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CSI REPRINT

A BATTLE REPORT:

.LAI HALFACAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

ALLEUTNANT FRITZ BAYERLEIN, a. D.

R GENERAL G. P. B. ROBERTS, CB, DSO, MC

Reprinted by permission of the Marine Corps Association, copy-right © 1956, and may not be further reproduced without theexpress permission of the copyright holder.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

When professional soldiers think in terms of future concepts, it is natural that theyshould seek to find some of their guide lines in the military actions of the past. Itwas with this in mind that the idea was conceived of presenting the report of acombat action as seen by two opposing commanders. To be of any value, the reporthad to shed some light on the problems of today: fluid actions of mobile forces operat-ing over widely separated areas; the logistic problems incumbent in such action; theeffect of terrain on the conduct of the operation and, most important, the employmentof air elements operating in conjunction with the ground forces.

The campaigns which were fought in the Western Desert during WWII seemedto fit the requirements more so than those of any other theater. Here, unencumberedby the problems which normally beset military operations in more populated areas, theopposing forces were free to engage each other in a classic form of war involving thecombatants only. A project to present such a report was begun in the spring of 1955.

Through the assistance of Col R. T. Vance, then the Marine Corps staff represen-tative at CINCNELM in London, B. H. Liddell Hart was reached and severalactions were examined to select the one best suited to the purpose.

At first it was considered that the operations at El Alamein might be most reward-ing since there the elements of offense, stand and retreat were executed by bothsides. Because of the length and complexity of this whole campaign, however, LiddellHart recommended that the narrative be limited to the battle of Alam Haifa, thesecond phase of the campaign. Here, the opposing forces were about equal (althoughthe logistical advantage lay with the British) whereas the first battle (retreat fromTobruk) and the third battle (British counteroffensive) were too one-sided.

It was also Liddell Hart who recommended the authors best suited to do the job.Bayerlein commanded the spearhead of Rommel's primary thrust and Roberts com-manded the unit which blocked it-each was instrumental in the conduct of theaction and both saw the battle from the same level. The authors wrote their portionsindependently and neither has seen the other's manuscript; thus a true picture, aseach saw it, is presented. Liddell Hart has tied the two accounts together andplaced the action in perspective. The translation, from the original German, of GenBayerlein's article was done by Capt H. W. Henzel, USMC.

The pictures bearing the authors' credit lines are from their own personal collec-tions and the captions identify the actual points concerned.

Discrepancies in the order of battle will be noticed in comparing one account withthe other. These, presumably, are the results of erroneous intelligence information onboth sides. Although perhaps confusing, these errors will give the reader a picture ofthe amount of information each side had available. Further, it shows how the fog ofbattle obscures the field commander's perception of his opponent and firmly substan-tiates the axiom, that war is truly an art.

A BATTLE REPORT:

ALII H iFA

CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

GENERALLEUTNANT FRITZ BAYERLEIN, a. D.

MAJOR GENERAL G. P. B. ROBERTS, CB, DSO, MC

MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATIONCOPYRIGHT 1956

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

90-2508

the Authors

Acclaimed as one of the great military minds of thecentury, B. H. Liddell Hart was born in France inOctober 1895. He received his education in Englandat Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University.With the outbreak of World War I he entered theKing's Own Light Yorkshire Infantry and embarkedfor France in 1915. As a captain he saw action in thebattles of Ypres and later he participated in the fiercefighting of the battle of the Somme, where the Britishused tanks for the first time at Cambrai.

Using his experiences during these actions in con-junction with a greal deal of research, he prepared astudy of infantry tactics in 1917. He later revised thisstudy for its publication by the British Army as anInfantry Training Manual in 1920.

The opportunity to further his active militarycareer was denied him when he was invalided out ofthe service in 1924 as a result of the wounds receivedduring the war. Appointed military correspondent forthe Daily Telegraph in 1925, he assumed the role oftactical analyst and military critic while at the sametime editing the military articles for the EncyclopediaBritannica.

Appointed permanent military critic and corre-spondent of The Times in 1935, he at once made fulluse of this position to conduct a campaign for a moreeffective co-ordination of the efforts being made inmatters of National Defense, a campaign which ledto the creation of a "Ministry for the Co-ordinationof National Defense." Unfortunately, the resultsachieved were far from being what Liddell Hart wasasking for in the columns of The Times.

In 1937 he became personal adviser to Hore-Belisha,then Minister for War, and was instrumental in themodernization of the British Army and the redistribu-tion of the Imperial Forces. Among many of his pro-posals that led to a modernized British Army was thecreation of an armored division for the Middle East.It was in this organization that a number of officerssuch as LtCol (later Field Marshal Viscount) Mont-gomery, and Capt (later General) de Guingand, whobecame Montgomery's Chief of Staff, received their

desert training. His faith in the importance of armorled him to advocate the concept of deep penetrationto cut the enemy's communications far in the rear ofthe front.

The author of no less than 27 volumes dealing withmilitary tactics, history, strategy and the doctrines ofnational defense, his works can be considered thetexts that educated the youthful officers of both theAllied and Axis armies prior to WW II. A sharp ex-ample of this fact is borne out by Fritz Bayerlein'scomments on Field Marshal Rommel's personal jour-nal of the campaign in North Africa. He creditsLiddell Hart with being the "military author whomade the greatest impression on the Field Marshaland highly influenced his tactical and strategical con-ceptions." General Guderian, creator of the GermanPanzer units, maintains in his memoirs that thePanzer unit was based on Hart's concept of an ar-mored division combining tanks with mechanizedinfantry. His influence on the other side of theledger can be seen in Montgomery's effective use ofnight tactics in the desert after 1942, and Patton'suse of his deep penetration concept in his drive to-ward the Rhine.

The military career of Generalleutnant Fritz Bayer-lein, a.D., began when he served as a private of infan-try on the Western Front in 1917. He was commis-sioned in 1922, when the military restrictions of theVersailles Treaty limited the Officer Corps of theReichswehr to a small select group. His talents andabilities soon came to the attention of his superiors andhe was assigned to the Kriegsschule in Dresden, from1927-30, as an instructor. It was during this periodthat he came to know another officer with whom hewas to be closely associated in years to come - ErwinRommel. With the conclusion of his tour as an in-structor at the Kriegsschule, he reported to the Gen-eral Staff School in Berlin, as a student. He remained

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there until 1935. The intervening years until 1939found him serving as a general staff officer with vari-ous Panzer units. When the invasion of Poland waslaunched, Bayerlein was with the 10th Pz Div. Forthe campaign in France, he was with PanzerkorpsGuderian which, as a part of Army Group A, wasinstrumental in executing the Manstein Plan insmashing through to the Channel coast behind themass of the Franco-British armies. Remaining withGuderian when his command was expanded and re-designated Panzergroup Guderian, Baverlein partici-pated in the lightning drive of that unit throughMinm k and Smolensk to the outskirts of Moscow.

He first came to the public attention of the Alliesas Chief of Staff of the Afrika Korps under Rommelin the Western Desert. His long association withErwin Rommel and his part in the campaigns inAfrica have made him one of the few living authori-ties on this period. He has collaborated with manymilitary writers in reconstructing the operational his-tory of WWII-Liddell Hart's The Rommel Papersprobably being the most familiar.

As the war in North Africa was drawing to a close,with the collapse of the Axis forces there, Bayerleinwas transferred to the Russian Front, where he tookcommand of the 3d Panzer Div, one of the oldest andbest German armored units. In 1944 he moved backto the Western Front with Rommel and took com-mand of the Panzerlehr Div. He led this divisionagainst the invasion forces in Normandy, at Caen,Tilly and St. Lo. Then, in the last German effortof the war, he had command of that division in theArdennes offensive, spearheading the forces that hitthe American forces in the Bastogne area in the Battleof the Bulge. As the tottering walls around the ThirdReich began to crumble he took command of theLIII Panzer Korps during the last ditch defense ofhis homeland, in the struggle for the Rhine (Rema-gen) and the Ruhr.

In presenting the German version of the Battle ofAlam Halfa in this narrative, Gen Bayerlein canreport with accuracy, since he was in actual commandof the Afrika Korps at the height of the battle. Oneof his achievements in preparing this narrative is themanner in which he clears up the still popular mis-conception that the war in the desert was a duel be-tween the Afrika Korps and the British Eighth Army.In reality, that highly effective unit, the Afrika Korps,was merely a component of the combined Italo-Ger-man forces in which the preponderance of troopswere Italian.

He now lives in Wuerzburg-Heidingsfeld, Germany.

Major General G. P. B. Roberts, CB, DSO, MC, at thetime of his retirement, had one of the most successfulcareers in recent British military history. Born in thedays of the Empire at Quetta, India in 1906, he sawthat Empire through some of its most troubled daysand played a vital part in the maintenance of theCommonwealth position in North Africa, by his lead-ership of the British units he commanded there. Hiscareer interestingly coincided with that of his oppon-ent in the battle here described. Both were associated

with the development and execution of the theories ofarmored warfare which their respective services for-mulated in the decade prior to the outbreak of WWII.

After attending Marlborough College and beinggraduated from Sandhurst, he was commissioned andposted to regimental duty with the Royal Tank Regi-ment. He served with his regiment, first in England,then in Egypt from 1928 to 1932. Returning then toEngland, he became an instructor at the Tank Schoolsin Bovington. In 1938 he was again posted to dutyin Egypt where he was to see so much action in thenext few years. In Egypt he was Adjutant of the 6thRoyal Tank Regt, and after the war broke out heremained in that area serving with the Eighth Armyin the Western Desert until the fall of Tripoli. Dur-ing this period he served in various staff billets withthe 7th Armd Div and the XXX Corps, and thencommanded the 3d Royal Tank Regt and the 22dArmd Brigade. After the fall of Tripoli, Gen Roberts,then Brigadier, was moved over to the First Army inTunisia. For a short time, immediately following hisarrival there, he was attached to the US 2d Armd Divunder Gen Orlando Ward. This was just after thebattle at Kasserine Pass. Until Tunisia was cleared hecommanded the 26th Armd Brigade of the 6th ArmdDiv. Leaving Africa, he returned to England, waspromoted to major general and given command of the11th Armd Div. Gen Roberts trained this division forthe coming invasion and landed with it at Normandy.He led this same division throughout the campaignson the Continent and once again encountered his oldopponent of the days in the Desert, Fritz Bayerlein.

Gen Roberts' achievements on the field of battlewere recognized by his being awarded the rank ofCompanion of the Bath, the Distinguished ServiceOrder (2 bars) and the Military Cross. Further, he wasmentioned in Dispatches 3 times and the French Gov-ernment awarded him the Legion of Honor and theCroix de Guerre.

After the war, in 1946, he was named CommandingGeneral of the 7th Armd Div and in 1948 was ap-pointed Director, Royal Armored Corps. Gen Rob-erts retired in September 1949, and now resides at"Postillions," Pembury, Kent.

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FOREWORDBy Capt B. H. Liddell Hart

T HE BATTLE OF ALAM HALFA IN

1942, fought as August turnedinto September, was a turn-

ing point of the war in the Medi-terranean- indeed, more truly aturning point than the more cele-brated "Battle of Alamein" that fol-lowed, in the fall. For by the timethis started, late in October, theBritish build-up of strength in NorthAfrica so vastly exceeded that of theGerman and Italian forces underRommel as to ensure the frustrationof his attempt to overrun Egypt-leaving only the question of howlong he could cling on to the door,and whether he could escape destruc-tion. In the clearer light of post-war knowledge, of the respectiveforces and resources, it can be seenthat Rommel's eventual defeat be-came probable from the moment hisdash into Egypt was originallychecked, in the July battle at Ala-mein, and this accordingly may beconsidered the effective turningpoint. Nevertheless, he still lookeda great menace when he launchedhis renewed and reinforced attackat the end of August. And as thestrength of the two sides was nearerto an even balance than it waseither before or later, he still had apossibility of victory-and mighthave achieved it if his opponents

Marshal Rudolfo Graziani

had faltered or fumbled as they haddone on several previous occasionswhen their advantage had seemedmore sure. But in the event, thatpossibility vanished beyond possi-bility of recovery. The crucial sig-nificance of "Alam Halfa" is svm-bolized in the fact that although itwas fought out in the same area asthe other battles of Alamein, it hasbeen given a separate and distinc-tive name.

In the two articles which follow,the course of the battle is vividlydepicted by key commanders on eachside-an illuminating conjunction.At the start of the battle Gen Bayer-lein was Chief of Staff of the AfrikaKorps, Rommel's main striking force,and took over command when GenNehring was disabled by a bombsplinter during the initial phase. GenRoberts commanded the armoredbrigade which covered the keypointof the British position, and thusplayed the principal combat role inthe issue of the battle. These twooutstanding leaders of "armor" con-fronted each other again, though notso directly, two years later in Nor-mandy-when Fritz Bayerlein com-manded the Panzerlehr Division and"Pip" Roberts the British 11th Ar-mored Division - being then, at 37years of age, the youngest divisionalcommander of the invading armies.These two armored divisions wongeneral recognition as the best oneach side.

As the Editor has asked me towrite a foreword to these accountsfrom different "sides of the hill,"the best way to help an understand-ing of their significance may be tofill in the historical and strategicbackground to the battle, whilesummarizing the course of events.

The war in the Mediterranean,and on the African continent,started in June 1940 when Musso-lini, seeing that France was obvi-

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ously collapsing under the Germanblitzkrieg, plunged into the war onHitler's side to reap some of thespoils of France's conquest, and totake advantage of the weakness ofthe British position in Africa. Atthat moment there were only 50,000British troops in Africa facing 10times as many Italians-over 200,000in Italian East Africa and nearly300,000 in Libya. But the ItalianArmy was ill-prepared for war andshort of motor vehicles. Marshal

Wride \W/rriM

General Sir Archibald Wavell

Graziani's advance from Libya intoEgypt did not begin until 3 monthslater in September, and after a 70-mile advance through the desert ithalted at Sidi Barrani, and therestuck for 2 months.

The British Commander-in-Chiefin the Middle East, Gen Wavell, de-cided to try the effect of an upset-ting stroke by the Western DesertForce-the embryo of the EighthArmy-under Gen O'Connor. Itwas visualized as in the nature of apowerful raid rather than an offen-sive -for Wavell had only 2 divi-sions. But the "raid" turned intoa decisive victory, owing to the de-moralizing effect of the heavily ar-mored British "Matilda" tanks-coupled with that of the 7th Armd

Wide World

Div's swoop through the desert ontothe Italians' rear. This sudden blowwas delivered on 9 December. Alarge part of Graziani's army wascut off and 35,000 captured, whiiethe remainder only regained theshelter of their own frontier aftera panic retreat that reduced themto a disorderly rabble. Then Bardiawas captured, on 3 January, with40,000 prisoners. Tobruk fell onthe 22d, with a further 25,000.

The surviving part of Graziani'sarmy retreated past Benghazi to-wards Tripoli, but was interceptedby an indirect approach in pursuitthat proved one of the most bril-liant and daring strokes of the war.The 7th Armd Div made a dashthrough the desert interior to reachthe sea south of Benghazi; on 5 Feb-ruary. Its leading elements covered170 miles in 36 hours over difficultand unknown country. Theyamounted to only 3,000 men, yet bytheir audacity in thrusting acrossthe path of a vastly superior enemythey secured a bag of 21,000 pris-oners.

Small as were the forces whichhad achieved this astonishing con-quest of Cyrenaica, there was at themoment little to stop them drivingon to Tripoli. But a halt was calledby the British Government in orderto provide the means of dispatchingthe ill-starred expedition to Greece.

General Sir Claude Auchinleck

Wavell was instructed to leave onlya minimum to hold Cyrenaica. Atthis juncture, also, the leading partof the German Afrika Korps, underRommel, arrived in Tripoli. Toolate to save the Italians from dis-aster, this German help came intime to prolong the North Africacampaign for over 2 years, duringwhich Britain's position in Egyptwas brought into imminent danger.

A rapid counterstroke launchedby Rommel at the end of Marchtook the weak British holding forcesby surprise and threw them into dis-order. Within a fortnight he hadswept the British out of the wholeof Cyrenaica, save for an isolated

portion which withdrew into I o-bruk-and there remained as a thornin his side. By the time he reachedthe frontier, however, he had over-stretched his supply lines and wasthus compelled to halt.

The Commander-in-Chief of theGerman Navy, Adm Raeder, hadurged, and continued to urge, theimportance of seizing the keys ofthe Mediterranean, and shutting theBritish out of that area. But Hitlershowed little interest in such proj-ects, being too intent on his plansof overthrowing Russia, as a way ofmaking Britain yield. The heads ofthe Army agreed with him on mili-tary grounds-they were averse tothe detachment of forces to Africaand disliked the idea of committingtroops across the sea, where the Brit-ish Navy could powerfully inter-fere. While the Italian collapsehad driven Hitler to send some helpthere, both he and his military chiefsshrank from giving Rommel thescale of reinforcements he neededto capture Egypt.

On the other hand, strategicminds in Britain conceived the ideaimmediately after the fall of Franceof developing a countermove byway of North Africa against thesouthern flank of Hitler's positionin Europe. Having been frustratedin his premature attempt to develop

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such a threat by landing in Greece,Churchill ardently embraced theidea of clearing North Africa - asan avenue into Europe.

After an abortive attack (Opera-tion "Battleaxe") on Rommel's posi-tion, the British launched a muchbigger offensive ("Operation Cru-sader") in November, with the largereinforcements that Churchill hadsent out to Egypt. By this timeWavell had been replaced by GenAuchinleck as Commander-in-Chief,while the forces on the Libyan fron-tier had been constituted as theEighth Army, under Gen. Cunning-ham. The offensive opened well,after a wide outflanking movethrough the desert, but the attack-ing forces then became disjointed,so that Rommel was able to defeatthem in fragments, throw them backtemporarily, and almost produce aretreat to Egypt. This whirling bat-tle of tanks continued for nearly 3weeks, shifting to and fro with re-peated turns of fortune, but in theend, Rommel's tank strength wasexhausted and he was forced to re-treat-right back to his Februarystarting position near Agheila, onthe frontier of Tripolitania.

To Rommel's British opponentshis most disconcerting characteristicwas the way he reacted to pressurelike a recoil-spring, and changedfrom a far-reaching retreat to anequally far-reaching riposte. He hadhardly withdrawn from Cyrenaicabefore he was back there again.

At the beginning of 1942, just ashe had reached the shelter of salt-marsh bottleneck on the Tripolitan-ian frontier, a small convoy arrivedwith reinforcements. Thereupon hepromptly planned to take advantageof the way that the British had be-come overstretched in their advance.By a surprise counterstroke, whenthey imagined him as still exhausted,he dislocated their front, then ex-ploited their disorder by an indi-rect thrust from the desert flankagainst the Benghazi base, andtumbled them back to Gazala-re-capturing more than half theirgains.

Churchill again built up thestrength of the Eighth Army for arenewed effort to throw Rommel outof Cyrenaica and out of Africa. ButRommel struck first. By a wide

flanking maneuver with his armor inthe night of 26 May he threw theEighth Army off its balance. Hewas checked, however, before hecould reach the coast and cut offthe British forces holding the Ga-zala Line. Thereupon he took up adefensive position with his backagainst the British minefields-whichled the British to feel that he wascornered, and bound to surrender.But their countermoves were toodirect and they fell into the defen-sive trap which Rommel had quick-ly improvised when he was checked.

With its reserves entangled andexpended, the Eighth Army was un-able to meet Rommel's next flank-ing move, and was beaten piecemeal.While one portion was falling backto the frontier, another portionwithdrew into Tobruk. Rommel'sarmored forces swept past Tobruk,as if heading for the frontier, thensuddenly switched around and struckat Tobruk in reverse, before theforces there had settled down. Pen-etrating the defenses at a weakpoint, the Germans overran the gar-rison and captured almost the wholeof it -together with such an abun-dance of supplies and transport asto provide the means for a pro-longed advance on their own part.

Rommel then chased the remainsof the Eighth Army helter-skelterthrough the Western Desert, andcame dangerously close to reachingthe Nile Valley, the main artery ofEgypt. If that had been secured,and with it the Suez Canal, Britain'swhole position in the Middle Eastwould have been wrecked.

On 30 June 1942, Rommel reachedAlamein after defeating the BritishEighth Army at Gazala-Tobruk, andchasing its tattered remains 350miles through the desert. Thatmorning he had written home ex-ultantly: "Only 100 more miles toAlexandria!" By evening he wasbarely 60 miles distant from hisgoal and the keys of Egypt seemedwithin his grasp. Hitler was tele-graphing congratulations and Mus-solini had flown to Africa ready fora triumphal ride into Cairo. On theother side, Auchinleck, the C-in-CMiddle East, had gone forward fromCairo into the desert to take per-sonal command of what was left ofthe Eighth Army, in an effort to

stem the tide. The situation lookeddesperately black. The British Fleethad hastily evacuated Alexandria.Clouds of smoke rose from the chim-neys of the military offices in Cairoas their records were hastily burnt.The world outside naturally inter-preted the snowstorm of charredpaper as a sign that the British werefleeing from Egypt.

But a vital change had now comeat the front. On July 4th, Rommel,still at Alamein, wrote home:"Things are, unfortunately, not go-ing as we should like. The resist-ance is too great, and our strengthis exhausted." His thrusts had notonly been parried but answered byupsetting ripostes. His troops weretoo tired as well as too few to becapable of making a fresh effort forthe moment. He was forced tobreak off the attack and give thema breather, even though it meantgiving Auchinleck time to bring upreinforcements.

Auchinleck was not content withstopping Rommel, but sought toturn the tables decisively. How nearhe came to succeeding is shown by aletter that Rommel wrote on 18 July,"Yesterday was a particularly hardand critical day. We pulled throughagain. But it must not go on likethat for long, otherwise the frontwill crack. Militarily, this is themost difficult period that I havebeen through."

Fortunately for Rommel, theBritish troops were as exhausted ashis own, and soon afterward Auchin-leck in turn had to suspend his at-tacks. But Rommel's closing reflec-tion was: "Although the Britishlosses were higher than ours, yet theprice which Auchinleck had to paywas not excessive. What matteredto him was to hold up our advanceand that, unfortunately, he haddone."

Soon, reinforcements arrived fromEngland. Churchill wanted theBritish to take the offensive withoutdelay, but Auchinleck, more wisely,insisted on waiting until the freshtroops had become tactically ac-climatized to desert conditions. Inthe sequel, Auchinleck was replacedby Alexander as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and Montgom-ery took over command of theEighth Army.

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I-IE BEGINNING OF AUGUST 1942had the makings of a very tryingmonth in the Western Desert.

It was a period of disorganizationand reorganization, of dust and flies,of orders and counterorders, and ofheat and "gyppy tummy" [amoebicdysentery].

The Eighth Army was licking itswounds and sorting itself out; pull-ing out as many units as possible tore-form and maintaining as muchstrength in the Alamein line as itsequipment and weapons would per-mit.

As far as the armor was concerned,the majority of the tanks that wouldrun at all were grouped into oneArmored Brigade - the 22d, towhich, at the end of July, I wasposted to command. Individual unitshad had heavy casualties so that allthe armored regiments of the Bri-gade, with one exception, werecomposite units.

The order of battle of the Brigadewas:

Royal Scots Greys (Greys)lst/6th Royal Tank Regiment

(1 RTR)5th Royal Tank Regiment/Royal

Gloucestershire Hussars(5 RTR)

3rd/4th County of LondonYeomanry (4 CLY)

1st Royal Horse ArtilleryRegiment (1 RHA)

1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade (1 RB)Each Armored Regiment consisted

of two squadrons of 12 Gen Grant

tanks and one light squadron oleither Crusader of Stuart tanks, withthe exception of CLY which hadonly one Grant squadron of 15tanks. In addition, it should be men-tioned that there were 6 Americantank crews dispersed throughout theBrigade who had come over for bat-tle experience. They were the firstAmerican soldiers to fight on Africansoil. They certainly got their battleexperience in a somewhat unortho-dox battle and I am glad to say with-out serious casualties, though one ortwo had to bail out of burning tanks.

The other armored formations leftin the Eighth Army were: a weakbrigade of Valentine tanks (23d Ar-mored Brigade) and the 4th LightArmored Brigade consisting of a

The author with Gen Montgomery duringa visit to the 22d Armd Brigade

Ronhrts

regiment of Stuart tanks, 2 regi-ments of armored cars, a motor bat-talion and one artillery regiment.Being the main armored force avail-able, many were the ideas of how22d Armored Brigade should be em-ployed. We spent our time recon-noitering different positions whichwe should occupy in varying tacticalcircumstances. It was all rather remi-niscent of the situation in the Gazalaline some 3 months earlier in May;then we had reconnoitered andplanned our defensive positions inmany areas which we might be re-quired to occupy in a variety of cir-cumstances. In any event, we hadnot been given sufficient time to oc-cupy the one selected to deal withthe German advance round BirHachiem and so were defeated indetail. Certainly on that occasion werecovered our balance and had theremainder of the battle been han-dled differently, might well havewrested the initiative from Rommel.

However, at Alam Halfa at theend of July 1942, the multiplicity ofplans as far as the 22d ArmoredBrigade was concerned did not in-spire the greatest confidence.

Early in August the Prime Minis-ter, the Chief of the Imperial Gen-eral Staff and others visited theWestern Desert. As a result of theirvisit certain changes in the highercommand were made. By AugustJ3th, Gen Alexander was the newC-in-C Middle East and Gen Mont-gomery the new Eighth Army Corn-

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WlUe WoUrlU

Roberts

Gen Montgomery (center) is briefed atAlam Halfa by Gen Horrocks (left) and

Brigadier Roberts.

mander.These changes were to have a

marked effect within a few days onour plans, on our life and on ouroutlook generally. Within two daysof his arrival Gen Montgomery hadtoured the whole front and visitedall the units in it. I well remembermy first meeting with him; he andthe new Corps Commander, GenHorrocks, were to meet me at a cer-tain point on the Alam Halfa ridgeat 0845 hours. At 0830 being afflictedwith gyppy-tummy I felt there wasjust time to disappear over the near-est ridge with a spade, and ploddingmy way back a few minutes latercomplete with spade I saw a largecortege arriving at the appointedspot and some 5 minutes ahead ofschedule. There was Gen Horrocks,XIII Corps Commander, whom I sa-luted, there were Bobbie Erskine,Brigadier General Staff, XIII Corps,and Freddie de Guingand, Chief ofStaff, Eighth Army and several othercharacters including a little manwith white knobby knees, an Austra-lian hat and no badges of rank whoI took to be a newlv arrived war cor-

respondent. Monty, whom I had notpreviously met was obviously goingto arrive later. I was just about toask Freddie de Guingand fromwhich direction the Army Com-mander might be expected when thegentleman in the Australian hat saidto me "Do you know who I am?" -"Yes, Sir," was the prompt reply. Itwas quite clear that whoever he wasit was better to know! And, ofcourse, it was Monty.

Very soon Montgomery appre-ciated that Alam Halfa was the cor-nerstone of the defensive position.He ordered up 44 Division from theDelta to occupy the high ground it-self, and within the perimeter of thatDivision's defenses were to be locatedthe 44th Divisional Artillery and cer-tain Corps artillery units. The 22dArmd Brigade, then an independentarmored brigade directly under XIIICorps, was ordered to select and toprepare static defensive positions onthe southern and eastern slopes ofAlam Halfa. It was considered, andquite rightly, that the Brigade wasshort of training as a Brigade and itsmechanical condition, as a result ofthe mileage already done by thetanks, precarious, and therefore un-suited to mobile operations. In factthis Brigade, with its same equip-ment, took part in the battle of Ala-mein and at one time led the pursuitof the German army to Tobruk.

Gone were all the other plans andwe gladly destroyed the mass oftraces with different code nameswhich had been prepared with la-borious staff work to indicate thealternative positions. There was onefirm plan and one position to occupyand we all felt better. (See sketchmap No. 2.)

It would be relevant here to de-scribe these positions and indicatethe factors affecting their selection.First and foremost, it must be borne

in mind that these were to be firmdefensive positions and that the bat-tle would be fought to a precon-ceived plan; there was to be littlepossibility of maneuver, so normalin armored tactics, to meet swiftlychanging situations. The second im-portant factor was the qualities andpeculiarities of the Grant tank whichwas the mainstay of the defense. Itsmain armament was a 75 mm gun ina side-front mounting. This prevent-ed good, natural "hull-down" posi-tions being selected, and since thegun had only a very limited traverseonly limited areas of fire were avail-able for each tank. The tank was veryhigh which increased the difficulty ofconcealment in anything but verybroken ground. Thirdly, a very widearea had to be covered to deal withattack from the east, southeast andsouth; consequently there were notroops available purely as a reserve.

Very briefly these matters wereresolved as follows. The 6 pounderAT guns of 1 Rifle Brigade and ofan antitank battery from an artilleryregiment, put under my commandspecifically for this operation, weregiven the area of flat and unbrokenground to cover; their concealmentin such terrain being obviously easierthan for Grant tanks. The Granttanks were put into the broken foot-hills, and where suitable positionscould not be found these wereachieved by bulldozing. Finally, theGreys, being equipped with the new-est Grant tanks were placed on theeastern slopes, from which directionattack was considered least likely, sothat they would be the most likelyto be available as a mobile reserveand were at the same time the mostmechanically reliable.

The detailed positions havingbeen decided upon, a careful artil-lery program was planned with SOStasks, particularly some tasks close

Static positions are prepared and dug in Stuarts -- useful for harassing roles Grant--its peculiarities -present a probglem

Touring the front with the Prime Minister.L-R, Alexander, Roberts, Churchill,

Horrocks

in front of the antitank guns.It should be pointed out here that

the Grant tank, in spite of the dis-advantages already mentioned, wasthe only tank then in the Desert ofany real value against the GermanPzKw III and IV. With its short-barrelled 75 mm gun in the sidemounting it could be very effectiveagainst these German tanks at about1,000 yards range. The other tanks,Valentine, Stuart and Crusader with2 pdr or equivalent guns were ofvalue in a harassing role, but no usein a "slugging match."

This was, at any rate, the impres-sion we gained in those days, butcareful tests carried out after thewar have shown that we were undulypessimistic regarding the perform-ances of our own tanks. At AlamHalfa, however, there was a surprisein store for us as will be seen later.

About this time the Prime Minis-ter returned to the Desert on hisway back to England from Moscowafter seeing the gentleman he de-scribed as the "Old Bear." Havingspent the night in Monty's caravan,the next day, 20 August, he touredthe battlefield. It was with greatpride that I squeezed myself into thecut-down station wagon in which hewas travelling with several senior of-ficers, and showed him the 22dArmored Brigade concealed in theirdefensive positions which wse had oc-cupied as a rehearsal that morning.Ten days later the battle was foughtover the very ground on which theplan was described to him, andwhich he remembered in some detailwhen I saw him again in Tripoli, 5

months later.The day after Winston's visit we

had a "telephone battle" organizedby Gen Horrocks and based onMonty's conception of the lines thebattle would take. A "telephonebattle" is the same thing as anAmerican CPX. Information mapswere kept and, in accordance withthe ncormal custom of those days,the enemy movements and positionswere shown in blue and our ownmovements and positions in red. Itmay be thought that this telephonebattle has not much bearing on astudy of the actual battle, but sufficeto say that on the day of the battleitself, the blue lines of the enemy'smovements-as put on the maps dur-ing the exercise-required little ad-teration to conform to fact. Thetiming was different, but the generalidea was there.

It must be explained that all thistime 22d Armd Brigade was in whatwas called "leager areas" some one totwo miles south of the selected de-fensive positions. Vehicles were in"air dispersion" and covering a widearea. Time was spent in improvingthe defensive positions by hand-digging, bulldozers and maintainingtanks and guns.

Meanwhile, in order to strengthenthe armored situation, every effortwas being made by the higher com-mand to get forward the 10th ArmdDiv under Gen Gatehouse, with 8thArmd Brigade which was being re-equipped with 3 regiments of newor reconditioned Grant tanks. 10thArmd Div Headquarters arrived inthe Alam Halfa area on about 27August and 22d Armd Brigade wasput under its command. Advanceparties of 8th Armd Brigade arrivedon 29 August, but main bodies ofthis brigade didn't arrive until 30August.

At this time the positions ofEighth Army were as shown insketch map No. 1. At the southernend of our line the 7th Armd Div,consisting of the 4th Light ArmdBrigade and the 7th Motor Brigadeheld the line of the minefield fromthe left of the 3d New Zealand Divto the southern edge of Deir el Mun-assib with 7th Mot Brigade. Theyguarded the remainder of the mine-field and the open flank back as faras Himeimat with 4th Light ArmdBrigade. This part of the front was

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therefore rather lightly held.Rommel's attack was expected any

night towards the end of the month.In the 22d Armd Brigade, elaboratepreparations were made for alertingthe Brigade and moving to our de-fensive positions during the night in"wireless silence."

On 30 August I was personallynot feeling my best; nothing serious,but just the effects of heat, sand andflies on top of the long summer bat-tles and being slightly wounded dur-ing June. Being anxious to be as.fresh as possible, I had got up aspare ambulance truck which couldbe made fly-proof and was a littlecooler than a bivouac tent. I had anap after lunch and went to bedearly. Shortly after midnight I wasawakened by gunfire in the distance.and it was quite clearly more thansome little affair.The Attack Comes

I look outside and the sky is litup by flashes, so I get up and strollover to my ACV (Armored Com-mand Vehicle) to find that the staffhave not, as yet, had any reports;I go out into the cool night airagain. To the northwest the shellingseems to be dying down a bit, butin the southwest the noise continues,German Verey lights lob forwardand an occasional tracer tears acrossthe sky. I am called into the ACVand find that ii formation has comethrough. It seems that there is avery determined attack against 7thMot Brigade towards the south ofthe minefields and we are ordered toour defensive position-to be readythere by 0400 hours.

The code word is sent round theunits, the move to start at 0130 hours-it is now 0100 hours. Bivouacs are

Montgomery, with Gatehouse (L) andRoberts (R) compares the new Germanlong 75mm with other tank ammunition

Roberts

pulled down, signallers roll in thecable, and navigator's tank movesinto position. At the appointedtime we move off and since we arein "wireless silence" I can only hopethat all the units are moving too.

As dawn breaks and we are allin our defensive positions, the tacti-cal situation becomes a little clearer.It appears that there had been asmall attack in the north which hasbeen completely held; fighting is stillgoing on in the center, but the situa-tion seems in hand; in the south,however, on the front of 7th MotorBrigade the Germans appear to bepenetrating our minefields in spiteof heavy casualties. It is quite clearthat our part in the battle is somehours away, so we all get down tobreakfast.

The morning is an anxious periodof waiting; there are two Stuka divebombing attacks, a fairly heavy oneon the Alam Halfa ridge itself anda lesser one on the 1 RTR-the lat-ter with no casualties. It does notseem that our defensive position hasbeen located.

About 1100 hours it is clear thatstrong enemy tank columns havepenetrated our minefields in thesouth. The 4th Light Armd Brigadeis withdrawing; it is not clear what7th Motor Brigade is doing.

As the morning wears on, the bluemarks on our maps indicating enemypositions, continue to move east-

Wide World

In the morning the Stukas attackAlam Halfa ridge

wards. What was 40 tanks movingnorth has become 90 tanks movingeast; there are 3,500 mechanizedtransports and guns reported; an-other 50 tanks are joining thosemoving east. This is quite obviouslya large-scale affair. In the earlyafternoon I feel the need of my owndirect information so I order outtwo of the light squadrons to go upto 5 miles south and southwest ofour positions and, without gettinginvolved, to report on any enemymovement. At about 1530 hours re-ports from the right of the twosquadrons begin to come in"Strong force of enemy tanks movingnortheast. Head of colum at figuresso-and-so." A little later "Columnconsists of 180 enemy tanks. Direc-

Sketch Map No. 1 -- deployment of the Eighth Army at the time of the attack

tion the same." They are comingstraight toward us. And then atthat moment there is another Stukaattack and this time on 4 CLY.There do not seem to be any casual-ties, but has the enemy become awareof our complete position?

Now I can see the enemy myselfthrough my glasses. They are comingstraight up the line of the telegraphposts which lead in front of ourposition. There is some firing bytheir leading tanks, presumably atour light squadrons, so I instructthese squadrons to come back but totake it wide so as not to give ourposition away.

On they come, a most impressivearray. And now they are swingingeast and look like passing us about1,200 yards from our more forwardpositions. I had given strict instruc-tions that we would not open fireuntil the enemy tanks were at under1,000 yards range. Here was some-thing of a dilemma. All our infor-mation has been passed back to Divi-sional Headquarters and I believethat at this time Gen Gatehouse iswith Gen Horrocks on Alam Halfaitself and a bit further east than weare; it seems that he can see thismass of enemy tanks about to passour position, at any rate at that mo-ment he speaks to me personally onthe wireless as follows, "I don't wantyou to think that we are in a bluefunk here or anything like that, butif these fellows continue on as theyare doing you will have to come outand hit them in the flank."

I immediately give orders for 4CLY and 5 RTR to be prepared tomove out of their defensive posi-tions, but no sooner have I done sothan the leading German tanks halt.(position of head marked "A" onsketch map No. 2.) so I cancel theorder at once. It is fascinating towatch them, as one might watch asnake curl up ready to strike. Butthere is something unusual too; someof the leading tanks are Mk IVs, andMk IVs have, in the past, always hadshort barrelled 75 mm guns used forclose support work and firing HEonly, consequently they are notusually in front. But these Mk IVshave a very long gun on them; infact it looks the devil of a gun. Thismust be the long-barrelled stepped-up 75 mm the Intelligence peoplehave been talking about.

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And now they all turn left andface us and begin to advance slowly.The greatest concentration seems tobe opposite the CLY and the ATguns of the Rifle Brigade. (Eighty-seven German tanks were countedat this time opposite this part of thefront.) I warn all units over the airnot to fire until the enemy are with-in 1,000 yards; it can't be long nowand then in a few seconds the tanksof the CLY open fire and the battleis on. Once one is in the middle ofa battle, time is difficult to judge,but it seems only a few minutes be-fore nearly all the tanks of the Grantsquadron of the CLY were on fire.The new German 75 mm is taking aheavy toll. The enemy tanks havehalted and they have had their owncasualties, but the situation is seri-ous; there is a complete hole in ourdefense. I hurriedly warn the Greysthat they must move at all speedfrom their defensive positions andplug the gap. Meanwhile the enemytanks are edging forward again andthey have got close to the Rifle Bri-gade's AT guns, who have held theirfire marvellously to a few hundredyards. When they open up they in-flict heavy casualties on the enemy,but through sheer weight of num-bers some guns are overrun. TheSOS artillery fire is called for; itcomes down almost at once right ontop of the enemy tanks. This, to-gether with the casualties they havereceived, checks them. But whereare the Greys? "Come on the Greys"I shout over the wireless "Get outyour whips." But there is no sign ofthem at the moment coming over theridge and there is at least anotherhalf hour's daylight left.

Meanwhile some of the enemyhave started to work round our leftflank and the 5th RTR is in action.Although 1st RTR is not engaged,I dare not move them from theirposition because there seem to be anumber of German tanks still in re-serve in the rear who could movetheir way.

And now in the center the enemyis edging forward again. The artil-lery is the only thing I have avail-able to stop them so we bring downall we can and again they are halted.And then the Greys come over thecrest from the north; they have notreally been long but it has seemed anage. I describe the situation to them

Sketch Map No. 2 -positions of 22d Armd Brigade on Alam Halfa ridge atapproximately 1700 hours 31 August

over the air as they come in sightof the battlefield and charge downthe hill; they are quite clear of thehole they have to plug and they gostraight in. The light is beginningto fade and the situation in the cen-ter seems to be stabilized. But thereis a little trouble on our left; someof the enemy have worked roundthe 5th Tanks position and are nowcoming on to our 25 pdr gun lines;a glance at sketch map No. 3 will

show that they had not got muchfurther to go before they meet noth-ing. Accordingly, since the center isnow a little congested with the Greysin most of the CLY's position I orderthe CLY (what remained of them)to move round to the left and coverthe gap between 5th RTR and the44th Division's defenses. As darknessfalls, flashes and tracer are to be seenon the left flank; the CLY have metthe enemy tanks but have halted

Sketch Map No. 3- the situation at approximately 2030 hours 31 August

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Wide World

Co-ordination of the air and ground effort -indispensable key to final success

them, so we seem secure for thenight at any rate.

Meanwhile, in the center of theArmy front the enemy has beendriven off the Ruweisat Ridge by astrong counterattack and have notreturned to the offensive. In thesouth the 4th Light Armd Brigadehas withdrawn to the area of Gaballaand the 7th Motor Brigade has with-drawn due east across the front of22d Armd Brigade, but some 5 milesto the south. Both these Brigadeswere to do some fine harassing workon the flanks of the enemy on thefollowing day.

It was hardly dark before the firstnight-bomber passes over our headsand drops a flare on the large con-centration of enemy vehicles gath-ered on the open plain below us.Bombs soon follow the flares, andthroughout the night an almost con-tinous stream of bombers keep upthis not very concentrated, butsteady and relentless attack. Thiswas the start of continous day andnight bombing which was a very im-portant factor in our success.

Within 22d Armd Brigade, as soonas it is dark, patrols from the riflecompanies of the Rifle Brigade areorganized to go out with parties ofengineers and further immobilizedamaged enemy tanks to preventtheir recovery by the enemy. Person-ally, while ammunition and fitters'lorries came up to arm and attendto the tanks and while I await re-ports of casualties to men and vehi-cles, I order up my small mess truckand have dinner. It all seems sudden-ly quite peaceful; my Brigade Sec-ond-in-Command, Col Roddick, andI sit at our table under the stars andforget the taste of bully stew and thestress of battle with excellent brandyand cigars recently brought up fromthe flesh-pots of Alexandria.

Inevitably we discuss the events of

the day. Things are not too bad; theGermans have not been so thrustfulas they were earlier in the summer,if they had been they would havetaken advantage of that gap in thecenter when one squadron of theCLY had been "brewed-up." Andthen they were slow finding ourflanks. Of course it is obivous thatneither side is as fresh as it had beenin May when the Germans had at-tacked the Gazala line; and it is easyto say what the attacking side shouldhave done when one knows all thedetails of the defense. But we arenot seeking excuses for failures-weare just considering the facts. Evenin a tank it is no fun coming underconcentrated artillery fire, but, par-ticularly when that fire is mainly of25 pdr caliber, that should not halta tank attack. On two occasions ithad halted an attack on this day.Obviously the enemy's morale is notas high as it had been a few monthsago. And at the very moment weare discussing these matters morebombers are going over us and moreflares and bombs are being droppedon their tank formations and supplyechelons. A comparatively sleeplessnight will not improve their moralefor the morrow, and besides, the 8thArmd Brigade is likely to come intoaction the next day; our left flankwill be more secure. Of course thereare still elements of anxiety; will theirlong-barrelled 75 mm guns decimateanother squadron? Will they pressround our right flank which hasbeen weakened by the move of theGreys? But in spite of these disquiet-ing thoughts we feel that we haveheld them on the first and most im-portant day; that we can do it again,particularly as more reinforcementsare available.

As the brandy is finished andcigars burn low, reports from theunits begin to come in. Taking the

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Brigade as a whole, casualties havenot been high. In tanks, and I mustmake it clear that I am referringto Grant tanks only, the figure seemsto be about 20; 4 CLY had 12, 5RTR 1 and the Greys 4. Seventeenout of a Brigade strength of 87. Ofthe AT guns, the Rifle Brigade hashad one section overrun and somemen have been taken prisoner; butthe remainder claim heavy enemycasualties. One gun alone claims 5enemy tanks, and the total for thisAT platoon is thought to be 19.The armored regiments have theirclaims too, though their figures areless certain. A fair and conservativeestimate for enemy tank casualtiesseems to be at least 30. Of course,in such circumstances, one wouldexpect the attacker to have highercasualties than the defender.

The night is uneventful; thebombing of the enemy continuesand more locally there are smallclashes between our patrols and theGerman tank recovery parties. (I re-gret to say that a few enemy tankswere recovered from under our verynoses. The Germans were alwaysgood at recovery and showed greatenterprise. On the other hand, a greatmany more were permanently de-stroyed by our demolition parties.)

As dawn breaks on 1 Septemberwe strain our eyes through ourbinoculars to discover how the ene-my's dispositons have changed dur-ing the night. Not much change isevident, though it seems that theenemy's forces are spread out rathermore widely and further to the eastthan had been the case the previousevening. Nothing particular hap-

Pilots of the RAF - they dominate thebattlefield and leave the enemy helpless

Wide World

Dawn 1 September- we seek to discover changes in the enemy's dispositions

pens at "first light" and there is cer-tainly no determined early attack.However, it is not long before amove seems to be made towards 5thRTR's position and the CLY on theleft are also in action. Some enemymovement is seen towards the eastand not long afterwards we hear thatthe 8th Armd Brigade is in action.We learn afterwards that they havehad a considerable battle with casu-alties on both sides, but the enemy'sthe heavier. Our own positions, in-cluding my own Tac Headquarters,are subjected to a certain amount ofshelling. During the morning, theCorps Commander, Gen Horrocks,visits me and his arrival coincideswith particularly concentrated gun-fire. He and I share the safety of theinside of my tank but my less fortu-nate artillery commander, who hasto remain outside, is heard to com-plain that we are being shelled by25 pdrs; his Second-in-Command,who is with him, mitigates the in-sult, however, by scornfully remark-ing that it is "only a 3-gun troop."(It must be explained that certain ofour 25 pdr guns had been capturedduring the retreat to Alamein andthat a troop normally consists of 4guns.) We are, of course, in fullview of the enemy and there is nodoubt that Gen Horrocks' arrivaland the gathering of one or twonearby officers who want to hear thelatest news are responsible for thisspecial attention by the enemy; nev-ertheless it is well worth it, as isalways a visit by Gen Horrocks. Hehas that wonderful knack of in-spiring confidence and enthusiasmwherever he goes, and the raised

morale he leaves behind quicklyspreads to those he has not evenseen. He tells us that the battle isgoing well; Monty has the wholething in hand and everything is go-ing exactly according to plan; the8th Armd Brigade is now up at moreor less full strength and the 4thLight Armd Brigade is having a ter-rific time on the enemy's southernflank and doing great damage. I tellhim that, as I had reported to myDivisional Commander, I am a littleconcerned about my right flank.

In the afternoon some pressure is,in fact, exerted against our rightflank and it looks as if an outflank-

ing movement might develop there.Having nothing else available I or-der the light squadron of 1 RTR totake up positions west of the 1 RTRposition and facing south, and shouldthe enemy advance in that directionto delay them as much as possible.Meanwhile, Gen Gatehouse informsme that the 23d Armd Brigade willbe moved over from the coastal sec-tor and protect my right flank from aposition on the high ground aroundDeir el Hima. This is good news.

As it happens, however, the attackin this area is not pressed home withmuch determination. 1 RTR are en-gaged from their main position andtheir light squadron engages theenemy further west. This was suffi-cient to stop him and though 23dArmd Brigade reached their newposition during the late afternoon,I do not believe they were calledupon to fire a shot.

The day gradually draws to a closeand there is no "last light" deter-mined attack by the enemy. In facton the whole of our front the enemyhas withdrawn out of tank rangeand the last shots that are fired areby the artillery.

Patrols during the night are againorganized but no contact is made.The battle of Alam Halfa, as far as22d Armd Brigade is concerned isvirtually over.

In the morning enemy artillery bombards our positions...

... we are beina shelled by the Germans usina our own 25 pounders