A BRIEF GEOPOLITICAL ATLAS OF THE RUSSIAN SCIENCE CITIES ... · Note from the Observatoire franco-russe, nO11, April 2015 the country desperately needs. Although it is not quite an

A BRIEF GEOPOLITICAL ATLAS OF THE RUSSIAN SCIENCE CITIES (NAUKOGRAD)

KEVIN LIMONIERNOTE FROM THE OBSERVATOIRE FRANCO-RUSSENO11, APRIL 2015

Skolkovo

www.obsfr.ru 2Note from the Observatoire franco-russe, nO11, April 2015

OBSERVATOIRE

Created in March 2012 and linked to the Economic Council of the Franco-Russian

Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI France-Russie), the Observatoire aims to

produce an in-depth expertise on Russia, and promote a greater awareness of French

realities among Russian political and economic elites. It publishes policy papers and

the annual report on Russia. It also organizes events such as colloquiums, seminars,

press conferences in Paris, Moscow and Russian regions. The following are members

of the Observatoire’s scientifi c advisory board, both scholars and experts, who ac-

tively participate in its work: Alain Blum, Pascal Boniface, Isabelle Facon, Peter Kopp,

Jean Radvanyi, Marie-Pierre Rey, Georges Sokoloff , Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, Natalia

Lapina, Sergei Karaganov, Fyodor Lukyanov, Ruslan Pukhov, Konstantin Simonov,

Tatiana Stanovaya.

AUTHOR

Kevin Limonier is a doctor of geography, researcher at the Institut Français de Géo-

politique (Université Paris VIII) and instructor in geopolitics at the Russian State Uni-

versity for the Humanities (RGGU, Moscow).


CONTENTS

Introduction............................................................................................................................4

1. The science cities: an archipelago of Russian innovation................................................6

2. A territorial and functional structure inherited from the USSR.......................................8

3. A development model born during the challenges of the transition...........................10

4. The status of “naukograd”: between autonomy and interventionism.........................12

5. Challenges of the revival: the example of Dubna.............................................................14

6. New policies to support innovation: competitive or complementary?........................16

7. The unique voting behavior of the science cities...............................................................18

Conclusion...........................................................................................................................21Sources.................................................................................................................................22


INTRODUCTION

At a time when Russia is mired in a serious economic and monetary crisis due par-

ticularly to the drop in hydrocarbon prices on the global markets, the ambition of

former president Dmitry Medvedev to make the country into an “innovating power”

seems like a thing of the past given how much the landscape has changed. Yet it

was not so long ago that Medvedev voiced this ambition: the president made the

support for innovation into a major national cause in 2009, when Russia was also

suff ering the eff ects of the international fi nancial crisis of 2008. This crisis realized

the fears expressed by a fair number of politicians since 2003–2005 regarding the

fragility of a Russian economy that had been deemed too dependent on its energy

income, and therefore the shocks of international prices. Worse, the idea that Russia

would become a mere “gigantic oil emirate” was gaining popularity in the media and

threatening to strain the credibility of the political project that was defended not only

by the president, but also and especially by his prime minister, Vladimir Putin. For how

could Russia be promoted as a model of a resurgent power if it was unable to inno-

vate, as much to ensure its future as to reconcile with a Soviet past that undoubtedly

was troubled but whose “technological adventures” of the 1950s–1970s still evoke

great pride? Innovation and research in Russia have this dual insurance value: both

for the future and as a heritage to preserve, because it reveals part of the story of the

Russians and who they are.

It is for all these reasons, and more, that in 2009 President Medvedev decided on

the establishment of an authentic new city on the outskirts of Moscow that was in-

tended to become the showcase of Russia’s technological ambitions: Skolkovo. With

tens of billions of dollars, the government thus wished to give life to an ultramodern

center of excellence in which the strategic orientations of the R&D would often be

in harmony with the legacy dimension of technology and with the space complex,

which Skolkovo’s offi cial website calls a “cultural and spiritual identity.” Quickly gai-

ning the nickname the “Russian Silicon Valley,” the project inspired the enthusiasm

of observers all over the world. The idea of creating a technopole that would gather

the who’s who of Russian R&D was warmly received, and the advertising related to

the project was tinged with the codes of Anglo-Saxon marketing. In addition, the

promoters ensured that corruption, which was viewed as a signifi cant obstacle to

Russian innovation, would have no place in Skolkovo because this was a city built

from scratch and great attention would be given to these issues. Finally, partnership

agreements were signed with many large international businesses, and this gua-

ranteed the project’s solid credibility.

Today, fi ve years after the fi rst stone was laid for the fi rst building of Skolkovo, many

hopes have been dashed. The fi rst corruption scandals appeared quickly, while the

economic crisis and sanctions put an end to many international partnerships the go-

vernment had been counting on in order to promote the technology transfers that


the country desperately needs. Although it is not quite an “empty shell,” as of 2015

Skolkovo has not met the expectations it inspired when it was launched. However,

now more than ever before, Russia needs to diversify its economy and sell its techno-

logies abroad, and to do so despite the sanctions and the ruble’s collapse. Given the

global situation, it seems sensible to think that in a near future, Skolkovo will continue

to fall short of its promises because its successes hinged greatly on the connections

that it could create with the global high-technology and advanced industrial giants,

which are largely Western. In addition, the development of the “Russian Silicon Val-

ley” still depends greatly on fi nancial resources that the government is no longer as

willing to provide due to the precarious economic situation.

Thus the question being raised for the country and foreign investors is how to

fi gure out how to take advantage of all the strengths of Russia, which despite eve-

rything is still a scientifi c powerhouse that benefi ts from one of the world’s most

educated populations. The response is no longer found in Skolkovo. It is sometimes

found far from the capital and the major urban centers, in small towns coiled in the

depths of a forest or in the bend of a river: the science cities. Vestiges of the former

colossus that was the scientifi c complex of the Soviet Union, these small cities that

were established for the needs of the Gosplan and the defense of the Soviet Union

constitute a true archipelago comprised of small “islands” with diff erent fates. Some

never recovered from the crisis of the 1990s—too isolated and too dependent on

their former line ministry, they subsequently became cumbersome ghosts. Others,

because they were dedicated to highly strategic activities, remained under govern-

ment control; visitors could not enter these “closed cities” without a pass. Finally,

there are the cities that survived as research centers and that managed to conserve

their “intellectual and scientifi c heritage.” Researchers in these cities have sometimes

used their own money to pay to preserve a laboratory that the government no longer

had the funds to maintain. Other researchers have established their undertakings

based on research they carried out on behalf of the Soviet Union.

This scientifi c archipelago constitutes a little-known opportunity. Not only do the

small islands that comprise it still have a substantial population of researchers and

engineers, but, thanks to strong corporate interdependences, they have also re-

tained an identity and a culture of research whose roots stretch back to the 1950s

and 1960s. This is an undeniable strength for the creation of new innovation ecosys-

tems. This atlas focuses on these cities.


The landscape of modern Russian innovation has some distinguishing attributes,

such as a widely varied R&D that is oriented toward both new technologies and areas

that the former Soviet Union excelled in. Its substantial territorial entrenchment, which

is hard to grasp in its entirety and diversity, nonetheless makes it possible to produce

a general cartography of this landscape.

Beyond the major urban centers, where the “creative classes” are traditionally clus-

tered, Russia has a unique type of innovation territory: the science cities. Since 1999

1. THE SCIENCE CITIES: AN ARCHIPELAGO OF RUSSIAN INNOVATION

Michurinsk

Biysk

KoltsovoZelenogorsk

Mirny

Sarov

Dzerjinsk

Zernograd

Akademgorodok

NOVOSIBIRSK

Moscow

St. Petersburg

Yekaterinburg

Zarechye

vetOre

bolensk

Mendelee

Krasnoznamensk

Krasnoarmeysk

IstraStar City

Dubna

rolev

Pushchino

O

tov

Tr

iazinohernogolovka

Dolgoprudnyye

PusPuPuPP hchPuusPu hh

ar Cityar Cittyar Cittyiiaaaa

herhehherhherhh

A. The archipelago of science cities

www.cassini-conseil.com

Peterhof

“Official” science cities (law of 1999)

Union of Science Cities member cities

MoscowZheleznodorozhny

Zhukovsky

0 5 10 15 20 25

Biotechnologies

Nuclear power

Energy

Chemistry

Aviation

Weapons

Space

Telecommunications

Moscow

St-Pete

rsburg

Novosib

irsk

50% of economic production

comes from the

innovation complex

Workers in the high-technology

sector account for 30%

of the active population

In number of science cities,

by specialties listed in the Russian’s framework programs

C. Main features* D. Areas of activityB. Demographic weight Nearly 4 million Russians live

in the archipelago of science cities.

In terms of absolute comparison,

this corresponds roughly to the population

of the country’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg.

Science

citie

s

* In the “official” science cities


these cities, whose roots lie in the Soviet Union’s scientifi c and military complex, have

enjoyed a legal status (naukograd) that protects the “intellectual and scientifi c poten-

tial” that is embodied by their economic, social and cultural organizations that were

inherited from the Soviet era.

Forty-odd cities are currently joined in a “union for the development of science

cities” (A). Among them, around 15 hold the legal status of naukograd. These cities

constitute a true “archipelago” of scattered small islands that are sometimes located

in remote areas but that share an economic profi le that is characterized by local ac-

tivities that are dominated by the sciences and technologies. The specializations of

these cities, which are often determined by history or the presence of a prestigious

institute, are the object of development framework programs. The R&D activities of

the science cities usually coincide with sectors that the government deems to be of

high priority (telecommunication, biotechnologies, energy, aviation), or that are reco-

gnized as “vital interests of the Russian Federation” (space, nuclear power) (D).

With a combined population of nearly 4 million people, the archipelago of science

cities has an absolute demographic weight that is comparable to that of the se-

cond-largest city in the country, St. Petersburg (B). According to federal legislation,

a signifi cant share (at least 30%) of the active population of the 15 cities that the

government recognizes as science cities works in the research and development

sectors (C).


The modern science cities derive from the Soviet Union’s scientifi c, military and in-

dustrial complex. Most of them were established between 1955 and 1970, in a period

when the housing crisis that the country had been experiencing since Stalin, along

with the growing complexifi cation of research processes, necessitated a new way to

organize technological development.

At the time, the Soviet Union’s scientifi c complex was characterized by a strong in-

terpenetration with the military sphere (B)—to the extent that it is impossible to clearly

2. A TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE INHERITED FROM THE USSR

NNOVOSIBIRSKOVOSIBIRSK

PERMERM

MOSCOWOSCOW

LENINGRADENINGRAD

Nuclear power

Space

Aviation

Biotechnologies and chemistry

Electronics

Technical military centers

MMOSCOWOSCOW

SVERDLOVSKVERDLOVSK


А. THE SOVIET UNION’S SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ARCHIPELAGO: A LOGICAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE

Major scientific

and technical areas

Installation area of

technical military capabilities

Moscow’s “green belt,” where most

of the elite cities of the Soviet

scientific complex were established

B. AN OVERABUNDANT SCIENTIFIC SECTOR

THAT DEPENDED ON THE MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

C. FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND TERRITORIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF RESEARCH

Share of 1990 Soviet GNP dedicated to R&D

30% of GNP

dedicated to R&D

80% of resources for R&D

are dedicated to the military

and industrial complex

Line ministry

(or military command)

Institute or

functional industryLocal governmentOther regional

and central authorities

HousingCulture

& educationLand-use planningProvisioning

MOSCOW

SVERDLOVSK


separate the science cities that were dedicated to civilian research from the military

cities that housed advanced infrastructure (development or maintenance of missiles,

etc.).

This complex gave rise to a genuine “science archipelago,” the small islands of

which have interesting features. First, most of them are dedicated to one or several

specifi c activities. Second, these urban units, which are shaped fi rst and foremost by

their tasks, are organized according to a functional logic. Map A clearly shows the

installation area of the technical military centers (both strategic bases and develop-

ment centers) in a belt that encircled the Soviet territory, along with “functional areas”

that were distributed throughout the country. For example, there is the Siberian area

(structured around Novosibirsk and the Siberian branch of the Soviet Academy of

Sciences), and the Ural area, which centered around Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg)

and was dedicated to the development of Soviet nuclear power. The area structured

around Moscow stands out from all the other areas due to the density of the cities

that comprised it, along with the diversity of their specialties. It was there that most of

the so-called elite research units were set up; they boasted a quality of life that was

higher than the national average, in a setting that enjoyed proximity to nature, mainly

in the “green belt” of forests that surround Moscow.

Finally, these cities were characterized by the major role played by the main re-

search institute in all aspects of local life (C): the upkeep of the housing, provisioning

of stores, etc. This institute thus constituted a factor of local experiences for the cities,

whose function often dictated the identity.


When the Soviet Union collapsed, the cities that comprised this archipelago expe-

rienced a profound crisis. The slashing of research budgets (B) induced a worrying

“brain drain” everywhere as well as the abandonment of a lot of cutting-edge in-

frastructure. Furthermore, the central government disengaged itself from the mana-

gement of most of the cities, aside from the so-called closed cities, which remain,

under a law passed in 1992, administered by line ministries.

Confronted by these changes, the elites of a number of cities organized large-scale

brainstorming in order to try to fi nd a model of transition from public, centralized

management of research toward a market economy. These cities then created the

1990 1991 19981992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999

Baikonur

Sevastopol

Tomsk

Dzerzhinsk

Obninsk

Zhukovsky

Dubna

Khimki

Korolev

Fryazino

Chernogolovka

Reutov

Protvino

Obolensk

Troitsk

Moscow

B. CHANGE IN FEDERAL BUDGET EARMARKED FOR SCIENCE AND INNOVATION C. CHRONOLOGY OF STRUCTURAL READJUSTMENTS

А. TА. THEHE SCIENTIFICSCIENTIFIC ANDAND TECHNICALTECHNICAL ARCHIPELAGOARCHIPELAGO ININ THETHE FACEFACE OFOF THETHE COLLAPSECOLLAPSE OFOF THETHE S SOVIETOVIET U UNIONNION


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

19901990 19911991 1998199819921992 19931993 19941994 19951995 19961996 19971997 19991999

Early 1990

Establishment of the

Union for the Development

of Science Cities

July 14, 1992

Adoption of the

law on ZATOs

October 1993

Defeat of the first draft legislation

on the creation of a “science city” status

1997

Asian economic crisis

April 7, 1999

Adoption of the law establishing

a legal status for science cities

Scientific or technical centers

that lost their special status


whose leaders established

the “Union of Science Cities”


that remained closed to foreigners (ZATO)


that Russia maintained abroad

Territory of the Russian Federation in 1992

Former Soviet republics

that gained independence

B. CB. CHANGEHANGE ININ FEDERALFEDERAL BUDGETBUDGET EARMARKEDEARMARKED FORFOR SCIENCESCIENCE ANDAND INNOVATIONINNOVATION C. CC. CHRONOLOGYHRONOLOGY OFOF STRUCTURALSTRUCTURAL READJUSTMENTSREADJUSTMENTS

А. THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ARCHIPELAGO IN THE FACE OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

In billions of 1991 constant rubles

3. A DEVELOPMENT MODEL BORN DURING THE CHALLENGES OF THE TRANSITION


Union for the Development of Science Cities (naukograd), the objective of which was

to uphold and build on their “intellectual and scientifi c potential that was inherited

from the Soviet Union.” The union’s goal was to have recognized, at the federal level

and through a special status, the exceptional nature of these urban units and to or-

ganize their safeguarding. As imagined, the process is based on a decentralized ma-

nagement and the corporate interdependences that exist in these cities in order to

ensure the transition. The established economic models were greatly inspired by the

example of the French technopoles (Sophia Antipolis), and they stressed the creation

of training centers and innovating business incubators that stemmed from the re-

search conducted by the institutes inherited from the Soviet era. More than a decade

prior, France had abandoned the strategy of the large national R&D programs (the

Plan Calcul) in order to focus on developing regional innovation centers—this was

reminiscent of the challenges the Russian leaders were facing.

Between 1989 and 1999 (C), the union’s member cities gradually set up such mo-

dels, albeit with modest successes (especially in the Moscow region) that were no-

netheless noteworthy considering the gravity of the economic crisis and the central

government’s obvious apathy toward issues of science and innovation. The new fe-

deral elites, who came from environments that were remote from research environ-

ments, were hardly sensitive to the cause of scientifi c networks that no longer occu-

pied in the federal political architecture the dominant position that had belonged to

them in the Soviet era. This is why the recognition of the status of naukograd did not

occur until 1999, at the end of a decade of intense lobbying before the federal elites.


The Duma’s 1999 adoption of the designation of naukograd ushered in a new pe-

riod. That same year, a fi rst city, Obninsk, gained the status as a pilot city. Starting the

following year, several other cities joined Obninsk, including Dubna and Zhukovsky.

Issued at the end of a long process involving numerous key institutions, the new

40 km.

MOSCOW

DUBNA

PUSHCHINO

TROITSK

ZHUKOVSKY

CHERNOGOLOVKAFRYAZINO

KOROLEV

REUTOV

Noginsk

Dmitrov

Solnechnogorsk

Klin

Naro-Fominsk

Source : Rosstat, Russian Census of 2010

Per capita municipal budget, in rubles

Share of local budget

coming from federal subsidies

ZHUKOVSKI Science cities

Other citiesNoginsk

42100 25260 15156 9093 5456 3273

A. THE “NAUKOGRAD” AND CENTRAL SUBSIDIES*

*2009 datawww.cassini-conseil.com

Initiative

The municipality itself, or a proposal

coming from subjects of the Russian

Federation, federal ministers or the

Academy of Sciences

Ministry of Economic

Development, Ministry of

Finance, Ministry of Education

and Science or the

Academy of Sciences

Federal Science

and Innovation Agency

Federal government

Presidential ukase

Organization

granting

their approval

Required

documents

Business case of the

municipality requesting

the status

Development project

Draft framework agreement

between the federal

government, the municipality

and the relevant subject (region,

republic, etc.)

Draft presidential ukase

B. PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING “NAUKOGRAD” STATUS

4. THE STATUS OF “NAUKOGRAD”: BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTIONISM


status granted cities rights to some federal and regional budget subsidies. In accor-

dance with the philosophy adopted a decade prior by the Union of Science Cities,

the management of these subsidies remained in large part at the discretion of the

municipality that benefi ted from them despite earmarking for federal programs. In

particular, this aid was supposed to be used to create innovation ecosystems that

were attractive due to the urban renewal and the support of some businesses that

met criteria that were predetermined by the municipality in conjunction with the cen-

tral authorities.

Starting in 2003, the amount of aid allocated to cities that had gained the status of

naukograd started to rise substantially. One of the causes of this increase lay in the

energy profi t Russia was enjoying; this made it possible to fi nance many renovation

sites and construction sites of new infrastructure. However, the main reason remained

the radical change in attitude of the federal government toward the science cities.

During his fi rst fi ve years in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin gradually laid the groundwork

of a genuine doctrine of support for innovation and protection of the technological

legacies of the Soviet Union. Thus several sectors were recognized as “vital interests

of the Russian Federation”; some, such as nuclear power and aerospace, pertained

directly to the science cities.

As the map opposite shows, in 2009 the naukograd of Moscow oblast went through

an exceptional budgetary situation compared to that of other cities in the region. The

per capita municipal budget there was much higher than those of other cities that

were nonetheless active (such as Klin, where large alcohol manufacturers were esta-

blished), and the share of federal funding was much larger there.


One of the main goals of these funds is to create an attractive environment to re-

verse the brain drain of scientists that these cities are experiencing, but what does

this mean in practice? The city of Dubna is an instructive example. This small city

of 75,000 inhabitants that lies 120 km north of Moscow has been viewed since the

1960s as a world capital of nuclear physics.

In concrete terms, the city inherited from the Soviet era an urban structure that was

marked by the specialization and well-thought-out distribution of living and activity

areas. Map A clearly shows three so-called functional regions: the eastern one is

MOSCOW

DUBNA

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

2002 200820072006200520042003

B. CHANGE IN AMOUNT OF SUBSIDIES RECEIVED

BY DUBNA AS PART OF THE NAUKOGRAD PROGRAM (2002–2010)

A. CREATING AN “INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM”

Functional districts

Functional companies

Special economic zone

New city center

Suspension bridge

(suspend)

New development axis

JINR

JINR

MKB

RADUGA

TENZOR

Volga


To the special

economic zone

CHERNAYA RECHKA

Green spaces

Forests

Prospekt Bogolyubova

(constructed in the 1980s)

Urbanized area between

1990 and the present

Project of

suspension bridge

Volga

C. BUILDING A SHOWCASE OF RUSSIAN INNOVATION

The “new city” under construction on the left bank of the Volga

5. CHALLENGES OF THE REVIVAL: THE EXAMPLE OF DUBNA


organized around the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR), which brought glory

to Dubna. In the west is another district built in the 1970s around the Tenzor factory,

which specialized in the production of safety materials for the nuclear power plants.

In the north, a third district centers around MKB Raduga, an aviation technology plant.

In the Soviet period, these three districts were physically separated and the socio-

professional profi les of their inhabitants diff ered.

Since the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the local authorities

have been trying to unite these three entities within a coherent whole in order to

promote collaboration. The naukograd status, which the city gained in 2001, enabled

the construction of a new, modern city center (map C), while a suspension bridge is

being planned to effi ciently link the two banks of the Volga. The construction of a vast

innovation special economic zone was decided on in 2005 in order to house R&D

initiatives that would be able to benefi t from the depth and diversity of the talents that

come from the city’s three traditional production centers. This zone, which is supple-

mented by a “new city” that is currently under construction (image C), is commonly

referred to in the municipal promotional materials as a true “showcase” of the revival

of Russian innovation and the city of Dubna.


Until the mid-2000s, the naukograd remained one of the only successful national-le-

vel initiatives in support of innovation. However, beginning in 2005, the federal go-

vernment started adding and diversifying projects in this domain. That year it was de-

cided to create several special economic zones based on a general strategy aiming

to create a large production and research focus including zones that until then had

been aff ected by the crisis. Most of the time, the high-technology SEZs were created

in the science cities so as to support the development of these cities, such as in Dub-

na. For these cities, this was an especially prosperous time marked by the consistent

increase in budgetary allocations.

6. NEW POLICIES TO SUPPORT INNOVATION: COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?

A. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF INNOVATION SUPPORT POLICIESArchipelago of science cities

Innovation SEZ

Production SEZ

Port SEZ

SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZ): A NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Strategic development

axis of SEZ

Skolkovo and Innopolis Kazan

Partnerships in the export

of the “Skolkovo model”

Customs Union

(Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan)

SKOLKOVO, OR THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A NEW MODEL

KAZAKHSTAN

UKRAINE

BELARUS

MONGOLIA

CHINA

POLAND

SWEDEN

IRAN

FINLAND

SKOLKOVO

INNOPOLIS

Tomsk

Zelenograd

Dubna

Murmansk

Sovetskaya

GavanUlianovsk

Titanium

Valley

Alabuga

Togliatti

Lipetsk

www.cassini-conseil.comC. OVERALL DECREASE IN SCIENCE BUDGETS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SKOLKOVO

- 60%20041,5 bln

2011579 mln

Funding of naukograd (in rubles)

2011

15 bln2012

22 bln

2013

17 bln

Funding of Skolkovo (in rubles)

B. DISTRIBUTION OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES FOR THE ENACTMENT OF THE “DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 2013–2020” PROGRAM

Fundamental research

Fundamental science & innovation

“Institutional development”

“International development”

Program implementation

“Infrastructure development”,INCLUDING FUNDING OF SCIENCE CITIES

INCLUDING FUNDING OF SKOLKOVO

In billions of rubles

29

798

442

216

52

23


However, in 2009, the situation changed. The new Russian president, Dmitry Med-

vedev, decided on the creation on the outskirts of Moscow of a large industrial park

named Skolkovo, which soon came to be nicknamed the “Russian Silicon Valley.”

Skolkovo was thought up to become the global showcase of Russian innovation, and

the project was fi nanced at an amount of several tens of billions of dollars. Offi cial-

ly, the development strategy of the naukograd and Skolkovo were compatible: the

naukograd focused on local development while Skolkovo had an international incli-

nation. However, vociferous criticism soon came from the Union of Science Cities,

which blamed Skolkovo for the plunge in allocations for the naukograd beginning in

2010 (C), while the program “Science 2020,” which set major objectives in Russian

innovation between now and 2020, dedicated only a small amount of its allocated

resources to the naukograd (B). This was combined with the fact that the project to

create a new technopole “ex nihilo” was disputed given that the science cities would

already fulfi ll, on their respective territories, all the conditions required for creating

this attractive environment that was inspired by the American example of Silicon Val-

ley and that off ered an excellent quality of life and a true “culture of innovation.”

Beyond an apparent complementarity, this was a confrontation between two phi-

losophies of Russia’s technological development: the philosophy of Skolkovo, which

was centralized and inspired by codes and processes borrowed from the Anglos-

phere, opposed that of the science cities, which was defi ned by a culture of inde-

pendent decision making and which placed importance on the notion of legacy, his-

tory and memory.


7. THE UNIQUE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SCIENCE CITIES

KALUGA

TULA

RYAZAN

VLADIMIR

YAROSLAVL

TVER

MOSCOW

Klin

KOROLEV

CHERNOGOLOVKA

PUSHCHINO

TROITSK

Naro-Fominsk

Noginsk

ZHUKOVSKY

DUBNA

Dmitrov

RYAZAN

OVERALL RESULTS

Russian Federation

Moscow Region

United Russia

Communist Party

A Just Russia

LDPR

Yabloko

Others

DUBNA

Noginsk

Cities

with naukograd status

Other cities

Kevi

n Li

mon

ier,

2014

2007 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

KALUGA

TULA

RYAZAN

VLADIMIR

YAROSLAVL

TVER

MOSCOW

Klin

KOROLEV

CHERNOGOLOVKA

PUSHCHINO

TROITSK

Naro-Fominsk

Noginsk

ZHUKOVSKY

DUBNA

Dmitrov

RYAZAN

OVERALL RESULTS

Russian Federation

Moscow Region

Kevi

n Li

mon

ier,

2014

2011 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS


At present, what is the true impact of the policies to support innovation in the nau-

kograd, particularly in political and societal terms? Beyond the economic activity that

these programs contributed to refl ate, attention must be given to what proves to be

the central aspect of these policies: preserving or creating spaces of socialization

that favor the emergence of new ideas, against a backdrop of a representation of de-

velopment or common good that is broadly infl uenced by the government’s political

orientations (safeguarding and celebrating heritage, etc.).

An analysis of the results of the December 2011 elections (legislative elections)

and the March 2010 elections (presidential elections) off ers the most noteworthy les-

sons. In the Moscow region, the naukograd diff ered from the rest of the territory in

showing a signifi cant change in their voting behaviors. While in 2007, during the

fi rst-round legislative elections, the science cities voted similarly to other cities, this

changed in 2011: in the naukograd, the Russia United vote retracted considerably, to

the benefi t of the Communist Party and the social-liberal coalition A Just Russia. It is

therefore striking to see that these same naukograd counted among the territories

of the country in which the party in power fared the worst, a trend that held in the

2012 presidential elections: Vladimir Putin barely got a majority there, contrary to his

showing in the neighboring cities.

This behavior can undoubtedly be explained in part by the climate of dissatisfac-

tion found in the country, which had been shaken by large waves of antigovernment

demonstrations. However, the existing diff erential between the science cities and the

“ordinary” of the small cities of the Moscow region cannot be decoded only in light

of this data. In reality, a deeper analysis of voting behaviors, at the level of the voting

stations of each city, would show that the majority of the “protest” vote (particularly

the Just Russia and Prokhorov vote) was concentrated in areas that were rehabili-

tated or built for the benefi t of the development program of the naukograd. These

areas are those into which new, young, educated populations had moved, attracted

throughout the 2000s to the naukograd by the development of advanced initiatives.

It can then be seen that although there existed a connection between gentrifi cation

and electoral dissatisfaction regarding the government, this connection was not wi-

thout its paradoxes: it was the territories and social classes that had most benefi ted

from the largesse of the federal government that then turned from it. In reality, while

this vote confi rmed that the development model of the naukograd was a relative

success (the Just Russia vote would therefore be a good indicator to measure the im-

pact of the revival programs), it also indicated a deepening rift between the “creative

classes” and the elites regarding the meaning to give to local prosperity.

A good example of this rift is off ered by the resurgence of confl icts in planning that

some science cities experienced. Since 2009 and the inauguration of the Skolkovo

worksite, the budgetary allocations of the naukograd are falling. These drops lead

the elites of these cities to fi nd new sources of funding and wealth accumulation,

particularly by selling land and real property. Plots of forest, lakes and rivers that were

especially valued by the inhabitants and were symbols of the privilege of a superior


quality of life were thus sold to developers in some of these cities (Dubna, Zhukovsky

and Khimki). These actions sparked widespread rallying against these projects by

new populations that were fi ercely opposed to the destruction of the environment

and that simultaneously accused the authorities of nepotism and corruption.

Henceforth, it would seem that a new challenge that is more far reaching for these

cities, and that pertains to the entire country, is responding to the economic success

of the science cities. In these territories where the safeguarding of the technical and

intellectual legacies of the Soviet Union may be considered successful, new electoral

dynamics and confl icts of planning invite questions on the stability of the develop-

ment model as proposed by the authorities throughout the 2000s. Indeed, neither

the economic successes nor the preservation of the legacies, which were broadly

evoked in the offi cial arguments to promote the naukograd model, seem to exempt

these cities from a new phase of reassessment regarding the defi nition of the gene-

ral interest and the meaning to give to technological development.


CONCLUSION

The naukograd represent an opportunity for Russia: fi rst, they concentrate in deli-

neated geographic areas a signifi cant share of the scientifi c and intellectual heritage

that comes from the complex of Soviet research; second, they are the custodians of

an idea, which was inspired by the Soviet ethical code, of the role that science and

innovation must play in society. Indeed, these cities were subject to various revival

and development programs in the 1990s and 2000s. These initiatives, which were

sometimes successful, nonetheless still fall short of the real needs that these terri-

tories have in order to complete a transition that has been going on for more than

twenty years. The opaqueness of these revival policies, and the fact that they were

considerably “eclipsed” by the Skolkovo project, has not helped these science cities

gain the publicity that they doubtlessly deserve.

For all that, and despite the aging and the gradual demise of the elite scientists

who were educated during the Soviet era, these cities are changing. As the last

plate of this atlas shows, the surprising electoral results that these cities post are the

mark of profound societal changes. The rise of the social-liberal vote, although it is

localized to particular sectors of these cities, indicates that a certain “gentrifi cation”

is occurring. Due mainly to the infl ux of young university graduates who are seeking

a pleasant place to live, this new trend sanctions the appearance of a provincial

“creative class,” whereas this type of population is usually seen in the centers of the

large cities (particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg). Beyond the political challenges

that they pose for the established municipal employees, these changes are well and

truly the proof that these former islands of the Soviet Union’s technological power are

transforming and adapting despite everything.

Before the colossal projects in support of innovation that are embodied in Skolk-

ovo and other large technopoles that were built ex nihilo in the provinces (Alabuga,

for example), the science cities thus continue to play their role of incubators and

breeding grounds of skills. Although it is still hard to predict the consequences of the

current economic crisis on these fragile ecosystems, they are no less an opportunity

for Russia and for foreign investors. For all anyone knows, perhaps it is these small,

placid cities that house the ingredient that Skolkovo lacks to become a “Russian Sili-

con Valley”: a history, a landscape, a heritage—in short, a true culture of life centered

on research and innovation.


SOURCES

1. THE SCIENCE CITIES: AN ARCHIPELAGO OF RUSSIAN INNOVATIONUnion for the development of science cities, 2013.

Rosstat, State Statistics Committee, 2013.

Federal Law n°70-F3 (April 9, 1999) on the status of science cities.

Parliamentary Commitee on local management issues. Doklad o sostojanii gosudars-

tvennoj politiki o naukogradah i napravenijax ee razvitija (Report on the state and

prospects of the development of public policies for science cities). Moscow : State

Duma, 2006.

2. A TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE INHERITED FROM THE USSRLIMONIER K., « Geopolitical analysis of what is at stake in a policy of power : the case

of science and innovation in Russia ». Hérodote, revue de géographie et de géopo-

litique n°146-147, 2012. pp. 193-216

OCDE, Science, Technology and Innovation Policies: Federation of Russia. Center for

cooperation with transition economies Centre for Co-operation with Economies in

Transition, Background Report, Vol. 2, 1994.

GLOAGUEN C., « Le complexe militaro-industriel russe » [The Russian Military-Indus-

trial Complex], Le Courrier des pays de l’Est n° 1032, 2003. pp. 4-17.

3. A DEVELOPMENT MODEL BORN DURING THE CHALLENGES OF THE TRANSITIONUnion for the development of science cities, 2012.

KUZNECOV Y. « Finansirovanie grazhdanskoj nauki v Rossii is federal’nogo bjudzhe-

ta » (Public funding of civil science in Russia). Otečestvennye Zapiski n°7, 2002.

4. THE STATUS OF “NAUKOGRAD”: BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTIONISMRosstat, State Statistics Committee, 2010.

Parliamentary Commitee on local management issues. Doklad o sostojanii gosudars-

tvennoj politiki o naukogradah i napravenijax ee razvitija (Report on the state and

prospects of the development of public policies for science cities). Moscow : State

Duma, 2006.


5. CHALLENGES OF THE REVIVAL: THE EXAMPLE OF DUBNALIMONIER K. La cité scientifi que de Doubna. De la « ville idéale » soviétique à la

vitrine du renouveau de la Russie contemporaine, étude d’un territoire d’innovation

mis au service d’un discours de puissance. Thèse de doctorat soutenue le 28 no-

vembre 2014, université Paris VIII.

Conseil Municipal de Doubna. Otčet Glavy goroda po itogam raboty za 2010g. (Rap-

port du maire sur les résultats de l’année 2010)

6. NEW POLICIES TO SUPPORT INNOVATION:COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?LIMONIER K. La cité scientifi que de Doubna. De la « ville idéale » soviétique à la

vitrine du renouveau de la Russie contemporaine, étude d’un territoire d’innovation

mis au service d’un discours de puissance. [The science city of Dubna. From the

Soviet « ideal city » to the showcase of contemporary Russia’s revival, study on a

territory of innovation in the service of a power discourse] PhD thesis defended on

November 28, 2014, university Paris VIII.

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. State program for the

development of science and technology 2013-2020. Moscow, December 20, 2012.

7. THE UNIQUE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SCIENCE CITIES.Election Commission of the Moscow oblast’ (Mosoblizbirkom), 2007, 2011.

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