A Disquisition on Government

Other titles of interest from St. Augustines PressSt. Augustine, On Order [De Ordine]Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles Nicomachean EthicsThomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on VirtueCharles P. Nemeth, Aquinas on CrimeJames V. Schall, The Regensburg LectureGerhart Niemeyer, Between Nothingness and ParadiseJoseph Cropsey, Polity and Economy: With Further Thoughts on the

Principles of Adam SmithLeo Strauss, Xenophons SocratesLeo Strauss, Xenophons Socratic DiscourseJacques Maritain, Natural Law: Reflections on Theory and PracticeFulvio di Blasi, God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas

AquinasHenrik Syse, Natural Law, Religion, and RightsGeorge J. Marlin, The American Catholic VoterPeter Augustine Lawler, Homeless and at Home in America:

Evidence for the Dignity of the Human Soul in Our Time andPlace

Josef Pieper, Leisure, the Basis of CultureJosef Pieper, In Tune with the World: A Theory of FestivityRoger Scruton, The Meaning of ConservatismRoger Scruton, An Intelligent Persons Guide to Modern CultureC.S. Lewis, The Latin Letters of C.S. LewisGabriel Marcel, Man against Mass SocietyRmi Brague, Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western CivilizationMichael Davis, Wonderlust: Ruminations on Liberal EducationStanley Rosen, Platos StatesmanStanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical EssayBernard OConnor, Papal Diplomacy: John Paul II and the Culture

of PeaceFriedrich Nietzsche, On the Future of Our Educational InstitutionsFriedrich Nietzsche, Prefaces to Unwritten WorksLeszek Kolakowski, My Correct Views on EverythingE. Michael Jones, The Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal as Ethnic

CleansingJames V. Schall, The Sum Total of Human HappinessRalph McInerny, The Defamation of Pius XII

A Disquisition on Government

John C. Calhoun

Edited with an Introductionby H. Lee Cheek, Jr.

ST. AUGUSTINES PRESSSouth Bend, Indiana

2007

Copyright 2007 by H. Lee Cheek, Jr.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, storedin a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, with-out the prior permission of St. Augustines Press.

Manufactured in the United States of America.

1 2 3 4 5 12 11 10 09 08 07

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataCalhoun, John C. (John Caldwell), 17821850.

A disquisition on government / John C. Calhoun; edited with anintroduction by H. Lee Cheek, Jr.

p. cm.This edition of The Disquisition is taken from Volume 1 of TheWorks of John C. Calhoun (Columbia, S.C.: A. S. Johnson, 1851), which was republished by D. Appleton and Company of New York City in 1853. No effort to modernize or change any aspect of the text has been undertaken.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN-13: 978-1-58731-185-7 (paperbound: alk. paper)ISBN-10: 1-58731-185-2 (paperbound: alk. paper)1. Political science. 2. United States Politics and government. I. Cheek, H. Lee. II. Title.

JK216.C15 2007320 dc22 2007027942

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements ofthe American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence ofPaper for Printed Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

ST. AUGUSTINES PRESSwww.staugustine.net

A Note on the TextThis edition of The Disquisition is taken from Volume 1 of The Worksof John C. Calhoun (Columbia, S.C.: A. S. Johnson, 1851), whichwas republished by D. Appleton and Company of New York City in1853. No effort to modernize or change any aspect of the text hasbeen undertaken.

For Two Great Tarheels

Howard Lee Cheek, my Father and Southern Gentleman; andDr. Clyde N. Wilson, Jr., the pre-eminent scholar of Calhouns

life and political thought

Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction xi

A Disquisition on Government 1

Bibliography for Additional Study 82

Index 87

Acknowledgments

Financial support from Brewton-Parker College and LeeUniversity was of great assistance to the editor in preparingthis volume for publication.

Special thanks are due to the editors friends and advisors:Joseph Abe Fornieri, Sean Busick, Steve Ealy, TimGoodman, Bob Paquette, Clyde Wilson, Tim Sifert, GeorgeCarey, Carey Roberts, Kevin Gutzman, Gary Gregg, BruceFrohnen, Clyde Ellis, Tom Metallo, Mary Waalkes, HarryBayne, and Jeff Nelson.

The editorial assistance and philosophical insight offeredby Reverend Allen Rea was indispensable to the completion ofthis project. My wife, Kathy B. Cheek, deserves praise for tol-erating my hyperactivity.

Without the keen judgment and patience of Bruce andBenjamin Fingerhut, this edited volume would have never beenpublished. Bruce is a magnanimous editor, publisher, andfriendand a defender of the inherited tradition of wisdomand self-restraint.

Introduction

Background

John Caldwell Calhoun was born in 1782 near Abbeville,South Carolina. Calhouns educational opportunities were lim-ited, albeit advanced by the occasional tutelage offered by hisbrother-in-law, Reverend Moses Waddel. After his parentsdeath and a period of self-education, Calhoun entered YaleCollege, studying under the arch-Federalist Dr. TimothyDwight. He proceeded to study law under Judge Tapping Reeveat the Litchfield Law School in Connecticut, the most promi-nent institution devoted to legal training during this period.Returning to his native South Carolina to practice law, a pur-suit he considered both dry and laborious, Calhoun wasmarried and served two terms in the South CarolinaLegislature until elected to the U.S. House of Representativesin 1811. As a congressman, Calhoun continued to embodyrepublican principles and acquired the reputation as a moralstatesman who regarded republicanism and patriotism as syn-onymous: he supported the War of 1812; he revised Madisonsoriginal national bank proposal and backed limited internalimprovements; and he continued to praise a free economy anda regime founded upon reason and equity that was sur-rounded by a world of fraud, violence or accident.

President Monroe asked Calhoun to assume the helm at theWar Department in 1817, where he served until 1825. Calhounwas generally considered too philosophical for such a practicalpost, but he accepted the appointment out of a republican

sense of duty. In the course of two terms in office Calhoun com-pletely reorganized and revitalized the War Department and itsgeneral staff, resolved its financial problems resulting from thewar, and demonstrated a new, more compassionate approachto Native American affairs. Calhoun also began reforming WestPoint through a new spirit of openness in terms of admissionsand administrative procedures. Calhoun has been described asthe ablest war secretary the government had before JeffersonDavis in 1853.

A broad spectrum of supporters encouraged Calhouns can-didacy for president in 1824 against his fellow cabinet mem-bers William H. Crawford and John Quincy Adams, Speaker ofthe House Henry Clay, and war hero and newly elected sena-tor, Andrew Jackson. Initially entering the presidential field,Calhoun realized he lacked adequate support and withdrewafter Pennsylvania nominated Andrew Jackson. Accepting thevice-presidential nomination, Calhoun was elected by a largemajority. The results in the presidential contest betweenJackson and Adams were inconclusive in terms of the electoraland popular vote, and the election was thrown into theHouse of Representatives, where Jacksons nemesis Clay servedas speaker. In an unusual series of events, Clay came toAdamss aid, with the House vote securing the election forAdams. The president-elect proceeded to appoint Clay as sec-retary of state. Many Americans considered the supposedarrangement between Clay and Adams a corrupt bargain.Calhoun believed the corrupt bargain had disrupted the bal-ance between preserving liberty and assuming power explicitlyreserved to the people; improperly acquired power woulddoubtless be improperly used, he opined. Calhoun and eitherAdams or his representative engaged in a pseudonymousdebate about the sources of political power.1 Thereafter,Calhoun began to separate himself from what he considered to

xii H. LEE CHEEK, JR.

1 See H. Lee Cheek, Jr., Sean R. Busick, and Carey M. Roberts,eds., Republicanism and Liberty: The Patrick Henry Onslow Debate (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2008).

Introduction xiii

be Adamss abuses of office, and supported General AndrewJackson in 1828. It was as part of this ticket, later known asthe Democratic Party, that Calhoun was elected vice-presidentin 1828.

The falling apart of the political union between Calhounand Jackson is one of the most remarkable events in Americanpolitics. Calhoun had hoped Jackson would assume the repub-lican political mantle, but his expectations were not fulfilled.When Jackson decided to seek a second term and selectedMartin Van Buren as his vice-presidential candidate, Calhounbecame more concerned about the corruptibility of the admin-istration.

As a result of the dispute with Jackson, Calhoun resignedas vice-president and was elected to the Senate. In an attemptto moderate the crisis posed by tariff-related concerns and theForce Bill in 1832, Calhoun questioned the prospect of pre-serving the union by force, and not relying on the harmoniousaggregate of the States. To this point in his career as a states-man, Calhoun had made few statements regarding slavery.Troubled by the increasing influence of abolitionism and therise of sectional conflict, Calhoun would devote the remainderof his life to defending his native region and the ideas of theFounders. Retiring from the Senate in 1843, he unsuccessfullypursued the presidency for the last time. In 1844, Calhoun wasappointed as secretary of state.

Returning to the Senate in 1845, Calhoun served as athoughtful critic of the war with Mexico, and accuratelywarned that the conflict would encourage disharmony betweenthe North and South. In 1844, Calhoun helped contain a trulyrevolutionary Bluffton Movement composed of his fellowSouth Carolinians. Many leading South Carolina politiciansthreatened drastic responses to a troublesome new tariff andTexas annexation. Calhouns success at moderating the conflictdemonstrated both his restraint in a crisis situation and hislack of control over the politicians often described asCalhounites due to their intimate ties to the statesman.

Published after his death, Calhouns two treatises on polit-ical theory and American constitutionalism, the Disquisitionand Discourse, demonstrate his hope that America could avoidthe impending conflict. Calhouns persistent concern about theunequal treatment of the South would, he feared, lead toincreased regional tensions and to civil war. His last years werespent attempting to unify the South and avoid strife. On March31, 1850, Calhoun died in Washington, D.C. Calhouns under-standing of restraint within political order, albeit imperfect,remains one of the most important characteristics of his polit-ical thought and his achievement as a statesman. In Calhounsinterpretation, the interposing and amending power of thestates implicit in the Constitution could only augment authen-tic popular rule by allowing for a greater diffusion of authori-ty. Calhouns purpose was the preservation of the original bal-ance of authority and the fortification of the American politi-cal system against the obstacles it faced.

The Disquisition as Calhouns Science of GovernmentAs Calhoun confided to his daughter Anna Maria, the

impetus for composing the Disquisition was to provide a solidfoundation for political science2 to assist future generations ofAmericans:

I finished yesterday, the preliminary work, which treatsof the elementary principles of the Science ofGovernment, except reading it over and making finalcorrections, previous to copying and publishing. Ittakes 125 pages of large foolscap closely written forme. I am pretty well satisfied with its execution. It willbe nearly throughout new territory . . .3

xiv H. LEE CHEEK, JR.

2 To Mrs. T. G. Clemson, June 15, 1848, in Correspondence ofJohn C. Calhoun, ed. J. Franklin Jameson, in AmericanHistorical Association Annual Report for 1899, Vol. 2 (Washing-ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 768.

3 Ibid.

Introduction xv

In the Disquisition Calhoun presented a theory of politicsthat is both original and in accord with the mainstream of theAmerican political tradition. More than any other contempo-rary thinker of his period, Calhoun sought to explain theenduring qualities of American political thought in light of thetroubled world of the mid-nineteenth century. In characteriz-ing his Disquisition as new territory, Calhoun was merelyattempting to describe his treatise on the foundations of poli-tics as his first and only systematic examination of these pri-mary concerns. Unlike other theorists who had preceded andwould follow Calhoun, both American and European, he didnot seek to invent a new mode of philosophical speculation ora grand theory for the human sciences. Instead, he attempt-ed to offer a refinement of classical, medieval, and modernnotions regarding the relationship between government andthe social order. As an effort in philosophical retrenchment, theDisquisition strengthened many pre-existing conceptionsregarding political liberty and popular rule within theAmerican regime, while offering such insight with a viewtowards the future that awaited America.

The roundabout and often unreflective manner of Disquisi-tion criticism frequently portrays the work as a reactionary,liberal, or utopian framework for defending Southern institu-tions against the impending crisis in American society. In onesense the work is reactionary, as it sought a recovery of SouthAtlantic republican thought and institutions. The reformsassociated with the Jackson presidency, abolitionism, and dem-ocratic theory were for Calhoun illusory, momentary, andcounterproductive, and he identified the limitations connectedwith this metamorphosis of republican political thought into ademocratic ideology throughout his life. The transition from astable, disciplined mode of popular rule to an undisciplinedspoils system convinced Calhoun that a recovery of the ear-lier ethos was necessary if the country were to survive. Theoriginal grounding of democratic ideas within a decentral-ized political order came under greater scrutiny

during the 1830s and 1840s. With the election of AndrewJackson to the presidency in 1828, the previously acceptedunderstanding of the national governments proper share ofactivity as explained by the Constitution and political practicebegan to erode.4 Long-standing provisions designed to promotearistocratic restraints upon uninformed or partisan opinion asa means of preserving the regime also came under attack. Asearly as 1826, Calhoun expressed his concerns to Jackson:

An issue has been fairly made, as it seems to me,between power and liberty; and it must be determined. . . whether the real governing principle in our politi-cal system be the power and patronage of theExecutive, or the voice of the people.5

For Calhoun, the ensuing Jacksonian Revolution tendedto denigrate these older principles within the polity, preferringinstead to celebrate the assumption of powers and centraliza-tion of authority by the national government that was neitherconferred by the Constitution nor the laws, but in derogationof both.6

Calhouns accomplishment lies in his gift for diagnosis,although his death in 1850 prohibited a more integrated par-ticipation in the cure. Many who would attempt to assumeCalhouns philosophical and political mantle during the nine-teenth and twentieth centuries actually committed a greatinjustice to his political theory by ignoring its more abidingqualities. In articulating the inherited understanding of prop-erly constituted popular rule for his political situation, Calhounmay be called the last of the Founders. The worldview heimbibed from early life, his own republican understanding of

xvi H. LEE CHEEK, JR.

4 To Samuel D. Ingham, July 31, 1831, in The Papers of John C.Calhoun (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press,1978), Vol. XI, p. 442 [Hereafter cited as Papers.].

5 To Andrew Jackson, June 4, 1826, in Papers, Vol. X, p. 110.6 Speech on the Presidents Protest, May 6, 1834, in Papers, Vol.

XII, p. 303.

Introduction xvii

popular rule, and his efforts directed towards preventing thedissolution of the regime are indicators of both an attachmentto and a willingness to defend the American republic. Whileneither providing a programmatic transition to the future norsimply rearticulating an appreciation of constitutional restraintwithin popular rule, Calhoun presented an authentic and pre-scient American understanding of social and political life thatcould contribute even today to remedying problems associatedwith popular rule in America and elsewhere. Having alluded toseveral aspects of this potential contribution, we shall now pro-ceed to examine the Disquisition as the primary theoreticalguide for assimilating Calhouns political thought into a philo-sophical whole.

To appreciate Calhoun, we must acknowledge that theDisquisition was a work of political theory, not a compendiumof esoteric knowledge. While presenting the intrinsic limita-tions of the Disquisition, we also recognize the treatise as partof a continuing conversation on Americas political heritage. Inthis regard, Calhoun stood at the crossroads between the earlyrepublic and modern America. As we approach Calhounspolitical theory in the Disquisition, contemporary Americanswill find encouragement for confronting the persistent andoften bewildering problems associated with popular rule andperpetuating the Founders design for dividing politicalauthority.

Most theories of politics, including the Disquisition,attempt to provide an assessment of human nature. A prudentpolitical philosophy must rest upon such a fundamental com-prehension, reflecting the understanding of the author and histheoretical universe. According to the Disquisition, humannature is expressed in terms of the constitution or law of ournature. In describing the human predicament in this fashion,Calhoun affirmed the Hebraic-Christian conception of humannature, which views humanity as divided between the higherand lower ethical possibilities, and in need of personal andsocietal restraint as protection against the impulse of the

xviii H. LEE CHEEK, JR.

moment. Calhouns theory of human nature also rejected socialcontractarian typologies devoted to promoting humankindsinert strength and virtue or ability to survive amidst isolation.Calhoun contended that a mans primary obligation lies in hiscommunity. Self-discipline and love of neighbor begin with theindividual, and spread to the community, and then to societyas a whole. In other words, the constitution or law of ournature serves to define the limitations of society and politicsfor Calhoun on one hand, while on the other it presupposes anddefends the necessity of a properly constituted community forsecuring the moral and ethical results concomitant to societysperpetuation.

Calhouns constitution or law of nature resembles theDeclaration of Independences Laws of nature and of NaturesGod, as both affirmed humanitys situation between theearthly and the transcendent. The implicit role of the transcen-dent at the beginning of the Disquisition becomes explicit asthe work unfolds. From an early point within the DisquisitionCalhouns concern for the transcendent is apparent, although itnever became the predominant aspect of his political thought.The American republic possessed a providential quality, perse-vering against great obstacles, and warranting Calhouns use ofthis tension for explaining the countrys political enduranceand prospects for its future. It is surprising that the theologicaldoctrine of providence exhibited throughout Calhouns writ-ings has escaped the attention of nearly every student of his lifeand work, suggesting an inability within the scholarly commu-nity to acknowledge and appreciate Calhouns philosophicaland theological acumen, as well as the role these concernsassumed in his political thought. To neglect Calhouns relationwith the spiritual, or to demean him as an anti-religionist ofsome variety, implies a failure to comprehend adequately hisself-understanding and his analysis of political crisis.

Continuing to approach the fundamental questions of thehuman condition, Calhoun undertook a comprehensive anddemanding process of examination. As with Aristotle, the

practicality of everyday life for Calhoun often coincided withthe need for contemplation and reflection.7 Amidst a long andconsuming public career filled with tremendous professionaland familial obligations, Calhoun acknowledged the need for aserious study of the great principles of politics and the morallife. Relying upon his lengthy involvement in government andcapacity for contemplation, Calhoun began his sustained med-itations on the elementary principles of political science inearnest nearly five years before his death, although his initialforay into composing the work came much earlier.8 In 1841Calhoun noted to Orestes Brownson that he had commencedand made some progress towards developing his views ofGovernment.9 His lifelong study resulted in the Disquisition,a science of government for apprehending the nature andobject of politics for the rising generation.10

The Enduring Significance of The DisquisitionThis edition of the Disquisition should encourage the

thoughtful reader to view Calhoun as an original politicalthinker. Calhoun was both a lover of the American regime andhis native region. For Calhoun the recovery of a proper mode ofpopular rule was dependent upon a return to the ideas of theFounding; such a project could not be accomplished withoutrevisiting and expounding the primitive principles and experi-ences of the Founding generation for a new day. Calhoun devot-ed his life to this task and his writings are the most profoundexamples of this attempt at recovery and self-understanding,

Introduction xix

7 Aristotle, Ethics 1106a201107a1, trans. J. A. K. Thompson(London: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 100101.

8 To John Alfred Calhoun, April 2, 1845, in Papers, Vol. XXI,pp. 46566.

9 To Orestes A. Brownson, October 31, 1841 in Papers, Vol. XV,p. 801.

10 John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government (St. Augustine'sPress, 2007), p. 1.

reframed for a nineteenth-century America that was consumedby new challenges.

For Calhoun, our political inheritance was establishedupon an appreciation of the necessary limitations of social andpolitical life. Primary among the means of limitation was theneed for societal and personal restraint when faced with thepossibility of radical transformation. While change and socialmobility were not the most commonly acknowledged aspects ofSouthern society, neither were such considerations beyond thepale of possibility. As an articulate representative of agrarianrepublicanism during the early and mid-nineteenth century,Calhoun could present an Aristotelian mean as the basis forinstalling an element of restraint in the operation of govern-ment. If government could not be restricted, the regime wouldnecessarily lose a sense of liberty and the populaces role ingoverning would be greatly diminished. Government, with itsuse and abuse of power, must become more moderate, or suf-fer its eventual demise.

The quality of restraint was instilled and encouraged by avast number of sources including the works of antiquity, thetreatises of Christian authors, and the genius of the foundinggeneration. Living within a society aware of its constraints,Calhoun also appreciated the limits of human experience,acknowledging the shortcomings of his own perspectives andholding utopian schemes in disdain. The necessary balancebetween the need for popular participation in the governmentand the need to avoid the potential excesses of popular ruleguided Calhouns philosophical mission. In this regard,Calhouns political theory should be understood as a reflectivejourney towards recovering genuine popular rule amidst thenational crises during his career as a statesman and politicalphilosopher.

Due to the complexity of Calhouns inherited worldviewand experiences, and his own psyche, discernible policy formu-lations were not always the result of his theoretical labors.

xx H. LEE CHEEK, JR.

Consequently, Calhoun was often criticized for his metaphys-ical approach to politics. Instead of dismissing Calhoun on thegrounds that he at some junctures did not conform to the moldof a practical political thinker, this edition seeks to appreci-ate and explicate his principled disavowal of efforts to dimin-ish the Western traditions attachment to individual and socialresponsibility in an effort to seek the deeper truths regardingpolitical life as a means of preserving the republic. Calhounpresents a political theory girded by a doctrine of restraint thatwould develop into a collective self-understanding that wasgrounded in a moral obligation to restore the regime to its orig-inal principles.

A thoughtful reading of the Disquisition will suggest thatCalhoun made a lasting contribution to American politics. Hisworldview serves as the philosophical foundation for a full-fledged theory of politics, and one that is of significance to allstudents of politics and limited government. For Calhoun,restraint and concern for the common good were more impor-tant than the perpetuation of any particular regime or politicalparty. In presenting Calhoun and his Disquisition in such amanner, it is hoped that he might be appreciated as a thinkerof great importance for the modern world.

Introduction xxi

A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT

In order to have a clear and just conception of the natureand object of government, it is indispensable to understandcorrectly what that constitution or law of our nature is, inwhich government originates; or, to express it more fully andaccurately,that law, without which government would not,and with which, it must necessarily exist. Without this, it is asimpossible to lay any solid foundation for the science of gov-ernment, as it would be to lay one for that of astronomy, with-out a like understanding of that constitution or law of thematerial world, according to which the several bodies compos-ing the solar system mutually act on each other, and by whichthey are kept in their respective spheres. The first question,accordingly, to be considered is,What is that constitution orlaw of our nature, without which government would not exist,and with which its existence is necessary?

In considering this, I assume, as an incontestable fact, thatman is so constituted as to be a social being. His inclinationsand wants, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to asso-ciate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found,in any age or country, in any state other than the social. In noother, indeed, could he exist; and in no other,were it possiblefor him to exist,could he attain to a full development of hismoral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself, in the scale ofbeing, much above the level of the brute creation.

I next assume, also, as a fact not less incontestable, that,while man is so constituted as to make the social state necessary

to his existence and the full development of his faculties, thisstate itself cannot exist without government. The assumptionrests on universal experience. In no age or country has anysociety or community ever been found, whether enlightened orsavage, without government of some description.

Having assumed these, as unquestionable phenomena ofour nature, I shall, without further remark, proceed to theinvestigation of the primary and important question,What isthat constitution of our nature, which, while it impels man toassociate with his kind, renders it impossible for society to existwithout government?

The answer will be found in the fact, (not less incontestablethan either of the others,) that, while man is created for thesocial state, and is accordingly so formed as to feel what affectsothers, as well as what affects himself, he is, at the same time,so constituted as to feel more intensely what affects him direct-ly, than what affects him indirectly through others; or, toexpress it differently, he is so constituted, that his direct orindividual affections are stronger than his sympathetic orsocial feelings. I intentionally avoid the expression, selfish feel-ings, as applicable to the former; because, as commonly used,it implies an unusual excess of the individual over the socialfeelings, in the person to whom it is applied; and, consequent-ly, something depraved and vicious. My object is, to excludesuch inference, and to restrict the inquiry exclusively to facts intheir bearings on the subject under consideration, viewed asmere phenomena appertaining to our nature,constituted as itis; and which are as unquestionable as is that of gravitation, orany other phenomenon of the material world.

In asserting that our individual are stronger than our socialfeelings, it is not intended to deny that there are instances,growing out of peculiar relations,as that of a mother and herinfant,or resulting from the force of education and habit overpeculiar constitutions, in which the latter have overpoweredthe former; but these instances are few, and always regarded as

2 JOHN C. CALHOUN

something extraordinary. The deep impression they make,whenever they occur, is the strongest proof that they areregarded as exceptions to some general and well understoodlaw of our nature; just as some of the minor powers of thematerial world are apparently to gravitation.

I might go farther, and assert this to be a phenomenon, notof our nature only, but of all animated existence, throughout itsentire range, so far as our knowledge extends. It would, indeed,seem to be essentially connected with the great law of self-preservation which pervades all that feels, from man down tothe lowest and most insignificant reptile or insect. In none is itstronger than in man. His social feelings may, indeed, in a stateof safety and abundance, combined with high intellectual andmoral culture, acquire great expansion and force; but not sogreat as to overpower this all-pervading and essential law ofanimated existence.

But that constitution of our nature which makes us feelmore intensely what affects us directly than what affects usindirectly through others, necessarily leads to conflict betweenindividuals. Each, in consequence, has a greater regard for hisown safety or happiness, than for the safety or happiness ofothers; and, where these come in opposition, is ready to sacri-fice the interests of others to his own. And hence, the tendencyto a universal state of conflict, between individual and individ-ual; accompanied by the connected passions of suspicion, jeal-ousy, anger and revenge,followed by insolence, fraud andcruelty;and, if not prevented by some controlling power,ending in a state of universal discord and confusion, destruc-tive of the social state and the ends for which it is ordained.This controlling power, wherever vested, or by whomsoeverexercised, is GOVERNMENT.

It follows, then, that man is so constituted, that govern-ment is necessary to the existence of society, and society to hisexistence, and the perfection of his faculties. It follows, also,that government has its origin in this twofold constitution of


his nature; the sympathetic or social feelings constituting theremote,and the individual or direct, the proximate cause.

If man had been differently constituted in either particu-lar;if, instead of being social in his nature, he had been cre-ated without sympathy for his kind, and independent of othersfor his safety and existence; or if, on the other hand, he hadbeen so created, as to feel more intensely what affected othersthan what affected himself, (if that were possible,) or, even,had this supposed interest been equal,it is manifest that, ineither case, there would have been no necessity for govern-ment, and that none would ever have existed. But, althoughsociety and government are thus intimately connected with anddependent on each other,of the two society is the greater. Itis the first in the order of things, and in the dignity of its object;that of society being primary,to preserve and perfect ourrace; and that of government secondary and subordinate, topreserve and perfect society. Both are, however, necessary tothe existence and well-being of our race, and equally of Divineordination.

I have said,if it were possible for man to be so constitut-ed, as to feel what affects others more strongly than whataffects himself, or even as strongly,because, it may be welldoubted, whether the stronger feeling or affection of individu-als for themselves, combined with a feebler and subordinatefeeling or affection for others, is not, in beings of limited rea-son and faculties, a constitution necessary to their preservationand existence. If reversed,if their feelings and affections werestronger for others than for themselves, or even as strong, thenecessary result would seem to be, that all individuality wouldbe lost; and boundless and remediless disorder and confusionwould ensue. For each, at the same moment, intensely partici-pating in all the conflicting emotions of those around him,would, of course, forget himself and all that concerned himimmediately, in his officious intermeddling with the affairs ofall others; which, from his limited reason and faculties, he

4 JOHN C. CALHOUN

could neither properly understand nor manage. Such a state ofthings would, as far as we can see, lead to endless disorder andconfusion, not less destructive to our race than a state of anar-chy. It would, besides, be remediless,for government wouldbe impossible; or, if it could by possibility exist, its objectwould be reversed. Selfishness would have to be encouraged,and benevolence discouraged. Individuals would have to beencouraged, by rewards, to become more selfish, and deterred,by punishments, from being too benevolent; and this, too, by agovernment, administered by those who, on the supposition,would have the greatest aversion for selfishness and the high-est admiration for benevolence.

To the Infinite Being, the Creator of all, belongs exclusive-ly the care and superintendence of the whole. He, in his infi-nite wisdom and goodness, has allotted to every class of ani-mated beings its condition and appropriate functions; and hasendowed each with feelings, instincts, capacities, and faculties,best adapted to its allotted condition. To man, he has assignedthe social and political state, as best adapted to develop thegreat capacities and faculties, intellectual and moral, withwhich he has endowed him; and has, accordingly, constitutedhim so as not only to impel him into the social state, but tomake government necessary for his preservation and well-being.

But government, although intended to protect and preservesociety, has itself a strong tendency to disorder and abuse of itspowers, as all experience and almost every page of history tes-tify. The cause is to be found in the same constitution of ournature which makes government indispensable. The powerswhich it is necessary for government to possess, in order torepress violence and preserve order, cannot execute themselves.They must be administered by men in whom, like others, theindividual are stronger than the social feelings. And hence, thepowers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression onthe part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by them converted


into instruments to oppress the rest of the community. That, bywhich this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what ismeant by CONSTITUTION, in its most comprehensive sense, whenapplied to GOVERNMENT.

Having its origin in the same principle of our nature, con-stitution stands to government, as government stands to socie-ty; and, as the end for which society is ordained, would bedefeated without government, so that for which government isordained would, in a great measure, be defeated without con-stitution. But they differ in this striking particular. There is nodifficulty in forming government. It is not even a matter ofchoice, whether there shall be one or not. Like breathing, it isnot permitted to depend on our volition. Necessity will force iton all communities in some one form or another. Very differentis the case as to constitution. Instead of a matter of necessity, itis one of the most difficult tasks imposed on man to form aconstitution worthy of the name; while, to form a perfectone,one that would completely counteract the tendency ofgovernment to oppression and abuse, and hold it strictly to thegreat ends for which it is ordained,has thus far exceededhuman wisdom, and possibly ever will. From this, anotherstriking difference results. Constitution is the contrivance ofman, while government is of Divine ordination. Man is left toperfect what the wisdom of the Infinite ordained, as necessaryto preserve the race.

With these remarks, I proceed to the consideration of theimportant and difficult question: How is this tendency of gov-ernment to be counteracted? Or, to express it more fully,Howcan those who are invested with the powers of government beprevented from employing them, as the means of aggrandizingthemselves, instead of using them to protect and preserve soci-ety? It cannot be done by instituting a higher power to controlthe government, and those who administer it. This would bebut to change the seat of authority, and to make this higherpower, in reality, the government; with the same tendency, on

6 JOHN C. CALHOUN

the part of those who might control its powers, to pervert theminto instruments of aggrandizement. Nor can it be done by lim-iting the powers of government, so as to make it too feeble tobe made an instrument of abuse; for, passing by the difficultyof so limiting its powers, without creating a power higher thanthe government itself to enforce the observance of the limita-tions, it is a sufficient objection that it would, if practicable,defeat the end for which government is ordained, by making ittoo feeble to protect and preserve society. The powers neces-sary for this purpose will ever prove sufficient to aggrandizethose who control it, at the expense of the rest of the commu-nity.

In estimating what amount of power would be requisite tosecure the objects of government, we must take into the reck-oning, what would be necessary to defend the communityagainst external, as well as internal dangers. Government mustbe able to repel assaults from abroad, as well as to repress vio-lence and disorders within. It must not be overlooked, that thehuman race is not comprehended in a single society or commu-nity. The limited reason and faculties of man, the great diver-sity of language, customs, pursuits, situation and complexion,and the difficulty of intercourse, with various other causes,have, by their operation, formed a great many separate com-munities, acting independently of each other. Between thesethere is the same tendency to conflict,and from the sameconstitution of our nature,as between men individually; andeven stronger,because the sympathetic or social feelings arenot so strong between different communities, as between indi-viduals of the same community. So powerful, indeed, is thistendency, that it has led to almost incessant wars between con-tiguous communities for plunder and conquest, or to avengeinjuries, real or supposed.

So long as this state of things continues, exigencies willoccur, in which the entire powers and resources of the commu-nity will be needed to defend its existence. When this is at


stake, every other consideration must yield to it. Self-preserva-tion is the supreme law, as well with communities as individu-als. And hence the danger of withholding from government thefull command of the power and resources of the state; and thegreat difficulty of limiting its powers consistently with the pro-tection and preservation of the community. And hence thequestion recurs,By what means can government, withoutbeing divested of the full command of the resources of the com-munity, be prevented from abusing its powers?

The question involves difficulties which, from the earliestages, wise and good men have attempted to overcome;buthitherto with but partial success. For this purpose manydevices have been resorted to, suited to the various stages ofintelligence and civilization through which our race has passed,and to the different forms of government to which they havebeen applied. The aid of superstition, ceremonies, education,religion, organic arrangements, both of the government andthe community, has been, from time to time, appealed to. Someof the most remarkable of these devices, whether regarded inreference to their wisdom and the skill displayed in their appli-cation, or to the permanency of their effects, are to be found inthe early dawn of civilization;in the institutions of theEgyptians, the Hindoos, the Chinese, and the Jews. The onlymaterials which that early age afforded for the construction ofconstitutions, when intelligence was so partially diffused, wereapplied with consummate wisdom and skill. To their success-ful application may be fairly traced the subsequent advance ofour race in civilization and intelligence, of which we now enjoythe benefits. For, without a constitution,something to coun-teract the strong tendency of government to disorder andabuse, and to give stability to political institutions,there canbe little progress or permanent improvement.

In answering the important question under consideration,it is not necessary to enter into an examination of the variouscontrivances adopted by these celebrated governments to

8 JOHN C. CALHOUN

counteract this tendency to disorder and abuse, nor to under-take to treat of constitution in its most comprehensive sense.What I propose is far more limited,to explain on what prin-ciples government must be formed, in order to resist, by itsown interior structure,or, to use a single term, organism,the tendency to abuse of power. This structure, or organism, iswhat is meant by constitution, in its strict and more usualsense; and it is this which distinguishes, what are called, con-stitutional governments from absolute. It is in this strict andmore usual sense that I propose to use the term hereafter.

How government, then, must be constructed, in order tocounteract, through its organism, this tendency on the part ofthose who make and execute the laws to oppress those subjectto their operation, is the next question which claims attention.

There is but one way in which this can possibly be done;and that is, by such an organism as will furnish the ruled withthe means of resisting successfully this tendency on the part ofthe rulers to oppression and abuse. Power can only be resistedby power,and tendency by tendency. Those who exercisepower and those subject to its exercise,the rulers and theruled,stand in antagonistic relations to each other. The sameconstitution of our nature which leads rulers to oppress theruled,regardless of the object for which government isordained,will, with equal strength, lead the ruled to resist,when possessed of the means of making peaceable and effec-tive resistance. Such an organism, then, as will furnish themeans by which resistance may be systematically and peace-ably made on the part of the ruled, to oppression and abuse ofpower on the part of the rulers, is the first and indispensablestep towards forming a constitutional government. And as thiscan only be effected by or through the right of suffrage,(theright on the part of the ruled to choose their rulers at properintervals, and to hold them thereby responsible for their con-duct,)the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled, through theright of suffrage, is the indispensable and primary principle in


the foundation of a constitutional government. When this rightis properly guarded, and the people sufficiently enlightened tounderstand their own rights and the interests of the communi-ty, and duly to appreciate the motives and conduct of thoseappointed to make and execute the laws, it is all-sufficient togive to those who elect, effective control over those they haveelected.

I call the right of suffrage the indispensable and primaryprinciple; for it would be a great and dangerous mistake tosuppose, as many do, that it is, of itself, sufficient to form con-stitutional governments. To this erroneous opinion may betraced one of the causes, why so few attempts to form consti-tutional governments have succeeded; and why, of the fewwhich have, so small a number have had durable existence. Ithas led, not only to mistakes in the attempts to form such gov-ernments, but to their overthrow, when they have, by somegood fortune, been correctly formed. So far from being, ofitself, sufficient,however well guarded it might be, and how-ever enlightened the people,it would, unaided by other pro-visions, leave the government as absolute, as it would be in thehands of irresponsible rulers; and with a tendency, at least asstrong, towards oppression and abuse of its powers; as I shallnext proceed to explain.

The right of suffrage, of itself, can do no more than givecomplete control to those who elect, over the conduct of thosethey have elected. In doing this, it accomplishes all it possiblycan accomplish. This is its aim,and when this is attained, itsend is fulfilled. It can do no more, however enlightened thepeople, or however widely extended or well guarded the rightmay be. The sum total, then, of its effects, when most success-ful, is, to make those elected, the true and faithful representa-tives of those who elected them,instead of irresponsiblerulers,as they would be without it; and thus, by converting itinto an agency, and the rulers into agents, to divest governmentof all claims to sovereignty, and to retain it unimpaired to the

10 JOHN C. CALHOUN

community. But it is manifest that the right of suffrage, inmaking these changes, transfers, in reality, the actual controlover the government, from those who make and execute thelaws, to the body of the community; and, thereby, places thepowers of the government as fully in the mass of the commu-nity, as they would be if they, in fact, had assembled, made,and executed the laws themselves, without the intervention ofrepresentatives or agents. The more perfectly it does this, themore perfectly it accomplishes its ends; but in doing so, it onlychanges the seat of authority, without counteracting, in theleast, the tendency of the government to oppression and abuseof its powers.

If the whole community had the same interests, so that theinterests of each and every portion would be so affected by theaction of the government, that the laws which oppressed orimpoverished one portion, would necessarily oppress andimpoverish all others,or the reverse,then the right of suf-frage, of itself, would be all-sufficient to counteract the tenden-cy of the government to oppression and abuse of its powers;and, of course, would form, of itself, a perfect constitutionalgovernment. The interest of all being the same, by supposition,as far as the action of the government was concerned, all wouldhave like interests as to what laws should be made, and howthey should be executed. All strife and struggle would cease asto who should be elected to make and execute them. The onlyquestion would be, who was most fit; who the wisest and mostcapable of understanding the common interest of the whole.This decided, the election would pass off quietly, and withoutparty discord; as no one portion could advance its own pecu-liar interest without regard to the rest, by electing a favoritecandidate.

But such is not the case. On the contrary, nothing is moredifficult than to equalize the action of the government, in ref-erence to the various and diversified interests of the communi-ty; and nothing more easy than to pervert its powers into


instruments to aggrandize and enrich one or more interests byoppressing and impoverishing the others; and this too, underthe operation of laws, couched in general terms;and which,on their face, appear fair and equal. Nor is this the case insome particular communities only. It is so in all; the small andthe great,the poor and the rich,irrespective of pursuits,productions, or degrees of civilization;with, however, thisdifference, that the more extensive and populous the country,the more diversified the condition and pursuits of its popula-tion, and the richer, more luxurious, and dissimilar the people,the more difficult is it to equalize the action of the govern-ment,and the more easy for one portion of the community topervert its powers to oppress, and plunder the other.

Such being the case, it necessarily results, that the right ofsuffrage, by placing the control of the government in the com-munity must, from the same constitution of our nature whichmakes government necessary to preserve society, lead to con-flict among its different interests,each striving to obtain pos-session of its powers, as the means of protecting itself againstthe others;or of advancing its respective interests, regardlessof the interests of others. For this purpose, a struggle will takeplace between the various interests to obtain a majority, inorder to control the government. If no one interest be strongenough, of itself, to obtain it, a combination will be formedbetween those whose interests are most alike;each concedingsomething to the others, until a sufficient number is obtainedto make a majority. The process may be slow, and much timemay be required before a compact, organized majority can bethus formed; but formed it will be in time, even without pre-concert or design, by the sure workings of that principle orconstitution of our nature in which government itself origi-nates. When once formed, the community will be divided intotwo great parties,a major and minor,between which therewill be incessant struggles on the one side to retain, and on the

12 JOHN C. CALHOUN

other to obtain the majority,and, thereby, the control of thegovernment and the advantages it confers.

So deeply seated, indeed, is this tendency to conflictbetween the different interests or portions of the community,that it would result from the action of the government itself,even though it were possible to find a community, where thepeople were all of the same pursuits, placed in the same condi-tion of life, and in every respect, so situated, as to be withoutinequality of condition or diversity of interests. The advantagesof possessing the control of the powers of the government, and,thereby, of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves,exclusive of all other considerations, ample to divide even sucha community into two great hostile parties.

In order to form a just estimate of the full force of theseadvantages,without reference to any other consideration,itmust be remembered, that government,to fulfill the ends forwhich it is ordained, and more especially that of protectionagainst external dangers,must, in the present condition ofthe world, be clothed with powers sufficient to call forth theresources of the community, and be prepared, at all times, tocommand them promptly in every emergency which may pos-sibly arise. For this purpose large establishments are necessary,both civil and military, (including naval, where, from situation,that description of force may be required,) with all the meansnecessary for prompt and effective action,such as fortifica-tions, fleets, armories, arsenals, magazines, arms of all descrip-tions, with well-trained forces, in sufficient numbers to wieldthem with skill and energy, whenever the occasion requires it.The administration and management of a government withsuch vast establishments must necessarily require a host ofemployees, agents, and officers;of whom many must be vest-ed with high and responsible trusts, and occupy exalted sta-tions, accompanied with much influence and patronage. Tomeet the necessary expenses, large sums must be collected and


disbursed; and, for this purpose, heavy taxes must be imposed,requiring a multitude of officers for their collection and dis-bursement. The whole united must necessarily place under thecontrol of government an amount of honors and emoluments,sufficient to excite profoundly the ambition of the aspiring andthe cupidity of the avaricious; and to lead to the formation ofhostile parties, and violent party conflicts and struggles toobtain the control of the government. And what makes this evilremediless, through the right of suffrage of itself, howevermodified or carefully guarded, or however enlightened the peo-ple, is the fact that, as far as the honors and emoluments of thegovernment and its fiscal action are concerned, it is impossibleto equalize it. The reason is obvious. Its honors and emolu-ments, however great, can fall to the lot of but a few, comparedto the entire number of the community, and the multitude whowill seek to participate in them. But, without this, there is areason which renders it impossible to equalize the action of thegovernment, so far as its fiscal operation extends,which Ishall next explain.

Few, comparatively, as they are, the agents and employeesof the government constitute that portion of the communitywho are the exclusive recipients of the proceeds of the taxes.Whatever amount is taken from the community, in the form oftaxes, if not lost, goes to them in the shape of expenditures ordisbursements. The two,disbursement and taxation,con-stitute the fiscal action of the government. They are correla-tives. What the one takes from the community, under the nameof taxes, is transferred to the portion of the community who arethe recipients, under that of disbursements. But, as the recipi-ents constitute only a portion of the community, it follows, tak-ing the two parts of the fiscal process together, that its actionmust be unequal between the payers of the taxes and the recip-ients of their proceeds. Nor can it be otherwise, unless what iscollected from each individual in the shape of taxes, shall bereturned to him, in that of disbursements; which would make

14 JOHN C. CALHOUN

the process nugatory and absurd. Taxation may, indeed, bemade equal, regarded separately from disbursement. Even thisis no easy task; but the two united cannot possibly be madeequal.

Such being the case, it must necessarily follow, that someone portion of the community must pay in taxes more than itreceives back in disbursements; while another receives in dis-bursements more than it pays in taxes. It is, then, manifest,taking the whole process together, that taxes must be, in effect,bounties to that portion of the community which receives morein disbursements than it pays in taxes; while, to the otherwhich pays in taxes more than it receives in disbursements,they are taxes in reality,burthens, instead of bounties. Thisconsequence is unavoidable. It results from the nature of theprocess, be the taxes ever so equally laid, and the disburse-ments ever so fairly made, in reference to the public service.

It is assumed, in coming to this conclusion, that the dis-bursements are made within the community. The reasonsassigned would not be applicable if the proceeds of the taxeswere paid in tribute, or expended in foreign countries. In eitherof these cases, the burthen would fall on all, in proportion tothe amount of taxes they respectively paid.

Nor would it be less a bounty to the portion of the commu-nity which received back in disbursements more than it paid intaxes, because received as salaries for official services; or pay-ments to persons employed in executing the works required bythe government; or furnishing it with its various supplies; orany other description of public employment,instead of beingbestowed gratuitously. It is the disbursements which give addi-tional, and, usually, very profitable and honorable employ-ments to the portion of the community where they are made.But to create such employments, by disbursements, is tobestow on the portion of the community to whose lot the dis-bursements may fall, a far more durable and lasting benefit,one that would add much more to its wealth and population,


than would the bestowal of an equal sum gratuitously: andhence, to the extent that the disbursements exceed the taxes, itmay be fairly regarded as a bounty. The very reverse is the casein reference to the portion which pays in taxes more than itreceives in disbursements. With them, profitable employmentsare diminished to the same extent, and population and wealthcorrespondingly decreased.

The necessary result, then, of the unequal fiscal action ofthe government is, to divide the community into two greatclasses; one consisting of those who, in reality, pay the taxes,and, of course, bear exclusively the burthen of supporting thegovernment; and the other, of those who are the recipients oftheir proceeds, through disbursements, and who are, in fact,supported by the government; or, in fewer words, to divide itinto tax-payers and tax-consumers.

But the effect of this is to place them in antagonistic rela-tions, in reference to the fiscal action of the government, andthe entire course of policy therewith connected. For, the greaterthe taxes and disbursements, the greater the gain of the oneand the loss of the other,and vice versa; and consequently,the more the policy of the government is calculated to increasetaxes and disbursements, the more it will be favored by the oneand opposed by the other.

The effect, then, of every increase is, to enrich andstrengthen the one, and impoverish and weaken the other.This, indeed, may be carried to such an extent, that one classor portion of the community may be elevated to wealth andpower, and the other depressed to abject poverty and depend-ence, simply by the fiscal action of the government; and thistoo, through disbursements only,even under a system ofequal taxes imposed for revenue only. If such may be theeffect of taxes and disbursements, when confined to theirlegitimate objects,that of raising revenue for the publicservice,some conception may be formed, how one portion ofthe community may be crushed, and another elevated on its

16 JOHN C. CALHOUN

ruins, by systematically perverting the power of taxation anddisbursement, for the purpose of aggrandizing and building upone portion of the community at the expense of the other. Thatit will be so used, unless prevented, is, from the constitution ofman, just as certain as that it can be so used; and that, if notprevented, it must give rise to two parties, and to violent con-flicts and struggles between them, to obtain the control of thegovernment, is, for the same reason, not less certain.

Nor is it less certain, from the operation of all these caus-es, that the dominant majority, for the time, would have thesame tendency to oppression and abuse of power, which, with-out the right of suffrage, irresponsible rulers would have. Noreason, indeed, can be assigned, why the latter would abusetheir power, which would not apply, with equal force, to theformer. The dominant majority, for the time, would, in reality,through the right of suffrage, be the rulersthe controlling,governing, and irresponsible power; and those who make andexecute the laws would, for the time, be, in reality, but theirrepresentatives and agents.

Nor would the fact that the former would constitute amajority of the community, counteract a tendency originatingin the constitution of man; and which, as such, cannot dependon the number by whom the powers of the government may bewielded. Be it greater or smaller, a majority or minority, it mustequally partake of an attribute inherent in each individualcomposing it; and, as in each the individual is stronger than thesocial feelings, the one would have the same tendency as theother to oppression and abuse of power. The reason applies togovernment in all its forms,whether it be that of the one, thefew, or the many. In each there must, of necessity, be a govern-ing and governed,a ruling and a subject portion. The oneimplies the other; and in all, the two bear the same relation toeach other;and have, on the part of the governing portion,the same tendency to oppression and abuse of power. Wherethe majority is that portion, it matters not how its powers may


be exercised;whether directly by themselves, or indirectly,through representatives or agents. Be it which it may, theminority, for the time, will be as much the governed or subjectportion, as are the people in an aristocracy, or the subjects in amonarchy. The only difference in this respect is, that in thegovernment of a majority, the minority may become the major-ity, and the majority the minority, through the right of suffrage;and thereby change their relative positions, without the inter-vention of force and revolution. But the duration, or uncertain-ty of the tenure, by which power is held, cannot, of itself, coun-teract the tendency inherent in government to oppression andabuse of power. On the contrary, the very uncertainty of thetenure, combined with the violent party warfare which mustever precede a change of parties under such governments,would rather tend to increase than diminish the tendency tooppression.

As, then, the right of suffrage, without some other provi-sion, cannot counteract this tendency of government, the nextquestion for consideration isWhat is that other provision?This demands the most serious consideration; for of all thequestions embraced in the science of government, it involves aprinciple, the most important, and the least understood; andwhen understood, the most difficult of application in practice.It is, indeed, emphatically, that principle which makes the con-stitution, in its strict and limited sense.

From what has been said, it is manifest, that this provisionmust be of a character calculated to prevent any one interest,or combination of interests, from using the powers of govern-ment to aggrandize itself at the expense of the others. Here liesthe evil: and just in proportion as it shall prevent, or fail to pre-vent it, in the same degree it will effect, or fail to effect the endintended to be accomplished. There is but one certain mode inwhich this result can be secured; and that is, by the adoptionof some restriction or limitation, which shall so effectually pre-vent any one interest, or combination of interests, from obtain-

18 JOHN C. CALHOUN

ing the exclusive control of the government, as to render hope-less all attempts directed to that end. There is, again, but onemode in which this can be effected; and that is, by taking thesense of each interest or portion of the community, which maybe unequally and injuriously affected by the action of the gov-ernment, separately, through its own majority, or in some otherway by which its voice may be fairly expressed; and to requirethe consent of each interest, either to put or to keep the gov-ernment in action. This, too, can be accomplished only in oneway,and that is, by such an organism of the government,and, if necessary for the purpose, of the community also,aswill, by dividing and distributing the powers of government,give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ,either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, ora veto on their execution. It is only by such an organism, thatthe assent of each can be made necessary to put the govern-ment in motion; or the power made effectual to arrest itsaction, when put in motion;and it is only by the one or theother that the different interests, orders, classes, or portions,into which the community may be divided, can be protected,and all conflict and struggle between them prevented,by ren-dering it impossible to put or to keep it in action, without theconcurrent consent of all.

Such an organism as this, combined with the right of suf-frage, constitutes, in fact, the elements of constitutional govern-ment. The one, by rendering those who make and execute thelaws responsible to those on whom they operate, prevents therulers from oppressing the ruled; and the other, by making itimpossible for any one interest or combination of interests orclass, or order, or portion of the community, to obtain exclusivecontrol, prevents any one of them from oppressing the other. Itis clear, that oppression and abuse of power must come, if at all,from the one or the other quarter. From no other can they come.It follows, that the two, suffrage and proper organism com-bined, are sufficient to counteract the tendency of government


to oppression and abuse of power; and to restrict it to the ful-fillment of the great ends for which it is ordained.

In coming to this conclusion, I have assumed the organismto be perfect, and the different interests, portions, or classes ofthe community, to be sufficiently enlightened to understand itscharacter and object, and to exercise, with due intelligence, theright of suffrage. To the extent that either may be defective, tothe same extent the government would fall short of fulfilling itsend. But this does not impeach the truth of the principles onwhich it rests. In reducing them to proper form, in applyingthem to practical uses, all elementary principles are liable todifficulties; but they are not, on this account, the less true, orvaluable. Where the organism is perfect, every interest will betruly and fully represented, and of course the whole communi-ty must be so. It may be difficult, or even impossible, to makea perfect organism,but, although this be true, yet even when,instead of the sense of each and of all, it takes that of a fewgreat and prominent interests only, it would still, in a greatmeasure, if not altogether, fulfil the end intended by a consti-tution. For, in such case, it would require so large a portion ofthe community, compared with the whole, to concur, or acqui-esce in the action of the government, that the number to beplundered would be too few, and the number to be aggrandizedtoo many, to afford adequate motives to oppression and theabuse of its powers. Indeed, however imperfect the organism,it must have more or less effect in diminishing such tendency.

It may be readily inferred, from what has been stated, thatthe effect of organism is neither to supersede nor diminish theimportance of the right of suffrage; but to aid and perfect it.The object of the latter is, to collect the sense of the communi-ty. The more fully and perfectly it accomplishes this, the morefully and perfectly it fulfils its end. But the most it can do, ofitself, is to collect the sense of the greater number; that is, ofthe stronger interests, or combination of interests; and to

20 JOHN C. CALHOUN

assume this to be the sense of the community. It is only whenaided by a proper organism, that it can collect the sense of theentire community,of each and all its interests; of each,through its appropriate organ, and of the whole, through all ofthem united. This would truly be the sense of the entire com-munity; for whatever diversity each interest might have withinitself,as all would have the same interest in reference to theaction of the government, the individuals composing eachwould be fully and truly represented by its own majority orappropriate organ, regarded in reference to the other interests.In brief, every individual of every interest might trust, withconfidence, its majority or appropriate organ, against that ofevery other interest.

It results, from what has been said, that there are two dif-ferent modes in which the sense of the community may betaken; one, simply by the right of suffrage, unaided; the other,by the right through a proper organism. Each collects the senseof the majority. But one regards numbers only, and considersthe whole community as a unit, having but one common inter-est throughout; and collects the sense of the greater number ofthe whole, as that of the community. The other, on the con-trary, regards interests as well as numbers;considering thecommunity as made up of different and conflicting interests, asfar as the action of the government is concerned; and takes thesense of each, through its majority or appropriate organ, andthe united sense of all, as the sense of the entire community.The former of these I shall call the numerical, or absolutemajority; and the latter, the concurrent, or constitutionalmajority. I call it the constitutional majority, because it is anessential element in every constitutional government,be itsform what it may. So great is the difference, politically speak-ing, between the two majorities, that they cannot be confound-ed, without leading to great and fatal errors; and yet the dis-tinction between them has been so entirely overlooked, that


when the term majority is used in political discussions, it isapplied exclusively to designate the numerical,as if therewere no other. Until this distinction is recognized, and betterunderstood, there will continue to be great liability to error inproperly constructing constitutional governments, especially ofthe popular form, and of preserving them when properly con-structed. Until then, the latter will have a strong tendency toslide, first, into the government of the numerical majority, and,finally, into absolute government of some other form. To showthat such must be the case, and at the same time to mark morestrongly the difference between the two, in order to guardagainst the danger of overlooking it, I propose to consider thesubject more at length.

The first and leading error which naturally arises fromoverlooking the distinction referred to, is, to confound thenumerical majority with the people; and this so completely asto regard them as identical. This is a consequence that nec-essarily results from considering the numerical as the onlymajority. All admit, that a popular government, or democracy,is the government of the people; for the terms imply this. Aperfect government of the kind would be one which wouldembrace the consent of every citizen or member of the commu-nity; but as this is impracticable, in the opinion of those whoregard the numerical as the only majority, and who can per-ceive no other way by which the sense of the people can betaken,they are compelled to adopt this as the only true basisof popular government, in contradistinction to governments ofthe aristocratical or monarchical form. Being thus constrained,they are, in the next place, forced to regard the numericalmajority, as, in effect, the entire people; that is, the greater partas the whole; and the government of the greater part as thegovernment of the whole. It is thus the two come to be con-founded, and a part made identical with the whole. And it isthus, also, that all the rights, powers, and immunities of thewhole people come to be attributed to the numerical majority;

22 JOHN C. CALHOUN

and, among others, the supreme, sovereign authority of estab-lishing and abolishing governments at pleasure.

This radical error, the consequence of confounding the two,and of regarding the numerical as the only majority, has con-tributed more than any other cause, to prevent the formationof popular constitutional governments,and to destroy themeven when they have been formed. It leads to the conclusionthat, in their formation and establishment, nothing more isnecessary than the right of suffrage,and the allotment toeach division of the community a representation in the govern-ment, in proportion to numbers. If the numerical majority werereally the people; and if, to take its sense truly, were to take thesense of the people truly, a government so constituted would bea true and perfect model of a popular constitutional govern-ment; and every departure from it would detract from its excel-lence. But, as such is not the case,as the numerical majority,instead of being the people, is only a portion of them,such agovernment, instead of being a true and perfect model of thepeoples government, that is, a people self-governed, is but thegovernment of a part, over a part,the major over the minorportion.

But this misconception of the true elements of constitution-al government does not stop here. It leads to others equallyfalse and fatal, in reference to the best means of preserving andperpetuating them, when, from some fortunate combination ofcircumstances, they are correctly formed. For they who fallinto these errors regard the restrictions which organism impos-es on the will of the numerical majority as restrictions on thewill of the people, and, therefore, as not only useless, butwrongful and mischievous. And hence they endeavor to destroyorganism, under the delusive hope of making government moredemocratic.

Such are some of the consequences of confounding the two,and of regardmg the numerical as the only majority. And inthis may be found the reason why so few popular governments


have been properly constructed, and why, of these few, so smalla number have proved durable. Such must continue to be theresult, so long as these errors continue to be prevalent.

There is another error, of a kindred character, whose influ-ence contributes much to the same results: I refer to the preva-lent opinion, that a written constitution, containing suitablerestrictions on the powers of government, is sufficient, of itselfwithout the aid of any organism,except such as is necessaryto separate its several departments, and render them independ-ent of each other,to counteract the tendency of the numeri-cal majority to oppression and the abuse of power.

A written constitution certainly has many and considerableadvantages; but it is a great mistake to suppose, that the mereinsertion of provisions to restrict and limit the powers of thegovernment, without investing those for whose protection theyare inserted with the means of enforcing their observance, willbe sufficient to prevent the major and dominant party fromabusing its powers. Being the party in possession of the govern-ment, they will, from the same constitution of man whichmakes government necessary to protect society, be in favor ofthe powers granted by the constitution, and opposed to therestrictions intended to limit them. As the major and dominantparty, they will have no need of these restrictions for their pro-tection. The ballot-box, of itself, would be ample protection tothem. Needing no other, they would come, in time, to regardthese limitations as unnecessary and improper restraints;andendeavor to elude them, with the view of increasing theirpower and influence.

The minor, or weaker party, on the contrary, would takethe opposite direction;and regard them as essential to theirprotection against the dominant party. And, hence, they wouldendeavor to defend and enlarge the restrictions, and to limitand contract the powers. But where there are no means bywhich they could compel the major party to observe the restric-tions, the only resort left them would be, a strict construction

24 JOHN C. CALHOUN

of the constitution,that is, a construction which would con-fine these powers to the narrowest limits which the meaning ofthe words used in the grant would admit.

To this the major party would oppose a liberal construc-tion,one which would give to the words of the grant thebroadest meaning of which they were susceptible. It wouldthen be construction against construction; the one to contract,and the other to enlarge the powers of the government to theutmost. But of what possible avail could the strict constructionof the minor party be, against the liberal interpretation of themajor, when the one would have all the powers of the govern-ment to carry its construction into effect,and the other bedeprived of all means of enforcing its construction? In a con-test so unequal, the result would not be doubtful. The party infavor of the restrictions would be overpowered. At first, theymight command some respect, and do something to stay themarch of encroachment; but they would, in the progress of thecontest, be regarded as mere abstractionists; and, indeed,deservedly, if they should indulge the folly of supposing thatthe party in possession of the ballot-box and the physical forceof the country, could be successfully resisted by an appeal toreason, truth, justice, or the obligations imposed by the consti-tution. For when these, of themselves, shall exert sufficientinfluence to stay the hand of power, then government will beno longer necessary to protect society, nor constitutions neededto prevent government from abusing its powers. The end of thecontest would be the subversion of the constitution, either bythe undermining process of construction,where its meaningwould admit of possible doubt,or by substituting in practicewhat is called party-usage, in place of its provisions;or, final-ly, when no other contrivance would subserve the purpose, byopenly and boldly setting them aside. By the one or the other,the restrictions would ultimately be annulled, and the govern-ment be converted into one of unlimited powers.

Nor would the division of government into separate, and,


as it regards each other, independent departments, prevent thisresult. Such a division may do much to facilitate its operations,and to secure to its administration greater caution and deliber-ation; but as each and all the departments,and, of course,the entire government,would be under the control of thenumerical majority; it is too clear to require explanation, thata mere distribution of its powers among its agents or represen-tatives, could do little or nothing to counteract its tendency tooppression and abuse of power. To effect this, it would be nec-essary to go one step further, and make the several depart-ments the organs of the distinct interests or portions of thecommunity; and to clothe each with a negative on the others.But the effect of this would be to change the government fromthe numerical into the concurrent majority.

Having now explained the reasons why it is so difficult toform and preserve popular constitutional government, so longas the distinction between the two majorities is overlooked, andthe opinion prevails that a written constitution, with suitablerestrictions and a proper division of its powers, is sufficient tocounteract the tendency of the numerical majority to the abuseof its power,I shall next proceed to explain, more fully, whythe concurrent majority is an indispensable element in formingconstitutional governments; and why the numerical majority,of itself, must, in all cases, make governments absolute.

The necessary consequence of taking the sense of the com-munity by the concurrent majority is, as has been explained, togive to each interest or portion of the community a negative onthe others. It is this mutual negative among its various conflict-ing interests, which invests each with the power of protectingitself;and places the rights and safety of each, where onlythey can be securely placed, under its own guardianship.Without this there can be no systematic, peaceful, or effectiveresistance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflictwith the others: and without this there can be no constitution.It is this negative power,the power of preventing or arresting

26 JOHN C. CALHOUN

the action of the government,be it called by what term itmay,veto, interposition, nullification, check, or balance ofpower,which, in fact, forms the constitution. They are all butdifferent names for the negative power. In all its forms, andunder all its names, it results from the concurrent majority.Without this there can be no negative; and, without a negative,no constitution. The assertion is true in reference to all consti-tutional governments, be their forms what they may. It is,indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution,and the positive which makes the government. The one is thepower of acting;and the other the power of preventing orarresting action. The two, combined, make constitutional gov-ernments.

But, as there can be no constitution without the negativepower, and no negative power without the concurrent majori-ty;it follows, necessarily, that where the numerical majorityhas the sole control of the government, there can be no consti-tution; as constitution implies limitation or restriction,and,of course, is inconsistent with the idea of sole or exclusivepower. And hence, the numerical, unmixed with the concurrentmajority, necessarily forms, in all cases, absolute government.

It is, indeed, the single, or one power, which excludes thenegative, and constitutes absolute government; and not thenumber in whom the power is vested. The numerical majorityis as truly a single power, and excludes the negative as com-pletely as the absolute government of one, or of the few. Theformer is as much the absolute government of the democratic,or popular form, as the latter of the monarchical or aristocrat-ical. It has, accordingly, in common with them, the same ten-dency to oppression and abuse of power.

Constitutional governments, of whatever form, are, indeed,much more similar to each other, in their structure and char-acter, than they are, respectively, to the absolute governments,even of their own class. All constitutional governments, ofwhatever class they may be, take the sense of the community


by its parts,each through its appropriate organ; and regardthe sense of all its parts, as the sense of the whole. They all reston the right of suffrage, and the responsibility of rulers, direct-ly or indirectly. On the contrary, all absolute governments, ofwhatever form, concentrate power in one uncontrolled andirresponsible individual or body, whose will is regarded as thesense of the community. And, hence, the great and broad dis-tinction between governments is,not that of the one, the few,or the many,but of the constitutional and the absolute.

From this there results another distinction, which,although secondary in its character, very strongly marks thedifference between these forms of government. I refer to theirrespective conservative principle;that is, the principle bywhich they are upheld and preserved. This principle, in consti-tutional governments, is compromise;and in absolute gov-ernments, is force;as will be next explained.

It has been already shown, that the same constitution ofman which leads those who govern to oppress the governed,if not prevented,will, with equal force and certainty, lead thelatter to resist oppression, when possessed of the means ofdoing so peaceably and successfully. But absolute governments,of all forms, exclude all other means of resistance to theirauthority, than that of force; and, of course, leave no otheralternative to the governed, but to acquiesce in oppression,however great it may be, or to resort to force to put down thegovernment. But the dread of such a resort must necessarilylead the government to prepare to meet force in order to pro-tect itself; and hence, of necessity, force becomes the conserva-tive principle of all such governments.

On the contrary, the government of the concurrent majori-ty, where the organism is perfect, excludes the possibility ofoppression, by giving to each interest, or portion, or order,where there are established classes,the means of protectingitself, by its negative, against all measures calculated toadvance the peculiar interests of others at its expense. Its

28 JOHN C. CALHOUN

effect, then, is, to cause the different interests, portions, ororders,as the case may be,to desist from attempting toadopt any measure calculated to promote the prosperity of one,or more, by sacrificing that of others; and thus to force them tounite in such measures only as would promote the prosperity ofall, as the only means to prevent the suspension of the actionof the government;and, thereby, to avoid anarchy, the great-est of all evils. It is by means of such authorized and effectualresistance, that oppression is prevented, and the necessity ofresorting to force superseded, in governments of the concurrentmajority;and, hence, compromise, instead of force, becomestheir conservative principle.

It would, perhaps, be more strictly correct to trace the con-servative principle of constitutional governments to the neces-sity which compels the different interests, or portions, ororders, to compromise,as the only way to promote theirrespective prosperity, and to avoid anarchy,rather than tothe compromise itself. No necessity can be more urgent andimperious, than that of avoiding anarchy. It is the same as thatwhich makes government indispensable to preserve society;and is not less imperative than that which compels obedienceto superior force. Traced to this source, the voice of a people,uttered under the necessity of avoiding the greatest of calami-ties, through the organs of a government so constructed as tosuppress the expression of all partial and selfish interests, andto give a full and faithful utterance to the sense of the wholecommunity, in reference to its common welfare,may, withoutimpiety, be called the voice of God. To call any other so, wouldbe impious.

In stating that force is the conservative principle ofabsolute, and compromise of constitutional governments, Ihave assumed both to be perfect in their kind; but not withoutbearing in mind, that few or none, in fact, have ever been soabsolute as not to be under some restraint, and none so perfect-ly organized as to represent fully and perfectly the voice of the


whole community. Such being the case, all must, in practice,depart more or less from the principles by which they arerespectively upheld and preserved; and depend more or less forsupport, on force, or compromise, as the absolute or the con-stitutional form predominates in their respective organizations.

Nor, in stating that absolute governments exclude all othermeans of resistance to its authority than that of force, have Ioverlooked the case of governments of the numerical majority,which form, apparently, an exception. It is true that, in suchgovernments, the minor and subject party, for the time, havethe right to oppose and resist the major and dominant party,for the time, through the ballot-box; and may turn them out,and take their place, if they can obtain a majority of votes. But,it is no less true, that this would be a mere change in the rela-tions of the two parties. The minor and subject party wouldbecome the major and dominant party, with the same absoluteauthority and tendency to abuse power; and the major anddominant party would become the minor and subject party,with the same right to resist through the ballot-box; and, ifsuccessful, again to change relations, with like effect. But sucha state of things must necessarily be temporary. The conflictbetween the two parties must be transferred, sooner or later,from an appeal to the ballot-box to an appeal to force;as Ishall next proceed to explain.

The conflict between the two parties, in the government ofthe numerical majority, tends necessarily to settle down into astruggle for the honors and emoluments of the government;and each, in order to obtain an object so ardently desired, will,in the process of the struggle, resort to whatever measure mayseem best calculated to effect this purpose. The adoption, bythe one, of any measure, however objectionable, which mightgive it an advantage, would compel the other to follow itsexample. In such case, it would be indispensable to success toavoid division and keep united;and hence, from a necessityinherent in the nature of such governments, each party must be

30 JOHN C. CALHOUN

alternately forced, in order to insure victory, to resort to meas-ures to concentrate the control over its movements in fewer andfewer hands, as the struggle became more and more violent.This, in process

Documents

A Disquisition on Government