-
7/29/2019 A 348618
1/20
NAVALW ARCOLLEGE Newport,.I .ANANALYSTSOFT
HEOPERATIONALLEADERSHIP
OFGENERALHEINZGUDERIAN
by
JohnW.MengelLCDR US N
ApapersubmittedtotheFacultyoftheNavalW ar Collegein
partialsatisfactionof therequirementsof
theDepartmentofJointMilitaryOperations.T he contentsof
thispaperreflectmyownpersonalviewsan darenotnecessarily endorsedth
e NavalW ar Collegeor theDepartmentofthe Navy.
Signature:J, .1 3February1998
. DtoMbottonnlimited ColonelWilliamP.Goodwin,U SA
FacultyAdvisor
OTIC QUALITY DraPECTED
X
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
2/20
UnclassifiedSecurityClassificationThisPageREPORTDOCUMENTATIONPAGE1
.Report.SecurityClassification:UNCLASSIFIED2
.SecurityClassificationAuthority:3
.Declassification/DowngradingSchedule:4
.Distribution/AvailabilityofReport: DISTRIBUTIONSTATEMENTA:
APPROVEDFOR
PUBLICRELEASE;DISTRIBUTIONISUNLIMITED.5
.NameofPerformingOrganization:
JOINTMILITARYOPERATIONSDEPARTMENT6 .OfficeSymbol: 7
.Address:NAVALWARCOLLEGE
- -. ' 6 8 6CUSHINGROAD'NEWPORT,RI 02841-1207
8 .Title( i n c l u d e Securityc l a s s i f i c a t i o n ) :
AnAnalysisoftheOperationalLeadershipofGeneralHeinzGuderian. ( U
)
9 .PersonalAuthors: JohnW.Mengel,LCDR,USN10.TypeofReport: FINAL
11.DateofReport: 13Feb199?12.PageCount:1913. SupplementaryNotation:
Apaper submitted to the Facultyf the N W C inpartialsatisfaction of
the requirements of the J M ODepartment. T he contents of this
paperreflect my ow npersonal views and are not necessarily
endorsedbyhe N W C or theDepartment of theNavy.14. Teneywords that
relate toouraper: Guderian, operational leadership, operational
art,blitzkrieg, armor, mechanizedwarfare, character, will,
intellect, risk.15. Abstract: This paper is ahistorical analysis
ofGeneral HeinzGuderian's operational leadership.These elements are
operational thinking, executionf operations, and the operational
leader'scharacter. Guderian's development of
combinedmechanizedwarfare (blitzkrieg), andhis leadershipstyle in
campaigns against PolandndFrance are discussed.1 6.Distribution
/Availability ofAbstract:
Unclassified Same As Rpt DTIC Users
17.Abstract SecurityClassification: UNCLASSIFIED 18.Name of
Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT19.Telephone: 841-6461 20.Office Symbol:
SecurityClassification of This PageUnclassified
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
3/20
PREFACE .Operationalar tisavitallinkbetweenthenationalan
dtheaterstrategicobjective
an
dtacticalcombat.tdealschieflywiththetheoryandpracticeofplanning,reparing,conductingan
dsustainingmajoroperationsan dcampaigns.he
veryessenceofoperationalar tistowin
decisively~achievingthestrategicaim, hileavoidingacostlyattrition
war.1
Impliedin thisdefinitionistheimportanceoftheroleof
thecommander,oritcanbearguedthatthemostcriticalelementofoperationalar
tdealswithoperational leadership. T he
operationalcommanderisresponsible fo
rdevelopinganoperationalvisionthatwillachievethestrategicaim.nshort,perationalar
tchallengesthecommandertoconsidertheendshemustachieve,he
waystoachievethoseends,nd how tousethemeansavailabletohim.
W hyaresomecommanderssuccessfulin
thischallengewhileothersarenot?sthestudyofperationalleadershipevenworthwhile,iven
themyriadofintangible
factorsinvolved?heanswerisyes;hestudyofgreatleaderscanilluminatethequalitiesthatcontributetomilitaryvictory.
Althoughstudyinggreatleaderswilluncoveradiversityofcharacteristicsandmethods,he
thesisof thispaperisthatthereisanidentifiable se
tofpersonalleadershipqualitiesthatsuccessfuloperationalcommanderspossessincommon.hesequalitiesmay
bebroadlygroupedasoperationalthinking,executionoftheoperationalplan,nd
theintangiblecharactertraitsofthecommander.1MilanVego,OnOperationalArt(Draft)",npublishedmaterialin
NW C1 0 3 5forT he UnitedStatesNavalW
arCollege,Newport,I,eptember1997 ,.2Ibid..8.
3MilanN.Vego,OperationalLeadership,"npublishedmaterialinNW C4107Afo
rT he UnitedStatesNavalW ar College,Newport,I,eptember1996,.
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
4/20
Thispaperwillattempttoidentifytheessentialqualitiesofperationalleadershipby
analyzingthestyleandmethodsofGeneralHeinzGuderian.THEORETI CA LFRA
MEWORK.
T heoperationalleadermusthavetheraregiftof thinkingbroadlyan
dunderstandinghow
eachactionfitsintotheoveralldesignsoastoaccomplishstrategicor
operationalgoals.
ccuratelyanalyzingcurrenteventscombinedwithanticipatingfutureeventsisvitaltosuccessinanymajoroperationorcampaign.
Utilizingoperationalthinking,
leadercandevelopoperationalvision-anabilitytounderstandho w
operational-levelactivitiesfitintothelarger,trategicpicture.
Itisthroughthecommander'soperationalthinkingthattheappropriateoperationaldesignisproduced.histhinkingisfocusedon
operationalobjectives,centersofgravity,riticalvulnerabilities,ulminatingpoints,ecisivepoints,nd
thelinesofperation.he
successfulcommanderisalsoabletoformulateavisionoftheen dstate.
fterconceptualizingtheendstate,emustprovidehisorganizationwithaclearsenseofdirection,ndinspirehissubordinatestostrivetoreachthatgoal.tiscriticalthattheoperationalcommanderimparttohissubordinateshispersonal"roadmap"tovictory.
emustalsoprovidethewaysandmeansforachievingvictory.5naddition,thecommandermustestablishacommandan
dcontrolorganizationthatprovidesfo
rsimplicity,larity,nityofcommand,nddelegation
ofauthoritytopermitdecentralizedexecution.
4Ibid...5Ibjd.,.
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
5/20
Duringth eexecutionofamajoroperationorcampaign,he
operationalcommandermustbeabletoreadeventsastheyunfoldon
thebattlefield. isskillin
doingthisaffectsthedecisionshemakesand,hus,nfluencestheoverallaccomplishmentof
theoperation.hisskillalsoallowsthecommandertomaintain th
einitiativean dprovideshim an
opportunitytorespondquickly,ndflexiblyothefluidnatureofth
ebattlefield.heoperationalcommandermustcontinuallyassessthebattlefieldinordertoestablishcoursesofactionthatshapehisareaofoperationsto
ensurereachingtheobjective.he commandermay
influencetheoutcomebycommitmentofoperationalreserves,btainingadditionalforces,hangingthepriority
ofeffort,nd acceptingrisktoensuresufficientstrengthat
thedecisivepoint.
Ultimately,heoperationalcommander'scharacterdriveshisoperationalthinkingan
dexecution.haracterisshapedby personality traits. successful
operationalcommanderexhibitsessentialtraitssuchasintelligence,mentaltoughness,boldness,moralan
dphysicalcourage,elf-confidence,ompassion,andor,ndimagination. A
willingnesstoassumeresponsibilityan
dtakerisksarealsocriticalcharactertraitsfo r
thesuccessfulcommander. einzGuderianexhibited thesetraitsan
dthatiswhatmadehim asuccessfulmilitaryinnovatoran
dfieldcommander.Before
exploringGuderian'sleadershipstyle,isinnovative
theoriesofmechanized warfare,an
dhissuccessfulexecutionofthesetheoriesinbattle,
lookathisbackgroundisin
ordertohelpunderstandwhatshapedhisleadershipqualities.
6JrgenJ.Gwin, "A
nAnalysisofOperationalLeadership:ieldMarshalErichVonManstein,"(Unpublished
ResearchPaper, .S .NavalW arCollege,Newport,I:ebruary1995)
,.7Vego,OperationalLeadership,".
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
6/20
GUDERIAN'SUPBRINGINGANDDUCATION.Borntheso
nofaninfantryofficerinEastPrussiain888,uderianlater
attendedboththeKarlsruhecadetschoolandtheGross-LichterfeldeinBerlin.he
standardsoftheseinstitutionswerehighandthecurriculum
washeavyinitsemphasison math,istoryan dmodernlanguages.he
latterwasparticularly
significantinthefuturedevelopmentofGuderian'sthought.
isexcellentEnglishandFrenchskillsallowedhim toreadan
danalyzemuchofthemilitaryliteratureinEuropeasanadult.8Moreover,twasatth
ecadetschoolsthatGuderianwasschooledinthePrussianmethodofinculcatingitsstudentswithathirstfo
rknowledgean dthementaltoolsfo
rcriticalthinking.ManyviewedPrussianmilitarytrainingasstrictandunbending.9
nthecontrary,he Prussianswereno tinterestedincreating"robots."10he
systemtaughttheyoungcadettoacknowledgeauthority,utitalsoencouragedthediscourseofdiffering
ideasan dopinions.ro m thisexposure,
uderiandevelopedaflexibilityofthoughtan dahealthyskepticism of
theestablishedsystemofmilitarythought.hesetraitscarried
Guderianintoadulthoodan dhelpedtoshapehiscareer.
GUDERIAN'STRAININGANDEXPERIENCE .Guderianwascommissioned
in1907andreportedtoaninfantrybattalion in
Lorrainewherehisfatherwas thebattalion
commander.uringtheFirstWorldW arhe
servedasasignalsofficerinacavalryunit.hisexperienceleftGuderianwithtw
oo HeinzGuderian,chtung-PanzerlLondon: rm san dArmourPress,
1992),.9KennethMacksey, uderian:reatoroftheBlitzkriegLondon:teinan
dDay Press,975),.Guderian,Achtung-Panzer!..
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
7/20
distinctimpressions.irst,ebecamefamiliar withtheadvantagesan
ddisadvantagesofoperatingwith mountedtroops,
hichinthosedaysprovidedtheonlymobilear mofthearmy. In
particular,ewitnessedthelogisticalfeasibilityofmovinglargenumbersoftroopsthroughdifficult
terrain.econd,uderianobservedthelatestwirelessradiotechnology an
dgainedan accurateunderstanding
ofitstacticalapplications.This'.'.experienceconvincedhim that
ifhighmobility,ong-rangeoperationsweretobewell-coordinated,adiocommunicationsha
dtobeaccuratean
dreachdowntothelowestpossiblelevel(e.g.,ndividualtank,APC,eep).12
Byinter-warstandards,he
progressofGuderian'scareerwasaverageuntiltheriseofHitler.hereafter,Guderian'scareertookoff.Whilehisearlypromotionpacewasordinary,Guderian'scareer
wasunusualinthediversityofassignmentsthatgavehim abroadexperience.
Guderiansuccessfullyservedasasignalsstaffofficer,GeneralStaffofficer,attalioncommander,uartermaster,ntelligenceofficer,ndoperationsofficer
with unitsfrom thecompanytothecorpslevels.
HeinzGuderian'sassignment totheDepartment
ofTruppenamt(MotorTransport)turnedou ttobe on
eoftheironictwistsofhiscareer.uderian
triedtoavoidtheassignment,laiminghe knewnothingaboutmotor
transport.twas,owever,duringthetw
oyearsspentinthisssignment,nvestigating
troopmovementsbytruck,thatGuderianconcludedthattheconceptofmotorizedcombatoperationswasno
tonlyvalid,utessentialtothefutureof theGermanarmy.eforesaw
thatinfantryattackson 1 1F.W.vo nMellenthin, ermanGeneralsofWorldW
arIINorman: niversityofOklahomaPress,1977),6. 1 2Macksey,0.13
GeorgeA.Higgins,T he
OperationalTenetsofGeneralsHeinzGuderianandGeorgeS.Patton,r."(FortLeavenworth:AM
SMonograph,985),3 .
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
8/20
footan dmassformationswereobsolete.Mobilitywasthekey
toavoidingtheattrition-stylewarfarethatcharacterizedtheFirstWorldWar.nfantrymountedintrucks,however,
asnotsufficient.uderianenvisioned thattheinfantryneededtobe
combinedinfullymotorizedformationsoftanks,rtilleryan
dcombatengineers.
Guderiandevelopedafascinationwithtanks,lthoughhehadnoinvolvement
withthemintheFirstWorldWar.ofilltheexperiencegap,ereadtheavailableliteratureonmotorizedwarfare,ncludingarticlesby
J.F.C.Fuller,iddellHart,GiffordMartel,nd
CharlesdeGaulle.naddition,estudiedcarefullytheBritishemploymentoftanksattheBattleofCambraiin
November1917 .etween1924an d1 9 3 0 ,
uderianwentfromstudenttoinstructor.ecauseofhisgrowingreputation,ewasinvitedtolectureon
armoredan dmotorizedwarfareattheBerlinW ar
Academy.ealsobegantocontributemanyarticlestothemilitarypress.
In retrospect,Guderian'sassignmenttotheTruppenamthelpedhim intw
oways.First,trequiredhimtounderstandthehistoricalan
dcontemporaryuseofarmoredan dmotorizedforces,herebymakinghim
theGermanarmy'sdefactoexperton thesubject.Second,eachingan
dwritinglayedanimportantroleinGuderian'sconception,development,nddisseminationofarmoredan
dmotorizedwarfaredoctrineforafuturewar. Itisironicthatby theen
dofthe1920 ' sGuderianwasofficiallyacknowledgedasaleadingexperton
tanktacticsan dhe ha dye ttosetfootinatank.
AlthoughGermanylackedtanks,
uderianrecognizedthatforeigndevelopmentsintanktechnologyprovedthattankspossessed
thespeedan drangetobeconsiderednot
1 4Ibid..8.1
5HeinzGuderian,anzerLeaderLondon:MichaelJoseph,Ltd,952),2-24.
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
9/20
onlyof
tactical,utpotentiallyofoperational,ignificance.Guderian'soperationaldoctrinecalledfo
rthecreationofacombinedarmsorganizationwithth
etankasthecenterpiece.talsocalledfo
rclosecooperationwiththeairforce.uderianwas convincedthattankson
theirown,rmerelyinconjunctionwithinfantry,
ouldneverachievetacticaloroperationalsuccess.uderianstressedtheneedfo
requalmobilityamongthevariousarms.
Guderianconceivedofane w relationshipamongthevariousarmson
thebattlefield.
eopposedtheparcelingoutoftankstoinfantrydivisions.ebelievedthatarmorunitsshouldbe
thecenterpiecearoundwhichcombinedarmsorganizationsshould
bebuilt.uderiancametoth econclusionthattanks,ntegratedin mechanized
formationswithinfantry,rtilleryan dengineersin"properproportion"an
dusedtogetherfo
rconcentratedblows,woulddeterminethecourseofamajoroperationor
acampaign.
Herecognizedthatmobileoperationsinvolvingattackstooperationaldepthswouldrequireagreatdealofcombatpowerconsistingofdivisionswhichcouldcomplementeachother:anzerdivisionsfo
r penetrationsanddeepthrusts,nd motorized divisionsfo
rflanksecurity,oldingterrain,ndprovidingdepth.17hiswas
Guderian'scrucialinsightan dheclaimstohavemadeitbytheearly1930 ' s
.18
ManyconservativeofficersremainedskepticalofGuderian'smessage.
Tosomehewasaradical.Withcredittohisforesightandpersistence,Guderian'sinnovativeideasgainedagreatdealofacceptanceby
theoutbreakof theSecondWorldWar. et
HeinzGuderian,chtunq-Panzer! .0. "Higgins,3
.HeinzGuderian,anzerLeader.4.
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
10/20
thePanzerforcesheadvocatednevergainedanoverwhelming priority.
uderianwas forcedtofightcontinuallyfo
rresourceswiththeothercombatarms.uderianwrotehisfamous Achtung-
Panzer!,utlininghisvisionftankemployment,nordertogainthewidestpublicityandresourcesforthecauseofthepanzerdivisions.Thebookassertedthatonlyby
theintelligentus eofarmoredformationscouldGermanyachieveswiftan
ddecisivevictoriesinfuturewars.
In February1 9 3 8 ,
itlerappointedGuderiantocommandtheworld'sfirstarmoredcorps.ittingly,sthecreatorofGermany'sarmoredforces,ewasselected
overseveralofficerssenior tohim.he
invasionofPolandprovidedGuderianthefirstopportunitytodemonstratetheeffectivenessofhisconceptsinbattle.POLISHCAMPAIGN
:
DuringthePolishcampaign, uderianwasgivena
rareopportunity-namely,otesthisconceptsinbattle.ha
tthePolishcampaignendedsoquicklyowedmuchtothestartlingsuccessoftheblitzkriegconceptsthatGuderianadvocated.he
essenceofblitzkriegwasthesynergismbetweensurprise,peedandconcentration.urprisefacilitatedspeed;peedfosteredsurprise;oncentrationenhancedboth.
SurprisewasachievedbyHitler'snegotiatinguntilthelastmoment,nd
thenattackingwithoutwarningan dwithoverwhelmingstrength.heWehrmacht
's combinedarmsoffensiveachievedexactlywhatGuderianhad foreseen. T
he deeppenetrationinto
thePolishrearareasbythepanzerdivisionsattheSchwerpunkt(thedecisivepoint),
19Ibid..03 .
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
11/20
togetherwiththeLuftwaffe'seliminationof
thePolishairforce,roughtabouttheverybattleofparalysisandannihilation
thatGuderianadvocated.
Guderian'sow nXIX Corps, hichcontainedon epanzerandtw omotorized
infantrydivisions,layedanimportantrolein
theoverwhelmingdefeatofPoland.tadvancedin thenorthfrom
PomeraniatotheVistulariverandcu toffenemyforcesin
thePolishcorridor.uderian,everon etoleadfrombehind,uthimselfinan
armored commandvehicleandaccompanied
theleadingpanzerformations.hisenabledhim to
maintaincontactwithhisorpsheadquartersan
dwithhissubordinatecommanders.Guderianwasawarethat,inceNapoleonan d
theadventof largearmies,he tendencywasfo
rcommanderstoleadfromtherear.hereasoningwasthatfromthisvantagepointthecommandercouldsurveytheentirebattlefield.n
thisnew ag eoffast,eep-penetratingmobilewarfare,owever,
uderianpromotedtheidea thatcommandersmustaccompanytheleadelementsof
theblitz.uderian wroteafter thewar
thatacommandershouldbelocatedwherehecouldpersonallyseewhatwasgoingon
andreceivedirectlyth ereportsofhisreconnaissanceunits.ro m
thisvantagepoint,ewas abletomakedecisionsan dgiveordersrapidly.T he
commandermustalwaysbeinfrontofhismen,therwisehelosesallpossibilityof
leadership.hesoldierwantstobeabletoseehisgeneralhimself."
In ordertoensurethatlateralandrearwardcommunicationsan
dliaisonsweremaintained,nd
thathisordersweretransmittedtoallconcerned,ereorganizedhisstaff.uderianseparatedhisstaff
intoaforwardechelon,whichaccompaniedthe20
HeinzGuderian,ArmoredWarfare:onsiderationsof th
ePastandFuture,"ArmoredCavalryJournal.January-February1949,.
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
12/20
commander,ndarearechelon,or
thetransmissionofordersandmessagestotheflanksan
dtotherear.uderiankepttheforwardorcommandstaffechelonsmallan
dmobilesothatitcouldmaintainitselfon
thebattlefield.oaccomplishthis,uderian was on
eofthefirsttomounthiscommandstaffinarmoredvehicles,quippingthem
withth elatestradiosan
dencryptiondevices.ealsodevelopeda"commandlanguage"fo
rarmoredunitstoensurebrevityandclarityfo rpassingorders.2
1Guderian'stimeasasignalsofficergavehim
theseinsights.uderiancreatedno tonlyanew
combatarm,butalsocapitalizedon new
technologies.eprovedhewasnotonlyatheorist,utapracticalofficerhighlyversedinallaspectsofactivesoldieringaswell.
In
thePolishCampaign,uderiandemonstratedthepotentialadvantageoftankforces.uderianconcentratedhisarmorupfronttoachievepenetration
attheSchwerpunkt.hisnsuredthatthearmorwouldbeinapositiontoraceintotheoperationaldepthsofthedefendingenemy.uderianrecountsthatby4September1
9 3 9hisXIX
CorpshadpushedacrossthePolishCorridortotheVistulaRiverandhad
totallydestroyedtw otothreePolishinfantrydivisionsandon
ecavalrybrigade,apturing
thousandsofprisonersandhundredsofguns.22hisfactsupportstheclaimthatthepayofffo
rreachingoperationaldepthsquicklycanbesignificant.perationalsuccessismeasuredbytheresultingoperationalorstrategiceffects.nthePolishCampaign,Guderian'soperationsplayedadecisivepartinachievingtheGermanstrategicgoalofthecollapseof
thePolisharmedresistanceandthesurrenderof thePolisharmedforces.
2 1bid.,..22Guderian,anzerLeader .3 .1 0
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
13/20
Therewerefurtherorganizationalan
dtacticalchangesaffectingtheconductoffuturebattles.nparticular,uderianadvocatedthatcommandersleadthebattlefrom
thefront.oaccomplish this,
uderianinsistedthatunitsbeprovidedwithbettercommandvehiclesan
dcommunicationsystems.loseairsupportfo
rtheleadingtroopswasalsostudiedingreaterdetail;mprovedintegrationevolved.
T heGermansidentifiedan
dcorrectedotherdeficienciesastheyreadiedthemselvesforaninvasionofFrance.
T HESICKLECUT:HEGERMANCAMPAIGN AGAINSTFRANCE.Followingth
edefeatofPoland, itlerdirectedtheGeneralStaff
todevelopacampaignplantodefeatFrance.he GeneralStaffsinitialplan
wasbasicallyaversionofthefailed ShlieffenPlanof1914 .tcalledfo rth
emainefforttobemadeby an envelopingattack
throughthelowlandsofBelgiumandnorthernFrance.
eneralErichvonManstein, ho
mGuderiancalled"ourfinestoperationalbrain,"btainedacopyoftheGeneralStaffsPlanGelb(Yellow)andfoundlittletoadmireaboutit.
T hestrategicobjectivewas
todefeatFrancequicklyinablitzkriegcampaignan davoidthestalemate an
dattrition warfarethatcharacterized
theFirstWorldWar.Mansteinarguedthatth
eproposedplanmightprovideoperationalsuccessbutnot
thestrategicobjective.
Mansteinproposedaradicallydifferentplan.
einsistedthatthestrengthofGermany'sforces,sdemonstratedin
thePolishCampaign,owlayin
theirmobilityandoffensivecapability.AlthoughMansteinwasno
tatankexpert,ethoughtin terms23 Le nDeighton,litzkrieg:romth
eRiseofHitlertotheFallofDunkirkLondon:onathanCape,Ltd,979),5.
1 1
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
14/20
oflongarmoredthrustswithPanzersandmechanizedorcesslicingthroughtheFrenchlinesintheArdennes.
eenvisionedthesebreakthroughsadvancingtothechannelcoast,cuttingofftheAlliedforcesinBelgiumanddestroyingthembeforetheycouldescapeacrossth
eSomme.ollowinganoperationalpause,he
remainingAlliedforcesbehindtheSommecouldbedestroyed.
T heGermanhighcommanddidno
tsupporttheMansteinplan.Mansteinthusapproachedtheonlyman
inGermanywho couldverifythefeasibilityofgettingtanksthroughth
enarrow,wistingroadsoftheArdennes;hat man
wasHeinzGuderian.24MansteinsimplyassumedthatitwaspossibletomaneuvertanksthroughtheArdennes
forest.uderianrememberedtheterrainfromtheFirstWorldW aran
dthoughtitwas possibletomovean dsupplyhisarmoredan
dmotorizedforcesthroughthishillyterrain.AlthoughthemajordesigneroftheSicklePlan,Mansteinwasrelegatedtocommanding
aninfantrycorpsduringthecampaign.he majorroleinexecutingtheplanwas
givento Guderian.
Guderianbecamealeadingadvocateofthe"SicklePlan"duringaseriesofw
ar
gamesinFebruary940.eproposedthathiscorps(XIXPanzerCorpsofArmyGroupA)crosstheMeuserivernearSedanandthendrivetoAmienson
theSommeriver,20milestothewest.eniormembersof
theGeneralStaffstronglydisagreedwithhim.TheysuggestedthatGuderian'stanksmightbeabletomakeabridgeheadovertheMeuse,utthatthearmorunitsneededtowaitfo
rtheinfantrytocatchuptomakea
24Ibid..09.
12
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
15/20
"unifiedattack."uderianviewedthisasoldthinking;perationaldesignbasedon
thesameoldtactics.
Guderian,swashistrademark,ontradictedhisseniors.
ewascertainthatwaitingfo rtheinfantryunitswould
jeopardizetheoperation.uch hesitation,eargued,wouldallow
theAlliestomassreinforcementsalongtheMeusean
dhalthisattack.Guderianha dahealthyrespectfo
rtheAlliedforces,articularlytheFrench.BecausetheAlliedforcesgreatlyoutnumbered
theGermans,uderianinsistedthatitwasessentialfo
rtheGermanstouseallof theiravailableoffensivepowerinon
esurpriseblow at theSchwerpunkt;odriveawedgesodeepan
dwideintotheenemy'srearthattheGermanforcesneedno
tworryabouttheirflanks.uderianreasoned
thathisforcescouldimmediatelyexploitanysuccesswithoutbotheringtowaitfor
theinfantry.
ThisillustratesGuderian'svisionof
thepropersequencingofoperationsfo rmechanized forces:irsttobreak
through theenemy'slines;econd,wreakinghavocin
theenemyrearcausingfearan dconfusion;nd finally,he
destructionoftheenemy'sforces.hisisatestamenttoGuderian'sinnovativevision,echnicalskill,eadership
andunderstandingofoperationaldesign.hisdesignplacedGermanstrengthagainstenemyweakness.talsoachievedoperationalsurprise.naddition,Guderian'sdecisivethrustintoth
eAlliedrearcutofftheAlliedforces,husattackingacriticalvulnerability
by cuttingoff theirlinesofcommunication.
Attackingthrough
theArdennesinvolvedgreatrisk.hissuitedGuderian'spersonalityan
dleadershipstyleperfectly.
consummaterisk-taker,ewas"toowell25Guderian,anzerLeader .0.
1 3
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
16/20
trainedan
dexpertinthehandlingofarmortobefoolhardy."26uderianprovedtohisdetractorsthathewasathisbestwhenhandlingaggressiveoperations.
Guderiancarriedthemainpartof thecampaign.
isthreepanzerdivisions, ith morethan3 00tanksapiece,rossed60
milesthroughthetough,teepterrainof theArdennesforestan
dovertheriverMeuseatSedanbeforetheAllies,ndmost"oftheGermanGeneralStaff,ealizedthathehadpulledofftheimpossible;uderiandrovehisforcesthroughthe"impassable"Ardennes.
In
hisdrivetothechannelcoast,tisaccuratetosaythatGuderianfacedasmuchoppositionfromhisow
nsuperiorsashedidfromtheAllies.WhenGuderianha dreachedth
eMeuse,heGeneralStaffwassorivetedon
whatthetacticalchallengeofcrossingtheMeusethattheylostsightoftheoverallgoal,he
Allieddefeat.27he
Germanhighcommandacceptedsecuringthebridgeheadasanen
dinitself,atherthanasameansofdestroyingth
eAlliedforces.Guderiandidno tlosefocusof thestrategicgoal,utwas
frustrated throughoutthecampaignby aseriesofhaltorders.
Guderian'sinstinctsattheMeuseallowedhim
tokeepthestrategicgoalofdefeatingtheAlliesinmind.eadvancedwithouthesitation,raggingHitleran
dtheGermanhighcommandwithhim,
hilemakinghistoryandrevolutionizingwarfarealongth
eway.uderianaccuratelysensedthatthehaltordersan dhesitanceofhis
seniorswouldpreventtheSchwerpunktforcefromreachingthechannelcoastandcausing
theoffensiveinthewesttofail.
26vo nMellenthin,0.27
R.H.S.Stolfi,Hitler'sPanzersEast:WorldWarIIReinterpretedNorman:niversityofOklahoma
Press,991 ) ,1 0. 14
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
17/20
Guderian'srelationshipwithhissuperiorsthroughout th
ewar,speciallywithHitler,
asoftencontroversial.heirdifferencescenteredon ho
woperationsshouldbe conducted.uderianretained
hisoperationalstyleofdrivinghispanzerforcesforwardin
aquickblitz.GuderianmetwithHitlercountlesstimesduringthewaran
doftencriticized Hitler'smilitaryleadership. iswillingnesstostandup
toHitlerprovoked manybitteran dviolentclashesbetweenthem.im
eandagainGuderianmusteredth ecourageto contradictan dwarnHitler.
ewasoneof thefewseniorGermanofficerswho stoodbyhisow nviewsan
dmaintainedthemoralcouragetocontradictHitler.
CONCLUSIONSANDLESSONSFORTODA Y .T
hesuccessesGuderianachievedrepowerfulexamplesof theimpactof
operationalleadership.Guderian'sinnovativeideas,isoperationalthinking,is
executionofoperations,nd mostimportantly
hischaracter,roughtsuccesson thebattlefield.
Guderian'sexamplestillprovideslessonsfor
today.uderianwasavisionarywhosaw thatarevolutionin
militarytechnology,oupledwithrevolutionarydoctrine,couldtransformthebattlefield.
AlthoughhisvisionwasoftenopposedbytheGermanmilitaryestablishment,Guderian'serseverancetranslatedhisbeliefsintoreality.neofGuderian'sgreatestskillswas
hisabilitytocommunicatehisvision tohissubordinates,nd thenleadthem
personally from thefront.
Guderianwasamasterin maximizinganeconomyofforce.
Herealizedthatat thebeginningofmostcampaigns,
Germanunitswouldbeoutnumbered.ewasacutely
15
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
18/20
awarethatGermanywouldno
tbevictoriousifitfellintoanotherstatic,ttritionstylewarliketheFirstWorldWar.hus,uderianespousedtheneedfo
rquick,litz-style.attacks,hatcapitalizedon
surpriseandanoverwhelming concentrationofstrength
atthedecisivepoint.
ispre-warpreparationsengineeredthetechniquesthatmadethistypeofwarfarepossiblenotonlyfo
rhisow nforces,utfo reveryotherpartoftheGerman
noArmy.
Guderian'sdevelopmentofogisticsandcommunicationsystemsenabledGermanmotorizedforcestooperateindependentlyfo
ruptofivedays,ndtorespondrapidlytotheirleaders'commands.hispointcannotbeoveremphasized.Withoutthissystem,heWehrmachtwouldprobablyno
thaveachieveditsstunning victoriesintheearlyyearsof thewar.
Guderian'soperationalthinking,lanning,ndexecutionwerebasedon
hiswillingnesstoacceptriskinordertokeephisforcesconcentratedattheSchwerpunkt.Guderianwasoftencriticizedan
dsecond-guessedby hissuperiors.im ean
dagain,however,isskillinaccuratelyassessingthesituationprovedhisskepticswrong.Guderianhadaknackfo
rmakingsoundandtimelydecisionswhenassessingthebestemploymentofhisforces.ncethesedecisionsweremade,eaggressivelyimplementedthem.Today'soperationalleaderscouldlearnmuchaboutdecision-making
from Guderian'sexample.
28Macksey,1 1 .16
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
19/20
BIBLIOGRAPHY Books
Alexander,evin.owGreatGeneralsW in .New York:W.W.Norton&
Company,1993 .Carver, .M .he ApostlesofMobility.New York:
olmesandMeierPublishers,1979 .Guderian,Heinz. chtung-Panzer!:he
DevelopmentofArmouredForces.heirTacticsan
dOperationalPotential.ondon: rm san dArmour Press,992.
anzer Leader .ondon:MichaelBrown,td.,952.Hart, .H .Liddell.he
GermanGeneralsTalk .New York:WilliamMorrow an dCompany,948.Macksey,
enneth.uderian:reatorof theBlitzkrieg .New York:teinan dDay
Publishers,975
he TankPioneers.ondon:ane'sPublishingCompany,981 .TankWarfare:
HistoryofTanksinBattle.New York:teinan dDay
Publishers,971 .romTriumph toDisaster:he
FatalFlawsofGermanGeneralshipfrom MoltketoGuderian.ondon:
reenhillBooks,996.
Mellenthin,.W .von. ermanGeneralsofWWII: sISaw Them
.Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,977.anzerBattles: Studyof
theEmploymentofArmorintheSecondWorldW ar .Norman:
niversityofOklahoma Press,956.
Stolfi, .H.S.Hitler'sPanzersEast:WorldW arIIReinterpreted
.Norman: niversity ofOklahoma Press,991
.Strawson,ohn.GeneralHeinzGuderian."n TheW
arLords.ditedbyFieldMarshalSirMichaelCarver,oston:ittle, rownan
dCompany,976.
-
7/29/2019 A 348618
20/20
GovernmentDocumentsGuderian,
einz.ArmoredForcesandTheirCooperationwithOtherArms."ranslatedfromtheGerman.or
tHumphreys:he ArmyW ar College,937
.Gwin,rgenJ.AnAnalysisofOperationalLeadership:ieldMarshalErichvonManstein."UnpublishedResearchPaper,
.S .NavalW arCollege, ewport,I:995.Higgins,
eorgeA.heOperationalTenetsofGeneralsHeinzGuderianandGeorgeS.
Patton.r.or tLeavenworth:AM
SMonograph,985.Vego,Milan.OnOperationalArt." npublishedPaper, .S
.NavalW arCollege,Newport,I:997.
OperationalLeadership."UnpublishedPaper, .S .NavalW
arCollege,Newport,I:996.Periodicals
Guderian,Heinz.ArmoredWarfare:onsiderationsofthePastan
dFuture."ArmoredCavalryJournal.an-Feb1949.T
heGermanArmoredDivisions."MilitaryReview .ep1940. #
