26 WORLD at WAR 38 | OCT–NOV 2014 WORLD at WAR 38 | OCT–NOV 2014 27

Rommel on Russia: His 1943 Solution for the Eastern FrontBy Gilberto Villahermosa

of staff of Rommel’s Afrikakorps and Panzerarmee Afrika commands. In light of Rommel’s tremendous experi-ence fi ghting a highly mobile war with a smaller force against quantitatively superior opponents better equipped and supplied, it’s worth pondering whether he’d arrived at a winning solution for the eastern front.

“You know Bayerlein, we have lost the initiative, of that there is no doubt,” Rommel began. “We have learned in Russia for the fi rst time that dash and over-optimism are not enough. We must have a completely new approach. There can be no question of taking the offensive for the next few years, either in the west or the east, and so we must try to make the most of the advantages that normally accrue to

The many formidable challenges facing the Reich at the time were at the forefront of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s and Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein’s thoughts as they met at Hitler’s headquarters in East Prussia. “It was a few days after the failure of the collapse of the Belgorod-Kursk offensive,” remembered Bayerlein, “in which our attacking forces had become bogged down in the Russian anti-tank screens and defenses, and the bulk of our latest tanks had been lost. And with that had gone all hope of a new summer offensive in Russia.”

After a personal meeting with Hitler, Rommel sat with Bayerlein and discussed the general military situation. The two were old acquain-tances: Bayerlein had served as chief

B y mid-1943 the Third Reich was being assailed from east, west and above. Still, Germany

was far from beaten. At that time the Wehrmacht numbered almost 9.5 million personnel, with the majority, almost 6 million, serving in the army. Those soldiers formed around a battle-hardened core of veterans who held together the rest of the armed forces. They were still relatively well equipped, especially at the small-unit level, and they were led by many brilliant, or at least competent, offi cers and NCOs. Further, the expansion of the Waffen SS, from 160,00 in 1941 to 450,000 in 1943, provided a further hard core of young, well trained, well equipped and fanatic soldiers sworn to fi ght to the death.

the defense. The main defense against the tank is the anti-tank gun; in the air we must build fi ghters and still more fi ghters and give up the idea for the present of doing any bombing ourselves. I no longer see things quite as black as I did in Africa [when it was lost to us], but total victory is now, of course, hardly a possibility.”

Rommel told Bayerlein that Germany must fi ght on interior lines, and then expounded: “In the east we must withdraw as soon as possible to a suitable prepared line. But our main effort must be directed toward beating off any attempt of the Western Allies to create a second front, and that is where we must concentrate our defense. If we can once make their efforts fail, then things will be brighter for us.”

The German forces on the eastern front at the time Rommel said that numbered approximately 2.6 million soldiers and consisted of some 122 infantry divisions, approximately 25 panzer divisions (and one separate brigade), and another 17 miscel-laneous divisions and another brigade. (Many of the “miscellaneous” divisions were “Luftwaffe fi eld divisions,” which had originally not been intended for frontline operations but, rather, for security missions at airfi elds and throughout the rear.)

All those formations together were responsible for defending a long and meandering front that ran more than 1,500 miles from Leningrad in the north to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea in the south. Many of the divisions,

however, were already offi cially listed as Abgekaempft (“fought out”), and were thereby acknowledged to possess only negligible combat value. A further number still fought effectively, but only as kampfgruppen (“battle groups”) of regimental or battalion sizes. At the same time the Germans had 12 divisions committed in Italy, while in the west there were 46 divisions and two separate regiments operational, with another seven divi-sions in the process of being formed. “Th[os]e fi gures strikingly reveal the strain exerted by the Russian war,” notes the offi cial US Army history of World War II. “The number of divisions in the east that needed

continued on page 30 »

This is offi cial Soviet-era war art, simply titled the “Battle of Kursk.” It depicts the moment of the fi nal defeat of the German spearhead in that failed offensive. It was the singular event, even more so than the Stalingrad debacle that

preceded it, which caused Hitler and his fi eld marshals to understand they needed a new strategy.

26 WORLD at WAR 38 | OCT–NOV 2014 WORLD at WAR 38 | OCT–NOV 2014 27

ISSUE MONTH FEATURE ARTICLES

289 NOV 2014 War of the Austrian Succession: the 1740-48 confl ict that made Prussia into a major power.

• The Catalan Grand Company• Burmese Civil Wars

• Battle of Cherbourg• Alamo to Appomattox

290 JAN 2015 Angola Civil War: analysis of one of the largest post-colonial wars to have been fought anywhere in Africa, climaxing in the late 1980s.

• WW1’s Caucasus Front• Hessians in the American Revolution

• Battle of Manzikert

291 MAR 2015 Warpath: The American Civil War in the Indian Territories; a complete analysis of this little known but important theater of the war.

• The Six Dynasties Wars• Hitler’s Paratrooper

• The PLAN Today

292 MAY 2015 North Cape: The aero-naval campaign fought off the coast of Norway from 1941 to the end of the war.

• First Punic War• Slave Trade Wars

• Philippine Insurrection• Congo Merc

293 JUL 2015 1066: an in-depth look at three battles fought in that fateful year that ended the Anglo-Saxon line of English kings and precluded the rise of a Danish line.

• Slave Trade Wars• Satan’s Chariot

• Battle of Mount Street Bridge, Dublin 1916

294 SEP 2015 WWI: An analysis of the strategic and grand-strategic strategies driving the course of the war that brought the world of European dynasties to an end.

• Desert Storm Intel• Muslim Conquest of Syria

• Fortifi cations of the Third System

WWW.STRATEGYANDTACTICSMAGAZINE.COMWWW.WORLDATWARMAGAZINE.COM | WWW.MODERNWARMAGAZINE.COM

38 MODERN WAR 14 | NOV–DEC 2014 MODERN WAR 14 | NOV–DEC 2014 39

1994-95 Battle of GroznyBy Christopher Miskimon

Note: The article is illustrated with scenes from the Battle of Grozny.

Background

A s the Soviet Union fell apart in the early 1990s, various national groups within its

borders declared independence. The Chechens were one such group.

A Chechen and former Soviet Air Force general, Dzhokhar Dudayev, became their independence movement’s leader, and the region declared “autonomy” in October 1991, even before the Soviet Union formally dissolved that December.

A month later the Russians sent troops to reestablish Moscow’s control, without success. In the next several

years the Kremlin leaders were too busy consolidating their position domestically to take further action. In late 1994, President Boris Yeltsin decided the situation had to change. The catalyst was a failed attempt by ethnic Russians inside Chechnya to seize power. While the Moscow government denied involvement, their support for the coup was obvious and,

with its failure, Yeltsin felt compelled to act directly. On 29 November he ordered the Chechens to disarm. When they refused, he sent in his military.

Four Phases

Yeltsin placed Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in charge of the operation. Grachev in turn assigned the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) as the responsible headquarters element. Russian army regulars, MVD (Interior Ministry) troops, Border Guards and FSK (Federal Counterintelligence Agency) units were all assigned to a hastily assembled force. That was the Russians’ fi rst misstep.

Those then running the NCMD lacked combat command experi-ence, and they weren’t prepared to handle the infl ux of troops. Further, they weren’t versed in conducting joint operations involving different service branches. Even so, planning moved ahead despite the noticeable shortfalls, as well as others in overall troop training and equipment.

The Russians developed an inva-sion plan in which multiple columns would fi rst surround Chechnya and then converge on its capital Grozny. That plan was divided into four parts.

In its fi rst phase, planned to last three days, the Chechen border

was to be sealed and Grozny sur-rounded on the north, east and west. The route south was left open to allow Chechen forces to fl ee.

The Second Phase was to be the reduction of Grozny. The Russians would send strong armored columns

38 MODERN WAR 14 | NOV–DEC 2014

1994-95 Battle of GroznyBy Christopher Miskimon

Note: The article is illustrated with scenes from the Battle of Grozny.

Background

A s the Soviet Union fell apart in the early 1990s, various national groups within its

borders declared independence. The Chechens were one such group.

A Chechen and former Soviet Air Force general, Dzhokhar Dudayev, became their independence movement’s leader, and the region declared “autonomy” in October 1991, even before the Soviet Union formally dissolved that December.

A month later the Russians sent troops to reestablish Moscow’s control, without success. In the next several

#14 | US CARRIER BATTLEGROUPS

The German forces on the eastern front at the time Rommel said that numbered approximately 2.6 million soldiers and consisted of some 122 infantry divisions, approximately 25 panzer divisions (and one separate brigade), and another 17 miscel-laneous divisions and another brigade. (Many of the “miscellaneous” divisions

intended for frontline operations but, rather, for security missions at airfi elds and throughout the rear.)

All those formations together were responsible for defending a long and meandering front that ran more than 1,500 miles from Leningrad in the north to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea in the south. Many of the divisions,

however, were already offi cially listed as Abgekaempft (“fought out”), Abgekaempft (“fought out”), Abgekaempftand were thereby acknowledged to possess only negligible combat value. A further number still fought effectively, but only as kampfgruppen(“battle groups”) of regimental or battalion sizes. At the same time the Germans had 12 divisions committed in Italy, while in the west there were 46 divisions and two separate regiments operational, with another seven divi-sions in the process of being formed. “Th[os]e fi gures strikingly reveal the strain exerted by the Russian war,” notes the offi cial US Army history of World War II. “The number of divisions in the east that needed

continued on page 30 »

This is offi cial Soviet-era war art, simply titled the “Battle of Kursk.” It depicts the moment of the fi nal defeat of the German spearhead in that failed offensive. It was the singular event, even more so than the Stalingrad debacle that

preceded it, which caused Hitler and his fi eld marshals to understand they needed a new strategy.

WAR 38 | OCT–NOV 2014 27

#38 | GHOST DIVISION

6 S&T 289 | NOV–DEC 2014 S&T 289 | NOV–DEC 2014 7

War of the Austrian Succession Frederick the Great's First Fight by Joseph Miranda

T he War of the Austrian Succession was a series of wars with multiple origins.

France and England clashed over colonial aspirations and control of the Low Countries. In central Europe, Prussia’s new king, Frederick II, known to later generations as “Great,” coveted the rich Austrian province of Silesia. Layered on these primary confl icts were the ambitions of a

military presence in Silesia was minimal. The winter of 1741 saw the Prussians taking Austrian fortresses such as Glogau while Maria Teresa gathered an army from the far-fl ung Habsburg realms. Even her Hungarian subjects, normally obstreperous when it came to contributing to wars not directly affecting them, recognized the common threat. They declared an insurrection (national mobilization) and called up their regiments. Other Habsburg lands also mobilized. Especially valuable were light troops from the Balkan frontier, both mounted and on foot, who were expert raiders and against whom Frederick had no defense.

The Habsburg army, under the command of Marshal Adam Neipperg, was on the move by early spring. Its advance into Silesia caught Frederick off guard. Faced with the prospect of his line of communications being cut, he stood and fought. The ensuing Battle of Mollwitz (10 April 1741) was a back and forth affair. At its opening, the Austrian cavalry defeated the Prussian horse,

half-dozen princes. The war would result in minor border changes and a tenuous peace amounting to no more than a breathing space in Europe’s dynastic wars.

Pragmatic Sanction

The root cause of the war was the Pragmatic Sanction, a 1713 declaration by the Holy Roman Emperor Charles

VI that upon his death, the rule of his lands (those controlled by the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs) could be passed to a female heir. The declaration was intended to avoid any confl ict caused by the ancient Salic law forbidding ascension of a female to a throne. Without the Sanction, Charles’ passing with only a female heir would touch off claims on his territories, scattered across southern Germany and the Netherlands, by a variety of relations. Charles spent most of his reign courting the acceptance of the Sanction by the other crowned heads of Europe. Most agreed, though often at a price.

Charles died on 20 October 1740, to be succeeded by his daughter, Maria Teresa. His death also vacated the offi ce of Holy Roman Emperor. Maria Teresa could not wear the crown herself, but she became involved in the wrangling to elect the man who would.

The focus on the Imperial throne opened an opportunity for Prussia’s king, Frederick II, himself newly crowned. Frederick’s Prussia was a poor country and a small one. Surrounded by enemies, it had no geographical depth and had vulnerable scraps of territory in western Germany. To him the rich Habsburg province of Silesia was a tantalizing prize; seizure of it would be a threefold boon: money to support the treasury, a signifi cant increase in population, and substantial expansion of Prussian territory.

His father, Frederick William, had signed the Pragmatic Sanction, but he also had left behind a well-trained army. Counting on Habsburg weakness and distraction, Frederick ordered his army to march as 1740 drew to a close. The impulsive decision would embroil Prussia in a quarter-century of war.

First Silesian War

The Prussian advance initially met little resistance as the Habsburg

Holy Roman Empire

The Holy Roman Empire was the name for a collection of kingdoms, principalities, and free cities theoretically united under an emperor. The concept of the empire originated with the crowning of Charlemagne in 800, then fell into disuse before begin revived in 962, when central Europe and north Italy were united under the German king Otto I. By the late Medieval era, the empire once again had fallen apart in all but name.

The fi ction nonetheless was maintained. An emperor was voted into offi ce by “Electors,” the rulers of some of the more critical principalities. They usually (but not always) included Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg (later part of Prussia), Bohemia, the Palatinate, and Hanover, plus the independent cities of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier.

The emperors had come from one branch or other of the Habsburg family since the mid-fi fteenth century, and from its Austrian branch since the mid-sixteenth century. The Austrian Habsburgs controlled not only the imperial territories of Austria, Bohemia, and the Palatine, but the non-imperial regions of Hungary, the Austrian Netherlands, and various north Italian states such as Milan.

Salic law forbade a woman being empress. When Maria Teresa came to the throne in 1740, she could be (via the Pragmatic Sanction) Archduchess of Austria, Queen of Hungary, Bohemia, and Croatia, Duchess of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, Countess of Tyrol, and ruler of a handful of other lands under various titles, but she could not be empress. She pushed for her husband, Francis, to become Holy Roman Emperor. There were other claimants, among them Charles Albert of Bavaria and Augustus of Saxony (both married to Habsburgs), and Philip V of Spain, inheritor of claims from another branch of the Habsburg clan.

There was no imperial army. An emperor would mobilize contingents from various lands he ruled, recruit mercenaries, and call on contributions of men or money, or both, from the other imperial territories. Together these forces were called the Reichsarmee(imperial army). ◆

Maria Teresa (1717-1780, ruled 1740-1780).

7

The Holy Roman Empire was the name for a collection of kingdoms, principalities, and free cities theoretically united under an emperor. The concept of the empire originated with the crowning of Charlemagne in 800, then fell into disuse before begin revived in 962, when central Europe and north Italy were united under the German king Otto I. By the late Medieval era, the empire once again had fallen apart in all but name.

The fi ction nonetheless was maintained. An emperor was voted into offi ce by “Electors,” the rulers of some of the more critical principalities. They usually (but not always) included Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg (later part of Prussia), Bohemia, the Palatinate, and Hanover, plus the independent cities of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier.

The emperors had come from one branch or other of the Habsburg family since the mid-fi fteenth century, and from its Austrian branch since the mid-sixteenth century. The Austrian Habsburgs controlled not only the imperial territories of Austria, Bohemia, and the Palatine, but the non-imperial regions of Hungary, the Austrian Netherlands, and various north Italian

Salic law forbade a woman being empress. When Maria Teresa came to the throne in 1740, she could be (via the Pragmatic Sanction) Archduchess of Austria, Queen of Hungary, Bohemia, and Croatia, Duchess of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, Countess of Tyrol, and ruler of a handful of other lands under various titles, but she could not be empress. She pushed for her husband, Francis, to become Holy Roman Emperor. There were other claimants, among them Charles Albert of Bavaria and Augustus of Saxony (both married to Habsburgs), and Philip V of Spain, inheritor of claims from another branch of the Habsburg clan.

There was no imperial army. An emperor would mobilize contingents from various lands he ruled, recruit mercenaries, and call on contributions of men or money, or both, from the other imperial territories. Together these forces were called the Reichsarmee

#289 | WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

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40 FEB 2015 Cauldron & Rampage: an analysis of the fi nal Soviet offensive in January 1943, which wiped out surrounded German Sixth Army & the 1944-45 campaign along Nazi Germany’s western border.

• Armor on New Guinea • Women at War

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