a . Co:r.c:".ts.

w-73 ~ 9 ~ - 2 LCDR W.3. CARVER, USN u 1c 2 1 2 1

b 4 6 6

3 3 5 5

+ Includes UIE J. C. KiYAlni$ Jr,,'USN, ConCVG-9 S t a f f Adnin, Asslt. $3; Includes LT G. L. GRAY, Jr., USIJ, 2nd LT J. J. W.IIGI€I', USTIfL, CmCVG-9

S t a f f Cperations Of f i ce r and EO, respective&. +XY Includes CDR T. D. H?iZiiS, USI?, CmCVG-3

. The mission of Ca r r i e r .lir Group NI:b, as s e t f o r t h in C1'F 77 OP Order No. 2-52, is t o pcrform c lose a i r sunnijrf,, .~ roconnaissance, i n t e rd i c t ion , and a i r bombardment missi.ons in ordcr t n clcstrog enom;r forces, communications, and i i l s t a l l a t fons i n support of :hi tcci ? h t l o n ~ Forces.

1-2

a. Statistics

15-27 JUE 1953

ZU LU

1 15 81 52

380 157

9 19 188

253 263 178 133 29 18 33 23. 978 TOTALS -

I___-

24 1098 F 2 7 JULY

TOT!”LIS 283 283 196 203 40 21 LLS

11-1

30 JAN - 27 JUL 195’3

88 554

27 404 67 418 266 15

28

6 4

87 550 L 31 D

404 73 82 407 153 262 1\68 16 435’

55 33

30 56

1

l2 8

62

161 390 520 1

1!.2 4

72

1 a

6

9 8

12

11 l4

125 25

11 2

1 176 lllL

66 943 149

1139 9 l.404 ll 1005

2

52 2 62

95 1

30

4

Ilrl:

39

4

12 1

70 lL4 Ill4 82 1% 220 26 39 38 h 4

24 18 24

TOVLL C O i E A T L877 1877 130h 1261 2 23 190 286 225 7243

11-2

II-3

J ULY

17 18 13 20 22 23 21: 25 26 27

_I_

J U I X

330 2%‘ 252

6 669

E 62

9 13 2

34 - 66 10

267:

15 5

75 .. L

2 6 30 305

2 3 1

6 L9

174 22

5 7 1

616 8094

5

3 1 2 27

2

3 0

tt8 5 2 7 12 1

3 5

3 3

6

3

3 3

1

27 JUL 5

263

w 6

h63 25 !\6 3

49 65 22

12 295

2

5 2

77 5

39 17 3.3 1 1

ll 1 1

8 39

2

4 1

1

F9F-2

F9F-2

kD-4

F9F- 2

F9F-2

F9F-2

F9F-2

FLII-4

FLl.U-5'N

FVJ-4

123072

123035

129013

125130

123049

123587

123585

97181

123193

81652

c ODE - 371% exploded under nose, D-2

Small f r a g i n nose. D-3

Frag ho le i n e l eva to r D-3 and v e r t i c a l fin. Frag i n fuselage. 3-3

Bi2l exploded i n s i d e nose&-3

2 f r a g holes i n horizol-r D-3 t a l s t a b i l i z e r Frag through t a i l pipe D-3 aRd shroud. Engine f a i lu re . Frcbably L t h e r e s u l t of enmy f i r e , 30 cal, i n drop tank. D-3

Believo 37IX exploded . L near wing t ip . L i r c r a f t and p i l o t crashed,

15-27 2'UI.X 1953 AlilCRWT LOST GR I 3 ~ - ~ Y A G X L F G N E SXCPBGP$.D iXPfiIR -I-- - - --

CODE - DLTZ UXIT 'MFE A/C BU.NOI CPSJSE PI_

7-15 VA-95 ;LM 129015 L o s t o i l p re s su re emerg. ldg. D-2

7-15 V'?-9l1 F4U-L 96807 Tail wheel cyl, mounting bracket D-2

7-17 VF43 FyF-2 123072 XL damage t o nose & nose wheel. D-2 f a i l e d on CV landing.

7-17 VF-9b FLU-L 82025 Cmshed on Cir take-off, L

7-20 W-91 F9F-2 127150 Crashed on ca tapul t shot. L

7-23 VP-71:. FLU-4 61815 Blown over s ide bv wind & prop L

7 - 2 ~ VF-91t FLU4 97181 En:;ine f a i i x e , probably resu l t - L Irash.

in:; oi? eneriy dai-iage. Ditched. a t ?Tonsan. 7-25 VF-94 FUJ-k 01652 Crashed. i n North Korea (Pifi,). L

7-26 VF-5'1 F9F-2 123422 C i 3 i n e f i r e . P i l o t edocted. L

30 J X to 17 i AR t o 1 2 i L Y t o 2 JUN to JUL to 30 J A N - 17 APlI 4 JUL 29 JUL 29 JUL

LET FCF-2 1 2 -- 1 2 2 8

1

1

2 1 4

D-2 DPdXGE

F9F-.Q 6 1 3 1 16

1 1 F3F-2 5 F4U-4 1 1 1 2 1 6

2 1

2 I. 5 1

c - 3

b. G<;Z??"LL.

(1) 3.gIqyment. -- During t h i s per iod of combat operations, t h e n a j o r i t y of t h e s c h c m o f : sorties have been florm ir. d i r e c t s p o r t of United Xations ground forces. Tlic prop quadrons ' e f f o r t was devoted exc1usiveQr t o close a i r support, ~ . ~ - t h tlio exception of t h e r e l a t i v e & few Xi,:, ISP, and A&! f l i g h t s , conccntrzted on Cherokee, Xecco, C 2 , photo, and photo escor t s o r t i e s . Severa l j e t Clicrolm f l i g h t s were d ive r t ed t o u rgen t ly needed close a i r support t a r g e t s by t h e t a c t i c 2 1 a i r cont ro l center,

The j e t s

( 2) Yeather. Fog, low c e i l i n g s nild reduced v i s i b i l i . t y were encountered dur- i n g a l a r g o ?ortion of t h i s period. t a sk f o r c e were executed as a mattci- ol routino.

IF2 clinb-outs 2nd let-downs around the

(3) =osition. Fince the bc:;in:iiiiy; of t!\c Cormmnist ofi'ensive i n e a r l y June, t h e intoilsit?; and accuracy of c nci-,i:r ai1CF-aircraTt f i r e has iilcreclscd considerably, pai'tiCuL:rl;i along thc: borxb l i n e ai?c! i i1 t h e CherolreG area.

C. JZT WCXTI@?F. No nerr opere t in? procoduras were c! c - ~ ~ . s : C ! . nor mrc: t h e r e any new operating d i f i i c u l t i c o cncountcr'jd.

Each j c t sqmclran c!cpartcd Yolcosuka with 13 197-2 a i r c r a f t .

PXl oP-2L..Tx ms . (1) Close Ar Support Piissions.

d* -_ E c e u s c af t he l a r g e numbers of a i r c r a f t

cmploycd on close a i r support miscion during t h i s tou r and t h e few j o i n t Lw/ Navy/;-ir Force radio frcquencies a l lnb lc , Ln:, delays i n obtainin2 airborne co i i t ro l i s r s a;id poor communic2.tio S o l i d ovcrcnsts along t h e b m b l i n c necess i ta ted r s s o r t t o 1lFQ drops on many of t ho c l x c a h - support n i s s i ons. excollcnt, t h e r e s u l t s on KiQ d r o x cc1-d.6 r a re ly be observed.

e. RIOTO, oLn t h e a e r i a l photogra.phic f l i g h t s ,

f , NIGRT ATT-',CK -'Nl IIIGIIT FIGiJTCL1 0 S. Thc day f l i g h t schedule with night rop~ci~&Shrlcnts, p lus goor >Jca.'thoia co:iditiors during ear ly ino r i~ng hours, p r a c t i c a l l y cur ta i lod night hccklcr oL7<:iT&. ?:IS.

m r c e:rpcri:;nced hjr t h e imjort ty of fl&hts.

A'.lthough qualitjr o f con t ro l l e r s was uni f ormily

Inclement wcath r was rcs;?oK:ible f o r tho cance l la t ion of t h e majority

.-I-

-I

SECUXTY I ~ F O ~ A T I O N

a. Sta t i s t ics

18 54

863.5

7 ti2

16

80

164 515

39 1120 1304

16 6

80

a, During t h e c i g h t p d g h t d.2.p of t h i s WestPac t o u r on irhich conbat f l i g h t oporations wore conductcrl, n i x r a f t a v a i l s b i l i t y , computed i n accord- ancc idti1 t h e Naval i,ir Warfarc Rcl’orting ?~I.lanu~.l, avcragod as follows:

mw iJc P-’”C- A l L !ST

F3F- 2 35.3 FYT-’-5P 91.5 FhU-4 9 th 5 FLU-SN 30.0 XI-4, hL, 4XL $0.7 LD-LLN 93.4 *33-LrT%! 93.3

b, Average a v a i L ~ b i l L t y f o r t ho period 17 July t o 27 J~ily iras its f ollot7s:

PX.2CCNT - TY?G ;,/c

F9F-2 37. a0 FFF-SP 10:3,0@ FLU-LI 97.70 F!fJ-SI? 95.00 m-4, 4L, bNLL 350.30 Lt.D-!!.lt lSC;.OO ;LD-~W 130.00

2. GEiG;il;lL ELIMIZNANCS - a. am.

(1) Some d i f f i c u l t y throu$ioLit thc cruise was axperioncod with a r r c s t i n g hook points. (P/N 1LF-6C3410-1) f a i l u r e s on F5.P-2 n i r c r a f t ; c igh t rzsultcc‘. i n b a r r i e r crashes. No f s i l u r c s WcrO encouiTtc:-c:’. v i t h re-mnoaled hook points.(P/N NAF1603~(l!3-7;2~). dcf o m along t h e s l o t sidc a f t c r of:-cantzr lnndings.

Eirly i n G:.: tour, t n c r e were t e n hook i ioint

Howct-.;r, t h e rc-annc?lcd poin ts cxhibitzd a tendency t o

(2) Contaminated f u o l tp.s 2 m j o r wsise of maiiltonance d i f f i c u l t i e s with j o t z i r c r a f t . h i t - l i k c substlnccs adhoring t o plungors and slccves i n TJCfs (?hi 285;-BPD-ll954S-2) enc‘, h i ~ h p-cscurc cock assenblios (?/IT @S-SPD- 11&17-5), caused numerous cnginc rlelfunctions.

(3) C ~ n d d c r n b l c . m l f u n c t i o n i n g o f ’ tho’ a i l e r o n boost sJ‘stem on P9P-2 a i r c r a f t occurred durin:; the L?st operating period.. The

I’J-1

iT' I :TXAi 'CZ (COP T) I

i nc rease of f a i l u r e s over t h e wc-fious ,?eriu.ds was approximately 300 percent. S ince t h i s i nc rease w ? s not an+;idp?.ted, t h e suppk? of a i l e r o n boost valve asseriblics (.'/IT 2834,?-2$00-20) T i x soon d e p l e t d , To prevent prolongcd grounding of t!ic a i r c r a f t , repnir of .?arty (40) of ths for ty-s ix (16) malfunctioning assemblies, ms accom?lished by t h e shipls acccssoqs shop. i ~ l e c t r i c a l f z i b r e s , sho r t ing of t he c o i l s 2nd burning of c o n t r c t poilits i n t h e :iolcnoicl, accounted f o r app?ox?.m.tely 7s nercznt cf t h e discrepancies. The rcm3.iic1.er e x p r i c n c c d l rO" riny; sc.-.ls and packing f a i l u r e s , s ix of which irere bojond r epa i r ,

b. PdGTS. - (1) ZC-15 spark plugs proved inaZequate f o r more than 60 hours of

o?peration on AD'S, o r more than ,C0 hours cn F!:Vs.

( 2 ) Tile ma j o n % - o r car'auretoi- chc:igc:: I.:CTC caused by conteminated I n m n y c-ses, rust-l i l io c':o-iosits caused s t i c k i n g of poppet valves. fue l ,

(3) ;:any failures o f t!!c ..A.'j v i n p f c l c ! cy l inde r (P/IJ 283-DC-525'5'15.5) occur red^ during t h i s cruise. Kits Tar incorporr.tion of AD Scr-jice Chanee No, 332, r les iped t o c o r r zc t this o.ncl?.-tion, were n t t r e c c i v d u n t i l July.

3 . 2LCT;OMICS (Sumary)

a. Gcncr2.1. Tube f a i l u r e s t:wc a c o n s t m t source of electronic equipment *-- nalfunccisning du r inz all tiuurs rn WE line,

coivcrs i n use ii<qvc been ov-rhouled m r l t h e ~ a c h a n i c n l pa r t s , c spcc ia l ly talzli.ng hcnds, drj-vc motors, ant' sc l cc to r motor c ' r i : ~ chains, hnvc worn c;:ccssirrcl.yl causin:; nwncrms failurc:: and iRamx man-hours of mintcnance.

XLiiost a l l of thc IW trans-

b. ~ L ~ A P X - ~ . Korc f a i l u r z s o f tlic L~(/AE<-~ equipment were cncsuntorcd &ufin3 A 1 L.II.~S .: t'mr than on 711 prcvio1J.s tmrs cmbincd. Tube f a i l u r c s and ak ios t continuous i n t c r r o g t i o n 3; kl~c stri! ic-le?der 's a i r c r a f t taerc t h e con- trYmtia:: factors. s t a t i o n r?.cicrs, with thc rusultni7-b 11.:-vy cu r ran t dra in on t h c t&cs of a s l n s l c IF' u n i t , it i s c,>nsidere? r o t a t e t h e IFF ;ward betwcm tha f' -; L:-dsr 2.nd other aj.rcro.ft of t ho f l i g h t .

COCT se of cor?st~:.i~t i n t c r r o g s t i o n ty sh i? a-d shore

1 (bc t r i i i c should be i n a u p x t c d t o . -

c. FZ Transmission Linc Didoct;*ic T 2 i h r a s . N o 3ther cor::ial c-

fi.in1cctri.c f n i l u r c s have ~:ccurrc:! i n 77F ' iF tr-.nsmission l?mx s incc t h e 17

I'J-2

a, I n ;piicr~.l, t h e m t c r i n l xp:cjrt racoivcd by Car r i e r i.ir GrowL> NLNE Shortzges of vas 0:;ccllciit tkroughout the period d d c p l o p c n t i n WestPzc.

o l lomnco list m2.terial occurre?.; t l ic scopo si such s h o r t a p s . incrcnsing p r o g r e s s i v d y witti successive opci-ating t o u r s on t h o l ine. H a J c v c r , t h i s sitl;-tioil TJX not unusual i n vicw oi" t h e rvinttcmncc r c q u i r m c n t s r e s u l t i n g fror,i t l ia hcavy opor i t i ng schedule and. .?bnorn.lly high usage of c c r t a i n d r ci*?.f t iil? i n t cnnn c c itms.

b, Linco t h e zir group has :>rovicl.d s t c t i s t i c s t o s u p p l m m t t h c cyarlcrly Tild i i n l l usage data rq>x--Ls submittod by t!ic sh ip t o t h c X r c r a f t ii-.Lcrinl Ofl'icer, O?klznd, no recormml- t ions f o r changes t o tho a l l o m n c c lists a rc oficrcd herein.

C. Of ttlc 36 :LC%'s c q c r i c a c c d c!uring t i c hrcstPac dcplo>;,iont, 21 occurred daring tlic l?.st o;xz:.t2.y t ou r on thc line. itens TJCIO obtnincd f ro% other car;-icm i n Task Force 77 and from tlc',ud"

of sp2 .m p?.rts t$$i?ich >:ere not av-ila'alc i n s tuck aboard ship, b u t which wero u r g o n t w rcquircd t o matntnin n i r c r> . f t opmsaticnal avnilnbj.lity,

Tho m j o r i t y of XCG

nircr- .f t ,-.>ear&. F i r c r a f t ... .:>ro\ridcd c n invalu3blc emcrgcncy sov.rce

d. Fhc fo l lov ing XOG's o c c u r x d &ring tlic: x r i o d 17-27 July:

NOIG;KL..TJ~nX I.fi~:~lificr, comncss 7 d v c , dcfuc l ing Valve .',ss:r, :,ileron b o x t I rd i ca to r , airspcoZ V d v G , dcfucling Valve, fucl sc l cc to r llcchmisni Bssy, rucldcr t nb Control j ~ s s j r , f u c l Cont ro l :.ssy, f u e l Control Asy, fuel V3lve, d rn in

D:LB LCOG 4 3 2 h 3 2 7 2 2 2 2

2.. bring the six months combat t o u r i n l e s t P a c , t h e r e have been twenty-one dFtchiii;s and crash w a t w Iandinzs, e igh t of thc: l a t t e r . si:staiiied a s a r e s u l t of these acciilcnts have been received by p i l o t s of j e t Qn,c ais-craft. Four p i l o t s received Coinpression f r a c t u r e s of lumbar vertebrae, one p i l o t received severe prolonged coccalgia, and f i v e p i l o t s received SeVarhfv wrcnchcd ancl contused b a c k which noccss i ta ted bed r e s t f o r s e v e r a l days. There >rere no f r a c t u r e s encountered characterized by a llshearingff of tlic v e r t e b r a l trmsversc procosses. a i r :;roups. t h c cXcst and tthoracic ver tebrae securely and t h e mfety b e l t t o sccurc t h e t h i g h s and t o a f fo rd s o w protcc t iml t o t h e pelvis, t h a t '~lierc is not amplc ! x o t e c t i m ?or t h e lowor t r u n k and hihr vertebrae. a rnsu l t , t h e r e e x i s t s a y i e ld ing sl" t h e b o w s t r u c t u r e s i n e i t h e r a v e r t i c a l (dowmard) d i r o c t i o n or transvcrsc! (forward) d i r o c t i p n q o n impact of t h e p lane wi th t h c mtcr, resulting f requen t ly i n a coiiprassion or t r ansvc r sc v e r t e b r a l f r a c t u r e or o the r back in jury . *:Itii t he advent of nioro j o t a i r c r a f t i n f l e e t ccrrLcr a i r groups, i t 5.s rocormandad tk t some typc of s a f c t y b o l t bc dcviscd an( adoptcc? f o r j?rotGctinp; t h a lower ++milk frail tho luinbar v e r t e b r a l i n ju r i e s . f o m of hydraul ic seat, a c t i n g six1ilar t o a i r c r a f t o leo struts, may lessen t h e v e r t i c a l fo rces subjdetud t o @lot:: -in crash landings.

Tho wjorit:. of iMur ie :

Rowever, t h i s t n e of i n j u r y has been rcportcd by o ther The tendency apparciitly h2.s bean fgr the shoulder harness t o p ro tec t

However, i L is considered As

Some

b. 73 soperato corrcspondcnce, rccomondcd improvemoots t o t hz parachute harncxs ai-d s a f e t y b o l t have ::cc.n s u h i t t c d t o higher authority.

V-1

1. During t h e cloven dnys of corfwt o:?crstions t h i s tour, t h o shortage of p i l o t s was k o e w f e l t r a-rcmginy 171 cl?.ily, S ince cur rsn t operatin2 c l x t r i n e requires spare a i r c r a f t t o be rx.nns2 on t h e b c s i s of 25 pcrccnt of schcclulcd so r t i c s , an avcr?ge of h3 p i l o t s i r c x roquircd f o r b r i e f ing 2nd manring of a i r c r a f t , i n addi t ion t o those regul?.r$y schsrluloil t o f ly t h e s o r t i c s . 3vcn though not subscqucnt3.y launched, p i l o t s schcchled as spares spent an a r x a g c of 15 hews performing t h i s f u n c t i on*

2. by ccch s.;uilrons' p i h t s on an avcr,-.So opcratin;;; day:

S o r t i c s Soi.'tias 3 6 c r t i es S o r t i c s aver. f l t . __F S?ud Ori Ecml i,v*Avvail Sched ?'?A?-= Schcd/P/Pilot Flown/,'ilot hrs./pilot

The ?ir GOULI was schcdulod f o r 1828 comb2.t s o r t i e s ,

ListeC: bolow i s a tabul?.t ion of ' l;h~ a v u r ~ , ~ o f l i g h t hours and s o r t i e s f lown

PI LOTS

m-91 19 57.9 so 63 3.5 2.4 3.89

VF-93 2 1 10.2 50 63 3.5 2e3 3e87

3 t i 2.1 1.55 Vfi-95' 23 22*0 30 38 1.7 L32 3.91

Conprons 20 20.0 ll 3i.r .7 *66 1.89

JI. Includcs p i l o t s scheduled a s spmcs.

3 . Sincc inva r i ab ly soma p i l ' A s TJCTC u m v a i l a b l c because gf i n j u r i e s and siclmcss, p i l o t s of soma squadrons wcrc requi red f o fQr more than t h e average

F'm e x c ~ ~ l c , on one day's opor-tion t h r c c F4U pilots were rcqui rcd t o f ly t h r e e combct niscions, to tz l in : seven t o oight f l i g h t hours. fddin: tiii:? rcquirccl f o r briefin:;, Y:.*.nn?.ng a i rc rq . f t , 2nd debriefing, t h o th rcc p i l o t s were involvcd i n flight o;?,-mi;ioils f o r a perioc! of from t h i r t c o n t o PLf t c Ln hours.

4, 3.88 hours i n ac tw.1 combat flyin:;, xi.th m n.'ditionzd 5*25 hours f o r f l i g h t preparz t icn f o r a t o t n l averagc: o:? 9.13 hours p ? r Cl3.y. recyircd t o spcnc7 a n avcrzsc of 6.7!. hours per cky involvec! i n f l i g h t opcratiDnsI The hours involved f o r a l l p i l o t s i s consi continuous combat f l i g h t o p r a t i ons vi.t;xut t h c rcst, previously. providod during rq>lcnis;inont dEys, Without adccp?.tc rest, g i l o t s become ca re l c s s and c f f i w decrw.sos rn@ly, r e s u l t i n g i n ?n incrsnscd rmnbzr of o p e r - t i o d zcciderrts.

5. Tho allowance of 1,s p i l o t s pel- a i r c r a 1 t (luring combat operations is con- s idc rcd t o be su f f i c i en t . Howevx, it i s cmsidcred imperative t h a t a fuf l a l l o m n c c bc mairrbaind a t a l l tixos. It i s therefore recommndcd t h a t a pool of rcpis.csment p i l o t s be ava i lnb lc t o opera t iona l commanders during fu tu re rrmd ?.ir combat oporstions.

f l i z h t s i nd ica t ed above.

l3.asod on tho above dnta, jet ;?ilot? "crc r c?u i r ed t o spend on t h e average

Prop p i l o t s 'were

r t ' r ! t o bo excessive f o r prolonged

PNV V I I SU3tTVAL

lr Crashes, D i t e n g s a r d Ejections, --I--

ar During the gcr iod of t h i : . repor t , sevon a i r group p i l o t s crashed o r ditcl-d and one ejected.

15' JUIX:

17 JiTiX:

20 JULY:

23 JiiJLX:

21: JULY:

25 JJIX:

26 JULY:

Loss o f o i l pressure o f f t h e coast of Japan while on a r e f r e s h e r f l i g h t f r m the carrier, caused an .*D p i l o t t o make a whcols-up cniergency landing on a sml l f i e l d i n Japan. i n j u r i e s .

Ln F4u-t~ crashed on take-off irmediiately a f t e r leaving tho bm. Tho pilot was rescued by iiclicopter, but sus ta ined minor i n t e r n a l i n j u r i e s .

1.n F9F-2 loaded with 900 i n t o t h e water i n n flat a t t i t u d e inmediately a f t e r a p o r t c a t apu l t shot.

An F~$.J-li, taAxLing i n t o pos i t i on behind ambher FL:.U-4 i n t h a talcc- off pos i t i on , s l i d on a slii2-;eqjj deck and was blown over t h e POI% side, The p i l o t receLwx1. back i n j u r i e s and a lnos t drowncc! before the h e l i c o p t e r c r e m n jmipod i n t o t h c w.1.t-r and placed him i n t o t h o hc lo ho i s t ing slin;.

An FLbU-4 engine f a i l e d ( l> rdxbP j duc t o enemy f i r e ) ncnr i.!onsan and vas ditched. uninjuried.

On 25' Ju ly , Snsign SSL..S, TF-SL, f l y i n g an FbU-4, m s h i t &. anti- a i r c r a f t f i r e near Tanchon. The p lanc crnshcd and burned. The p i l o t d id not survivc,

An F9F-2 caught f i r e abo-.-c an ovcrcast nczr t h e bombline. bhen the cockpit f i l l o d :gith smoke, t h e u i l o t j c t t i soncd h i s canopy r i i t h t h e a i r b o t t l e and than c j cctcd, u s ing nomal llpre-pos-o::-pulltt procedure, i h e ojccti0nw.s accor,ii?lis!ior; :.t 220K i n lov'21 flig1i;ht 3% 17,000 feet. 3 t c r leav ing t h e s w t e-t th? to;) of i t s t r a j ec to ry , tho p i l o t f e l l about 2000 f e e t beforc o-)cning h i s mrzchutc. cxcant for ? s l i g h t l y 5;i .K

He sus ta ined no

pounds of I-onbs a d f u l l f u e l tailks flew

The p i l o t wne rccovcm? by helico;Jtcr uninjuried.

Tile p i l o t ir2.s recovered i m u d i i a t e l y by h e l i c o p t c r

m

He lzndcd u r h j u r c d 21: rccAved during t h o ejection.

PART VII I !.In IhTC%UGIENCE

1* - CFL!ZE. Ori$nally, during thc z i r group's T i r s t t o u r on t h e liiic, each p i l o t vas furnished wi th 1:5;0,000 s c a l e chart coverage of t h e crca i n vhich t h e misrion's tar;;& W ~ S locatcc:.. It ins believod t h a t 1:50,000 scalc cha r t s would he&) p i l o t s most i n becoming f c n i l i a r wi th t h e t e r r a i n , The p l an met wi th soxe SUCCCSS. It was not a l t o g c t h c r p a c t i c a l , however, s ince p i l o t s e n g a p ' i n rtaintaining t i g h t d iv i s ion f orm?tion seldom had axiplc opportunity t o study l a r c smlc charts, F o r t he rcrnaindcr of t h c a i r group's t o u r of duty, 1:50,00C sc&lc charts wcrc issued t o d iv is ion and sec t ion 1cac:ors only. The rxi7ons lor this change wcrc tiint as t h e p i l o t s bccamc morc faiilinr with the t e r r a i n tho need f o r l a rge s c d c cova-azc: diminishcdj and sccondlv, t h e s h i p ' s sup;>ly was limited.

2. X V l Y i10OlT. Squadron A i r 1ntelli;;cncc Officcrs standardized rcnc1.y room disp lnys so t h a t maximum nv-.ilal;la f z c i l i t i o s would b c on h-nd f o r br ief ings rcgarS.1sss of which re?.* r o m ne.+t be uscrl. Zzch ready room contoincd one of t h e following: 1: 250,000 tcr:?.?.n c k r t s (kia se r i e s L-552 and scrios L542), 1: 250,000 USA7 A ;prc)n.cli Charts boti'. 9; Fonb,linc and t a r g o t a r m s I 3. s t a t u s board display%ng idcnt i f icxbion , sea-nil- iYSCUC, -nd CSCIpB nnd evasion i>.easWes. A d a i w p l o t of a l l n e c c s s r q im@or-+' ., on WIS iniint?.?incd on those charts. Each re3.Q room wc?s c i the r oricntccl in i t s c n t i r c t y .rav.nd !..I. b r i e f ing d isp lays o r contained R sepe ra to 7.i-w d.evot. d complct&y t o Lir In te l l igence . 111 addi t ion t o t he rcm1.r 'cricfiiiG Ciisp2?.ys, c-ch r e i d y room h?d sp?.cc f o r sup lcmcnt:. 1 LIP t e r i d of s i gnif icmc='.

3. X!IdFIiG* Kore?.n t c r r s i n t h a t were e x t r e m e b i . i i"l icult t o locatc?, consi2crzblc tiine was spent by the N O S i n s t u e j i n z thc t c r r - i n 2nd chgramming t h e most prominent po in ts , The J O s diagramed such iden t i fy ing lmdm2rks a s ro-d turn:: md i n t x r c c t i o n s , bi5.dgcs, strcoms ?:,-c' r i v e r s , r a i l r o i d s , in6 most important of all - t h e ridges 7.nd v n l l q s which usu?.lljj a r e n o t r e a d i l y ?istinguis!v..ble by : lacin: 2.t thd t c r r ? i . n ch7rts.

On those f l i g h t s which involved enemy t a r g e t s i n t h e North

A s p i l o t s becme n0i-C: f m i l i a r with t h e te r rn in , thcro w7.s less ncccl f o r d c t a i l e d and lengthy bridFn:<s. b r i z f i n g Ind lzunch was rcducsc' con- ' -cJ.x>.:2>7 15 th t h e ccming 02 w,?mcr neathor and subsequent shedcling cf e-osix-c mi.ts*

I n addi t ion , t ho i n t i r v a l bctwcen

PhCE -- a. v-1, a.

13 VI-1, 5.

SUBJECT

Provir'c an irc,p-cved sTfety b o l t t o n f f o r d moro protect ion t o p i l o t s .

Naintain rull allow-nco )f pilots i n conbrt squadrons. Naintain p o o l o f replacement p i l o t s Ln thcz t r c of comb. t oy c w '"ions.