9781137460660 01 prexii · seemed to loom large in the lives of its subjects. However in the period fol - lowing the Second World War, at least in the English-speaking world, the

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables vii

Preface viii

1 The Modern State 1

What is the state? 2 State capacity 12 State power 27

2 The Origins of State Capacity 33

City-states 35 Empires 46 The ancient state 59 Conclusion: Lessons from antiquity 63

3 Building Capacity, East and West 65

The Chinese Empire 65 Byzantium 70 West European feudalism 76 Central power and its projection 80 A patrimonial variant 87 Governmental coherence: Absolutism and constitutionalism 88 Institutional interdependence? 98 Conclusion: Lessons of the feudal and early modern period 108

4 The State, Capitalism and Industrialization 109

The state and industrialism 111 The ‘late developers’ 118 Industrialization and the development of state infrastructure 121 The social embedding of the state 132 Enhanced interdependence 138 Asian backwardness? 141 Conclusion: The state and industrialization 159

Copyrighted material – 9781137460660


vi Contents

5 States and International Systems 160

The European international system 162 The East Asian international system 179 A world system? 182 An imperial world system? 191 Conclusion: The state and the international system 192

6 The State Embedded: Twentieth-Century Alternatives? 194

Welfare capitalism 195 East Asian welfarism 213 Communist totalism 216 Capitalist success, communist failure? 227 No third way 228 Conclusion: State capacity in the twentieth century 230

7 State Capacity and Governance in a Globalized World 231

Economic globalization 233 Political globalization 236 Cultural/ideological globalization 240 The limits of globalization 244 The state and globalization 254 Conclusion: State power in the twenty-first century 264

Conclusion 266

Bibliography 273

Index 297



1

Chapter 1

The Modern State

This chapter discusses the nature of the state, emphasizing the impor-tance of the relationship the state has with society. This is normally discussed in terms of state ‘autonomy’, but more useful is the notion of interdependence. Along with governmental coherence and power projec-tion, interdependence is one of the key elements of state capacity, which is the principal focus of this book. Capacity is in turn associated with infrastructural power.

The state has been paramount during recent decades. The conditions within which millions of people lived were shaped by the state, the role it sought to pursue and the ability it had to pursue that role. The centrality of the state is evident as soon as we look at some of the most important developments of the last century. In the communist countries, states forced through rapid-paced programmes of societal transformation that turned in one case a backward partly industrialized society into a nuclear superpower within 40 years. In the capitalist West, the post-war long boom characterized by the most sustained highest living standards ever achieved by large populations was underpinned by state expenditure policies and the construction of the welfare state. In parts of the third world, weak states, and in some cases kleptocratic states, were instru-mental in the continuation of widespread poverty, disease, low living standards, violence and war. More than in any other century, people’s lives everywhere on the globe were affected by the successes and failings of states.

The state, its power and capacity, was for a long time the central focus of many of those who thought seriously about politics. In part reflect-ing the origins of political science in constitutional law, this approach projected the state directly into the centre of the concern to understand political life. In contemporary society of the time, the power of the state seemed to loom large in the lives of its subjects. However in the period fol-lowing the Second World War, at least in the English-speaking world, the state seemed to go out of fashion. This may in part have been a response to recent history, with the Nazi experience in Germany being seen as a case of overweening state power at the expense of the citizenry, and the communist threat being conceived in the same way. But it was also a func-tion of the way in which political science developed as an independent



2 The Nature and Development of the Modern State

discipline in the Anglophone world, spreading the intellectual net to embrace things other than formal institutional structures. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the changing intellectual fashion, reflected in the prominence in the discipline of methodologies like behaviouralism and functionalism and the direction of interest toward social actors broadly conceived, squeezed the state out of the centre of concern. However with the growing calls in the 1980s to ‘bring the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1985), this relative neglect of the state by English-speaking scholars was reversed. The size of the literature on the state and its future expanded enormously and shows little sign of diminishing. This is merely recognition of the important role the state plays in contemporary life. But what do we mean by the state? Where does it come from? And what does it do?

What is the state?

Debate about the state and how it is best defined has been a staple of political science for many decades. There is no need here for an extensive discussion of this, but it may be useful simply to survey the range of dif-ferent types of approaches to the state. Two main approaches may be identified. The first sees the state in terms of what it does, and in particu-lar as a means for serving certain interests. In this view, what is important is not how the state is structured or how it functions, but what interests it serves. The second approach sees the state in institutional terms. It is not concerned with the interests the state may serve but rather how it is structured and works, and what it actually does. While there are clear points of contact between these different approaches, the focus of each is different.

State as representative of interests

Within the first approach – the state as representative of interests – there are three principal interpretations of the state and its role. In principle, these are distinct conceptions of what the state does, but in practice many theorists’ views straddle these distinctions.

The state as partisan

The partisan model (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987: 331–332) sees the state as pursuing its own institutional interests or those of the officials who work within it rather than the interests of any other group. This assumes that the state is autonomous from other forces in society (see ‘The state as guardian’, below), but does not necessarily imply that



The Modern State 3

the state is all-powerful. In pursuing its own interests, the state may simply be able to override any opposition to it from within society, but in the contemporary world it is more likely that the state must work with other forces to achieve its aims. This may require bargaining and compromise, enabling others to achieve some of their aims in return for the state gaining some of its own interests. State aims may also often coincide with the aims of other groups, so the state may be able to get its way without much opposition, or at least with significant social sup-port. Migdal’s work (1988 & 2001) can be seen as fitting in to this sort of view. He argues that the state–society divide is blurred by the way in which different parts of the state ally with groups outside to further their goals. This constitutes his ‘state-in-society’ approach. In any event, the key factor is that the state pursues its own interests, not those of other social forces.

The partisan model of the state is consistent with the Weberian view of the state. Although the usual view of the Weberian model emphasizes the rationality, and hence objectivity, of bureaucratic performance, such a concern for rationality and the adherence to bureaucratic norms effec-tively represents an assertion of the interests of the state. Demanding that life be conducted according to bureaucratic norms automatically moves it onto the ground where the state is most dominant. In this way, the independent entity of the state acts to realize its interests. The partisan view is also reflected in the work of public choice theorists, who argue that state officials will seek to maximize their own personal interests and will use the state to do so. It may be that in some cases their personal interests will coincide with broader social interests, but this is not inevi-table, and when they do conflict the former will be given priority (e.g. Tullock 1976). What public choice theorists see as state failure is private advantage achieved via the state.

This view is also consistent with the work of James C. Scott (1998). He saw a major task of the state to be to make the ‘society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxa-tion, conscription, and prevention of rebellion’ (p. 2). It was this process of ‘legibility and simplification’ that enabled the state to engage in mas-sive social transformation of the sort he describes in his book. But it also facilitates the more ordinary course of administration. This partisan view is consistent, too, with the instrumental view of the state (see ‘The state as instrument’, below) and with a school that has been important in the study of international relations, realism. Realism sees the state as a uni-tary actor relentlessly pursuing its interests in the international sphere, and although this view has come under considerable criticism it remains prominent in the international relations literature (Morgenthau 1948; Hobson 2000: ch.2).




The state as guardian

In this view, the state acts not to advance its own interests but to stabi-lize the system overall. This conceives of the state as ‘an autonomous institutional force capable of rebalancing the social pressures upon it’ (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987: 329). The state is seen as keeping in view the best interests of the system as a whole and reacting to developments to ensure that that system does not become destabilized. For some, it is the state managers and bureaucrats who decide what is in the best interests of the system, using their professional knowledge and skills to determine the policies which will maintain the status quo. For those who see the predominance of certain interests in society (e.g. the capitalist class, big business, business-trade union corporatist arrangements), the state is seen as working with them to stabilize the system from which those interests benefit; one strand in Marxism has this view (see ‘The state as instrument’, below). Some of those who adopt a more pluralist approach, seeing policy making as much more a function of the interplay between different social forces and groups, view the state as maintaining a balance between these groups to ensure that none gains the sort of primacy that might upset the whole structure. In this view, the state may be seen as an arena within which different forces, groups and individuals struggle for supremacy to implement their ideas (e.g. Dahl 1963). In any event, the state is essentially neutral, seeking to stabilize the system and teaming up with different social forces at different times in order to do so.

This is consistent with the liberal view of the state which sees it as remaining neutral in domestic affairs while acting to protect the individ-ual rights of those who constitute the community. (Dyson 1980; Hobson 2000: ch.3) This view of the state as serving community needs has also been prominent among those who have studied the origins of the state. For Service (1975), the state provided a range of benefits for all, Carneiro (1970; 1978) saw the state emerging in order to combat a serious chal-lenge confronting the community as a whole, while Wittfogel (1957) saw it as essential for the construction and maintenance of large-scale irrigation projects upon which the community depended. Otto Hintze (1975a) argued that military challenge from without encouraged mili-tary centralization within, which became consolidated into the state form. In all of these views, the state’s role was guardian of the interests of the community.

The state as instrument

In this view, the state is conceived as a pliable instrument which is con-trolled by forces outside it to achieve their ends. There is little sense of state autonomy or room for independent action by state actors, and



The Modern State 5

the impression of the state is that it is largely monolithic. The state is captured and turned to the ends sought by those who capture it. Elite theorists tend to see the state in this light (e.g. Mosca 1939). The instru-mental view may also be held by pluralists (although many adopt the guardian or the partisan view, reflecting the underdeveloped nature of state theorizing in pluralism) who argue that the democratic electoral process is the means whereby different groups compete for control of the state, with the victor being determined by the levels of popular sup-port the contestants achieve. (Schumpeter 1944; Dahl 1971) Among students of state origins, the instrumental view of the state is prominent. For Fried (1967), the state was a means of consolidating control by a leading kin group, while those who saw the state as resulting from external conquest saw it as the means of rule by the conquerors (e.g. Oppenheimer 1975).

Some feminist writers see the state as the vehicle for patriarchal oppression and for the reproduction of patriarchal domination (e.g. Millett 1970; MacKinnon 1989). Similarly some green theorists see the state as naturally antagonistic to sustainable development because of the way in which such development is incompatible with the logic and interests of the state. (See discussion in Paterson, Doran & Barry 2006.) In contrast, post-structuralists and Foucauldians see the state as much less important in itself but as part of a broader process of, in Foucault’s terms, governmentality, which governs and shapes people’s conduct. In this view, the state is reduced to a series of practices, and therefore seems to disappear as a single institutional entity (Finlayson & Martin 2006; Dean 2010).

However, the most influential theory in which the instrumental view of the state has been prominent has been Marxism, an approach which takes no account of institutional structures (and therefore is in striking contrast to Weber) and focuses purely upon the role of the state. This view is most clearly reflected in the comment that: ‘The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (Marx & Engels 1951a: 35). In this view, the state is explicitly the instrument of rule by the dominant class. This view is also clear in Engels’ work (1954a) on the origin of the state where the state is shown as emerging to institutionalize the dominance of the economi-cally exploitative class. (For a more rounded view, see Engels 1954b.) However this crude, directly instrumental approach is not the only one within Marxism. Some theorists have adopted a guardian perspective on the state, seeing its role as protecting the interests of the capitalist class generally (the state as ‘collective capitalist’) despite the ramifications this may have for individual capitalists and regardless of the direct political role played by members of this class. (For a celebrated debate over this




see Miliband 1969 and Poulantzas 1973b & 1976.) In some of his writ-ings, Marx (1951) also suggested that the state could play an arbitrating role between balanced social classes but it has been the instrumental and guardian approaches that have been most influential.

State as institution

These three interpretations are focused principally upon the question of whose interests the state serves. This is clearly an important question, but it is not one that facilitates a study of the development of the state as a political form. This requires an essentially institutional definition, look-ing at what comprises the state rather than who it serves.

While most such definitions will differ in some details, the core is widely accepted and reflected in the view of Max Weber (1978, I: 56):

The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by leg-islation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only in so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. … The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of con-tinuous operation.

Weber’s definition is complex and elliptical, but suggestive of a vision of the modern state comprising four elements. These are a centralized and bureaucratically organized administrative and legal order run by an administrative staff; binding authority over what occurs within its area of jurisdiction; a territorial basis; and a monopoly over the use of force. These elements form the core of most definitions of the modern state.

Bureaucratic organization

Central to the generally accepted view of the modern state is a bureau-cratic form of organization (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987: ch.1; Vincent 1987: ch.1; Hall & Ikenberry 1989: ch.1; Poggi 1990: ch.2; Hay et al. 2006). The offices and many of the institutions of which the state con-sists are structured in a formal hierarchy with clear lines of direction and accountability. This formal hierarchy, and the rules of direction and



The Modern State 7

obedience intrinsic to it, is essential for the central state authorities to project their power and authority into the society and across the terri-tory over which they have jurisdiction. The bureaucratic nature of the organization means that it is run by formal rules designed to ensure its efficient functioning. Objective rules and standards are meant to prevail in all decision making, thereby eliminating personal or partial considera-tions from the process. Advancement through the bureaucratic structure is based on merit, measured in terms of the acquisition of qualifications and performance on the job, and offices are filled by professional, full-time officials. There is regularized communication up and down the structure and a high level of discipline and obedience to instructions from above. Usually bureaucrats and the structures in which they work will be divided into a central state apparatus located in the national capital and a regional apparatus which administers the areas outside the capital. Both parts of the state structure run along bureaucratic lines.

Bureaucracy: A hierarchical institutional structure staffed by officials tasked with carrying out the administrative responsibilities of the state or other organization (e.g. a business corporation) which it is meant to serve.

This bureaucratic structure is characterized by specialization and organizational differentiation from other bodies. This means that the hierarchical structure of offices and institutions that forms the physical manifestation of the modern state is distinct from all other organizations and bodies found within the society. In practice, of course, no organiza-tion is totally distinct from other structures in society. They are linked together by numerous bonds: personal, institutional and ideological. In contemporary Western democracies, the state is connected to institutions like political parties, pressure groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses, and through these to the society as a whole. As will be argued later, this is crucial to state operation. But what is essential is that the state is distinguished from these other groups by the nature of its primary concerns and responsibilities: the state focuses upon political affairs with its sphere of concern ranging across all aspects of political life. In this sense, the modern state is much more wide ranging than other political organizations like parties and interest groups. Furthermore the notion of what is political and within the sphere of state concerns has expanded considerably. Areas as diverse as environmentalism, welfare, safety at work and childcare have become the concern of the state because of their importance for the ordering of life in contemporary society.




And in the secular sphere, this is the state’s primary role: the regulation and ordering of community life. The modern state is thus a distinct insti-tution, separated from others by this overarching responsibility. Also important is what has been called the autonomy of the state. The state is independent of the control of other organizations or social groups within the society, able to pursue its own aims and objectives that are different from those of other parts of the society. This notion of autonomy will be discussed further below.

The modern state is both centralized and internally organizationally differentiated. The bureaucratic structure that is the state is not a mono-lithic machine, but a congeries of institutions, agencies, organizations and bodies. It is functionally organized into executive, legislative and judicial arms, while each of these may be further divided into distinct parts. For example, the bureaucratic administrative machine consists of a range of distinct government departments, agencies and organizations, many of which have branches throughout the regions as well as a central office. Similarly there will be a hierarchy of judicial and perhaps legisla-tive organs spreading across the territory. The state structure is therefore highly differentiated. However, it is bound together by ties of centralism. All of the discrete parts of the state machine are linked to their counter-parts at different levels by organizational rules, regulations and proce-dures, and by the range of informal relationships and practices which enable any bureaucratic structure to function. The ties between these different parts bind them all into a hierarchical structure where the cen-tral offices of state exercise overall directive and administrative power. These different parts do not exercise authority on their own behalf, but only that authority which flows to them as part of the state. In this sense, the state is both highly differentiated and strongly centralized. It is this that enables it to carry out its central, unique, function: the centralized coordination of power on a territorial basis.

Sovereignty

Sovereignty: There are two dimensions to sovereignty. Domestically it refers to the ultimate source of supreme power within a polity. Internationally, it means that a state can function as an independent unit free from external control.

The modern state is sovereign, or the ultimate source of authority within the territory under its jurisdiction. There are two aspects of this: internal and external. Internally, it means that there are no authorities higher



The Modern State 9

than the state. The citizen cannot appeal against the state to any other authority; the state is supreme, and its will cannot be countermanded. While the appeal to conscience is today accepted in many states as a valid claim against state authority, this is not generally seen as a vitiation of the state’s claim to sovereignty because in most instances the state does not seek to enter the moral realm. Externally, state sovereignty means that other states recognize the authority of a state within its borders and accept that that state can speak for its citizens in international affairs. External sovereignty as established under the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 therefore involves the international recognition of the domestic sovereignty of a particular state. External recognition was ini-tially linked to internal capacity because all a state needed for recognition was control over its territory. This link never prevailed completely (e.g. the outbreak of civil war did not automatically lead to the international delegitimation of a state or regime), and in 1960 the UN separated rec-ognition of external sovereignty from internal capacity. Since then many have argued that such recognition should be dependent upon observance of certain standards by the state, especially regarding the protection of human rights (Zürn & Deitelhoff 2015: 200–205). Sovereignty is crucial to the state because it is this that elevates the state to a position of supe-riority in the society and constitutes the recognition of its right to make binding decisions upon those who live within its bounds. In essence, this is the focus of the state’s role: its right to make binding decisions upon its citizens and upon those who enter its territory. This right is the key to its power and role, and although at times the sovereignty of individual states may be vitiated (e.g. by voluntary cession through international treaty or involuntarily through the action of other states), as a principle for defining the state, sovereignty remains central.

Territoriality

The modern state is territorially based and bounded. The state exercises its authority within clearly defined and internationally acknowledged territorial boundaries; these are ‘hard borders’, lines on maps rather than vague border zones. It possesses no authority outside those boundaries, just as no other state possesses authority within another state’s bounda-ries. The state’s territorial basis distinguishes it from most other types of organization or association, whose power and authority tend to be functionally based rather than geographically defined. It is this territorial basis that injects an element of ambiguity into the notion of the state. In English, but not in many other languages, the same word, ‘state’, is used both for the administrative apparatus that runs a country and the territorial formation of which that country consists. In this book, both meanings are relevant.




Monopoly of force

The right to exercise authority must be backed up by the capacity to do so, and this is where a further characteristic of the modern state is impor-tant: the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The state has at its disposal a preponderance of coercion within the society. Institutionally manifested in the armed forces, police and paramilitary forces, this pre-ponderance of force is important for the maintenance of state supremacy, although in terms of the daily course of political life, such force is usually secondary. It is there to back up the state’s legitimacy if it is called into question and to ensure the observance of laws and the maintenance of order when these are infringed. As well as this preponderance of force, what sets the state apart from other entities that might use coercion (in practice, a complete monopoly is impossible) is that the state possesses a monopoly of the legitimate use of such coercion. Only the state has the right to use organized coercion to get its way. This is intrinsic to state sov-ereignty and essential for the state to be able to achieve what many see as its basic purpose, the security of its citizens through the maintenance of law and order.

Some claim one further characteristic of the modern state, the exist-ence of a popular feeling of identity with and attachment to it, or what Finer (1997, I: 3) calls ‘a community of feeling’. This community of feel-ing is often held to rest upon assumptions about shared ethnic identity and to be manifested in a common language, culture and history. Many states have had populations who have shared such feelings, and this has given rise to the term ‘nation state’. Yet the vast majority of states are not characterized by a coincidence between a particular geopolitical unit and a single ethnic group; most states have within their boundaries a variety of ethnic groups, and many ethnic groups are to be found spread across state boundaries. So insofar as the term ‘nation state’ implies a coinci-dence between state and ethnic nation, it is a misnomer. Nevertheless it is true that states generally have sought to engender in their people a sense of identity with the state, to bring about feelings of attachment and iden-tification with the state. Such an endeavour has been an essential part of state building, from the granting of citizenship to all inhabitants of the Roman Empire after AD 212 to ‘the invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) by states in the nineteenth century. But although the development of such an attachment occurs in most states, it is not an essential definitional quality of the state.

These characteristics stemming from the Weberian conception of the state – a centralized and bureaucratically organized administrative and legal order run by a professional administrative staff, sovereignty, ter-ritoriality and a monopoly of the legitimate use of force – are the central elements of the modern state. This is where they have come together in



The Modern State 11

their most developed form. The nature of the regime, i.e. the system of rule or government, is not relevant to whether a particular formation is a modern state or not. The characteristics noted above may be present in states run by liberal democratic parties, by a single party, by the military and even by a single dictator. The definition of a state is not dependent upon the nature of the regime.

Some of these characteristics of the modern state may be individually shared by other organizations, but no other organization shares all of them. Particularly distinctive is the combination of sovereignty and terri-toriality, because while many organizations claim sovereignty, in no other type of organization apart from the state is this defined territorially; in other organizations, like the church or business concerns, this is defined functionally or on the basis of the personal attachment of people to that entity (e.g. through employment). It is this combination of factors that sets the state apart. It is this that enables the state through the formaliza-tion of its enactments in law and the projection of them through its insti-tutional structure to bring about both the depersonalization of power and its transformation into a continuing public force. The power of the state is impersonal, much of it exercised through bureaucratic channels, and unrelenting. In a quotation where the word ‘state’ could easily be substituted for ‘government’, a scholar of medieval France (Dunbabin 1985: 227) has said:

What distinguishes government from personal control is its unremit-ting character. To be governed is to be subjected to the regular pressure of an authority operating according to fixed rules. In the full sense of the word, it is arguable that nobody was governed before the later nineteenth century.

To the extent that the state can be said to have an essence, it is the contin-uing projection of public power in the pursuit of its aims. It does this in a particular territory through acceptance of its sovereignty, its bureaucratic structure and the monopoly of coercion.

The projection of public power does not mean that that power is necessarily used for the best interests of the society as a whole (which is obviously the position of many theorists who fall into the first, interest-based, approach discussed above), although that clearly is the basis upon which the modern state is legitimized. This is reflected in the view that the principal responsibility of the state is to create the conditions for secure and civilized life, a responsibility realized through the oft-quoted view that the state’s role is to ensure law and order. The use of public power to serve social interests is the fundamental rationale of the modern state, especially in its democratic variant. But this simple assertion of the




perceived purpose of the state leaves open the role the state actually plays in contemporary life. Central to this is the question of state capacity.

State capacity

State capacity: The ability of a state to make a decision and to implement that decision.

State capacity refers to the ability of the state to set and then carry out tasks, to get its way when it wants to; it can be seen principally in terms of how effective the state is in determining on a course of action and car-rying that action through to fruition. Scholars have often used tax collec-tion as a useful indicator of state capacity; a state that can collect large amounts of tax in a systematic fashion is seen as possessing significant capacity. But while the performance of particular tasks may be a good indicator of capacity, two qualifications must be borne in mind. First, the fact that the state does not perform some functions is not necessarily an indication of a lack of capacity. It may, rather, reflect a lack of will. Rather than being unable, for example, to collect a high level of tax, state elites may choose to collect a lower level because of the gains in terms of social peace that this may bring. So lack of performance may not always be a sign of lack of capacity. Second, capacity levels are neither constant nor set. The state will not need to expend all of its capacity on every task that confronts it. Rather state elites will seek to use sufficient capacity to achieve the aim at hand and no more. This means that the capacity a state finds it necessary to use in any particular instance will be shaped by the scale of the task at hand. Furthermore capacity can vary across geographical areas, policy sectors and over time, and depends upon what state elites want to do; for example, the state’s capacity may be greater in the capital than the periphery, and its ability to collect tax may be greater than its ability to distribute welfare or wage war. These qualifications mean that it is difficult to speak meaningfully about general state capac-ity in an empirical sense. Accordingly, the principal focus of the following discussion will be upon the superstructure of state capacity: what must exist for the state to be able to get its way, for it to be able to exercise capacity? Once that superstructure exists, to whatever degree it does, it is then up to state elites to make use of it to implement their policies.

The superstructure of state capacity comprises three interlinked dimensions: governmental coherence; projection of power; and interde-pendence.



The Modern State 13

Governmental coherence

Most discussions of state capacity do not include the notion of the govern-mental coherence of state institutions. Instead they focus upon the state’s ability to organize society such that it can achieve its tasks. However if state institutions are not themselves organized so that they will function in an effective and orderly fashion, the state will be unlikely to be able to organize society satisfactorily. Governmental coherence is therefore a central component of capacity. There are three aspects of such coherence: integration; decision making; and legitimation.

Integration refers to the process whereby potential actors are, or are not, involved in the political process, and on what terms. Such potential actors may be of a number of types, but historically have often been seen in class terms. The exclusion of the peasantry and the working class until the twentieth century and the rise to prominence of a bourgeoisie have been seen as classic cases of potential actors being effectively excluded and then gaining entry to the political process, but other sorts of groups can be in this position in particular states; for example, ethnic and religious minorities, political parties or NGOs. Governmental coherence does not necessarily mean that all potential actors have been incorporated into the political process, but that there is a means to accommodate such actors if and when they seek to gain entry. Levels of governmental stability can be quite high even when major social constituencies are excluded if those constituencies are not actively seeking inclusion. This sort of coherence, characterized by the exclusion of some important potential actors, may be labelled exclusive. Where all potential actors have been incorporated into the process, coherence is inclusive. Thus exclusive coherence will see a small range of actors involved in ruling, inclusive a large range of actors thus involved. If major actors are excluded when they are politically active and seeking inclusion, governmental coherence is likely to be low.

The ability to make clear and authoritative decisions is fundamental to state capacity. There are two components of this: the nature of the process, and the information flow upon which it rests.

1 Nature of the decision-making process. What is crucial about the decision-making process is that there is a structured mechanism whereby authoritative decisions can be arrived at on a consistent basis. No structural mechanism can ensure that the best decisions

Governmental coherence: The organization of the institutions of the state and how they work in such a way as to ensure that they operate in an effec-tive and orderly fashion.




are made at all times (even if what was ‘best’ could always be objec-tively determined), but there needs to be a means whereby deci-sions emanate from a decision-making body in a timely fashion and are accepted as legitimate by those outside that body. A structured decision-making process may take many forms: a single leader, per-haps advised by a small advisory group; a small collective body like a cabinet or politburo; a large collective body like a parliament; or an assembly of citizens as in classical Athens; it can be demo-cratic or authoritarian in nature. Whatever form the decision-making process takes, it must be able to decide on issues, and those deci-sions must be considered legitimate. If either of these two qualities – decisiveness and legitimacy – is absent, this aspect of state capacity is flawed. It is thus whether decision making is structured in an effec-tive fashion rather than whether it is centralized or not (cf. Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 61–66) that is important.

2 Information flow. Optimum results are likely to flow from central decisions if those decisions are appropriate to the issue they are meant to address. This means that the greater the availability of information to the decision makers, the more likely they are to make decisions that bear on the issue at hand in a positive fashion. But the availability of relevant information in decision-making circles is not the only problem. The agendas of decision makers are often crowded with a wide variety of issues with the result that the time they have to devote to any particular one may be very small and therefore they may not be able to digest all of the information available; on some issues, the sort of information needed may not exist; or the institu-tional structures designed to gather the necessary information and collate it into a usable form may be deficient. The result is that many decisions may be taken on the basis of an inadequate understanding of the issue at hand because of information deficiencies.

A third component of governmental coherence is legitimation. The need for decisions to be accepted as legitimate has already been noted, but this depends upon the process whereby those decisions are made being itself accepted as legitimate. This does not refer to popular legitima-tion, but to whether elite political actors accept that the decision makers have the authority to make the decisions they do. In effect, this means: is there a succession process that is followed and has broad elite acceptance, and is there agreement upon the extent and nature of decision makers’ authority? If both of these are present, a political leadership will be con-sidered legitimate while it operates within the accepted parameters. If either or both are absent, governmental coherence and effectiveness are likely to be limited.



The Modern State 15

Projection of power

This refers to both the implementation and enforcement of decisions, whether those decisions are about tax collection, industry policy, social service provision, popular mobilization or going to war. Projection of power thus includes not simply the extraction of resources from society, which is what most people discussing state capacity focus upon, but also the provision of goods to society. Central to this is the institutional mech-anism designed to implement government policy, the state bureaucracy. In looking at the role of the state bureaucracy, two distinctions must be made: between dimensions of power and types of bureaucracy.

There are two dimensions of power, infrastructural and despotic (Mann 1986a; also see, e.g., Soifer & vom Hau 2008; Soifer 2008; Mann 2008). Infrastructural power is defined as ‘the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’, ‘to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure’; it is ‘the logistics of political control’ (Mann 1986a: 113, 114 & 116). Despotic power is ‘the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups’. The essential difference between these types of power is the presence or absence of an institutionalized means to ‘negotiate’ with groups in soci-ety. In practice, what this means is the presence or absence of a routinized set of procedures operated by the state and accepted by society through which discussion, bargaining and negotiation can occur and decisions can be made and implemented. This assumes both an effective state bureaucratic structure and a high level of interdependence with society. Where institutional and organic interdependence (see ‘Interdependence’, below) are well developed, infrastructural power can be wielded. Where such interdependence is absent (and this may be in a geographical region or a policy sphere), the state must use extraordinary, non-routinized means or despotic power. For example, the difference between a state collecting taxes by means of automatic withdrawals on the part of the employer before employees receive their pay or by means of episodic vis-its by military detachments is a distinction between infrastructural and despotic power. The more infrastructural and the less despotic the state’s power, the greater the level of interdependence characteristic of the state–society relationship, and the greater the capacity the state will enjoy. The more the state’s power is despotic, the lower the level of state–society interdependence will be, the less efficient it will be at administering the society and the more problematic its capacity. This relates to the type of bureaucratic structure the state has.

The first type of bureaucracy is the rationalist bureaucracy described above in the discussion of Weber’s definition of the state. This is a structure




in which the hierarchy of positions, their powers and functions, are deter-mined by the organizational rules of the bureaucracy itself, with the result that the whole machine functions in a routinized and impersonal fashion. What is important for the individual official is the rules governing his/her position rather than the personal views of his/her superior. Rationality prevails where routinized procedures are the means through which the bureaucracy functions. Full-time officials appointed on the basis of their relevant qualifications and (maybe) formal training, acting in accord with bureaucratic provisions and promoted on the basis of merit and perfor-mance, ensure that issues are handled efficiently, effectively and impartially.

Patrimonialism: A form of power relationship in which the essential link is personal, reflected in patron–client relationships. Such a relationship usually rests on an exchange between patron and client, with the client giving support to the patron in return for benefits such as material resources or promotion.

In contrast, the second type of bureaucracy is the patrimonial bureau-cracy (for one attempt to distinguish between the two types, see Burke 2005: 30). This is one where personal preference rather than the imper-sonal bureaucratic norm prevails. In the extreme case, the bureaucratic machine is treated as the personal property of the ruler, designed simply to deliver to him/her the resources he/she craves. The bureaucracy is dominated by the ruler’s personal appointees, who in their turn appoint clients to the lower levels of the bureaucratic structure and use those positions to appropriate resources and wealth. Here bureaucratic rules and norms are much less important than the views of individual officials, and rather than impartiality being the modus operandi, personal prefer-ence is the norm. It is the word of the boss that is important, not the rules of the organization. This type of rule, patrimonialism, is the histori-cal norm, much more prevalent throughout history than the rationalist bureaucracy of Weber.

Of course in practice, every bureaucracy is likely to have elements of both the rationalist and the patrimonial. No organization can run effec-tively only on the basis of formal rules, and in none do such rules play no role. But it is the balance between these that is crucial, and this can change over time as rationalist or patrimonial elements expand at the expense of the other (for an argument about ‘repatrimonialization’ lead-ing to the decay of institutions, see Fukuyama 2011 & 2014). Generally the more rationalist the bureaucracy, the more likely is the dominance of infrastructural power and the more patrimonial the more likely is des-potic power. But these are questions of degree.



The Modern State 17

Both rationalist- predominant and patrimonial-predominant bureau-cracies can implement central policy. However, the greater the demands made upon the bureaucracy (in terms of both volume and breadth of issues to be addressed), the less likely a patrimonial bureaucracy is to be able to cope. This is because of the weakness of organizational proce-dures in such a bureaucracy where the key factor is the personal opinion of the officials. In contrast, where there is the predominance of rule and regulation, there are likely also to be established institutional procedures for handling work, and therefore a greater capacity to deal with a high volume of tasks. This means that the more rationalist a bureaucracy is, the more effective it is likely to be across the range of tasks coming before it.

Important in the ability of a bureaucracy to function effectively is the social capital of the bureaucrats (on the importance of the quality of bureaucrats, see Migdal 2001: 84–88). At base, this refers to literacy. Given the task and size of a state’s administrative bureaucracy, it must rely upon written instructions and records, which assumes that the abil-ity to generate and make use of documents is central to the capacity of the bureaucracy to function. This applies to both rationalist and patrimonial bureaucracies, even if it could be less important in the latter because of the role of personal preference in that structure. But literacy is not the only necessary quality: bureaucrats also need the technical knowledge and training to deal with the sorts of issues that will confront them in their jobs. This could range from issues like international trade, childcare policy and the economics of construction through to questions of ethics and morality. The demand for such skills has increased over time and is likely to be greater in rationalist bureaucracy where the essence is the application of specialist knowledge to particular problems. But even ear-lier relevant skills wider than just literacy were important in shaping the effectiveness of a state’s administrative structure. Well-trained bureau-crats should enhance state capacity.

The capacity of the state bureaucracy to implement policy is also dependent upon the levels of technological development to which it has access. Policy implementation involves the projection of state power horizontally across territory (extensive) and vertically into society (inten-sive). The better the state is at both of these, the more effective it can be. But both of these rely upon technology, especially transport and com-munications technology. Effective transport and communication links are crucial to reducing local autonomy and strengthening central control. Where there is an effective transport and communications network that relies on, for example, electronic modes of communication, the prospects for central control are greater than where reliance must be had, for exam-ple, on a messenger on horseback. Technological capacity is therefore central to bureaucratic capacity: the lower the level of technology, the




less effective the bureaucracy is likely to be in terms of both the imple-mentation of central state policy and the provision of good information to central decision makers. Technology enhances infrastructural power and its projection.

Also central to the exercise of bureaucratic capacity are material resources. There must be adequate funding available to sustain bureau-cratic operations and the whole exercise of power by the state. Financial resources are essential: without them, and their judicious application to support the functioning of the state, the state would effectively cease to operate. This is why the ability to harvest resources from society, princi-pally in the form of taxation, has been so central to state development.

The state also needs to be able to ensure that the decisions that it takes are complied with. This is usually seen in terms of the extraction of resources from society (e.g. tax collection), but it actually refers to all types of state action. The optimum situation from the state’s perspective is that everyone accepts its decisions as legitimate and therefore abides by them. (For one discussion about ascetic Protestantism, especially Calvinism, generating a ‘disciplinary revolution’ which decreased state administra-tive costs, see Gorski 1993; Gorski 2003.) But where such compliance is lacking, the state must be able to enforce its will. Ultimately this means that the state must have the coercive capacity to ensure its will prevails. The usual means of this is the mobilization of coercive forces, either the police or military, with both types of force available for domestic use; external use is usually solely the sphere of the military. In this sense war is the state seeking to enforce its policy in the international realm.

The ability of the central state institutions to project their power is related to the third dimension of capacity, interdependence.

Interdependence

This refers to the extent to which the state is embedded within society, and is often discussed in terms of state autonomy, meaning that the state is not captured by any of the forces in society (for one discussion of the relationship between capacity and autonomy, see Fukuyama 2014: 515–516). There has been a tendency in much of the theorizing about the state to conceive of it in an epiphenomenal way. The state is seen as not having an existence in and of itself, but as being merely a representa-tion of other social forces. The liberal approach to the state views it as an arena within which a variety of social forces struggle for supremacy within the context of a broad value consensus that underpins the legiti-mate authority of the whole process. In this view, the state does not exist independently of the interactions of these social groups; it is their rela-tionships that give the state its meaning and purpose. An epiphenomenal approach is also evident in Marxism. In this view, the state is the means



The Modern State 19

whereby the exercise and consolidation of the control of the dominant class is brought about. The state has no existence, purpose or interests independent of those of the dominant class (although there is significant variation in the views of Marxists on this question). It is thereby a prod-uct of class interest rather than an organization with any independent standing or purpose.

However this epiphenomenal approach, reducing the state to a mani-festation of deeper social forces, is misleading. Certainly there will be instances when the state is used by groups for their own ends. The state can be captured by particular groups and their agenda imposed upon it. But this does not happen all of the time. The state as an institution does possess the potential for autonomy, the potential for pursuing policies that are in its own interests as an institution, that are in the personal interests of those who work in the state, or that are in the interests of the society as a whole as perceived by state officials. This assumes that the state is not automatically the representation of other social forces, but has an existence and a set of interests that are different from and potentially in conflict with those of other social forces. Once we conceive of the state as a set of institutional structures, primarily administrative and coercive, it follows that those structures and the people who work in them will have their own interests arising from the state’s very existence (the partisan model). At minimum, these will include maintenance of the state structure and protection of its integrity against outside forces. By extension this will also embrace the maintenance of order in society, since the existence of widespread conflict and dissent is destructive of the state itself. Thus even without implying any idealistic feelings or aspirations on the part of the state, its concern for its own survival will dictate that it has an independent interest in the way in which society is ordered. Given that the state also has to participate in international geopolitics by interacting with, inter alia, other entities like itself, the quest for survival will lead it to pursue policies in the international arena as well as the domestic.

If the very existence of the state as an institutional structure gener-ates a set of interests centred around its maintenance and survival, this will involve overlap with the interests of the dominant classes in society. State survival requires domestic peace and order, and this is best achieved through the guaranteeing of the existing power structure, including as expressed through property relations. The dominant classes share this aim, wishing to bolster their predominance against possible challenge from below. In this sense, the state is normally concerned to defend the status quo, an aim which coincides with that of the dominant classes. However the state’s desire for maintenance and survival also generates a point of tension with the dominant classes in society. Central to the state’s survival is its ability to collect sufficient resources to sustain its




operations, but in this it is in competition with the dominant classes. Both state and class seek to extract resources from the populace, thereby gen-erating the tax-rent trade-off; the more the people have to pay in taxes to the state, the less upper classes can extract in the form of rent, and vice versa. This tension is present in the relationship between all states and dominant classes, and unless it is stabilized the relationship between the two is likely to be difficult. Furthermore, the state may actively pur-sue policies at variance with those preferred by the dominant classes. The state’s quest for order and domestic peace may encourage it to make concessions to lower classes at the expense of dominant classes, while its desire for external security may lead it into policies which have a negative impact upon the wealth of members of the dominant class (e.g. increas-ing the tax burden on them) or may even lead it to seek to restructure domestic society the better to compete internationally. Thus state and class interests do not always coincide, and it is the capacity of the state to maintain the autonomy that enables it to pursue its interests in this situa-tion. But what enables the state to establish and maintain its autonomy?

There have been a number of answers to this question. Marx (1951: 303–311; also Miliband 1977: 74–90) provided one in his discussion of mid-nineteenth-century France and Bonapartism. In this conception, a broad balance of social forces in which none gained a primary or domi-nant position enabled the state to escape from control and pursue a course guided by its own perceptions. The Bonapartist leader, relying upon the state bureaucratic and coercive infrastructure, was able for a time to override social interests and pursue his own course of action without constraint. The problem with this conception of the state and its autonomy is that it continues to see the state in terms of social forces in the society. What enables the state to gain autonomy is nothing about the state itself, but the nature of the broader class relationships within society as a whole. Of course in practice state autonomy is linked to the nature of class relations. But to define state autonomy purely as a function of those relations is once again to reduce the state to epiphenomenal status. State autonomy has been better explained in other ways.

One approach to this question is to focus upon the nature of state personnel (e.g. Trimberger 1977 & 1978). In this view, state autonomy depends upon the holders of high civil and military posts not being recruited from the dominant classes and not developing close relations with those classes once in office. It is thus the personal origins and associations of state officials that are seen to be central. In Trimberger’s view, when officials retain ties to dominant elites reform may be pos-sible, but revolution from above, and therefore maximal state action, can only come about when the state elite is free of such ties. Thus this view sees state autonomy as being the same as the state having few direct



The Modern State 21

relations with the society as a whole. This implies that state power is best conceived of as a zero-sum game, to be exercised over the society rather than through it. State autonomy is thus a product of the insulation of the state from society. The problem with this approach is that it conceives of the state acting autonomously only against the will of society. This is because it has focused upon those major cases when the state has stepped in to fundamentally re-organize society in the form of a revolution from above. Such an effort clearly provoked opposition from within society, and the state has been able to overcome that principally through the mobilization of coercive capacity. But it is not clear that this way of view-ing the problem assists in our understanding of how the state administers the society in an ongoing fashion. When the focus is upon humdrum day-to-day administration, the view of the state arising from periods of large-scale state-induced societal transformation is not necessarily the most useful. Such an approach emphasizes the disconnection of state from society, which is precisely the reverse of the situation that prevails in looking at normal administration.

Another approach is to see the state as a distinctive sort of organiza-tion operating in a sphere that no other organization fully occupies, although many will impinge upon it (Mann 1986a). The state is seen as the only type of institution that projects power throughout an area defined in territorial terms; autonomy stems from ‘the state’s unique ability to provide a territorially centralized form of organization’ (Mann 1986a: 109, emphasis in original). It combines this territorial focus with an institutional structure attuned to the needs and demands of a ter-ritorial unit. This implies a combination of administrative capacity and coercive potential, and is underpinned by recognition of the need to use power as a means rather than it being an end. But what is important about this territorial focus is that the state is the only body which may be defined in terms of exercising political power (as opposed to economic or ideological – see ‘State power’, below) over that territory. As such, the state has a unique role to play in a sphere conceptually autonomous from other spheres of activity. The state is, therefore, in principle autonomous, and it remains so unless it is captured by forces operating in the other spheres of power. Thus, in this view state autonomy arises from the dis-tinctiveness of the state as an organization, from the fact that it alone can perform certain functions. This general proposition requires greater specificity before we can use this notion of the source of autonomy to analyse the changing role of the state.

One view that builds upon this sees state autonomy as arising from the fact that the state as an institution is located at the intersection of the international and the domestic arenas (Skocpol 1979: esp. 32). Having responsibilities in both arenas, for defence and the pursuit of interests




abroad and for the ordering and security of life at home, the state is able to escape the control of potential captors. It is able to play off different groups against one another, balancing between the two arenas of activity, and to use them to blunt challenges to its continuing position. What is cen-tral to this view of the basis of state autonomy is the function of the state, and the fact that that function must be carried out within two distinct policy arenas. Rooted in both and restricted to neither, the state is thereby able to maintain its autonomy from all of those groups whose interests are limited to one or the other arena in the way that its interests are not. This is a persuasive explanation of state autonomy, emphasizing as it does the duality of the state’s role and therefore the importance of the often ignored external arena. But as it currently stands it underestimates the complexity of both the state and the context within which the state acts.

Neither the external nor internal arena is monolithic; both are divided into numerous discrete but individually overlapping spheres, each of which is populated by a diversity of actors. In the international arena, a state will be concerned with a range of issues, including military security, economic security and welfare, international regulation, trade, people movements, terrorism, cultural relations and maybe human rights. In each of these policy spheres, it will have to interact with a different set of actors: other states, international organizations, and even individuals and small groups. In the domestic arena, the range of different spheres in which the state is active is much larger. All areas of life are potentially areas of policy concern, from those dealing with individuals’ personal lives all the way through to major issues like the structure and function-ing of the polity itself. In every one of these policy spheres, a diversity of actors is to be found, ranging from individual political activists through to highly organized formal associations. The sheer number of spheres and actors and the range of their concerns, and the fact that the state is involved in them all (some episodically, others continuously), of itself means that the state is able to maintain its autonomy should those who run it desire to do so. The competing interests of its potential clients, for that is what those operating in the various policy spheres effectively are, given that they are seeking state support to get their way on a par-ticular issue, inhibits the creation of the sorts of coalitions necessary for establishing stable and continuing control over the state. State autonomy thus rests on the multiplicity and diversity of interests seeking to gain its support.

The situation is actually even more complex than this because the state itself is not monolithic. The state is internally differentiated into a variety of institutional structures. These are divided vertically by function, horizontally by geography. The vertical divisions roughly correspond to the major spheres within which both the multitudinous interests noted



The Modern State 23

above are active and the state must take an interest. Within the state, these are viewed as policy areas (and constituencies), and are signified by the presence in states of civil service departments devoted to particular policy areas, like health, transport, education, law and order and consumer affairs. The horizontal divisions correspond to the spatial organization of the polity: whether it is a federal or unitary state, the jurisdiction of local and regional government. Many of the vertically defined segments of the state, the civil service departments, will be divided horizontally as well. The legislative arm of the state may also be divided horizontally, as in a federation. What is important about these divisions is the relationship that develops between these segments of the state and the political activists and forces active within the broader social spheres and policy constituencies. The more these segments sink their roots into their constituencies, the more firmly rooted the state will be in the society. But also the more diverse are the constituencies within which the state is thereby rooted, the more secure the state as an institution is from seizure by a particular group. The conflicting demands generated from within these constituencies in their total effect will normally ensure that no constituency becomes dominant, and therefore will liberate the central state apparatus from external con-trol. If those constituencies were to come together and thereby form stable coalitions, the likelihood of capture of central state organs would increase. But given the maintenance of normal political conditions, the diversity of groups and demands should ensure that this does not occur and therefore should sustain the continuing autonomy of the state.

But the reverse is also important. By becoming closely connected with these policy constituencies, the branches of the state open themselves up to penetration by those constituencies. No arm of the state, be it govern-ment department, agency or statutory authority, can remain completely immune to and separated in a watertight container from those constitu-encies if it wishes to be effective in its policy-making and administrative endeavours. In order to carry out its functions, to make and implement policy and to conduct the rule making which is the state’s role in society, it needs the cooperation of these relevant constituencies and the organi-zations of which they consist. In exchange, state bodies must partially open themselves up to those constituencies. In institutional terms, this may take the form of discussion, bargaining and negotiation, maybe the co-optation of members of these constituencies into the workings of the state body, and the inclusion of members of the former in policy draft-ing and implementation. There are also more informal links: personal contacts between people working in the same policy sector, personal favours, inducements and other forms of influence peddling. Whatever form it takes, the interlinking of state bodies with these constituencies is central to the former’s functioning. This seems to call into question state




autonomy. It seems to be exactly the scenario envisaged by those who argue that the state is captured by particular groups and therefore acts purely as an instrument of those groups.

However the situation is not so simple. Two factors, together, can enable the state to maintain its autonomy even in a situation of such interlinking. The effect of this on state autonomy is counterbalanced by both the nature of the policy spheres and the nature of the state. In terms of policy spheres, policies are often the object of conflict between differ-ent groups within society, with the result that in a particular policy area, the state is rarely confronted by a single dominant interest group. State bodies must inevitably interact with a range of groups, and therefore are less likely to fall under the control of one unchallenged group. In terms of the nature of the state, interlinkage may be offset by both the bulk of the state itself and by its centralization. The capacity of individual state bod-ies in the policy spheres is heavily reliant upon the state as a whole. They can do nothing without the authority and the resources provided by the overall state; they are but a part of the larger enterprise. Furthermore this is an enterprise that is run on centralized lines, in the sense that ultimate authority lies at the centre and there are rules and norms that bind the whole together under the overall direction of central state organs. Such rules and norms are crucial to the overall operation of the state organiza-tion and provide the rationale for those who work within it. Moreover the state’s central organs will seek to limit any loss of control over non-central organs that may be threatened by any penetration of lower-level organs by constituencies within society. Thus despite penetration at the local level, lower-level state organs are not necessarily captured nor lose their autonomy. And certainly it does not mean that the state as a whole has lost its autonomy even if a large number of its lower-level organs have been penetrated. By the nature of the policy constituencies, those branches of the state that have been penetrated are likely to have been penetrated by different groups whose interests will not always coin-cide. Individual state bodies interact with different policy constituencies, with the result that penetration is achieved by a mosaic of different actors which can enable the state overall to balance upon these and retain its autonomy. In this sense, the state can be seen as an arena within which these actors can compete for the achievement of their aims, but the very diversity of those actors ensures the state’s autonomy.

But this sort of interlinkage should not simply be seen as state organs being taken over by non-state actors. While the involvement of such actors in state activity provides those actors and the organizations they represent with potential leverage against the state, this may also be seen as state co-optation of civil society actors and organizations. The perceived penetration is two-way as the state organ is able to use the connections it has with civil society organizations to further its own aims. By linking



The Modern State 25

up with organizations that constitute civil society, the state can use those organizations not only to develop policy, but to implement policy as well. By working with such organizations, the state maximizes its capacity to have a direct effect on society at large and extends its reach into the com-munity. Such linkages are crucial for an effective state. This constitutes the embedding of the state in the society.

There are two aspects of this:

1 Institutional interdependence. Scholars have given this a variety of terms, including ‘embedded autonomy’, ‘interactive embeddedness’ and ‘governed interdependence’ (respectively Evans 1995; Seabrooke 2001; and Weiss 1998) reflecting the interactive nature of the rela-tionship. The principal site of institutional interdependence that has been studied is the economic sphere, broadly conceived, but given that this term refers to the existence of a cooperative working rela-tionship between state body and organized groups or associations within society, it can exist in any sphere of life. The essence of institu-tional interdependence is that state bodies consistently work directly with organizations arising from within society generally or a particu-lar policy sector, with state decisions shaped by this interaction. This is a form of institutional embedding of the state in the organizational structures of the society.

Institutional interdependence: A structured cooperative relationship whereby state institutions work with non-state organizations to achieve common ends. Its essence is the relationship between the institutions.

2 Organic interdependence. The essence of organic interdependence is that state institutions are staffed by members of the society over which they rule. This provides an organic link between state and society, both embedding the state within the society and providing an avenue of influence into the state. However, in most cases, represen-tation in state organs is not widely spread throughout all potential constituencies in society; representation is usually skewed toward particular constituencies, like classes, ethnic groups, and the male gender, which means that a crucial question is how broad organic interdependence is: are state bodies staffed from narrow social con-stituencies or from a broader cross section of the population? Another question is the degree to which these organic links are vitiated by the ethos of state service: does being a member of the state bureaucracy, for example, mean that one must forsake most of the social legacies stemming from one’s origins? There may thus be a tension between




state position and social origin. Such interdependence can be found in two types of state bodies, the bureaucracy that implements state decisions and, where there is one, the legislature that is part of the decision-making process.

Organic interdependence: The way in which state institutions are staffed from within society. This may be either narrow, where officials come from only one segment of society (e.g. a class or religious group), or broad, where they come from right across society generally.

Where institutional and organic interdependence are well developed, the state is more firmly embedded in and penetrative of the society than where these are underdeveloped. The state is also usually more effective where such interdependence is well developed. It is more soundly rooted not only because its attachment to social forces enables it better to imple-ment effective policy, but also because that attachment can create incen-tives for the social forces to seek to work through the existing structure to achieve their ends rather than go outside it. This means that the state’s connections with society help to stabilize the whole situation and lock many of the more important social forces into a position of supporting the status quo. If those social forces can achieve their aims through the relationship with the state, and the corresponding power structure, they will be more likely to support it, including in times of difficulty. In this sense, the stability and survivability of the state depends upon the degree to which it is rooted in society at large.

Importantly, the functioning of both institutional and organic interde-pendence is not reliant only on state institutions, but also depends on the society within which state structures sit. Institutional interdependence requires the existence of established groups with which state institutions can interact. If there are, for example, no organized producer groups in the economy or consumer groups among the populace, there is no one for state institutions to engage in either of these sectors. Similarly, organic interdependence works best when the populace is politically aware, or at least sufficiently educated to be able to engage meaningfully with state bodies. Where the populace is apathetic or unable to play a politi-cal role, the relationship ceases to be interdependent because there is no percolation up the structure. This means that state embeddedness may be most effectively established where there is a developed civil society and an active populace. When this occurs and there is broad social inclusion in state affairs, we may call this cooperative governance. Where such embeddedness, and therefore cooperative governance, does not exist,



The Modern State 27

the state’s relationship with society is likely to be more organizational, administrative, directive and potentially coercive.

Cooperative governance: When state institutions work in association with non-state organizations in a continuing, coherent and structured way. The essence is that each cooperates with the other.

This does not mean that the state may not penetrate society where there is neither active civil society nor involved populace. But when the society is like this, rather than cooperative governance what tends to exist is a situation where the state must exercise administrative, organi-zational control from above. Rather than interdependence and coopera-tion, there is direction and control. This sort of relationship rarely builds effective state capacity.

State power

These three dimensions of capacity – governmental coherence, projection of power, and interdependence – can be seen to be exercised through three modes of rule:

1 Direct state action. This is where appointed state officials directly carry out the tasks required. For example, decisions are made by state officials, regional governors are sent from the centre to administer the regions, tax is collected by state tax collectors. Military rule of regions could also be seen in this way.

2 Indirect through agents. The chief form of this is where local nota-bles are co-opted into positions within the formal state structure to exercise administrative control; for example, a city leader is made the regional governor.

3 Alliance with non-state actors. Rather than the imposition of a state administrative structure and the populating of it by local notables (mode 2), this involves reliance upon existing non-state structures and people for administration. For example, local chiefs are retained to act in the state’s name.

All three modes of exercising rule, and therefore realizing capacity, can be effective for the implementation of governing tasks, but it is the first two that best facilitate the building of state capacity.

Operationalization of these modes involves the exercise of power. Power is an instrument of capacity and therefore central to all modes




of realization of that capacity. The state is, par excellence, the means for concentrating power. But power is itself a diversified concept. There is not merely one type of power, nor is there one means through which power can be expressed or projected. There is a wide diversity of the latter and there is a range of different types of power. It is, following Michael Mann (1986a, 1986b, 1993, 2012, 2013), useful to identify four types of power the state can use.

Ideological power is the power of ideas. It involves the construction of arguments aimed at justifying a particular set of social or political arrangements or persuading people of the correctness of a particular course of action. Ideological power is thus used principally to legitimate authority. There are in principle two types of such legitimation: ascend-ant and descendant. The ascendant principle has historically been the less common of the two types, rooting a justification for political and social arrangements in the populace. The most common form of ascendant belief has been the modern ideology of democracy, but in practice this has been a dominant paradigm for the organization of society only over the last 200 years of a history of organized political society stretching back over 5,000 years. The descendant principle nests the justification for political and social arrangements in some conception of a superior authority, usually of divine origin. Society is seen as in some sense a divinely inspired order, with religion being a major prop to and justifica-tion of schemes for the organization of society. An important difference between the ascendant and descendant forms is that the former is much more open to change by society and the people in it than the latter, where any change may call into question the religious belief which underpins that society. This sort of legitimation is essentially the justification of power relations.

Ideology can also be a means of establishing social solidarity within the community. It helps to define the social unit by specifying the quali-ties that mark it off from its neighbours. This is usually done in terms of the presentation of a pseudo-historical or mythological vision that provides a sense of a common past for the community based upon com-mon experiences and common beliefs. Creation of a sense of normative solidarity, of belonging together as a natural unit, is a significant aspect of ideological power. What this means is that ideological power is the means of defining both the nature of the community and the power relations that hold sway within it. It can also justify particular policy positions.

Economic power involves the use of economic resources to achieve one’s ends. There are two principal means for the state to mobilize the resources central to economic power. First, direct involvement in eco-nomic activity. This may take the form of state monopolies of all or some types of activity whereby competition with state institutions is formally



The Modern State 29

prohibited and enforced by penalties. But it may also take the form of the more limited entry of the state into economic activity through the estab-lishment of state agencies to act in competition with non-state bodies in particular spheres of activity, or state action in intervening in the market to achieve certain limited but particular goals. The mass purchase of grain to ensure an adequate food supply to the urban poor is an example of this. The second means of achieving control is more indirect, through regulation. The rulers may generate a wide range of rules, laws and regu-lations designed to structure economic activity. Such measures will range from broad laws relating to the general conduct of economic life to quite specific measures about particular aspects of economic activity. But what is crucial is the capacity of the rulers to enforce these measures. This depends upon political power.

Political power manifests itself principally through organizational or administrative control and relies overwhelmingly on state officials. Political power is territorially based, in the sense that the definition of whom power may be exercised over is conceived in territorial terms and, insofar as the state is concerned, will be centralized. This means that the focus of political power is likely to be concentrated in a central region, where direct control can be exercised over the populace, but this will be surrounded by zones in which such control is weaker, stretching to areas over which no political control is exercised by the centre at all. The administrative reach of the political authorities will almost always be less than the military reach; an army can be sent outside the borders much more easily than administrative control can be created. A con-centric model of political control is useful for conceptualizing this (e.g. Lattimore 1962: 480–491 & 542–551).

The establishment of an effective administrative network requires a developed infrastructure, principally of communication but also of control. The problem for all governments, even contemporary ones with a highly developed infrastructure of this sort, is that its officials may disappear into society, or see their loyalties as lying rather more with the communities within which they work than with the central authorities. If this happens, the centre’s capacity to continue to exercise political control over the region in which this has occurred collapses because the local official acts for that community rather than for the state. This is an intrinsic problem because if the official is to do his duty properly, he must become highly familiar with the local community and its problems. But once the official has become thus familiar, and thereby close to that com-munity, the possibility of split loyalties is increased. While the presence of a developed communications and control infrastructure makes this less likely, or at least enables the centre to respond quickly when it does happen, it cannot prevent this type of development. States have created




a variety of ways of seeking to deal with this problem. The despatch of plenipotentiaries from the centre to audit local officials is one method, but this is a means only of exercising episodic control. Another is the rotation of officials so that someone cannot sink roots into the local community and thereby gain the incentive to defect from the centre. But the problem with this is that if officials do not remain in one place for very long, they can never become sufficiently familiar with it to be able to act effectively in the centre’s interests. So the disappearance of admin-istrative staff is a real problem for political authorities in their quest to exercise political power. It is also a major way in which political power is contested.

Military power is the simplest of the forms of power. It stems from the need for security, is closely allied to political power, is linked to ter-ritory and centralization and its essence is coercion. However, in many cases, the threat of the use of force is more effective than its actual use. Nevertheless it is the threat of the use of such power that underpins such a pre-emptive form of constraint. Moreover, like political power, mili-tary power depends upon officials (or perhaps, state-employed actors, like soldiers); without a special coercive apparatus, the mobilization of military power would be difficult.

These four types of power are linked in a variety of ways depending upon the situation. Increases in one type of power may have implications for the other three. It is important to realize that there is no necessary complete fit between, for example, political power on the one hand and ideological, economic and military power on the other. Both ideological power and economic power may be much more extensive in their reach than political power; the role of the Vatican throughout much of its his-tory is an example of authorities exercising more extensive ideological than political power. In terms of economic power, the location of small states close by larger ones may mean that the economy of the former will be dominated by decisions made in the latter. Similarly, domesti-cally these types of power will not always coincide. Parts of a territory under a centre’s political control may be ideologically heterodox and/or economically autonomous. But the crucial factor for our analysis is that the aim of state elites throughout history, both real and aspirant, has generally been to concentrate all types of power in their hands, although this has been less so in the economic and ideological spheres than in the political and military. State leaders have tended to see their positions as being most secure when they could control all of these types of power, using them in combination to overwhelm potential challengers. Effective state capacity involves the wielding of all four types of power by the state.

Thus the three dimensions of state capacity (governmental coherence, projection of power, and interdependence) may be realized through three



The Modern State 31

structural modes of rule (direct, indirect and alliance) and expressed through four forms of power (ideological, economic, political and mili-tary). There are no consistent patterns among these three sets of char-acteristics; the different forms of power may flow through all three structural modes in realizing each of the dimensions of capacity. The relations between these are always in flux, depending upon the particular circumstances, while different types of resources are needed for the dif-ferent forms of power.

This survey of the elements of capacity suggests that if state elites want to expand governing capacity, their best course is to strengthen the operation of the central institutions of the state and create extensive partnerships with a wide range of actors in society. Strengthening the way in which central institutions function – effective decision making and a rational bureaucracy responsive to central commands – will facilitate the extension into society while avoiding capture by social actors. The three dimensions of capacity – governmental coherence, projection of power, and interdependence – are thus linked. They are central to the ability of a strong state to play a continuing decisive role in society. But in practice not all states possess high-level capacity. States that have little effective capacity are deficient in at least one of these dimensions of capacity. Government may be incoherent as a result of political instability at the top of the state (as in Thailand during much of the twentieth century when it was wracked by frequent coups) or a constitutional arrangement whereby there is no clear source of final authority (as in Republican Rome – see Chapter 2). Effective power projection may be undermined by the patrimonial nature of the bureaucracy or the poor resources devoted to it, as in Zaire. The state may be weak in interdependence, sit-ting atop the society with few institutional links into it, as in conquest states. A state may have more developed capacity in one area than in oth-ers; for example, many states have more extensive military than economic capacity. And strengths in one area may outweigh weaknesses in another; for example, the governmental incoherence reflected in the 41 different Italian prime ministers between 1945 and 2015 was compensated for by the bulk and capacity of the bureaucracy and a high level of interdepend-ence. Even in states with high levels of capacity, there will be blank spots, areas which the state cannot see. For example, in contemporary Western democracies the shadow economy still functions, tradespeople are paid cash in hand and thereby avoid tax, and illegal immigrants disappear into society. Highly developed capacity does not give total control, and there will always be limits to what the state can do, as the attempts to establish totalist political systems in the twentieth century show. Nevertheless the higher the level of state capacity, the stronger and more effective the state is likely to be. But the situation will vary from state to state and over time.




As noted earlier, it is very difficult to get an overall sense of the extent of state capacity in any particular case: capacity may differ in different policy spheres, geographical locations, over time, and in different forms of power, with the result that scholars have been unable to devise any commonly accepted means of measuring it (e.g. Fortin 2010; Hendrix 2010; Kocker 2010). Appreciation of state capacity is also complicated by the fact that if it is defined in terms of the ability to achieve one’s ends we need to distinguish between possession of the means to achieve those ends and a willingness on the part of state elites to expend state capacity in the pursuit of those ends. The failure of the state to achieve a particular outcome may be a result of its inability to do so, but it may also result from a state elite’s preference not to use capacity to its fullest extent in pursuit of that outcome. The failure to achieve an outcome, of itself, tells us nothing about the strength of state capacity in that particular case. Alternatively, achievement of a particular outcome will usually mean that state capacity was sufficient to achieve the state elite’s aims. In think-ing about state capacity, it may therefore be better to see it in terms of whether it is sufficient to meet the challenges that confront it rather than trying to measure it in any overall sense. This means that when we talk about the dimensions of capacity, we are actually talking about whether the structures exist to enable state elites to achieve whatever it is that they want. So the capacity required is related to the size of the task confronted. It is therefore something that will differ from situation to situation.

In line with this, this book does not seek to measure state capacity, but to chart the development of the leading edge of the superstructure of capacity over time. There is not a direct and causal historical link between the periods identified in this book, but in each period major developments in state capacity occurred. This book will chart those developments. In doing so, it assumes that capacity is likely to be maxi-mized when:

1 the political system is coherent and decision making is effective and produces legitimate decisions;

2 rationalistic bureaucracy relies upon infrastructural power and institutional and organic interdependence to produce cooperative governance;

3 enforcement is primarily through such cooperative governance, backed up by the threat of overwhelming force.

And these rest upon a technological basis adequate to sustain them. The following chapter will analyse how capacity developed in the ancient state.



297

Abbott, Tony 212absolutist state/absolutism x, 71, 74,

77, 88–108, 110, 111, 137, 147, 156, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, 267

Abyssinia 236, 238Al-Farabi 185Al-Kindi 185al-Qa’eda 237, 240America 148, 167, 177, 187, 188Amnesty International 240Anderson, Perry 94, 110, 169, 184Antonine emperors 48Aristotle 185Asquith government 197Athens 14, 33, 34, 36–38, 42,

44–45, 48, 59, 60, 62, 63Augustus 34, 39, 47Australia 200, 212, 233Austria 101, 105, 131, 136, 169,

171autonomy, state (see also interde-

pendence) x, xii, 1, 4, 8, 18, 19, 20–27

Avicenna 185

Balkans 251Baltic republics 226Basil I 74BBC 242, 252Belgium 191Bell, Stephen 259, 260Beveridge, William 198Bismarck, Otto von 197Bloch, Marc 184Bodin, Jean 88, 96Bonney, Richard 91bourgeoisie (burghers) 5, 69, 80,

87, 89, 92, 108, 110, 117, 118, 132–135, 139, 141, 177

Braudel, Fernand 105Bretton Woods agreement 235, 250Britain viii, x–xi, 82, 88, 91, 105,

111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123–124, 126, 128–129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 147, 148, 151, 152–155, 158, 164, 177, 195–213, 236, 242, 247

broken-backed states 229, 261bureaucracy ix, x, xii, 6–8, 10, 14,

15–17, 25, 35, 42–45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 60–61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68–69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 82, 84, 86, 90, 93, 97, 98, 106, 107, 109, 131, 132, 138, 141,147, 149,153, 155, 156, 167, 171, 173, 174, 176, 190, 196–197, 203–204, 214, 217, 222, 223–224, 226, 229, 230, 259, 261, 265, 266, 267, 269, 271, 272

rationalist x, 3, 6–7, 15–17, 31, 32, 67, 69, 72, 91, 93, 131, 267, 271, 272

Burgundy 163Bush, George W. 237Buzan, Barry 160–161Byzantium x, 65, 70–76, 81, 108,

162, 266

Caesar, Julius 35Canada 200capacity, state viii–x, xi, xii, 1,

12–32, 33–35, 62, 63, 65, 70, 73, 76, 97, 98, 107, 109, 139, 159, 167, 169, 172, 173, 194, 199, 201, 211, 212, 227, 229, 230, 231, 259, 260, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271

Index



298 Index

Capetian dynasty 83capitalism 1, 109, 110, 111, 116,

139, 142, 147, 159, 169, 182, 234, 245, 247–248

capstone state 143, 152, 155, 271Caracalla 56Carneiro, Robert 4caste system 146, 153–154Catalonia 251centralization viii, x, 7, 8, 29, 30, 51,

68–69, 75, 80–87, 110, 111, 174 Chernenko, Konstantin 224China x, xi, 33, 35, 46, 48–50,

50–53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65–70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 81, 108, 109, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149–152, 153, 158, 159, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 266, 267, 268

China Central Television 242China, communist 215–216Chola 152Christianity 66, 76, 80, 162–163,

165Church, Roman Catholic 30, 66, 78,

81, 95, 107, 120, 162, 164, 165, 166, 178, 266

Cicero 42, 95citizenship 10, 37, 38, 60, 195, 196,

208city state 33, 34, 35–45, 60, 76, 97,

107, 161, 166, 171, 174, 176civil society 26, 143, 146, 203, 270,

271, 272global 239–240

civil war 263class ix, 5, 19–20, 25, 37–42, 58, 68,

92–93, 131, 132–140, 169, 177, 183–184, 195, 203

Claudius 49CNN 242, 252coherence, governmental viii, 1, 12,

13, 30–31, 32, 35–42, 45, 46–50, 63, 64, 69, 70, 75, 76, 88–108, 137, 159, 212, 221–222, 230, 266, 270

Colbert, Jean-Baptiste 105–106Cold War 199, 205, 237, 242, 249,

250communication 17, 29, 35, 68, 120,

121, 129–130, 139, 153, 164, 191, 199, 204, 223, 230, 239, 240–244, 246, 252–255, 266, 271

communist party 217–228, 270communist state xi, 1, 194,

215–228, 232, 268, 269, 270, 272

computers 199, 235, 243–244, 246, 253

Confucianism 48, 50, 52–53, 57, 66, 67, 68–69, 146, 150, 181

Constantine V 74Constantine IX Monomachos 73constitutional state/constitutionalism

x, 77, 88–108, 109, 137, 170, 171, 174, 267

cooperative governance 26–27, 32, 201–216, 230, 258–265, 270

corruption 1, 54, 68, 94, 131, 229

court (royal) 35, 46–47, 48, 49, 50, 59, 63, 67, 72, 78, 88, 90, 103, 153, 155, 158

Daesh/ISIS/ISIL/IS 240Davos summit 257decision making 13–14, 31, 32,

35, 36, 46–47, 57, 67, 212, 222

democracy 11, 27, 36, 44, 89, 140, 168, 195–196, 201–202, 203, 212, 214, 262–263, 270

Denmark 173Deutsche Welle 242developmental state 215, 216Deyo, Frederic 215differentiation 7, 8, 22–25Diocletian 48, 49, 53, 55, 56Domitian 56Downing, Brian 171dynastic state 76, 81–82, 94, 108,

166, 167, 178, 267



Index 299

early-modern state 65, 88–108, 172, 174

economy, state and ix, xi–xii, 18–27, 28–29, 30, 44–45, 55–57, 58–59, 60, 69, 74–75, 92, 93, 98–108, 109–159, 167, 182–183, 194–230, 233–236, 244–249

education 23, 72, 122, 128–129, 194, 198, 202, 203, 220, 230, 255

Edward I 164Edward III 164, 165elites ix, 5, 12, 14, 20–21, 31, 33,

47, 50, 57–58, 60, 63, 95, 105, 106, 110, 118, 120, 128, 135, 137, 141, 155, 159, 167, 177, 178, 181, 261, 267

elitism 5Elvin, Mark 151email 243–244embeddedness ix, xi, 18, 20–27,

134, 139, 194–230, 258–265, 268, 269, 270, 272

emperor 46–47, 50, 57, 58, 59, 152–153

Byzantine 71, 74Chinese 48–49, 51, 67, 69Roman 47, 48, 49

empire 34, 35, 46–59, 60, 66, 70, 161, 191–192

Engels, Frederick 5England x, 65, 77, 82–83, 84–85,

88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 109,112, 117, 144, 145, 164, 169, 170, 171, 173, 191, 195

Ertman, Thomas 173Esping-Anderson, Gosta 200European Economic Community

(EEC) 239European expansion 143, 147, 148,

158, 181–192European Union 239, 247, 251,

255

Facebook 243failed states 229

feminism 5feudalism x, 65, 75, 76–87, 89, 94,

95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 107, 109, 110, 115, 117, 120, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 174, 175, 178

FIFA 240Finer, Samuel 10, 67, 74Foucault, Michel 5, 260France x-xi, 1, 11, 20, 65, 69, 77,

82, 83, 84, 85–86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 111, 112, 114, 119, 121, 123, 124–125, 126, 128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 144, 145, 154, 165, 169, 171, 174, 177, 191, 201, 247, 260

Frank, Andre Gunder 148, 157, 186Friedman, Milton 207Fried, Morton 5

G7 257G20 257General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT) 238, 257Genoa 171, 185George III 91Georgia 250Germany 1, 97, 109, 118, 119, 121,

123, 124–125, 126–127, 131, 135, 136, 139, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176, 177, 191, 197, 201, 218, 237

Gerschenkron, Alexander 118, 120global financial crisis 248globalization xii, 191, 230, 231–

265, 268cultural/ideological 240–244,

252–254economic 233–236, 247–249,

254political 236–240, 249–252, 254

Gorbachev, Mikhail 225governance xii, 231, 258–264, 265,

268, 269Greece 239, 251green theory 5



300 Index

Greenpeace 240Grotius, Hugo 168

Hall, John 143–146, 150, 172Han dynasty 33, 50, 51, 53, 57, 65,

76, 160Hanseatic League 97, 166, 174Hapsburg Empire 109, 165Held, David 253Henry VIII 95, 120Hindmoor, Andrew 259, 260Hintze, Otto 4, 141, 170Hobbes, Thomas 88, 96Hobson, John 119–120, 143Hoffman, Philip 190Holy Roman Empire 76, 162, 165Huang, Ray 151Huber, Evelyne 200Hui, Victoria Tin-bor 176, 177Human Rights Watch 240Hundred Years War 166, 168, 175Hungary 77, 173

IBM 240identity 10, 28, 66, 81, 94–95, 129,

167, 177–179, 193, 231, 267India 143, 146, 147, 152–155, 156,

158, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190

industrialization ix, xi, 1, 69, 109–159, 190, 194, 226, 227, 267, 268, 269, 271

information flow 14, 47, 59, 230Instagram 243interdependence x, xi–xii, 1, 12, 15,

18–27, 30–31, 33, 44, 55–57, 59–60, 62–63, 75, 98–108, 109, 121, 132–141, 144, 159, 194–230, 231, 254–265, 266, 267, 268, 269

institutional x, 15, 25, 32, 44, 75, 98–108, 121, 140, 159, 200, 213, 228, 230, 258–265, 267, 270, 271

organic x, 15, 25–26, 32, 44, 45, 48, 55, 58, 59, 62, 75, 98–108, 121, 132–137, 140, 144, 159,

226, 228, 230, 261, 262, 267, 270, 271, 272

interests 2–3, 4, 11, 19, 21–22International Monetary Fund (IMF)

257international system 34, 61, 66, 76,

144–145, 160–193, 267–268East Asian xi, 160, 163, 179–182,

189European xi, 160, 162–179, 180,

181internationalization 239, 244,

245–246Internet 235, 243–244Islam 70, 71, 143, 144–145, 146,

155, 156, 157, 162, 163, 184, 185, 188

Israel 246Italy 31, 97, 109, 121, 136, 142,

164, 166, 174, 176, 201, 247

James I 96Japan 180, 181, 189, 192, 201, 213,

214, 215, 247, 252, 255Joan of Arc 167Jones, Eric 149–150Justinian 72, 74

Keynes, John Maynard 197Kiser, Edgar 172Khrushchev, Nikita 227Komnenos dynasty 71, 73Korea 180, 181, 213, 214,

247Kropotkin, Pyotr 129

late developers 118–121, 139law 10, 11, 23, 71, 74, 79–80, 84,

85, 90, 91, 110, 112, 127, 139, 147, 153, 155, 157, 204, 219, 258–259, 260, 266

League of Nations 238legislature ix, 23, 69, 84, 85–86, 88,

89, 90–92, 93, 98, 100, 107, 108, 109, 111, 113, 115, 135, 137, 159, 170, 202–203, 212, 222, 226, 267



Index 301

legitimation 6, 14, 27, 37–38, 44, 60, 71, 95–97, 106, 167–168, 203, 219–220, 257, 259

Lenin, Vladimir 217Leo III 74Leo VI 74Linton, April 172literacy 17, 35, 72, 78, 122, 131,

242Little, Richard 160–161localism 253Louis XI 102

Macrinus 53Mann, Michael 80, 125, 171Marcus Aurelius 53Marshall, Thomas H. 196Marx, Karl 6, 20, 141–142, 217Marxism 4, 5–6, 18–19, 109, 141–142Maurice 72Mauryan dynasty 152Maximinus 56McGrew, Anthony 253mercantilism 95, 105–106, 110,

113, 115, 116Migdal, Joel 3military 10, 15, 18, 27, 29, 37, 39,

45, 49, 54–55, 58, 59, 61–62, 63, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 88, 94, 97, 113–114, 125, 127, 128, 169–177, 190, 205, 219, 236–238, 249–250, 256

Ming dynasty 65, 69, 149, 151, 158, 179, 186

Mobutu, Sese Seko 229mode of rule

alliance 27, 31, 43, 63, 153, 230, 265, 269

direct 27, 31, 55, 68, 153, 230, 269indirect 27, 31, 33, 55, 63, 68,

153, 230, 265monopoly of force 6, 10, 61, 97,

147, 258–259, 261, 269Moore, Barrington Jr 154Morris, Ian 151Mughal Empire xi, 109, 141, 144,

145, 147, 152–155, 182, 187

Napoleon 119, 126, 165national security 211nationalism 129Nero 35Netherlands 77, 87–88, 105, 106,

136, 165, 168, 169, 171, 173, 177, 191, 201

New Zealand 200, 210News Limited 240nobility 37, 38, 39–42, 50, 52–53,

59, 62–63, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90–91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 99, 110, 128, 133, 134–135, 141, 150, 151, 169, 174–175, 177

non-government organizations (NGOs) 7, 13, 239, 255

North American Free Trade Area 234, 255

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 250

Norway 247nuclear threat 237, 249–250

Obama, Barack 212officials, state 3, 19, 20–21, 29–30,

35, 49, 51, 53, 54, 58, 67, 68–69, 72, 73, 80, 84–86, 87, 91, 93–94, 101, 107, 117, 123–124, 129, 138, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 204, 214, 223, 269

Ottoman Empire xi, 70, 109, 141, 144–145, 147, 148, 152, 155–158, 162, 189, 190

palace polity 46, 47, 63, 67, 72, 73, 74, 90, 152, 155

Paleologos dynasty 71Palestine 251Parthasarathi, Prasannan

154party state 217–228patrimonialism x, 16–17, 43, 46, 53,

58, 60, 61, 77–79, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90–91, 94, 98, 99, 131, 166, 173, 178, 229, 261, 266, 267, 271



302 Index

peasantry 37, 44, 50, 57, 77, 134, 169, 183

Perkins, Dwight 151Peters, B. Guy 258Phillips, Andrew 160Pierre, Jon 258pluralism 4, 5Poland 77, 169, 170, 173police 10, 18, 115, 126–128, 199,

219political parties 7, 13, 135, 136,

196, 199, 201, 202, 207, 214Polo, Marco 187Pomeranz, Kenneth 151Portugal 187, 191power

despotic 15, 62, 127, 223, 224, 228, 266, 271

infrastructural x, 1, 15, 32, 59, 62, 68, 82, 98, 120, 121–132, 171, 190, 223, 224, 228, 230, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272

powereconomic 28–29, 30, 31, 63, 107,

189, 232–236, 244–249, 269ideological 27–28, 30, 31, 50–53,

58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 70, 74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 107, 142, 144, 149, 150, 156, 162–163, 165, 179, 181, 216, 218, 219–220, 240–244, 244–245, 252–254, 259, 260, 266, 269

military 30, 31, 63, 107, 189, 269political 29–30, 31, 58, 63, 70,

107, 189, 236–240, 249–252, 269

predatory states 229projection of power x, xi, 1, 7, 11,

12, 14, 18, 29–30, 30–31, 34, 42–43, 50–55, 59, 61, 63, 67–68, 69, 70, 72–73, 75, 80–87, 88–89, 91, 93–94, 108, 109, 122, 138, 147, 156, 173–174, 204, 212, 221, 223, 230, 266, 267, 271

property 44, 60, 79–80, 111, 112, 220, 260

Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph 129

Prussia see Germanypublic choice theory 3Pufendorf, Samuel von 168Putin, Vladimir 250

Qin dynasty 33, 50, 51, 53, 57, 76, 176, 179, 190

Qing dynasty 69, 149, 150, 151, 158

radio 241–242, 252rationalization 3, 6–7, 15, 172, 173,

177, 199, 203–204Reagan, Ronald 207, 237realism 3Red Crescent 240Red Cross 240regulatory state 210rentier states 229Richard II 164right to protect (R2P) 240, 251Ringmar, Erik 160rollback of state xii, 206–213, 269Rome

Empire 10, 33, 35, 38, 46, 47–48, 49, 53–47, 58, 60, 62, 66, 70, 71, 72, 76, 160, 162, 163, 179, 185

Republic 33, 34, 38–42, 43–44, 45, 48, 59, 60, 63, 64

Ropp, Paul 68Russia ix, 77, 79, 109, 118–119,

121, 135, 137, 139, 162, 169, 170, 171, 191, 249

Russia Today 242

Scotland 163, 251Scott, James C. 3, 129Septimius Severus 53, 56Service, Elman 4Shaw, Martin 232, 238Shue, Vivienne 67Sky Channel 242Snowden, Edward 211Song dynasty 53, 65, 68, 69, 143,

188sovereignty viii, x, 8, 9, 10, 82, 96,

97, 166, 193, 229, 232, 234, 236, 249, 251, 266, 267, 269



Index 303

Soviet Union 194, 196, 216–228, 249, 268

Spain 87, 94, 105, 111, 144, 145, 162, 163, 171, 187, 191, 236, 238

Stalin, Joseph 224state-building

organic 80, 84–85, 86overarching 80, 84, 85–86, 87

Stephens, John D. 200Strayer, Joseph 94, 172Sui dynasty 65, 66, 67surveillance 199, 211Sweden 162, 173, 201, 204Syria 250, 251

Tabb, William 232Taiwan 213, 214Tajikistan 226Tang dynasty 65, 66, 67, 149tax 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 27, 31, 38,

42, 43, 45, 56, 57, 58, 61, 66, 74, 78, 85, 92, 100–101, 103, 106, 114, 125–126, 149, 153, 154, 156, 165, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 193, 198–199, 205, 206, 207, 208, 213, 234, 248, 266

Tea Party 212technology 17–18, 32, 34, 70,

175–176, 188, 190, 199, 231, 242–244, 253

telephone 243, 246television 241–242, 252territorial state/territoriality viii, x,

6, 9, 10, 30, 76, 81–82, 88, 89, 97, 107, 108, 109, 111, 117–118, 161, 166–167, 168, 174, 231, 232, 266, 267, 268, 269

terrorism 211, 240, 255, 263Thailand 31, 192Thatcher, Margaret 207third world 1, 228–230, 261Tilly, Charles 125–126, 160,

170–171, 172totalism 216–218, 222

trade 44, 74, 99, 104, 115–116, 145, 149, 154, 157, 163, 164, 166, 181, 182–192, 233, 234, 248, 254, 257

Trajan 53trans-national corporations (TNCs)

233–234, 235, 240, 255, 256, 259

transport 17, 35, 68, 113, 120–122, 129–130, 139, 199, 240–241, 252, 255

Trimberger, Ellen Kay 20Turkey 192Twitter 243

Ukraine 250United Nations (UN) 9, 238, 240,

251United States of America (USA) viii,

123, 124–125, 131, 136, 191, 200, 201, 212, 225, 233, 237, 242, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 255, 256, 262

value consensus 39, 51–52, 53, 61, 63, 66, 67, 68, 108, 266

Venice 101, 171, 185Veyne, Paul 54Vietnam 180, 181view of state

guardian 2, 4, 5institutional 6–12instrumental 3, 4–6liberal 4, 18Marxian 4, 5–6, 18–19partisan 2–3, 19

Vijayanagra 152

Wallerstein, Immanuel 182–185, 187

war xi, 1, 18, 93, 94, 99, 100, 107, 113, 118, 143, 153, 158, 160, 165, 166, 169–177, 181, 193, 267

Warsaw Treaty Organization 250Weber, Max 3, 5, 6, 10, 15–16,

141–142



304 Index

welfare state xi–xii, 1, 194–216, 268

Westphalia, Peace of 9, 82, 166, 167

Wikileaks 211William I 82, 84, 101Wittfogel, Karl 4World Bank 211World Trade Organization (WTO)

234, 238, 257Wood, Ellen Meiskins 91

working class 115, 122, 126–127, 131, 134–137, 139, 197, 203

world system 182–193Wudi 51

Yuan dynasty 66, 68, 69, 149, 180

Yugoslavia 239

Zaire 31, 229Zheng He 149



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