A Critical Analysis of Deloitte’s Brand Resilience Framework: A study of and recommendations on managing brand risk and resilience in the information age

8/10/2019 A Critical Analysis of Deloittes Brand Resilience Framework: A study of and recommendations on managing brand

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School of Management

Royal Holloway, University of London

This dissertation is submitted as part of the requirement for the award ofMaster of Business Administration International Management

A Critical Analysis of the Brand Resilience FrameworkA study of and recommendations on managing brand risk and

resilience in the information age

MN5251

Master of Business Administration International Management

Kelliann M. McDonald

Candidate Number: 1402851

SupervisorProf. Justin OBrien, MBA Director

1 September 2014


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DECLARATION

This dissertation has been prepared on the basis of my own work and that where other published and

unpublished source materials have been used, these have been acknowledged.

Word Count : 16,468

Number of contacts with supervisor : 6

___________________________________________Kelliann M. McDonald

___________________________________________

Date


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ABSTRACT

This study explores the feasibility of Copulskys (2011) brand resilience framework in an effort to

compare the theoretical framework to what typically occurs in the workplace. This was discerned

through in-depth discussions with mid and senior-level executives at global firms, highly concerned

with brand and reputational capital. A reflective practitioner approach to a semi-structured interview

methodology was employed to systematically analyze the use of the framework in practice. This

methodology lends itself well to use in business, as it is a flexible approach that can be used to evaluate

and improve workplace practices. The study found that while Copulskys framework was perceived as

functional and well codified, it fell victim to the common pitfalls of conceptual understandings when

transitioned into practice. The validity of the underlying assumption of the framework, the brand

fragility paradox, was called into question and the framework itself was found to be static and not

reflective of the dynamic conditions under which business decisions are made. Several managerial

recommendations, derived from the research findings and a review of relevant literature are provided,

including suggestions on how Copulskys framework may be tailored for practical use. Additionally, a

revised version of the brand resilience framework is presented in infographic form.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, without my mother, Leleith McDonald, none of this would be possible. Thank you,

Mom. I love you.

I would like to especially thank my dissertation supervisor Justin OBrien, MBA Director at RoyalHolloway, University of London for his guidance and support throughout the year and for his direction

and suggestions on the production of this my final project as an MBA candidate.

I would also like to thank all the faculty and staff at the School of Management, particularly Helen

McEwan, Jackie Brackenbury, and Dawn Fowle.

I would be remiss if I did not thank my mentors and Royal Holloway alumni, Matthew Clark and Nick

Hanbidge.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank the participants who so graciously shared their time

and expertise for the benefit of this study.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION 1

ABSTRACT 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3

CHAPTER 1 5

Introduction 5

Purpose of the Study 7

Research Objectives 8

Definition of Terms ( Figure 1 ) 10

Structure of Dissertation 11

CHAPTER 2 12Literature Review 12

Brand Fragility Paradox ( Figure 2 ) 13

Brand Resilience Framework ( Figure 3 ) 16

Gartner s BI, Analytics & Performance Management Framework ( Figure 4 ) 30

CHAPTER 3 34

Research Approach & Methodology 34

CHAPTER 4 39

Discussion and Analysis of Results 39

CHAPTER 5 50

Recommendations 50

Integrated Organizational Change Strategy ( Figure 5 ) 52

Conclusion 53

BIBLIOGRAPHY 55

APPENDICES 62

Appendix A: Descriptions of Research Participants 62

Appendix B: Introduction & Semi-structured Interview Briefing Document 63

Appendix C: Themes Revealed by Research Results 64

Appendix D: Revised Brand Resilience Framework (Infographic) 65


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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The pressure for business to respond to foreseeable change has never been greater (Abrahams,

2008). The world has been ushered into a knowledge-based society bounded by a high-tech global

economy that influences the efficiency of manufacturing processes and service methods. In a free-

market society, the information age has allowed individuals to simplify the way in which they make

decisions about the transactions they intend to make, increase the speed by which those decisions can

be made and acted upon, and has significantly reduced the associated costs of those transactions

(Humbert, 2007). These influences can be said to effect supply and demand on a massive and

irreversible level of an increasingly globalized and interconnected world. Change in the structure of

demand creates risk, as Sull (2006) describes, a kaleidoscope shifting numerous volatile variables, such

as regulation, technology competition, micro-economics and consumer preference (p. 2). Additionally,

the speed of response time needed to cater to more products and service offerings creates even more

risk (ibid). The development of product and service centered marketing strategies and the evaluation of

return on investment (ROI) on each alternative plan is likely to create further uncertainty for business

and its managers (Abrahams, 2008).

In tandem with the adjustments in societal behaviors and habits of consumption, the information

age has also had considerable impact on channels of communication, such as through web-based

content, cable television, and mobile smart phones, thus increasing audience fragmentation. This

fragmentation and subsequent coagulation of audiences based on their specific and nuanced interests

has profound implications for the ways in which organizations interact with individuals and which

business models are employed (Abrahams, 2008). The interactive nature of communication channels

including social media such at Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, YouTube, WeChat (Chinese competitor to

WhatsApp) and Instagram means that marketers and business managers must grow accustomed to

marketing being a two-way, interactive conversation with individuals and online communities, asopposed to previous eras where it was more simply a one-way broadcast to a captive audience (Macleod,

2004). Marketers and business managers must also acknowledge that due to the bearing of social media,


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these communities have an amplified voice and the potential to impact business processes, brands and

corporate reputation, such as in the quintessential case of United Break Guitars.

In this seminal example of social media s influence on business, Canadian musician Dave

Carroll chronicles a real-life experience of how his guitar was broken as a result of intentional rough

handling by United Airlines baggage handlers during a trip in 2008 and the subsequent series of

unsavory responses he received from the airline (Dunne, 2010; Soule, 2010). Ultimately, Carroll

authored a song and created three music videos about his experience. According to Carroll, his

negotiations with the airline for compensation lasted nine months before he decided to author the song,

which he posted to the video-sharing social media site YouTube on July 6, 2009. The music video

amassed 150,000 views within one day, prompting United Airlines to contact Carroll in hopes of

pacifying the issue. The video garnered over half a million hits by July 9, 2009, 5 million by mid-August

2009, and at the time of this report the video has over 14 million views and approximately 26-thousand

comments on YouTube (Cosh, 2009; CBC News, 2009; Jamieson, 2009; UPI Chicago, 2009).

Numerous media sources reported the story of the song's instant success and the public

relations nightmare for United Airlines (CNN, 2009). Sawhney (2009) reported that within four days

of the video being live, United Airlines' stock price fell 10%, costing stockholders about $180 million

USD in value. However, it is important to note that according to other notable sources, United's stock

prices had varied widely all that quarter, and actually rose after the videos came out in early July, but

fell after the airline s second quarter earnings were released (Huffington Post Business, 2009;

Consumerist, 2009). According to Carroll (2009):

United has demonstrated they know how to keep their airline in the forefront of their

customers minds and I wanted this project to expand upon that satirically I should thank

United. Theyve given me a creative outlet that has brought people together from around the

world If my guitar had to be smashed due to extreme negligence, Im gl ad it was you that

did it.

Word of mouth is increasingly seen as a legitimate measure of brand performance, which the

United Breaks Guitars case exemplifies. In the age of information and social media, marketers must


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become accustomed to a smarter conversation with their audiences and develop strategies to match.

According to Abrahams (2008), marketing managers can no longer look to a single outside agency to

satisfy traditional communication objectives and support them as the brain of the brand . Instead, a

greater share of the responsibility for overseeing the soundness of branding strategy and its coherence

across multiple audience touch points has to come from the internal marketing department. Without

compromising creativity or innovation, there is a new opportunity for marketing managers to

corroborate a boards escalating need to communicate effectively with external audiences. The

language of risk can become a common currency of communication and understanding between the

marketing function and the board of management that invests in its judgment (ibid, p. 12). Aligning

the interests of marketers and the board and the use of the tools and techniques of evaluating and

managing brand risk are designed to support cross-functional decision-making ultimately benefiting

company stakeholders.

Purpose of the Study

Consider that in the information age intangible assets such as brands add substantial value.

Companies used to derive most of its corporate value from tangible assets such as real estate and

equipment. However, in a contemporary, knowledge-based economy, sources for corporate profits are

more likely to originate from a variety of intangible assets. Product brands, marketing processes, and

the interconnection of key stakeholder relationships that constitute reputation capital belong to this asset

category (Dowling, 2006; OECD, 2005). As it is the duty of directors to promote the success of the

company, risks to the brand or company reputation must always be high on the agenda. If the brand is

a fundamental source of competitive advantage, it needs to be thoroughly understood. Yet at times, it is

challenging for non-marketers to fully consider the brand in risk analysis and decision-making (ibid).

Abrahams (2008) stated that the absence of a framework for brand thinking may mean that important

risk issues are not fully considered or adequately managed, however, Jonathan Copulsky, National

Managing Director, Brand and Eminence at Deloitte Consulting LLP, has brought forth an applicable

brand resilience framework in his most recent book (Copulsky, 2011). According to Deloitte (2014),

the largest in the world by revenue and by number of professionals of the Big Four professional


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services firms (Singh, 2012), Copulsky (2011) provides the tools and framework to help determine how

susceptible organizations are to brand sabotage and provides some actions that can be taken to reduce

the likelihood and impact of said sabotage.

The purpose of this study is to critically analyze elements of the seven step brand resilience

framework in an effort to compare this theoretical framework to what may actually occur in a practical

sense in the workplace, as discerned by primary research in the form of semi-structured interviews with

executives at global firms. This is done in an effort to bridge the gap that often times exist between the

theoretical and the practical and to provide more contemporary recommendations for managing brand

risk in the information age.

Research Objectives

Communications and marketing business managers are under immense pressure to increase

profits, boost sales, and to maximize shareholder value - all of which begins with having a clear

competitive advantage and superior corporate reputation. Nonetheless, managing a companys

reputation across a global network of stakeholders can often prove challenging. Still, employing small

steps to make reputation a business imperative, such as identifying key stakeholders or emphasizing the

importance of a reputation management strategy, can position an organization on the fast track to

attaining significant financial value. Research shows that corporate reputation is an indicator of equity

value, and reputable firms are more likely to sustain superior financial and market performance over

time (Dowling, 2001; Dowling, 2006; Tonello, 2007). Specifically, Obloj & Obloj (2006) show that

corporations ranking high in reputation are seen to benefit from an average annual stock price increase

of approximately 20.1 percent, whereas publicly traded shares of 10 companies that ranked at the bottom

in reputation suffered an average annual decline of approximately 1.9 percent. Additionally, it is proven

that strong reputation reflects on the economics of corporate dealings. Specifically, it lowers transaction

costs for all parties involved in the transaction and commands higher price premiums to the advantage

of the reputable firm (Obloj & Obloj, 2006). As brand reputation increasingly becomes a top business

priority for executives, leadership teams are faced with an array of challenges and questions on how to


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best manage and cultivate this critical intangible asset (Reputation Institute, 2014). In that light, the

research objectives of this report directly support these challenges and concerns and are as follows:

1. To critically analyze the steps and underlying assumptions suggested by the brand resilience

framework.

2. To evaluate and provide recommendations on how the brand resilience framework may be used

in a practical way to manage brand risk in a corporate setting.

It is the aim of this study to contribute to the public discourse on managing brand risk in the information

age by bridging the gap that may exsist between the theorectical brand resilience framework and the

practical applications of brand risk management in the workplace.

Definition of Terms

For purposes of this report, the following definitions and common understandings should be presumed.

These definitions are provided in an effort to standardize the concepts discussed and to frame the

findings presented in this report (see Figure 1).


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Figure 1: Definition of Terms


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Structure of Dissertation

Moving into chapter 2, this dissertation will delve into the literature relevant to the topic

at hand and will outline a general hypothesis that will introduce a new consideration related to

strategically managing brand risk in the information age. In chapter 3, the research methodology and

rationale will be described. The research questions and participants will be identified and the design of

the survey and data collection process will be discussed. In chapter 4, the research findings will be

highlighted and critically analyzed. Chapter 5 will provide recommendations derived from the research

findings and the report will conclude with final thoughts on the topic. A thorough bibliography and

several appendices supporting research offered in this report will be included at the end of this

dissertation.


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CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

As the purpose of this study is to critical analyze the elements of the Copulskys ( 2011) brand

resilience framework in an effort to parallel this theorectical framework with its practical implications

in the workplace, the book from which the framework is derived will be throughly outlined. The main

counterinsurgecy metaphor and brand paradox assumption argued by Copulsky (2011) will be

explained, and the seven steps in the managing brand risk and recovery framework will be disected. A

deep dive in to the literature and coceptual frameworks in crisis management, stakeholder management

and brand and reputational manangement will be examined. This review of revelvant literature will also

draw attention to any limitations or flawed assuptions made by Copulsky and will mention how the

work does or does not support the findings of other cited works.

Br and Fr agil ity Paradox

Copulsky (2011) begins his narrative by insisting that the rise in the importance of brand trust

means that any breach of that faith in a brand could be fatal. The assumption goes on to state that if

our brand behaves in a manner that suggests our trust is misplaced, we terminate that relationshsip

quickly and decisiv ely (p. 23). Unrepaired breaches are partciular ly detrimental. The most vauable

brands would seem to enjoy strong relationships with their customers, but strong customer realtionships

depend on trust. The author goes on to describe how competitors are also quick to capitalize on

preceived breaches of trust. In the current state of the world, brands are now faced with incredible

schizophrenic consumer behavior. On diametrically opposed sides of the spectrum, consumers forge

incrediably loyal bonds with brands, but abandon those brands when they prove unworthy. The

supposition goes on to state that trust is fragile and that we are now in a world where brands can be

incedibly powerful, but more challenging and more expensive to create and maintain, and are less

resilient. Thus, building a resilient brand and defending it against both intended and unwitting acts of

brand sabotage needs to be a firms number one priority. Here the author introduces the brand fragility


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paradox (see Figure 2). According to Copulsky (2011), when brand value and brand fragility grow

simultaneously, the importance of trustworthiness is heightened accordingly.

Figure 2: Brand Fragility Paradox

Source: (Copulsky, et al., 2011)

Brands create enormous value for their owners by enabling premium pricing, high levels of customer

advocacy, and great permission to enter new markets, new customer segments, and new product

categories, all of which are crucial advantages in a saturated market. Nonetheless, these same qualities

make brands more vulnerable, particularly when considering the level of transparency toda ys

consumers demand (Copulsky, 2011).

The main counterinsurgecy metaphor used throughout the book links marketing efforts to win

market share and beat the competition to the U.S. M ilitarys Counterinsurgency Field Manual tactics

and mentions Tzus (1910) Ar t of War and Krieges (1832) On War as two military strategy books that

have become required readings for many marketers. An insurgency is the protection against a barrage

of potential attacks by saboteurs. Copulsky (2011) goes on to cite well-known marketing author,

professor and pundit, Kotler and Singhs (1981) as the seminal thought leaders in establishing the link


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between military strategy and marketing. According to Copulsky (2011), the marketing-as-warfare

metaphor works by creating a laser-like focus on destryoing the emeny, conveys a sense of decisiveness

and purpose with clear objective, plan, tactics and means of measuring success. Thirdly, the metaphor

implies that marketing, as well as military operations, can be organized around a series of tightly

coordinated and well-executed campaigns. Fourth, marketers need to carefully plan and orchestrate their

use of weaponry relying on the Four Ps of marketing rather then air, land, and sea power, as observed

in the military (Copulsky, et al., 2011).

The foundational premise of the marketing-as- warfare metaphor is that marketing is a zero -sum

game against known enemies (Copulsky, 2011, p. 32). One co mpanys gain is another companys loss.

Success is measured in market share and if marketing efforts help increase the size of the market, thats

good, but if marketing efforts increase size and market share that is even better. Brand resilience is

about brand owners being more deliberate in protecting their investments by agressively playing defense

and having strong recovery strategies prepared. Marketing is now about the need for brand defense

since, as the brand fragility paradox dictates, brands are more valuable, but are also much more fragile

than ever before.

Copulsky (2011) goes on to question whether or not marketing warfare is still relevant by citing

Rindfleisch (1996), who argues that the assumptions underlying the warfare perspective are no longer

valid or applicable in a world in which traditional competitors often find themselves collaborating,

rather than head-to-head fighting. Copulsky (2011) validates this position by agreeing that every day at

Deloitte they see more and more examples of companies working closely together with their toughest

competitors. The author goes on to admit that the warfare metaphor is problematic because companies

cannot always afford to focus single-handedly on enaging and overwhelming a clearly discernible

opponent under well-defined conditions, governed by well-understood rules. Continuing with the same

warfare language and tone of argument, Copulsky (2011) admits that brand stewards today are

confronted by a myriad of issues, such as assaults to the the brand from unpredictable sources, assaults

to the brand as unintentional consequences of other activities and decisions, the increased frequency of

assaults, since brand activities have become more visible, the speed at which damage can be done, and


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the diversity of weaponry used in assaults to the brand in the age of social media. The author then goes

on to mention that any brand steward can learn a lot from The U.S. Army/ Marine Corps

Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Department of Army , 2006) as a brand resilence playbook.

Br and Resil ience F ramework

According to Copulsky (2011), managing brand risk with intelligence includes playing an active

role and consistent defense to threats to the brand inside the borders of the firm, such as brand

ambassadors losing credibility, employees creating viral video/blog, repeated product discounts or

boorish executive leadership behavior. Threats outside a firms borders include social media

impersonators, outsourced supplier quality, scathing blogger review or an irate customer. Copulsky

(2011) suggests that brand saboteurs are those who take part in acts that threaten the brand and include

accidental or seemingly random acts, but what matters is impact more than intent. He then goes on to

propose a seven step brand resilience and counterinsurgency framework (see Figure 3, p. 15) that has a

three pillar action component: 1. Plan, 2. Prepare and 3. Execute. This three pillar element then supports

a seven step sequence: 1. Assess brand risks, 2. Galvanize your brand troops, 3. Deploy your brand risk

early warning systems, 4. Repel the attacks on your brand, 5. Learn and adapt your brand defenses, 6.

Measure and track brand resilience, 7. Generate popular support for your brand resilience campaign.


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Figure 3: Brand Resilience Framework

Source: (Copulsky, et al., 2011)

STEP 1. Assess Brand Risks: The first section begins with The Enemy Within. Here Copulsky

(2011) speaks to being mindful of the saboteurs within or beyond the firms borders. The more intuitive

form of sabotage is external from competitors, disgruntled customer or activists, the author asserts.


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Other examples include employees blogging about their job dissatisfaction or leadership behaving

boorishly in public. The author urges companies to understand the motivations behind sabotage and the

potential impacts to help avoid them. It is made clear that much of the internally generated brand

sabotage is accidental, executives, employees and supply chain partners do inadvertent things to damage

the brand. Often, carelessness is the culpr it, not malicious intent (p.73), but Copulsky (2011) makes it

clear that the outcome, not the intent is the most important factor. In this chapter, Copulsky (2011) also

suggests that brand risk does not begin and end in the marketing department, but can be a consequence

of operational decisions in engineering (product performance problems), finance (tightening of credit

policies), IT (inadvertent disclosure of customer information), legal (failure to protect copyrights), and

procurement (problematic offshore manufactures) to name a few.

In use of the phrase the The Enemy Within to refer to the internally generated brand sabotage

inflicted by executives, employees and supply chain partners, Copulsky (2011) seems to overlook

employees as the largest and strongest stakeholders in good brand reputation. To counter this view,

Tonello (2007) asserts, a company can hardly shield from its personnel any significant gap between

corporate identity, known to insiders, and public reputation a gap that inevitably translates into

employee dissatisfaction and skepticism about the business (p. 43) . A favorable perception of the firm

by the public reflects on employee moral as well, by fostering a positive attitude in performance.

Specifically, a strong corporate reputation plays on employees desire to enhance their self -esteem and

social status by sharing the prestige of being part of a highly regarded group (ibid). Consequently, this

tends to augment employees identification with and commitment to the organization they are affiliated

with and increase the companys ability to attract and retain talent (Carmeli & Freund, 2002; Ellemers,

et al., 1999; Shelley & Zhao, 2006). It can thus be assumed that engaging employees as brand advocates

may reduce brand risk as result of intentional harm and increase resiliency.

Additionally, in contrast to the central claim of Copulskys (2011) view in Step 1, Tonello &

Brancato (2007) assert that a civil workplace centered on business ethics and a culture of integrity is

crucial to the employees impression about the company. As they work in the organization, employees

are more knowledgeable about the true identity of the firm than other category of stakeholders (p. 89).


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Tonello & Brancato (2007) go on to argue that the most valuable contribution that the board can provide

is to oversee the formation, implementation, and efficacy of a compliance and ethics program, inclusive

of a set of anonymous whistle-blowing procedures, to foster a climate of transparency and accountability

at every level of the organization. This valuable contribution by the corporate leadership suggested by

Tonello & Brancato (2007) aligns with C opulskys (2011) views mentioned in Step 2: Galvanize brand

troops, Step 6: Measure and track brand resilience, and particularly in Step 7: Generate popular support

for your brand resilience campaign, to be reviewed in detail later in this report. Surmise

The second section in the first step begins with B eyond Your Borders. Here Copulsky (2011)

discusses the enemies that live beyond the borders of the organization. This perspective is to supplement

The Enemy Within perspective, as it describes a raft of intentional brand insurgents, whose

motivations range from responding to real or perceived breaches of trust to inflicting legal and long

standing brand damage. The author then goes on to suggest that the four most obvious categories of

external insurgents are customers, reviewers, ideologues and competitors, whose tactics are often

unpredictable. According to Copulsky (2011), disappointment, anger and rage are the pivotal phases in

diminished customer trust, which could ultimately lead to the customer s feeling of let down and then

them undermining the brand, if not addressed. United Breaks Guitars, as mentioned in the introduction

of the report, is just such an example of a customers disappointment transforming into anger and

ultimately rage that generated a socially viral negative result for the company and damaged the brand

(Dunne, 2010; CBC News, 2009). Volunteer reviewers, Copulsky (2011) suggests, are the second set

of external saboteurs who ultimately require more of a firms attention and can ultima tely harm the

brand. While customers learn a lot about the brand from what the company communicates, much of

what they know also comes from information that is not internally generated or controlled. The author

goes on to reason that research about buying patterns suggest that looking at online reviews and ratings

prior to purchase is a major step for most consumers. He goes on to suggest that while professional

reviewers and analysts generally adhere to strict policies about reviewing, more and more online reviews

are now generated by web users, so constraints are virtually unenforceable. To corroborate this view we

can look to Moyer (2010) who calls into question the validity of crowdsourced online reviews and

suggests that online ranking systems suffer from a number of inherent biases such as the obvious: people


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who rate purchases have already made the purchase and the more bias: people tend not to review things

they find merely satisfactory. Moyer (2010) states that a controlled offline survey of seemingly

polarizing products revealed that individuals true o pinions fit a bell-shaped curve - ratings cluster

around three or four (on a scale of one to five), with fewer scores of two and almost no ones and fives.

Self -selected online voting creates an artificial judgment gap; as in modern politics, only the loudest

voices at the furthest ends of the spectrum seem to get heard (ibid). Moyers standpoint falls in line

with Copulskys view that volunteer reviewers are external saboteurs who ultimately require more of a

firms attention and can ultimately harm the brand.

Ideologues are the third group of external saboteurs specified by Copulsky (2011). Here the

author offers a muckrakers metaphor, calling on the age of Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th President of

the United States during the progressive era that flourished from the 1890s to the 1920s (Buenker, et

al., 1986). The era called for reform of the political landscape and investigative journalist and authors

were particularly influential. These ideologue muckrakers are influential persons mainly concerned

with a common set of issues, such as the environment, excessive greed, health, labor conditions and

undue corporate influence on government officials. The difference between the enrage customer and

the contemporary muckraker lies in their motivation, Copulsky suggests. One is enrage by how he or

she may have been treated individually, while the other is broadly enraged by the firms principles and

practices. Michael Moore, an American filmmaker, author and social critic, has been accused of being

a muckraker for writing and producing cinematic works that criticize globalization, large corporations,

assault weapon ownership, former U.S. presidents, the Iraq War, the American health care system, and

capitalism. In 2005, Time magazine named Moore one of the world's 100 most influential people, and

his most famous documentary, Fahrenheit 9/11, grossed over $222 million USD total worldwide,

making the film one of the highest grossing of all time, thus corroborating Copulskys (2011) claim that

muckrakers are highly influential and potentially detrimental to brands (Mintz, 2005; Box Office Mojo,

2014; The New York Times, 2014).

The finally external saboteur examined by the author is the competitor, which he states is

increasing eager to capitalize when a firm stumbles. Copulsky (2011) then cites political dirty tricks


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as an example. Photoshopping images and creative editing are mentioned as questionable modern day

tactics used to make wrongdoings easier to commit and harder to conceal. In accordance with what

Copulsky (2011) asserts in step one, Oxenford (2011, p. 8) suggests that:

Internal factors can play just as an important part of building [the] external brand as the

other brand initiatives But brand is not simply good public relation s or a strong

marketing campaign, but rather all the interactions and actions of an organization both

internally and externally.

However, in direct conflict with what Copulsky (2011) asserts in his brand fragility paradox (see Figure

2), Oxenford (2011) goes on to argue that, brand is part of reputation and a well developed brand can

help protect reputation in times of crisis and busines interuptions . Dowling (2001) adds that typically

reputation takes a long time to form, and once developed they work like a flywheel - delivering a

sustained stream of power to what ever they are attached to (p.3). This conflicts with Copulskys notion

that any breach of that faith in a brand could be fatal to said brand. Further, it can be said that the

underline supposition of Copulskys brand fragility view is based on the faulty assumption that the

brand is an externally devised construct of a company that is disposable, as opposed to an internally

developed holistic and authentic way of doing business with clear corproate governance implications.

To further illustrate this point, we look to Tonello (2007) who contends that empirical research

shows that companies that can rely on a solid corporate reputation proposition are better suited to face

a situation of reputational crisis. A notable example of this is Johnson & Johnson, which was able to

regain 95 percent of its market share within three months of its Tylenol/ cyanide scandal in the 1980s ,

when 7 people in west-side Chicago died mysteriously (Harris, et al., 2002). Tylenol was the leading

pain-killer medicine in the United States at the time and enjoyed 37 percent market share, strong growth,

high profitability and was the major contributor to the financial success of its parent company Johnson

& Johnson (ibid). It was uncovered that Tylenol Extra-Strength capsules had been replaced with

cyanide-laced capsules, resealed in the packages and deposited back on the selves of at least a half-

dozen pharmacies and food stores in the Chicago area (Collins, 2003). Once the connection was made

between the Tylenol capsules and the reported deaths, Johnson & Johnson chairman James Burke


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formed a strategy team charged with protecting consumers first, and saving the product secondly (ibid).

Johnson & Johnson was faced with the dilemma of the best way to deal with the problem without

destroying the reputation of the company and its most profitable product. The response was a product

recall from the entire country which amounted to about 31 million capsules and a loss of more than

$100 million USD, they halted all advertisement for the product, toll-free cosumer numbers were set-

up, and press conferences and media junkets with major news and talk shows were organized, so that

the chairman could address the situation publically (Kaplan, 1998; Susi, 2002). As a result McNeil

Cosumer Products Company and its parent company Johnson & Johnson introduced the tamper-proof

packaging that persists today. Johnson & Johnsons response in this instance is an strong example of

corporate social responsibility and keen stakeholder and crisis management strategy and is historically

considered an seminal illustration of what excellent companies do when confronted by brand sabotuers.

The company was able to effectively salvage its brand because of their immediate and thorough

response to crisis, supplemented by the strong market presense and reputation prior to the incident.

Further in Step 1, Copulsky refers to customers as one of the four most obvious categories of

external insurgents and brand saboteurs, however Tonello (2007) counters that the relationship with

customers may be only marginally affected by the reputation of the corporation. The author (Tonello,

2007, p. 16) asserts that in a variety of business sectors, especially in the consumer goods industry, what

really cultivates the relationship with customers is a powerful and dependable product brand:

Since customers may remain unaware of (and even be uninterested in) the maker of their

favorite products (many, for example, do not know that Ferrari is a Fiat brand or that

Mercedes is made by Daimler), companies in those sectors and with multiple brands may not

f eel the need to associate the product with the brands owner by investing in overall corporate

reputation.

What is more, it may be concluded that the lack of a singular perception of the manufacturing firm

would help to isolate the negative effects of a br ands potential deterioration in the consumer market.

In this view, minimizing corporate visibility and reputation can be a mindful risk management strategy.

However, there are a few notable examples of business models such as Anita Roddicks Body Shop,


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where the overall reputation of an organization, including how certain principles and beliefs influence

the firms production processes, employee talent selection, and operational style, is strategically

deployed to appeal to a segment of the market that identifies with those ideals (Argenti &

Druckenmiller, 2003). In other cases, overall corporate reputation can operate as a cohesive franchise

and lend credibility to new products and/or ventures such as in the case of the strategy pursued by Steve

Jobs to leverage Apples reputation as a designer of cutting -edge, alternative computer technology in

order to create new expectations in the marketplace and make an impact on the music and ITC industries

(Tonello, 2007).

STEP 2. Galvanize your brand troops : Here Copulsky (2011) suggests that preventing brand

sabotage begins with awareness of the threat and involves how to galvanize, or stimulate, employees to

take personal responsibility and detecting and preempting threats to the brand. The author warns that

this is the area in which strong leadership is warranted on the part of the executive team. A mission

must be defined, the climate and culture reinforced, and employee training and guidance provided. He

adds that there are three ingredients to the effective engagement of brand troops. They are a clear

mission that links the troops to the cause of the brand resilience, a purposeful and sustained outreach

program and a strategy for employee ownership of said mission. Copulsky (2011) suggests that a

companys actionable elements are to commit to sharing information with their employees about brand

value, including drivers of and the potential impact s of brand sabotage. Companys should also assess

whether they are engaging its employees in brand resilience efforts for the long term by developing a

clear strategy at all critical points during employee tenure, and creating clear policies and guidelines for

employee use of the brand and social media. Lastly, the company must focus on educational efforts on

giving employees the situational cognition of recognizing brand sabotage by providing them with a

platform and the motivation to share what they learn.

This step seems to present a slight divergence from Step 1 in that Copulsky (2011) moves from

labeling employees as internal saboteurs or The Enemy Within to wanting to galvanize troops, or

elicited excitement and support from said employees to benefit the brand. As mentioned above, in Step

1, Copulsky (2011) seems to overlook employees as the largest and strongest stakeholders in good brand


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reputation, but looks to recover from this faulty assumption with rhetoric, here in Step 2, focused on the

corporate mission, outreach programming and internal culture necessary to get employees to take

personal responsibility for enhancing brand resilience. In Step 2, Copulsky seemingly shifts gears to

acknowledge and suggest the utilization of Tonellos (2007) view that a strong corporate reputation

plays on employees desire to enhance their social status by being a part of a highly regarded group,

consequently, augmenting the employees commitment to the organization with which they are

affiliated. Additionally, in contrast to the foundational assumption of Step 1, in Step 2, Copulskys

seems to support Tonello & Brancato s (2007) assertion that a place of work centered on business ethics

and a culture of mission integrity is crucial to an employees impression about the company, which

ultimately helps he or she to take personal responsibility for detecting and preempting threats to the

brand. Here in Step 2, Copulsky also affirms Tonello & Brancato s (2007) notion that the most valuable

impact that company leadership can provide is to oversee the formation, implementation, and efficacy

of a compliance and ethics program.

In line with what Copulsky (2011) asserts in Step 2, Taylor (2010, p. 2) also embraces the

connection between brand and corporate culture:

Even the most creative business leaders I know recognize that success is not just about

marketing differently from other companies: more daring ads, more new products, more

aggressive use of Twitter and Facebook. It is also, and perhaps more important, about caring

more than other companies about customers, about colleagues, about how the organization

conducts itself in a world with endless opportunities to cut corners and compromise on values.

Taylor (2010) goes on to say that the new power couple inside the best companies are ironclad

partnerships between marketing leadership and HR leadership. The actions of the United Services

Automobile Association (USAA), a Texas-based Fortune 500 diversified financial services group of

companies, can be used to further illustrate this point and its close association wi th Copulskys (2011)

view in Step 2. The USAA only serves one customer base, active or retired members of the U.S. military

and their families. Its customer-loyalty rankings are superlative and it has become a legendary brand,

both in terms of technology innovation and service. One of the main reasons for its strong performance


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as a brand is the strong sense of identification between its front-line employees and its customers. The

company has a much-admired training program in which employees learn the technical skills they need

to work efficiently. What the employees learn deeply, through coaching and engagement efforts enacted

by company leadership, is to empathize with a soldier on active duty and all of the other pressures and

demands on its 7.4 million military members. The employees are tied to the mission of the brand. The

personal identification between employees and customers is what gives USAA the drive to provide great

service and to allow innovation. For example, USAA was the first financial-services company to allow

customers to deposit checks by iPhone. The point behind the success of the USAA is that companies

cannot be distinguishing and compelling in the marketplace unless they create something distinguishing

and compelling within the workplace by culture shaping (Taylor, 2010; Oxenford, 2011). This USAA

illustrates how the brand may shape the culture and how the culture may bring the brand to life and the

influence of internal stakeholders on external stakeholders. USAA demonstrates how to link the

employees to the cause of the brand resilience and how to purposefully develop and sustain a strategy

for employee ownership of said brand, as Copulsky (2011) asserts is necessary to galvanize troops in

the brand resilience efforts of Step 2.

STEP 3. Deploy your brand risk early warning systems: Here Copulsky (2011) urges companies to

build an early warning system to alert to rumblings of trouble, take steps to deter and minimize the

damage, build and test early warning systems, and evaluate available third-party solutions for assessing

and detecting potential threats. The author argues that predicting brand sabotage is hard at first, as the

company may not recognize that the brand is under attack, but by enlisting everyone to be part of the

early warning system in the fight against sabotage and listening carefully to the signs, threats can be

detected earlier. Copulsky (2011) then goes on to warn that listening does not have much value if the

processes to take action are not in place and operable. C opulsky suggests that a companys actionable

elements should acknowledge that not every possible incident of sabotage will be detected, but the goal

is to spend less time in defense mode. The author then suggestions that the opportunities for

crowdsourcing information (a stakeholder engagement effort) about potential sources of brand sabotage

is another pivotal action task for which a company must assign responsibility.


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As mentioned above in Step 1, Moyer (2010, p. 1) calls into question the validity of

crowdsourcing by criticising the quality of the data and the motives of particularly influencial members

of the crowd, stating:

The philosophy behind this so-called crowdsourcing strategy holds that the truest and most

accurate evaluations will come from aggregating the opinions of a large and diverse group of

people. Yet a closer look reveals that the wisdom of crowds may neither be wise nor necessarily

made by a crowd. Its judgments are inaccurate at best, fraudulent at worst.

However, Brabham (2008) take issue with this position calling crowdsourcing is a valid and reliable

distributed problem-solving business model and a team-based multi-disciplinary practice. Brabham

(2008) goes further to describe crowdsourcing as a successful, alternative business model based on

aggregating talent, leveraging ingenuity while reducing the costs and time formerly needed to solve

problems. Similarly, Surowiecki (2004) examines several cases of crowd wisdom at work, where the

success of a resolution is dependent on its emergence from a large body of problem-solvers. Based on

his empirical investigations on estimating the weight of an ox and theories on the Columbia shuttle

disaster, Surowiecki (2004) finds that under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intell igent,

and are often smarter than the smartest people in them (p. xiii). Brabham (2008) states that the wisdom

of crowds is derived from aggregating solutions, not averaging them. As with most things, the average

is mediocrity, however with decision-making, it is often excellence. This perspective aligns with

Copulskys (2011) view that in the fight against brand sabotage, everyone can play a part of the early

warning system and that one of the primary things a company should do to actively deploy brand risk

early warning systems is to consider opportunities for crowdsourcing information about potential

sources of brand sabotage from various stakeholders.

STEP 4. Repel the attacks on your brand: Here Copulsky (2011) suggests a course of action after a

brand attack to limit fallout, appease public trust and emerge stronger in the end (crisis management).

This involves actively responding to attacks in the appropriate timeframe on the appropriate level.

Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) agree, arguing that post-crisis opportunity is time-sensitive and create

a critical period of learning readiness in organizations. Copulsky (2011) goes on to suggest that a brand


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attack be recognized as an event with the opportunity for pre- and post-actions, however Crandall, et al.

(2014) disagrees, arguing that crisis is more than just an event, it is a life cycle phenomenon that has a

birth, an acute stage - the crisis - and an aftermath. Copulsky (2011) also suggests to think of an apology

as an expression of regret, not as an admission of guilt. A sense of urgency should be displayed when

there is a bona fide problem and all corporate responses to said problem should be rehearsed and on

brand narrative.

Here Copulsky s (2011) recommendations align with the case mentioned in Step 1 of Johnson

& Johnsons response to the Tylenol tampering and the subsequent Chicago area deaths, where the

company exhibited a strong corporate social responsibility and employed a keen stakeholder and crisis

management strategy allowing the company to salvange its brand, primarily because of their immediate

response to the crisis, supplemented by their strong market presence and corporate reputation (Harris,

et al., 2002; Kaplan, 1998). There are two broad approaches to managing crises: (1) Try to keep them

from reoccurring, and (2) mitigate or soften the impact of the crisis when it does occur (Crandall, et al.,

2014).

Copulsys (2011) Step 4 strategy (and much of his brand resilience framework) falls in line with

Crandall, et al.s (2014) four stage crisis management conceptual framework which invloves 1)

Landscape Survey: identifying potential crisis vulnerabilities, 2) Strategic Planning: organizing the

crisis management team and writing the plan, 3) Crisis Management: addressing the crisis when it

occurs, and 4) Organizational Learning: applying lessons from crises so they will be prevented or

mitigated in the future. Crandall, et al.s (2014) framework takes a new spin on traditional crisis

management frameworks by emphasizes the importance of managing both the internal landscape (those

stakeholders within the organization, such as the employees, owners, and management) and the external

landscape (those stakeholders outside of the organization, such as the media, customers, suppliers,

general public, government agencies, and special interest groups). The authors (Crandall, et al., 2014,

p. 4) offer this official definition:

A crisis is an event that has a low probability of occurring, but should it occur, can have a

vastly negative impact on the organization. The causes of the crisis, as well as the means to


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resolve it, may not be readily clear; nonetheless, its resolution should be approached as

quickly as possible. Finally, the crisis impact may not be initially obvious to all of the relevant

stakeholders of the organization.

To the contrary, Copulskys (2011) definitively defensive tone throughout his description of the brand

resilience framework (see Figure 3) (as evidenced by the use of the counterinsurgency metaphor)

deflects from that which is represented in Crandall, et al.s (2014) outlook above. Copulsky (2011)

implies that there is always a high likelihood of brand sabotage looming on the horizon, as a result of

the high-speed world within which business much function. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) take issue

with this assumption, pointing out that defensiveness inhibits openness to learning and negatively

affects the quality of information that is gathered in a crisis situation (p. 31). The authors go on to argue

that crises can be a valuable source of information and a motivator for change.

STEP 5. Learn and adapt your brand defenses: Here Copulsky (2011) urges brand stewards to learn

from each assault and adapt behavior and tactics accordingly. Sources of brand sabotage can be

opportunities for insight and growth. The author goes on to advise companies to translate one-off

responses into more systematic changes that reduce the likelihood of future attacks (organizational

change). An organization can move from complacency into action in the midst of a crisis (p. 151) . The

role of a brand steward is to make sure the company takes a hard look at what actually happened and

not just simply fix it and move on, but mobilize to analyze what really happened. The author also

prompts the reader to the acknowledge that expectations for transparency are high when clarifying

policies implemented in response to attacks and brand shocks. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000)

corroborate this view arguing that during a crisis there is confusion, and employees look to top

managers specifically to understand how they should behave (p. 31) .

Again, this step closely aligns with Crandall, et al., (2014) crisis management conceptual

framework, particluarly Stage 4, Organizational Learning: applying lessons from crises so they will be

prevented or mitigated in the future, which suggests that after the crisis ends, the organization must take

time to learn from what has occurred. Crandall, et al. (2014) also suggests that one of the main keys to

learning from a crisis is timing, not to wait too long after the event has occurred to reflect and evaluate


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the occurrence. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) suggest that if too much time elapses, management

may reach a stage termed forgetfulness and the organization may return to normal operations without

the motivation to evaluate and learn from the crisis. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) go on to state that

there are three phases that organizations tend to go through once a crisis has occurred: first

defensiveness, then openness to learning, and finally forgetfulness. It is during the openness phase that

most learning can occur. At a minimum, management must assess how the crisis was handled and what

organizational changes need to be made in the crisis management blueprint. Pearson & Clair (1998)

suggest that this can be examined in terms of degrees of success and failure. For instance, an

organization may succeed at resuming timely operations, but fail at guarding its reputation. An

organization that is successful at learning will change its policies and procedures when necessary and

apply that new knowledge to future crisis events (ibid).

In the external landscape, industry regulators often reevaluate and renew their procedures

after a crisis. Certainly the airline industry has changed dramatically in terms of safety

regulations after Americas worst terrorist incident on September 11, 2001. Government

regulations are often implemented after a crisis, usually to increase the safety of stakeholders

in the affected industry (Crandall, et al., 201, p. 14).

We can look to a more recent instance of crisis and sabotage at Malaysian Airlines (MAS) to

further illustrate the widely held view of learning from each assault and adapting behavior and tactics

accordingly (Copulsky, 2011; Crandall, et al., 2014; Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000; Pearson & Clair,

1998). In early 2014, the airline lost two Boeing 777 aircrafts within 131 days, with a total of 537

passengers and crew lost. Flight 370 disappeared in an unknown location, without a distress signal, most

likely in the Southern Indian Ocean, on March 8 with 239 persons on board. The second, Flight 17,

crashed near Donetsk in eastern Ukraine on July 17 with 298 passengers and crew on board. The plan

was shot out of the sky by a surface-to-air missile (Patterson, 2014). Even before the crash of Flight

17, many analysts and pundits suggested that MAS would need to rebrand and repair its image and/or

require government assistance to return to profitability. A month after the disappearance of the first

plane, MAS chief executive Ahmad Jauhari Yahya acknowledged that ticket sales had declined, but


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failed to provide specific details (displaying a lack to transparency). Mr. Ahmad stated in an interview

that the airline's primary focus is that we do take care of the families in terms of their emotional needs

and also their financial needs. It is important that we provide answers for them. It is important that the

world has answers, as well (Raghuvanshi & Ng, 2014) . In terms of crisis management and

organizational learning, MAS has been working over the last several months on consolidating flights,

preparing short-term capacity adjustments to mitigate losses and a restructuring plan aimed at adjusting

its strategy to the challenging market conditions and the impact of the crashes (Centre for Asia Pacific

Aviation, 2014; Zhang, 2014).

STEP 6. Measure and track brand resilience: Here Copulsky (2011) emphasizes the importance of

the using business intelligence (BI) information systems (IS) to measure and track brand resilience as

vigilantly as a f irm would any other vital sign. The right measurement and tracking capabiliti es are

crucial to understanding whether your efforts to manage brand risks are working (p. 166). According

to the author, capturing the voice of the customer (VoC) is the first step in the evolution processes of

building brand resilience measurement capabilities. Getting information on what happens on the front

lines and including brand risk management in the scope of activities of executive leadership are of

pivotal importance, as well. To that end, the author emphasizes the importance of management s r ole,

responsibility and accountability for measuring and tracking brand resilience.

According to Subramaniam, et al., (2009), BI refers to methodologies and technologies for the

collection, integration, and analysis of all relevant information in a business, for the purpose of better

business decision-making. This is in essence discovering different variables crucial for business and

their correlation to variables that define success for the business. BI systems are widely used across

many industries, typically to track Key Performance Indicator (KPIs), aid decision support systems,

perform data mining and do predictive analysis based on the information acquired. Structured

information constitutes only a small portion of large volumes of information available in enterprises

(Gartner, 2011). It is widely accepted that structured data constitutes only about 20% of the complete

enterprise data, which includes communications from the customer or VoC (Berry, 2012; Gartner, Inc.,

2014; Subramaniam, et al., 2009). Subramaniam, et al. (2009) argues that VoC can enrich business


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insights, as suggested by Copulsky (2011) however, carrying out the collection process in an effective

manner requires effective BI systems for VoC. The authors go on to emphasize that there are three

major issues in using VoC for BI. The first challenge is data quality, the second major challenge is in

integrating the VoC with other enterprise structured and unstructured data, and the third challenge is in

storing and processing large volumes of data, as huge computational power is required to process VoC

(Subramaniam, et al., 2009). Copulsky (2011) himself acknowledges this issue, stating that critics and

advocates of IS management philosophies agree that success require significant changes in behavior

and processes, and it requires change in the structure of the organization using such systems.

Information is the platform for these changes, but does not ensure that an organization will achieve the

same results as those realized in organizations with successful BI IS implementations Copulsky (2011).

In line with Copulsky s (2011) view of developing organizations with more mature brand

resilience measuring and tracking systems, Gartner (2011) offers a BI, analytics and performance

management framework (see Figure 4) that defines the people, processes and technologies that need to

be integrated and aligned to take a strategic approach to performance management (PM).

Figure 4: Gartner BI, Analytics and Performance Management Framework

Source: (Gartner, 2011)

Suggested by Gartner (2011), in a familiar defensive tone, there was a need for the framework, as:

Increased volatility, ongoing economic uncertainty driving first cost-cutting and the return-to-

growth strategies and increasing stakeholder pressure has only increased demands for


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business executive seeking new or better ways to improve performance at all level of the

organization. (Gartner, 2011, p. 2).

However, fatal to the practicality of Copulskys (2011) recommendations, Gartner (2011) finds that a

strategic view requires defining decision-making and analytical processes, as well as the processes that

define information management, independently from the technology that will be used for

implementation. Additionally, the program management, technology and complexity of skills

associated with the strategic use of BI, analytics and PM increase dramatically as the scope of the

initiative widens across multiple business processes (Gartner, 2011), further highlighting the complexity

of enacting organizational change.

STEP 7. Generate popular support for your brand resilience campaign: Here Copulsky (2011)

suggests companies broaden its base of support. Brand advocates can be powerful additions to a firms

counterinsurgency arsenal. The author cautions that so long as a brand resilience campaign fails to attain

popular support, it will most likely not succeed, thus building in a plan for gaining popularity is

necessary. Additionally, Copulsky (2011) suggests that particular attention be paid to brand advocates

so that the company does not inadvertently turn them into brand saboteurs. The author then comes full

circle by suggesting that organization start developing a plan for contacting advocates in response to

brand shocks, including having the advocates play a role in early warning systems, as mentioned in Step

3, and develop solutions to repel attacks on the brand, as mentioned in Step 4.

Copulsky (2011) begins his description of brand advocates, individuals who preach the merits

of a given brand with or without prompting, by focusing his attention on secondary stakeholders and

potential brand advocates external to the organization. The author illustrates his strict external focus by

citing several real-world examples, such as in his description of the 2010 U.S. midterm elections where

President Barack Obama referred to convenience store 7- Elevens branded drink, the Slurpee, as a very

delicious drink and inadvertently became a global brand advocate for the brand. The Stakeholder theory

of organizational management suggests that primary stakeholders, (usually internal stakeholders, that

engage in economic transactions with the business e.g. stockholders, customers, suppliers, creditors,

and employees) and secondary stakeholders, (usually external stakeholders, who - although they do not


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engage in direct economic exchange with the business - are affected by or can affect its actions e.g. the

general public, communities, activist groups, business support groups, and the media) are both pivotal

to engagement efforts (Freeman, 1984). There is substantial evidence in the stakeholder and

communication management literature to suggest that enlightened organizational strategy-making is

best informed by a process of continuous dialogue with stakeholders (Sinclair, 2011). According to

Miles (2012), stakeholder engagement is the process by which an organization involves people who

may be affected by the decisions it makes or can influence the implementation of its decisions. Further,

stakeholder engagement provides opportunities to further align business practices with societal

expectations, helping to drive long-term sustainability and shareholder value. Sinclair (2011) suggests

that the business benefits of effective engagement are well-known and well-documented and that a

number of studies have found a clear correlation between stakeholder relationship quality and financial

performance (Waddock & Graves, 1997), sustainable wealth/long-term value (Post, et al., 2002), and

corporate reputation (Dowling, 1994). Additionally, Botan & Hazleton (1989) and Grunig (1992) point

to the value of on-going stakeholder engagement in organizational decision-making. This engagement

process and its underlying organizational management implications are in line with Copulskys (2011)

recommendations for mobilizing popular support for brand resilience efforts by the identification and

utilization of brand advocates mentioned in the final step, however Copulskys seems to set his focus

primarily on secondary stakeholders as opposed to primary stakeholders, which may prove problematic.

In essence, there is substantial evidence in the brand and reputational management, stakeholder

management, performance management and crisis management literature to suggest that Copulskys

(2011) brand resilience framework (see Figure 3) has several valuable promptings. However, the

literature also suggests that the framework is hedged by several assumptions that call into question the

practicality of the framework in totality in a real-world setting. Copulsky (2011) may be overlooking

one of the most important groups of stakeholders - employees - in his brand resilience and risk-reducing

efforts, as he mainly focuses his efforts on sabotage external to the organization. The overwhelming

complexity of the framework, coupled with the defensive tone may be off-putting to executives looking

to employ this framework in a practical sense. Additionally, while business justifications for each step

were provided, a lack of clear and specified timeframes for each step, and levels of commitment for


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financial/ budgetary, staffing, and learning curve requirements may also prove problematic in the

deployment of this framework.


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CHAPTER 3

Research Approach & Methodology

A reflective practitioner and semi-structured interview methodology was undertaken to

systematically explore and assess the feasibility of the brand resilience framework (see Figure 3) in

global corporations with recognizable brands. In so doing, an attempt was made to compare this

theoretical framework to what typically occurs in the workplace. Bearing in mind the overall benefit of

effective brand resilience techniques, the overall design intent was to bridge the gap that often exists

between the theoretical and the practical, helping to provide contemporary recommendations for

managing brand risk in the information age.

The methodology lends itself well to use in business because it is a flexible approach that can

be used to evaluate and improve workplace practices. It can be an important tool in practice-based

professional learning settings where individuals are learning from their own professional experiences.

It involves the capacity to reflect on action so as to engage in a process of continuous learning and

involves paying critical attention to the practical values and theories which inform everyday actions

(Schon, 1983). Further, through reflection one is able to see and label schools of thought and theory

and enhance knowledge (McBrien, 2007). Since the intent of the research was to explore a framework,

a conversational semi-structured interview, with open-ended questions, was undertaken in order to build

a rapport with participants, allowing new ideas to be brought up during the interview and increasing the

depth of knowledge shared by the participants. This method gives the researcher the freedom to probe

the interviewee to elaborate or to follow a new line of inquiry introduced by what the interviewee is

saying (University of Surrey, 2014; Barriball & While, 1994). This method works best when the

interviewer has a number of areas he/she wants to be sure to address (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), such as

in the case of this research endeavor. Strengths of this method include positive rapport between the

participant and interviewer which is an efficient, simple and practical way of attaining data that is not

easily observed. High validity is also considered a strength of this method, as participants are able todiscuss managing brand risk in detail and the justifications of perspectives may be revealed as the

interviewee is allowed to speak freely with little direction from the interviewer. This method has the


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potential to overcome the poor response rates of questionnaire surveys and it can facilitate comparability

by ensuring that all questions are answered by each respondent (Austin, 1981; Bailey, 1987; Barriball

& While, 1994). Finally, this method is ideal because the interviewer can hone in on information that

either had not occurred to the interviewer or of which the interviewer had no prior knowledge (Sociology

Central, 2012).

Eleven participants (see Appendix A) were selected to take part in the semi-structured interviews

based on the following criteria of eligibility:

1. Those who currently or formerly work in management or executive leadership roles at global

brands (any industry)

2. Those who have been in a managerial position for five years or more

3. Those willing to share their professional perspectives and experiences on managing brand risk

in a corporate environment

In order to obtain the most candid responses anonymity was guaranteed to all eligible participants.

Participants were recruited and selected based on public information provided on their LinkedIn profiles

suggesting that they fit the criteria above. Ultimately, six male and five female participants agreed to

take part. Four participants were based at multi-national companies headquartered in the U.K., six

participants were based at multi-national companies headquartered in the U.S. and one participant was

based at a multi-national company headquartered in Australia. Five participants had 20+ years of

managerial experience, five participants had approximately 10 years of managerial experience and one

participant at approximately 5 years of managerial experience. All participants had at least an

undergraduate degree. Participants from a diverse background of business categories were selected for

participation (primarily FMCG, hospitality, technology, professional services, mass media, and food

and beverage) as to gather diverse perspectives and insight and widen the base of applicability for the

research findings whilst maintaining the uniformity of the most pivotal variables, as mentioned in the

criteria of eligibility above. The reason for targeting this specific population was that, in terms of the

structure and objectives of the research, perspectives needed to be obtained from managers who had

acquired a certain level of corporate responsibility at global firms that are particularly interested in


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protecting and maintaining highly-visible and respected, global brand reputations. It therefore meant

that the participants would be able to provide information detailing the typical experiences of managers

in practice executing brand resilience efforts in the applicable corporate environments. Eleven persons

met the criteria and all of them were approached to form part of this study whilst adhering to ethical

principles. (Please see Appendix A for a description of each participant).

The steps in the research and data-collection process were as follows:

Initially, the contact information (valid email addresses) for 25 eligible professionals was

gathered from various online sources. These potential participants where then emailed and asked to

share their professional expertise by participating in the study. The introductory email explained the

general intent of the study (see Appendix B) and included an attachment with seven interview questions

listed, so that it was clear what was expected of each participant and so that the participants had time to

mentally prepare and recollect their first-hand professional experiences in the context of the study. The

attachment also included two figures, the first illustrating the brand fragility paradox (see Figure 2) and

the second illustrating the brand resilience framework (see Figure 3). The participants were asked their

thoughts on reliability, the strengths and weakness and utilization of the frameworks as it pertains to

their first-hand experience (see Appendix B for the full introduction and interview briefing document).

Immediate responses were received from just fewer than 50 percent of the contacted potential

participants. Once their eligibility was confirmed, interviews were scheduled with all of the potential

participants. Five interviews were conducted over the phone, three interviews conducted via Skype, two

interviews were conducted in person, and one interview was conducted in writing. The researcher acted

as the facilitator of the interviews.

Each interview (excluding the written interview, as timing could not be assessed) took 30 minutes

or greater, although 20 minutes was initially allotted for each. The open-ended questions allowed each

participant to elaborate as much as they would like and all participants took advantage of the

opportunity. Additionally, the research facilitator asked several probing questions based on the

responses given which also elongated the timeframes. Not more than three interviews were scheduled


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in one day as time zone differences as well as the unpredictable interview lengths complicated

scheduling a bit. Two interviews needed to be rescheduled due to timing conflicts.

Verbatim data was collected via laptop and iPhone recorders and the digital files of each interview

are available, but will be kept password protected and in the possession of the researcher as to protect

the identities of the participants. One participant requested not to be recorded, one participant responded

in writing as mentioned above, and three participants stated that they would be open to being named in

the final version of the report, so long as they can have final approval on the quotes used. The researcher

also reflected by keeping personal and observational notes during the interviews as well as on the

reflective process as a whole. Streubert Speziale, et al., (2007) suggest these personal notes may be

regarded as field notes to be used as reference when the verbatim data and narratives are analyzed.

Follow-up emails were sent to all participants clarifying disclosure information and thanking each

for his or her participation. Ethical considerations that were taken into account included human rights -

the right to self-determination, privacy, anonymity, confidentiality and fair treatment. Approval to

conduct the study was obtained from participants and the assigned research supervisor. Participation

was voluntary and each participant agreed to an informed consent and could withdraw at any time during

the study. The privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of the participants were protected by not linking

any names or the name of the institution to the collected data. Measures to ensure trustworthiness were

applied based on the evaluative model proposed by Lincoln & Guba (1985) and included credibility,

transferability, dependability and confirmability. Under the truth value (credibility) criteria, strategies

used in this research include reflective notes for reflexivity, verbatim audio for member checking,reframing questions for interview techniques and integration of data in a logical manner for structural

coherence. For the transferability (applicability) criteria, strategies used in this research include

representativeness of all participants, for consistency (dependability) and neutrality (confirmability),

this research provides a dense description of the research methodology (Crabtree, 2006; De Swardt, et

al., 2012).

Limitations of this method include time intensiveness and the skill of the interviewer may come into

question - the ability to think of questions during the interview, and the articulacy of the respondent


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(Sociology Central, 2012). Adjusting each interview, for example, in order to obtain accurate and

complete data yet maintaining sufficient standardization to secure the validity and reliability of data is

a major challenge to interviewers and depends upon thorough training (Moser & Kalton, 1986; Barriball

& While, 1994). It is important to note that the interview facilitator in this research study has undergone

some professional interview training from a previous role in public relations and media relations. Also,

the researcher may have no way of knowing if the respondent is insincere, however in this case, the

researcher has no indication that untruths were provided by participants based on a review of the audio

recordings and field notes. Barriball & While (1994) argued that access to the nuances of the

interactions between respondent and interviewer (e.g. intonations, pauses) helps validate the accuracy

and completeness of the information collected and reduces the potential for interviewer error. Ornes

(1962) demand-characteristic effects of the personal interview was also considered in this research, as

several of the participants (see Appendix A) differed in ethnicity, gender, socio-economic background

and age from the interviewer. This dynamic could have had the potential to intimidate the interviewer

posing a potential for bias in the research (Bailey, 1987), however, the self-presentation of the

interviewer, in terms of dress, etiquette and manner largely overcame this potential for bias and went a

long way towards putting the respondents at ease (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Barriball & While, 1994).


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CHAPTER 4

Discussion and Analysis of Results

The results of this study are presented in terms of the themes addressed in the seven main

interview questions, namely (1) tangibility of risk associated with managing a global brand, (2) internal

versus external risk, (3) precautionary methods used to protect brand reputation, (4) perspectives on

Copulskys (2011) brand paradox framework, (5) perspectives on Copulskys (2011) brand resilience

framework, (6) internal leaderships concern with the safeguard of the brand, and (7) future implications

of brand risk in the information age.

Under the first theme, the tangibility of risk associated with managing a global brand, there was

wide consensus among all the participants that there was a true and present danger in managing the

brand of a global firm. Three subcategories emerged under this theme, namely the level of competition

in the market place, the speed at which crisis can escalate and the repercussions of corporate decision-

making. The data confirms that the participants perceived the level of competition in the market, what

Sull (2006) describes as a volatile variable, to be the first subcategory of the real dangers in managing

brand risk and generally expressed the idea that the brands that seem ed to get it right were the brands

that everyone tried to imitate. Often times this imitation attempt put into jeopardy the authenticity of

the original brand seeking to better its reputation. Participant 1 said, Everyone is trying to imitate the

ones that did it correctly. Everyone is trying to be like Starbucks. Brand manipulation and inauthenticity

is the result, as brands stay away from the original ideals of the firm in pursuit of the success associated

with the ideals of another brand. The data confirms that the participants perceived the speed at which

crisis can escalate to be the second subcategory of the real dangers in managing

Documents

A Critical Analysis of Deloitte’s Brand Resilience Framework: A study of and recommendations on managing brand risk and resilience in the information age