9 the Neuropsychology That Would Have Interested Freud Most: Commentary by Oliver Turnbull (Bangor, UK)

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The Neuropsychology That Would Have InterestedFreud Most: Commentary by Oliver Turnbull (Bangor,UK)Oliver Turnbull

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To cite this article:Oliver Turnbull (2001) The Neuropsychology That Would Have Interested Freud Most: Commentary byOliver Turnbull (Bangor, UK), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences,

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuroscience

(Kosslyn, 1999). Language activation studies show

discrete regional responses in classical language areas

when the brain is

sliced

axially or coronally. My

colleagues at the Brain Imaging Research Institute in

Melbourne, Graeme Jackson and David Abbott, have,

for analytic purposes, viewed the brain

as

a series of

decreasing concentric volumes. Voxel counts are pro

jected onto the surface of each volume. This approach

yields a rather different view. What appear

to

be dis

crete regions in conventional cuts through the brain,

can now be appreciated

as

continuous transcortical

ribbons of activation. This finding has something in

common with Freud's aphasiological model, and is

interesting from that point

of

view. The difficulty that

remains, however, is that cognitive activation para

digms do not contain within them the broad mental

reach

of

psychoanalytic concepts. The most we can

hope for at this stage is a cerebral map

of

fragments

of the Freudian view of mind. Working memory is

a favorite topic amongst the neuroimaging fraternity;

perhaps the mystic sketchpad would allow one to

claim working memory as a fundamentally Freudian

concept

Along similar lines, the notion

of

verbal memory

is crucial in censor-ego function (Gilmore and Nerses

sian, 1999). There is a growing body

of

literature on

the functional neuroanatomy

of

verbal memory. It is

becoming clear that this function is underpinned by

a widely distributed cortical system that includes the

highest levels

of

neocortical association cortex (Dolan

and Fletcher, 1997), and pathways to the hippocampus

via perirhinal and entorhinal cortices (Saling and

Weintrob, 1999). This system clearly has one foot in

the external world, and the other in the inner world.

But does this finding lead us to the seat

of

ego?

While I find it difficult to accept the idea

of

a

special and natural nexus between cognitive neuropsy

chology and psychoanalysis, I applaud Semenza 's

contribution to the search for a link between the two

cultures of psychology, for its desire

to

bring to an end

the century of misunderstanding (Whittle, 1999).

References

Dolan,

R

J., & Fletcher, P. C. (1997), Dissociating prefron

tal and hippocampal function in episodic memory encod

ing. Nature, 388:582-585.

Freud, S (1891),

On Aphasia.

New York: International

Universities Press, 1953.

Gilmore, M.,

Nersessian, E. (1999), Freud's model of the

mind in sleep and dreaming.

This Journal, 1 2 :225-232.

Kosslyn, S M. (1999), If neuroimaging is the answer, what

is the question? Philosoph. Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond., B.,

354: 1283-1294.

Saling, M. M., Weintrob, D. (1999), The functional neu

roanatomy of verbal memory in focal epilepsy. In

ternat. Neuropsycholog. Soc., 5:274.

Whittle, P. (1999), Experimental psychology and psycho

analysis: What we can learn from a century

of

misunder

standing.

This Journal, 1 2 :233-245.

School of Behavioural Science

Department

of

Psychology

The University ofMelbourne

Victoria

3

Australia

e-mail: [email protected]

The Neuropsychology

That

Would Have Interested

Freud

Most:

ommentary

by Oliver Turnbull (Bangor, UK)

Carlo Semenza has offered a thought-provoking dis

cussion on the relationship between the theoretical

foundations of psychoanalysis, and those of modern

cognitive neuropsychology. In doing so, he reviews

the core features

of

the cognitive approach, and sug

gests that psychoanalysis shares much in common

Oliver Turnbull, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in Cognitive Neuroscience

at the University

of

Wales, Bangor, and Consultant Neuropsychologist at

The Anna Freud Centre, London.

with modern cognitivism. It is a radical, and rather

interesting, argument. The idea is interesting because

there are unquestionably

some

similarities between the

two fields, which is (to some extent, see below) cap

tured by Semenza's use

of

Howard Gardner 's list

(1985). For example, there is much merit in the argu

ment that both fields are investigating the mental appa

ratus, and that they do so using the language of

representation. Semenza's idea that Freud can be

regarded

as

a diagram maker has some appeal. In addi-


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tion, Freud was clearly of the opinion that the mental

apparatus consists

of

a number

of

component parts,

each

of

which is relatively independent, and that such

systems can be (at least to some extent) independently

modified (though the process is one of over- or under

activation, rather than by lesion). These arguments

make Semenza s suggestion rather interesting.

The Modern Opinion of Semenza s Position

However, Semenza s argument is radical because

one can already hear the howls

of

objection from both

sides. I can think of very few cognitive neuropsycholo

gists who would blithely accept that their discipline

shares its core assumptions with psychoanalysis. Cer

tainly, such scientists would be wondering why the

core assumptions and methods

of

the two disciplines

appear to be so different (for a review

of

these con

cepts see the introductory chapters of Ellis and Young

[ 9 8 8 ] ~ McCarthy and Warrington [ 9 9 ] ~ Parkin

[1996]). For example, where are the concepts of mod

ularity and dissociation in psychoanalysis? Where are

the painstaking experimental attempts to localize a

deficit to a single component

of

a model

of

mental

apparatus? There are no doubt ways in which such

questions can be countered by Semenza, but only with

difficulty. However, I feel that the most important ob

jection relating to a link between psychoanalysis and

cognitive neuropsychology relates to the type

of

pa

tient that is studied. Where in psychoanalysis would

you find the investigation of

neurological patients with

focal brain lesions? It is true that there has been some

work

of

this sort, especially recently (e.g., Kaplan

Solms and Solms, 2000). However, it has been almost

entirely absent from the earlier history

of

psychoanaly

sis. I will return to this point later in this discussion.

The objections against an analogy between psy

choanalysis and cognitive neuropsychology would

also be strongly heard from the psychoanalytic side.

Where, analysts would doubtless ask, are the great

questions

of

motivation, emotion, and personality to

be found in cognitivism? This is, I feel, the weakest

aspect of Semenza s argument. He claims, from Gard

ner s list, that the two fields share a common founda

tion in the (momentary) deemphasis of affect and so

on Such an argument is difficult to defend. It seems

that psychoanalysis is, in many respects, directly con

cerned with context, culture, and history. Indeed, it is

beyond dispute that affect is

of central

concern to

psychoanalysis, and it almost certainly

is

not a viable

enterprise if the role of emotion is deemphasized. The

Oliver Turnbull

obverse side

of

the coin is also true: The absence of a

consideration

of

affect lies at the core of the cognitive

approach. For this reason, in particular, I doubt that

many analysts would agree with Semenza.

Freud s Opinion of Semenza s Position

Semenza s argument is all the more interesting be

cause

of

the matter of historical precedent. As he

points out, modern cognitive neuropsychology has ex

plicitly looked to the behavioral neurologists

of

the

late 19th century as intellectual forebears (Shallice,

1988). Of course, we also know that psychoanalysis

was predated by Freud s substantial academic career

as a neurologist during the same period. Thus, we are

in the interesting position

of

having a clear set

of

his

torical documents in which Freud gives

his

opinion

of

the acknowledged forebears

of

modern cognitive

neuropsychology. In one sense, then this allows us to

ascertain Freud s position

on

Semenza s claim.

Freud had a variety of opinions about the state

of

behavioral neurology in the late 19th century. On

the one hand, he was sufficiently interested in the topic

to have followed the literature, investigated a number

of

patients, and published

on

the

topic the

best ex

ample being Freud (1891). This sort of behavioral neu

rology was the forerunner of neuropsychology in

general (rather than cognitive neuropsychology in par

ticular), and it clearly held great interest for Freud in

the period before psychoanalysis.

However, it is

also well known that Freud s admi

ration for the neuropsychology of his time was far

from total. From one perspective, Freud was unhappy

with some specific aspects

of

the data collected in the

field (see the early chapters

of

Freud [1891]). More

importantly, in the present context, he disagreed with

his cognitive colleagues

on

some core theoretical

points. For example, he seems particularly uncomfort

able with the narrow localizationist view, which

is (arguably) the forerunner of modularity, and hence

cognitive neuropsychology. Thus, in the famous chap

ter 6

of Aphasia

he describes the thought-pro

voking model that offers a reinterpretat ion

of

the

classic aphasiological data. In its place he suggests a

nonmodular account of the dissociation evidence,

which stands up well to modern scrutiny (cf. Pribram,

9 6 2 ~

Shallice, 1988, pp. 245-257). However, it is a

position that

is

more-or-Iess incompatible with modu

larity. Given that modularity is central to modern cog

nitive neuropsychology (Ellis and Young, 9 8 8 ~

McCarthy and Warrington, Parkin, 1996) this


4/7


makes it difficult to regard Freud

as

a founder of the

discipline.

However, while Freud was clearly

interested

in

the neuropsychology of his time, the interest was not

sustained through his career-he described problems

of this sort as a silly game

of

permutations (Solms,

2000, p. 83).

Of

course, the clearest evidence of his

waning interest in neuropsychology

is

his growing in

terest in what was to become psychoanalysis. This

intellectual shift was (arguably) a result of the fact

that many patients (notably those with hysteria) had

no demonstrable brain lesion at autopsy, and could not

adequately be explained in terms

of

the box-and-arrow

diagrams offered by the neuropsychology of Freud's

time. One of the reasons for this may have been that

such models focused on cognition at the expense of

emotion and motivation. Indeed, by dealing with this

omission, affective neuroscience and modern neuro

psychiatry are making great strides in establishing the

biological basis of disorders which were previously

classed as functional rather than organic. The

absence of knowledge of this sort in the neuroscience

of

Freud's time is likely to have been one

of

the rea

sons for his shift of emphasis to psychoanalysis, where

Freud developed a theory that

was

capable

of

ex

plaining the deficits of his patients. We can observe

the period of transition in the fact that the 1895 Proj

ect for a Scientific Psychology is an attempt to de

velop a neurological model which incorporates affect

and motivation. It was,

of

course, famously aban

doned-and marks the turning point in Freud's inter

est in the neurobiology

of

the mental apparatus.

What Sor t of

Neuropsychology Would Have

Interested

Freud?

This presents us with an interesting question. Freud

would have had no real desire to investigate the neuro

biology of, say, language and vision, when his inter

ests had moved on to those of emotion and motivation,

which lie at the core

of

psychoanalysis. However,

as

the years passed, Freud had access to an increasingly

well-developed model of the mental apparatus, which

could potentially be tested using the method which

was familiar to him from his earlier career. If he had

pursued this line

of

enquiry, then he

would

have been

able to establish the biological basis

of

psychoanaly

sis-the problem which he had failed to deal with in

the Project. This begs the question of why Freud

did

not

investigate the biological basis of the psycho

logical topics that

were

of interest to him. Had he done

35

so, then the discipline that we have recently named

neuropsychoanalysis

would have emerged decades

earlier than it now has. Why did he not begin to inves

tigate the neuropsychology that would have been of

greatest interest to him? One way to view this issue

is in the context of the standard detective novel, where

one evaluates evidence using three criteria: means,

motive, and opportunity. We should briefly examine

each.

Means, Motive, and Opportunity

First, it would seem that Freud had the

means

to study

the psychoanalytic aspects of the changes seen after

brain injury. This is the question of

whether he had

the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out the

task. The evidence here seems, at first sight, fairly

clear. For example, Freud had all the clinical tools

required to make an assessment of an appropriate pa

tient. He was, after all, not only a neurologist and

neuropathologist, but also an experienced psychoana

lyst. His years of experience in various domains of

neurological science leave us in no doubt that he had

sufficient knowledge of neuroanatomy and neuropa

thology to carry out such a study. In fact, clinicoana

tomicallocalization

of

function was a subject

of

very

special interest to

him

(Solms, 2000,

p

80). Finally,

he was extraordinarily familiar with the detail

of

psy

choanalytic theory, having developed the theory him

self. Thus, it seems self-evident that Freud had the

necessary knowledge and skills.

Second, Freud clearly had a

motive

We have es

tablished above that Freud had little taste for the neu

ropsychological investigation

of cognitive

abilities in

his later

career-they

no longer held any great interest

for him. However, he would have had

very

good rea

son to investigate the biological basis of psychological

functions of psychoanalytic interest. Some evidence

of this comes from the fact that he lived to see the early

emergence of the science of psychopharmacology, and

appears to have followed the progress of

the discipline

with some interest. More importantly, he frequently

made statements to the effect that our understanding

of

various depth psychological functions would be all

the easier

if

we knew their biological basis. Finally, he

made frequent reference to the fact that the separation

between psychoanalytic theory and neuroscience was

'The deficiencies in our description would probably vanish if we

were already in a position to replace the psychological terms by physiolog

ical or chemical

ones

(Freud, 1920, p 60).


5/7

only temporary, and that the disciplines would one

day be reunited.

2

Thus, Freud would have been de

lighted to see the present-day moves toward interdisci

plinarity. One surely cannot claim that he would have

been anything but highly motivated to investigate the

neurobiological basis of psychoanalysis.

This leaves the final

question-of

whether Freud

had the opportunity Would he have been able to carry

out such investigations, even if he had both the skills

and the motivation to complete the task? One should

recall that Freud was seeing patients more or less

all

day, every day

of

the working week, for the duration

of his analytic career (Jones, 1956). Thus, we may

assume that he would not have had the time to visit

hospitals and to investigate the appropriate patients.

Indeed, he would certainly not have considered a brief

interchange with a patient at the bedside to be suffi

cient to draw any sort

of

reliable psychoanalytic infer

ence about them. It would be necessary to meet

regularly with the patient, in a setting like that

of

his

analytic consultation room. Without this, he would not

be investigating the depth psychological issues that

were

of

real interest to him.

However, the lack of time to visit hospitals need

not be such a major objection to the claim of lack

of

opportunity. Freud was spending a great deal

of

time

seeing patients, and he could have perhaps taken on

someone as an analytic patient who had suffered a

neurological injury. In such a case, Freud would not

have to travel to the hospital to see the patient, and he

need not be hurried in making a premature diagnosis

at the bedside. Instead, he would be able to take his

time in assessing the mental apparatus in all its com

plexity. If the proposal that Freud could have seen

neurological patients in his consulting room is valid,

then Freud would have had the opportunity (as well

as the motive and means) to investigate the biological

basis

of

psychoanalysis. To the best

of

my knowledge,

he did not do so. Why did he not choose this strategy?

There are a range of possible reasons for Freud s

reluctance to take

on

neurological patients. Perhaps

(1) no one would refer neurological patients to him.

This seems unlikely, given that psychiatry and neurol

ogy were closely allied disciplines, that Freud was

well connected in the medical community in Vienna,

and that he received a huge number of international

referrals (Jones, 1956). Another option is (2) that

Freud may have been of the opinion that such patients

would not

benefit

from analytic treatment, and hence

2 We must recollect that all of our provisional ideas will presumably

one day be based on an organic substructure (Freud, 1914, p 78).

Oliver

Turnbull

seeing such cases would have been unethical. This ar

gument has a slightly stronger basis, given that the

talking cure was designed for the treatment

of

neu

rosis, and that Freud was always skeptical

of

those

who attempted its use for other disorders (such s

schizophrenia). Finally, for those who favor conspir

acy theories, there is the unlikely possibility (3) that

Freud did see such patients, but chose not to report

them.

The Claim of Lack of Means

To the best of my knowledge, there has only been one

attempt to explain why Freud did not embark

on

an

analytic investigation of neurological patients. Solms

(2000) claims that Freud did not attempt to investigate

the problem because t he clinico-anatomical meth

od

was incapable

of

providing the correlations he

sought (p. 81). Thus, he suggests that Freud did not

have the means (the theoretical and methodological

tools) necessary to undertake this line of enquiry, be

cause

of

the limitations of the currently available

method. Now, we should recall that the clinicoanatom

ical method has been a central feature

of

neuropsy

chology for some 150 years, and was the technique

by which so many of the great discoveries of the disci

pline were made (aphasia and the language areas of the

left hemisphere; recent memory and the hippocampus,

etc.). It is not a method that lacks reliability; it is also

the tool that is

currently

being recommended as an

excellent candidate method for pursuing modern neu

ropsychoanalysis (Solms, 1998a,b, 1999,2000; Kaplan

Solms and Solms, 2000). Thus, it is of some impor

tance that we clarify why Freud may have rejected this

approach, and also how it is that Solms et al. now

come to recommend it.

Solms s claim is that Freud rejected the clinicoa

natomical method, as it existed during his lifetime

because it was incapable of accommodating (1) the

functional nature of neurotic pathology and (2) the

dynamic nature of normal mental processes (p. 81).

This situation, Solms argues, has now changed; he

dates this change to the work of Aleksandr Romano

vich Luria (1902-1977). The claim is that Luria s in

troduction of the concept of a functional system

adapted the clinico-anatomical method to accommo

date the essentially dynamic nature of the mental pro

cess (Solms, 2000,

p

98). This method was not

available during Freud s lifetime, because it was de

veloped by Luria after the Second World War (see

Luria s [1979] autobiography for an account

of

the


6/7


chronology). This argument suggests, then, that Freud

did not feel able to undertake the task

of

developing

a depth neuropsychology because of the inadequacy

(real or merely perceived)

of

the available methods in

neuropsychology. He lacked the means

to

do so. It

may well be that there are problems with Solms's

claim; for example, why did Freud not have another

attempt at developing a dynamic neuropsychology, as

he did in the 1895 Project ? He might well have

had greater success in the 1930s, in the context of

developments in psychopharmacology. However, the

one merit

of

Solms's argument is the best one: that it

explains the evidence that Freud does not seem to

have tried to develop neuropsychoanalysis.

Semenza's Argument Reconsidered

What does this mean for the argument suggested by

Semenza: that Freud came close to developing by

himself the central tenets of cognitive neuroscience ?

I think there are two points that can be made. First,

Freud clearly

did

involve himself in the neuropsychol

ogy

of

his time. Had he continued to work

in

neuro

psychology proper (instead

of

moving to

psychoanalysis) he would have continued

to

make a

contribution perhaps

even a more substantial one

than he is currently credited with (cf. Pribram, 1962).

However, I doubt that he would have made the sub

stantial contribution to

cognitive

neuropsychology that

is suggested by Semenza; for example, because

of

the

great importance

of

cognition to Freud's interests,

and because of his attitude to modularity. Thus, Se

menza's claim is interesting, but probably overstated

on this point.

Second, one might rephrase Semenza's position

to consider Freud as the founder

of another

sort

of

neuropsychology, which investigated the neurobiol

ogy

of

the psychological functions that

were

of interest

to him. This discipline, now called neuropsychoana

lysis, is the neuropsychology that would have inter

ested Freud most, and the field that he would have

liked to have founded. It seems that he did not make

the attempt. The one argument in his favor

on

this

point is that his repeated suggestions that such a disci

pline would be inevitable, given that neuroscience

would grow across the decades, has laid the ground

work for the new field. It will be

of

some interest to

see what happens to psychoanalysis in the process, for

Biology is truly a land

of

unlimited possibilities. We

may expect it to give us the most surprising informa

tion, and we cannot guess what answers it will return

7

in a few dozen years to the questions we have put to

it (Freud, 1920, p 60).

In summary, Semenza contends that Freud

founded a discipline that I believe he would not have

wanted to found (cognitive neuropsychology). In addi

tion, it is clear that Freud did not found a discipline

that I believe he would have wanted to found (neuro

psychoanalysis). To make a set

of

claims other than

this would, I think, not do justice to Freud's attitude

to the neuropsychology

of

his day and its relationship

to psychoanalysis. Freud made substantial contribu

tions to both psychoanalysis and neuropsychology, but

it seems that we have identified some areas in which

he did

not

make a radical contribution. We should

remind ourselves

of

the enormous contribution that

Freud made (in several domains), but also recall that

excellence in one domain does not imply omniscience.

References

Ellis, A. W., Young,

A

W. (1988), Human Cognitive

Neuropsychology.

Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Freud, S (1891), On Aphasia. New York: International

Universities Press, 1953.

(1895), Project for a scientific psychology.

Stan

dard Edition

1:281-391. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.

(1914), On narcissism: An introduction. Standard

Edition 14:67-102. London: Hogarth Press, 1957.

(1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

Standard

Edition

18:1-64. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.

Gardner, H. (1985), The Mind s New Science. New York:

Basic Books.

Jones, E. (1956),

Sigmund Freud: Life and Work

Vol.

London: Hogarth Press.

Kaplan-Solms, K., Solms, M. (2000), Clinical Studies

Neuro-Psychoanalysis. London: Karnac Books.

Luria,

A

R (1979),

The Making

Mind: A Personal Ac

count

Soviet Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.

McCarthy,

R

A., Warrington, E.

K

(1990), Cognitive

Neuropsychology: A Clinical Introduction.

Orlando, FL:

Academic Press.

Parkin, A J (1996), Exploration in Cognitive Neuropsy

chology.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Pribram, K H (1962), The neuropsychology of Sigmund

Freud. In: Experimental Foundations

Clinical Psy

chology ed.

A

J Bachrach. New York: Basic Books.

Shallice, T (1988),

From Neuropsychology

to

Mental Struc

ture. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Solms, M. (1998a), Towards an integration of psychoanaly

sis and the neurosciences. Part

I:

Neuroscientific roots

of

psychoanalysis.

Forums der Psychoanalyse

14:193-202.

(In German)


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38

(1998b), Preliminaries for an integration of psycho

analysis and neuroscience. Brit. Psycho-Anal. Soc.

Bull., 34 9 :23-38.

(1999), Towards an integration

of

psychoanalysis

and the neurosciences. Part 2: Syndrome analysis of psy

chic functions.

Forum der Psychoanalyse, 15:58-70.

(In German)

(2000), Freud, Luria and the clinical method. Psy

choanal. Hist., 2:76-109.

Centre rCognitive Neuroscience

School

Psychology

University

Wales, Bangor, 383670

Gwynedd, Wales

LL57 2DG, U

e-mail: [email protected]

Carlo Semenza

Response to Commentaries by

Carlo

Semenza (Trieste)

General

While waiting for relevant case studies, neuropsychoa

nalysis, as I think this journal is trying to promote,

can only be an intellectual exercise. This exercise of

exploring the fields of psychoanalysis and neurosci

ence primarily consists

of

the search for concepts that,

while developed in one

of

the two disciplines, may

turn out to be useful if somehow incorporated into

the other.

The shared belief is obviously that psychoanaly

sis and neuroscience, while differing in aims and

methods, are ultimately about the same

thing-the

hu

man mind. We know that the two disciplines have

been separated almost from the very beginning, and

that adepts of one field have generally gone their own

way without knowing too much about the other field.

In many respects this separation was desirable,

and dictated by theoretical necessity and lack of em

pirical findings bridging the two fields. In the past

decade, however, the opinion emerged that there was

no longer a reason for this state of affairs. It was intu

ited that the advanced knowledge in neuroscience

could now allow useful interaction with psychoanaly

sis. I am also convinced that the reverse is true: Psy

choanalysis can indeed inspire interesting

interpretations

of

findings in neuroscience.

Within this framework I felt I could offer a few

suggestions. These were by no means prescriptions, as

some of my commentators, notably Green, understood

them to be. My aim was only to provide some food

for thought. In short, my main suggestions were the

following:

Carlo Semenza, M.D., is Professor of Neuropsychology at the Univer

sity of Trieste, Italy.

If psychoanalysis is to benefit from neuroscience,

this could better and more naturally happen with

the mediation

of

cognitive psychology.

2 Cognitivism is not a psychology entirely extrane

ous to Freud s thought. If Freud s scientific back

ground and his

work on

aphasia in particular are

closely considered, his familiarity with ideas and

methods that would later be the basis of cognitive

psychology is revealed.

3 Cognitive neuropsychology and psychoanalysis

have methodological affinities. The supremacy of

single case methodology, valid in both disciplines,

stems from what cognitive neuropsychologists

have called the principle of transparency: Pathol

ogy, provoking an imbalance among working struc

tures and processes, may highlight, in specific

cases, functions that are obscured by the harmoni

ous flow of a relatively undisturbed mind.

4 Connectionist models should be adopted with the

utmost caution. Shallow analogies will not work

and would make any theorization more prone to

criticisms of Popper s type (while I believe that,

properly defended by the same sort of arguments

that cognitive neuropsychologists use, psychoanal

ysis could instead be virtually immune to such dev

astating objections).

5 Somehow, against immediate intuition, the modu

larity theory may be useful, especially in a less rigid

form than Fodor s. There are indeed theoretical

distinctions within memory functions that are neu

rologically implemented. These distinctions may be

useful when considered within psychoanalysis. A

key concept in Fodor s theory, that of informa

tional encapsulation, may perhaps be specula-

Documents

9 the Neuropsychology That Would Have Interested Freud Most: Commentary by Oliver Turnbull (Bangor, UK)