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9. THE BALKANS WARS
1. A short chronology2. Kosovo3. Excerpt from film: ‘The Death of Yugoslavia’4. IR theories & the Balkans Wars * ‘Clash of civilizations’? * Liberal theories * Institutionalist theories * Realist theories * Constructivist theories 5. Conclusions
A BADLY-TIMED PUBLICATION!
“.. Between the 1971 and 1981 censuses in Yugoslavia, the number of individuals who declared Yugoslav
identity increased 4 and a half fold … from 1.3% to5.4% of the population … The declaration of Yugoslav
identity by such proportions of their populations constituted a remarkable assertion of shared political
identity, or ‘sense of community’. It is a clearindication of increased political integration … Thedeclaration of Yugoslav identity is likely to become
more widespread & the level of support for themultinational community is likely to increase”
Steven L. Burg & Michael L. Berbaum,American Political Science Review, June 1989
1. A SHORT CHRONOLOGY
1974: Constitutional changes weaken power of Serbia in Yugoslavian federation 1980: Death of Tito1981: Kosovo Albanian independence protests crushed1986: Milosevic becomes Serbian Communist Pty head Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences & Arts1987: Milosevic visits Kosovo & adopts cause of Kosovo Serbs1988: Milosevic stages series of popular rallies in Serbia & ‘takes over’ Communist parties in Vojvodina, Kosovo & Montenegro1989: Autonomy of Kosovo rescinded1990: Yugoslav Communist Party disintegrates Free elections bring nationalists to power in five of six republics
1. A SHORT CHRONOLOGY (Contd.)
1991: Croatia & Slovenia declare independence; first military conflicts1992: Bosnia-Hercegovina declares independence; war breaks out1994: First significant NATO military intervention1995: US brokers Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia after successful Croatian-Bosnian offensive v. Serbs & NATO air strikes v. Bosnian Serbs 1996: New elections confirm nationalist leaders in power1998: Outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo1999: Rambouillet talks fail; NATO attacks Serbia; Yugoslavia capitulates; Kosovo becomes UN protectorate, but not an independent state
2. KOSOVO
• Part of Kingdom of Serbia until late C14 (defeated in battle by Ottoman Turks, 1389)
• Ethnic Albanians form majority of population from late C18 onwards, after Serbs migrate northwards during Austro-Turkish wars
• Serbia reconquers Kosovo in early C20 as Ottoman empire disintegrates
• European powers ‘create’ Albanian state after 1st & 2nd Balkans wars, but ratify Serbian control of Kosovo
3. IR THEORIES & THE BALKANS WARS
I. Defining traits of a ‘clash of civilizations’
• Protagonists must be from different civilizations
• Cultural differences must be important source of ‘clash’
• States’ allegiances in conflict must follow civilizational lines (‘kinship syndrome’)
• Protagonists must be culturally more similar to other states in same civilizations than to each other?
3. IR THEORIES & THE BALKANS WARS
I. ‘CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS’?
• Hardly any ethnic differences• Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims speak same language (although Serbs & Croats have different alphabets)• Northern & southern nations belonged for centuries to different empires & have different religions (Slovenes & Croats Catholic; Serbs Orthodox; Bosniaks & Kosovo Albanians Muslim)• In this sense, Yugoslavia was a cross-roads of different civilizations. BUT:
I. A ‘CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS’? (Contd.)
• Large-scale animosity & violence between Yugoslav nations seem to be a predominantly C19-20 phenomenon: a product of the ‘age of nationalism’• Are the values, beliefs, life-styles of the ex-Yugoslav nations so different as to justify labelling this a ‘civilizations clash’?• Pattern of alliances followed cultural/civilizational lines only partly: Russia & Greece displayed sympathy for Serbia, Islamic world for Bosnian Muslims, Germany for Slovenia & Croatia, but the US supported the Bosnian Muslims (& Croatia) & a broad international consensus emerged v. Serbia
More a clash of nations than of civilizations?
ANCIENT ANIMOSITIES OR ELITE STRATEGIES?
‘The tensions between the communities emerged above all in the phase of national awakening, let’s say from
the start of the nineteenth century … The firstBalkans wars were between the Bulgarians & the Serbs, who are both Orthodox – which demolishesthe idea according to which the Balkans wars are
religious wars, Orthodox against Muslims.’
Jacques Rupnik, interview, ‘Balkans: comment laHaine a gagne’, Le Nouvel Observateur,
15-21 April 1999, p. 82.
ANCIENT ANIMOSITIES OR ELITE STRATEGIES?
“From the outside, one is tempted to believe that the hate, the animosities … between Serbs & Croats have historical
causes going back to time immemorial, that the clash between the two communities was inevitable. This
interpretation does not stand up to analysis. Serbs & Croats have only been living together since 1918 … The
Serbian elites’ success is not determined by ancestral hatred, but by political strategies for conquering or
preserving power, legitimated by reference to national values or history. It’s not ancestral hatred that is the cause
of the war in Bosnia. It’s the war that has created the hatred”.
Eric Nguyen, Les nationalismes en Europe, p. 151
ANCIENT ANIMOSITIES OR ELITE STRATEGIES?
‘That hatreds & rivalries existed in Bosnia’s past iscertainly true … But … the animosities that did existwere not absolute & unchanging. Nor were they the
inevitable consequences of the mixing together of dif-ferent religious communities. The main basis of hostilitywas not ethnic or religious but economic … Animositieswere … products of history & could change as history
developed … For most of the period after 1878, the dif-ferent religious or ethnic communities in Bosnia lived
peacefully together: the two major episodes of violence [WWI & II] were exceptions, induced & aggravated by causes outside Bosnia’s borders.’
Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. xxiii
ANCIENT ANIMOSITIES OR ELITE STRATEGIES?
‘Malcolm assailed what he considered the myth thatthe current bloodshed[in Bosnia] was the result of ‘ancient
ethnic hatreds’ … He blamed the bloodletting on belli-cose politicians, especially those in Belgrade. But the leaders of the three groups, while undoubtedly evil &guilty, could never have won over large majorities of
their peoples for their chauvinistic designs if thememories of past suffering at the hands of the othersand a hidden thirst for revenge had not been there’
Aleksa Djilas, ‘Imagining Kosovo’, in:Foreign Affairs, 77:5 (September/
October 1998), p. 126
ANCIENT ANIMOSITIES OR ELITE STRATEGIES?
‘Malcolm claims that the present Albanian-Serbian conflicthas its origins in the First Balkan War of 1912 … Serbianatrocities [then], however, did not create the ‘systematic hostility &hatred’ between the Albanians & the Serbs, but only exacerbated them. The enmity is rooted in cen-
turies of discrimination against the Serbian Orthodox Church & oppression of Serbian peasants by Muslim Albanian lords
& their followers … The oppression would not have been possible had there not been ethnic & racial awareness …
Religion was even more important … In Kosovo & Bosnia discrimination against Christians was particularly harsh’
Aleksa Djilas, ‘Imagining Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs, 77: 5 (1998), pp. 127-28
3. IR THEORIES & THE BALKANS WARS
II. LIBERAL THEORIES
• ‘Democracies or economically interdependent states do not fight each other’
BUT:• Yugoslavian republics economically very interwoven• Nationalist leaders came to power in more or less free elections & were re-elected after wars• In Serbia at least, some of the main competitors to Milosevic are also extremely nationalistic
States in a democratic transition & stillunstable may be quite aggressive?
3. IR THEORIES & THE BALKANS WARS
III. INSTITUTIONALIST THEORIES
• ‘International institutions attenuate international conflicts’
BUT:
• Yugoslavia was an international institution, a kind of South- east European Union – albeit held together by force• It still disintegrated violently after Tito’s death & the end of the Cold War• External international institutions - eg, the EU & the NATO - were very slow to intervene – although, when they did, they did pacify the combatants
3. IR THEORIES & THE BALKANS WARS
IV. REALIST THEORIES
• Realist theorists would probably attribute the wars to the following factors: 1. End of Cold War removed Soviet threat & made fate of Yugoslavia less significant for the West 2. Unequal distribution of military power between Serbia (which possessed most of resources of Yugoslavian Army) & other states; and 3. Territorial interspersion of national groups between different states (Serbian minorities in Croatia & Bosnia)
3. IR THEORIES & THE BALKANS WARS
V. CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES
• Constructivist theories would explain the wars in Yugoslavia in terms of the ‘identity’ of its constituent nations &/or states:
- Why is ‘ancient’ history still so present? - How has history been interpreted to create national ‘mythologies’? - Why is there a surplus of aggressive ‘ethnic’ nationalism in the Balkans? - Why are there so many national ‘persecution complexes’?
CROATIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
‘Here [in Zagreb] the battle between Communism &Capitalism is merely one dimension of a struggle
thatpits Catholicism against Orthodoxy, Rome againstConstantinople, the legacy of Habsburg Austria-
Hungary against that of Ottoman Turkey – in other words, West against East, the ultimate
historical & cultural conflict’
Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, p. 7
SERBIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
‘Serbs are in such an unjust position in Yugoslavia thattheir very existence is threatened. They are discrimi-
nated economically & politically by Croatia & Slovenia. They made the greatest military contribution& suffered the most casualties over the last century &
are now being punished in peacetime … In Kosovo,Serbs face total genocide. They are facing the greatestdefeat in their liberation struggle waged since 1804,
the Serb revolt against the Turks … Except during the Ustache [WW II) period, Serbs in Croatia have never
been as threatened as they are today’
Paraphrased contents of the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences & Arts
ALL VICTIMS OF HISTORY?
‘A cultural corpus which fuses history, folklore &myths is grafted on to religion & language …Here
you get into the ideological construction of a historywhich is forced to show the continuity of your
presence on a certain territory, going back veryfar in time. For, very often, the same territory con-stitutes an important symbol of national identity for
different peoples … The important thing in this context is not the historical truth. The aim is to
remedy an historic injustice. For all these nationshave the feeling that they are victims of history’
Jacques Rupnik, ‘Balkans: comment la haine agagne’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 15-21 April 1999
5. CONCLUSIONS
Elements of an explanation of the Balkans Wars
I. Background &/or facilitating factors:
• Historically rooted grievances & animosities (but rooted more in recent than in ancient history?)• Dispersion of ethnic groups throughout the republics• Death of Tito• Inter-republic economic disparities & intensifying economic crisis during the 1980s• End of Cold War (& end of Yugoslavia’s strategic importance)• Initial lack of interest of foreign powers (espec. US) in Yugoslavian crisis
5. CONCLUSIONS
Elements of an explanation of the Balkans Wars (contd.)
II. Immediate factors:
• Milosevic’s decision to play the nationalist card in Serbia & attempt to ‘take over’ Yugoslavia
• The ‘echo’ that this strategy produced in other republics, which chose nationalist leaders & independence
No one theory entirely convincing – realism,constructivism most, liberalism & institutionalism
least plausible?
THE NATO & THE WAR IN BOSNIA
‘Why did the international community fail to nipthe problem in the bud & wait until now [September1995] before intervening decisively? .. Mr Radovan
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, admits thattimely intervention would have stopped his
military campaign. “I knew that if Nato put 5000troops at a couple of strategic points, our plans
would be finished”, he says’.
Laura Silber, ‘The terrifying logic of war’,in: Financial Times, 2/3 September 1995