. The latter analysis was conducted on the state of Massachusetts and some Eastern
states. Section IV points out the elements of socio-economic foundations for emerging accounting
information disclosure.
II Railroad Regulation in the State of Illinois in relation to the Granger Movement
II-1. Introduction(3)
The United States in the nineteenth century was an agricultural country and was in reality
characterized as a granary of Europe which was, in turn, the center of the world economy. For the
inclusion of the American agriculture into the world economy, the establishment of the world-wide
transportation system which brought together farmers' products from inland areas to the shipping
ports of the East Coast which sent them off to Europe, was a physical precondition. That is, the
demand for gathering the grains to the East Coast stimulated the development of the transportation
system within America.
Steam boats running on rivers were the first means of inland transportation. Many canals were
constructed which connected one river to another river or rivers, and to the Great Lakes. Most famous
was the Erie Canal constructed in 1825. This was a kind of main artery which connected inland Mid-
Western areas to the East Coast. For the South, active transportation on the Mississippi River made
New Orleans prosperous.
After a while, railroad transportation came to play an important role as a substitute of the river
transportation for transporting grains. Railroad transportation originally functioned as a
supplementary system to the river and lake transportation, for example, in the case that the Great
Lakes froze in winter. But railroads progressively substituted for steam boats because of their speed
and were the first step for connecting it agriculture to railroads.
Although, earlier we emphasized the relationship between the railroads and agriculture, railroads
were at least in the early years, constructed by the capital contributed not by farmers but by capitalists
and merchants of the east coast area. The merchants of the east coast intended to earn profits from
connecting canals to their own cities, that is, the inland Mid-Western states to the east coast by
constructing railroads. But the direct and indirect aid from farmers became indispensable for
constructing the railroad in the Mid-Western states, only since the latter half of the nineteenth century.
In this area, railroads had the double function of bringing the industrial products and necessities of life
produced in the east cities to the Mid-Western area, and of sending the grains harvested in the latter
area to the former area. In the American domestic economy, the extension of railroads to western
states corresponds to the penetration into the farmers dotted in some frontiers of capitalistic
production system.
Fundamentally and economically the railroads were indispensable for the living of the farmers who
lived in the inland Mid-Western areas. But actually the relationship between railroad corporations and
farmers was not cooperative. It would be better to say that the history of the relationship between
these two organizations in the latter half of the nineteenth century was one of conflict. For railroad
corporations needed to accumulate the capital for the purpose of winning in the capitalistic
competition among railroad corporations. In consequence, they decided naturally to adopt the
management strategies which pressed the insufficiently organized and weak farmers, and small
producers and merchants. Reacting to the immoderate management of railroad corporations, farmers
began to organize themselves in broader areas and to develop an anti-railroad movement beginning in
the 1870s. In the following, we mainly analyze the living and economic conditions of the Mid-
Western farmers and take their relation with railroad corporations into consideration. This analysis is
helpful in finding the social and economic changes among farmers, local governments and railroad
corporations. Moreover, it should contribute to the comparative analysis of the case of the east coast
and its socio-economic foundation for the emerging modern accounting information disclosure in the
middle and the latter half of the 19th century in the United States.
II-2. Conditions of the States in the Mid-West
The most important and the broadest factor which stimulated the farmers to organize themselves
was the countermeasure against the pressure of large railroad corporations. But in this subsection we
should describe their living conditions in detail, in particular, their discontentment and dissatisfaction
in referring to the paper written by E.W.Bemis(4) at the end of the nineteenth century.
First we should point out that the farmers were unsatisfied with the low prices of agricultural
products in two aspects. One aspect was that the seasonal fluctuations in the prices of farm products
unfavorably affected the farmers. The other aspect was that the prices of grains decreased in the long
run. For judging whether the discontent of the farmers were the case or not, some data should be
offered in this context. Table I(5) shows the fluctuation in the price of spring wheat at the Chicago
Grain Exchange, which did not completely correspond to the proper period but may indicate the price
tendency. Figure I(6) provides the data which indicates the decreasing trends in the prices of farm
products. (The long term average price of ten staples in American wholesale markets were added as a
reference).
-------------------------------
Table I and Figure I about here
--------------------------------
From the data of Table I, we can say that the seasonal price of grain was considerably stable. This
was also the case for Corn and Oats in the same period. Bemis also concluded that the dissatisfaction
of the farmers in the period might be groundless by saying that ;
The figures tell their own story. They not only show at there is no fall in prices at harvest
when we should most expect it, but they reveal a remarkable evenness of price between all
the months over a series of years(7).
Therefore, It can not be proven that farmers sold at an unreasonably low price fixed by the pressure of
speculation in the harvest season.
Figure I shows clearly the long term decreasing trends of prices of agricultural products. Bemis was
not, however, in sympathy with farmers in the decreasing price tendencies of their produced goods
because there was no relative change in prices. The long term average prices of industrially produced
goods (iron, wool, oil, salt etc.) were also falling. Bemis thought that the economic conditions facing
farmers did not relatively change.
As far as we are depending upon the data offered by Bemis, farmers were not always unfavorably
influenced by the changes both in relative and in absolute prices of agricultural products. If so, the
dissatisfactions held by the farmers in the Mid-Western areas, were they at least partially a kind of
illusion ? We must pay attention to the fact that the price data inserted by Bamis was the one collected
at the Chicago Exchange although we can not concretely present the contra-data against Bemis's data.
The prices shown in Table I and Figure I were not prices at which the farmers sold their harvested
grains to brokers and were not the ones which the farmers entirely accepted. This fact has two
meanings. The one is that there were some differences between the prices at which farmers sold their
grains to brokers and the prices at which brokers sold them at the Exchange. The other is that these
prices should be related to the railroad and warehouse fees. Then we must refer to Table II (8)which
indicates that the fees at which farmers in the Mid-Western and the Southern areas sent their grains to
Chicago by train were relatively higher than the fees which dominated in the east coast areas. The
reason why the fees of transportation were relatively high should in reality be attributed not to
physical conditions but to the economically monopolistic positions held by the mid-western
railroad corporations and warehouse lenders. Naturally they charged high fees to the insufficiently
organized farmers(9). Consequently we must consider it unreasonably costly for farmers to send their
grains to the large exchanges located in big cities. Then there emerged a second and particularly
discontentment among farmers. That is, farmers were dissatisfied with the rapid accumulation of
properties by the railroad managers and warehouse lenders by using unfair rates systems which had
harmful effects on them. In considering both the changes in grain prices and the rate policies adopted
by the railroad and warehouse managers, we must conclude that the dissatisfaction held by the
farmers in the Mid-Western and the Southern areas became real ones by the strengthened influence of
two factors even if the prices of industrial products were falling along with the agricultural ones in the
long term.
-------------------
Table II about here
-------------------
The third factor was related to the insufficiency of the social capital in the rural areas compared
with urban areas. In particular, the incomplete facilities of schools delayed the spread and
improvement of agricultural technology for increasing productivity. This was the case especially in
the South(10).
The fourth factor was relatively high interests at which farmers borrowed(11). There was also the
taxation system which imposed unfair taxes on farmers. For example, the securities held by urban
people could be concealed more easily than the cattle held by farmers when assessing the tax values(12).
Moreover farmers had more serious damages than residents in cities when encountering natural and
unexpected accidents since they had few savings(13).
Judging from earlier surveys with regard to discontentment among farmers, it becomes clear that
there was one common characteristic among them. It is the fact that all discontentment factors were
related to the urbanization and to becoming more capitalistic. Farmers in that period felt that they did
not enjoy the benefits accrued from the capitalistic production system which benefited urban residents.
They had also the feeling that they were exploited by banks and railroad corporation main offices
which were located in urban cities and which were centers of capitalistic and commercialized
economy. It seems that these feelings fostered discontent among farmers. Surprisingly enough they
looked enviously even at the labor class which began to develop a labor movement and to throw
discontent into the capitalistic production system. Farmers were dissatisfied with the situation in
which capitalists and labor were respectively organized in cities for seeking their own purposes while
they were organized too insufficiently to show off their existence(14).
The discontent of farmers stimulated and prompted American farmers' movements since the 1870s.
Needless to say, the discontentment factors provided the content of farmers' movements ; concretely:
the spread of agricultural education to improve productivity, the direct purchasing of necessities of
living and farming implements by themselves to avoid their exploitation by urban merchants, the
requirement by local governments of railroad regulations, and the establishment of farmers'
organizations for pursuing their purposes. These discontents gave birth to the Granger Movement. The
living conditions and farmers' movements in the mid-western areas would have provided after all the
method of railroad regulation which was helpful for explaining the emergence and validity in modern
mass-democratic society for accounting information disclosure.
II-3. Analysis of Railroad Regulation in the State of Illinois(15)
Although it was usually said that the Granger Movement was the first large scale farmers'
movement in American history, it was not the first American farmers' movement. From the viewpoint
of farmers' organizations, the earliest farmers' organization was established after the War of
Independence. After that, some organizations appeared and disappeared both at the state level and at
the federal level. In the early years, influential farmers convened to discuss the problem of
improving agricultural technologies for raising productivity. Such endeavors helped established the
Federal Bureau of Agriculture in 1862. Also, all early farmers' organizations were not voluntarily
organized and were not organized from the bottom by individual farmers.
There emerged a voluntary and early organization in the 1830s in which farmers participated and
which intended to defend members' economic interests in watching contemporary economic
conditions. That was the New England Association of Farmers, Mechanics and Other Workingmen.
According to the comment of J.R.Commons,(16)
This association, though at first rather an industrial than a political organization, eventually
advocated a mechanics' lien law, reform in the militia system, simplification of the laws,
extension of the suffrage, reform in the land tenure laws, in the system of taxation, and in
banks and other incorporated monopolies, abolition of imprisonment for debt, protection of
labour instead of capital, factory legislation, especially in the interest of women and children,
a better system of education, in particular, provision for the education of children in factory
districts, and shorter hours of labour.
The high ideals suggested the high consciousness of the members. The main constituent of the
organization was, however, not farmers but labor. Substantially farmers were not active members and
were taken advantage of by labor(17)(18). This organization of which assertion enables us to recognize
the serious critical mind was not a pioneer of farmers organization. Nonetheless it suggests the
extension of the darkness produced by capitalistic production system.
The true pioneers must be small farmers' societies and clubs which were independently dotted
throughout at least twenty states. They extended throughout New York, Vermont, Oregon, Washington,
California and so on from the 1850s to the 1860s. In the meetings of these societies, the regulation of
railroad corporations did not yet come out to the surface for discussion. The main theme was
exclusively concerned with the federal congress or state assembly. After that, the theme gradually
changed to the railroads which developed degressively only in the period of the Civil War but
continued to press farmers to accept unreasonable rates.
When he was aware of the living conditions and wanted to improve them, O.H.Kelley organized in
1867 at the state of Minnesota a farmer organization named the Patron of Husbandry which
consisted of suborganizations, that is, Granges. The membership of the Grange was limited to men
more than eighteen years old and women more than sixteen years old who were engaged in
agriculture. Each group, which was composed of at least nine men and four women, was authorized as
a Grange. According to the saying of Kelley the original purpose for this organization was the social
and cultural progress of farmers' living similar to the one for above-mentioned societies and clubs(19).
It intended to promote the spread and propagation of progressive agricultural technology(20). For
clarifying the earlier characteristic of the Granger Movement, some words of Kelley should be cited
as follows:(21)
Among the objects in view may be mentioned a cordial and social fraternity of the farmers all
over the country. Encourage them to read and think; to plant fruit and flowers, ---- beautify their
homes; evaluate them; make them progressive.
These purposes were petit-bourgeois and consequently suggested only a closed and self-sufficient
orientation among farmers although the objectives largely appealed to farmers all over the states.
But at this earlier time, from the Granger Movement we can not recognize the attention that farmers
paid to general economic conditions and to other social classes and organizations.
The earlier Granger Movement did not pretend to revolutionize the social structure producing the
discontent of farmers. They were discontent only with being differentiated and being ignored by other
social classes after first affirming their basic socio-economic foundations --- or it would be better to
say --- without considering their basic socio-economic foundations. Then the means of improvement
suggested in the earlier Movement was reciprocal, calming the feelings of farmers. Although these
peculiarities were continuously held among farmers, the farmers' movement became more aggressive
after the 1870s(22).
Farmers came to be discontent with the earlier movement so that the policy and principle of the
movement was forced to be revised. Then the Granges turned their attention to the outside social
classes. They started collecting and communicating rapidly the information concerning prices,
volumes of demand and supply, market conditions and transportation of grains in addition to setting
the facilities and extending co-operative purchasing. Thus, farmers began to take advantage of the
information which was produced by the interactions of the outside social classes other than farmers.
In consequence, this also meant that farmers began to take part in or to have something to do with the
outside social classes.
The principle of the movement was developed to result in two watch words which reflected the new
purposes of the movement; " cooperation " and " down with monopolies ". After that, the movement
was developed along the new principle which was authorized in 1871 at a general meeting. How
strongly this new principle captured the hearts of farmers than the old one did can be verified by the
increase in the number of Granges. Table III, IV and V provide the evidence for proof. These tables
tell us that the peak in which the Granges increased in number and accordingly in aggressiveness and
activeness can be recognized in the first half of the 1870s. The movement extended from Minnesota,
Iowa, Illinois and Indiana through Missouri and Ohio to New York, Tennessee, Massachusetts, Kansas,
Kentucky, Vermont, Georgia and South Carolina(23).
--------------------------------------
Table III, IV and V about here
-------------------------------------
Next, we should analyze some concrete effects brought about by the Granger Movement. First of
all, we must look at the Granger legislation in some states. Strictly speaking, the Grange itself was
only a reciprocal organization prohibited to attend to political activities. But we can not deny that it
functioned as a substantial base for farmers' political and legislative activities. In the process of the
movement, farmers pressed their local governments to legislate some laws to protect their own
interests. This was " the Granger Legislation ". Some laws by the Granger Legislation were brought to
court for trial by railroad corporations and states. These were afterwards called " the Granger Cases ."
The state of Illinois was identified with the Granger Cases. But they spread over some states, in
particular, over the states in the Mid-Western areas.
The Constitution of the state of Illinois was amended in 1870(24). It was not only the power of the
Granger Movement but also another power of farmers' association that forced the Illinois state
government to amend the Constitution which newly contained the railroad and warehouse
regulations(25). Since the beginning of the 1860s, laws regulating railroads were many times presented
to the state assembly of the state of Illinois. In these attempts the Act concerning Railroad Rates was
passed through the Assembly in 1869. This Act prohibited rate setting based on the notorious pro rate
principle. But the prohibition was invalid because the Act presented no concrete alternative principle.
On the other hand, it grew the demand for regulating railroads of farmers organized as society and
club. Before long the fourth constitutional convention was held at Springfield in December, 1869.
This convention was adjourned for a while. In this adjournment, the public opinion demanding the
railroad regulation rose in tension. For example, the informal talk of a farmer, H.C.Wheeler was
referred to in an article of the Prairie Farmer, a journal which was popular among farmers of Illinois:
....the farmers of the great North-west concentrate their efforts, power, and means, as the
great transportation companies have done theirs.... And, to this end, I suggest a convention
of those opposed to the present tendency to monopoly and extortionate charges by our
transportation companies, to meet at Bloomington, Illinois, on the 20th day of April
next. ....Farmers, now is the time for action(26).
Such a trend was supported by newspapers and extended to farmers in the north and mid-western
areas.
In the beginning of the conventional session the representatives, however, opposed regulating the
railroad companies, in particular, regulating the transportation rates by the state in spite of the farmers'
aggressive opinions. For example, R.P.Hanna who was a representative said as follows:(27)
Build competing lines, hold out liberal inducements for capitalists to come from every
portion of the country and invest their capital and compete with them. When you have done
this, the problem is solved and the true and only relief furnished.
Judging from the mention of R.P.Hanna, representatives were distressed about unreasonable
rates of transportation but they generally thought that there was no means for regulating railroads
practicable for the state government. At last, farmers' opinion supported by the farmers' movement,
however, pressed a representative of Bloomington, R.Benjamin, who was also a famous researcher of
Constitution, to make a expression that the state government was able to have a right to regulate the
railroad fees. Since railroad corporations had been established for the public good, and had been given
the power of public domain, they were under the control of the legislature. R.Benjamin asserted
that;(28)
there are and can be no vested rights of governmental power in any individual or
corporation, except those conferred by the constitution,
This opinion was agreed to spontaneously by many representatives to add to the new Constitution the
sections ( from Section 9 to Section 15 ) concerning the railroad rate regulations. The following two
sections were cited as a reference ;(29)
Section 12. Railways...are hereby declared public highways, and shall be free to all persons
for the transportation of their persons and property thereon, under such regulations as may
be prescribed by law. And the General Assembly shall, from time to time, pass laws
establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and
freight on the different railroads in this state.
Section 15. The general Assembly shall pass laws to correct abuses and to prevent unjust
discrimination and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different
railroads in this state, and enforce such laws by adequAte penalties, to the extent, if
necessary for that purpose, of forfeiture of their property and franchises.
The amendment to the Constitution in 1870 was decided by direct voting of the electorate. The
Constitution as a whole was approved by 134,227 against 35,443. The Sections with regard to railroad
regulation were voted independently and passed by 144,750 against 23,525. The Sections concerning
the warehouse regulation were also passed by 143,532 against 22,702. In this connection Table VI(30)
shows the contemporary population structure by occupation in the state of Illinois. Cook County, in
which was located Chicago, was by far the area of Illinois first in industrial production output and
consequently a leader in modernization. In other words, only Cook County had progressed in
featuring railroad industry while the other counties had a production structure mainly characterized by
agriculture. In 1870 the industrial output of Cook County totaled 92 million dollars, contrasted to the
output of 8 million dollars recorded in the secondly industrialized Peoria County. These polarizations
both in population structure by occupation and production structure surely contributed to the passage
of the new Constitution in Illinois(31).
-------------------------
Table VI about here
-------------------------
In 1871 some laws regulating railroads and warehouses were enacted based on the new
Constitution in the state assembly by members of the assembly who were elected by the Grange
farmers. At this time the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners was established.
Subsequently we analyze the content and its development of railroad regulations in the state of Illinois
by referring to the earlier annual reports issued by the Board(32).
The law passed in 1871 was the Act Establishing a Reasonable Maximum of Charge for the
Transportation of Passengers. The law obliged railroad corporations to file to the Board the annual
report which disclosed their annual revenues. The Board adopted the policy to recommend a
maximum rate respectively to each railroad which was classified to four (A,B,C and D) ranks
according to the revenue information. The filing system of annual report to the Board was a main
means of railroad regulation in the state of Illinois from the earliest period. From the following
sentence cited from the first annual report of the Board, we can imagine how strongly the Board
expected the success of regulation by the filing system ;(33)
If this Board should succeed in nothing else than in furnishing the public with accurate
and reliable information as to the operation of the large moneyed power embodied in the
railroad interests, so as to indicate reasonable means of protection against its encroachments,
it will have performed a very important and useful function of a considerate government.
On August 1, 1871 railroad corporations filed to the Board their first annual reports which were
incomplete and were forced to be modified, although the Board required only a very simple format of
an annual report. The incompleteness could be explained by some factors. Railroad corporations
adopted different accounting systems each other. They did not record any information concerning
original subscribers of stock, original contributors of capital and amounts of cash contributed because
of their many time transmutations.
When implementing the filing system for railroad regulation, the most important issue was a fact
that there was no accounting information regarding the income earned within the state of Illinois
because railroad corporations usually conducted business with an interstate charter. On the other hand,
this information was indispensable for the Board to decide the rate ranking. The Board was confident
that it could considerably collect the necessary information by continuous suggestion and education to
railroads. According to the filed accounting information, it became clear that railroad corporations in
Illinois almost had charged unreasonably high rates to passengers and had continued adopting
differentiating rates. We must our attention to the fact that the Board disclosed gathered information
and rate ranking of each railroad in newspapers. Based on the information, private individuals who
were discontent over the rates charged could sue the railroads concerned for refunding of rates. Such a
system and the procedures surrounded railroad regulation in Illinois in the earliest period.
As you have already recognized, there was a big issue in the 1871 law. According to the law,
......the action to enforce penalties for its violation is given to the party aggrieved,
exclusively, and this Board does not seem to possess any authority to institute actions to
recover penalties for the violation of that law nor has it any control over actions
instituted by private individuals(34).
Needless to say, the issue was a conceptual limitation of "party aggrieved" to private individuals.
Naturally each private individual had less power than large railroad corporations so that an individual
could not easily sue them for recovering penalties. Thus, the early filing system was in reality invalid
for establishing a maximum fair rate.
Learning a lesson from this failure of regulation, a new and more rigid law for railroad regulation
was passed in 1873. According to the new law, the Board had a right to fix rates and to become a
party aggrieved. Some suit cases were reported in the fourth annual report of the Board issued in
1874(35). That is, the Board came to have a right to directly control railroad businesses. Of course, the
filing system was continuously used in combination with the direct control of business.
After that, railroad regulation in Illinois entered a new stage. The decisions whether laws regulating
railroads and warehouses were constitutional or not in referring to the American Federal
Constitution were brought to court by the railroad corporations and warehouse companies. As we
have already mentioned, a series of such cases were called the Granger Cases. The typical case was
Mann vs. Illinois in 1876(36). The issue of the case was whether the law passed in 1873 was
constitutional or not in referring to the American Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court approved
its constitutionality(37).
It would be very difficult for us to decide whether railroad regulation in the state of Illinois was
successful or not. But we must add that a historian evaluated the strong railroad regulation in Illinois
as a limited success. An another researcher affirmatively evaluated the results of regulation in Illinois.
At any rate, by the 1880s railroad regulation was well under way in the state of Illinois(38).
Turning our attention to the aspect of business conditions of railroad corporations in Illinois, we
analyze particularly the Illinois Central Railroad. Why they did not accept an indirect regulation, a
filing system or information disclosure system ? As a consequence, why did they ultimately go to the
point of accepting direct control of business ?
The Illinois Central Railroad was chartered in 1850 and was expanded by the donation of lands
from the government to become the largest railroad corporation in Illinois. Sometimes this
corporation had the rumor that it could be misapprehended as a real estate company. It was financed
not, by issuing stocks, but by issuing bonds on mortgage of endowed lands. It was told that the
corporation's stock was used to be delivered only as premiums on subscribers of bond. The total
amount of the bond issued was 9 million dollars in contrast to three hundred thousand dollars in the
amount of outstanding stock. In addition, the considerable part of the stock of this railroad was issued
in the English capital market.
Turning our interests to the aspect of management of the Illinois Central Railroad, the proper
development as a corporation of this railroad was disturbed by economic depression, poor harvest and
the Civil War from 1857 to 1870. In addition, the managers of this corporation continued to be
annoyed by foreign intervention -- as we have already mentioned, the stock was almost issued in
England -- so that they could not help adopting more conservative management policies than the ones
adopted if the capital had been contributed by the people living along the railroad line or at least
American people. In consequence, it did not implement the active management strategies adopted by
other competitive railroad corporations so that it often lost passengers and customers. It obtained only
temporary success which in turn, visited it as a loss afterwards(39). Moreover, it could not afford to
accept the requirements presented by the public, in particular, farmers.
We have analyzed the socio-economic conditions at the end of the 1860s and in the first half of the
1870s in which railroad regulation appeared, the changes in means of regulation and the management
conditions of railroad corporations in the state of Illinois. The state had double polarizations both in
population structure by occupation and in industrial production structure and consequently had a
temporary but considerably aggressive farmers' movement requiring anti-railroad and anti-
monopolistic policies. Under such circumstances, the discontent of farmers directly resulted in the
direct control of railroad business in which were fixed railroad rates by the government. In regard to
the indirect regulation method of accounting information disclosure, it was invalid because the
railroad corporations being regulated were forced to adopt unstable and profit oriented management
policies ignoring farmers' demand by foreign intervention and competitive pressure.
The trend of railroad regulations like Illinois expanded over Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota and the
states in the Mid-Western areas. Subsequently we should look at the development of direct fixation of
ratea by government in the state of Wisconsin. The assembly of Wisconsin passed the Potter Law
which was evaluated at that time as one of the strongest laws in Granger legislation. The analysis of
the development of railroad regulation in Wisconsin would be helpful as a supplementary analysis to
the state of Illinois.
According to the first annual report of the railroad Commissioners of the State of Wisconsin(40), the
Potter Law was the result of the efforts made by the producing population who were awakened to the
realities of unfair behaviors and of unreasonable rates taken for a long time by railroad corporations in
Wisconsin. This resulted in the Potter Law regulation for rate setting as a reaction to railroad's unfair
behaviors. For example, the legislature had rights to establish reasonable rates by setting maximum
total incomes or maximum earnings and to establish the maximum amount of investment in new
railroad lines. As a result, this law was particularly burdensome for the new railroad lines.
Furthermore, the regulation was not flexibly adapted so there emerged some bad influences. The
annual report of the Commissioners in 1874 had already suggested that investments in new lines were
little by little decreasing in length(41). Such a tendency increased in tension and afterwards railroad
corporations in Wisconsin stopped paying dividends. What was worse, general investment behavior in
Wisconsin became inactive, which led to the depression in the Wisconsin economy. The strong
railroad regulation in Wisconsin reflected in the Potter Law was unsuccessful, in provoking the
economic depression in the whole state. The Eighth Annual Report of the Commission of Wisconsin
issued in 1881 indicated that only five railroad corporations among at least thirty corporations
reported their dividends(42). The changes in miles of new railroads in Wisconsin were shown as Table
VII which was cited from the Fifth Annual Report of the Commission of Wisconsin issued in 1878(43).
--------------------------
Table VII about here
-------------------------
In this section, we analyze railroad regulation in the Mid-Western areas, in particular, in the state of
Illinois which was instigated by the Granger Movement. In the development of regulation, the means
of regulation using accounting information disclosure was invalid and the direct control of business
establishing reasonable rates was adopted in some states. Such a type of regulation obtained limited
success in Illinois but failed in many Mid-Western states typically exemplified by the development in
Wisconsin(44). Many states abolished the Granger legislations and some states relaxed their railroad
regulations. The state of Wisconsin changed its means of regulation from the direct control of
business to indirect regulation using accounting information disclosure(45).
On the other hand, the Granger Movement itself became inactive since the latter half of the 1870s
as it had achieved good results of passing Granger legislation in many states in the first half of the
1870s. The discontent and demand of farmers were changing in appearance from the Granger
Movement, the Greenback Movement to the Populist Movement(46). Finally we should add that the
Granger itself continued to function as a reciprocal organization for farmers.
III Railroad Regulation in the State of Massachusetts
III-1. Introduction There seems to be two types of railroad regulation in the Unites States occurring in the latter half of
the nineteenth century. Regulatory subject was uniquely the state which established railroad
commission or board of railroad commissioners. The data concerning the year when railroad
commissions were established in each state were offered in Table VIII(47). Although there were time
differences among states, each had a commission for regulating railroads.
We can classify two types of means employed by states in railroad regulation. The one was, as we
have already seen, direct control of business through establishing fixed rates. And the other was
indirectly by requiring only accounting information disclosure. The ratio of direct regulation to
indirect regulation could be informed from Table IX(48). We selected the state of Illinois as a typical
example of the former and the state of Massachusetts as typical of the latter. In the previous studies,
however, these two types of railroad regulation were not equally evaluated. Many historians attached
more importance to the direct control of business than to information disclosure. Previously it was
understood that the regulation of large corporations first required by farmers was conducted by the
state using the direct control of business which was succeeded by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and step by step strengthened by the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Hepburn Antitrust
Act. It means that the direct control of business continues to be dominant in the area of corporate
regulation in general. In reflecting such a general understanding, for example, R.V.Fletcher did not
evaluate the indirect regulation(49). H.U.Faulkner also said that (50);
(commissions of experts) were of two kinds: the strong commission, as in Illinois, with
power to regulate rates and enforce the law; and the weaker commission, as in
Massachusetts, with powers merely advisory and the duty to make reports to the
legislature.
These two researchers have a common characteristic of treating the function of information disclosure
lightly although Faulkner used such wording as " it may be said that the latter type in the long run
often proved to be the most successful"(50). But we want to re-evaluate properly the regulating function
of information disclosure in a mass democratic society to evaluate the accounting information
disclosure from the new socio-economic viewpoint. Then we can recognize the utilization of
accounting information disclosure by regulatory agencies of local and federal governments in the
development of regulating large organizations from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the
beginning of the twentieth century in addition to employing direct control of business. The ultimate
purpose of this chapter is to clarify the socio-economic foundations of modern accounting information
disclosure by studying the concrete reasons why two different types of regulation appeared in
different states having different social structures and different industrial structures. In this section
we try to analyze the socio-economic conditions and the development of railroad regulation in the
state of Massachusetts in contrast to the ones in the state of Illinois. Before this analysis the survey on
the development of the railroad and its surrounding interests in Massachusetts will be offered in the
next subsection (III-2.).
III-2. Conditions of the State of Massachusetts(51)
First of all, we must evaluate the significance of railroad construction in the state of Massachusetts
of the nineteenth century in the light of the development of railroads in the United States. Generally,
the early period of constructing railroads in the United States was divided into four stages. In the first
stage, short line railroads were constructed as supplementary transportation to river transportation
mainly in the East Coast states. This stage would correspond to the period extending from 1827 in
which was chartered the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to the 1830s. Since then, railroad construction
began in Massachusetts. The second stage corresponded to the period extending from the 1840s to the
1850s, in which railroad industry was established as the center of economy and in which it was
completed the construction of four trunk line railroads. A large amount of capital also began to flow
from England in this period(52). The third stage included the period in which large railroad
corporations wove the mesh of railroad transportation all over the states. This period falls from the
1860s to the first half of the 1870s. The fourth stage comes under the period beginning from the latter
half of the 1870s when investment bankers entered into railroad industry by reorganizing stagnant
railroad corporations. It was a sign of monopolization which would blow up in and affect all
industries at the turn of the century.
The first stage was the stage in which railroads were employed as supplementary to steam boats
and were unanimously built and financed by the merchants and the bankers of large cities in the east
coast or by the aid of local governments in an attempt to join their own cities and trunk canals. The
ultimate end was to join them to the Mid-Western granaries. The Mohauk and Hudson Railroad and
some railroads in Massachusetts were constructed under such intention. How some large cities in the
east coast were eager to obtain the leading and central position in the mesh of railroad transportation
would be exemplified by the competition between the Mohauk and Hudson Railroad and the one in
Troy(53).
The second stage was the one of completion of trunk lines which extended from the east coast
through the Appalachians to Lake Erie, that is, to the Mid-West. The New York Central Railroad had
the first trunk line. It was established in 1853 by merger but its antecedents were jointly connected to
each other to become a trunk line. In the 1850s, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Erie Railroad and the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in succession completed trunk lines. In this period, capital came from
England to be invested in the expansion of trunk lines. For example, the Pennsylvania Railroad
promptly decided to introducecapital from England for expanding its lines(54).
The 1860s was the third stage. Railroad construction was stimulated by the famous executives with
which the railroad corporations were identified after years. For example, C.Vanderbilt of the New
York Central and J.Gould of the Erie have even now stable positions in American business history.
They accumulated their properties commonly by manipulating the stock of their corporations
and they deserved being criticized by the public. The managements and promoters in this period,
however, had such common characteristics. In fact this period is even now called the " Gilded Age."
Thus farmers became discontent at watching exactly the behavior of these managements.
The management style and the competition of constructing railroads in the third stage had relatively
shorter lives. In the fourth stage, investment bankers including J.P.Morgan showed off their financial
power by reorganizing railroad corporations that had gone bankrupt in the 1870s' depression. After
that, they began to play an important role in the merger movement at the turn of the century on the
base of financial powers accumulated in the process of railroad reorganizations.
The first three stages of railroad development is the subject of my analysis concerning railroad
development in Massachusetts. At this point it seems proper to offer the data with regard to railroad
miles constructed in the northern areas of the United States (see Figure II(55)).
-------------------------
Figure II about here
-------------------------
Judging from Figure II, the miles of railroad in the New England states remained on a stable level at
least since the 1860s. It means the cease of intensive railroad construction in the New England. The
New England states include Main, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and
Connecticut
Now we turn our attention to the trend of interest groups surrounding railroad industry in
Massachusetts(56). They had a leading position among the East Thirteen states after Independence.
Although since the first issue of the Census statistics in 1790 the total population of the United States
increased in percent to 150% by 1820, the one in the Massachusetts increased only 30%. It seems that
the states to the west of the East Thirteen states including Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana,
Indiana, Missouri, Illinois, Alabama and so on, made progress rapidly while Massachusetts remained
stable in progress.
Boston which is the most populous city in Massachusetts prospered as a center of domestic and
international trade. It gathered products from New England, India, China, and the East and the West
islands of India, and shipped them not only to American domestic markets but also to remote
European markets. This was the case for some another cities in Massachusetts so that they could
accumulated considerable capital to contribute to the subsequent industrial revolution and
economic development in this area.
This prosperity from international trade enjoyed by some cities in Massachusetts was attributed to
their geographic superiority. Entering into the nineteenth century, New York became a menace to
Boston because the former, facing the Hudson River, was superior to the latter in geographic position
for connecting domestic trade to international trade. Additionally the state of New York completed the
Erie Canal in 1825 under the direction of D.W.Clinton. By this canal New York held an unshakable
position in connecting the Pacific Ocean and Lake Erie, that is, between international trade and
domestic trade. In considering the economic affairs surrounding Massachusetts, we can easily imagine
that social and local economic-interest groups commonly recognized the importance of improving
inner-state transportation and of expanding it to the West(57).
Turning to the economic and industrial conditions within Massachusetts, merchants were
gradually missing their opportunities of investments in competing with the ones in New York. The
accrued extra capital, however, fostered the cotton industry in this area. For example, the Boston
M.Company established in 1813 in the East of Massachusetts succeeded in the cotton industry and
recorded a seventeen percent dividend in 1817. Thus Boston was enlivened again by the development
of the cotton industry.
Agriculture in Massachusetts at this time was also prosperous in Worcester and the Worcester
Agricultural Society was organized in 1825. This area became active in the cotton industry, beginning
in the 1830s.
The coexistence of the cotton industry, of the agriculture and of the demand for farming
implements brought birth to the steel industry in Massachusetts. As a reference we should cite from
the McLane Report the data concerning the cotton and the steel industries in Massachusetts in this
period(58) .
-----------------------
Table X about here
-----------------------
Massachusetts was at last re-established as one of the biggest industrial districts in the United States
when it changed its economic structure from the international commercial trade to the production
industry. Consequently, Massachusetts was characterized as one of the foremost states in regard to the
American Industrial Revolution and continues to be analyzed until now by many researchers. As a
researcher gave importance to the cotton industry(59), so another researcher paid attention to the steel
industry(60). But the existence of agriculture should never be neglected. With their economic power the
merchants and bankers in Boston still had a large influence. It should be taken into consideration the
distribution of industry by the region shown in Table X. We should confirm here one important
characteristic concerning the economic structure of Massachusetts. Massachusetts had first an
experience of modern industrialization in the United States and had also first an experience of having
the socio-economic structure typically recognized in the highly developed capitalistic economic
society. There emerged many organized interest groups which included not only the traditional
farmers and merchants but also the professional people who accrued from the capitalistic production
system. The regional conflict had already been recognized since the 1830s. Then we must conclude
that the state of Massachusetts had already produced the prototype of the modernized socio-economic
structure which would become dominant by the industrial monopolization movement in the United
States as a whole at the turn of the century and in which the managements of relatively large
corporations actively adopted management policies in considering into accounts and reacting to the
demands and requirements proposed by many different organized interest groups.
III-3. Analysis of Railroad Regulation in the State of Massachusetts
The analysis concerning the development of railroad regulation in the state of Massachusetts will
be offered in this subsection. Since the 1820s, the railroad construction from Boston to Albany in the
state of New York was earnestly studied in Massachusetts. The main issue of railroad construction
was a financial problem. That is, which should contribute the funds, the state government or the
private sector ? If the state government would finance the railroad construction, it meant that the state
people as taxpayers substantially had to pay the costs which were involved in the construction. Thus,
the necessity of the railroad was discussed in terms of the interests surrounding the railroad. We must
pay attention to the fact that the discussion was conducted in the form of town meetings which were,
of course, the democratic tradition of Massachusetts(61). As a result, the Boston and Worcester
Railroad was chartered for constructing a railroad from Boston to Worcester located in the middle of
the way to Albany(62). But many local governments in the state of Massachusetts did not financially
support the railroad construction including the Boston and Worcester Railroad(63), even though
state governments in the United States generally and substantially financed the large social
infrastructures in this period. This fact meant that the general public in Massachusetts had not yet
evaluated the usefulness of railroads(64). Although refusing to finance railroad construction, the state
government had a right to charter it because the establishment of the corporation was based on the
charter system(65). Then the real issue was what kind of power the state should give in the charter to
corporations which would undertake railroad construction. The wording of the charter saved face for
the regulators and anti-monopolists who feared the monopolization of railroads , but the substance
gave to the private investors, that is, stockholders, nearly everything they desired(66). S.Salsbury
said that;
The legislature, however, insisted that the railroad should keep no secrets. To this end the
directors were to report annually to the General Court the company's receipts, expenditures,
and operations. As if this were not enough, the charter added that the corporation's books "
shall at all times be open to the inspection of any Communities of the Legislature." Stiff
penalties would result from failure to so comply(67).
In Massachusetts at this time, it had already become an important issue to adjust the differences of
interests concerning railroad among several varied interest groups which consisted of banking, real
estate holding, wholesale, retail, merchandising, investing, manufacturing and so on(68). We can cite
the following sentences from S.Salsbury again;
(The history of railroads in this period in Massachusetts was) ...the history of how these
powerful groups exerted pressures to force the railway managements to serve particular
interests(69),
and also was the history of adjusting conflicting interests. But after all the Boston and Worcester
Railroad was welcomed at its opening in April of 1834 because the success of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad had already been confirmed(70).
We focus on the conflicting interests and its adjustment process of railroads in Massachusetts in the
rest of this subsection.
The managements of the Boston and Worcester Railroad were oriented to local interests so that the
board of directors intensively discussed the rate setting policy. In the 1830s, directors D.Denny and
D.Henshow, insisted that low rates were beneficial both for the public and for the railroad itself in the
long run(71). On the other hand, N.Hale supported by the interests of banks, favored raising the rates.
This conflict ended in a temporary policy of raising rates. But the rates were cut down when the
earnings of the railroad increased in 1839(72). These facts tell us that the management of the railroad
was conducted in consideration of the interest groups involved.
By the way, the Western Railroad was also chartered for extending its railroad to Albany in March
of 1833 after the charter of the Boston and Worcester Railroad. Now we must look at financing of this
new railroad. The board of directors of the railroad needed very badly the financial support from the
state government. Then directors G.Bliss,Jr and J.Willard asserted the establishment of the State Bank
of Massachusetts by the charter which assured the purchase of the stock of the Western Railroad by
the bank. But this assertion was opposed by democrats. Thereafter, the railroad began to obtain the
support of the public and it succeeded to earn the support of two counties, Franklin and Hampshire
because it had succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the journals, Courier and Mercury. After that,
the plan of establishing the state bank itself was revoked by democrats but still the railroad was
successful in obtaining financial support from the state in the sense that the state came to purchase one
third of the stock issued by the Western Railroad(73). On account of this fact, the railroad included the
state as stockholders in its interest groups.
There appeared a conflict among real estate holders because the prices of the real estate fluctuated
depending upon the location of railroad stations. The town of Worcester held mass meetings for
opposing and protesting the one sided decision of stations' location by the Western Railroad and for
communicating the public's demands to the railroad(74). On the other hand, the Western Railroad issued
the bulletin " Address to the People " for appeasing the public(75). This could be considered as a kind
of disclosure policy taken voluntarily by the corporation.
Next we discuss another conflict concerning the rate setting policy among directors of the Western
railroad in the 1840s. When he asserted that the railroad could be managed on the same low rate basis
as the steam boats, E.H.Derby wanted to hold actual control power over the corporation by winning
the support of the public. W.Jackson naturally opposed the opinion of Derby because of its
impossibility. The interesting point was the means by which Derby gradually obtained the support of
the public. He explained to the public that the railroad could conduct business on the same rate basis
as the Erie Canal through some articles in journals and some addresses by using statistical simulations.
The statistical data contained the net income calculated from the total revenue and expenditures of
labor cost, maintenance cost and so on accrued on the condition that the transportation facilities of the
Western Railroad were fully and completely operated(76). This discussion ended up to the compromise
that the low rate was adopted concerning the passenger and the high rate was supported in the case of
freight(77). The discussion regarding rate setting exactly indicates the monopolization of railroad
industry in Massachusetts according to a railroad fee theory(78).
The fact that the information disclosure regarding railroad corporations became worthy of notice,
in other words, the fact that the public always watched the behaviors of railroads, pressed the state
assembly to pass the law regulating the accounting procedures of railroad corporations in 1846 before
the establishment of the Board of Railroad Commissioners. It seems that this law gave influence to the
subsequent accounting information disclosure of railroad corporations in Massachusetts(79).
We tried to describe the circumstances surrounding railroads and the behavior of management in
the first half of the nineteenth century in Massachusetts by referring to the cases of the Boston and
Worcester Railroad and the Western Railroad as historical instances. This analysis should clarify that
it was necessary for the railroad corporations in Massachusetts to conduct management behavior in
consideration of several opposing interest groups -- the public as a whole -- into account. For example,
information disclosures were employed to appease and to persuade the public. This meant that the
railroads began to have monopolistic powers and to allow a margin for adopting modernized
democratic management policy. We can supplement this assertion by showing the stable and
increasing propensity of dividends for the two railroad corporations ( see Table XI(80)). The public of
Massachusetts criticized and watched railroads only after they affirmed the existence of the railroads.
The conservative opposition to railroads in a sense on the side of the public was exactly reflected in
the gradual increase in the number of passengers. Table XI can also offer data with regard to two
railroads' passengers. Thus the situation in Massachusetts contrasts remarkably with the one in
Illinois.
------------------------
Table XI about here
------------------------
In following the way of monopolization, railroads gradually extended(81). The Boston and Worcester
Railroad and the Western Railroad merged into the Boston and Albany Railroad. This merger was
accelerated by competition from the New York Central Railroad(82). And in 1869 the Board of
Railroad Commissioners was established in bringing with only the information disclosure
requirement(83). Then we should analyze, first of all, the content of the requirement by referring to the
First Annual Report issued by the Board(84).
The most important function to be conducted by the Board was to inspect both the management
ways and conditions and the obedience to their own charters and to the laws in Massachusetts of
railroad corporations by referring to the annual reports filed by railroads for the purpose of evaluating
railroads within the state in terms of the public's safety and convenience. So the Board had a right to
visit for inspection any railroad within the state when necessary. The duties and rights of the Board
were provided by Section 3 in Chapter 408 of the law passed in 1869. According to the law,(85)
Commissioners shall inform such railroad corporation of the improvements and charges
which they adjudge to be proper and a report of the proceedings shall be included in the
annual report of the commissioners to the legislature.
In other words, the Board was invested only with the duty and right to counsel improvements and
to report them to the legislature when railroads violated their charters or laws. The legislature
disclosed the facts. Naturally the Board itself was at the beginning bewildered by its limited powers.
For example, when the Board was consulted in the case of the Boston and Lowell Railroad's refusal to
offer transportation service to a certain customer, it could not bring the railroad to court by itself
because of its limited rights. With regard to this case, the Board expressed its regret in the First
Annual Report(86).
Then we would like to know whether the way of regulation adopted by the Board in Massachusetts
was successful or not. It is generally understood that the Board was established only to assure the
publicity of the railroads because of holding no power to directly control railroads. So the Board was
treated lightly and was itself annoyed. As we have already pointed out, some historians did not
evaluate the Board and its regulating power. The descriptions drawn by A.T.Hadley and F.C.Clark(87)
is, however, useful for answering this question from another viewpoint. They insisted on its
successfulness. As far as we agree with the opinion of Hadley, we must indicate originally some data
supporting its successfulness. Concretely, the passenger rates both in Illinois and Massachusetts are
offered as Table XII(88). According to Table XII, the decrease in price for passenger rates was
observable in both states.
-------------------------
Table XII about here
-------------------------
If we can say that the railroad regulation system, that is, regulation by (accounting) information
disclosure in Massachusetts was at least partly successful, we must next sum up the reasons. As a
matter of fact, the reasons are expected to suggest also the socio-economic foundations for modern
accounting information disclosure typically observable in a modern capitalistic economy.
The first reason is that the railroad corporations in Massachusetts were sensitive to public opinion.
The persons holding property rights, including the stock reflecting equity and managers managing
them, had to regard for others to protect their property rights because the concept of property right
itself was relatively new one and consequently was not defended by long term conventions. In
particular, the large monopolistic railroad corporations were apt to be criticized and to be watched by
the public because they earned considerable profits and in turn they actively adopted a management
policy for keeping the public in good humor. On the other hand, it can be understood that the Board in
Massachusetts expertly read the tendency of the railroads. The Board, for example, educated public
opinion so that the public voluntarily demanded improvements to railroads. By depending on this
policy the Board could force the railroads to install safety devices and to run the trains beneficially for
local industries in addition to setting reasonable rates which were intended. These functions seem to
be inherent in information disclosure systems. The publicity had substantial power over requiring
respect and obedience from the railroads(89).
The second reason is that the interests both of railroads and the public in the long run came to an
agreement. If the management of large railroad corporations had intended only to make their
dividends as large as possible, it would have been possible by oppressing the local transportation
companies. But if they had done so, they would have lost connection with local transportation services
and would have had to invest huge funds into local services. Needless to say, such a policy was very
dangerous for the railroads themselves. Then for railroads there was a necessity to keep harmony with
the local transportation companies. By forcing the railroads to disclose their management and
accounting information, the Board could prevent the oppression of the public's interests caused by
possible the railroads' short-profit maximizing behavior. On the one hand, the function of information
disclosure allowing the public to watch the management behavior of large corporations and on the
other hand, the existence of monopolization of the railroad industry, both were prerequisites to the
prevention of immoderate management of railroad corporations. Although the Board of Massachusetts
also employed this function of information disclosure, it did not appear to be sufficiently evaluated for
its results(90).
The third reason is that the railroad industry in Massachusetts had a relatively long history and
consequently had entered into stable business conditions. We have repeatedly mentioned, there existed
no active competition and no aggressive management behavior(91). As free competition was valid for
expanding rapidly the railroad mesh at the sacrifice of the public's interests, so the monopolization of
railroad industry was a prerequisite to a high quality transportation system and management system to
railroads. Generally the monopolization or oligopolization seems to be an economic prerequisite to
the social structure in which the public can inspect the management behavior of big businesses by
using management and accounting information disclosure and can also demand their improvements
and big businesses can, in turn, take moderate management policies in reacting to public opinion. Of
course, such a social structure was for the first time realized in smaller size in the state of
Massachusetts, than in the United States as a whole at the turn of the century. We can not also ignore
the coexistence of several organized interest groups, that is, the organized public as a whole.
The fourth reason is that there was an ideal and an institutional tradition with regard to democracy
which was typically reflected in the town (or mass) meeting in Boston. The tradition gave active
influence to the public's function of watching big corporations.
The state of Massachusetts succeeded in railroad regulation by using only information disclosure in
the above mentioned four reasons, which brought about two derivative effects. The one was that there
was no support among the members of the Board for nationalization of railroad. The other was that
some states gradually adopted railroad regulation by information disclosure accompanying
improvements of some accounting techniques and rules, especially after the Granger Movement was
finished about 1878(92). Such states naturally experienced the changes in their socio-economic
structure into a modernized one like Massachusetts. The real case of Wisconsin has been already
offered in the previous section. Before long, the Interstate Commerce Commission would adopt the
accounting information disclosure as a measure of big business regulation at the Federal Government
level.
IV Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the development of railroad regulations both in the mid-western
states and in the East Coast states for finding the socio-economic foundations of the modern
accounting information disclosure typically conducted by modern big business. Thus we would like to
sum up some analytical results as conclusions, although we should recognize that the limited number
of sample states may result in a limited conclusion. The period treated in Section III was older than
the one in Section II. The peculiarity of the state of Massachusetts determined that the modernized
socio-economic structure in which the several organized interest groups watched the railroads, caused
the railroads, in turn, to adopt moderate management policy for appeasing them. At the beginning, the
people in Massachusetts doubted the necessity of a railroad but after that they began to criticize the
railroad after accepting its existence. The democratic tradition continued to remain in Massachusetts
and such a socio-economic structure enabled the Board of the Railroad Commissioners established in
1869 to succeed in regulating railroads by utilizing only accounting information disclosure. At this
point we must attend to the fact that resolution of the economic problem by accounting information
disclosure could never become the essential resolution to the economic problems in this period
accrued from the capitalistic production system which was gradually penetrating into the United
States as a whole. The resolution of economic problems by accounting information disclosure is only
a temporary resolution on the condition that the capitalistic production system was extending, that is,
monopolization was expanding.
The polarization of the economic interest groups resulted in the strong and direct control of
business of railroad corporations by the state legislatures in mid-western states. In such circumstances
there emerged the polarized conflict between farmers and railroads so that farmers required strong
regulations over railroads. It seems, however, that farmers were essentially conservative in nature.
The strong regulations became invalid after they prevented sound economic development in some
certain states. In Mid-Western states, several interest groups were gradually organized within a state
and after that these organizations extended beyond the boundary of states to become nationa wide.
This was the case even for farmers. All the interest groups, including farmers were incorporated into
the reproduction system of big business enterprises.
We dare to say that the socio-economic structure established in Massachusetts in the middle of the
nineteenth century was in similitude formed at the turn of the century in the United States as a whole
as a result of appearance of modern big business system or modern industrial monopolization. In
regard to the accounting information disclosure, new big businesses, for example U.S.Steel, other than
railroad corporations also began to adopt it to reconcile the anti-monopolistic movement developed
actively at the turn of the century. We can also find in the Progressive Movement the real case of
emerging democratic ideology like a town meeting tradition in Massachusetts. The analysis of these
phenomena will be conducted in the next chapter.
Notes(1) The effects that were brought about by the development of railroad industry in the United States were
differently evaluated among economic historians including W.W.Rostow and R.W.Fogel.
(2) Syoujirou Ishii, Amerika Tetsudou Ron, Cyuoukeizai-sya, 1974, p.67.
(3) The references of this subsection are as follows; A.Fishlow, American Railroad and the Transportation of the
Ante-Bellum Economy, Massachu- setts, Harvard University Press, 1965. P.H.Cootner, " The Role of the
Railroads in United States Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic History, Vol.23, No.4, ( December,
1963). Suzuki,Keisuke and kouji Nakanishi, " Amerika Shihonsyugi no Hatten to Tetsudougyou --
Nanbokusensou Izennojiki wo Cyuusinni --,(1)(2)(3) " Syakaikagaku Kenkyu, Vol.22, No.4( March, 1971 ),
Vol.22, No.5.6 ( March, 1971 ), Vol.22, No.2 (November, 1971).
(4) E.W.Bemis, " The Discontent of the Farmer," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.I, (March,1983).(5)
Ibid., p.202.
(6) T.B.Veblen, " Price of Wheat Since 1867," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.I, ( DEcember,1892).
(7) E.W.Bemis, op.cit., p.204.
(8) F.A.Schannon, The Farmer's Last Frontiers, New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1961, pp.296-297.
(9) For example, railroads charged an unreasonably high rate to weak and uninfluential farmers while they
issued free pass tikets to influential politicians and attorneys and paid rebates to major grain companies.
Furthermore, they charged higher rates in the non-competitive area than in the competitive area even on the
same railroad line. These oppressive railroad actions were caused by arbitrary rate setting policy easily
manipulated by railroads. W.Z.Ripley, Railroads; Rates and Regulation, New York, Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1913, Chapter VI, "Personal Discrimination," Chapter VII, "Local Discrimination,". Kenji Ozawa,
"19seiki Kouhan no Amerikani okeru Noumin Undou no Tenkai (2)," Nougyou Sougou Kenkyu, Vol.29,
No.3 ( July, 1975), p.65.
(10)E.W.Bemis, op.cit., pp.195-198.
(11)Ibid.,pp.193-194.
(12)Ibid.,p.199.
(13)Ibid.,pp.198-199.(14)Ibid.,pp.199-200.(15)The references in this subsection were as follows; C.C.Taylor,
The Farmers' Movement, 1620-1920, New York, American Book Comapny, 1953. F.A.Shannon, The
Farmer's Last Frontier, 1961. S.J.Back, The Granger Movement, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press,
Originally published in 1913. Kenji Ozawa, " 19seiki Kouhan no Amerikani okeru Noumin Undou no
Tenkai (1)(2)(3)(4)," Nougyou Sougou Kenkyu, Vol.28, No.2 ( April, 1974), Vol.29, No.3 ( July, 1975),
Vol.30, No.4 ( October, 1976), Vol.32, No.3 ( October, 1978).
(16)C.C.Taylor, op.cit., p.78.
(17)Ibid., p.79.
(18)Ibid., p.79.
(19)Kenji Ozawa (2), op.cit., p.49.
(20)Ibid., pp.49-50.(21)C.C.Taylor, op.cit., p.117.
(22)The conservative and petit-bourgeois nature of farmers does not seem to be directly reflected in the Granger
Movement. But the nature of farmers should be closely related to the reasons why farmers could not
actively revolve the social structure and why they could not help being incorporated in the capitalistic
production system at the turn of the century in spite of the fact that they substantially and continuously
had organized the Granger Movement, the Greenback Movement and the Populist Movement.
(23)The following three tables have different sources so that their numerical data are slightly different from
each other. We can, however, roughly know the changes both in the number of Granges and in the number
of their members. Table III and Table IV were cited from, Kenji Ozawa, op.cit., (2), pp.51-52. Table V was
calculated by the writer based on the data of, C.C.Taylor, op.cit., pp.135-137.
(24)The discussion developed below was based on the following references; S.J.Back, The Granger
Movement, Chapters IV,V,VI. H.G.Brownson, History of the Illinois Central Railroad to 1870, Illinois,
University of Illinois, (reprinted in 1967). J.Cornelius, A History of Constitution Making in Illinois,
Illinois, University of Illinois, 1969.
(25)In the state of Illinois, there existed the Illinois State Farmers' Association other than the Granger. They
developed farmers' movements at the same time. C.C.Taylor, op.cit., p.103.
(26)S.J.Back, op.cit., p.128.
(27)J.Cornelius, op.cit., p.58.
(28)Ibid., p.59.
(29)S.J.Back, op.cit., pp.129-130.
(30)The writer made this table based on the 9th Census of the United States.
(31)J.Cornelius, op.cit., p.43.
(32)In particular, the content of railroad regulation in Illinois was written in detail in the First Annual Report
of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois, 1872.
(33)Ibid., p.4.
(34)Ibid., p.5.(35)The Fourth Annual Report of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois,
1874.
(36)The detail of this case could be offered in the following book; Amerika Gakkai translates and edits, Genten
Amerikasi, Yuwanami Syoten, 1979, Vol.4, " Mann vs.Illinois, 1876, ".
(37)Ibid., p.152.
(38)R.P.Howard, Illinois: a History of the Prairie State, Michigan, William B. Erdamans Pu. Company, 1972,
p.364. The Tenth Annual Report of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Illinois, 1881, pp.20-21.
Frederick C.Clark, " State Railroad Commissions, How They May Be Made Effective," Publications of the
American Economic Association, Vol.VI, American Economic Association, 1891.
(39)H.G.Rroenson, op.cit., p.73.
(40)The First Annual Report of the Railroad Commissioner of the State of Wisconsin, 1874.
(41)Ibid., p.94.
(42)The Eighth Annual Report of the Rairoad Commissioner of the State of Wisconsin, 1881, p.xxiv.
(43)The Fifth Annual Report of the Railroad Commissioner of the State of Wisconsin, 1878,p.iv. We must
consider into account the fact that the United States as a whole suffered from an economic depression from
1873 to 1878. Nonetheless, it is surprising that Wisconsin decreased in newly constructed railroads, in miles
from about 80% to 90%, which was considerably below the average of decrease in the United States as a
whole.
(44)A.T.Hadley, Railroad Transportation, Its History and Its Laws, New York, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1903,
pp.135-136.
(45)Ibid., p.135.
(46)A.Rochester, The Populist Movement in the United States.
(47)Hideyoshi Satou, " Amerika no Kinyuushihon Seiritsukini okeru Syuni yoru Tetsudou Jigyou Kisei no Hou
Kouzou," Waseda Hougaku Zasshi, Vol.20, 1969. p.177.
(48)Ibid., p.178. The regulation should be within states when we consider that the Interstate Commerce
Commission had already established.
(49)Ibid., pp.184-185.
(50)H.U.Faulkner, American Economic History,
(51)The discussion developed below was based on the following books and papers ; J.Moody, The Railroad
Builders, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1920. A.F.Harlow, The Road of the Century, New York,
Creative Age Press, Inc., 1947. Suzuki, Keisuke and Kouji Nakanishi, " Amerika Shihonsyugi no Hatten to
Tetsudougyou -- Nanbokusensou Izennojiki wo Cyuusinni --,(1)(2)(3) " op.cit..
(52)Jirou Ozawa, " Amerika no Tetsudou Kensetsu to Igirisu Shihon," Syakai Keizai Shigaku, Vol.38, No.5
( January, 1973 ).
(53)Takashi Mori, " New York Central Railroad Kaisya no Seiritsu," Keizaigaku Kenkyu, Vol.29, No.3 (August,
1979), Section IV.
(54)Takashi Mori, " Pennsylvania Railroad niokeru Shihon Chikuseki no Tenkai," Keizaigaku Kenkyu, Vol.17,
No.4 (December, 1967).
(55)Suzuki Keisuke and Kouji Nakanishi, op.cit., (2), p.54.
(56)The discussion developed below was based on the following books; S.Salsbury, The State, the Investor, and
the Railroad; The Boston & Albany, 1825-1867, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1967. Tadakatsu
Inoue, Amerika Keieishi, The Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, 1961, pp.57-
98.
(57)S.Salsbury, op.cit., Chapter I.
(58)The data was reproduced based on the original data in; Toshirou Kusui, Amerika Shihonsyugi to Sangyou
Kakumei, Koubundou, 1970, pp.463-497.
(59)Ibid..
(60)Keisuke Nagata, Amerika Tekkougyou Hattatsushi Josetsu, Nippon Hyouronsya, 1979.
(61)S.Salsbury, op.cit., Chapters I,II.
(62)The public campaign in the journal, Daily Advertiser, conducted by editor N.Hale gave much influence to
the establishment of the railroad. C.J.Kennedy, " The Early Business History of Four Massachusetts
Railroads," Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, Vol.XXV, No.1 (March,1951).
(63)The Boston and Lowell Railroad and the Boston and Providence Railroad were also included.
(64)S.Salsbury, op.cit., pp.80-81.
(65)Kazuhiko Tamamura, " Amerikani okeru Tetsudou Kensetsu no Keizaiteki Haikei, Doushisya Syougaku,
Vol.20 No.3.4 (February,1969).
(66)S.Salsbury, op.cit., p.81. At that time, It was generally understood that railroads were treated in the same
way as highways. But the mangement of railroads was different from the running of trains and cars on it.
(67)Ibid., p.89.
(68)Ibid., Chapter V.
(69)Ibid., p.92. The sentence within parentheses was inserted by the writer.
(70)Ibid., p.132.
(71)Hiroshi Morikawa, Genkasyoukyaku Ron, Moriyamasyoten, 1978, pp.76-77.
(72)S.Salsbury, op.cit., p.125. As a reference, the rate between Boston and Worcestor from 1836 to 1839 was
4.51 cent per mile. From 1839 to 1840, it decreased to 3.38 cent. C.J.Kennedy, " The Early Business History
of Four Massachusetts Railroads -- IV," Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, Vol.XXV, No.4
(December, 1951), p.211.
(73)S.Salsbury, op.cit., p.143.
(74)Ibid., p.166.
(75)Ibid., p.146. The annual reports disclosed in detail information on the Western Railroad. Or Hiroshi
Morikawa, op. cit., pp.83-87.
(76)S.Salsbury, op.cit., pp.213-214. C.J.Kennedy, op.cit.,(IV), pp.222- 224.
(77)Yasuo Ikuta, Amerika Kokuminkeizai no Seisei to Tetsudou Kensetsu -- Amerika Tetsudou Keizai no
Seiritsu --, Senbundou, 1980, p.250.
(78)Ibid., p.252.
(79)Hiroshi Morikawa, op.cit., pp.93-102.
(80)S.Salsbury, op.cit., pp.213-214. The Data were rearranged based on original data.
(81)From the end of the 1840s to the 1850s there appeared managers who gave the first importance to profit
maximization of railroads while adopting information disclosure as a management policy. We can point
to G.Bliss,Jr. of the Western Railroad as an example. We do not insist that there always emerged
managements who took the interests of the public into consideration. On the contrary, we should say that
G.Bliss,Jr. was a kind of modern manager.
(82)S.Salsbury, op.cit., Chapter XIII.
(83)The following book and paper are useful for understanding the establishment of the Board in Massachusetts;
C.F.Adams, Jr., " The Railroad System," contained in, C.F.Adams, Jr., and H.Adams, Chapters of Erie, New
York, Augustus M.Kelly, 1967, originally published in 1871.
(84)The First Annual Report of the Board of Railroad Commissioners, Massachusetts, 1870.
(85)1869. 408 Section 3.
(86)The First Annual Report of the Board of Railroad Commissioners, Massachusetts, 1870.
(87)The following book and paper are helpful for deciding whether the railroad regulation in Massachusetts was
successful or not; A.T.Hadley, Railroad Transportation, Its History and Its Laws, op.cit.. F.C.Clark, " State
Railroad Commissions, and How They may be Made Effective, " op.cit..
(88)The Sixth Annual Report of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois, 1876, pp.446-
447. The Seventh Annual Report, Appendix, pp.70-71. The Eighth Annual Report, Appendix, pp.84-85. The
Tenth Annual Report, p.17. The Eleventh Annual Report of the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the
State of Massachusetts, 1880, p.12.
(89)A.T.Hadley, op.cit., p.137.
(90)Ibid., p.138.
(91)Ibid., pp.138-139.
(92)Ibid., p.137.
Chapter TwoAccounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprises in
Contemporary Times
I Introduction
With business firms internationally developing and influencing each other, accounting practices in
business firms of many countries will also be reciprocally affected. In particular, multinational
enterprises and their accounting practices sometimes cause difficulties both in some aspects of
businesses and in some countries. Actually these difficulties need international adjustment and
rearrangement. In focusing on accounting problems regarding technique, some issues may be
promptly pointed out. For example, international integration and adjustment of accounting standards
and principles should be reached out for the purpose of internationally comparing financial statements
issued by firms of some different countries. Some unsolved accounting problems should be resolved
for evaluating as a whole the financial position and operating results of multinational firms which
have many foreign affiliated companies and operate in different currencies. Needless to say, we are
writing about difficulties in translating different currencies and internationally consolidating financial
statements. With regard to the political problem surrounding international accounting, international
competition among some developed capitalistic countries are carried out for obtaining leading
positions in regard to adjusting accounting principles. Furthermore, we can recognize the effect of the
North-South problem in related to the extent of accounting information disclosed by multinational
enterprises.
When we analyze international accounting, we should essentially take many issues into
consideration. But in this chapter we exclusively focus on the international accounting information
disclosure by depending on the statements and reports published by the United Nations. This
necessarily means that we will analyze some issues of the accounting information disclosure of
multinational enterprises colored by the North-South problem.
By the way, it should be better to pointed out here that the conclusion drawn from the analysis of
preceding chapter concerning the relation between American railroad regulation in the 19th century
and the emergence of modern accounting information disclosure, must be helpful for understanding
the important point at issue of the contemporary accounting information disclosure of multinational
enterprises colored by the North-South problem.
II Emergence of Accounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprises
Firms which have accumulated considerable capital, plan to extend their business activities over
geographical and legal boarders. They become so large that they conduct simultaneously important
business in different countries, although at the beginning they operated mainly in their mother
countries. In such a case, however, the authority of management control is usually not commissioned
to and is not delegated among managers of different countries. If we can label "multinational
enterprises", firms of which business activities are internationally extended(1), the history of such firms
seems to be old in the United States(2). But it was in the 1960s that there emerged apparently big
businesses having active global organizations in relation to the rapidity of communication. And the
1960s was a period in which multinational firms were actively and favorably evaluated(3).
Entering into the 1970s, the negative aspects of multinational enterprises were paid attention to by
many developing countries which had previously accepted multinational enterprises(4). The reason
why they came under criticism was partly that in this period the multinational enterprises having
mother countries other than the United States -- including England, France, West Germany and Japan
-- were also established so intensively that their activities affected considerably the international
economy and partly that they became noticeable because of their excessive activities. As a reference
we offer the data concerning the amount of international direct investment(5).
-----------------------
Figure I about here
-----------------------
Next we should point out some problems which multinational enterprises would cause in
accepting(host) counties since the 1970s. These problems were emerging between American
multinational companies and Japan, between American companies and France, that is, between
developed capitalistic countries, and they were also emerging between multinational enterprises
which have developed countries as their mother countries and developing countries. According to the
Report issued by the United Nations in 1973 [1], developed countries recorded two thirds of the
balance of foreign direct investment ( based on assessed book value) while developing countries
recorded only one third of the balance. This means that foreign direct investment was being carried
out mainly among developed countries and that developing countries accepted only one half of
international direct investment(6). In this sense, the problem accrued from foreign direct investment
was faced primarily by developed capitalistic countries. But " .... the presence of foreign multinational
corporations in the developing countries is generally of greater relative significance, since their
economies account for much less than half of that of developed market economies.(7)" So some
problems caused by multinational enterprises became more closely related to the North-South
problem.
We can consider the problems of multinational firms from different and various viewpoints such as
politics, economy, ethics and so on. The focus of this paper, however, should be placed on economic
problems. These must be classified as follows(8)(9);
I) aspect of industrial structure
i. monopolization or oligopolization
ii. limitation of validity of industrial policy
iii. outflow of production elements out of accepting countries
iv. creation of excess productivity
II)aspect of market
i. formation of oligopolized market structure
ii. evasion of taxation by using transfer pricing
III)aspect of labor
i. worse industrial relations accrued from violation of labor market rules
ii. fluctuation in employment coming from sudden entrance and retreat
IV)another aspect
i. effect over short-term capital movement
ii. currency manipulation
iii. effect over international trade balance
It will be useful for understanding the nature of the problem concerning multinational enterprises to
refer to the transfer pricing problem as an example.
It is usually understood that multinational enterprises purchase raw materials in the country where
the prices of materials concerned are cheapest, assemble them in the country where the labor cost is
lowest and sell finished products in the country where the selling prices are highest in taking the
shipping costs into account. Furthermore, there are ordinarily different taxation system on business
activities in different countries and the extents of inflation are also different among countries. Of
course multinational enterprises must take all factors into account for world-wide profit maximization.
Consequently, they adopt transfer pricing policy in taking most advantage of these factors. By shifting
materials and finished goods around the world, they manipulate transfer prices for minimizing
corporate income tax payment.
On the other hand, accepting countries may not be able to recover funds through tax payment by
which they can fix and reproduce the damaged and amortized social capital caused by multinational
enterprises' production activities if transfer pricing policy is not interfered with even on the condition
that the economic activities of accepting countries take a turn for the better. Thus, accepting countries
naturally require the tax payment which offsets the costs which are involved in business activities of
multinational firms in accepting countries. In the 1970s we could recognize conflicts between
accepting countries and multinational firms. This is typically one of the problems concerning
multinational enterprises. In particular, developing countries having accepted multinational
firms, were seriously affected from such problems because of the large relative weight of
multinational enterprises in their economic activities(10).
Reacting to the above mentioned problems the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
established on July 28, 1972, a committee which "study the role of multinational corporations and
their impact on the process of development, especially that of the developing countries, and also their
implications for international relation,(11)" , and which draws, based on the research, the significant
conclusions and makes proper recommendations which can be referred to in each government's policy
decision(12). It was formally called the United Nations Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Role of
Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations. With regard to the
accounting information disclosure of multinational corporations, the United Nations expressed for the
first time their position in the reports [1] and [2]. The report [1] was issued as the discussion material
for the Eminent Persons' Group by the Bureau of the United Nations on August 12, 1973. The report
[2] was published by the Eminent Persons' Group itself. We will analyze the opinion of the United
Nations concerning accounting information disclosure of multinational enterprises in the earliest
period by referring to these two reports in the remainder of this section.
The report [1] reviewed both the active aspect and negative aspect of multinational corporations
from the international viewpoint in spending in their first three chapters. We can know which aspects
the United Nations considered important from the following descriptions;
The positive Contributions of multinational corporations to the many facets of development
have been readily recognized. At the same time, the problems raised have become
increasingly visible(13).
Furthermore the report said that;
The generally favorable reception given to multinational corporations in the host countries
in the immediate postwar year .... has been tempered by skepticism and concern(14).
From the beginning, the United Nations paid their attention primarily to the negative aspect of
multinational corporations. The concrete content of the negative aspect might be similar to problems
we have listed in the earlier description. The report recommended the integrative approach for
resolving these problems by saying that ;
In the search for solutions separate item-by-item or issue-by-issue approaches are not likely
to be effective(15).
The appropriate strategy for action would therefore appear to be to concentrate on the setting up of an
appropriate machinery whereby many key issues can be dealt with flexibly and simultaneously(16).
Some definite means for resolving them were also presented in the report [1], which also suggested
the position of the United Nations toward multinational corporations. The nationalization and
acquisition of multinational enterprises by the accepting countries, the contribution of capital and
acquisition of management control by accepting countries and the establishment of an organization
examining foreign direct investment by accepting countries were discussed in the report [1] (17).
The guidelines in regard to international investment proposed by the International Chamber of
Commerce were also concurrently made public as a reaction from the side of multinational enterprise.
The Chamber proposed "local equity ownership, local participation in management, and promotion of
local personnel to posts of responsibility, as well as suggestions for government behavior(18)."
By comparing the emerging real intention of the United Nations and the proposition of the
Chamber, it seems that the United Nations were apt to take a position recommending the direct
control of business over multinational enterprise. Consequently the expected function of the Centre on
Transnational Corporations, establishment of which was proposed by the report [1], was substantially
understood as collecting information for assisting direct control of business of multinational
corporations by accepting countries(19).
What kind of report did the Eminent Persons' Group prepare for answering to the report [1] ? The
report [2] was the result of discussion among eminent persons. A certain member said that " the report
[1] considerably affected the discussion among eminent persons because the report [1] reflected the
opinion of the Bureau of the United Nations as a professional group "(20). So it was probable that the
report[2] of the Eminent Persons' Group acknowledged the negative tone of the report[1] which had
been analyzed in the earlier part of this section (21). Behind the negative tone of the report[1] in this
period, we should not neglect the fact that there was a radicalism of the North-South problem in the
United Nations because of an upsurge of nationalism among developing countries which had accepted
the multinational corporations(22).
According to the summary of professor Ryutarou Komiya who was a member of the Eminent
Persons' Group, the features of the report[2] were as follows;
i) When evaluating the investments and business activities of multinational corporations in
developing countries, the prerequisite of the report[2] was the value judgement that it was
desirable to reduce the economic gap between the North and the South, in particular, to
promptly develop developing countries(23).
ii) Recognizing that multinational corporations can contribute to the development of developing
countries by using their technology, management and marketing abilities, funds and so on, the
report explores the possibility of the program that these abilities and powers of multinational
firms should be mobilized to world-wide exploitation in assuring the reasonable benefits of
interest groups concerned(24).
iii) It was emphasized that the investment of multinational corporations was apt to be accompanied
with bud influences(25).
iv) It was recommended that accepting countries should regulate investment of multinational
corporations in several manners(26).
v) Accepting countries were also required to adopt some measures for regulating accepting
countries themselves.(27)
vi) It is recognized the idea that the distributional structure of the benefits accruing from
investment of multinational enterprises and from transfer of technology should be changed for
improving the benefit of developing countries which accept multinational firms by
strengthening their negotiating powers on the condition that at present the distribution of the
benefits be conducted for the benefit of multinational enterprises and consequently to the
disadvantage of developing countries(28).
vii) The report emphasizes the international cooperative activities for regulating multinational
corporations in substitute for respective activity of each nation with respecting national
sovereignty(29).
From these features, both the report [1] and [2] have a common plan to conduct international
cooperative activities for regulating multinational enterprises in outlining the negative aspect of their
business activities. Furthermore, these reports have the intention to control directly business of
international firms for the benefit of developing countries even if total economic efficiency would be
sacrificed. As one step for achieving this end, the Eminent Persons' Group recommended the
establishment of both the Commission on Transnational Corporations and the Centre on Transnational
Corporations for the purpose of discussing some issues and collecting information on transnational
corporations. But we must confirm here that establishing these two organizations is "a kind of
temporary action easy to be supported by many countries "(30) and that;
Immediate steps can be taken in the short run where a consensus is found to exist, and at the
same time a start can be made toward longer-run measures that will demand further
investigation and negotiation(31).
In other words, these organizations are expected to function supplementarily to essential
policy, that is, direct control of business activities of multinational corporations by developing
countries which are the majority in the United Nations. In consequence, it seems that the collection of
information -- the (accounting) information disclosure from the viewpoint of transnational
corporations -- should be supplementary means for assisting developing countries to control activities
of multinational firms for their own interests.
In this section we surveyed the position of the United Nations in the earliest period concerning
multinational enterprise, in particular, the characterization by the United Nations of information
disclosure of multinational enterprise. It was expected to function as a supplementary measure for
direct control of business activities of multinational corporations. But before long, the information
disclosure would become the main and unique policy that the United Nations could in reality employ
for regulating multinational firms. In the next section we analyze the changing process of the United
Nations' position regarding transnational corporations by referring to some reports issued subsequent
to the reports [1] [2].
III Development of Accounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprises
The next task for the United Nations, subsequent to establishment of administrative organizations,
was drafting and formulating "the Standards for Conduct of Transnational Corporations". The
formulating process was made public in some reports[3] and were also commented on by many
researchers(32). At the same time, it was established the Group of Experts on International Standards of
Accounting and Reporting in 1976 for studying the accounting information disclosure of
multinational corporations. This organization published the report [7] accompanying with the
report[6] issued by the Commission on Transnational Corporations. The centre on Transnational
Corporations also published the reports[4] and [5] which were drafted for discussion by the Group of
Expert and the Commission. In this section we focus on surveying these four reports [4][5][6][7] to
know the changing position of the United Nations concerning the accounting information
disclosure of transnational corporations.
Before surveying the four reports, we must take into consideration the fact that for reacting to the
position of the United Nations, the OECD of which member countries are mother countries of
multinational corporations, quickly disclosed the guideline for behavior of multinational
corporations -- with the formal title, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 1976 --
which corresponded to the "the Standards for Conduct of Transnational Corporations" of the United
Nations. The guideline provided for the provision concerning the accounting information disclosure of
multinational corporations. We cited the provision in the following(33);
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (OECD)Extract
Information Disclosure
Enterprises should, having due regard to their nature and relative size in the economic
context of their operations and to requirements of business confidentiality and to cost,
publish in a form suited to improve public understanding a sufficient body of factual
information on the structure, activities and policies of the enterprise as a whole, as a
supplement, in so far as necessary for this purpose, to information to be disclosed under
the national law of the individual countries in which they operate. To this end, they should
publish within reasonable time limits, on a regular basis, but at least annually, financial
statements, and other pertinent information relating to the enterprise as a whole,
comprising in particular:
i) the structure of the enterprise, shoeing the name and location of the parent company, its
main affiliates, its percentage ownership, direct and indirect, in these affiliates,
including shareholdings between them;
ii) the geographical areas where operations are carried out and the principal activities
carried on therein by the parent company and the main affiliates;
iii) the operating results and sales by geographical area and the sales in the major lines of
business for the enterprises a whole;
iv) significant new capital investment by geographical area and, as far as practicable, by
major lines of business for the enterprise as a whole;
V) a statement of the sources and uses of funds by the enterprise as a whole;
vi) the average number of employees in each geographical area;
vii) research and development expenditure for the enterprise as a whole;
viii) the policies followed in respect of intra-group pricing
ix) the accounting policies, including those on consolidation, observed in compiling the
published information. ( footnote ommitted)
In the sentences the OECD clearly expressed its position regarding the accounting information
disclosure of multinational corporations by saying that " ( accounting information disclosure should
be conducted) ...only for improving the comprehension of the public to multinational
corporations." The position of the OECD is definitely different from the one taken by the United
Nations. As the latter understood the accounting information disclosure of multinational corporations
as the supplementary means for directly controling business activities of multinational corporations
by developing countries, so the former considered the accounting information disclosure only as a
measure for improving the awareness of the public in the developing countries. In my opinion,
approaches taken by the two international organizations to the accounting information disclosure are
completely different from each other. But we make here, only confirmation that there are two different
approaches, in other words, two different ways of understanding with regard to the accounting
information disclosure. A complete discussion will be offered in the latter part of this paper. Needless
to say, however, my opinion has already been suggested in the previous chapter.
Returning our attention to the latter four reports of the United Nations, there have already emerged
the above-mentioned two approaches even in their descriptions. For example, the report[6] made the
statement that the information disclosure should contribute to the following three purposes(34). These
purposes were originally recognized as purposes of the Commission on Transnational Corporations
itself in 1975.
(a) To further understanding of the nature and the political, legal, economic and social
effects of the activities of transnational corporations in home countries and host
countries, and in international relations, particularly between developed and developing
countries;
(b) To secure effective international arrangements for the operation of transnational
corporations designed to promote their contribution to national developmental goals and
world economic growth while controlling and eliminating their negative effects;
(c) To strengthen the negotiating capability of host countries, in particular the developing
countries, in their dealing with transnational corporations.
These purposes of information disclosure appeared to be succeeded to report[7]. The purpose (a)
would be the result in which the United Nations sufficiently reflected the position of the OECD. In
contrast, purposes (b) and (c) were closely related to the interests and position of developing
countries.
The information content required by these reports [5][6][7] can be characterized as the greatest
common divisor of the international questionnaire concerning contemporary accounting
practices for multinational corporations(35).
The report [5] consists of three subreports. The first subreport includes a minimum list of
accounting items which should be disclosed by multinational corporations. This list is divided into
five parts (A-E) in which information items are described in detail. Part A includes some important
accounts of financial statements. Part B is related to disclosure of accounting policies, and Part C
treats the information of multinational corporations and of their subsidiaries. The segment report by
geographical areas and the segment report by industries are referred to in Part D and Part E is
concerned with some items in non-financial reporting. The titles of the five parts are as follows(36);
Minimum List
of International Standards of Accounting and Reporting
for Transnational Corporations, 1977.________________________________________________________
A. Main items in financial statements
BALANCE SHEET
Long-term assets
Current assets
Long-term liabilities
Current liabilities
Other liabilities and provisions
Shareholders' equity
Balance sheet foot-notes
INCOME STATEMENT
Revenue
Costs and expenses
Net income
Income statement foot-notes
STATEMENT OF SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
B. Disclosure of accounting policies
C. Financial information on members of a transnational corporation group
D. Reporting on segments of a transnational corporation
Segmentation by geographical areas
Segmentation by industries
E. Some items in non-financial reporting
________________________________________________________
The report [6] lists information items in four (A-D) parts. The first category treats main items of
information on individual transnational corporations and their affiliates. Forty-one items of
information including name of corporation, organization, accounting information and financial ratio
are listed. The second is concerned with main items of information on laws, regulations and policies
relating to transnational corporations. These items number a total of twelve. The third is on main
items of information about contracts and agreements between transnational corporations and host
country entities. The fourth treats main items of bibliographical and documentary information. We
show four categories as follows(37);
List of Information Items
in Development of an Information System, 1977
________________________________________________________
SOME MAIN ITEMS OF INFORMATION
A. Some main items of information on individual transnational corporations (and their
affiliates)
B. Some main items of information on laws, regulations and policies relating to
transnational corporations
The law
Definitions in national legislation
Administration of foreign direct investment
Establishment of foreign enterprise
Investment guarantees
Ownership and managerial control
Finance
Transfer of technology
Employment
Competition laws and regulations
Corporate taxation
Information and supervision
C. Some main items of information contracts and agreements between transnational
corporations and host country entities
Type of arrangement
Parties to an arrangement
Economic sector
Main clauses
D. Some main items of bibliographical and documentary information
1 Conceptual and definitional questions and general
2 Explanations of foreign direct investment and management and
organization (including textbooks on international business)
3 Data and information on individual enterprises
4 Aggregate (statistical) data and information on transnationalcorporation
activities : size, growth, distribution, characteristics, trends(including country
case studies)
5 The role of transnational corporations in individual economic sectors (see 7 for
impact)
6 The role of transnational corporations in individual countries,regions and the
internal system (see 7 for impact)
7 The impact of transnational corporations
8 Transnational corporations and other actors
9 Technical assistance
________________________________________________________
The report [7] classifies information items to be disclosed into two classes. Items in one class are for
general purpose reporting. Furthermore these items are divided into financial information and non-
financial information. Items in the other class are for special purpose reporting. The latter parts treat
the user, purpose and confidentiality with regard to the special reporting of transnational corporations.
The former class is shown in the following(38);
List of Information Items inInternational Standards of Accounting and Reporting
for Transnational Corporations, 1978
__________________________________________________________________
Part 1. Financial Information
SECTION A. ENTERPRISE AS A WHOLE
List of minimum items for general purpose reporting in financial statements of a
transnational corporation
1. Main items in financial statements
BALANCE-SHEET
Long-term assets
Current assets
Total assets
Long-term liabilities
Current liabilities
Other liabilities and provisions
Minority interests
Shareholders' equity
Total shareholders' equity
Balance-sheet foot-notes
PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT
Sales
Gross profit
Interest and investment income
Equity in income(profit and loss) of associated companies
Depreciation
Amortization of intangibles
Interest expense
Taxes on income
Unusual charges and credits(describe)
Minority interest in income of group companies consolidated
Net income
Profit and loss statement foot-notes
STATEMENT OF SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
(Not applicable to banks)
2. Disclosure of accounting policies
3. Information concerning members of a group and associated companies
4. Segmentation by geographical area
Segment and disclose geographically
To the extent identifiable with a geographical area, disclose
5. Segmentation by line of business
Segment and disclose by line of business
To the extent identifiable with a line of business, disclose
SECTION B. INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COMPANY
1. Main items in financial statements
BALANCE-SHEET
PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT
STATEMENT OF SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
2. Disclosure of accounting policies
3. Financial information on members of a group of companies
4. Disclosure of foreign assets
5. Segmentation by line of business
PART II. NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION
SECTION A. ENTERPRISE AS A WHOLE
List of minimum items for general purpose reporting of a transnational corporation
1. Labour and employment
2. Production
3. Investment programme
4. Organizational structure
5. Environmental measures
SECTION B. INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COMPANY
1. Labour and employment
2. Production
3. Investment programme
4. Organizational structure
5. Environmental measures
__________________________________________________________________
These three reports require commonly disclosure of minimum items of accounting and non-
accounting information as the greatest common divider, although the ways of classification differ
from each other. It seems that the amount of items of information is very large. The reason of the large
number of information items, in particular, of non-accounting information items, must come from the
United Nations' motivation that these should be employed in developing and accepting countries to
regulate transnational corporations in spite of the wording of the purpose (a) in the report [6] (39). In
this stage, the United Nations is paying attention both to a position that accounting information
disclosure should be used to obtain the understanding of the public in developing and accepting
countries and to the other position that it should be used as a supplementary measure to regulate
directly business activities of transnational corporations.
But the United Nations changed their position toward transnational corporations since issuing the
report [8] in 1978 which is the revised version of the report [1]. This means that the United Nations
began to take a cooperative attitude toward multinational corporations in substitute of an aggressive
attitude. For example, The report says that;
Its central theme is not so much whether transnational corporations have, on balance,
exerted positive or negative effects in the past, but whether, how what directions their
activities might be moulded or channelled to bring about positive effects in the future(40).
It can be understood that the change in attitude of the United Nations reflects the change in attitude of
developing countries since the trend of the United Nations is usually affected by developing countries.
The change could also be reflected in the position of the United Nations regarding accounting
information disclosure. The report also says that;
The monitoring of changes of this kind by Governments in developing countries may be
seen as a countervailing force that can offset the tendency of transnational corporations to
pursue goals which may conflict with national goals, or the non-implementations of agreed
terms and conditions, such as the development of local sources of supply or the opening up
of export markets. .... Such an administration cannot, of course, be built up
overnight, ....(41).
Judging from the sentence, the United Nations begin to be negative in adopting the monitoring system
of multinational corporations by using accounting information disclosure. Professor Kojima predicted
in 1978 that the United Nations would begin to require only the extent of accounting information
disclosure conducted in stockholder meetings of the mother country by a multinational corporation in
substitute of requiring accounting information for exposing problems, in other words, for direct
control of business activities. He also asserted that such change should be welcomed as an escape
from "collecting information without purposes."(42)
Does the relaxing of United Nations trends contribute to the formulation of international standards
concerning accounting information disclosure? Changing to the cooperative attitude of developing
countries means that they begin to take advantage of multinational corporations. Moreover, their
taking advantage of multinational corporations means that they accepted the accounting information
disclosure of multinational corporations as a means of persuading them or of checking business
activities of multinational corporations and also means that they abandoned the function of accounting
information disclosure as aiding for direct control of business activities of multinational corporations.
Does this change in attitude make sense for developing countries? Is it possible for developing
countries to employ the accounting information disclosure only as checking and watching the business
activities of multinational corporations? For answering these questions we should survey the reports
published by the United Nations since 1978.
IV Turn of Accounting Information Disclosure of Multinational Enterprise
In the previous two sections, we looked to the fact that two different views of function were
mingled in the reports of the United Nations and other international organizations with regard to
the accounting information disclosure conducted by multinational enterprises. If we can be permitted
to repeat, one is that the accounting information disclosure would be used to regulate and control
multinational enterprise. The other is that it would be employed to increase the understanding of the
public in accepting countries. As we have already mentioned, the United Nations began to approach
the latter view in report [8]. Now we look to how the view of the United Nations would be developed
after issuing the report [8].
In 1979, the Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations [9] was drafted and published in
considering both the different opinions developed in report [3] and the changing view in report [8]
into account. Section 43 in report[9] was devoted to the accounting information disclosure of
multinational corporations as follows(43);
43. Transnational corporations should, within reasonable time-limits and on a regular basis,
but at least annually, provide to the public in the countries in which they operate, clear and
comprehensible information designed to improve understanding of the structure, activities
and policies of the transnational corporation as a whole.
Though judging from the cited sentences, a great amount of information would be expected to be
disclosed, we must pay attention to the sentence ; " citation ". It could be understood that the
unique purpose of accounting information disclosure in the report was obtaining the understanding of
the public in accepting and developing countries concerning business activities of multinational
enterprises. The change in view of accounting information disclosure reflects the fact that the United
Nations have still taken the cooperative attitude toward transnational enterprise.
Subsequently, reports [10][11] were made public at the beginning of the 1980s. We continue to
survey them. Report [10] was published as an intermediate report by the Experts' Group in the
Commission on Transnational Corporations(44) in answering the above-cited Section 43(45) and report
[7]. Five tasks (referred as a - e )were carried out in report[10]. First task (a) was a comment on the
Section 43 of report[9](46). According to report[10], some member countries asserted that the
following clauses should be added to section 43 in the Code of Conduct in contrast to the fact that
section 43 was content with the extent of accounting information disclosure offerring understanding
of the public in accepting countries(47);
(a) Transnational corporations should, at least annually, give a clear statement that they had
not, during the period they are reporting about, been involved in any illegal act in the
countries in which they operate, directly or indirectly, and that they are abiding by the laws
of the country of origin and the countries in which they operate and the International Code
of Conduct;
(b) The report should include a statement by the corporation on its activity, where appropriate,
in the field of transfer of technology to the developing countries, especially the countries in
which it operates.
This assertion can be understood as a kind of criticism from developing countries to the United
Nations which began to take a cooperative attitude toward multinational enterprises, that is, to take the
side of developed countries since the end of the 1970s. Such critical spirit can be recognized in the
second task reexamining the minimum list of information items listed in report [7]. For example,
some countries insisted that some additional items of information should be prepared for obtaining the
true and fair view of business activities of multinational corporations. Other countries asserted that it
would be enough for multinational corporations to disclose only information for providing complete
and correct financial information(48). The conflict between developing countries and developed
countries can be clearly recognized in the discussion. But we can not help having an impression that
the change in view and attitude of the United Nations is decisive so that the assertion of developing
countries was inserted only as a reference.
Next we briefly make a survey of report [11]. The report was issued by the Centre on Transnational
Corporations for surveying previously differing views and their development concerning the
(accounting) information disclosure. After all we must focus our attention on the viewpoint adopted
by the Centre when surveying the development. The Centre characterized the previous efforts and
research on accounting information disclosure of multinational corporations conducted by some
international organizations as the process of adjusting and of integrating internationally different
accounting and reporting standards and techniques. But as we have already noticed, basic
problem of accounting information disclosure of multinational enterprises colored by the North-South
problem can not be resolved by the adjustment or integration of accounting standards and techniques.
We think that whether the modern accounting information disclosure can function effectively or not in
a certain socio-economic condition does not depend on accounting standards and techniques or on
their integration. The Centre, however, took the position that the disclosure problem could be resolved
by the integration of different accounting standards and techniques. This means ultimately that the
Centre took the position that the problem of information disclosure would be a kind of technical
problem so that it could be resolved by techniacl adjustment and integration. Then the extent of
accounting information disclosure provided by the integrated accounting standards, will be formally
accepted by the United Nations. And this integration will be carried by developed countries which are
also mother countries of multinational corporations. This must be an extension of the position taken
for the first time in report [7].
After report[11], we had two revisions of report [1] as [12] and [14]. Ad Hoc Intergovernmental
Working Group also published the report [13]. From report [12], It can be recognized that to
encourage transnational corporations to extend their business to developing countries became
serious problem than to regulate them in developing countries because they changed their investment
policies as follows(49);
The decline of in the efforts which transnational corporations are devoting to the exploration and
development of petroleum and gas resources in developing countries is a matter of serious concern
not only to there countries but to the international community as a whole. The leading
transnational corporations have redirected their investments toward locations that they
consider to be least exposed to risk.
In such situations, the regulation of multinational corporations by accounting information
disclosure cannot be a main concern even to developing countires which have kept employment in
their countries and have intended to develop themselves by taking advantage of the economic powers
of multinational corporations. Thus report [13] throughout discusses the general reporting purpose
of accounting information, although it continuously lists numerous information items as a relic of
the past.
In the next section, we analyze the information disclosure problem of multinational corporations
from the viewpoint confirmed in the previous chapter, which will suggest essentially the direction of
resolution.
V Some Emerging Issues — Conclusion —
The United Nations came to adopt the view of function regarding accounting information
disclosure, that it aids the public of developing countries in understanding and watching
business activities of multinational corporations, which is similar to the contemporary function of
accounting information disclosure in developed countries. In Japan, a business man similarly asserted
that "multinational enterprises of the Western countries publicize skillfully that they contribute to the
governments and industries of accepting countries by using their annual reports. .... In contrast,
Japanese multinational corporations do not recognize the importance of international information
disclosure and they have poor industrial relations so that even relatively large international
corporations of Japan do not publish annual reports at present. ... They must continue to make efforts
to satisfy the discontent of accepting countries by disclosing this information(50)." In his opinion, it is
also understood that information disclosure would aid in allaying discontent. In other words, his
opinion is exactly the same as the opinion of the United Nations that it is useful for increasing the
understanding of the public of accepting countries.
Furthermore, both Professor Ryutarou Komiya and Professor Kiyoshi Kojima evaluate such a
cooperative position on the basis of the cost-benefit analysis that unnecessary and excess information
disclosure should be avoided.
But we should here reiterate the problem if it is possible that the accounting information disclosure
functions as a means to persuade and to appease the public in developing countries, in other words as
a means to check and to watch the activities of big businesses from the viewpoint of the public, which
recently have become dominant and a popular phenomenon even in developed countries other than
the United States. Of course, the United States exceptionally has a long history of modern accounting
information disclosure. In the remainder of this section, we point out the conditions of assuring the
persuading and watching function of accounting information disclosure to testify if such conditions
are met by developing and accepting countries.
As we have already analyzed in the previous chapter, it was necessary for a economic society to
employ accounting information disclosure both as a checking function for the public and as an
appeasing function from big business to meet some socio-economic conditions. First, industries in the
society should be monopolized or oligopolized so that they adopt cooperative and democratic
management policy. Second, there should exist several sufficiently organized interest groups
surrounding big businesses. Third, there should exist a democratic ideology and tradition in the
society concerned. Last, two conditions can be integrated into one condition of establishing a mass-
democratic society. To describe more fully, the public should be sufficiently organized to demand
their own interests to big business and to their government in the democratic manner. In this process,
the public require the accounting information disclosure of big corporations for aiding them in
obtaining the exact information on business results of big businesses while the big businesses disclose
their accounting information for appeasing the public. And there should exist social value recognition
which affirms such democratic negotiation process. But we can not think that there have already
appeared such socio-economic structures in developing countries. We think that the rise of
nationalism in developing countries based on the tendency of anti-multinational corporations is
completely different from the criticism toward big business in a mass-democratic society usually
observable in developed capitalistic countries. Then the accounting information disclosure of
multinational corporations in developing countries is useful only as a supplementary means for
direct control of business activities of multinational corporations, otherwise this procedure is
useless for the public of developing countries.
According to the lesson drawn from American accounting history, in particular, from American
railroad regulation in the nineteenth century, it can be said to be impossible in developing countries to
realize the social mechanism in which the improvement of understanding of the public and the
dissolution of economic conflict between the public of developing countries and multinational
corporations are expected to be reached by using accounting information disclosure. Such social
mechanisms can be realized only in a special economic society which has already reached a certain
level of industrialization and has a common social value recognition of democracy. This can not be
universally realized at the present time. Nonetheless, if someone asserts that accounting information
disclosure can be used as dissolving economic conflict between multinational enterprises and
developing countries, he says this only as an excuse from the viewpoint of multinational enterprise.
If we are permitted to use analogy, developing countries can follow the way taken by the state of
Illinois in the nineteenth century when it regulated the railroad corporations. They can not follow the
way of the state of Massachusetts. If they desire to more realistically follow the way taken by the state
of Wisconsin or some other Mid-Western states in the latter half of the 1870s, they should, first of all,
industrialize their own countries. They can not do it by using accounting information disclosure of
multinational corporations.
When we think of the difficulties involved in accounting information disclosure in developing
countries, we can not help but consider the difficulties involved in the integration of different
accounting standards and techniques.
Finally, we should add that our viewpoint and methodology will be useful for analyzing the validity
of accounting information disclosure conducted in partly democratized East European countries.
Notes
(1) The definition of multinational corporation or transnational corporation has very variety. But
we adopt the definition of the United Nations in this paper. The difficulties involved in
defining multinational corporation were described in Chapter 1 of [1] or Ryutarou Komiya, "
Takokuseki Kigyou to Teikaihatsu Koku -- Kokuren Kenkyu Guruupu no Houkokusyo wo
Megutte --," Keizaigaku Ronsyu, Vol.40 No.3 ( October,1974), pp.5-7.
(2) Tadakatsu Inoue, " "
(3) D.A.Heenan and H.V.Perlmutter, Multinational Organization Development, Addison-Wesley Pu.
Co., Massachusetts, 1979, Chapter 1.
(4) Notorious cases among developed countries are as follows: Crysler took over Cimca in 1963 in
France; G.M. took over Machine Pull in 1963. The notorious case between developed and
developing countries is the case in which I.T.T. of the United States intervened in the election of
the presidency in Chili in 1970. Hiroshi Fukuda ed., Takokuseki Kigyou no Koudou Shishin,
1976, Chapter 2, and Ryutarou Komiya, op.cit., footnote(4) pp.3-4.
(5) Nippon Ginkou, Cyousa Toukei Kyoku, Cyousa Geppou, October,1977, p.16.
(6) [1] p.7.
(7) [1] p.7.
(8) Hiroshi Fukuda, op.cit., pp.62-63.
(9) Professor Komiya points out that the effect of multinational corporations on international trade
has not been empirically studied and has been emotionally criticized. Ryutarou Komiya, op.cit.,
pp.24- 26.
(10) The problem of income division extends to the problems of transfer of profits to mother countries
and of royalty in transfering technology.
There did not exist any theoretical approach toward the problem of why large corporations in
developed capitalistic countries go abroad by themselves rather than selling production
technology and why accepting countries necessarily suffer from disadvantages. An
exceptional research was done by P.J.Buckley and M.Casson, The Future of the Multinational
Enterprise, The Macmillan Press, London, in which they asserted that large corporations went
abroad with production know- how to avoid inefficiency of market, subsequently, to internalize
markets concerned. This assertion is compatible with the one made by A.D.Chandler,Jr. in the
field of business administration. Conversely, accepting countries can not in reality utilize the
production technology which might have became free because of economic externality if the
technology had been traded in market.
(11) [2],p.1.
(12) The formal name of the group is the United Nations Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Role
of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations.
(13) [1],p.85.
(14) [1],p.85.
(15) [1],p.85.
(16) [1],p.86.
(17) [1],p.87.
(18) [1],p.86.
(19) [1],p.98.
(20) Ryutarou Komiya, op.cit., p.4
(21) Ibid.,p.11.
(22) Ibid., pp.2-3. See also p.11 in [2] " The World Perspective ", which seems to take the side of the
South in considering the North-South problem into account.
(23) Ryutarou Komiya, op.cit., p.11.
(24) Ibid., p.12.(25) Ibid., p.13.(26) Ibid., p.14.(27) Ibid., p.16.(28) Ibid., p.16.(29) Ibid., p.17.(30)
Ibid., p.17.(31) [1], Introdictin, p.xiv.
(32) For example, see the following papers; Kiyoshi Kojima, "Kokuren no 'Takokuseki Kigyou
Koudou Kihan' " Sekai Keizai Hyouron, Vol.21,No.8 (August, 1977), Kenji Kojima, " Zoku
'Takokuseki Kigyou Koudou Kihan' Zukuri," Sekai Keizai Hyouron, Vol.22, No.6 (June,1978).
(33) OECD, International Investment And Multinational Enterprises, 1976, pp.14-15.
(34) [6],p.3.
(35) The report [4] is the result of a questionnaire covering foreign multinational enterprises in
accepting countries and multinational enterprises in mother countries, which may affected the
information items selected as items of minimum list.
(36) [5],pp.13-23.
(37) [6], Annex I,p.1.
(38) [7], pp.58-75.
(39) There may be some issues concerning the selection of accounting information items. The result
of the questionnaire presented in [4] was provided by the Price Waterhouse Accounting Firm.
How can be it useful to disclose accounting information in developing countries which is
useful in developed countries ? The probelm is not discussed anywhere.
(40) [8],p.4.
(41) [8],p.141.
(42)Kenji Kojima, " Zoku 'Takokuseki Kigyou Koudou Kihan' Zukuri,", p.20.(43) [9],p.7.
(44) This group was established in 1979 by the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations.
The formal name is the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on
International Standards of Accounting and Reporting.
(45) After publication of the report, the section 43 was slightly revised in the part following the
second clause.
(46) [10],p.5.
(47) [10],Annex II,p.4.
(48) [10],p.7.
(49) [12],p.8.
(50) Michio Houjou, " Kokusai Kigyou Katsudou to kigyou no Jouhou Koukai, Jurisuto, No.703,
( November 1, 1979),p.39.
Reports of The United Nations
[1] United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development, New York,1973(ST/ECA/190).
[2] Economic and Social Council, The Impact of Multinational Corpo- rations on the DevelopmentProcess and on International Relations. Report of the Secretary-General (E/5500, 14 June1974). Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Role of Multinational Corporationson Development and on International Relations, 1/2/ (E/5500/Add.1 (Part I), 24, May, 1974),(E/5500/Add.1 (Part II) 12 June 1974).
[3] Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations: Issues Involved in theFormulation of a Conduct, (E/C 10/17 June 1976). Related Materials; (E/C 10/18)(E/C 10/19)(E/C10/20) 1976, (E/C 10/30)(E/C 10/31)(E/C 10/33)(E/6006)(E/C 10/AC, 2/3) 1977, (E/C 10/AC2/3) 1978.
[4] Commission on Transnational Corporations, Information on Transnational Corporations, (E/C10/11 and Add.1), 1976.
[5] Centre on Transnational Corporations, Technical Papers : Inter- national Standards ofAccounting and Reporting for Transnational Corporations, (ST/CTC/5), 1977, Which contains
i) Towards International Standards of Accounting and Reporting for Transnational Corporations.ii) International Standards of Accounting and Reporting.iii) Some Aspects of Corporate Accounting and Reporting of Special Interest to Developing Host
Countries.[6]Commission on Transnational Corporations, Development of an Information System. Progress
Report of the Secretariat,(E/C 10/283/March 1977).[7] Commission on Transnational Corporations, International Standards of Accounting and
Reporting for Transnational Corporations, Report of the Secretary-General Report of the Groupof Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting, (E/C 10/33),1978.
[8] Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in Word Development Re-examined, Unedited Version, 1978.
[9] Outcome ofthe Seventh Session of the Intergovenmental Working Group on a Code of ConductTransnational Corporations : Code of Conduct ; Formulation by the Chairman", CTC Reporter,Vol.I, No.6, (April, 1979).
[10]Commission on Transnational Corporations, Comprehensive Informa- tionSystem :Internatinal Standards of Accounting and Reporting, Report of the Ad HocIntergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting andReporting on its first, second, third, and fourth sessions. (E/C 10/81, 27 May 1981).
[11]Centre on Transnational Corporations, Towards International Standardization ofCorporate Accounting and Reporting, (S/CTC/30), 1982.
[12]Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World Development, ThirdSurvey, 1983.
[13]Centre on Transnational Corporations, International Standards of Accounting and Reporting,Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards ofAccounting and Reporting, 1984.
[14]Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World Development, Trendsand Prospects, Fourth Survey, 1988.
[15]Report of Intergovernmental Working Group of experts on International Standards of Accountingand Reporting(1982 established).
Chapter ThreeGeneral Conclusion
Adaptation of Accounting Information Disclosure to Problem of MultinationalCorporations
We should here reiterate the problem if it is possible that the accounting information disclosure
functions as a means to persuade and to appease the public in developing countries, in other words as
ameans to check and to watch the activities of big businesses from the viewpoint of the public, which
recently have become dominant and a popular phenomenon even in developed countries other than
the United States. Of course, the United States exceptionally has a long history of models accounting
information disclosure. In the remainder of this section, we point out the conditions of assuring the
persuading and watching function of accounting information disclosure to testify if such conditions
are met by developing and accepting countries.
As we have already analyzed in the first chapter, it was necessary for a economic society to meet
some socio-economic conditions when it intended to use accounting information disclosure both as a
checking function for the public and as an appeasing function from big business. First, industries in
the society should be monopolized or oligopolized so that they adopt cooperative and democratic
management policy. Second, there should exist several sufficiently organized interest groups
surrounding big businesses. Third, there should exist a democratic ideology and tradition in the
society concerned. Last, two conditions can be integrated into one condition of establishing a mass-
democratic society,. To describe more fully, the public should be sufficiently organized to demand
their own interests to big business and to their government in the democratic manner. In this process,
the public require the accounting information disclosure of big corporations for aiding them in
obtaining the exact information on business results of big businesses while the big businesses disclose
thew accounting information for appeasing the public. And there should east social value recognition
which affirms such democratic negotiation process. But we can not think that there have already
appeared such socio-economic structures in developing countries. We think that the rise of
nationalism in developing countries based on the tendency of anti- multinational corporations is
completely different from the criticism toward big business in a mass - democratic society usually
observable in developed capitalistic countries. Then the accounting information disclosure of
multinational corporations in developing countries is useful only as a supplementary means for direct
control of business activities of multinational corporations, otherwise this procedure is useless for the
public of developing countries. According to the lesson drawn from American accounting history, in
particular, from American railroad regulation in the nineteenth century, it can be said to be impossible
in developing countries to realize the social mechanism in which the improvement of understanding
of the public and the dissolution of economic convict between the public of developing counties and
multinational corpora6ons are expected to be reached by using accounting information disclosure.
Such social mechanisms can be realized only in a special economic society which has already reached
a certain level of industrialization and has a common social value recognition of democracy, This can
not be universally realized at the present time. Nonetheless, if someone asserts that accounting
information disclosure can be used as dissolving economic convict between multinational enterprises
and developing countries, he says this only as an excuse from the viewpoint of multinational
enterprise.
If we are permitted to use analogy, developing countries can follow the way taken by the state of
Illinois in the nineteenth century when it regulated the railroad corporations. They can not follow the
way of the state of Massachusetts. If they desire to more realistically follow the way taken by the state
of Wisconsin or some other Mid- Western states in the latter half of the 1870s, they should, first of all,
industrialize their own countries. They can not do it by using accounting information disclosure of
multinational corporations.
Finally, we should add that our viewpoint and methodology will be useful for analysing the validity
of accounting information disclosure conducted in partly democratized East European countries.
Adoption of Commission System by the United Nations
As we have already said, the commission system appeared based on both the democratic social
environment and the origopolitic economic environment. In particular, this system was usually in the
United States accompanied with accounting information disclosure, because the latter reflected the
ideal of democracy as assuring the publicity of big organizations. It functioned like sunshine. And we
drew the conclusion that the real function of the commission system was avoiding the polarized and
extreme solution toward the economic problems concerned by employing accounting information
disclosure. But as such function was soundly conducted only in the specified economic and social
situation, so accounting information disclosure functioned only in the Emoted situation.
Then, does there emerge the special economic and social situation in developing countries in which
multinational corporations operate? And much more important, does the situation surrounding the
united Nations meet the special requirements specified in the first chapter? The most harmful factor
for the commission system accompanying with accounting information disclosure must be the
polarization in non-democratic society and organization which leads to a catastrophic solution of the
problem concerned.
Considering the above-mentioned requirements into account, we cannot help drawing the
conclusion that the accounting information disclosure system or the commission system
accompanying with it is not essentially suitable for solving the problems which were caused by
multinational corporations in developing countries and subsequently were colored by the North-South
problem.