A Case of Academic Misconduct: Does Self-Interest Rule?

A Case of Academic Misconduct:Does Self-Interest Rule?*

JOANNE JONES, York University

GARY SPRAAKMAN, York University

ABSTRACTMost analyses of academic misconduct focus on students’ integrity and what istaught at the universities. Surprisingly little attention is paid to the role of facultymembers. This article presents an unusual case of academic misconduct that pro-vides an opportunity to examine the actions and rationalizations of the studentsand faculty members involved in the event as well as the broader university context.The case is unusual in that the instructor initiated and facilitated the academic mis-conduct. The analysis of the misconduct and the subsequent events suggest thatself-interest rules and concerns for wider interests are all but silent. While the casepresents a somewhat dismal view of the integrity of some accounting faculty mem-bers and future accountants, it provides interesting insight into self-interest, ratio-nalization, social context, and both students’ and faculty members’ integrity. Theanalysis discusses the mechanisms used to prevent and manage faculty member mis-conduct, along with limitations of self-regulation and student reports as forms ofcontrol. The article also considers how accounting educators can encourage futureaccountants to act with integrity and concludes that in order to achieve that goal,accounting educators must serve as role models who act honestly.

Keywords Academic ethics; Academic misconduct; Accounting education; Integrity

UN CAS D’INCONDUITE EN MILIEU UNIVERSITAIRE :L’INTÉRÊT PERSONNEL PRIME-T-IL ?

RÉSUMÉLa plupart des etudes relatives a l’inconduite en milieu universitaire portent surl’integrite des etudiants et la matiere enseignee dans les universites, mais elles mani-festent etonnamment peu d’interet pour un facteur crucial : le role des professeurs.Les auteurs exposent un cas inusite d’inconduite en milieu universitaire qui fournitl’occasion d’examiner les comportements et les rationalisations des etudiants et desprofesseurs en cause, ainsi que le contexte universitaire dans son ensemble. Le casest inusite en ce que les etudiants ne sont pas seuls concernes, puisque le professeurdeclenche et facilite l’inconduite. L’analyse de l’inconduite et des evenements

* We would like to thank Mark Schwartz and conference participants at the 2009 AAA Midyear

Teaching and Learning Conference, the 2009 Annual Symposium on Ethics Research in

Accounting, 2010 Canadian Academic Accounting Conference, and the 2010 American

Accounting Association Conference for their insightful comments.

AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC Vol. 10, no 1 (2011) pages 1 – 22 ª CAAA /ACPCdoi:10.1111/j.1911-3838.2011.00017.x

subsequents semble indiquer que l’interet personnel prime et que les preoccupationsa l’egard d’interets plus larges sont a peu pres inexistantes. Bien que le cas presentel’integrite de certains professeurs de comptabilite et de futurs comptables sousun jour assez peu reluisant, il offre d’interessants renseignements sur l’interetpersonnel, la rationalisation, le contexte social et l’integrite tant des etudiants quedes professeurs. Les auteurs analysent les instruments utilises pour contrer et gererl’inconduite des professeurs, ainsi que les limites de l’autoreglementation et desrapports des etudiants a titre de mecanismes de controle. Ils se penchent egalementsur la facon dont les professeurs de comptabilite peuvent encourager les futurscomptables a faire preuve d’integrite et concluent que, pour atteindre ce but, lesditsprofesseurs doivent se comporter en modeles de role en agissant avec sincerite ethonnetete.

Mots clés : ethique universitaire, formation comptable, inconduite en milieuuniversitaire, integrite

There are too many people who think that the only thing that’s right is to get by,

and the only thing that’s wrong is to get caught.

– J.C. Watts

Accountants’ technical knowledge is essential to the creation of financial reports.The reliability and meaningfulness of these reports depends on the integrity of theindividuals responsible (DiPiazza and Eccles, 2002; Gill, 2009; Waddock, 2005).Accountants with integrity are motivated to act in the interest of others (e.g.,investors, creditors, and the public) and not merely for their self-interest or per-sonal gain (Gostick and Telford, 2003). Integrity also implies that accountants arefaithful to their commitments and will pursue them despite adversity (e.g., pressurefrom superiors, shareholders, or, in the case of auditors, clients) (Calhoun, 1995;Williams, 1973). Thus, acting with integrity (as a core ethical principle) shouldlead to financial reports that are objective and that apply the spirit of the account-ing principles rather than the technical interpretation of the rules (Gill, 2009; Insti-tute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, 2007; InternationalFederation of Accountants (IFAC), 2003).1

Given the importance of integrity, the accounting profession has placed arenewed emphasis on the role of accounting ethics education and, as a result, manyinnovative programs are being developed.2 For instance, in 2006, the International

1. Many academics, business leaders, and professionals equate ‘‘integrity’’ — ‘‘acting consistently

according to one’s stated values or principles’’ (Williams, 1973) — with ‘‘ethics’’. Based on this

definition, however, mafia or terrorists arguably act ethically. Thus, one must determine if the

‘‘principles’’ or ‘‘values’’ in use are ethically justified before establishing that one is acting

ethically. See Cox, La Caze and Levine, 2008 for further discussion of the different views on

integrity.2. Most spates of accounting scandals are followed by an increased discussion on accounting ethics

education. For instance, in the late 1980s, a Canadian national commission on fraudulent

reporting (the McDonald Commission) recommended more ethics training for students (Gunz

and McCutcheon, 1998).

2 ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVES / PERSPECTIVES COMPTABLES

AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

Accounting Education Standards Board (IAESB) of the IFAC developed an ethicseducation framework that aims to help accounting students develop ethical knowl-edge and sensitivity. Recently, KPMG produced an ethical toolkit, ‘‘The EthicalCompass,’’ which includes videos, case studies, and role-play exercises, and iscurrently used by over 100 business schools (KPMG, 2008; McCann, 2007).3

Despite an ongoing interest in ethics, many doubt that business and account-ing educators can be successful in developing future accountants who act withintegrity without significantly changing the current university culture (Jennings,2009). Some even claim that ‘‘we are in crisis’’.4 To begin with, business schools,where the vast majority of accountants (in North America) are educated, seem toattract candidates for whom ‘‘winning is everything’’ (Lane, Schaupp, and Par-sons, 1988). Also, compared to students in other professional schools, businessstudents generally have a much more relaxed attitude towards what constitutescheating (Klein, Levenburg, McKendall, and Mothersell, 2007; Roig and Ballew,1994). Thus, it is not all that surprising when the business press and academic lit-erature report a high proportion of business and accounting students who havecheated or are willing to cheat if given a chance (McCabe, Duckerich, and Dut-ton, 1994; West, Ravenscroft, and Shrader, 2004). Such results are particularly dis-turbing since research suggests that students who cheat are much more acceptingof unethical behavior in business and are more likely to act unethically when theybecome professionals (Harding, Carpenter, Finelli, and Passow, 2004; Lawson,2004; Papadakis et al., 2005).

While business schools may attract students who are more accepting of unethi-cal behavior, the students are only one part of the puzzle. The ethical values andbeliefs that underlie the curriculum are also important pieces. For instance, manycritics claim that business schools and accounting programs reinforce what Miller(1999) calls the ‘‘norm of self-interest’’ (Cohen and Holder-Webb, 2006; Ghoshal,2005; McCabe, Butterfield, and Trevino, 2006). Because accounting and businessprograms instill the belief that everyone acts in their own self-interest (i.e., psycho-logical egoism) (Ghoshal, 2005; Waddock, 2005), they make it acceptable to justifyones’ choices on the basis of their own self-interest (i.e., ethical egoism), or in thebelief that everyone acts in their own self-interest (Miller, 1999). As a result, peopleare able to rationalize even unethical choices by making ‘‘their own rules’’(McCabe, quoted in Gulli, Kohler, and Patriquin, 2007). In a similar vein, othersnote that the value neutral and technical approach to accounting education doeslittle to enhance students’ ethical sensitivity or their awareness of the broaderimpact of their decisions (Gill, 2009; Waddock, 2005).

3. In the 1990s, Arthur Andersen also made significant investment in the development of case

materials designed ‘‘to promote discussion and awareness of ethical issues arising in the business

world’’ (Toffler, 2003).4. This is quoted from leading ethicist Michael Josephson on a recent investigative report from

ABC News Primetime – A Cheating Crisis in America’s Schools.

A CASE OF ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT 3

AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

There has been considerable examination of students and the curriculum. Manycritics claim the focus should also be on the ethics and integrity of academe itself(Crumbley, Flinn, and Reichelt, 2010; De Russy, 2003). Yet, research into the roleof faculty members and university culture regarding academic conduct is somewhatlimited. This is somewhat surprising since much of what students learn about ethicscomes from the informal teaching and learning that occurs when students interactwith faculty members and the university (Cabral-Cardoso, 2004). Informal learningand moral development are not limited to the students. When events occur, whetherthey represent ethical excellence or failure, they are opportunities for reflexive learn-ing, at both the individual and organizational level, that can initiate positivechanges to occur (Argyris, 1985).

Despite the limited research into the role of faculty members, what we do knowraises questions as to whether or not universities devote enough effort into encourag-ing high ethical standards among faculty members. Some have concluded that thereshould be deep concern about the integrity in academia, its practices, and itsenforcement of integrity (De Russy, 2003; Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2001). David,Anderson, and Lawrimore (1990) have reported that over one-quarter of the businessstudents in their study did not consider their professors to be ethical. Others havenoted that some highly unethical university practices are often a matter of routine atmany North American campuses (Kekes, 1996). For instance, faculty members willgo to great lengths to cover up graduate student plagiarism in order to avoid publicscandal (Cabral-Cardoso, 2004). In other instances, university administrations maynot discipline faculty members who have committed fraud despite the negativeimpact such events have on the university’s reputation (Bruhn, 2008). Facultymembers themselves also admit to having observed cheating and having chosen to donothing or to handle it privately (Berrett, 2010; Jendrek, 1989; McCabe, 1993). Onestudy even made the conclusion that ‘‘perhaps ethics education should begin withfaculty members and not students’’ (Stevens, Harris, and Williamson, 1993).

The following section explores an actual case of academic misconduct that issomewhat unusual as a faculty member initiated and facilitated the ‘‘cheating’’.5

The case illustrates the failure of the university system to adequately prevent anddeal with faculty member misconduct and its aftermath. In our analysis, we exam-ine the social context along with motives and rationalizations of the studentsinvolved, the faculty member who initiated the misconduct, and the other facultymembers who dealt with the aftermath. To assist in our analysis, we draw upon the-oretical work on corruption that posits that institutional forces as well as ‘‘self-serv-ing biases’’ and rationalization play a key role in the acceptance and continuationof unethical behavior (Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi, 2004; Moore and Loewenstein,

5. Although the case is unusual, it is not the only case of ‘‘cheating’’ that involved or was

condoned by a faculty member. For instance, in a recent lawsuit, a nursing student

whistleblower reported that the instructor had repeatedly let the students out of their clinical

training early and failed to provide the students with sufficient clinical training hours needed for

their degree (Stevens, 2009).


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

2004; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008). The data were collected from primarysources (description of events by key players and informants) and the recollectionsof one of the authors as a faculty member at the department at the time of the inci-dent. For obvious reasons, actors’ names and affiliations are not disclosed. Thenames of all characters are fictitious to protect the identities of the individuals andthe organization involved.

AN UNUSUAL CASE OF ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT

The Event

Early in the fall semester of a multi-section introductory accounting course, a stu-dent reported to Donald Merino (Merino), a full-time faculty member (who wasalso the associate dean for undergraduate programs) who taught one of the sec-tions, that her sessional lecturer, Harold Raveche (Raveche), had allowed studentsto copy from one another during an in-class quiz. She had observed several of herfellow students copying from each other and told Raveche about the cheating, but,to her dismay, he did nothing. Merino was somewhat surprised by Raveche’s lackof proper action. Although Raveche was new to the department, he had taught atother universities and had come highly recommended. Following appropriate proto-col, Merino went directly to the department chair, Dr. Vivien Babbio (Babbio).Babbio spoke to Raveche but Raveche argued that the class size was too large toproperly monitor the students.6 Babbio told Raveche that he would have invigila-tors present at future quizzes in order to prevent students from copying from oneanother. Subsequently, invigilators were hired to attended the remaining quizzes.

In December, Allan Cutler (Cutler), a sessional lecturer who taught anothersection of the course, called Merino to express his frustration. Apparently, stu-dents had told Cutler that Raveche had shown his students the final examination(which was common to all sections). Cutler was frustrated because he had con-tacted the coordinator Dr. Felt (Felt), who had done nothing regarding the‘‘rumours’’. Cutler then followed the administrative hierarchy and spoke to Bab-bio. When it became clear that Babbio did not plan to take any action, Cutlercalled Merino for advice.

Merino, aware of Felt’s hands-off approach to managing part-time instructorsand remembering the earlier ‘‘cheating’’ incident, immediately went to see Babbio.Babbio informed Merino that mere rumours were not enough evidence for her todo anything. Further, she did not believe Cutler, and added that he was a trouble-maker who only wanted to get more sections to teach. Merino persisted and

6. Although it is expected that part-time instructors will be managed by the course coordinator, in

this instance the course coordinator took a hands-off approach; therefore Merino went directly

to the department chair. This university has collegial management institutionalized within the

collective agreement. Therefore, it would be considered inappropriate for an associate dean to

contact a faculty member directly on a performance matter. It would be necessary to inform the

union.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

suggested that if the examination had indeed been revealed to the students, thenthey should perform better in the pending common final examination than studentsin the other sections. If the examination had not been revealed, then those studentswould do no better on average than the students in the other five sections.

Merino volunteered to supervise the marking of all 548 final examination papersduring the weekend immediately following the examination. Babbio relented andtold Merino that she did not care if he wanted to waste a weekend marking examin-ations, but the difference in performance between the section that was supposed tohave had viewing privileges and the other five sections had to be statistically signifi-cant. Merino followed a rigorous marking process in order to avoid any potentialbiases. He hired five markers and assigned one to each of the five questions on theexamination. He also hired a clerical assistant who was responsible for aggregatingand summarizing the results. Marking began on Saturday morning. The clericalassistant randomized the papers to avoid section or alphabetical biases. The mark-ing was standardized with a mean set at 68 percent. To ensure that the standardswere achieved, Merino developed marking guides and reviewed the marking forconsistency. The average on the overall examination was 68 percent. The section inquestion had an average of 80.2 percent, which was 10.8 percent points higher thanthe next section and 13.9 percent points higher than the overall average. On Sundaynight, Merino phoned Babbio and gave her the results.

Babbio immediately, and without argument, accepted that the examinationhad been revealed. Babbio did not require any statistical testing. She appreciatedthe efforts of Merino. On Monday, Babbio met with Raveche, who admitted tohaving revealed the examination to his students. He said he would never do itagain; however, Babbio terminated Raveche’s contract effective immediately. Rav-eche accepted the termination without complaint and, since he was a non-union-ized part-time instructor with no access to any grievance procedures, he had nofurther recourse. Babbio now had to deal with the problem that the students inthat particular section had received substantially higher marks than students inother sections.

The Aftermath

When Babbio looked at the students’ term marks, she found that the average of thestudents’ grades on the quizzes was an astonishing 97 percent. Hence, both the termwork (worth 50 percent of the final grade) and the final examination mark (alsoworth 50 percent) were considerably higher than the other sections. Given the finalexamination experience, Babbio doubted that the term marks were achieved legiti-mately. Since Babbio reviewed and approved all grades, the ultimate responsibilityregarding students’ final grades rested with her. Babbio, in consultation with herdeputy chair, Dr. Nixon, decided to reduce the final grades of all 90 studentsenrolled in the section. The result was that the overall average in that class became72 percent (15 percentage points lower than the original average of 87 percent). Theother sections had an overall average of 68 percent, which was consistent with


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

the standard expectation. Babbio and Nixon justified the reduction on the basisthat each course must abide by the department’s standards for grade averages anddistribution.

Both Babbio and Nixon felt that the students were not to blame for Raveche’sactions, and therefore, did not feel that it was necessary to start any AcademicHonesty proceeding against the students. However, in order to be fair to thestudents in the other sections, they agreed that it was necessary to put Raveche’sstudents in line with the other sections (even though their marks were higher).Babbio and Nixon also decided that if students complained about the grade reduc-tion, then the students would be given an option of a new 100 percent final. Therationale was that if the students felt their grade did not reflect their level of knowl-edge learned in the course, then they would be given an opportunity to prove itthrough another examination. The examination was to be given to the students atthe end of the next semester (which was consistent with the department’s deferredexamination policy).

Given Merino’s involvement in the case and the fact that he was also theassociate dean for undergraduate programs, Babbio and Nixon met with Merinoto decide how to deal with the student complaints. The normal procedure forhandling student inquiries or complaints regarding final grades was that the stu-dent would contact the department’s administrative office to request a review ofan examination. If, after reviewing the examination, the student felt that theexamination was indeed unfairly marked, then s ⁄he could file a formal requestfor re-appraisal (which would be performed by another faculty member). How-ever, under the circumstances, neither of those avenues seemed to be appropriate.It was decided that, because Merino had been involved with the situation fromits onset and that he was responsible for undergraduate students, he should han-dle all student complaints. Merino informed the dean of the event, who toldMerino to handle it as he saw fit.

After the students had received their final grade transcripts, approximatelyone-third (30) of the students from Raveche’s section visited or called the admin-istrative office to complain about the grade reduction. The staff at the adminis-trative office directed the students to Merino. Each student met with Merino,who explained the rationale behind the grade reduction and, as decided by Bab-bio and Nixon, offered each student the option to write a 100 percent finalexamination. None of the students accepted that option. One student explainedthat he had not attended the class where the examination was revealed. In fact,the student had not attended any classes and was unaware that either the quizzesor the final examination had been revealed. Merino checked the student’s termmarks and verified that he had received zero on the quizzes. That student wasawarded his original grade.

The university’s academic honesty policies (which were clearly publicized onthe course outline and the course website), indicated that cheating was defined as‘‘the attempt to gain an improper advantage in an academic evaluation’’ and that


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

one form of cheating was ‘‘[o]btaining a copy of an examination before it isofficially available’’. All the students who visited Merino claimed that they didnothing wrong and that it was Raveche who revealed the examination. They alsotold Merino that Raveche was revealing the quizzes as well. They acknowledgedthat they had an ‘‘unfair’’ advantage over students in other sections. As withother multi-section courses in the department, each section followed the samecurriculum and assessment methods, which consisted of closed book quizzes setby the instructor, and shared a closed-book common examination. The studentswere aware that the only difference between their section and the other sectionswas that Raveche showed four of the five the quizzes and the final examinationto the students in advance.

The students admitted that they did not mind obtaining this ‘‘unfair’’ advan-tage over their peers. For instance, one of the students with a high grade pointaverage (GPA) who consistently performed well in his accounting courses, admit-ted that revealing the quizzes and the examination was of real benefit to him sincehe would get his A or A+ without help. He also acknowledged that although theresult was not fair to the students in other sections, he thought it was ‘‘nice’’ thatthe weaker students in his class received marks higher than what they would nor-mally get.

While the students were aware that they had an ‘‘unfair’’ advantage, they didnot consider it to be their responsibility to report Raveche’s behavior. The studentsalso declined to report their peers’ actions. During the meetings with Merino, manyof the disgruntled students told Merino that students in other sections who knewabout Raveche’s actions ‘‘unofficially’’ attended the final lecture in order to find outwhat was on the examination. The disgruntled students argued that those studentsenjoyed the same benefit but were excluded from the punishment. However, whenpressed to identify their peers, none of the students was willing to put names onthose students from other sections. Given this refusal of students to identify theirpeers, Merino decided not to pursue the matter and did not inform Babbio of thisfinding. He did tell Babbio that Raveche had shown the quizzes, which was not asurprise in view of the extremely high average term marks.

Although most students accepted the grade reduction and the rationalebehind it, Merino encountered two students who did not. One student broughthis parents, a high school principal and a retired teacher. The mother (the princi-pal) said that their son had trouble in school but liked accounting and workedvery hard on this introductory accounting course. The parents thought the gradereduction was unfair. However, once Raveche’s actions were explained, theychanged their original assessment. Nevertheless, the student did not agree. Hebelieved his mark should not be reduced as he had done nothing wrong. Simi-larly, another student also argued he did not do anything wrong and the decisionto reduce his final mark was unfair. Interestingly, this student had written a veryflattering note in his examination booklet to Raveche. Apparently, Raveche wasthe student’s all-time best professor.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

Epilogue

Once Merino had dealt with the thirty students, no other complaints were receivedand the adjusted grades remained as the students’ official grades reported on theiruniversity transcripts.7 Apart from a few casual conversations immediately follow-ing the incident, there was no formal discussion or analysis of what happened. Noadjustments were made to any policies regarding the recruiting and monitoring ofpart-time instructors, the educating of faculty members on what constitutes appro-priate conduct, or the handling of complaints pertaining to faculty member miscon-ducts. However, through the collegial process, Merino changed the method forappointing coordinators from being appointed by the chair being elected. In addi-tion, the dean began to exercise the right to approve the elected coordinators. Nev-ertheless, coordinators and faculty members did not change their attitudes towardsacademic misconduct.

Raveche moved on and obtained contractual employment to teach accountingin a MBA program at another university. However, within two weeks of the startof class, Raveche’s contract was terminated. The MBA students had petitioned tohave Raveche removed from their classes. Ironically, the students deemed him unfitto teach.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

This case presents a somewhat dismal view of the integrity of some accounting fac-ulty members and future accountants. It provides interesting insight into the socialenvironment, self-serving biases, rationalizations, and integrity of individuals. Thecase raises a number of questions about mechanisms within universities to preventand handle faculty member misconduct and their implications for the university.Finally, the case highlights that faculty members cannot expect students to act withintegrity if they themselves do not.

Self-Interest, the Social Environment, and Corruption

An obvious question is why Raveche would reveal the quizzes and the examinationto the students. It would seem that Raveche was aware that one of the key criteriaused in the decision to retain part-time instructors at the department was teacherevaluations and complaints. This is not unusual since student teaching evaluationshave become the favoured low-cost mechanism by which universities can monitor

7. When we presented this paper at a conference, one of our American colleagues commented that

he was surprised that none of the students formally complained about or appealed the grade

reduction. In fact, some American students have gone as far as filing lawsuits regarding similar

grade reduction practices (Jaksic, 2007; Matus, 2007). In one case, the student who did not have

the ‘‘enhanced’’ benefit of having access to the commercially available test bank did file a

lawsuit on the basis that the across-the-board grade reduction was unfair (Matus, 2007).


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

all faculty members’ teaching (Langbein, 2008; Sproule, 2000). Based on theresponse from the graduate students at the other university, Raveche appeared tobe an incompetent teacher, even though the undergraduate students were happywith his teaching quality. It appears that Raveche’s decision to show the examina-tion (and quizzes) was the means by which he managed his students’ perceptions ofhim and, ultimately, the teaching evaluations. Although Raveche’s teaching strategyis a rather extreme example, given the conditions under which he taught, it is notsurprising that he chose an examination-oriented teaching strategy (Bhattacharyya,2004).

Raveche was teaching a compulsory and difficult multisection course. In addi-tion, many of the students were required to achieve a certain grade if they plannedto pursue a professional accounting designation. All sections shared a common syl-labus as well as a required common final examination. Because Raveche’s teachingskills were lacking and he could not use other techniques that could inflate studentevaluations, such as deflating the course content or examinations (Crumbley andSmith, 2009), he made the rather unorthodox decision to reveal the exams. Becausethe administrators wanted satisfied students and the students wanted high gradeswith little effort, he was able to satisfy their goals along with his own by using theexamination-oriented teaching strategy (Bhattacharyya, 2004; Crumbley, Flinn, andReichelt, 2010).

Raveche created a corrupt classroom and reinforced the commonly held beliefamong many university students that ‘‘cheating’’ is an acceptable way of gettingahead (Conlin, 2007; Simkin and McLeod, 2010). The corrupt environment pro-vided the students with the rationalization that they were not cheaters because theydid not deceive the assessor (Raveche) and they did not conduct any deliberateaction (such as stealing an exam).8 Given these conditions, along with the powerdifferential between the students and Raveche, and that the students greatly bene-fited from the situation, it is not surprising that no students reported his miscon-duct. The conclusion of two students who met with Merino and stated that theydid not do anything wrong and should not have their grades reduced is also notsurprising.

While Raveche’s decision was unorthodox and even unethical, faculty membersroutinely make similar, albeit less extreme, decisions. Moore (2009: 25) states that,in today’s university environment, ‘‘instructors, and especially part-timers, adjuncts,and even tenured and non-tenured faculty members will think twice about givinglow grades to any student.’’ Making students happy was likely part of the rationalebehind Raveche’s actions and it is possible that he did not have the foresightto consider the aftermath once his grades were submitted. Most ethical theo-rists acknowledge that some people are corrupt by nature, and when given the

8. Of course, this implies that the students cheated ‘‘by accident’’, but given that the majority of

the students who complained knew that they had an unfair advantage over the students in other

sections, they were aware that their grades were deceptive.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

opportunity will break the rules. The social context or departmental culture canhave a profound effect on moral reasoning and actions (Fleming and Zyglidopo-ulos, 2008; Trevino and Weaver, 2003). Perhaps Raveche thought that the depart-mental culture was characterized by ‘‘no one cares’’ and, therefore there would beminimum recourse for his actions when his higher grades were submitted.

Social context represents much more than the formal rewards and punishmentsin the system. It includes the shared perceptions and norms surrounding what isappropriate (Granovetter, 2007; Victor and Cullen, 1988). Some of Felt’s andBabbio’s earlier actions suggest that there was a general lack of concern regardingthe teaching quality, student cheating, and faculty member misconduct. Forinstance, the coordinator, Felt, took a hands-off approach to managing part-timers,which meant he was not actively involved in assessing their teaching quality or indealing with reports of misconduct. Based on the collegial practices within thedepartment, coordinator appointments were largely distributed at the discretion ofthe chairs. Senior or research active faculty members who were awarded the coordi-nator positions, which had additional remuneration of a course release and stipend,may have viewed the appointments as ‘‘perks’’ with minimal workload expectations.As a result, Felt was not inclined to observe Raveche teach at anytime throughoutthe semester despite Raveche being a newly hired instructor, and he did not investi-gate Cutler’s complaints.9

The events suggest that the politics within the department played a major rolein Babbio’s decisions. For instance, Babbio expected Felt to be minimallyinvolved as a coordinator, and it would seem she did not find Felt’s behavior tobe morally objectionable. Babbio also seemed to use her power to thwart mean-ingful ethical inquiry. The dean delegated to Babbio the power to run the depart-ment, and she did not want that power to be diminished. In other words, it wasnot in her self-interest to rock the boat. Although she did require Raveche to useinvigilators, she did not investigate the student’s claim that Raveche did nothingabout the cheating and she ignored Cutler’s complaint by discrediting the qualityof the evidence and Cutler’s motives. She was operating under what Moore(2009) refers to as the ‘‘Code of Silence,’’ which is often used by universityadministrators to prevent complaints, such as Merino’s and Cutler’s, frombecoming public. Babbio only acted when the evidence became so convincing thatit could no longer be ignored. At that point, Babbio did act like she cared. How-ever, given the earlier episode of students cheating in the classroom, why did shenot come to the same conclusion as Merino any earlier? We also wonder if herreaction would have been the same if Merino had been another part-time instruc-tor and not a full-time faculty member who was also an associate dean. Thepower implied in the associate dean position likely meant that Babbio could not

9. The economics literature would argue that since Felt was ‘‘effort-averse’’, it is not surprising

that he did nothing (Arrow, 1968; Noreen, 1988). Further, the system did not have any

processes in place that would constrain his opportunistic behavior, and therefore his actions are

not surprising (Jones, 1995).


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

ignore Merino as she had done earlier with a part-time instructor. This suggeststhat other factors such as organizational power plus concern for departmentaland personal reputation influenced Babbio’s actions. Although Merino’s diligencefrom a position of power brought the matter to light, it seems the political nat-ure of the situation had impeded him as well.

Although Felt’s and Babbio’s initial lack of action are somewhat disconcerting,it is not an unusual response to reports of misconduct. Other instances of academicmisconduct suggest that departmental politics often get in the way of ensuring thecase is handled appropriately (Cabral-Cardoso, 2004). In their analysis of corrup-tion, Anand et al. (2004: 50) note that when unethical acts are reported, ‘‘there isoften strong resistance to accepting the facts, no matter how strong the evidence.’’An often-used tactic is to discredit the whistleblowers by questioning their motivesand self-interest (Carson, Verdu, and Wokutch, 2008). Others have also noted thatacademe’s initial reaction to misconduct is to ignore or do nothing about the allega-tions (Brumfield, 2007; Cabral-Cardoso, 2004), while others have found that univer-sity administrators will use a variety of tactics to even punish ethical activists suchas Merino and Cutler (Moore, 2009). As summarized at a recent accounting educa-tion conference, academe’s approach to handling misconduct can often be catego-rized as: ‘‘We don’t care. We don’t deal with it. We don’t want the hassle’’ (Agle,2010).

Self-Interest, Fairness, and Rationalization

While institutional pressures and mechanisms contributed to the original corruptacts and some of them were clearly conscious and deliberate, we believe that ratio-nalizations and self-serving interpretations of fairness played a major role in‘‘smoothing the moral terrain’’, thus allowing unquestioned acceptance of some actsand decisions (Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008: 268). Some of these rationaliza-tions may be due to unconscious bias whereby people think they are being objec-tive, but they unknowingly evaluate evidence through a biased lens leading them todevelop justifications in line with their own self-interest (Kunda, 1990). Or it maybe that people are aware of their self-interest and use rationalizations to neutralizeand preempt the ‘‘taint of moral defect’’ (Sykes and Matza, 1957; Granovetter,2007). The department was rife with politics and conflicting goals, and had a short-term focus, providing the structural basis for self-serving biases to thrive (Mooreand Loewenstein, 2004). Such a context also increases the propensity for rationali-zation of the ongoing corrupt activities and making these activities acceptable(Granovetter, 2007; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008).

The most obvious instance of self-serving biases and rationalizations is thestudents’ response to Raveche’s actions. As in experimental studies of self-servingbiases (i.e., Babstock and Loewenstein, 1997), the actors who were on the losingside (i.e., the students enrolled in the other sections) interpreted the events asbeing unfair and some chose to report the misconduct. Unfortunately, as inmany instances, the whistleblower’s motives are not purely altruistic (Fisher et


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

al., 2000).10 The actors on the winning side (i.e., the students enrolled in Raveche’ssection) were able to justify the ‘‘fairness’’ of their preferential treatment. Stu-dents argued that Raveche voluntarily showed the exam to them, and that theydid not do anything deliberate.

These students were ‘‘active rationalizers’’ who were fully aware that Raveche’sactions were inappropriate but could provide justifications that downplayed theirinaction, and they used principles of fairness to explain away the unethical natureof their implicit participation. Some may argue that the students were ‘‘innocentparticipants’’ who unwittingly perpetuated the corrupt classroom (Zyglidopoulosand Fleming, 2008). However, we argue otherwise. Two-thirds of the studentsaccepted their grade reductions without complaint, and, except for the two dissent-ers who would not accept the rationale behind the reduction, all the students whodid come forward admitted that they were aware of their unfair advantage over thestudents in the other sections. It should be noted that the two dissenters, despitetheir protests, did not file a formal appeal regarding their grade reduction.

There are also more subtle examples of self-serving interpretations of fairnesswhen we examine the decisions related to the grade reductions and the related after-math. In the end, Babbio reduced the students’ marks on the basis of fairness to thestudents in the other sections. While this argument seems reasonable, Raveche’sstudents still had higher grades than students in other sections who had worked toearn their grades. Perhaps Babbio’s concern to keep the event quiet hindered herability to look at the totality of the situation. If the situation became public, it islikely that there would be many questions raised regarding both Babbio’s and Felt’slack of action regarding the student complaints. If either one of them had donesome sort of follow-up on earlier complaints, or if Babbio had simply decided tohave another version of the final exam, most of the ensuing problems could havebeen avoided.

Babbio also decided to reduce the grades even though she did not know if allthe students in Raveche’s class saw the examination. One student did tell Merinothat he was unaware that the examination was revealed. Also, Babbio knew thatstudents in other sections were aware that the examination had been shown, makingit probable that some students outside of Raveche’s class had seen the examinationas well (or were at least aware of what was on the examination). Subsequent meet-ings between students and Merino support that some students in other sections hadseen the examination.11 Thus, it would seem that the grade reduction was not solely

10. As Fisher et al. (2000) highlight, the term ‘‘whistleblower’’ carries more positive connotations

than similar terms such as informants, tattletales, snitches, and stool pigeons. While each

category describes people who disclose information concerning unethical activities, the different

labels suggest people make these disclosures for a variety of reasons.11. Interestingly, Merino decided not to tell Babbio about the students who unofficially attended

Raveche’s last class since he did not know the students’ names. While there is legitimacy to this

action and it would have been difficult to investigate given the students’ lack of cooperation,

Merino’s decision reflects his awareness of the political environment.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

made on the basis of fairness, and that self-interest influenced the decision. Forinstance, the alternative, to hold another examination for all students would havebeen fraught with its own difficulties. One can imagine the development of anotherexamination, trying to get 548 students back together, and dealing with the com-plaints, would be a huge ‘‘hassle’’ for Babbio and Nixon and certainly not in theirself-interest. However, it would certainly have sent a clear message that they werevery much concerned about academic integrity and fairness.

Babbio, Nixon, and Merino agreed to the optional 100 percent final on the basisthat it was a fair alternative for the students who would argue that the grade reduc-tion was unfair. We question whether or not this option was really offered to be fair,knowing that most students would not risk losing the grade that they had alreadyreceived. It is quite likely that most students would assume that the 100 percent finalwould be much harder than the original one. We also wonder why, given the resultsof the quizzes, all Raveche’s students were not required to write a 100 percent finalexamination. It appears that fairness is not the only rationale behind these decisions.We suggest that some of the rationale was related to minimizing student complaintsand the visibility of the event in order to protect the department’s reputation.

University Mechanisms and Faculty Member Misconduct

This case highlights the limits of collegial and informal procedures in dealing withfaculty member misconduct. This university, like most other Canadian universities,operates on the assumption that students initiate most transgressions. As a result, ithas very detailed policies and procedures to deal with student cheating and it alsohas a student code of conduct. However, the university policies related to facultymember misconduct, or even defining what exactly is appropriate behavior (apartfrom research misconduct and limiting outside employment), are scant. Like mostother universities it does not have a code of ethics to guide faculty member behav-ior (Kelly, Agle, and Demott, 2006). Implementation of a formal faculty code ofethics would be the university’s first step in committing itself to decision-makingbased on ethical values and to creating an ethical culture (Vaughan, 1992).

As the case demonstrates, the department operated on the assumption thatproblems that fall outside of student misconduct can be handled on a collegial andamicable basis. On the surface, this implies a system that is built on principles offairness. However, collegiality can be abused. In this instance, the departmentalself-rule of collegiality had weak accountability mechanisms and had little check onthose exercising authority. As in other universities, there appears to be limited con-sequences for full-time faculty members’ misconduct.12 As the case demonstrates,

12. While Raveche suffered the consequences, there did not appear to be any consequences for

other full-time faculty members. This does not seem to be isolated to this university. For

instance, at one university where a faculty member listed non-existent publications on his

resume, the vice president of academic affairs told the dean, ‘‘Just tell him not to do that

anymore’’ (Bruhn, Zajac, Al-Kazemi, and Prescott, 2002).


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

this type of system is prone to serving the interests of the administrators withoutregard for the needs of the university (Thompson, 2004).

Merino and Cutler followed the policy of reporting complaints through thehierarchical chain, and yet, as Thompson (2004) points out, a system in whichaccountability for gross misconduct is solely vested in an administrator one level upfrom the individual whose conduct is being called to account is prone to self-servingdecisions. The hierarchical reporting system may be adequate for dealing with rou-tine issues, but perhaps not when misconduct can cause damage to the institution’sor department’s reputation, Mechanisms that do not hide a vested interest in theprocess and that can call into question the administrators’ decisions are needed forgross misconduct cases. A whistleblower policy that represents a ‘‘visible, earnest,and a formal channel’’ increases the likelihood of reporting (Moberly, 2006; Seifert,Sweeney, Joireman, and Thornton, 2010). In order to promote whistleblowing, thesystem must be perceived as fair and reasonable and must show that management issupportive and will take appropriate action (Seifert et al., 2010). Given this univer-sity’s environment, it is necessary to have the whistleblowing channel operated byan independent group that is separate from and not accountable to the faculty hier-archy, and is assigned the responsibility for following up on all reports of gross mis-conduct. This would reduce the potential of reports being blocked or filteredthrough faculty members and would help break the ‘‘Code of Silence’’ and attemptsto protect faculty members’ collective self-interest (Seifert et al., 2010; McCutcheon,1991).

The system should ideally require formal reports of such incidents to seniormanagement and ensure an independent review of decisions. Processes that encour-age outside communication not only allow a review but can also promote communi-cation and debate among the various stakeholders. Through this debate andreflection, organizational learning can occur (Argyris, 1985). This learning wouldhelp refine efforts to reduce future faculty member misconduct and perhaps lead toa deeper discussion of the underlying causes (Caldwell, 2010; Granitz and Loewy,2007). It may also improve the university’s commitment to accountability, therebyreducing the likelihood that reports will not be investigated promptly or that acover-up will occur.

Apart from the problems with the policies and procedures regarding the inves-tigation, university administrators often become aware of faculty member miscon-duct only via student complaints. However, student complaints appear to be avery ineffective means of control. While students in other sections did come for-ward, it was likely due to them being at a significant disadvantage compared totheir peers. There is no guarantee that students will report faculty member mis-conduct. For instance, a recent study found that students are only likely to reportfaculty members when any of them grossly disregard ethical standards such assexual relations with students and coming to class intoxicated (Braxton, Bayer,and Noseworthy, 2002). Regarding other types of behavior that violate facultymembers’ professional ethics, such as preferential treatment of students, lateness,


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

and being unprepared for class, students were surprisingly ambivalent (Braxtonet al., 2002).13

This case illustrates that a heavy reliance on student teaching evaluations as asignal of teaching quality is a questionable practice. Many theorists argue that stu-dent evaluations are more of an expression of student satisfaction than a reliablemeasure of what the students actually learned (Crumbley and Smith, 2009). Forinstance, past studies demonstrate that there is a direct association between studentrating and grade expectations (Johnson, 2003; Sproule, 2000). As Langbein (2008)points out, socially destructive outcomes are likely when ranking counts. As in thiscase, the easiest means to elicit higher student evaluations is through awardinghigher grades (Langbein, 2008; McPherson, 2006). However, as this case illustrates,those grades are then meaningless in terms of demonstrating if the students learnedeffectively or how they performed in comparison to their peers.

Although we only have a snapshot of the courses managed by Felt, it wouldappear that the department’s approach to promoting a high-quality teaching andlearning culture was ad hoc at best. Since student evaluations can be of question-able value, universities need to consider improving the current approach to evalu-ating teaching quality. For instance, ongoing classroom visits and peerevaluations, not just the sporadic ones associated with new hires or at tenureand promotion time, could be useful means of assessing and improving teachingquality. Evaluation processes that consider student learning rather than just stu-dent perceptions of teacher performance may also enhance the usefulness of thestudent evaluation process (Byrne and Flood, 2003; Lizzio, Wilson, and Simons,2002).

The university in which this case occurred has a high proportion of part-timefaculty members and limited resources to manage them. Universities increasinglyrely on part-time instructors or ‘‘casual employees’’ to provide a significant por-tion of their teaching. Yet many universities take Felt’s approach to managing itspart-timers. In substance, they spend very little time on screening applicants ortraining them (either on pedagogy or on the basis of university policies) oncethey are hired. As one study pointed out, the primary selection criterion is oftenthe availability and willingness to accept the position (University of Queensland,2003). In other studies, many part-time instructors report limited contact with orguidance from the university and have limited commitment to the university (Ra-jagopal, 2004; University of Queensland, 2003). Thus, it is not all that surprisingthat some part-time instructors are like Raveche: effort-averse and ethically chal-lenged who are not well equipped to teach, have little or no stake in the system,and who attempt to manage their teaching evaluations in order to achieve goodresults.

13. A more recent study of business students found that the students considered few behaviors to be

definitely unethical. The main categories of unethical conduct were sexual relations with

students, special treatment, and breaches of confidentiality (Valentine and Kidwell, 2008).


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

Integrity and Faculty Members as Role Models

While much of the current debate around academic dishonesty focuses on using for-mal education to enhance students’ integrity, it is also important to acknowledgethe role of informal education that occurs in the classroom. Faculty members areimportant role models to students (Caldwell, 2010). Many students report that theyview faculty members as moral anchors whose opinion matters (Simkin and McLe-od, 2010). While faculty members need to be vigilant in monitoring and reportingstudent misconduct (and this seems to be the emphasis of most university policiesand procedures), simply policing and enforcing the rules is not enough. Facultymembers need to exhibit exemplary behavior and reinforce the importance of per-sonal integrity through their own actions (IFAC, 2006; Caldwell, 2010).

In the case reported here, Raveche reinforced the notion that it is acceptable touse any means possible to get ahead. The students who reported the revealing ofthe examination, the lack of action by the administration would have seemed to behypocritical compared to the extensive procedures in place to prevent student cheat-ing. Creating a culture that discourages academic misconduct by both faculty mem-bers and students and shows concern for student learning and faculty memberdevelopment can go a long way in improving the university’s ethical culture and itsreputation (Caldwell, 2010; Simon, Carr, and McCullough, 2004). As O’Neil (1983)points out: ‘‘A university that teaches and preaches ethical responsibility to othersmust itself be a model of that very responsibility if it is to maintain credibility andpublic trust and continue to be regarded as an essential contributor to society’swell-being.’’

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

As this case highlights, failure of ethics in academe represents a complex individualand organizational phenomenon (Bruhn et al., 2002). For instance, rules and regu-lations designed to reveal and punish academic misconduct are only as effective asthe managers and the system in which they operate. Senior managers such as chairs,associate deans, deans and presidents are given the power to enforce the respectiverules and regulations. However, these senior managers are often isolated from whatis happening. They do not have direct access to the knowledge of the academic mis-conduct and there is no systematic information on academic misconduct. Further,collegially managed (i.e., self-regulated) faculty members are often not inclined toenforce rules and regulations (Thompson, 2004). Further, often the ones who havedirect exposure to the misconduct, such as students and part-time instructors maynot have the power to enforce the rules and regulations. Nor should they beexpected to enforce the rules and regulations on their own.

This case supports theorists’ concerns about integrity within academe. Perhapsthe students who spoke to Merino gained some insight into the impact of theiractions on their peers and perhaps they had some insight into their self-servingbehaviour. However, the actions of Raveche and the inaction of the students and


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

some faculty members tend to suggest that there is cause for concern about the ethi-cal values that prevail in some academic settings. There is merit to theorists’ predic-tion that we may continue to see an erosion of ethics as cheating becomes moreacceptable (Covey quoted in Gulli et al., 2007).

Because some theorists have attributed this sad state of affairs to students’focus on ‘‘getting a degree and not the education’’ (Gulli et al., 2007), we wonderif students had thought about this sort of behavior possibly harming the reputa-tion of the university and, ultimately diminishing the value of their degrees in theeyes of potential employers. Had they done that, we wonder if they would havereported the instructor’s actions. We also wonder if university administrators wereto consider how poorly implemented controls and an overreliance on part-timeinstructors could compromise the quality of their reputation and degrees, if theywould be more diligent in putting into place better accountability mechanisms.This suggests, somewhat ironically, that self-interest may hold the key to thesolution.

REFERENCES

Agle, B. 2010. Ethics and the accounting profession. Presentation at Leveraging for Change:

The New Pillars of Education Academic Symposium sponsored by CICA and the

University of Toronto, November 22.

Anand, V., B. Ashforth, and M. Joshi. 2004. Business as usual: The acceptance and

perpetuation of corruption in organizations. Academy of Management Executive 18 (2):

39 – 53.

Argyris, C. 1985. Strategies, change, and defensive routines. Boston: Pitman.

Arrow, K. 1968. The economics of moral hazard: A further comment. American Economic

Review 58 (3): 537 – 39.

Babcock, L., and G. Loewenstein. 1997. Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of

self-serving biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (1): 109 – 26.

Berrett, D. 2010. Cheating and the generational divide. Inside Higher Education. http://

www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/11/17/cheating.

Bhattacharyya, N. 2004. Student evaluations and moral hazard. Journal of Academic Ethics

2 (3): 263 – 71.

Braxton, J., A. Bayer, and J. Noseworthy. 2002. Students as tenuous agents of social con-

trol of professorial misconduct. Peabody Journal of Education 77 (3): 101 – 24.

Brimble, M., and P. Stevenson-Clarke. 2005. Perceptions of the prevalence and seriousness

of academic dishonesty in Australian universities. Australian Educational Researcher

32 (3): 19 – 46.

Bruhn, J. 2008. Value dissonance and ethics failure in Academia: A causal connection?

Journal ofAcademic Ethics 6: 17 – 32.

Bruhn, J., G. Zajac, A. Al-Kazemi, and L. Prescott. 2002. Moral positions and academic

conduct: Parameter of tolerance for ethics failure. Journal of Higher Education 73 (4):

461 – 93.

Brumfield, G. 2007. Misconduct? It’s all academic. Nature (445): 240 – 41.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

Byrne, M., and B. Flood. 2003. Assessing the teaching quality of accounting programmeses:

An evaluation of the Course Experience Questionnaire. Assessment and Evaluation in

Higher Education 28 (2): 135 – 45.

Cabral-Cardoso, C. 2004. Ethical misconduct in the business school: A case of plagiarism

that turned bitter. Journal of Business Ethics 49 (1): 75 – 89.

Caldwell, C. 2010. A ten-step model for academic integrity: A positive approach for

business schools. Journal of Business Ethics 92 (1): 1 – 13.

Calhoun, C. 1995. Standing for something. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5): 235 – 60.

Carson, T., M. Verdu, and R. Wokutch. 2008. Whistle-blowing for profit: An ethical

analysis of the Federal False Claims Act. Journal of Business Ethics 77 (3): 361 – 76.

Cohen, J., and L. Holder-Webb. 2006. Rethinking the influence of agency theory in the

accounting academy. Issues in Accounting Education 21 (1): 17 – 30.

Conlin, M. 2007. Cheating: Or postmodern learning. Business Week 4034: 42.

Cox, D., M. La Caze, and M. Levine. 2008. Integrity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/integrity/.

Crumbley, D. L., R. Flinn, and K. Reichelt. 2010. What is ethical about grade inflation and

coursework deflation? Journal of Academic Ethics 2: 1 – 11.

Crumbley, D. L., and G. S. Smith. 2009. The games professors play in the dysfunctional

evaluation system used in higher education: Brainstorming some recommendations. In

Measure Learning Rather than Satisfaction in Higher Education, eds. R. E. Flinn and

D. L. Crumbley, 41 – 58. Sarasota, FL: Teaching Learning and Curriculum Section,

American Accounting Association.

David, F. R., L. M. Anderson, and K. W. Lawrimore. 1990. Perspectives on business

ethics in management education. SAM Advanced Management Journal 55 (4): 26 – 32.

De Russy, C. 2003. Professional ethics begin on the college campus. The Chronicle of Higher

Education 50: 20.

DiPiazza, S., and R. Eccles. 2002. Building public trust: The future of corporate reporting.

New York: Wiley.

Fisher, J., E. Harshman, E. Gillespie, H. Ordower, L. Ware, and F. Yeager. 2000.

Privatizing regulation: Whistleblowing and bounty hunting in the financial services

industries. Dickinson Journal of International Law 19 (1): 117 – 43.

Fleming, P. J., and Zyglidopoulos, S.C. 2008. Ethical distance in corrupt firms: how do

innocent bystanders become guilty perpetrators? Journal of Business Ethics 78 (1 ⁄2):265 – 74.

Ghoshal, S. 2005. Bad management theories are destroying good management practices.

Academy of Management Learning and Education 4 (1): 75 – 91.

Gill, M. 2009. Accountants’ truth: Knowledge and ethics in the financial world. New York:

Oxford University Press.

Gostick, A., and P. Telford. 2003. The integrity advantage. Salt Lake City, UT: Gibbs Smith.

Granitz, N., and Loewy, D. 2007. Applying ethical theories: Interpreting and responding to

student plagiarism. Journal of Business Ethics 72: 293 – 306.

Granovetter, M. 2007. The social construction of corruption. In On Capitalism, eds. V. Lee

and R. Swedberg. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gulli, C., N. Kohler, and M. Patriquin. 2007. The great university cheating scandal.

McLeans. http://mcleans.ca/homepage/magazine/article.jsp?content.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

Gunz, S., and J. McCutcheon. 1998. Are academics committed to accounting ethics

education? Journal of Business Ethics 17 (11): 1145 – 54.

Harding, T. S., D. D. Carpenter, C. J. Finelli, and H. J. Passow. 2004. Does academic

dishonesty relate to unethical behavior in professional practice? An exploratory study

Science and Engineering Ethics 10 (2): 311 – 24.

Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW). 2007. Information for

better markets: Reporting with integrity. London: ICAEW.

International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). 2003. Rebuilding public confidence in

financial reporting: An international perspective. New York: IFAC.

International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). 2006. Approaches to developing and

maintaining professional values, ethics, and attitudes. New York: IFAC.

Jaksic, V. 2007. Don’t like your grade? Sue your law school National Law Journal,

December 18.

Jendrek, M. 1989. Faculty reactions to academic dishonesty. Journal of College Student

Development 30: 401 – 06.

Jennings, M. 2009. Business ethics: Case studies and selected readings. Mason, OH:

South-Western Cengage Learning.

Johnson, V. 2003. Grade inflation: A crisis in college education. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Jones, T. 1995. Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics.

Academy of Management Review 20 (2): 404 – 37.

Kekes, J. 1996. Academic corruption. Monist 79 (4): 564 – 76.

Kelly, P., B. Agle, and J. Demott. 2006. Mapping our progress: Identifying, categorizing

and comparing universities’ ethics infrastructures. Journal of Academic Ethics 3 (2-4):

205 – 29.

Klein, H., N. Levenburg, M. McKendall, and W. Mothersell. 2007. Cheating during the

college years: How do business students compare? Journal of Business Ethics 72 (2):

197 – 206.

KPMG. 2008. Ethics and Compliance Report 2008. New York: KPMG.

Kunda, Z. 1990. The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin 108 (3): 480 – 98.

Lane, M., D. Schaupp, and B. Parsons. 1988. Pygmalion effect: An issue for business

education and ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 7 (3): 223 – 29.

Langbein, L. 2008. Management by results: Student evaluation of faculty teaching and

the mis-measurement of performance. Economics of Education Review 27 (4):

417 – 28.

Lawson, R. 2004. Is classroom cheating related to business students’ propensity to cheat in

the ‘‘real world’’? Journal of Business Ethics 49 (2): 189 – 99.

Lizzio, A., K. Wilson, and R. Simons. 2002. University students’ perceptions of the learning

environment and academic outcomes: Implications for theory and practice. Studies in

Higher Education 27 (1): 27 – 52.

Matus, R. 2007. Ex-FAMU student sues school. St. Petersburg Times, October 12.

McCabe, D. 1993. Faculty responses to academic dishonesty: The influence of honor codes.

Research in Higher Education 34 (5): 647 – 58.

McCabe, D., K. Butterfield, and L. Trevino. 2006. Academic dishonesty in graduate

business programs: Prevalence, causes, and proposed action. Academy of Management

Learning and Education 5 (3): 294 – 305.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

McCabe, D., J. Duckerich, and J. Dutton. 1994. The effects of professional education on

values and the resolution of ethical dilemmas: Business school vs. law school students.

Journal of Business Ethics 13 (9): 693 – 700.

McCann, D. 2007. KPMG spreads the ethics gospel. CFO.com. Nov 29. http://www.cfo.

com/article.cfm/10234252?f=related.

McCutcheon, 1991. Peer review: Treacherous servant, disastrous master. Technology Review

94 (7): 29 – 40.

McPherson, M. A. 2006. Determinants of how students evaluate teachers. Journal of

Economic Education 37 (1): 3 – 20.

Miller, D. 1999. The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist 54 (12): 1053 – 60.

Moberly, R. 2006. Sarbanes-Oxley’s structural model to encourage corporate

whistleblowers. Brigham Young University Law Review 1107 – 80.

Moore, D., and G. Loewenstein. 2004. Self-interest, automaticity, and the psychology of

conflict of interest. Social Justice Research 17 (2): 189 – 202.

Moore, P. 2009. Why we should measure student learning: A glossary of collegiate

corruption. In Measure Learning Rather than Satisfaction in Higher Education, eds.

R. E. Flinn and D. L. Crumbley, 17 – 28. Sarasota, FL: Teaching Learning and

Curriculum Section, American Accounting Association.

Noreen, E. 1988. The economics of ethics: A new perspective on agency theory. Accounting,

Organizations, and Society 13 (4): 359 – 69.

O’Neil, R. 1983. Ethical responsibility of faculty. In Ethical Principles, Practices, and

Problems in Higher Education, eds. M. Baca and R. Stein, 37 – 44. Springfield, IL:

Charles C. Thomas.

Papadakis, M., A. Teherani, M. Banach, T. Knettler, S. Rattner, D. Stern, J. Veloski, and

C. Hodgson. 2005. Disciplinary action by medical boards and prior behavior in medical

school. New England Journal of Medicine 353: 2673 – 82.

Rajagopal, I. 2004. Hidden academics: Contract faculty in Canadian universities. Toronto:

University of Toronto Press.

Roig, M., and C. Ballew. 1994. Attitudes toward cheating of self and others by college

students and professors. Psychological Record 44 (1): 3 – 12.

Seifert, D., J. Sweeney, J. Joireman, and J. Thornton. 2010. The influence of organizational

justice on accountant whistleblowing. Accounting, Organizations, and Society 35 (7):

707 – 17.

Simkin, M., and A. McLeod. 2010. Why do college students cheat? Journal of Business

Ethics 94 (3): 441 – 53.

Simon, C., J. Carr, and S. McCullough. 2004. Gender, student perceptions, institutional

commitments and academic dishonesty: Who reports in academic dishonesty cases?

Assessment and Evaluation of Higher Education 29 (1): 75 – 90.

Sproule, R. 2000. Student evaluation of teaching: A methodological critique of conventional

practices. Educational Policy Analysis Archives 8 (5). http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa.

Stevens, A. 2009. Jury awards whistle-blower student $450,000. Metro Atlanta, August 27.

http://www.ajc.com/news/jury-awards-whistle-blower-125401.html.

Stevens, R. E., O. J. Harris, and S. Williamson. 1993. A comparison of ethical evaluations

of business school faculty and students: A pilot study. Journal of Business Ethics 12 (8):

611 – 19.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

Sykes, G., and D. Matza. 1957. Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency.

American Sociological Review 22: 644 – 70.

Thompson, P. 2004. University governance and the accountability of academic

administrators. Journal of Academic Ethics 2 (3): 187 – 97.

Toffler, B. 2003. Final accounting: Ambition, greed, and the fall of Arthur Andersen.

New York: Random House.

Trevino, L., and G. Weaver. 2003. Managing ethics in business organizations: A social

scientific perspective on business ethics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

University of Queensland. 2003. Training support and management of sessional teaching staff:

A review of the literature. Australia: The University of Queensland.

Valentine, S., and R. Kidwell. 2008. Business students’ evaluations of faculty misconduct.

Quality Assurance in Education 16 (3): 287 – 300.

Waddock, S. 2005. Hollow men and women at the helm. Hollow accounting ethics?. Issues

in Accounting Education 20 (2): 145 – 50.

West, T., S. P. Ravenscroft, and C. B. Shrader. 2004. Cheating and moral judgment in the

college classroom. Journal of Business Ethics 54 (2): 173 – 83.

Whitley, B. E., and P. Keith-Spiegel. 2001. Academic integrity as an institutional issue.

Ethics and Behavior 11 (3): 325 – 42.

Williams, B. 1973. A critique of utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism: For and Against, eds.

J. Smart and B. Williams, 75 – 150. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Vaughan, G. 1992. Leaders on a tightrope: The risk and tensions of community college

leadership. In Dilemmas of Leadership: Decision Making and Ethics in the Community

College, eds. . G. Vaughan and Associates, 3 – 29. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Victor, B., and J. Cullen. 1988. The organizational bases of ethical work climates.

Administrative Science Quarterly 33 (1): 101 – 25.

Zyglidopoulos, S., and P. Fleming. 2008. Ethical distance in corrupt firms: How do

innocent bystanders become guilty perpetrators? Journal of Business Ethics 78 (1-2):

265 – 74.


AP Vol. 10 No. 1 — PC vol. 10, no 1 (2011)

Documents

A Case of Academic Misconduct: Does Self-Interest Rule?