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C© 2013 The Historical Society and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Cody Jame s Foster
A Forgotten Catalyst: HerbertHoover and the Creation of the
Modern AmericanPost-Presidency
A CHINESE HOME is engulfed in flames and on the verge of collapse while
the lives of four children hang in the balance. Thousands of Americans sit
at the edge of their seats in silence, awaiting details from their 1938 Fire-
stone table radios. They hear a crowd gathering to witness the conflagration
that threatens to raze the house at any moment. From within the crowd, a
mysterious man’s voice can be heard. “Please let me through here, will you?”
he demands, pushing through surrounding soldiers, “I’ve got to get into that
house. There are kids crying in there.” “Those Americans are crazy,” one
soldier remarks to another as the mystery man leaps into the treacherous
home, “will you look at him dive right into those flames?” Smoke bellows
out of nearly every crevice of the home as American listeners eagerly await a
report on their fellow American. After what seems to be an eternity, the gath-
ering crowd announces the appearance of the man emerging from a cloud
of smoke. “He’s got something,” someone announces as soldiers rush to the
I wish to thank the Ronald E. McNair Scholars Program, my advisor Dr. Nick Cullather, agenerous grant from the Hutton Honors College, the archivists at the Herbert Hoover Presiden-tial Library, Scott Hovey, and the Journal of the Historical Society reviewers for their excellentcontributions to this paper.
The Journal of The Historical Society XIII:1 March 2013 69
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man’s side. The spectators and listeners soon learn that the “crazy Ameri-
can” saved two Chinese children from what might have become a tomb of
ashes. The man then dashes back into the house to save two more children.
With the fire appearing less menacing, the man approaches the homeowner.
“How can I ever thank . . . . tell me . . . who are you?” the homeowner de-
mands. “My name is”—the voice actor pauses to allow the suspense to
build—“Herbert Hoover.” The announcer of the syndicated radio show
then intones the familiar catchphrase: “Believe it or not!”1
Hoover’s paradoxical life gave Robert Ripley the material required to
entertain his audiences with such an unbelievable story. Ripley found that
the disparity between what mankind was willing to believe and what could
seduce our curiosity was just enough to keep those who would listen around
for more. Surely nobody believes that saving the lives of children is really
that baffling. Instead, the story challenged the public’s perception of a pres-
ident who left public office in the shadow of disgrace after he failed to end
the Great Depression. It proposed that the man behind the presidency was
compassionate, selfless, and benevolent. It captured Hoover’s philosophy of
never leaving a man to care for himself during moments of desperation.2
It called into question how a man could win the presidency in a landslide
and then garner such deeply rooted public dissatisfaction during his term
of office, while winning the highest accolades for his service outside of the
White House. The public struggled to understand the dissonances between
Hoover the man and Hoover the president.
He first became a defender of the needy when he fought against the “Four
Horsemen” of “war, famine, pestilence and death,” during World War I by
providing food to the hungry as director of the American Relief Administra-
tion, encouraging reconstruction efforts in postwar Europe, and addressing
the need for a permanent peace.3 This overarching humanitarianism testi-
fied to a strong sense of responsibility toward mankind. Guided by “ordered
1“Ripley’s Believe It or Not Script, Final Version,” April 26, 1938, Folder 9, HP-PPS 92,Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, West Branch, Iowa (hereafter HHPL).
2Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 10.3Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874–1920 (New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1951), 149; “Hoover Sees Peril of ‘Five Horsemen,’” NewYork Times, February 24, 1939, 1.
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A Forgotten Catalyst
liberty, freedom, and equal opportunity to the individual,” Hoover sought
to improve humanity through individual initiative and voluntarist organi-
zation.4 This philosophy evolved into an associational ideology that shaped
his outlook and guided much of his public life from the Woodrow Wilson
administration to his death in 1964.
Alexis de Tocqueville first acknowledged the role of civil associations in
modern democracies and their ability to inspire individualism through de-
centralized networks.5 Rather more recently, Andrew J. Polsky and Olesya
Tkacheva connected this idea to Hoover’s preference for government decen-
tralization in favor of business and volunteer-based initiatives. They argued
that Hoover sought to pursue greater economic efficiency by enhancing the
role of the private sector while decreasing the presence of the government.6
This is not to argue that Hoover wanted to eliminate the government, but
that he wanted it to cooperate with volunteer-based initiatives as a regu-
latory agent instead of an interventionist one. Over the course of his post-
presidency, his views evolved in a way that opened new opportunities for
his post-presidential career.
As he became a fervent opponent to the New Deal, Hoover’s evolving
associationalism encouraged a redefinition of the post-presidency to fit the
modern era by adding a humanitarian component, specifically while work-
ing as a citizen-diplomat within the realm of US foreign policy. In a world
tormented by wars, famine, and the disruptive byproducts of industrializa-
tion and modernization, Hoover utilized the post-presidential platform to
benefit humanity in ways that differed from those of his ex-presidential pre-
decessors. As an ex-president, Hoover found that he could use his status as
an international figure to engage in a more widespread humanitarianism,
4Herbert Hoover, “Principles and Ideals of the United States Government,” The MillerCenter for Pubic Affairs http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/6000 (accessed April10, 2012); Ellis W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an‘Associative State,’ 1921–1928,” The Journal of American History 61:1 (June 1974): 117.
5Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Eduardo Nolla, trans. James T.Schleifer, Vol. 3 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2010), 897, http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2287/Tocqueville_1532.03_LFeBk.pdf (accessed April 15, 2012).
6Andrew J. Polsky and Olesya Tkacheva, “Legacies Versus Politics: Herbert Hoover, PartisanConflict, and the Symbolic Appeal of Associationalism in the 1920s,” International Journal ofPolitics, Culture, and Society 16:2 (Winter 2002): 209–211.
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while influencing public policy at home. But this was not an easy project.
To reemerge as a leading political figure, Hoover countered New Deal poli-
cies by emphasizing an anti-bureaucratic modus operandi that emphasized
decentralization. The changes that he brought to the post-presidency proved
a significant and lasting legacy for subsequent ex-presidents, and can still
be seen today. How is it that a man who is consistently rated as one of
the worst United States presidents was able to redefine his image and reveal
more popular, personal dimensions that were previously inhibited by the
issues surrounding his presidency?7 Mr. Ripley interpreted Hoover’s selfless
act as being difficult to believe; Hoover saw it as his true nature and the
foundation for his post-presidency.
Presidential Emancipation
The 1932 election replaced President Hoover with a pragmatic Democrat,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had captivated the public with promises to
end the Great Depression. Pictures taken on inauguration day reveal a sullen
and, perhaps, slightly confused Hoover as he concluded the last day of his
only term as a US president. Candid pictures caught his bafflement with the
immediacy of what appeared to be a forced retirement from nineteen years
of public service. Yet, after a tumultuous first term as president, Americans
felt wary about giving him a second chance to solve the Great Depression. In
the immediacy of the moment, Hoover’s reputation for public service since
the Woodrow Wilson administration was severely threatened when he was
booted out of public office with only 39 percent of the popular vote.
Regardless of public sentiment, Hoover was adamant that his services
belonged to President Roosevelt. He remained at his suite in the Waldorf-
Astoria in New York after Roosevelt’s inauguration in order to assist the
president at a moment’s notice. Hoover and Roosevelt had been amiable
colleagues during the Wilson administration, in service to the president’s
7See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton,” Politi-cal Science Quarterly 112:2 (Summer 1997): 180–89, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657937;Douglas Brinkley et al., “C-SPAN Survey of Presidential Leadership,” C-SPAN, http://www.americanpresidents.org/survey/ (accessed August 6, 2011); “Siena’s 5th Presidential ExpertPoll 1982–2010,” Siena College, http://www.siena.edu/pages/179.asp?item = 2566 (accessedAugust 6, 2011).
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A Forgotten Catalyst
domestic and foreign policies. Toward the end of Wilson’s term, Roosevelt
urged Hoover to join the Democratic Party because of their political similar-
ities and Hoover’s dedication to progressivism. But Hoover had cultivated
ideas of limited government during Wilson’s presidency, causing him to di-
verge from Roosevelt in his approach to social progress. Whereas Roosevelt
would engage in government intervention and collectivism during his presi-
dency, Hoover sought the same goals through individualism and voluntarist
organizations.
Ellis Hawley wrote that, unlike the type of bureaucratic government in-
tervention that Roosevelt would employ during his presidency, Hoover’s
approach was “flexible, responsive, and productive, built on service and ef-
ficiency rather than coercion and politics . . . staffed by men of expertise and
vision, not by self-serving politicians or petty drudges.”8 Indeed, it surprised
Roosevelt’s when Hoover chose the Republican Party and campaigned to
elect Warren G. Harding to the presidency.9
Their divergent approaches to social progress help to clarify why Roo-
sevelt did not seek Hoover’s guidance in the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, he
sought advice from several advisors from the Hoover administration while
stubbornly working around the central figure himself. Roosevelt was prob-
ably wary of widespread backlash if he used Hoover’s advice to cure a
crisis that the public interpreted as Hoover’s fault. This came as a shock to
Hoover, who, as quietly as possible, retreated to his home on the Stanford
University campus in Palo Alto, California, to seek the solitude that would
rehabilitate his soul.10
In the meantime, President Roosevelt and Democrats on the Hill would
continue to Hoover’s failed presidency as ammunition to propel legislation
through the Congress and return confidence to US citizens. “It is obvious,”
Hoover confided in 1920 to George Sokolsk of the Hearst newspaper cor-
poration, “that the Democrats are going to make me and my Administration
8Hawley, “Herbert Hoover,” 117–18.9Timothy Walch and Dwight M. Miller, eds., Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt: A
Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 1.10Gary Dean Best, Herbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933–1964 (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 1; Walch and Miller, Herbert Hoover, 1, 5.
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a major basis of their campaign again.” He warned Republican presiden-
tial hopefuls to protect themselves from the mudslinging by keeping “free
of political lepers” like him.11 For two years, Hoover had stood idly by
as both his name and his presidency were defamed. We can never be sure
whether he was seeking refuge in his home from the virulent attacks, or was
merely disregarding them as political business as usual. Whether he realized
it or not, Hoover was strengthening his stamina to establish what would
become the longest and, arguably, the most successful post-presidency in US
history.
Thomas Shaller and Thomas Williams’s description of the post-presidency
helps to describe Hoover’s state as a new ex-president. “Ex-presidents have
no vehicle,” they write, “and only whatever fuel they generate themselves.”12
Although the solace at Palo Alto increased Hoover’s vitality, he still needed
a vehicle that would drive him toward a successful life after the presidency.
For this, he relied on his ex-presidential predecessors to supply the insight
on how to move forward as a new post-president.
The primary tool of many ex-presidents, and one that Hoover often used,
is the pen. It was not very surprising, given Hoover’s predilection for limited
government, that he initially opposed the New Deal by seeking to expose
it as a socialist government takeover.13 Writing to a personal friend and
future co-author, Hugh Gibson, Hoover explained how he was consumed
with publishing his “own diatribe about mid-September, just to give the
New Deal more exercise in mud-throwing.”14
His first post-presidential book, The Challenge to Liberty, was released in
September of 1934. Listed tersely as “the ex-president’s challenge to the New
Deal,” the book explained how abuses of American liberty might allow the
11Letter from Herbert Hoover to George E. Sokolksky, August 5, 1940, Folder 2, HP-PPS92, HHPL.
12Thomas F. Shaller and Thomas W. Williams, “The Contemporary Presidency: Postpresi-dential Influence in the Postmodern Era,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 33:1 (March 2003):190.
13“Hoover Plans to Aid in Fall Campaign,” New York Times, April 8, 1938, 20.14Letter from Herbert Hoover to Hugh Gibson, August 23, 1934, Folder 2730 (1), HP-PPI
68, HPPL.
74
A Forgotten Catalyst
government to become the “master of peoples’ souls and thoughts.”15 At the
same time, Hoover wrote the book to protect the central tenets of classical
liberalism, which he thought were best represented by the Republican Party.
He argued that liberty was an individual and indestructible right granted
by God, an assertion that would have delighted John Locke. He was also
convinced that a newly emergent pseudo-liberalism had replaced classical
liberalism by incorporating European socialism into the American economic
system.16 Hoover disagreed with socialism as a governmental means of
protecting man’s economic and political liberty. The book provided a way to
publicly lambast New Deal policies that he thought encroached on individual
liberty.17As Hoover moved forward as the protector of classical liberalism
in the Republican Party, his book countered the New Deal by encouraging
progressive associationalism as an alternative to social progress orchestrated
by the government.
It was not until 1951 that Hoover followed the practice of his post-
presidential predecessors by beginning to publish a three-volume memoir.
Ex-president Ulysses S. Grant is credited with initiating this practice in 1885
after writing his voluminous memoir in the twilight of his life. But Hoover
did not need the same financial boost as Grant. Having amassed a net worth
of about $75 million through his engineering career, Hoover was far from
penurious.18 In fact, during his presidency, he insisted that he would not
accept a check for public service, and instead gave the money to charity
and to presidential staffers that he thought deserved a higher salary.19 His-
torians Gary Dean Best and George Nash have argued that Hoover used
15William L. Langer, “Some Recent Books on International Relations,” Foreign Affairs,January 1935, 165; “Recent Publications,” Barron’s, October 1, 1934, 16.
16Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), 203–04.
17Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934),3–4.
18Douglas A. McIntyre, “The Net Worth of the U.S. Presidents: From Washington toObama,” The Atlantic, May 20, 2010 http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/05/the-net-worth-of-the-us-presidents-from-washington-to-obama/57020/#slide30 (accessedApril 22, 2012).
19Alonzo Fields, interviewed by Raymond Henle, July 24, 1970, transcript, Herbert HooverOral History, Miller Center for Public Affairs, Charlottesville, VA; “Hoover Never Used SalaryAs His Own,” New York Times, February 2, 1938, 21.
75
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his memoirs to vindicate his own presidency, but because of the time of
their publication and because his residency in the White House comprised
only a small part of the trilogy, it seems shallow to suggest that he merely
sought to exonerate his single term as president.20 If he were merely seeking
vindication, perhaps he would have written the memoirs during the New
Deal era to counter false claims posited by Roosevelt’s cronies during and
after the 1932 election, such as how the economy would not have improved
under Hoover’s leadership. For the rest of his life, Hoover maintained that
worsening economic problems in 1933 were “a direct consequence of Roo-
sevelt’s failure to cooperate with him during the preinaugural period,” not
a result of Hoover’s policies.21
The second tool that Hoover’s post-presidential predecessors used was
that of a permanent, public megaphone. Theodore Roosevelt bounded back
from an African safari to the American political sphere during his post-
presidency in order to denounce the policies of his presidential successor,
William Howard Taft. Hoover took a different approach. Perhaps as an
act of political civility, he cordially defended his successor’s policies during
the first year of the Roosevelt administration. When, on March 7, 1933,
Roosevelt implemented a controversial decision to close the banks in an
effort to counter the escalating financial crisis, Hoover asked the American
public to back the decision with unwavering support.22 But as the Roosevelt
administration continued to attack Hoover and design more radical policies,
Hoover became unwilling to support the president’s decisions and, on behalf
of the American public, demanded a voice that reflected his own political
beliefs.
Hoover was in a very curious period in his life in which his political ef-
forts were stymied, as being connected to him still drew negative attention.
From the 1932 election onward, the Democratic Party criticized Hoover’s
20See George H. Nash, “Achieving Post-Presidential Greatness,” in Richard Norton Smithand Timothy Walch, eds., Farewell to the Chief (Worland, WY: High Plains Publishing Co.,Inc., 1990), and Gary Dean Best, Herbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933–1964(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).
21Best, Herbert Hoover, 4.22“Hoover Urges All To Back President,” New York Times, March 7, 1933, 3.
76
A Forgotten Catalyst
presidency, while being associated with Hoover as a Republican meant the
possibility of losing one’s constituency. As a result, many Republicans ab-
jured association with Hoover, marginalizing him in a political limbo dur-
ing the incipient stages of his post-presidency. Brant Short ideally describes
Hoover’s predicament in noting, “unlike the parliamentary system, in which
former prime ministers continue to play important roles in policy-making,
the American system affords no special status to former presidents.”23 To
remain politically relevant, Hoover began to address both sides of the po-
litical spectrum. It was precisely Hoover’s emphasis on limited government
that encouraged some pro-New Deal politicians to align with his ideology as
they came to believe that certain New Deal programs might best be executed
by local, and not the federal, government. At the same time, he drew support
from old and new members of the Grand Old Party who identified him as a
defender of classical liberalism.
These various sources of support positioned Hoover to redefine his image,
leaving many perplexed by his ingenuity. Hoover utilized the unofficial office
of the post-presidency on behalf of the Republican Party to further advance
his ideals, counter the policies of the sitting administration, and enhance
the image of party leadership. This served as a transitory instrument that
allowed him to re-enter the public sphere as a key member of the GOP,
assuring the advancement of his personal ambitions as an ex-president.
The public had been vexed by the image of a man that they associated
with the Great Depression, yet some recognized that his ideals might offer a
way forward in a time of desperation. Joan Hoff Wilson describes Hoover’s
unique ideology:
Hoover saw the world, and America in particular, as standing at a
crossroads in history after World War I—one path leading to higher
standards of living through decentralized technocorporate organiza-
tion and cooperative individualism; the other leading to socialism,
fascism, syndicalism, or communism, through the establishment of
23Brant Short, “The Rhetoric of the Post-Presidency: Herbert Hoover’s Campaign Againstthe New Deal, 1934–1936,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 22:2 (Spring 1991): 333.
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authoritarian collectivism and the dehumanized collective personality
that would destroy individual initiative and retard progress. It was im-
perative in such a transitional time that the country reevaluate its past
liberal-democratic heritage in light of present and future technological
needs.24
His emphasis on limited government stressed the importance of individual-
ism. Ellis Hawley wrote that Hoover “envisioned an ‘associative state’ in the
1920s,” that “preserv[ed] and work[ed] through individual units, commit-
ting them voluntarily to service, efficiency, and ethical behavior.”25 Hoover
took these ideas with him into his post-presidency as he argued how big
government should be limited by individual initiative instead of relying on
bureaucratic systems. His approach to deregulation was an attempt to high-
light the primacy of the individual at a time when Roosevelt was increasing
the government’s dominion. As he picked up speed in speaking against Roo-
sevelt’s policies, Hoover garnered support from anti-New Deal Democrats,
business-oriented Republicans, classical liberals, and reliable Hoover sup-
porters.
Hoover’s increasing popularity also drew support from those who desired
to see him enter the 1936 presidential race. Some leaders of the Repub-
lican Party sought for Hoover to become a revitalized public figure who
represented the pillars of the Republican Party. A.H. Kirchhofer of the
Buffalo Evening News demanded that Hoover take a role in leading the
Republican Party, regardless of any partisan views, because it was a “pa-
triotic need” and only Hoover was qualified. “Even Moses or the Greatest
Leader of Men has not been free from such calumny but what of it?” Kirch-
hofer reassured Hoover, “[t]heir causes go right on; their detractors defame
only themselves.”26 The overwhelming approval of Hoover’s speech at the
1936 Republican National Convention implied that the public was will-
ing to give him a second chance. Hoover maintained, “My interest in my
24Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Prospect Heights, IL: WavelandPress, 1992), 57.
25Hawley, “Herbert Hoover,” 117–18.26Letter from A.H. Kirchhofer to Herbert Hoover, July 30, 1937, Folder 3082, HP-PPI 112,
HHPL.
78
A Forgotten Catalyst
country could not be ended by an election, especially as I knew the character
and purposes of the men coming into power were not those of traditional
America.”27
Hoover believed that Roosevelt was introducing a revolution that was
destructive to the constitution, the economy, and individual liberties.28
While he may have attacked the New Deal to defend his presidency, in time
he would come to argue that it was not only the New Deal that was pulling
the nation out of the Depression; it was also due in part to personal initiative
in combination with the available market for American industrial products
in the build up to World War II that spurred the creation of jobs and saved
the economy.29 Hoover drew from views he had developed during the 1920s
when he led relief efforts in Finland after World War I in conformity with
the tenets of Wilsonianism. By the end of 1934, Hoover had returned to
the public sphere with a new ideology and tools from his post-presidential
predecessors, and was steadfast in working on behalf of the American public.
Hoover continued to passionately oppose the Roosevelt administration
on behalf of the Republican Party and his own personal ideologies. Hoover
historians Dwight Miller and Timothy Walch write that the most obvious
piece of evidence of the crippled relationship between Hoover and Roosevelt
came when the president requested that Hoover brief his administration on
the food situation in Europe. “There was no one else in the world with
as much experience with famine relief,” Roosevelt humbly admitted.30 Al-
though Hoover committed unwavering service to every president since Wil-
son, he opposed President Roosevelt to such an extreme that he refused to
assist the chief executive in an area where Hoover’s record proved him to
be clearly superior. His wartime relief efforts in Finland and Belgium during
the Wilson administration gained him widespread fame for humanitarianism
27Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 351; Press Conference,Folder 10, HP-PPS 98, HHPL; “Hoover’s Convention Speech Seen as Making Him a LeadingFactor in Campaign,” New York Times, June 12, 1936, 15; “Bid to Convention GratifiesHoover,” New York Times, June 4, 1936, 3.
28“Hoover Denounces New Deal As Foe of Human Liberty,” New York Times, September4, 1934, 1.
29Herbert Hoover, “National Defense,” in Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road,1940–41 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941), 8–11.
30Walch and Miller, Herbert Hoover, 169–170.
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after World War I. He had subsequently devoted himself to Presidents Hard-
ing and Coolidge, and later would do the same for Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. But Hoover’s anger and bitterness with
Roosevelt was resounding and prevented him from aiding the incumbent
president.31 Hoover, however, did not see this refusal as meaning that he
would deny assistance to the countries that were in need. Instead, he saw
this as an opportunity to prove to the nation the value of associationalism
over collectivism.
An Ex-President Emerges from the Wilderness
On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union’s Red Army took the offensive
against the “peace-loving people” of Finland. Immediately, Finnish repre-
sentatives sought help from Hoover, their humanitarian hero from the 1920s
famine.32 It was a curious predicament for Hoover, having denied President
Roosevelt any assistance in aiding the people of a wartorn world. In dis-
tancing himself from the presidency, Hoover had a unique opportunity as a
post-president to act on his anti-bureaucratic ideas as a private citizen. By
directly asking Hoover to assist with their needs, the Finns circumvented the
American government, allowing Hoover to come to their aid as an indepen-
dent agent. To ensure that the Finns would receive the required aid, Hoover
began designing a plan that would highlight associationalism in order to
prove it a capable alternative to direct government involvement.
Progressive associationalism, according to Hoover, relied on individual
initiative to preclude the need for state action through service-oriented or-
ganization. “Progress of the nation is the sum of progress in its individuals,”
he wrote; “acts and ideas that lead to progress are born out of the womb of
the individual mind.”33 He thought it a fallacy to believe that the govern-
ment could benefit society with greater efficiency than those who operated
of their own individual will.34 Relying on this ideology would avoid what
31Ibid.32Herbert Hoover, Finnish Relief Fund Report to American Donors: December 1939-July
1940 (New York: Finnish Relief Fund, 1940), 5.33Hoover, American Individualism, 24.34Hoover, “Principles and Ideals.”
80
A Forgotten Catalyst
Joan Hoff Wilson refers to as the “smug paternalism” of those in power
while preserving “participatory democracy” against the encroachment of
bureaucratic methods.35
Hoover argued for limited government that decentralized power to lo-
cal organizations.36 This meant diminishing the bureaucracy that was built
under the Roosevelt administration. Conservatives and some progressives
adored Hoover’s devotion to associationalism, while Republicans admired
Hoover’s tenacity as a newly re-emergent leader. But, as Kendrick Clements
rightly proposes, it would be a misconception to believe that Hoover success-
fully combined both progressive and conservative ideals.37 Instead, Hoover’s
actions indicate that he combined key features from each distinct philosophy
to enhance his post-presidency. Without a doubt, he recognized the strategic
potential of drawing on his personalized ideology so as to collect support
for his post-presidential humanitarian agenda.
By 1939, Hoover put his philosophy into practice by building a decentral-
ized, humanitarian campaign that was built upon individual initiative. He
worked with his colleagues to establish the Small Democracies Committee,
an independent group founded upon the “expression of American feeling
that steps should be taken to prevent starvation in Finland, Norway, Hol-
land, Belgium, and Central Poland.” The committee was yet another way
of gathering support for opposition to Roosevelt while offering a solid al-
ternative for solving international crises. The goal was to provide the means
necessary to save what was predicted to be “millions of innocent lives.”38
This venture into humanitarianism on behalf of the small democracies in
Europe established the first global facet of Hoover’s post-presidency.
In order to execute his growing agenda, Hoover had to find a way of
collecting vital information outside of Washington. For this he turned to the
Stanford University Food Research Institute that he had founded in 1920. To
his dismay, the institute had drifted away from Hoover’s political orientation
35Wilson, Hoover the Progressive, 62; Hoover, American Individualism, 48.36Hoover, “Principles and Ideals.”37Kendrick A. Clements, Hoover, Conservation and Consumerism: Engineering the Good
Life (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 203.38Newsletter by the National Committee on Food for the Small Democracies, Folder 10,
HP-PPS 154, HHPL.
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under the direction of what he described as a “Left Wing, near-communist”
group that opposed feeding the needy democracies in Europe. This strength-
ened Hoover’s resolve to avoid any form of bureaucracy. “These statements
from an institution which I had founded were well received, and acclaimed
by the warmongers, who opposed that movement,” Hoover confided in his
notes. To Hoover, this was yet another obstruction created by the New Deal,
which later encouraged him to blame the bureaucrats for the “millions who
died.”39 For the rest of Hoover’s life, he would perceive bureaucracies as the
antithesis of liberalism in their ability to withhold freedom and democracy
from the people.40
Hoover’s conclusions about the inevitable failures of bureaucracy shaped
the way in which his post-presidency developed. This view not only enhanced
his investment in individualism, but it also helped him to design a volunteer-
led, decentralized operation on behalf of the needy Finns.
Hoover began by informing newspaper organizations throughout the
United States about the Finnish Relief Fund in order to gather emotional
and financial support. He was flexing his newly found power as a post-
president, rivaling the Roosevelt administration in gathering public support
in foreign affairs. The plan involved encouraging newspapers and religious
institutions to raise funds from the local community and send them directly
to Finland, bypassing any form of bureaucracy that would hinder the timely,
efficient, and cost-effective delivery of aid.41 A private organization of this
magnitude circumventing the government surely raised questions within the
Roosevelt administration.
Hoover’s system of voluntarism created opportunities for communities
throughout the nation to support the Finnish Relief Fund. Soon, 1,200
newspapers across the country began participating in the campaign, inspiring
Hoover to expand the initiative even further. With the assistance of New
York Mayor Fiorella LaGuardia, the fund’s New York chapter organized
an event at Madison Square Garden in order to raise money for the Finns.
39Memorandum of Hoover, The Stanford Food Research Institute, May 16, 1942, Folder10, HP-PPS 298, HPPL.
40Hoover, “Principles and Ideals.”41“Hoover Appeals For A Finland Day,” New York Times, December 12, 1939, 16.
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A Forgotten Catalyst
In a matter of days, 15,000 people had purchased tickets for the 8:30 p.m.
event to hear a compelling speech from Hoover himself. After tabulating the
donations and ticket sales, supporters managed to raise more than $50,000
to be sent for food, aid to children, and assistance in the evacuation of
500,000 noncombatants in war-torn regions of Finland.42
By the end of this newspaper campaign for Finnish relief, Hoover had
established an exuberant post-presidency, proving that it was possible to
campaign on behalf of international humanitarianism through voluntarism
as an individual agent. He thus became a key player in world politics during
his post-presidency, which provided Hoover with the evidence to convince
Americans of the benefits of aiding foreign countries in need during what
was turning out to be a global war.43
The Citizen Diplomat
Hoover’s innovations ushered the post-presidency into the modern era
by engaging in foreign policy without any official power or government
approval. In fact, Hoover’s voice was becoming so monumental that foreign
heads were interpreting his every move as a principal indicator of US foreign
policy.
The US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Joseph P. Kennedy, called
Hoover after his 1939 food campaign for Finland to share the details of his
dinner soiree with British Cabinet members and how he informed them “that
the very moment it became evident that there was death and starvation [in
Europe], the Americans were going to feed [the Europeans], and would feed
them in spite of the British Navy, if they had to send their own war vessels
to do it.” Kennedy hinted at Hoover’s unofficial diplomatic importance
when he informed the cabinet ministers how they “ought to pay attention to
Mr. Hoover’s influence or it might alienate him entirely from his favorable
attitude toward the British cause.”44
42“Hoover Extending Fund Organization,” New York Times, December 19, 1939, 13;“$100,000 Is Cabled For Finnish Relief,” New York Times, December 20, 1939, 3; “15,000at Rally for Aid to Finland Cheer As Hoover Pays Tribute,” New York Times, December 21,1939, 1.
43“Hoover Asks Help for 500,000 Finns,” New York Times, January 7, 1940, 40.44Memorandum by Hoover, undated, Folder 3064 (1) HP-PPI 110, HPPL.
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Hoover must have understood the magnitude of his influence over US
foreign policy as a citizen-diplomat because he began to correspond with
the Roosevelt administration in an effort to guide public policy. Although
he desired an “associative state,” Hoover was aware that the government
was not going to disappear.45 A general policy of non-intervention would
not prevent the government from stepping in during moments of crisis.
Instead, the goal was to keep the government from intervening in erroneous
ways that hindered individual initiative. The only way to see this idea come
to fruition was to become involved in the government’s affairs.
Hoover wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on one occasion in an
effort to advise the administration’s food policies during World War II. “I
have increasing reports that the Administration is opposed to relief for the
occupied democracies,” Hoover wrote to Hull. “I feel deeply concerned that
America should ever be thought of as opposing the saving of these millions of
people.” In an attempt to encourage speedy delivery of relief to the innocent
victims of World War II, Hoover pleaded to Hull, “You will realize that
it would take at least two months for food to arrive, and in the meantime
there will be many people dying.”46 Hoover was so adamant on this issue
that he temporarily flip-flopped on his non-interventionist stance so as to
convince Roosevelt how the strategic delivery of food might help to win the
war. Hoover wrote:
. . . I would like to present the bearings of the use of food control to
aid in winning the war and the peace and in the special interest of the
United States. . . . I know that millions of Americans would be gratified.
And I know it would bring to the British cause support. . . . And it
brings to Americans the feeling that the standards of Christianity have
not been abandoned by our country. It can have no military advantage
to the Germans; it has immense values to our future.47
45Hawley, “Herbert Hoover,” 118.46Letter from Herbert Hoover to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, March 5, 1941, Folder
2956 (1), HP-PPI 95, HHPL.47Letter from Herbert Hoover to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, March 27, 1941, Folder
2956 (1), HP-PPI 95, HHPL.
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A Forgotten Catalyst
As shall be discussed later, this proposal had deeper implications, as it
presciently modeled core elements of what would become the Marshall Plan.
Hull had no patience for Hoover and continuously provided a blanket
answer in an effort to silence the humanitarian. An irritated Hull wrote to
Hoover, “I hope that in this connection, you will realize that the Government
is constrained to act in the light of all phases of the task of relief.” Despite
Hoover’s persistence, his recommendations were discarded as the Roosevelt
administration preferred for food relief to be in the sovereign hands of the
occupying nation’s government.48 Becoming a self-appointed representative
of the people, he vociferously wrote back to Secretary Hull, “Not only am I
deeply shocked at the present attitude of our Government, but I know tens
of millions of Americans would also be shocked. History will never justify
the Government of the United States siding with the starvation of these
millions.”49 But his perseverance never paid off. Hoover was unable to
convince the Roosevelt administration of the dire consequences of ignoring
the desperate pleas from Europe. It was not until the Truman administration
that a sitting president would reach out to the ex-president and seek advice
on how to support the poor, starving nations in postwar Europe.
On April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt died at his desk of a brain hem-
orrhage. Regardless of the differences between the two, Hoover recalled the
days of the Wilson administration when their common adherence to progres-
sivism facilitated an amiable relationship. “Whatever differences there may
have been,” Hoover eulogized, “they end in the regrets of death.” Hoover
concluded the statement most suitably: “we shall march forward.”50
Mark K. Updegrove argues that the power of an ex-president is highly
reliant on the relationship between a post-president and an incumbent pres-
ident. This is only partially true given the discussion thus far. Hoover’s
vast post-presidential projects outside of the Roosevelt administration indi-
cate that ex-president Hoover’s success was independent of the incumbent
48Letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Herbert Hoover, May 10, 1941, Folder 2965(2), HP-PPI 95, HHPL.
49Letter from Herbert Hoover to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, June 4, 1941, Folder 2965(2), HP-PPI 95, HHPL.
50Press Release, Folder 3661, HP-PPI 195, HPPL.
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president. Roosevelt was opposed to a reciprocal relationship from the very
start of Hoover’s ex-presidency, commenting to his advisors after Inaugu-
ration Day that he was “not Jesus Christ,” and would absolutely not raise
“him from the dead.”51
When Vice President Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency, he was
instantly urged by his advisors to form a relationship with the Republican
ex-president. And with Roosevelt out of the picture, Republicans were des-
perate to reenter the White House. Hoover recalled a lunch with some close
friends in which they had been the fourth group to insist that he offer his
services to Truman:
. . . I had to explain that I would not go to Washington except at the
direct invitation of the President. They told me that I ought to be of
bigger mind and that Truman needed and wanted my advice. I said
that if they considered that my advice were worth anything it at least
warranted an invitation from Truman; that so far as my own personal
feelings were concerned because of the pettiness and vindictiveness of
the group in Washington that my own inclination was to tell them all
to go to Hell.
Given that Hoover’s Finnish Relief Fund was unsurpassed in its ability to
raise non-government funds to feed the postwar victims in Europe, Truman
was at least inquisitive about Hoover’s success, if not desperately seeking all
the help he could get after abruptly assuming office during the late stages of
the Second World War.
Truman initially sent an intermediary, Secretary of War Henry Stimson,
to seek Hoover’s advice concerning the postwar food situation in Europe.
Above all else, Hoover “knew about hungry people,” Truman thought.52
The ex-president immediately declined, stating, “I would not ride on the
horse of my pride,” and that the president needed to extend a personal invi-
tation if he truly desired any assistance. Hoover maintained a safe distance
51Richard Norton Smith, “Introduction,” Hoover & Truman: A Presidential Friendshiphttp://trumanlibrary.org/hoover/intro.htm (accessed April 10, 2012).
52Mark K. Updegrove, Second Acts: Presidential Lives and Legacies After The White House(Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2006), 15.
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A Forgotten Catalyst
so as to limit any negative reaction to the possibility of advising the new
president. Secretary Stimson relayed the information to Truman, to which
the president simply replied that Hoover was “making a mountain out of a
molehill.” But to Hoover the molehill had become a mountain during the
Roosevelt era, which clarifies why he was hesitant to advise the president
given that many of Truman’s advisors were retained from the Roosevelt ad-
ministration. Press Secretary Steve Early, for example, felt that, “if Hoover
wanted anything he would have to come down on his knees to get it.” Surely,
thought Hoover, a direct invitation from Truman would begin to cure some
of the remaining hostilities.53 Upon receiving Secretary Stimson’s relayed
message, Truman sent Hoover a handwritten letter and called him on the
phone to ask for his personal assistance.54
As if Hoover were merely waiting for the president to acknowledge his
existence, he returned the letter only a few days later with a packet of infor-
mation regarding aid for postwar Europe. After a very long note expressing
his willingness and excitement to work with Truman, Hoover categorized his
advice on US foreign policy under four headings: “The European Food Or-
ganization,” “The Domestic Food Organization,” “The Creation of a War
Economic Council,” and “The Japanese Situation.”55 He summarized the
memoranda by suggesting that the army take over the delivery of relief, while
urging for the creation of an economic council composed of government offi-
cials from Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, and France, along with one
official from the US military.56 The recommendations were oriented toward
expediting the delivery of aid, while also emphasizing self-sustainability and
self-determination—two suggestions influenced by his overwhelming asso-
ciationalism.
53Hoover Memorandum, Folder 3591 (1), HP-PPI 239, HHPL.54Letter from Truman to Hoover, May 24, 1945, Folder 3591 (1), HP-PPI 239, HHPL.55For more information, see Memorandum on the Organization of Foreign Relief and Re-
habilitation, Memorandum on Reorganization of the War Food Agencies, Memorandum onWar Economic Policies and Their Organizations, and Memorandum on Ending the JapaneseWar from Herbert Hoover to Harry S. Truman, May 30, 1945, Folder 3951 (1), HP-PPI 239,HHPL.
56Hoover Memorandum, May 28, 1945, Folder 3951 (1), HP-PPI 239, HHPL; Joan HoffWilson, “Hoover’s Plan for Ending the Second World War,” International History Review 1:1(January 1979): 86, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109269 (accessed July 11, 2011); HooverMemorandum, May 28, 1945, Folder 3951 (1), HP-PPI 239, HHPL.
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As a result of Hoover’s suggestions, Truman invited him to direct
America’s relief fund for the postwar world by traveling a total of 35,000
miles to survey the European landscape and to recommend how aid should
be delivered to the foreign countries.57 Newspapers applauded Truman’s
decision to appoint Hoover to this mission as “he had won the applause of
Republicans and had sharply reminded the nation of the immediate necessity
of feeding Europe.” Emerging from Truman’s office as both a newly lauded
ex-president and a citizen-diplomat, Hoover made an immediate statement
to the press in which he dramatically declared, “It is now 11:59 on the clock
of starvation.”58
At Truman’s request, Hoover departed for his world food tour in 1946. He
returned with a comprehensive report that examined “twenty-two countries
which have a deficiency of food,” concluding that while the United States
was obligated to assist these countries, a more multilateral approach should
be implemented. Even when the government was to be involved, Hoover
always maintained that associations between individuals, institutions, and
countries would act as a greater means toward reaching a desirable end. He
recommended that assistance from countries with surpluses, such as Rus-
sia, Argentina and other parts of Latin America, Canada, and the Union of
South Africa, would guarantee certain and timely delivery of aid to needy
countries.59 Truman promised that Hoover’s report would become the foun-
dation of his administration’s food policy while divulging that a domestic
policy of conservation would soon follow.60 As Honorary Chairman of the
Famine Emergency Committee, Hoover gave a speech that summarized his
view on how food was capable of cultivating peace and asserted, “the final
57Benjamin F. Rogers, “‘Dear Mr. President’: The Hoover-Truman Correspondence,” Pres-idential Studies Quarterly 16:3 (Summer 1986): 504.
58“The Presidency—Era of Good Feeling,” Time Magazine, June 4, 1945, Folder 3951 (1),HP-PPI 239, HHPL.
59Letter from Herbert Hoover to Harry Truman, May 13, 1946, Folder 3951 (2), HP-PPI239, HHPL; A Suggestion by H.H. Memorandum, June 29, 1947, Folder 2137 (2), HP-PPI 13,HHPL.
60Letter from Harry Truman to Herbert Hoover, May 15, 1946, Folder 3951 (2), HP-PPI239, HHPL.
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A Forgotten Catalyst
voice of victory is the guns, but the first voice of peace is food. The world
has organized to maintain peace, surely it can organize to maintain life.”61
The flourishing reciprocal relationship between the activist ex-president
and the incumbent president revealed the growing importance of the post-
presidency. This modest relationship should not be considered a first for
an ex-president and incumbent president, but it should be considered from
a different angle. Hoover was a vociferous opponent of the Roosevelt ad-
ministration and had gained widespread support for his Finnish newspaper
campaign. This operation put Hoover in a respected position where Ameri-
can diplomats studied his movements and speeches concerning international
aid. Such increasing activity and status encouraged Hoover to broaden the
post-presidency by increasing his efforts as a citizen-diplomat and conduct-
ing US foreign policy without outright government endorsement.
With the inauguration of Truman in 1945, Hoover could be either a
critical asset or an imposing foe to the new administration. Consequently,
Truman acknowledged that the only living ex-president would be a valuable
asset to his administration because of his experience, his renewed leadership
within the Republican Party, and his burning desire to serve the people
through the White House. During Truman’s initial meeting with Hoover,
the ex-president began to weep. After Hoover stepped out of the office to
regain his composure, Truman stated, “I knew what was the matter with
him . . . it was the first time in thirteen years that anybody had paid attention
to him.” Although this Truman anecdote from Merle Miller’s book, Plain
Speaking, has been challenged as being inauthentic, it does help to illustrate
Hoover’s likely emotional response to such an invitation.62
Soon after the world food tour in 1946, Hoover sought to influence the
formulation of US foreign policy to establish the postwar settlement. Gov-
ernment officials speculated how best to approach the European community
and the growing threat of the Soviet Union. Truman’s Economic Recovery
Plan (commonly known as the Marshall Plan) was designed to rebuild,
61United States Department of Agriculture Famine Emergency Committee press release, April5, 1946, Folder 4, HP-PPS 141, HHPL.
62Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: BlackDog & Levanthal Publishers, 2005), 220.
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develop, and modernize Europe after World War II, as well as to encourage
support of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe. Hoover considered his
foreign aid experience to be invaluable and he was insistent on asserting his
views in the discussion.
In November 1946, Hoover accepted an invitation by Secretary of War
Robert Patterson to brief the president on the condition of the army’s food
relief policies in both Germany and Austria. Hoover sought to expand his
domain by including an examination of the German economy. He formed
an alliance with the Office of Military Government in Germany and the
US War Department to develop solutions for a self-sufficient German econ-
omy. The primary concern among US diplomats was that Germany might
strengthen itself to its prewar power. Hoover’s controversial report to Pres-
ident Truman called “for the removal of nearly all restrictions on German
industry except those that were obviously military.” According to Hoover,
the road to European recovery passed first through Germany.
The whole economy of Europe is interlinked with [the] German econ-
omy through the exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods.
The productivity of Europe can not be restored without the restoration
of Germany as a contributor to that productivity. . . . We can keep Ger-
many in these economic chains but it will also keep Europe in rags.63
At the same time, Hoover called for particular sanctions in the develop-
ing Marshall Plan that were built upon his belief in both American non-
intervention and in a foreign country’s need for self-sustainability within
the world economy. While Hoover insisted on providing relief, he was more
confident that countries would grow if they were allowed opportunities for
guided self-sufficiency and self-determination. Hoover demanded that the
Marshall Plan include guidelines to “make for more efficient Administra-
tion, less strain upon the American taxpayer, less strain on our economy,
and at the same time, deliver the same volume of commodities to Marshall
63Scott Jackson, “Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitmentfor a European Recovery Program,” The Journal of American History 65:44 (March 1979):1062–63.
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A Forgotten Catalyst
Plan countries.”64 This recommendation was another instance of Hoover
designing a regulatory plan that sought to prevent any direct and lengthy
intervention by the American government.
Hoover’s conception of the Marshall Plan corresponded to his desire for
limited government. In The Challenge to Liberty, Hoover discussed how
the progress of humanity must remain in the hands of individuals, not the
state or national government. Indeed, this belief shaped his approach to
foreign policy. As a classical liberal, Hoover believed that individualism
would give man equality of opportunity, liberty, and freedom, not large-
scale government intervention. He wrote that man should be assisted to a
certain level of equality, but in the end, “he must . . . stand up to the emery
wheel of competition.”
Around the same time that Hoover was submitting these memoranda,
the economist F.A. Hayek submitted an argument against the growing col-
lectivism of socialism in favor of greater individualism. His view aligned
with Hoover’s in that he believed governments should take a regulating role
that would create the conditions for progress, but that it was ultimately
the responsibility of the individual to seize the moment and strive toward
greatness.65 Similarly, Hoover’s views about liberalism, individualism, and
progressive associationalism shaped how he approached US foreign policy
and intervention in the delivery of aid to foreign nations after World War
II. These three elements culminated in his post-presidential ideology, which
guided his citizen-diplomacy and the advice that he brought to Truman on
issues related to US foreign policy.
Conclusion
“Bathtubs are a menace to ex-presidents,” Hoover informed Truman in
1964, “for as you may recall a bathtub rose up and fractured my vertebrae
when I was in Venezuela on your World Famine Mission in 1946.”66 Hoover
64Letter from Herbert Hoover to Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin,March 24, 1948, Folder 2137 (3), HP-PPI 13, HHPL.
65F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge, London: The University of Chicago Press,2007), 84–87, 90.
66Letter from Herbert Hoover to Harry Truman, October 14, 1964, Folder 3951 (9), HP-PPI239, HPPL.
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remained in contact with his ex-presidential peers, just as he did in this letter
to Truman on October 14, 1964, six days before Hoover passed away.
After having cultivated a relationship with the incumbent president during
the Truman administration, Hoover found his advice being sought after
from presidents and presidential candidates alike. “You will discover,” he
jokingly remarked to Richard Nixon in 1961, “that elder statesmen are little
regarded . . . until they are over 80 years of age—and thus harmless.”67
Hoover’s post-presidency had changed in extraordinary ways since 1933.
By the time of his death in 1964, Hoover had traveled tens of thousands
of miles through foreign countries, delivered enough speeches domestically
and internationally to fill eight volumes, published thirty-three books on
numerous topics, accepted countless awards and positions from various in-
stitutions, and all along the way, diligently responded to numerous letters.
His service to his country was, arguably, unmatched for over thirty-two
years as he struggled to feed Europeans, spread the prospect of peace, re-
pair the international economy, and enhance US foreign policy. “For some
years,” Hoover stated to Thomas Dewey, “I have thought my best service
to the American people was . . . advice in fields where I have some expe-
rience . . . with an entire independence of view. . . . I hope to finish in that
harness.”68
During the Roosevelt administration, Hoover struggled to find a position
within society while the administration all but exiled him from Washington.
This inspired an assiduous dedication to his post-presidency that altered the
shape of the office for future ex-presidents. That his demand for decentral-
ization offered an alternative method of solving problems is what made him
a fiery opponent to Roosevelt’s New Deal. Many from outside of the Re-
publican Party were enticed by Hoover’s emphasis on the decentralization
of government through volunteer-led organizations, which helped him to
escape the criticism of his failed presidency.
Immediately following Hoover’s acclaimed 1946 food mission, his long-
time friend, Joseph Kennedy, congratulated Hoover on what Updegrove
67Wilson, Herbert Hoover: The Forgotten, 229.68Letter from Herbert Hoover to Thomas Dewey, July 6, 1949, Folder 2543 (3), HP-PPI 47,
HPPL.
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A Forgotten Catalyst
calls the “second life” of an American president. “You have had the acclaim
of the American people,” Kennedy wrote, “you have had the criticism of
the American people; and now, in the twilight of your life, the American
people have come to realize that Herbert Hoover is one of our few capable
outstanding men in the public life of this generation.”69
Indeed, it was under President Truman that Hoover was given the re-
sources to become such a magnanimous public servant. The friendly reci-
procity between Hoover and Truman repaired the long-divided relation-
ship between the ex-president and the Executive Branch. Truman perceived
Hoover as a valuable asset to his presidency when policy formation during
the end stages of World War II required an expert on foreign aid. With
Truman’s help, Hoover ushered the post-presidency into the modern era by
adding the dimensions of both humanitarianism and citizen-diplomacy. This
optimized the post-presidency to benefit the Executive Branch, the United
States, and the world as a whole.
The history of the post-presidency shows how ex-presidents have often ad-
vised incumbent presidents during times of stress. That incumbent presidents
could use post-presidents as a foreign policy tool was wholly unprecedented.
Hoover took this opportunity to aid desperate countries after World War
II, just as he had done prior to assuming the presidency in 1929. Hoover
used his growing diplomatic influence to guide foreign policy as an advisor.
His associational ideology led him to influence how the United States deliv-
ered aid to foreign nations. He desired to cultivate conditions that would
spur improvement and progress, but did not see unilateral US intervention
as being the proper means to that end. Instead, he wanted regulation over
intervention, built on multilateralism. Here, Hoover was not as influential
as he might have hoped as he witnessed the Marshall Plan become a strategic
tool seeking to secure Eastern European allegiance to Western ideologies.
Nonetheless, Hoover changed the post-presidency in monumental ways, and
in so doing shaped the position as we know it today.
69Letter from Joseph Kennedy to Hoover, July 26, 1949, Folder 3064 (1), HP-PPI 110,HPPL.
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Taking the stage again at the 1960 Republican National Convention in
Chicago, Hoover received a “thunderous ovation” as he walked toward the
microphone at the podium. Hoover said his final goodbyes. He had bidden
“an affectionate good by [sic] to three previous conventions” and declared,
“unless some miracle comes to me from the good Lord this is finally it.”70
Leaving the convention for the last time, the ex-president may have reflected
on his lifelong dedication to public service and the way that he had helped
the post-presidency to grow over the past thirty-two years.
Modern ex-presidents such as Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter have received
much praise for their work, but it must be remembered that the roots of the
modern post-presidency extend back into the days of the Great Depression.
Examination of Hoover’s post-presidential activism reveals an ideal model
that might benefit ex-presidents in the future. In building on this model,
the post-presidency has the potential to reach even greater bounds as future
ex-presidents find that they have more freedom to pursue their presidential
agendas as they leave office, without the countless constraints placed on
the Executive Branch. Indeed, future ex-presidents should consider how
their personal ideologies might shape their post-presidential career, just as
Hoover did during his post-presidency.
Perhaps we have something to learn from presidents who leave office in
the shadow of public disapproval. Now is the time to begin questioning
whether George W. Bush or, eventually, Barack Obama will follow the
magnanimous examples of their post-presidential predecessors as we enter
an age in which we have more living ex-presidents than ever before, or
whether they will merely retire into oblivion without setting foot back into
public service. Some might even consider it admirable for ex-presidents to
leave politics to those in power, much as Gerald Ford did during his ex-
presidency. The history of the post-presidency and the potential power of
the unofficial office reveal that former presidents can exercise effective post-
presidential careers working, not merely for the government, but truly on
behalf of the American people.
70“Hoover Says Nation in Moral Slump,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 26, 1960, Folder 2,HP-PPS 105, HPPL.
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