A decision-centred view of environmental planning

Landscape Planning, 12 (1985) 239-256 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam --Printed in The Netherlands

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A DECISION-CENTRED VIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING

A. FALUDI

Institute for Urban and Reg~onu~ Planning, University of Ca~iforniu, Berkeley CA 94720 (U.S.A.]

(Accepted for publication 6 March 1985)

ABSTRACT

Faludi, A., 1985. A decision-centred view of environmental planning. Landscape Plum., 12: 239- 256.

This article attempts to transcend the “substantivist” versus “proceduralist” controversy by proposing a theory of environmental planning combining understanding of procedures with understanding of features of the environment that make for a need for planning. It notes common elements in the views of the environment and environmental planning held by authors from divergent intellectual traditions: (a) they all conceive of the environment as, amongst other things, institutionally determined in the sense of legal barriers forming an important element of it; (b) they see the environment as the object of both private and public decision-making; (c) they see the environment as forming the object of conflict. On this basis, the article identifies land decision units as the foci of public and private decision-making concerning the environment. They are characterised by (a) the resources on them, (b) the channels linking them to other units, (c) the land regime providing barriers against intrusion, (d) land titles identifying the primary decision makers concerned. Public environmental measures taken because of externalities can aim at changing each of these attributes. Land decision units cover jurisdiction like seamless garments, and there is much interaction between what happens on them. Much as with measures of private actors, public environmental measures can mutually enhance each other or get in each other’s way. Where this occurs, the article speaks of externalities of the second order. Environmental planning stands for the preparation of environmental plans taking care of such externalities, so that public environmental measures are taken with full knowledge of all their implications. A theory of environmental planning must combine awareness of the element of decision-making in planning with an understanding of the externalities of the second order arising out of the nature of environmental measures as being addressed to land decision units with definite locations in a spatial- temporal expanse. A case study of Dutch urbanisation policy illustrates the notion of externalities of the second order.

INTRODUCTION

In a seminal article, Davidoff and Reiner (1962) claimed that planning was basically a “set of procedures” and that planning education was ex- cessively concerned with subject matter, but by the end of the decade, many American courses were oriented towards the planning process. At the same time, many others dealt with theories of the phenomena with which planning was concerned, thus signalling lack of consensus as regards the proper content of planning theory courses (Hightower, 1969).

0304-3924[85/$03.30 0 1985 Eisevier Science Publishers B.V.

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Procedural planning theory is what my work (Faludi, 1973, 1984) is about, although I never meant to suggest that planners could do without substantive knowledge of their areas of concern. However, like Davidoff and Reiner, I did suggest that procedural knowledge and generic planning skills were more central to planning education. After all, the substantive understanding needed varies from case to case.

Claims such as these have spawned the “substantivist” versus “proceduralist” controversy (Reade, 1976, 1983; Faludi, 1976, 1977, 1979; Cooke and Rees, 1977; Frost, 1977; Scott and Roweis, 1977, 1978; Harris, 1978; Thomas, 1979; Camhis, 1979; Scott, 1980, 1984; Healey et al., 1982; Paris, 1982; Breheny, 1983; Roweis, 1983; Taylor, 1984). Among current debates, this one must seem the least constructive to practitioners. It concerns the nature of theory and the object of planning theory as an academic discipline. For good reasons, professionals are convinced that they need both procedural and substantive knowledge.

The debate is equally frustrating for us procedural planning theorists. As Breheny (1983, p. 110) says, there “ . . . is virtually no work on planning theory in the last decade that does not begin with a swinging critique of the characteristics of procedural planning theory . . .“. We enrage our critics because of the underrating of substantive knowledge and issues which our approach seems to signal. Thus, Frost (1977) challenges me for lack of attention to “ . . . features of the historical development of mankind as the uneven pattern of economic growth, and the underdevelopment of vast areas of the world; persistent poverty and homelessness in metropolitan countries; unemployment; racism, etc.” (p. 221). Rather than conceiving of procedures as generic such as I do, other critics argue that they must reflect the nature of whatever planning is concerned with. Thus, Roweis (1983) argues that procedure is not separable (even analytically) from substance and that the explanation of planning strategies must always be based on substantive assumptions (pp. 144-145).

This must be a misunderstanding, because this is what I argue in “Planning Theory”, where I seek to explain the mode of planning by reference to the “technology image” and the “view of society” underlying, by all accounts substantive variables. But such frustrations are a private affair. What is of more general concern is that these critics do not answer the pertinent question which they raise: How does planning reflect the nature of its object of concern? I propose to move beyond this sterile situation by demonstrating what a theory of environmental planning should involve. In so doing, I shall introduce the notion of “externalities of the second order”. Generally, externalities provide grounds for public intervention. Likewise, externalities of the second order provide grounds for coordinating public measures so that they do not interfere with each other but rather contribute to a common purpose.

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At present, I describe mine as a decision-centred view of planning (see Faludi, 1982). It forms a synthesis of “Planning Theory” (Faludi, 1984) with the work of the Institute for Operational Research (see Faludi and Mastop, 1982; Faludi, 1982). It is decision-centred in a two-fold sense:

(a) The point of planning is seen as influencing operational decisions with real effects on the outside world. Herein rests the pragmatic orientation of this view. If planning can not exert this influence, then it is not worth doing (see also Friend and Jessop, 1977,lst edn. 1969, p_ 111).

(b) Public decision makers must be able to give reasons for their proposals. This requires them, amongst other things, to attend to in~r-relations between decisions, but during operational decision-making there is commonly no time to explore all of these. This must be done in advance. Figuring out what to do, and why, results in the formulation of some framework which guides us in our actions. Such a framework I call a plan. Developing and adapting it - planning - in turn involves many decisions, thus providing even more reasons for describing this view as decision-centred.

Against the background of this decision-centred view, a theory of enuiron- mental pIarming must address the following question:

Which aspects of the environment demand that we should attend to the ~~~e~-~e~a~~o~s bet,ween such interventions in the environment as do take place?

To answer it, a fresh look needs to be taken at the object of env~o~rn~ntal planning. I shall propose that we view the environment as a configuration of resources to be found on land decision units, each linked to others by channek of communication, and each protected from intrusion by barriers provided by the land regime. Equally, I shall propose that we view the object of environmental planning as the sum total of operational decisions with respect to public environmental measures. These must be taken not only wih a view to scarcity, now and in the future - which is the conventional “conservation for development” argument - but also to their pasitions relative to each other in space and time. These may give rise to the externalities of the second order mentioned above and discussed at some length below. They form the reasons for viewing env~onmental measures against a broader framework, i.e. reasons fox planning. Thus, we obtain a theory of e~~~r~nrnentu~ planning based on substantive analysis of externalities of the second order, and in so doing bridge the gulf between procedural and substantive theory. Such will be the conclusions of an analysis of views of the environment in the literature. They will be illustrated by reference to Dutch urbanisation policy.

FOUR VIEWS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

This section reviews four works, It analyses the views of the en~ronment and environmental planning held by their authors (starting with the one

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which has been most influential in shaping the argument of this article). The degree of consensus between them is remarkable; the more so since they diverge in their intellectual backgrounds. This will provide a vantage point for indicating what a theory of environmental planning involves.

D. Biikemann, “Theorie der Raumplanung” (A Theory of Environmental Planning)’

Central to the analysis of Biikemann (1982) is his concept of sites as constituted by “. _ . rights of actors to control natural resources and infrastructural opportunities available within certain predefined boundaries. Infrastructural opportunities are connections to inter-locational channels for receiving communications and supplies . . . “_

The owners and/or users of sites “ . . , are protected by - material as well as institutional - barriers which form part of inter-locational boundary systems.” (pp. 20-21).

“In our society, the right of control over sites is not vested in one person alone . . . ; but . _ . is rather distributed . . . over land owners and the various authorities . . . in whose jurisdictions the land under consideration is located . . . ” (p. 21).

The value of any site depends on “ . . . the number of alternative uses to which it could be put. This value-

parameter, described as locational use potential, is determined (1) by the resources on a site . . . , (2) by the infrastructure providing access to markets of factors of production and of goods, and (3) by systems of barriers and boundaries (i.e. the land regime) preventing the intrusion of nuisance and other negative influences from the outside. Infrastructure and the land regime in particular . . , result from measures taken by territorial authorities. With every investment in infrastructure (from building roads to telephone lines) and with every territorial boundary being drawn (from subdivision to local authority boundary reform), sites are being re- or devalued or {this being in principle the same thing) new sites are being produced.” (p. 25).

Infrastructure and the land regime are complementary. Infrastructure connects sites for the mutual benefit of their users, the land regime separates conflicting uses. Both are essential for the optimal use of sites.

In a real sense, therefore, public authorities are in the business of producing sites. The opportunities for their users are the ultimate good they produce: for firms the opportunities for combining on a site various means of production obtained via infrastructural channels (whilst at the same time being protected from interference by the prevailing land regime); for households the consumption opportunities offered by their environment.

Bijkemann sees sites as goods in the sense of economic theory because they can be used for certain purposes and because the right of use can be

’ Quotes translated from the original by A. Faludi.

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purchased and sold. Furthermore, and in accordance with the “economic theory of democracy”, he conceives of politicians as the owners of the state apparatus which they use for their private ends, much as private entrepreneurs would. Thus, territorial authorities act in ways similar to private firms. Their factors of production are land, infrastructure and the land regime. Authorities, as site-producing firms, can therefore be characterised: “- by their relevant constitutional powers . . . ;

- by the ability to determine, by way of settingplanninggoals, which type and quantity of the product (i.e. locational potential) is to be produced by means of combining the relevant factors of production;

- by their ability to obtain the necessary factors of production . . . and to market their products (thereby making use of the commercial skills of land owners and estate agents);

- by their production capacity in the area of planning and implementation.” (p. 331).

Biikemann sees environmental planning simply as the management of the production of sites:

“In particular, environmental planning must coordinate infrastructural and land-use control measures in such a way that . . . political aims of changing the existing urban fabric . . . are achieved . . . without wasting scarce resources” (p. 14).

Likewise, environmental plans can be compared to productions schedules of firms.

“Any development plan enables us to exercise direct influence on sites by up-grading or down-grading them. We can derive from it the structure of the product to the extent that the plan comprises:

(1) a spatial arrangement of the intended infrastructural and land-use control measures . . . , and

(2) a temporal arrangement (phasing) of the intended infrastructural and land-use control measures in the sense of a critical path analysis.

In a technological sense, therefore, the spatial-temporal combination (coordination) of the factors involved in the production of sites . . . defines the structure of the product.” (p. 340).

In treating the state apparatus as their “firm”, politicians must strike a balance between a strategy maximising income and one aiming at obtaining votes. According to the first, measures must be directed towards sites promising the highest income to the authority and thus increasing the power of politicians; according to the second they must be distributed so as to reduce regional inequalities.

To summarise, Bijkemann sees environmental planning as providing sites on which households and firms can produce and consume goods. A site is made up of the resources available on it, the channels through which households or firms gain access to more resources and/or export their products - including waste - and the barriers surrounding it preventing outside interference with the production and consumption of goods.

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Channels are, by definition, physical in nature, but barriers can be of a legal kind also. Bijkemann’s concept of the environment can be described as the set of sites (each being characterised by resources, channels and barriers) within a jurisdiction.

A.J. Scott, “The Urban Land Nexus and the State”

Scott (1980) is indebted to historical materialism. His central notion is that of an urban land nexus: a theoretical construct referring to the “ . . . process whereby urban civil society on the one hand and the urban planning system on the other combine to form an organically integrated entity . . . ” (p. 3). This nexus has a composite logic reflecting:

(a) “ . . . the spontaneous decision-making calculus of private firms and households in urban space . . . structured by the social and property relations of capitalist society” (p. 135);

(b) “( . . . ) the rationality of collective political decision-making (reflecting - AF) the global orientations, biases, and imperatives of the capitalist State as it finds itself inextricably involved in the task of managing and attempting to resolve the urban land-use problems set in motion by private decision- makers” (p. 135);

(c) their interaction giving rise to “ . . . a field of evolving, but problematic land-use relationships in urban space” (p. 135).

Thus, the urban land nexus “ . . . is land . . . on which human beings have expended labour materialized in the form of structural and infrastructural artefacts. It is, in short, a phenomenon that is socially produced in a complex dynamic . . . ” (p. 136).

In this “dynamic”, Scott distinguishes private and public decisions: “The combined outcome of these two phases of the process of land development then gives rise to the urban land nexus as a finished use value, that is, as a composite system of differential locational advantages . . . ” (p. 136).

Scott then introduces the notion of externalities: “The urban land nexus constitutes an expanse of territory punctuated

by a dense and multifarious variety of locational events. These events interact both prescriptively and negatively with another . . . (but - AF) their production and consumption are not structured by a market and a concomitant pricing mechanism and, as such, they represent externalities . . . (p. 148).

These lie “ . . . in the background of a great many urban planning interventions . . . ” (p. 49). Scott distinguishes between static and dynamic land- use problems. The static ones are listed below.

(a) Negative spillovers Noise, pollution etc., reducing “ . . . in one way or another the satisfaction

and efficaciousness of urban life, just as they tend to raise the costs of urban life” (p. 151). These problems provoke “ . . . a remarkable variety of collective responses as urban planners are called upon to counter the negative spillover

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effects generated in various ways at various sites in the urban land nexus” (p. 154): zoning, pollution control, etc.

(b) Land development bottlenecks The assembly of land is made difficult by its private ownership. “Since

private land-development companies lack the power . , . to overcome the barriers set in their path by the institution of private land-ownership, the collectivity is inexorably drawn into the issue. Applying its prerogative of eminent domain, the State then sets about the task of breaking the power of private land ownership wherever this is essential to ensure the achievement of the overriding capitalistic goal of unhindered expansion of the bases of commodity production.” (p. 155).

(c) The free-rider problem This is yet another instance “ . . , of the failure of private and social

decision-making to coincide with one another in a common optimal solution” (p. 158). Individuals simply try to benefit free of charge from the efforts of others. The State attempts to transcend this free-rider problem. Examples are growth-pole policies and urban renewal.

Next to these static there are also dynamic land-use problems.

(a) The slow convertubili~ of the urban Iand nexus “ . . . land-use conversions are always delayed in time as a function of the

fixed capital invested in buildings and structures. This means . . . that spatial inefficiencies . . . become locked into the urban landscape . . . ” (p. 161).

(b) Development decisions: timing and choice of land use This is a special case of the problem of timing of development decisions

in the urban land nexus. It “ . . . consists in a persistent discrepancy between privately optimal and socially optimal land-use conversion times in the two- fold sense that private conversions may be premature or they may be long overdue relative to social criteria of evaluation” (p. 161).

(c) The temporal rnyop~~ ofpriuate vocational activity Sometimes, private locational decisions cumulatively generate extremely

high social costs, in particular transport costs. Thus, “ . . . in pursuing their own . . . interests, individual land users . . . tend to block out the achievement of socially rational land-use patterns at some future point in time, and , , . their own decisions tend . . . to become increasingly inefficient as further private locators enter into urban space” (p. 166).

In the main, Scott intends to show that “ . . . the whole process underlying the growth and development of the urban land nexus is inevitably anarchical . . . ” (p. 174). This does not concern us here. We simply note that his view of the environment as an “expanse of territory punctuated by . . . locational events” is similar to that of BGkemann.

Like Scott, Roweis (1983) argues that “ . . . because land is a seamless garment, what happens on one part of it affects other parts of it; . + . because no parcel of land has on it all the necessities of its occupant(s), every occupant is, to a larger ar smaller extent, dependent on innumerable other occupants of innumerable other parcels of land.” (p. 152).

He calls this “pervasive interdependence” operating through *‘channels of mutual acoess” and “nodes of assembly”: Yactories, offices, shops, schools, homes, etc”. Territorial relations within these networks result from:

“(a) the physical characteristics and/or the territorial configuration of the network of channels of access or of some relevant elements thereof;

(b) the type and/or intensity of use of the network of &arm& of access or of some relevant elements thereof; or,

(c) the types of inhabitants or users, activities, or objects available (or absent) in various nodes of assembly within the relevant territory.” (pp. 153---154).

Roweis also raises the issue of flexibility. He says that “standmdized modes of behaviour” (social institutions) cannot adequately govern territorial relations. For this reason, territorial rights and obligations cannot be specified (or enforced) in ~~s~~a~~~o~ from the spec@c set of territorial relations they are expected to govern.” (p. 154).

The need to attend to specifics leads to “ , * . recurrent pressure to change some existing social institutions go~er~i~~ territorial relations . . . zoning, expropriation, transfer of development rights, taxing %mearned land-rent increments” . . . ” (p. 154). This, in turn, leads to territorial politics. In line with his historical materialist presuppositions, and much like Scott, Roweis concludes that it suffers from inherent contradictions:

“On the one hand, most social groups . . . insist on preserving a minimally acceptable margin of liberty in the private exchange and use of land. On the other hand, similarly broad pressures are put on all levels of government to ease _ . . bottlenecks . . _ As a result, contemporary territorial politics COMES to rely more heavily on the making of ad hoc decisions to ease this or that bottleneck and only n~inimally resort to significant institutional change.” [pp. 154-155).

Again, we leave this analysis aside and merely note the similarity of the underlying view of the envirunm~nt with that of Biikemann.

N. LichfieEd, “Towards land policy for human suruivaE”’

Lichfield (1983) deals with two themes: resource management and Iand poticy. Under the former, he distinguishes (non-renewable) fund or stock resources; ~renewable) flow resources; and resources which are both fund and flow: biological resources, soil mmurces and man-made improvements attached to land. A broad definition of land includes all land-based resources.

Land is also property. Lichfield argues that private property need not be detrimental to the wise management of land:

‘i . . . many a. private owner, particularly of large estates, . . . has taken a long and wide view of his objectives and has practiced resource management on lines which leave little to be desired for the community. More than t.hat, just as for utilisation of resources, it is necessary to have an owner of the landed interest (which farmer would grow crops if they were subject to legal pillage), for conservation to be implemented it is necessary to have an owner with an eye to the longer term, for otherwise no one has the interest in pursuing conservation. Tenure is a critical element in development, management and conservation.”

Next, Lichfield argues for a new balance to be struck between development and conservation. It is in this context that he discusses land policy, starting with the concept of a “proprietary land unit”:

“By definition, the management of the resource relates to that land, according to the management objectives of the proprietor, which are con- ditioned by his tenure . , . , long-term management carries with it the concept of a plan based on the objective of optimum return over the future which is the context for the management operation, it being recognised that the return can be seen not only in financial terms but also pride of ownership, status, political power, etc. and, in these days, self-sufficiency in food, utilities and energy . . .

In such management, the guiding principle is that the land resource can sustain man over a longer period if properly conserved (in maximum sustained use) having regard to the kind of resource in question, renewable, non- renewable, etc.”

Within such “private” management of land, it has been necessary to recognise in law property rights. The legal basis of “private land policy” is clearly a matter for government. The latter must also have a “public land policy” resulting in public land policy measures,

“Examples are the acquisition of land by government to enable current ownership patterns to be pooled; the control of the use of land withaut the need for government to take up part of the land; the advance purchase or banking of land to ensure that it is available for suitable development in needed quantities, a~~ro~~ate sites, appropriate tenure, at the right time and at the appropriate price.”

Other measures are not so much aimed at the efficiency of land utilisation, but at the equity of distribution of the profits from it.

Other policies aim at minimising resource depletion and pollution control. Lichfield calls them land resource poEicies rather than land policies. He adds land reform as a third category of measures. Under the need to coordinate land resource policies, he gives the following summary:

“In human settlements the function of the management of land resources thus arises in varied quarters. It exists in both the private and public sectors in the on-going management of “proprietary land units”; in the planned

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development of the land resources . . . ; in the public urban and regional planning agency of human settlements; in public policies to regulate environmental disruption; in socially and economically oriented land reform.

In all this diversity . , . there has grown up land policies and instruments . . there is the need for their coordination in the interest of wise management.”

Lichfield ends with a review of arguments for and against public intervention in land. They do not concern us here. It is clear that his view of the environment is similar to that held by the other three authors, the only difference being the greater emphasis which he puts on the management objectives of the owners of proprietory land units.

THE OBJECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING

The common-sense answer to the question of the object of environmental planning is that it is the material environment around us. As we have seen, our four authors hold more refined views. Their common denominator provides the vantage point for formulating a decision-centred view of environmental planning.

There are three common elements. First, all authors conceive of the environment as largely man-made, not only in the sense of containing man- made structures, but also of being institutionally determined. Thus, Lichfield talks about “proprietary land units”, Biikemann visualises sites as being surrounded by legal barriers defined by the prevailing land regime, Scott refers to the urban land nexus as “ . . . socially produced in a complex dynamic . . . ” (op. cit.), and Roweis points out the importance of territorial organisation.

Second, land is seen as the objects of both private and public decision- making. Thus, Bokemann shows that the right to control land is distributed over land owners and the various levels of government. Likewise, Scott’s land nexus and Roweis’s territorial relations result from the interaction between private and public decisions. Lichfield compares private and public management of land, thereby also implying that they exist side by side.

Third, they agree on the environment forming an object of conflict. Scott and Roweis stress conflict between public and private decisions. Bijkemann gives conflicting principles guiding public decision makers in making use of their urban planning “firm”, i.e. whether to work towards maximising income or equality. Likewise, Lichfield says that public land policy measures can aim at efficiency of land utilisation as well as at equity of the distribution of profits from it.

This is not to deny the differences. In principle, Lichfield and Biikemann seem content with the present mix of public and private decision-making. Scott and Roweis emphasise the contradictory nature of planning under capitalism. fiowever, the purpose of this comparison has been to print out their common way of seeing the environment as a set of what Lichfield calls “proprietory land units”, Biikemann “sites” and Roweis “parcels of

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land”. They circumscribe areas of land which form the focus of private and public decision-making. Henceforth I shall call them land decision units.

Land decision units have a number of attributes: (a) the - man-made and natural - resources on them; (b) the infrastructural channels linking them with others, (c) the land regime protecting them from intrusion (including pollution control). In all this, I simply follow Bijkemann and also Roweis (who refers to this as territorial organisation). In addition, one more attribute comes out of Lichfield’s paper: (d) the land title identifying the primary decision maker concerning each land decision unit.

Each jurisdiction includes a set of land decision units covering it, as Roweis says, Iike a seamless garment. Now, the fact that these are land decision units has an effect on the decision-situations of these primary decision makers. Activities on land decision units are potentially affected by - and in turn exert influence on - activities on other land decision units. (Note that this includes effects on environmental quality, such as air and water pollution, caused by activities on one site and having detrimental effects on activities on others.)

Various of these effects give rise to the externalities discussed by Scott. They make for a need for intervention in the decisions of the title holders of land decision units by taking public environmental measures directed at one or more of the attributes of land decision units by: (a) changing the land regime (including that concerning resources on land decision units) (B~kem~n, Scott, Roweis and Lichfield); (b) changing infrastructure (Bakemann, Scott and Roweis); (c) aquiring the title to land decision units (Scott, Lichfield) and using it for public ends.

The significance of land decision units then lies in the fact that they are the addresses to which we direct environmental measures. The effects of environmental measures are mediated by their effects on the decision situations of title holders of land decision units. This makes us appreciate why many a measure (for instance allocating land to certain uses by way of zoning) has no effect: because it cannot alter the decision situation of the title holder.

Viewing the environment as consisting of land decision units within boundaries defined by some ju~sdiction may sound unnecessarily restrictive. Three points need emphasising, however.

First, land decision units were so defined that they included (a) resources on the sites to which they refer, (b) channels linking them to other units, (c) barriers against undesirable intrusion, (d) land titles. All environmental measures are concerned with one or other of these, and no environmental measures seems conceivable that do not take effect uiu changes to resource- management, channels, barriers or land titles.

Second, this view recommends itself as being capable of transcending theoretically unsatisfactory distinctions, as between urban and regional planning, between land-use planning and environmental protection, between development and conservation. So, it may act as a unifying device for any theory of en~ronment~ planning.

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Third, the fact that land decision units within a jurisdiction are contiguous, so that their spatial proximity makes for interrelations between various environmental measures, lies at the heart of environmental planning.

So far, I have merely conjured up the image of public authorities being drawn into taking environmental measures addressed to land decision units (respectively to their holders). These measures reflect concern for the more efficient use of these units in ways impossible without public authorities. Both Scott and Roweis argue so, claiming thereby to have rooted planning in its historical context and related it to its substance, but they have merely given reasons for public involvement in environmental issues - which is not the same as planning. To speak of planning, there must be what I propose to call “externalities of the second order”. What follows is an analysis of this, what I think is a key-concept in the theory of environmental planning.

Public authorities take a large number of environmental measures. They are involved in a daily routine of taking decisions concerning them. As in operational decision-making generally, it is usually impossible to say why these operational decisions should be taken without adequate preparation. Thus, above, I introduced the notion of plans as frameworks for helping in operational decision-making.

Environmental measures are addressed to land decision units. The measures are located in space, and often also in time. Many effects (both desirable and undesirable ones) entirely depend on where this location is, and when the measure is taken (often in ways which are difficult to foresee). So, taking operational decisions requires insights in a complex spatial-temporal system.

Also, we need insights into which other environmental measures are, or will be, taken, where and when. Environmental measures can greatly enhance each, such as when conservation measures combine with selective investments. Equally, they can cancel each other out, such as when a recreation area is located next to obnoxious industry. So, there are interrelations between environmental measures. In the ordinary course of operational decision-making, these are not always taken account of. Public agencies behave much like private actors: they have only their imrr liate concerns in mind. The market does not correct their mistakes, sin.p,,3/ because they do not operate in a market situation. So, between them, public agencies are quite capable of unwittingly producing inefficiencies. It is these which I call externalities of the second order. Externalities arising out of the inter- relations between the measures of public agencies which are not attended to in the ordinary course of operational decision making.

This is understandable. Time is at a premium in operational decision- making, and the skills of those involved mostly do not relate to the wider implications of decisions, i.e. the externalities of the second order. This is why environmental plans based on insights in these wider implications are essential for the adequate discharge of their environmental responsibilities by public authorities.

Environmental planning is concerned with the making of such environ-

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mental plans as frameworks for operational decisions concerning public environmental measures. It is itself a process of decision-making, i.e. about the form which that framework should take. Much as in individual operational decisions, such decisions must also be defended in a public arena. Leaving the methodological issues which this raises aside (see Faludi, 1983; 1985a, b), we proceed to exploring the implications of this view of the central theme of this paper: the theory of environmental planning based on a conceptualisation of the object with which it is concerned.

This takes us through several steps. First, as outlined above, there are land decisioPz units, with their four attributes {resources, channels, barriers, land titles), their title hoaxers and the effects of their decisions taken with a view only to their own interest (which can be fairly broad, as Lichfield points out). Second, we have authorities taking a range of pub& enuiron- mental measures designed to change the decision situations of title holders of land decision units. Their addresses locate them in a spatial expanse. They influence each other and, in so doing, any socially defined aim which public authorities might pursue in ways depending on their locations. Since planning is here seen as the making of plans as frameworks for operational decisions - in the case of environmental planning issuing in public environmental measures - it follows that the object of environmental planning is not the material environment as we see it around us. Rather, the object of e~u~ronment~i planning is the sum total of all operational decisions which the authority concerned coutd take with respect to enu~ronment~l measures bei~gu~~resse~ to land decision units (respectively to their title holders) within its jurisdiction.

Of course, this does not mean to say that we may ignore the material environment in planning. The reason for taking public environmental measures in the first instance is that we wish to preserve it; or even enhance it. For the same reason, we need to attend to the inter-relations between environmental measures. But the point is that planning affects the environment only indirectly, i.e. via the guidance it gives to these public environmental measures. Since they, in turn, aim at influencing the decision situations of the title holders of land decision units, there are two intermediate steps between planning and its effects on the material environment. Because of this, there is much uncertainty surrounding these effects.

The notion above of the object of environmental planning is cogently derived from a view of the environment in relation to, as we should view it, its uses by human beings. It takes account of concerns for achieving sustainable development. Furthermore, it roots the theory of environmental planning in planning theory generally. All too often, that theory is confounded with tbories explaining the need for public environmental measures as such. Elsewhere, I have argued that there are various views of planning, each defining planning differently. One of them is the control-centred view, which comes in a total and a partial variant, depending on how comprehensive control is envisaged to be. The partial control-centred view in particular

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defines planning as the “ . . . identification of developments which need to be checked” (Faludi, 1982, p. 88). Planning theory is then seen as theory explaining the need for intervention - like the concept of externalities does. In the same paper, however, I also argue that the decision-centred view of planning takes public powers as read and directs its attention to the ways in which they should be used, paying regard to the inter-relations between individual measures. I submit, then, that a theory of environmental planning has to direct its attention to those aspects of its object which make for the need to attend to the inter-relations between public environmental measures, the main reason being that they may give rise to externalities of the second order as identified above. To illustrate these extern~it~es of the second order and their role in environmental planning, I offer a sketch of Dutch urbanisation policy.

CASE STUDY: DUTCH URBANISATION POLICY

Dutch urbanisation policy concerns the type and distribution of urban development. For more than 40 years, central government has intervened in urban development. This makes Dutch urbanisation policy into an interesting object of study. The preconditions for planning being as favourable as they are, it illustrates opportunities and limitations of planning in a Western democracy.

It is not these aspects that I shall attend to, here. I merely wish to elucidate how “externalities of the second order”, arising as a consequence of public enironmental measures, make for a need for environmental planning.

Most governmental systems are differentiated into layers. Thus, we must distinguish environmental measures according to the layer of government by which they are taken. The distribution of powers as between layers varies, depending on (a) the spatial situations of countries and (b) their respective constitutions. The Netherlands being small and having a con- stitution which accords only limited autonomy to provincial and local government (the set-up being described as a “decentralised unitary state”), there are many reasons for - and no constitutional arguments against - central government orchestrating environmental measures.

These reasons lie in growing awareness, ever since the 1920’s, of the effects of uncoordinated planning by local authorities under powers given at the beginning of this century. Important matters were not attended to. So, the preservation of areas of outstanding natural beauty was one of the arguments advanced in favour of national planning as early as 1924. Of course, Dutch central government is also playing a major part in the provision of infrastructure. In particular, the seminal struggle against the sea makes it necessary to organise sea defences on a national scale.

Reasons for central government involvement in environmental planning neatly fit Scott’s notion of externalities. Local authorities could not do the job, and private developers would not touch it. Here we are only concerned

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with externalities resulting from the actions of governmental bodies which are themselves based on the recognition in the past of externalities resulting from private decision-making. Hence the notion of “externalities of the second order”.

From the 1950’s onwards, Dutch government - assisted by the Dutch Physical Planning Agency - developed an overall view of the desirable spread, type and intensity of urban development. The background to this was formed by the post-war situation. War damage and a uniquely high rate of population growth during and immediately after the war, combined with the loss of Germany as a trading partner and of the colonies in the East Indies, had made a need for enforced industriaIisation and urbanisation. Without deliberate guidance, it was feared that this would lead to the “green heart” within the ring of towns and cities which characterises the densely populated West of The Netherlands (the “randstad” or “rim city”) filling up. It was feared also that development there would out-pace that in the rest of the country, with undesirable consequences in terms of overall balance. In this way, a coherent policy emerged during the 1950’s and 1960’s of protecting the “green heart”; of preventing towns and cities from coalescing by means of buffer zones and of directing development to outlying areas. At one stage it was hoped that no less than 3 million new inhabitants might be housed in the less developed North alone. This against the background of the expectation of 20 million inhabitants by the year 2000.

The arguments were thus the classic ones for preserving scarce and largely non-renewable resources, like an open countryside, in relative proximity to major centres of growth - the area around Rotterdam, for instance, having been one of the most dynamic industrial regions of post-war Europe! They were far-sighted, deriving the justification for central government intervention from the perception of the likely consequences of not taking action. Again, these arguments fit the various categories of externalities.

Consensus concerning urbanisation policy was almost universal. Still, at around the middle of the 1970’s, the pressure for suburban development in the “green heart” - and the willingness of small local authorities to cater for it so as to increase their revenues - was such as to turn it, contrary to intentions, into the most dyn~ic area of The Netherlands.

When combined with the shock of the first oil crisis, this led to refinements to the strategy pursued. It was accepted that people aspired to a largely suburban way of life and that a considerable part of new development would take place in close proximity to existing areas from where suburbanites came. So, new urban development was to be channelled into nearby towns and cities earmarked as centres of growth. The overall goals were still the same: to protect the “green heart” and to channel some development to outlying areas (but with fewer illusions than before; the population projections had been revised to a bare 15 million by the year 2000 due to a radical shift in the birth rate). The aim was to provide attractive alternatives to suburban development in growth centres purposefully developed with strong support

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from central government and in locations favoured by public transport so that alternatives to the private motor car should become available.

Within a span of a few years,the growth centres have significantly increased their share of home construction. Also, nowadays, provincial and local plans restrict growth more or less effectively. Finally, the Dutch railways are enjoying great popularity due to notorious traffic jams and gasoline prices which would shock any North American. They can hardly cope, investments in rolling stock and the opening of new lines and stations notwithstanding.

There are also points on the debit side. Success in relocating industry has been limited. With people being re-housed in growth centres at a distance of 30-40 km from the “randstad”, and with jobs not relocating, commuting in certain parts of the country has increased. As a consequence, bridges and tunnels across the North Sea Canal are notoriously overloaded because people living on the peninsula of North Holland, to the North of Amsterdam, have their jobs in the dynamic area around Schiphol Airport to the South.

Even more significant is a recent change of perspective. As with the British New Towns policy, the very success of Dutch urbanisation policy is seen as having adverse consequences. The promotion of growth centres is threatening the viability of existing towns and cities - in particular Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. In other words, a new “externality of the second order ” is being perceived, having to do with yet another resource threatened with depletion: urban life with its amenities and its sources of innovation. Also, a new group is making itself felt, and one which housing policy has been notoriously unwilling to cater for: single- person households consisting of the young and the divorced who singularly depend on - and enjoy! - living in the city centre. So, Dutch urbanisation policy must be more balanced towards existing urban areas. Even the present right-of-centre government is acknowledging the necessity of this shift.

CONCLUSIONS

The Dutch case shows the emergence, over the years, of a definite view relating to the overall direction which environmental measures by various levels of government should take. It does not amount to a theory of environmental planning though. Theory must be of more general applicability than just one instance. Rather, we may describe it as a doctrine, reasonably coherent and taylor-made to suit the Dutch context. Clearly, however, this doctrine incorporates many elements of a theory of environmental planning: propositions relating to the externalities of the second order, i.e. the - positive and negative - effects resulting from the inter-relations between public environmental measures.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate what an environmental - as against a generic - planning theory involves. It is indeed a special case of generic theory and builds on an appreciation of specific aspects of the object of planning provided by substantive theories.

Roweis (1983) belongs to my more outspoken critics as regards my alleged neglect of substantive theory. Implicit in Roweis’ argument is the convincing planning-theoretical principle that, where decisions are inter- related, these inter-relations must be attended to. Of course, activities on land are frequently inter-related. The whole argument of this paper rests on this. So there are territorial relations which give rise to planning. What difference is there between this argument of Roweis’s and mine, in “Planning Theory”, saying that the scope of the technology image - defined as the number of “known linkages between the areas of responsibility of planning agencies” (Faludi, 1984, p_ 167) - influences the mode of planning? The only difference is that I couch my argument in more general terms, whereas Roweis deals with a particular instance of inter~relations -territorial relations - leading to environmental planning. Which is why I hope that this paper might help in transcending the “proceduralist” versus “substantivist” controversy .

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A decision-centred view of environmental planning