The Muslim Brotherhood’s Rise and Fall:

An Comparative Analysis of the Egyptian and Syrian Chapters

A Final Paper Submitted By:

Marianne Crielle G. Vitug

In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the course

POS 190

Submitted to:

Professor Hansley Juliano

Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences Ateneo de Manila University Loyola Heights, Quezon City

27 March 2014

Introduction

In January of 2011, a group of liberal university students led a

revolt that ousted authoritarian leader Hosni Mubarak and

continued the chain of the Arab Spring. While they were hopeful of

the changes that were supposed to follow, they instead

encountered political divisiveness and further chaos throughout the

nation. Taking advantage of the pandemonium, the Muslim

Brotherhood, the long-standing moderate Islam social movement

and political group, rose to power by filling half the seats of Egypt’s

lower house in the election following the ouster, just as Mohamed

Morsi was voted into the presidency (Laub 2014).

Morsi’s leadership did not prove to be genuinely democratic

as earlier promised. In November of 2012, he unilaterally decided

to accord himself more power, in the form of being exempt from

judicial review and disallowing the court to dissolve the upper and

lower houses of parliament regardless of circumstance. The lower

house rushed to create a new constitution that was approved with

63.8% of the vote, but with voter turnout low. These actions, among

many others, sparked more protests involving hundreds of

thousands of Egyptians, with one of the worst being the one that

took place in January of this year, the 2-year anniversary of the

revolution against Mubarak. In June, the number of protesters was

pegged at the millions, all calling for Morsi to step down

(Henderson 2013).

In the beginning of July, the country’s powerful military

declares an ultimatum for both sides to settle their disputes within

48 hours, after which it will carry out its own solution. This plan

consisted of ousting Morsi and replacing him with an interim

government, nullifying the constitution, and holding elections after

a year. On July 3, this plan was executed, and Mohamed Morsi was

overthrown (Henderson 2013).

At the center of this is the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ikhwan al-

Muslimeen in Arabic, whose participation in the Morsi regime has

been largely criticized and contested by the Egyptian people.

Despite this, the Brotherhood’s relevance, though dwindling,

remains an issue in determining the future of the country and if

true democracy is to be established there. What is more is that

given its history of moderation, their presence in Egyptian politics

may be what is best for the fight against tyranny and extremism

(Laub 2014).

In another part of the Arab League, Syrian nationals continue

to live in a state of civil war, after having begun a call to democracy

in March of 2011, less than two months from the onset of Egypt’s

first ouster. By April of that year, soldiers in tanks were firing at

protesters in Daraa and two other sites, and house-to-house sweeps

were mandated. Checkpoints were established at strategic parts.

Utilities such as electricity and water, as well as cellphone service

were cut. This prompted the United States to impose sanctions on

Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian President, in May (“Syrian uprising”

2013).

Human rights violations, such as more unwarranted killings of

protesters, force the United States, the United Kingdom, France,

Germany, and the European Union to demand Assad’s resignation

in August, which landed on deaf ears. By early November, the

death toll stood at 3,500, and the Arab League voted to suspend

Syria’s membership and approved sanctions against the nation.

By February 2012, however, China and Russia vetoed a

motion in the United Nations Security Council that involved the

Arab League making a move toward Assad stepping down. In

March, on the anniversary of the revolution, thousands of pro-Assad

Syrians marched in Daraa to show their support to the regime. At

this point, the death toll was at 8,000. By July, the Syrian

government announced a threat to use weapons of mass

destruction, meaning chemical and biological, should they face

attacks from foreign nations, which made United States President

Barack Obama reconsider the military’s involvement in the issue.

Despite numerous calls for his resignation, Assad announces

in January of this year that he will not step down “as long as there

is one terrorist left” in Syria (“Assad’s speech” 2013). Both the

European Union and the United States began sending weapons to

rebel groups after intelligence brings to light that chemical

weapons have been used in the civil war. By April, it was declared

that the death toll is pegged at 93,000. In August, Assad was once

again accused of using chemical weapons on innocent civilians,

which he denies, but prompted Obama to declare his support of

military force and intervention in Syria. However, he sought the

approval of congress before taking such a step (“Syrian uprising”

2013).

On a much smaller scale, present in Syria as well is the

Muslim Brotherhood, which announced the creation of a multi-

cultural political party, the Syrian Waad Party, in early November

(Lefèvre 2013). While the Party is evidently young, the question

now is whether the moderation and modernity that it brings to the

table can be a key factor in rebuilding the Syrian democracy when

the Assad regime comes to an end.

Given these facts, the problem statement then follows:

Despite their history of political moderation and modern

interpretations of Islamic tenets, why has the Muslim Brotherhood

been antagonized into seeming like a fundamentalist sect in the

Egyptian and Syrian contexts especially when it may prove to be a

key actor to consolidating democracy in both nations?

While the Brotherhood’s failings and even violations are

undeniable, so too is their historical relevance in bringing Islam to

reconciliation with Western democracy. In the age of the Arab

Spring, perhaps it is time to inspect how the Brotherhood can

reform in order to be the real representatives of the people, not

only to their respective administrations, but also to the

international community that is yet to figure out how to handle

these crises and their aftermaths.

Theoretical Framework

The problem statement shall be approached through a

sociological institutionalist framework, which takes a look at

organizations and how they take on certain processes and forms as

a result of culture and yet do so in a transnational manner, meaning

an institution present in several countries may often have several

similarities in terms of organizational design and practice (Hall &

Taylor 1996:13). This perspective allows the Muslim Brotherhood,

which started in Egypt, to be inspected in terms of how similar it is

in the context of the two nations, and how it is a key democratic

player for both administrations.

Moreover, sociological institutionalism, unlike the historical

and rational choice variants, does not rigidly separate institutions

from culture. This key factor is crucial, as the Muslim Brotherhood

draws heavily from Islamic teachings, with its political facets rooted

heavily in religion. While it may come as a surprise to some, this is

what drew many Egyptians to them decades back, and continues to

be one of the most relatable aspects of the group. This branch also

acknowledges the mutual relationship between the organization

and the individual in terms of how one shapes the other’s

character. This aspect will contribute to analyzing the Muslim

Brotherhood’s impact on the Egyptian and Syrian nationals

themselves, and vice versa. Since sociological institutionalism also

posits that organizations take on new practices to increase social

legitimacy, this will be used to critique the ways in which religion

has been used by the Muslim Brotherhood in order to gain

followers and attain power in both regions, and whether or not

these have been contributory to the democratic process.

As can be expected for a highly controversial and complex

organization, there are many conflicting theories and analyses as to

how the Muslim Brotherhood is really like and what its relevance is

in Egyptian and Syrian politics. Much of the available literature

often depicts the group as an extremist organization, this being the

seemingly prevalent perspective from Western media. This paper,

however, intends to debunk the image of the Muslim Brotherhood

as fundamentalists, and instead present its moderate and

democratic nature. In line with the aforementioned theoretical

framework, this will be done through analyzing the various

institutions that have been relevant to the democratic consolidation

and respective revolutions of Egypt and Syria with respect to the

Muslim Brotherhood as the key actor.

As such, a brief history of each country will be given, while

giving emphasis on points relevant to the recent crises. After

which, the key actors in each country will be discussed, paying

attention to the various views that are held by experts on each one.

Lastly, using the literature, analysis will be provided as to what role

the Muslim Brotherhood, as the central actor, will play in future

democratic proceedings in each country.

Methodology

The researcher will delve into the context of the two chapters

of the Muslim Brotherhood by examining the history and

establishment of each one in its respective countries. Such perusal

will show how the Brotherhood adapted to the culture and

traditions of each nation, and how it came to find itself in the

sensitive position it is in right now.

The analysis will be done by looking at how the Muslim

Brotherhood has developed its various relationships with other

relevant parties concerned with democratic consolidation in both

Egypt and Syria. Many of these actors have shown to be hostile

towards the organization, and such antagonistic relations may yet

push the Brotherhood out of relevance, both politically and

violently. Despite the vast differences in cultural nuances between

the two chapters, they may possibly share the same fate.

Findings

Egypt

The Arab Republic of Egypt spans about 1 million square

kilometers of land, and is home to about 83.9 million citizens. Its

major language is Arabic, and the two dominant religions are Islam

and Christianity. The capital of the nation is Cairo, where much of

the revolution has taken place (“Egypt profile” 2014). Its current

interim president is Adly Mahmoud Mansour, who took over after

the ouster of Morsi. He has announced that presidential and

parliamentary elections are to take place within 2014, and that he

will not be running as a candidate.

The Muslim Brotherhood

At the epicenter of this revolution is the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is the oldest Sunni Islamist organization founded in Egypt, as

well as the biggest. Its founder was Hasan al-Banna, who

established the organization in the hopes of putting Islam at the

center of Egyptian politics. Once a practitioner of violent means to

achieve its political agenda, it reformed in the 1970s by focusing

instead on social welfare. Doing so made it popular amongst

Egyptians, who badly needed the pharmacies, hospitals, and

schools that the Brotherhood provided. The government during that

time could not provide such services, and this allowed the

organization to cultivate the loyalties of the people (Laub 2014).

The height of the Brotherhood’s success was arguably in

2012, after the ouster of Mubarak. The organization’s Freedom and

Justice Party won practically half of the seats in the nation’s lower

house or People’s Assembly, in tandem with Morsi, their

presidential candidate, winning the election and a subsequent

runoff. In fear of a Brotherhood takeover, the Supreme Court

abolished the lower house, which backfired and gave Morsi both

executive and legislative powers. His regime was marked with

ineffective economic policies, the effects of which were severely felt

by the lower classes. Such abuses of power led to the downfall of

Morsi, along with the Brotherhood. What followed was a crackdown

on their supporters, and it is estimated that the government has

killed about one thousand of them. The Brotherhood has been

banned in the country, and has now labeled as a terrorist group by

Saudi Arabia (Kirkpatrick 2014).

Gama’a

While the Muslim Brotherhood has been largely construed as

an extremist organization blindly loyal to and, to an extent,

misguided by the tenets of Islam, at the real end of the spectrum is

the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyaa. It is the largest Islamist militant

organization in Egypt, and its sole mission has been to dethrone the

secular and democratic Egyptian government in order to implement

a new administration based on sharia (Islamic) law. They were

responsible for several terrorist attacks in the 1990s (Fletcher

2008).

The radical group supposedly denounced violence in the

2000s after the Mubarak regime staged a crackdown on their

members, but other sources have stated that they actually split into

two factions. One was led by Mustafa Hamza, and this faction

agreed to a ceasefire. Rifa’i Taha Musa’s faction, on the other hand,

continued the group’s original militant goals and merged with al-

Qaeda. Several other terrorist groups based in Afghanistan have

also been reported to support Gama’a’s remaining violent faction.

The Egyptian Military

In a nation that has faced two ousters within a span of five

years, it is inevitable that the military be a guiding force in

implementing the peace and maintaining order in the nation. The

military has been the forceful actor in ensuring that the ultimatum

against Morsi was followed, and thereby committed the ouster

itself. Since then, it has risen to power, and has therefore been

under the watchful eye of the international community. This is due

to the fact that the propensity for abuse rises greatly when the

military is given so much power. How the planned election is to

take place within the year is yet to be seen, but procedures have

been smooth thus far. The general who was at the forefront of the

ouster, Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, has recently resigned from the military

in order to announce his intent on running for president (Tawfeeq

2014). He is expected by many to win easily.

This actor has also been in charge of the aforementioned

crackdown on Brotherhood members and supporters, which has

been its way of achieving order in the chaotic landscape that is

Egypt.

Civil Society

Although never rigidly divided, civil society is often

classifiable by ideology, and Egypt is no exception. First, there are

liberals who seek true secular democracy, and feel that this period

of time, wherein transitions are ongoing and citizens seek radical

reform, is the best opportunity Egypt has gotten in a very long

time. Many of these liberals are also thoroughly against the idea of

the Muslim Brotherhood coming back to power in any capacity, and

might even be supportive of the violent crackdown that is being

done to them right now. There has been the possibility of banning

religiously-affiliated political parties altogether, and those liberals

at the end of the spectrum might see this as a safeguard against

repeating history.

Second are the moderates. Given the characterization of the

Muslim Brotherhood, it can be said that their followers are still

moderates, in that they believe that a middle ground can be

achieved between the country’s innate religiosity and the

democracy that was introduced to them by the West (Leiken &

Brooke 2007:107-108). Many of these individuals, however, are

unsurprisingly silent on their views, due to the antagonistic view

that the government has taken against the Brotherhood (Miles

2013).

Lastly, there remain to be the conservatives, who, in essence,

are radical fundamentalists more aligned with the ideals of Gama’a

than the Brotherhood. Some will continue to advocate for sharia

law to be one with Egyptian law, and still others might even justify

violent means in order to make this a reality.

The tense political situation in Egypt has certainly divided the

people, and how rigid such divisions are may be unclear until such

a time that the citizens no longer feel afraid to voice their political

beliefs once more. Those who are more vocal, however, have

evidently reacted differently to how the Muslim Brotherhood has

been treated following the Morsi ouster.

The International Community

The Egyptian crisis has been an international issue as much

as it is a local one. This has been due to the fact that it epitomizes

the battle for democracy in a non-Western nation against the

original ideals it once held, many of which were rooted in religion.

The United States, in particular, has been greatly supportive of the

efforts towards secularism and democratization.

In line with this, many Western analysts have framed the

Muslim Brotherhood as the new enemy and face of Islamic

fundamentalism (Stakelbeck 2013:25-27). Having fielded the

ineffective and corrupt Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood is now seen

as the perfect example of why religion cannot intertwine with

politics so closely, as it is more likely to yield to abusive practices

and be unable to properly govern a nation.

Syria

Home to 21.1 million people, the Syrian Arab Republic has

also been the center of one of the biggest humanitarian crises of

the century. It covers 185,180 square kilometers, and, like Egypt,

has Arabic as its main language, as well as Islam and Christianity

as its major religions (“Syria profile” 2014). Assad continues to be

the leader of the nation, despite the innumerable allegations

against him, both from citizens and leaders of the free world alike.

The situation in Syria is seemingly at a standstill, with international

actors immobilized from taking real action against Assad.

Assad’s Regime

Bashar al-Assad was once the promising son of Hafez al-

Assad, who was a dictator in his own time. The younger Assad, who

was once the president of the Syrian Computer Society, promised

modernization and reforms, particularly toward upgrading the

technological capacities of Syria. Over time, the abusiveness of the

regime escalated, and many of his crimes against humanity may yet

be undiscovered by the international community (“Profile: Syria’s

Bashar” 2013).

The worst offense that he has committed thus far is the use of

sarin gas, which is a chemical weapon agreed upon by the global

civil society never to utilize. He specifically used this against

innocent civilians. This prompted United States President Barack

Obama to voice his support of a strike against Assad. This bold

move, however, did not amount to real action due to the limitations

of his power (Parsons 2013).

Assad continues to refuse to step down, and justifies his

actions by saying he leads in order to fight terrorism. No tangible

action is being done by the international community as of the

moment, but Assad’s downfall is seen by many to be inevitable.

Despite this, the situation in Syria continues to worsen, and

although Assad’s ouster would bring vast improvements to the

nation, it will continue to deal with several repercussions from his

regime.

Civil Society

Two forms of opposition against Assad’s regime have risen in

Syria, one that is political, and one that is armed (“Syria crisis”

2013). Political or ideological opposition against Assad is spread

throughout the spectrum. Despite this giving them more political

clout, this also means greater divisiveness among the leaders, who

come from various groups and will therefore prioritize different

goals. Many of them have attempted to form several coalitions for

better cooperation, and have achieved varying degrees of success.

Some of the most prominent coalitions have been the National

Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, the

Syrian National Council, the National Coordination Committee, and

the Kurdish Supreme Committee.

On the other hand, armed opposition has been estimated to be

as large as 1,000 groups, with more than 100,000 fighters

altogether. Much like their political counterpart, they are disunited

due to several constraints that range from geographic to ideological

to political. This also makes them disorganized, as there is no

coordination between the 1,000 groups, seeing as this would be a

logistical impossibility. The lack of harmony among these groups,

and the possible lack of coordinated efforts with the political sector,

makes the armed opposition limited in its capacity to effect change

as well.

The International Community

Syria still has at least two allies, namely, Russia and Iran (Yan

2013). Russia aligns with the Assad regime supposedly due to the

naval base that it has in the country. Protecting the regime means

that the naval base can remain there to aid Russia in any future

attacks against it. There also seems to be a Cold War mentality

being utilized, in that Russia denounces interventionist mentality as

a form of imperialism. Iran, on the other hand, sees the United

States and Israel as threats to its own sovereignty, and Syria has

proven itself useful in protecting Iran’s interests.

Syria currently seems to be at a standstill, as there is a great

debate on intervention that is ongoing amongst the powers of the

world. Evidently, the military attack would be the quickest solution,

but it would also bring the most number of casualties. At this point,

given the 100,000 death toll, risking more lives would seem just as

inhumane. On the other hand, there is insistence that Assad cannot

go unpunished for using chemical weapons, as it was long ago

agreed upon that under no circumstances would such a crime be

permitted. Some have also posited the use of other sanctions, such

as economic ones, to freeze out Assad and drain his resources. This

will, however, take much longer, and might be just as risky as a

military intervention, given that Assad might lash out at the citizens

in his remaining time.

One argument that has been raised is to not intervene at all,

in order to make way for a necessary rebalancing of power (Zakaria

2012). This will allow a more natural progression to the democratic

process of the country, as intervention often skews the power and

makes the nation dependent on foreign rule. Allowing for a slow

and even painful rebalancing still risks lives, but gives the nation’s

citizens to assert their own interests and maintain the nation’s

sovereignty at the same time.

The Muslim Brotherhood

It was in 1945 that the chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood in

Syria was born. While it was independent from the Egyptian body,

it had similar grounds for development, and that was social welfare.

Like its mother organization, the Syrian arm was able to provide

services that the government could not. It also had a similar

organizational structure, and it entered into politics as a result of

its reformist goals. While largely moderate, it was seen as a threat

to the dictatorship of Hafez al-Assad, who ordered a massacre of

the Brotherhood’s supporters in Hama (Lefèvre 2013:20-21).

Unlike in Egypt, however, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is

merely at the periphery of the crisis due to the hostility of the

Assad regime toward the organization. Due to this, the Brotherhood

currently has five seats in the Syrian National Council in order to

actively oppose the regime on a political level. Its recently launched

political party, led by Dr. Mohammed Walid, insists that it will not

dominate, and therefore not follow the trajectory of its Egyptian

counterpart.

Analysis

Egypt

While current widespread belief is that the Muslim

Brotherhood has become the epitome of Islamic fundamentalism

and therefore has no place in modern democracy, it can be argued

that the Brotherhood has historically served as the bridge between

democracy and Islam. This moderate ground allowed for many

Egyptians to be more deeply involved in politics, and use their

religious beliefs to demand for true social change from their

government. It made the newfound tenets of democracy more

relatable to a largely traditional audience, and gave them a unique

experience of what democracy can truly do for them as a people

(Abdo 2002: 7-12).

The crimes and shortcomings of the Brotherhood are

undeniable and unforgiveable, but this does not mean they are

immediately a dispensable party. While recent actions have not

allowed for the party to show its capacity for good governance,

there is much room for necessary change that could allow for it to

still be a key player in the democratic process of Egypt. These

changes start with embracing plurality, and thereby acknowledging

that a secular state does not mean it has to be anti-Islam. They

must also separate completely from the ultra-conservatives, such as

the Salafis, which will allow them to be free from the image of

extremism. Another suggestion is to involve women and youth in

political processes, as they are severely underutilized sector in the

nation, and they clearly need all the support they can get at the

moment (Husain 2013).

Whether it is too late for such reforms to take place given that

the crackdown is happening remains to be the question. The

Brotherhood still has followers in the millions, and such

disbandment may force them to take up arms. Having characterized

many of these followers as moderates, it is a toss-up as to whether

they will choose to be more liberal or conservative in their beliefs.

It must be taken into consideration, however, that many of them

have felt displaced and threatened since the Morsi ouster. The

military takeover has antagonized many moderates, and may well

push them to the brink of extremism (Georgy & Perry 2013).

Even more compelling is the fact that many extremist groups

now feel affirmed that they have taken the right courses of action in

taking up arms in order to forward the Islamist cause. The decline

of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt proves to them that it is

impossible to peacefully negotiate with democratic powers in order

to elevate sharia law as national law. By showing that there is no

way but radicalism in order to achieve their goals, they are less

inclined to be open to negotiations or to renounce the use of arms

in the long run.

The absence of the Muslim Brotherhood from the political

process in Egypt may therefore mean a step back for democratic

consolidation, as more moderates feel threatened and more

conservatives feel affirmed. It removes the middle ground that was

more viable and open to debate, thereby making the rebalancing of

power less organic.

Syria

The very presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria shows

the capability of institutions to transcend national borders and

adapt to different cultures while still maintaining the same essence.

They were able to have the same principles of prioritizing Islamic

values and social welfare, as well as construct a similar hierarchical

structure. Despite this, the Syrian chapter has grown in its own

way, as an independent institution that is nuanced to the context of

this other nation. It has evolved as a response to the hostility of

both Assads, who similarly wanted to push the Brotherhood to the

periphery of the political scene.

Given the similarities between the two chapters, it might be

possible that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood will be largely

affected by the downfall of its Egyptian counterpart in a negative

manner. Assad has blatantly stated that he celebrates the downfall

of the Brotherhood in Egypt, thereby possibly delegitimizing the

Syrian chapter in the process. Even the international community

and media seem to propagate the demonization of the Muslim

Brotherhood, which very likely scares possible supporters away

from the Syrian arm, in fear that it will follow the same pattern and

make the same unforgiveable mistakes (Al-Abdeh 2013).

This fear might be validated by the fact that the Brotherhood’s

political party is following an eerily similar trajectory to the

Egyptian arm, in that it is now planning its rise to power after the

toppling of the Assad regime. Once the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood attained power in the Morsi regime, they exhibited

their lack of a capacity to properly govern and control their

officials. That type of behavior led to their biggest crisis in more

than eighty years. If the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood chooses to

make the same mistakes, then it wasted an opportunity to forward

the democratic process.

On the other hand, being more politically strategic may allow

them to be a key player in the eventual rebalancing of power that is

to come after the Assad regime. Considering the several coalitions

and parties that will continue on, learning to embrace plurality

while at the same time maintain ample power will allow for the

Syrian arm to live on much longer than the Egyptian one. Until

such a time that the Assad regime is toppled, however, it is unclear

as to how the Brotherhood will behave in a democratic setting

(Lefèvre & Sayigh 2013).

Conclusion

The Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhoods have very

similar ideological foundations and organizational structures.

Despite this, each one has crafted its own distinct identity and

function over time by adapting to the respective cultures of each

country. Both have had to deal with the question of how to

reconcile religious beliefs with democratic ideals, and have had to

face hostile governments and dictators.

Currently, the fate of both remain elusive to many. The

Egyptian arm is facing a hostile nation after having lost its power

so quickly. This has resulted in intense antagonization by various

institutions, despite the fact that it is likely a crucial factor in

shaping a more stable democracy for the country.

On the other hand, the Syrian arm is gaining political power

just as its mother organization is declining, but it may end up

following a similar trajectory. While it has been a politically

moderate and even liberal actor, what it will do with the power it is

accumulating remains to be a mystery.

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