A Careful Management. the Borghese Family and Their Fiefs in Early Modern Lazio

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/138537808X334331

Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193 www.brill.nl/jemh

A Careful Management: Th e Borghese Familyand their Fiefs in Early Modern Lazio*

Bertrand ForclazVrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Abstract Th is article investigates economic management of efs as well as social relationships between lords and vassals in 17th- and 18th-century central Italy. Up to recent years, historians of early modern Italy as well as other European countries have stressed the archaic features of noble management, which would have prevented the emergence of a modern market-oriented agrarian economy, or have portrayed noblemen as market-oriented landowners neglecting their seigneurial rights. I argue here that both dimensions were present in noble management, as lords did not choose between them, but rather leaned upon one or the other according to circumstances. I base my argument on the case of the Borghese, one of the wealthiest papal families of the 17th century. Finally, this study shows that modern ele-ments could be brought into a model characterized by strong seigneurial rights.

Keywords Fiefdom, Southern Italy, seigneurial rights, Borghese

Introduction

Seigneurial rights played a key role in the economic and social life of sev-eral rural areas in early modern Europe, including Southern Italy. Th e emergence of a new nobility, the regulation of the market for efs by public magistracies, and changes in their management even led to a strengthening

* Th is article sums up part of my PhD Th esis, discussed at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris) in 2003 : Les Borghese et leurs efs aux XVIIe et XVIII e sicles. Gestion conomique, stratgies sociales et enjeux politiques . It was presented at the European Social Science History Conference in Berlin in March 2004; I would like to thank the chair of the session, Jan Luyten van Zanden, and the participants for their comments, as well as Bas van Bavel, Maarten Prak and Gregory Hanlon for their comments on previous versions of the text; a special thanks to Gregory Hanlon for correcting the English.

170 B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

of seigneurial rights, in which conicts between feudal lords and commu-nities became more frequent. In the 1960s, historians of Southern Italy argued about the nature of these transformations. Rosario Villari proposed the concept of refeudalization in the second half of the 16th and rst half of the 17th century, whereby relations between feudal lords and their subjects hardened as the former exerted economic pressure on the latter, due to the renewal of the aristocracy and the nancial power of the new lords. Giuseppe Galasso objected that this thesis implied a preceding defeudalization which was unlikely to have taken place. Over time, this debate lost its polemical component, although new empirical research has conrmed the hardening of seigneurial rights.1 Th e refeudalization thesis stressed the archaic features of noble management, which would have prevented the emergence of a modern market-oriented agrarian economy. In his 1978 essay on the Italian transition from feudalism to capitalism, Maurice Aymard, while stressing the modern elements in the manage-ment of Southern Italian latifundia, such as production for the market and the constitution of large estates, explained those features by the transfor-mation of feudal lords into mere landowners. Later contributions to the study of noble management reinforced the antinomy by insisting on feu-dalisms traditional features and reasserting the importance of seigneurial rights against market-oriented production in poorer areas.2

If we consider other historiographic traditions, we will nd a similar opposition between traditional seigneurial rights and modern eco-nomic management, the former being seen as the dead weight of the past hampering economic growth and modernization. Th is vision is linked to the idea of a bourgeois revolution erupting in the 19th century. One excep-tion to that framework would be England. Noble landlords there have been described as the main protagonists of the agricultural revolution which took place in the 18th century, via the enclosure and the creation of large estates, although recent research has questioned this view and stressed the active role of leaseholders.3 In France, the nobility has been identied

1 See R. Villari, La rivolta antispagnola a Napoli. Le origini (1585-1647) (Rome, 1967); G. Galasso, Economia e societ nella Calabria del Cinquecento (Naples, 1967).

2 See M. Aymard, La transizione dal feudalesimo al capitalismo, in R. Romano, C. Vivanti (eds.), Storia dItalia, Annali, I, Dal feudalesimo al capitalismo (Turin, 1978), 1131-192; T. Astarita, Th e Continuity of Feudal Power. Th e Caracciolo di Brienza in Spanish Naples (Cambridge, 1992).

3 See R.C. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman: Th e Agricultural Development of the South Midlands, 1450-1850 (Oxford, 1992).

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193 171

as a source of agrarian backwardness, and the leaseholders of large noble estates have been identied as the only element of modernization and growth in a rural economy considered as conservative and stationary. Even this model has been revised recently, as Philip Homan has pointed out agents of growth within the local peasantry.4 Most recently, scholars have tried to go beyond the opposition of feudalism to capitalism: while acknowledging the importance of tradition in noble economic behaviour, they have emphasized the concern of noblemen with prot and their care for sound management. William Hagens book on Prussian Junkers showed that heavy seigneurial rights did not preclude the efs from being prot-driven enterprises, and that commercialized manorialism could generate growth and enrichment.5

We thus need to get rid of an either/or alternative in which noblemen are seen either as feudal lords who blocked any agricultural modernization or as market-oriented landowners neglecting their seigneurial rights. In this paper, I argue that both dimensions were likely present in noble man-agement, as noblemen did not choose between them, but rather leaned upon one or the other according to circumstances. Th e object of my research is a papal family, the Borghese. I will explain the nature of their authority and its impact on the economic life of the efs they owned in the Papal States, and investigate their relationships with the inhabitants and the transformation of these relationships over time.

Th e Borghese family belonged to the papal nobility.6 Marcantonio Borghese came from Siena to Rome in the 1530s and worked as a lawyer

4 See P.T. Homan, Growth in a Traditional Society: Th e French Countryside, 1450-1815, Princeton, 1996; concerning the nobility as a source of agrarian backwardness, see J. Dewald, Pont-St-Pierre 1398-1789. Lordship, Comunity, and Capitalism in Early Modern France (Berkeley, 1987), 285-86.

5 See W. W. Hagen, Ordinary Prussians. Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 2002); for this historiographical shift, see P. Janssens, B. Yun-Casalilla (eds.), European Aristocracies and Colonial Elites. Patrimonial Management Strategies and Economic Development, 15th-18th Centuries (Aldershot, 2005).

6 On the Borghese family, see W. Reinhard, mterlaufbahn und Familienstatus. Der Aufstieg des Hauses Borghese 1537-1621, in Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, 54, 1974, 328-427; W. Reinhard, Papstnanz und Nepotismus unter Paul V. (1605-1621). Studien und Quellen zur Struktur und zu quantitativen Aspekten des ppstlichen Herrschaftssystems, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1974; G. Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt. I Borghese. Secoli XVIII e XIX (Rome, 1979); V. Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese (1605-1633). Vermgen, Finanzen und sozialer Aufstieg eines Papstnepoten (Tbingen, 1984); B. Forclaz, La famille Borghese et ses efs. Lautorit ngocie dans lEtat pontical dAncien Rgime (Rome, 2006) (abridged and reviewed version of my PhD Th esis).


at the Roman Curia; he was able to develop important connections within the Curiaand with the Roman nobility, for several of his children married into patrician families. One of his sons, Camillo, embarked on an ecclesi-astical career. Vice-auditor of the Apostolic Chamber from 1588 on, nun-cio in Madrid in 1593, he was made cardinal in 1596 and was elected pope in 1605, at the relatively young age of 53. He took the name of Paul V and was to reign until 1621. Th is unexpected electionhe was a compromise candidate between opposing factionsallowed his family to complete its rapid social ascension into the high nobility. Th e mechanisms of this ascen-sion are classic: Camillo appointed a cardinal-nephew, Scipione Borgh-ese, as superintendent of the Papal States, entrusted with the care of the familys clients. Th e Borghese multiplied their matrimonial alliances with the old Roman nobility, such as the marriage between the popes nephew, Marcantonio, and Camilla Orsini. Th ey embraced a more aristocratic life-style, entailing the purchase of a suburban villa and enlarging the family palace in Campomarzio. Not least, they acquired extensive real estate, both feudal and allodial.

Th e case of the Borghese as lords is interesting for several reasons: did their acquisition of efs lead to a strengthening of seigneurial rights during the 17th century? Within the wide range of assets they held, which ele-ment proved more important, land ownership or seigneurial rights? Th e answer to these questions might help us establish the particular place of Lazio in early modern rural Italy. Was it a stronghold of seigneurial rights, as in Southern Italy, or did nobles there adopt more modern forms of landed property and management, as in Northern and Central Italy? Fur-thermore, the Borghese example can help us understand the management style of noble landlords and their role in early modern rural economy. Did they adopt management choices which were specic to new nobles and which diered from those of the old nobility, as Volker Reinhardt has suggested was the case for Paul Vs nephew, cardinal Scipione Borghese, stressing his commercial acumen?7 Before we can answer those questions, we need to show the importance of efs in the familys assets.

7 See Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese.


Th e Constitution of the Landed Patrimony

Th anks to the important donations by the pope, the family was able to buy extensive domains in the Agro romano, the countryside around Rome, together with efs across Lazio, the latter providing the Borghese with titles of nobility. Th e purchase of these efs resulted from the debts of old noble families, who were constrained to sell part of their estates from the second half of the 16th century on.8 Papal authority proved central in these land investments, for only the pope could authorize an entail to be broken. Whereas the Apostolic Chamberthe institution managing the patrimony of the Holy Seebought some of the estates brought onto the market, the main purchasers were the popes relatives, who had privileged insider infor-mation. During his long ponticate, Paul V donated more than 3 million scudi to his relatives, and several loans were made to them by the Apostolic Chamber under favorable conditions.9 Th is policy was also followed by the other popes of the 17th century, although from the late 1660s on, due to nancial diculties of the Papal States, it became less routine. Such aggres-sive nepotism has been overlooked by the supporters of the thesis of a weak-ening of feudal nobility in the Papal State from the late 16th century on, in the aftermath of pope Pius V prohibiting the infeudation of new lands in 1567. Th e practice of nepotism directly limited the relevance of this meas-ure, since most popes sought to provide their relatives with efs sold by the old nobility. Nepotism also limited the centralization of the Papal States especially in the Lazio region, around Rome, where territories directly depending on the Holy See were strewn with efs.10

8 See J. Delumeau, Vie conomique et sociale de Rome dans la seconde moiti du XVIe sicle, vol. I (Paris, 1957-59), 459-485; F. Piola Caselli, Una montagna di debiti. I monti bar-onali dellaristocrazia romana nel Seicento, in Roma moderna e contemporanea, I, 1993, 2, 21-56; S. Raimondo, Il prestigio dei debiti. La struttura patrimoniale dei Colonna di Paliano alla ne del XVI secolo (1596-1606), in Archivio della Societ Romana di Storia Patria, 120, 1997, 65-165.

9 See Reinhard, Papstnanz und Nepotismus, vol. I, 119-138; Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipi-one Borghese, 196-98, 209, 219-26.

10 Historians traditionally insisted on the eciency of centralization in the Papal State and on the limits of seignorial powers: see mostly P. Prodi, Il sovrano pontece. Un corpo e due anime : la monarchia papale nella prima et moderna (Bologna, 1982); B.G. Zenobi, Le ben regolate citt: modelli politici nel governo delle periferie ponticie in et moderna (Rome, 1992). Recent scholarship, however, has considerably undermined this thesis: see lately M.A. Visceglia (ed.), La nobilt romana in et moderna. Proli istituzionali e pratiche sociali, Rome, 2001 ; C. Castiglione, Patrons and Adversaries. Nobles and Villagers in Italian Politics, 1640-1760 (Oxford, 2005); Forclaz, La famille Borghese et ses efs.


Th anks to Paul Vs long papacy and the donations deriving from it, the Borghese became one of the biggest landowners in Rome: between 1607 and 1621, Paul Vs brothers, Francesco and Giovan Battista, and his nephew, cardinal Scipione, bought 12 efs scattered around the Eternal City. Th e most prestigious efs were situated in Southern Lazio and had belonged to old families: the Colonna, the Caetani and the Savelli. Scipi-one and his uncles did not adopt a territorial strategy but rather exploited every protable occasion, purchasing efs in Northern Lazio and in Sabina, to the north-east of Rome. In addition to feudal jurisdictions, they also bought allodial properties in the Agro romano, the deserted Roman coun-tryside, whose nancial return was a bit higher than that of efs (3,75-4% against 2,5-3% of the value of the estate). Th ey invested about 1,2 million scudi in efs and 1,3 million in these allodial properties.11

Two features characterize the Borghese familys landed investments rela-tive to other papal families of the 17th century: the importance of allodial properties in their patrimonyin the middle of the century, they were the second largest holder of such lands in the Agro romano, after the Chapter of St. Peterand the continuation of their expansion after Paul Vs death. Between 1621 and the late 1670s, the Borghese bought 19 more efs, so that they owned 31 of them at the beginning of the 18th century, with a total of 24 000 inhabitants. Only the Colonna, one of the oldest families in the Roman nobility, had more subjects (31,000). Th e Borghese could not buy any more efs in Southern Lazio, despite several attempts, since the families of Paul Vs successors invested in that area, so they increased their properties in Sabina instead, where they built up a compact terri-tory.12 Th is continuing expansion is quite unique amongst papal families, which normally stopped increasing their patrimony after the popes death. Th e long duration of the Borghese ponticate explains it in part, since the family had accumulated such extensive nancial power that they were the only ones able to compete with new reigning families. Th ey also had other investments they could liquidate in order to buy new efs, such as shares of the public debt. Above all, their great wealth allowed them to become

11 Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, 194-235. 12 Forclaz, Les Borghese, 33-58; for the number of vassals, see Archivio di Stato di Roma

(=ASR), Congregazione del Sollievo 1-2, fasc. 2/10; for the hierarchy of landowners in the Agro romano, see M. Teodori, La propriet fondiaria a Roma a met Seicento. Le tenute dellAgro romano, in D. Strangio (ed.), Studi in onore di Ciro Manca (Padua, 2000), 555-600.


the creditors of other nobles, whose estates they would eventually seize.13 Th is policy shows the Borghese familys growing interest in efs after Paul Vs death. While efs represented 46% of the value of the familys landed properties in 1621, their share increased to almost 60% in 1658. Although efs were less protable than allodial properties in the Agro romano, the prestige and power derived from enjoying jurisdiction over vassals made them attractive investments. Territorial considerations appear in some investments: in 1633, Marcantonio Borghese exchanged the ef of Rignano for the state of Canemorto, in Sabina, which consisted of four villages, less protable than Rignano but situated next to Marcantonios other possessions. After Marcantonios death 1658, his patrimony was inherited by his grandson Giovanbattista. Th e latter continued Marcanto-nios policy and expanded the familys territories in Sabina, with three new efs purchased in 1678, with money from the sale of other lands and nancial investments. He even contracted debts in order to pay for the new estates. Th ese choices brought some changes to the structure of the Borghese patrimony. Whereas the landed properties represented 76% of the whole in 1658, their share had increased to 83% when Giovanbattista died in 1717. Th e share of nancial investments shrank to a mere 5%.14 After 1717, there were very few purchases or alienations. Th roughout the 17th century, there was thus a double shift in the structure of the assets: from nancial investments to landed properties and, among the latter, from allodial to feudal estates. Several motives explain these modications: the decreasing return from shares of the public debt after 1650, the extension of the familys territories in Sabina, and possibly a desire to diversify crops. Th e most important motivation appears to be the Borghese insistence on their aristocratic rank on the Roman social scene following Pope Pauls death. But while other papal familiessuch as the Barberiniput their survival in the nobility at risk through excessive purchases during their ponticate, the Borghese followed a more careful and gradual investment policy, which allowed them to consolidate their status.

Th e Borghese acquired efs in Lazio in two districts, primarily. To the northeast of Rome, the family owned a compact territory in Sabina, most

13 Th ey lent for example 40,000 scudi to the Anguillara family in the 1620s and bought the latters lordship Stabia in 1660 (ASV, AB 23/36, f. 23); they also lent in the 1630s 30,000 scudi to the Savelli family, which were refunded with the purchase of Castelchio-dato and Cretone in 1656 (AB 27/138; AB 301/1).

14 Forclaz, Les Borghese, 81-82.


of which was bought between 1630 and 1660. In Bassa Sabina, a region of hills close to Rome, the main rural specializations were wheat and livestock raising, but also vines and olive trees. In Eastern Sabina, situated in the mountains near the border with the kingdom of Naples, vineyards and olive trees were rare. Th e main activities there were wheat-growing and livestock-raising, complemented with hemp and chestnuts. Th e other area where the Borghese owned several efs was Southern Lazio; but unlike in Sabina, these efs were scattered.15 In the Monti Albani, wine was the main production; in the hills of the Monti Prenestini, dierent crops were grown: wheat, vines, olive and fruit trees; in the Monti Lepini, stock breeding and cereals were dominant. To summarize, two typologies are important from the geographic and economic point of view. In the efs located in the hills, various crops were possiblecereals, vineyards, fruit and olive treeswhereas in the mountain areas, the economy was founded on grain, pas-ture and the exploitation of forests. Moreover, the proximity of roads in Bassa Sabina and Southern Lazio allowed the commercialization of part of the production in Rome or in the lesser towns of Lazio. As we shall see, these dierences are also related to variations in the structure of the feudal revenues.

Geography and Typology or the Feudal Rights

Which rights did the Borghese possess in their new efs? Ill focus here on the banalits, manorial rights and property rights and, leaving aside rights of justice (these proved to be very signicant in Lazio, since the Borghese, like other families belonging to the high nobility, held penal and civil juris-diction as well as the right to hear appeals and to pronounce the death penalty). Apart from its relevance in terms of authority and prestige, which was stressed by the possesso, a ceremony during which the inhabitants had to take an oath of allegiance to their new lord, jurisdiction authorized the lord to collect a variety of dues.16 What did these consist of ? First, there

15 About Lazio and its geography, see ASV, AB 3018; P. M. C. De Tournon, tudes statistiques sur Rome et la partie occidentale des tats romains, Paris, 1831; F. Nobili- Vitelleschi, Relazione del Commissario Marchese Francesco Nobili-Vitelleschi . . ., in Atti della Giunta per la Inchiesta agraria e sulle condizioni della classe agricola, vol. XI (Rome, 1883-84).

16 On this issue, see D. Armando, I poteri giurisdizionali dei baroni romani nel Sette-cento: un problema aperto, in Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica, 1993, 2, 209-239; Forclaz, Le relazioni complesse.


were property rights, rents and levies paid by the inhabitants who culti-vated the lands owned by the lord. Th ey were generally paid in kind and amounted to 1/6th-1/4th of the crops. Th is deduction was extremely high, since in the Kingdom of Naples, it generally amounted to 1/10th of the crops.17 Next there were banalits, mainly the seigneurial monopolies (of the mill, the oven, the inn or the oil press), to which the whole population of the ef was subject. In some efs, tolls existedtaxes on merchandise or passengers travelling through the jurisdiction. Th ere were also contribu-tions in kind (such as Christmas dues). Finally, the few manorial rights consisted of personal labour contributions, the corves, which were in some cases substituted by a monetary contribution.

Th e balance among these rights varied from one district to another. In pastoral Eastern Sabina, feudal rights were diverse and heavy. Some mano-rial rights existed: the vassals were obliged to bring every year the dues in kind to the lords storehouses in Rome for a very low salary. In some of the efs, there were still corves (that is, unpaid labour details)one or two days a year. As for banalits, the lord generally possessed the monopoly of the oven; furthermore, he inherited the belongings of the inhabitants who died without an heir. In Canemorto and the bordering efs, the owners of animals had to pay a fee. Finally, the vassals had to pay contributions in kind to the lord at Christmas or Easter. With respect to property dues, the levies varied between 1/6th and 1/4th of the crops, a considerable share.18 In Bassa Sabina, the situation was quite dierent. In the ef of Palombara, there were many fewer rights, for example no corves, and no contributions in kind. Banal rights included the monopoly of the oven and of the oil press, and a toll on transiting merchandise. Th e levies paid by the tenants of feudal lands amounted here to 1/5th of the crops.19 In southern Lazio, the situation was comparable to Bassa Sabina. In Montefortino, Olevano and Norma, the property dues were dominant, and the levies were very high1/4th of the crops. Th ere were some contributions in kindfor example in Norma, where all inhabitants had to give two chickens every

17 See G. Curis, Usi civici, propriet collettive e latifondi nell Italia Centrale e nellEmilia con riferimento ai Demanii comunali del Mezzogiorno, Napoli, 1917; Pescosolido, Terra e nobilit; for the Kingdom of Naples, see M.A. Visceglia, Territorio feudo e potere locale. Terra dOtranto tra Medioevo ed Et Moderna (Naples, 1988), 121; Astarita, Th e Continuity of Feudal Power, 82.

18 ASV, AB 2764. 19 ASV, AB 732/9, 732/141.


year to the lordand some fees, but on the whole the banal rights were fewer than in Eastern Sabina, and there were almost no corves. As for the monopolies, the lord held that of the oven or of the millbut there were dierences between the single efs.20

Th e division of landed property ownership conrms these sub-regional divisions. According to the general cadastre of the Papal State of the late 1770s, in Eastern Sabina, the Borghese owned about 1/3 of the land. In Bassa Sabina, their share amounted to 40%, and in southern Lazio, the situation was more diverse: in the Monti Albani, the portion of the land directly owned by the lord was very low, whereas in the Monti Lepini, it came to more than the half of the land.21 We should emphasize that mano-rial and banal rights were important where the lords share of the land ownership was low, whereas elsewhere, property rights brought in higher income and manorial dues proved less important. Areas where seigneurial land ownership was low were also poor villages situated in less fertile mountain areas, where landed incomes were lower. In these regions, the lords sought to maintain their banal rights, which aected the whole pop-ulation and depended less on agricultural productivity.

How can we explain these dierences? Th e lack of research on seigneurial dues in 16th-century Lazio makes it dicult to know the previous history of the efs, although the few studies available seem to indicate that the lords tried to impose new rights upon their vassals in the 16th century.22 One could also relate the hardening of landlord pressure in Eastern Sabina to a lack of municipal statutes, for such laws regulated the relationships between the lords and their subjects as well as the political and judicial organization of the communes. Th ere is a signicant dierence between the regions where the Borghese owned their efs in this regard: whereas in Southern Lazio and in Bassa Sabina, nearly all of the communes were pro-vided with statutes, in Eastern Sabina, most villages lacked them. It seems likely that these communities, which were small and isolated, found them-selves in a weaker position with respect to the bigger villages. Historical factors also testify to the strength of the communes in the former regions:

20 ASV, AB 579/12, 582/101, 703/22, 715/42bis. 21 Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt, 70-77. 22 C. Iuozzo, Feudatari e vassalli a Vignanello. Un caso di lotta politica e giudiziaria nella

seconda met del Cinquecento (Viterbo, 2003), 25, 110-11, 119-20, 151-52.


in Bassa Sabina, there were some free communes in the late Middle Ages, whereas in Southern Lazio, the cities were more numerous.23

Th e Growth of Feudal Rights in the 17th Century

Upon acquiring new efs, the Borghese tried to increase their right. Paul Vs reign represented a favorable period, as the family wielded papal authority over the communes. In 1613, Paul V provided his nephew, car-dinal Scipione Borghese, with the monopoly of the mill in all his efs. Th e Borghese also bought some new rights from indebted communes in Sabina, mainly monopolies, in the years 1611 and 1612. Th is policy continued after 1621, but new opportunities presented themselves less often.24 In several efs, in the 1620s and 1630s, the Borghese also tried to impose new banal rights, in particular the monopoly of the oven, by forbidding private ovens. In other efs, where there was no monopoly, the lords stewards tried to force subjects to use the seigneurial mill by forbidding them to grind their cereals outside the village.25 In all these situations, jurisdiction was an essential tool to this policy, as the lord promulgated edicts and local tribunals prosecuted the oenders.26

Th is policy of hardening the feudal rights was also extended to the landed dues: in 1633, in Montecompatri, the Borghese introduced a levy on fruit production, but after a petition of the commune, the familys administrators stepped back.27 In some cases the Borghese tried to force the inhabitants to lease their lands right after the purchase of the ef. At the end of the 17th century, when some communes in Sabina were heavily indebted to the lords, they agreed to cultivate the lords lands in exchange for the cancellation of their debts.28

23 Forclaz, Les Borghese, 113. 24 See Reinhard, Papstnanz und Nepotismus, vol. I, p. 26; ASR, Segretari e Cancellieri

della Reverenda Camera Apostolica, vol. 367, . 430r-431v, 451r/v, and vol. 393, . 362r-365v; ASV, AB 150/1 and AB 2879, f. 4; AB 702 /24, 722/443 and 736/258.

25 ASV, AB 327/73; ASV, AB 579/12, letter of Francesco Eusebij, 10 November 1634; ASV, AB 582/18, edicts of 1637 and 1638; ASV, AB 582/88.

26 Forclaz, La famille Borghese, 78-81. 27 Archivio storico del comune di Montecompatri, Archivio preunitario, 1/2, Consiglio

1616-1647, f. 216v. 28 ASV, AB 648/16, 648/64, 648/79; ASV, AB 2876, . 24-27.


Such forceful initiatives led to conicts with the inhabitants, and espe-cially with the communesjust as in the Kingdom of Naples.29 Interest-ingly, conicts about monopolies concerned mainly the efs of Southern Lazio, where property rights were predominant, while in Eastern Sabina the antagonisms focused around manorial rights. After they purchased Canemorto, the Borghese sought to increase the quantity of wheat the commune had to transport every year to Rome.30 Whereas the communes had opposed previous lords in several lawsuits before the papal tribunals in the late 16th and early 17th century, after the acquisition of the efs by the Borghese the number decreased sharply. Th e new lords acted carefully and backed up their claims by buying new rights, signing agreements with the communes or imposing a monopoly only gradually. Th eir dominant posi-tion within the Curia, during Paul Vs reign, also forestalled the interven-tion of Roman magistracies against them.

Growing Conicts in the 18th Century

Th e situation changed for the Borghese in the early 18th century. Some communes contested seigneurial rights, and the central magistracies were bent on verifying their extent. In 1704, Pope Clement XI taxed the proper-ties of lords in their efs and subjected communes to the jurisdiction of the Congregazione del Buon Governo, in charge of supervising local nances.31 Th is decision led to surveys of the communes by Roman prelates, who wanted to check possible seigneurial abuses, such as undue fees required from the communes. Th e Congregations major concern was to reduce communal debt. In the Borghese efs in Eastern Sabina, communal ocials complained to the prelates about a number ofseigneurial rights (such as the obligation to transport wheat to Rome and the taxes paid by the owners of

29 M.A. Visceglia, Comunit, signori feudali e ociales in Terra dOtranto tra XVI e XVII secolo, in Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, CIV, 1986, 259-85; Astarita, Th e Continuity of Feudal Power, 147-50; M. Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini. La signoria rurale nel Regno di Napoli attraverso lo studio dei feudi dei Tocco di Montemiletto (XI-XVIII secolo), Bari, 1997, 210-15.

30 ASV, AB 167/3; ASV, AB 151/66. 31 S. Tabacchi, Tra riforma e crisi: il Buon Governo delle communit dello Stato della

Chiesa durante il ponticato di Clemente XI, in Ph. Koeppel (ed.), Papes et papaut au XVIIIe sicle. VI e colloque Franco-Italien organis par la Socit franaise dtude du XVIIIe sicle (Paris, 1999), 51-85.


animals) and about the monopolies sold to the Borghese by the communes. Th e prelates then put together a list of the rights at issue and asked the Borghese to justify them.32

In the years following these surveys, several lawsuits pitted inhabitants of communes against the lord or the leaseholder. Th e new policy of the papal authorities revealed the existence of a local elite whose interests diverged from those of the Borghese. Th ese lawsuits led to a fundamental questioning of seigneurial rights. In Canemorto, for example, the com-mune in 1709 appealed to the Buon Governo against a decree ordering inhabitants to carry wheat to Rome for the second time that year. Not only did the commune refuse to do it, but it also identied carriage as a regalian rightand therefore not due to the lord. Th ese arguments did not con-vince the Congregation, which conrmed the controversial right.33 A sim-ilar evolution occured in Bassa Sabina, especially concerning property rights. In Palombara, a long lawsuit opposed the commune to the lord about levies on olive production. It all started in 1720, when the lease-holder, Gregorio Fargna, claimed dues on olives, cherries and other pitted fruits produced in the vineyards belonging to the lordamounting to 1/5th of the production. Th e commune appealed to the Buon Governo and claimed that there had never previously been any levy on olives. Th e adversaries based their assertions on contradictory juridical texts: the com-mune referred to the statutes, which did not mention any dues on olives, whereas the lord quoted the purchase contract for the ef, which did. Th e suit went onwith some interruptionsfor half a century. Dierent magistracies dealt with it, deciding alternately in favor of the commune and the Borghese. At stake were around 10% of the total incomes of Pal-ombara for the Borghese, and the commercialization of the olive oil pro-duced by the vassals, who brought it to market in Rome. Eventually, the commune won the case in 1770, when prince Marcantonio Borghese withdrew from it.34 Th e defeat was not only material for the prince, but also symbolic, especially after a fty-year struggle. But what were the ori-gins of these growing conicts?

Th is evolution is clearly related to the development of peasant property in the 18th century: due to demographic growth, wastelands belonging to

32 ASR, BG, IV, 980, . 4v, 13r, 5v/6r, 8r, 9r, 13r, 15r, 233r/v, 594r. 33 ASR, BG, II, 667; Forclaz, Les Borghese, 134-36. 34 ASR, BG II, 3321, 3323; ASV, AB 754-760; Forclaz, La famille Borghese, 349-52.


the lord were rented out to the peasants, and intensive crops were culti-vated, such as olive trees, fruit trees or vineyards.35 Since investment was necessary, these lands were only accessible to the upper and middle strata of peasants. Th e conditions of the leases changed: the lord rented out these lands at longer terms and commuted rents in kind into money payments. Th is also transformed the relationships betweens the lord and his subjects, as autonomous farmers emerged in the efs, who were able to commercial-ize part of their production on the Roman market. In Palombara, we nd distinct features of this process. In the 18th century, more olive trees were grown in orchards, and farmers tried to escape the levies by claiming that they had never been collected on olives. Th ey reinterpreted history accord-ing to the present situation, while clinging to the letter of the communal statutes, which did not mention olive trees.36 Th e Borghese and their man-agers, on the other hand, tried to enforce traditional leviesone fth of the harvestson a modern production, but they were not able to over-turn the juridical arguments of their opponents. In other efs, though, the Borghese adapted to the new situation by adopting new leasesin money and not in kind. It is likely that the polarization of the conict made such an evolution impossible in Palombara.

Th us, there was clearly an intensication of conicts in Lazioa trend opposite to the one unfolding in the Kingdom of Naples, where conicts lessened in the 18th century.37 Whereas in the 16th century, lawsuits were mere reactions to feudal abuses, in the 18th century the vassals ques-tioned seigneurial dues altogether. Once more, regional dierences are evi-dent: whereas in Eastern Sabina, the conicts concerned taxes and transport services, in Bassa Sabina, land rental dues were at stake. An emerging autonomous rural elite sought to free itself from the lords grasp on the local economy, by cultivating intensive commercial crops and developing contacts with the Roman market.

35 Id., Les Borghese, pp. 151-155; the phenomenon is also testied to in the Kingdom of Naples: Visceglia, Territorio feudo, 240-41; Astarita, Th e Continuity of Feudal Power, p. 86; Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini, 349-52.

36 As did the inhabitants of the efs owned by the Barberini in a similar conict: see Castiglione, Patrons and Adversaries, 164-66.

37 Astarita, Th e Continuity of Feudal Power, 151-54; Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini, 226 -27.


Structure and Evolution of the Revenues

It is important to consider to what extent the elements described so farregional dierences, increasing feudal rights in the 17th century and grow-ing conicts in the 18thinuenced incomes brought in by the efs. Did those incomes drop after 1700? And was the hardening of feudal dues subsequent to a crisis of the revenues? In order to evaluate the importance of feudal incomes, it is rst of all necessary to assess their monetary value by comparing them with prices in 17th century Lazio. A team of oxen, for example, cost about 50 scudi in the 1650s, whereas a rubbio of wheat, which fed an adult for a year, cost in the same period between 7 and 8 scudi.38 At that time, the twenty-three efs held by the Borghese yielded almost 40,000 scudi a year, a sum inconceivable for a local farmer. How-ever, there were signicant dierences between efs: Palombara brought in about 7500 scudi, but Vallinfreda only 650 scudi. Th is gap was related to demographic and geographic variables; in order to explain it, it is worth examining rst the structure of the incomes. In Eastern Sabina, the share of land-use payments in the overall revenues was rather low:39 in 1637, in Canemorto, it constituted only 32.9% of the income, in Vivaro 41.2%, in Scarpa 32.5%. Th e monopolies, on the other hand, represented an equal or more important share of the revenues: 34.5% in Canemorto, 45% in Vivaro, 53.4% in Scarpa. Th e other banal and manorial rights (corves, various taxes and contributions) brought in 28.8% in Canemorto, but only 7% in Scarpa and 5.4% in Vivaro, as did the pastures (4% in Canemorto, 8.3% in Vivaro, but 20.9% in Scarpa).

Table 1: Revenues of Eastern Sabina, 1637 (in scudi)

Canemorto Vivaro Scarpa

Levies 353.8 301.5 240Monopolies 372 330 341.5 Other banal rights 310.9 40 22.5Pastures 42.8 61.1 160Total 1079.5 732.6 764

38 Ago, Un feudo esemplare, 54; ASV, AB ASV, AB 8567, f. 418 v/r. 39 ASV, AB 2764.


Th e situation was quite dierent in Bassa Sabina:40 the levies and incomes from pastures and forests represented the principal part of the revenue. Th e former constituted 45.3% of the total incomes of Palombara, 50.3% of the incomes of Moricone and 37.8% of those of Mentana, while the latter brought in respectively 37 (Palombara), 29.1 (Moricone) and 45.2% (Mentana). Accordingly, monopolies and other banal and manorial rights represented a low share of the revenue: 17% in Palombara, 18.7% in Mori-cone and 17% in Mentana. Whereas in Mentana, the agricultural incomes came almost exclusively from wheat, in Palombara and Moricone, they also included vine and olive oil production (10-15% of the total rent). In these efs, the land-use payments (levies and rentals of pastures) amounted to 80% of the revenues.

Table 2: Revenues of Bassa Sabina, 1649/56 (in scudi)

Palombara (1649)

Moricone (1654)

Mentana (1656)

Levies 3442.5 142.1 2413.2Monopolies 1114 484.6 1086Other banal and manorial rights

244.91 44.6 0.5

Pastures, exploitation of forests

2802.5 823.1 2890.8

Total 7603.9 2827.6 6390.5 In Southern Lazio, the revenue structure is similar to that of Bassa Sabina, with the predominance of land-use fees more pronounced (63% in Mon-tecompatri and Monteporzio, 52.6% in Montefortino, 70% in Norma); rentals of pastures and forests represented 23.6, 35.3 and 21.4%, while monopolies brought in only13, 8.4 and 7%. Th ere was ample agricultural specialization between the dierent efs: in Montecompatri and Monte-porzio, vineyards were dominant (40% of the rent), whereas in Montefor-tino and Norma, the production consisted mainly of wheat.41

40 ASV, AB 8566, f. 169, 223; ASV, AB 8567, f. 213, 394. 41 ASV, AB 327/60; 703/23; 8566, f. 165, 238.


Table 3: Revenues of Southern Lazio, 1635/1650 (in scudi)

Montecompatri/Monteporzio

(c. 1635)

Montefortino (1650)

Norma (1630s)

Levies 3791 3390.3 1863Monopolies 725 551 180 Other banal and manorial rights

60 225.4 65

Pastures, exploitation of forests

1413 2280.9 575

Total 5989 6447.5 2683 On the whole, then, we observe a striking diversication of income between the dierent regions: whereas in Eastern Sabina, the share of monopolies and other banal rights was important (around the half of the revenue), in Bassa Sabina and in Southern Lazio, revenue mainly consisted of pay-ments for the use of land. And in these regions, there was also a greater diversication of crops: in Bassa Sabina, incomes from vineyards and olive trees represented a signicant part of the total, whereas in Southern Lazio, some efs were specialized in wine production and others in wheat and livestock breeding. Th us, as in Southern Italy, the Borghese familys feudal investments in dierent regions appear to have hedged against the varia-tions in production, as not all crops would have bad harvests the same year.42 Furthermore, in most efs, levies and other land-use payments con-stituted the main share of the revenue. Banal and manorial rights were only important in the poorer efs of Eastern Sabinaa conclusion which conrms Tommaso Astaritas results for the efs of the Caracciolo di Brienza family in the Kingdom of Naples.43 In richer regions of Southern Italylike Sicily or Pugliathe latter were not signicant for seigneurial income. Th is does not mean, as many assumed in the 1970s and 1980s, that feudal

42 Th at behavior follows the model that has been established by Witold Kula for Poland: see W. Kula, Th orie conomique du systme fodal. Pour un modle de lconomie polonaise 16 e-18 e sicles (Paris-La Haye, 1970), 42; for Southern Italy, see M. A. Visceglia, Lazienda signorile in Terra dOtranto nellet moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII), in A. Massafra (ed.), Problemi di storia delle campagne meridionali nellet moderna e contemporanea (Bari, 1981), 44-45, 63.

43 Astarita, Th e Continuity, 78-80.


lords in the early modern period became mere landowners deprived of jurisdictional or political power in their efs.44 What subsequent research has shown is that land-use income became the principal origin of their revenues.

With such dierences in the structure of the revenues, the question of their evolution over time and of the overall conjuncture becomes impor-tant. Did the raising of the charges for manorial and banal rights in the 17th century have consequences for the seigneurial income overall, or did it just compensate for a previous diminution? And did the conicts of the 18th century lead to a decreasing of overall income? Finally, can one dis-cern similar uctuations of revenues in the dierent regions? As to the rst question, we lack evidence for the revenues from the efs in question at the beginning of the 17th century, before purchase by the Borghese family. In some cases, there was a revenue increase: in Eastern Sabina, in the years after the purchaseas the new lords bought some monopolies from the communesthe income went up by 25 to 33%.45 In Southern Lazio, rev-enue remained stable in the rst half of the 17th century.46 Th e incomes of the monopolies increased, though, mainly in Montefortino (from 78 to 515 scudi between 1615 and 1649),47 but this did not aect the overall income.

Did increasing incomes from monopolies represent an answer to a reduction of landed incomes? In fact, they were a consequence of the rural crisis in 17th-century Italy. For Rome as well as for Southern Italy, the starting point of the crisis can be dated back to the middle of the century, thus later than in north-central Italy, where the crisis began in the 1620s. Although it can best be described as a deation rather than a Malthusian crisis, it started in a classical way with a demographic catastrophe, the epi-

44 Aymard, La transizione, 1191-192; Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt, 50-51; critics to this position in Astarita, Th e Continuity, p. 71. On the political and jurisdictional powers of the lords, see, for the Kingdom of Naples, Astarita, Th e Continuity; for the Papal State, see Armando, I poteri giurisdizionali; Forclaz, Le relazioni complesse; Forclaz, La famille Borghese.

45 Percile and Civitella, rented out 1000 scudi in 1610, are rented out 1300 scudi in 1613; the revenues of Vivaro increased from 450 (1612) to 680 scudi (1616), while those of Scarpa went from 800 to 1000 scudi between 1612 and 1620 (Reinhard, Papstnanz und Nepotismus, vol. I, . 122, 124, 126).

46 Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, . 204-09, 220-21. 47 ASV, AB 582/101; ASV, AB 8566, f. 165r.


demic plague in 1656, which aected rst the Kingdom of Naples, then the Papal States and Genoa. Due to this severe mortality, rst demand and then supply shrank. Consequently, feudal incomes lessened, as land-rents, grain prices and incomes from monopolies and other banal rights all con-tracted. Signicantly, the revenues rst crashed in Eastern Sabina, which bordered on the Kingdom of Naples: they shrank at least one third between 1654 and 1659, and in some cases by 50%.48 In 1680, the revenues were one-quarter lower than in the early 1650s.49 In Bassa Sabina, the diminu-tion took place later than in Eastern Sabina. In 1680, the income regressed, although less than in Eastern Sabinaprobably due to the diversity of crops and to the weaker eects of the plaguebut at the beginning of the 18th century, the contraction of revenues was pronounced there too. In Southern Lazio, nally, although incomes remained high throughout the 17th century in Montecompatri and Monteporzio (the efs that were spe-cialized in vineyards), other efs registered an evolution similar to Bassa Sabina: levies diminished, while the relative share of monopolies increased. Th e regression was less than in Eastern Sabina.

Th e response of the Borghese assumed dierent forms: on one hand, they increased their pressure on local communities. In Eastern Sabina they bought monopolies from some communes and forced the inhabitants of other efs to cultivate seigneurial lands, probably where the population had regressed after the plague. Incomes from monopolies remained constant and increased in some cases, following population growth. It is possible that the Borghese and their leaseholders, in order to cut down production costs, abandoned grain cultivation in elds that were converted to grazing lands. Another policy, starting in the last decades of the century, conceded lands to peasants for long-term monetary rents. In many efs, when the population increased again, monetary incomes grew from planting new intensive crops such as vineyards and olive trees. Incomes from pastures and forests lessened proportionally, because of land reconversion. Th is lat-ter policy spurred the growth of peasant property in the 18th century and gave greater autonomy to the farmers, creating the conditions for future

48 ASV, AB 8567, f. 622v, 624v. 49 ASV, AB 8572, f. 853, 860, 873-74. About the rural crisis, especially in north-central

Italy, see G. Hanlon, Early Modern Italy, Basingstoke, 2000, 217-19; for Tuscany, see lately G. Hanlon, Human Nature in Rural Tuscany: an Early Modern history, Basingstoke, 2007, chapter 4; for grain prices in Rome and the Papal State, see Reinhardt, berleben in Rom, 311-331.


conicts between the lords and their subjects. It is not possible to examine the further evolution of the revenues, as we do not know their composition after the Borghese rented out their efs in the 18th century. Nevertheless, we observe a slight revenue increase from 1720 onwards.

Beyond the question of the evolution of revenues, we must keep in mind the protability of the efs as compared to other assetsallodial estates and nancial investments. Around 1600, the income from efs has been estimated at between 2.5 and 3% of their value, whereas in 1660, it dropped to only 2.1%; similarly, the income of allodial estates fell from 3.5-4% circa 1615 to 3% in the 1660s.50 Financial investments were more protable, as the shares of the public debt yielded between 4.5 (for the transmissible bonds) and 7.5-9% (for the non-transmissible bonds) around 1600.51 However interest rates later went down to 4% for transmissible bonds in 1656, and to 3% in 1683. Although the protability of efs and, more generally, of landed properties was not very high, their attractiveness competed by default with that of nancial assets.

Management Choices

How did the Borghese collect their revenues? Two options were available: leasing or direct management. As the Borghese lived in Rome and not in their efs, they needed intermediaries for both. In most efs, the prosecu-tor of the feudal tribunal was in charge of collecting dues, selling grain and leasing out the seigneurial lands. Each individual ef was part of a bigger structure, however: in Sabina, general superintendents based in Canemorto and Palombara supervised the management of the other efs, gathered in two feudal states. In Southern Lazio, a superintendent living in the Borghese summer villa of Frascati managed the neighboring efs of Mon-tecompatri and Monteporzio, while further south, the steward of Monte-fortino also ran Norma and Olevano. While prosecutors generally belonged to the local elites, superintendents often came from other efs.

50 For the following gures, see Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, p. 194; M. Teodori, I parenti del papa. Nepotismo ponticio e formazione del patrimonio Chigi nella Roma barocca (Padua, 2001), 174, 198.

51 Th e transmissible shares could be inherited at the death of the owner, whereas the non-transmissible shares went back to the state.


If seigneurial assets were rented out, however, a leaseholder managed them. Since rental contracts generally lasted six or nine years, the leaseholder was undoubtedly a key gure in the ef. Th e major dierence between direct management and leasing is that when the efs were rented out, the lease-holderand not the lords stewardshad to take care of leasing the lands, collecting the rents and commercializing the dues collected in kind. Stew-ards and leaseholders had to respect several constraints: rst, they were obliged to rent out the lands to the farmers of the village, since only the latter had the right of cultivating them. Every third or fourth year, accord-ing to crop rotation schedules, seigneurial lands were distributed among the owners of oxen. Likewise, the inhabitants held access rights to pastures and forests owned by the lord.52

What made the Borghese choose between direct management or leasing out? Several factors made leasing an easier option. First, the lord and his stewards did not have to worry about leasing the lands, or about collecting dues or debts from peasants, which were important in the Ancien Rgime.

52 See Curis, Usi civici, pp. 473-485, 528-567, 732-739; Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt; R. Ago, Un feudo esemplare. Immobilismo padronale e astuzia contadina nel Lazio del 700 (Fasano, 1988).

0,00

5 000

10 000

15 000

20 000

25 000

30 000

35 000

40 000

45 000

1650' 1680 1700' 1720 1744 1763

Bassa Sabina Eastern SabinaSouthern Lazio Total

Revenues of the efs between 1650 and 1763 (in scudi)


Even in bad years, the leaseholders always had to pay rent to the Borghese. On the other hand, direct management could bring in more prots by eliminating the middleman, but one has to consider the costs it entailed. At the end of the 17th century, expenses (salaries of the feudal ocers, maintenance of mills, expenses for the harvest) often represented more than 20% of the incomes, whereas they constituted only 10% of the rent in the leased efs.53

In Lazio as in Southern Italy and elsewhere in Europe, the lords rented out their efs from the second half of the 16th century on. By then many leaseholders were Roman commercial farmers, the mercanti di campagna; sometimes even bankers took part in the lease. As soon as they bought their efs, the Borghese rented out almost all of them. After Paul Vs death, this remained the preferred option. Until the middle of the 17th century, most efs were leased out, excepting the most desirable of themMonte-fortino, Palombara and Mentana. During the second half of the century, the Borghese rented out fewer efs, since the prots lessened for leaseholders. Many of the latter discontinued their lease, and by the 1680s, only ten of thirty-two efs were leased outthis time the most protable ones. How can we explain this evolution? In the 1650s, it was possible for the farmers and their stewards to sell the wheat for high prices. Th irty years later, the cultivated areas had declined and so had the production, which explains the loss of interest on the leaseholders side and the fact that only the bigger efs were rented out. In 1650 direct management of the bigger efs was lucrative for the Borghese, but after 1680 it ceased to be attractive.54

At the beginning of the 18th century, two-thirds of the efs remained rented out.55 Th e decline of revenue was probably due to the bankruptcy of several leaseholders in the late 17th century. Th e Borghese then consoli-dated the contracts until only ten leaseholders rented twenty-one efs. During the 18th century, direct management became quite exceptional, and businessmen holding long-term leases managed the efs. In Southern Lazio, the Tuschi family leased Norma uninterruptedly from the 1720s to the end of the century.56 Who were the other leaseholders? During Paul Vs

53 Forclaz, Les Borghese, 204. 54 About the leaseholders in the Papal State, see Delumeau, Vie conomique, vol. I, 481-

82; for the early 17th century, see Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese; in Southern Italy, see Aymard, La transizione, 1141-42; Astarita, Th e Continuity, 67.

55 ASV, AB 23/33, 25/54, 29/240, 7650. 56 ASV, AB 327/103, 582/33, 705/253, 705/240, 705/246.


reign, some of them were Roman bankers, but the latter seemed to take less interest in farming in the second half of the century; some leaseholders were merchants active in the capital. Others came from the lesser towns of Lazio, where they had other activities. In the 1650s, the leaseholders of Norma also leased the oven of the neighboring city of Velletri. Finally, many emerged from the elites of the efs themselves: they leased in par-ticular the smaller ones, especially in Sabina.57

Although the Borghese preferred renting out their efs, they demon-strated an interest in management nevertheless, taking part in negotiations with potential leaseholders and keeping informed about prices of wheat. One of the main problems of direct management was the sale of dues col-lected in kind. Due to their centralized administrationthe stewards of the bigger efs supervised the management of the smaller ones, especially in Sabinathe Borghese often sold wheat from one ef to another, or to the Roman market and to bakers of lesser towns. Th e Borghese and their administrators seemed to prefer reliable buyers, able to buy large quanti-ties. An important part of the grain was also sold to the inhabitants of the efscommunes and bakers for supplying the population, peasants for seeds. Th e inhabitants, as small-scale purchasers, often had to buy it at a more expensive rate than foreign buyers: in 1644 for example, the baker of the city of Tivoli bought wheat for 6.5 scudi a rubbio, while the baker of Palombara paid 8 scudi.58 Th ere were important commercial movements on a regional scale, within Sabina, and from efs situated in Sabina to those in Southern Lazio. Th e Borghese attention to the commercialization of their revenues in kind diers from the policy of lords belonging to the old nobility, who preferred to sell their wheat to the communes of their efs.59 It seems that, while the Borghese respected the moral economy, i.e. the duty of supplying their subjects with their own produce, they put their economic interest rst, especially in years of shortages, as regards to both the buyers and the prices.

57 Forclaz, Les Borghese, 206-08. 58 ASV, AB 737; other examples in AB 326/42; AB 8566, 141, 271, 350, 352, 699; AB

8567, 204, 245, 405, 539, 549. 59 Astarita, Th e Continuity, 92; Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini, 299; Raimondo, Il pres-

tigio, 125.


Conclusion

Th e management of the Borghese clearly displayed traditional features: they made few investments and their main goal was to guarantee a stable income. Moreover, they followed an aggressive policy to increase their incomes during Paul Vs ponticate through the imposition of new monopolies. Towards the end of the 17th century, again, they tried to squeeze their vassals in order to oset the decline of their incomes. How-ever, it is legitimate to emphasize their commercial acumen too.60 Several elements indicate this: the purchase of efs in the later 17th century show-ing distinctions in the structure of the revenues, and a diversication of crops; and more generally the ability of the Borghese to adapt to the situa-tion and to take advantage of it. In Eastern Sabina they enforced banal and manorial rights; in Bassa Sabina, they tried to improve revenues by extend-ing traditional levies to new crops, like olives. Th ey also proved to be care-ful managers in the commercialization of wheat. As they collected a wide range of dues and owned an important share of the lands, their power over vassals was extremely strong, especially in Bassa Sabina and in some efs of Southern Lazio. In the 18th century, though, there was a substantial shift and the lords position weakened. Th is was due to the development of peasant property, strengthening relations between the peasants and the Roman market, and the diminution or stagnation of the feudal revenues. However, the Borghese still owned an important part of the land and col-lected important incomes from their efs. Th is evolution shows the impor-tance of legal conicts over the long duration, and the active role of the communes in changing the balance of power.

Seigneurial rights in Lazio thus proved to be extremely signicant throughout the early modern period and the lords position was compara-ble to that of lords in Southern Italy. Th e renewal of the feudal nobility in the 17th century allowed a signicant hardening of seigneurial rights, and more research is needed on the transition from the 16th to the 17th cen-tury. Did this only apply to the papal families, or did new lords belonging to curial or patrician families exert a similar pressure on their efs? Were seigneurial rights hardened as well in efs retained by the old nobility? It would also be interesting to determine whether the Borghese management

60 For the denition of a traditional management, see Astarita, Th e Continuity, 69-70; about the commercial elements, see Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, 129-31.


resembled that of other feudal lords, especially among the newcomers. But even conceding this, it would be an oversimplication to put this pattern of estate-management into a generic framework of traditional rural economy. Th is study shows that the opposition traditional / modern needs to be softened, as modern elements could be brought into a model characterized by strong seigneurial rights. In the 17th century, the Borgh-ese created vast estates and centralized the management of their efs, espe-cially as regards the commercialization of revenues in kind. Th e choice between management optionswhether direct or renting outwas based upon considerations of prot. In this, the Borghese were similar to French or Prussian noble families. Traditional seigneurial rights remained in all cases important throughout the early modern periodand to some extent they were even consolidated; yet the lords also showed a concern for com-mercialization of assets and for a rigorous management of their efs.61 Another modern element is agricultural innovation: although the Borgh-ese did not initiate it directly, they cleared lands, brought in new kinds of leases, and allowed the farmers to introduce intensive crops. Th is led to the growth of peasant property and the development of new productions. In Lazio as well as in other Western European countries, innovation and pro-ductivity growth came from small and medium exploitations, but the lords encouraged a certain degree of specialization and might have given the local farmers a model for the commercialization of their own production. In the early modern economy, commercial and feudal features, far from being mutually exclusive, were therefore intertwined.

61 See Hagen, Ordinary Prussians; Janssen, Yun-Casalilla (eds.), European Aristocracies.

Documents

A Careful Management. the Borghese Family and Their Fiefs in Early Modern Lazio