EDITORIAL

Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism:Understanding Intentionality, Intersubjectivityand Ecology of Mind

Agustn Ibez & Diego Cosmelli

Published online: 15 January 2008# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Abstract The emergence of the Cognitive Sciences, in the middle of the 20th Century,was initially based on an abstract model of the mind: the computer metaphor. The humanmind was understood in analogy to the digital computer, as a rule-based, symbolprocessor. As a consequence, the human being was envisioned as logicallyrationallyguided, radically disembodied and isolated from culture. Over the last few decades,several disciplines, such as Biology, Mathematics, Philosophy, Psychology andNeuroscience, have begun to address the study of intentionality, intersubjectivity andnatural cognition. Searching for a better understanding of these complex issues, a numberof approaches have been developed with the promise of capturing the specific qualities ofhuman cognition, radically omitted from a computationalist view of mind. Nevertheless,since these research programs are rather recent, concrete methodological designs andempirical approaches in the form of experimentally testable hypotheses are still scarce.This special issue brings together several perspectives in order to propose alternativeresearch approaches in the topics of Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology ofMind. We believe it is necessary to discuss and advance towards explicit empiricalframes in the form of actual experiments, specific predictions and formal models. Theessays presented here constitute an attempt to move in this direction, with the specificaim of reconsidering the study of some forgotten properties of brain and mind.

Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:129136DOI 10.1007/s12124-007-9045-4

A. Ibez (*)Neuroscience Laboratory, Universidad Diego Portales, Vergara 275, Santiago, Chilee-mail: agustin.ibanez@udp.cl

A. IbezDepartment of Gerontopsychiatry, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany

D. CosmelliCentro de Estudios Neurobiolgicos, P. Universidad Catlica de Chile, Marcoleta 391 Segundo Piso,Santiago, Chilee-mail: dcosmelli@uc.cl

D. CosmelliEscuela de Psicologia,P. Universidad Catolica de Chile,Vicua Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile

Keywords Embodied cognition . Neurodynamics . Dynamic approachesto cognition . Situated Cognition . Brain dynamics

Cognitive Sciences Versus Cognitivism

The present context of cognitive sciences can be described as the questioning of adominant classical paradigm, known as computationalism or computational cogniti-vism. It was established between the 60s and 70s as a multidisciplinary program tounderstand cognitive processes. The core concept of this revolution assumed that themind could be understood on the basis of symbolic calculations, being explained onthe basis of logicalsyntactic rules and principles. Meaning lost its leading role in themechanistic explanation of the mind, favoring syntax and objective correspondencewith entities of the world. This program became a prescriptive undertaking in how toinvestigate, and began with great promises in the field of simulation of cognitivephenomena. It offered in itself a metaphor of the mind as a computer, updated by theimage of new and sophisticated computational technology.

As time passed, investigation itself within computationalism produced some insightsinto the programs limitations. The strange synthesis between Cartesian dualism and themetaphysical monism of computationalism (Descombes 2001) has been criticized forits positivist assumptions and its fragmentary tendencies. The transgenerationalattempt (starting with Cartesianism, passing through orthodox analytic philosophy upto the beginning of cognitivism) to reduce human reasoning to formal processes ofcalculation on resident representations in the mind, had already been questioned byWittgenstein (1952) and Ryle (1949).

Some of the most important original promises of the computationalistic enterprisefailed (Anderson 2003; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990; Wheeler 1996). A prototypiccase was pointed out by Winograd (1984) who emphasized the insoluble limitationsof computationalism in explaining the phenomenon of natural languages (Winogradand Flores 1986). Perception understood in computational terms became passive,and in clear contradiction to the natural interaction with action and environment.Simple sensorimotor functions became serious problems in the immediate planningof movable robots. On the other hand, non-representational alternatives in the fieldof robotics were successful (Brooks 1991; Wheeler 1996).

In spite of the success of expert systems, capable of competing in chess or checkers,simulations did not manage to reproduce plasticity and human flexibility (Dietrich2000). This difficulty was considered insurmountable using a computational approach(Shoham and Dermott 1988) since it led systems based on calculations to the so-calledVon Neumann bottleneck. The difficulty lies in estimating adequately and in real timea decision ecologically founded on complex contexts. For that reason, theconsideration of mind as a formal logical system gradually lost its credibility (Dietrich2000). Also, authors in the field of neuroscience supported by new connectionistmodels criticized the logicalsymbolic models of functionalism (Churchland 1986).1

1 It is important to emphasize that the notion of classic computation does not need to be exhaustive ofwhat is a valid computational process. In other words, perhaps a biological system is a better computerthan the best computer in existence. However, it still is one, only under a different paradigm of what weunderstand as computation (e.g.: Gabriel and Goldman 2006). See also Cosmelli et al. (2008).

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The Emergence of Post-Cognitivism

Along with issues within computationalism itself, the appearance of new trends incognition questioned the traditional view that computational cognitivism does nothave major rival theories (Fodor 2000). As disappointment with cognitivism grew,alternatives departing from computational assumptions emerged. These trends haveopened the field of investigation to include phenomena not tackled by the orthodoxtradition; new dialogues with social and biological disciplines have been generatedand many classic issues of cognitivism have been reconsidered.

In this framework, the approach of situated cognition (Clark 1997; Lynn andStein 1991; Wilson and Myers 1999, among others) assumes that knowledge isstructured in the social, ecological and physical environment which shapes theexperience. The Embodied cognition approach (Anderson 2003; Dourish 2001;Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Thompson and Varela 2001; Varela et al.1991) holds that the mind is embodied and placed in a specific ecological contextwhere cognition on a biological, psychological and cultural level is constituted bymeans of sensorymotor processes in the body (Cornejo et al. 2007b, c; Ibez et al.2006). The extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Li 2003, among others) isconcerned with the role of the environment in the genesis of the cognitive processes,emphasizing this not only as part of action, but also of thought. From the perspectiveof distributed cognition (Cole and Engestrn 1991; Holland et al. 2000; Hutchins1995; among others), knowledge is taken as forming a continuum with environ-mental processes, so that establishing sharp distinctions between the world and themind is sometimes a non-trivial matter. The application of activity theory incognition (Engelsted 1993; Engestrm 1991; Jones et al. 2005; among others)criticizes the use of computational simulation for the comprehension of humancognition, and assumes that psychological phenomena like intentionality cannot beunderstood in mechanistic terms. Dynamic approaches to cognition keep thecontroversial promise to be applied as much to neural interactions as to culturalphenomena, supporting their explanations in mathematical formalizations of cognitiveprocesses. The central core of these theories is based on the metaphor of cognitionas a dynamic system, sustained on a spatio-temporal topology (Ibez 2007a, b).

Alternative approaches in cognition have drawn out a clear necessity in the fieldof cognitive sciences: the development of language games that are not exclusivelymaterialistic or exclusively mentalist in the development of inter-leveled cognitiveapproaches. In other words, the need for a reconceptualization focused on action,intentionality of living systems and the intersubjective nature of complex cognitivephenomena. In short, the need to understand the mind as a multi-leveled processwhich is dependent on the interaction between mind, body, environment and culture(Cornejo et al. 2007a).2 Reductionist materialism (mathematical, physical orneurological) and de-biologized discursiveness (psychological or social) share theimpossibility of tackling cognitive phenomena once their multiplicity of descriptionlevels have been accepted. Nevertheless, one must ask if the alternative approaches

2 It is important to emphasize that although a certain temporary sequence exists between classiccomputationalism and the alternative approaches of cognition, there are simultaneous antecedents ofteninterwoven throughout both perspectives (Ibez 2007a, b).

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ipso facto constitute in absolute terms the aforementioned paradigmatic direction. Onthe other hand, these approaches may be considered as being in the process ofestablishing themselves as full-fledged research programs. The reconsideration of thenature of cognition which has arisen through such alternative conceptions requires atheoreticalempirical revision of its current scope.

Towards a Deep Foundation of Post-Cognitivism

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of post-cognitivist alternatives is thatthey appeal to our common sense: we feel like beings that form part of a (natural)complex system, interconnected and interdependent: descriptions of an aspect ofreality are compatible with multiple alternative descriptions and we coexist withoutbeing single-minded machines but rather ambiguous beings (in the neutral sense ofthe term). This intuitive compatibility between the paradigms that emphasizeembodied cognition, the ecology of mind and a multi-leveled comprehension ofreality, represents not only an interesting opportunity but also, we believe, hides itsgreatest enemy. It is one thing to talk about situated cognition but another to say howthis occurs. In other words, can one formulate concrete operational conditions forthese paradigms which will allow them to play a role beyond that of being anintuitively valuable description? We believe that this represents one of the greatestchallenges faced by this series of paradigms towards becoming valid alternativeresearch programs.

It could be argued that, as we discussed in the first part of this editorialintroduction, that it is indeed thanks to the criticism that has arisen from such newperspectives (and common sense) that the classical computationalist theoreticalframework had to be revisited. Nevertheless, it is not trivial to express the samedissatisfaction in a positive way. Furthermore, we believe that the existing situationof malaise surrounding the inability of the traditional paradigms to account for suchessential aspects as our being-in-the-world as intentionality, intersubjectivity and thecontextual nature of cognition, calls for certain risks to be taken: What experimentsand results would force us to reject a given embodied or situated perspective? Whatre-conceptualization of a given series of experimental data allows us to eliminate(reduce) representational language from our explanation without losing epistemo-logical ground? What methodological and analytical frameworks are needed totackle the problem of situated cognition and which are not? What are the limits ofthe new theories of cognition? Without pretending to answer all these questions, thecontributions in this volume represent a concrete attempt at going beyond both theclassic computational cognitive framework and the approach by intuitive analogy,towards a scientifically generative formulation of hypotheses and a methodologicallyrigorous framework in the study of cognition.

Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind

In this issue, three conceptual post-cognitive topics are tackled by the differentcontributions. This set of contributions is far from being homogenous and draws on

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frameworks and disciplines from very different approaches. Nevertheless, from theirown heterogeneity, all contribute to a better conceptualization of alternativeapproaches in their respective fields of application.

Intentionality

Intentionality can be understood either as simple behavior aimed at minds, orintention as a macro-property of the human being. This seems to be the basis ofcomprehending meaning and sense in cognitive action. At a cognitive level, theactions of the body can only be understood when intentionality plays an organizingrole in it. There exists a growing consensus that this is an unavoidable property ofcognition that cannot be left aside once it is needed to understand the activity of anorganism. Phenomenology applied to cognition (Descombes 2001), neurodynamics(Freeman 1997, 2000), neurophenomenology (Lutz and Thompson 2003; Varelaet al. 1991), some trends in embodied cognition (Thompson and Varela 2001), andothers in dynamic system theory (Juarrero 1999; Orsucci 1998; Tschacher andDauwalder 2003) are representative of this perspective. In this issue, Walter Freemantackles the problem of perception of time and causation. Taking a historical andphilosophical perspective the author reappraises the importance of the AristotelianThomist view of intentionality to understand the problem of time perception.Accordingly, and building upon extensive neurophysiological data, the authorsuggests that the solution to this question resides in the way the nervous systemgenerates predictive actionperception cycles through the mechanism of preaffer-ence. In Freemans view time is therefore kinesthetically constituted as every actionbecomes an action of a neurally animated body into the future. Causality makessense only in this temporal context, i.e. through the animals perceiving and learningthe consequences of his own endogenously motivated (intentional) actions. AndrsHaye defends that because human beings are not only living but also speakingbeings, a consistent framework is needed to account for the particular type ofknowledge this capacity/behavior implies. He claims that if we understandintentionality solely as will or aboutness, one cannot encompass the crucial aspectof meaning in human cognition. As a solution, the author proposes a dialogicalexplanatory basis for the understanding of meaning as a virtual contestableposition in a social context, which is taken by the participant through actualutterances (public or private). According to the author, because this type ofintentionality is what distinguishes human knowledge, any viable theory of humancognition should be constructed on this ground.

Intersubjectivity

Another idea radically opposed to orthodox computational reasoning resides in thenotion of intersubjectivity. This is compatible with the acceptance of intentionality,since it implies subjectivity and subjectivity does not appear to be a solipsistproperty. The inclusion of intersubjectivity is nothing but the acceptance that allcognitive development is set in an inherent dialogicity upon which all developmentof cognitive capacities is maintained. There exists a corpus of theories that haveargued for this on the basis of the study and theorization of intersubjectivity in the

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heart of cognitive phenomena. Among them, it is possible to point out theory of themind studies (Chandler and Carpendale 1998; Whiten 1991); development theoriesbased on intersubjectivity (Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Hobson 1993; Trevarthenand Aitken 2001) and the so-called simulation theories (Decety and Grezes 2006;Gallese and Goldman 1998). In this issue, the contribution of Carlos Cornejoassumes that the origins of meaning are assessed in the intersubjective spacecontingently formed between a subject (S), an other (O) and a common object (T),which they are talking about. The so observed synchronized co-feeling amongsubjects, upon which language comprehension takes place, is called by Cornejo co-phenomenology. When analyzed in this way, intersubjectivity shows at the sametime its social, phenomenological and biological dimensions. Later, Luis Florestackles the intersubjectivity as the core element of consciousness, regards to thedynamic and relational property of being-in-the-world. The embodied, temporal andintentional aspects of consciousness are immersed with others in the world. To takethis fact into account has several consequences for cognitive theories consciousness.

Ecology of Mind

The idea that the mind can only be understood as a process that happens in a certaincontext is another central dimension of non-orthodox theories of cognition. Underthis perspective, mind is related not only to the intentional action of the body and tothe dialogicity between cognitive agents, but also contained in a specific situation,with an environmental framework that comprises the cognitive processes in whichthey are developed. There exists an intrinsic co-constitution between organism andenvironment, understanding the latter as a domain of interaction for the intentions ofthe organism. Starting with the pioneering contributions of ecological psychology(Gibson 1979), and including theory of activity applied to cognition (Engestrm1991; Jones et al. 2005, among others), approaches of embodied and situatedcognition (Anderson 2003; Dourish 2001; Clark 1997; Wilson and Myers 1999,among others), extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Li 2003), distributedcognition (Cole and Engestrn 1991; Holland et al. 2000; Hutchins 1995, amongothers), and dynamic approaches of cognition (Fischer and Bidell 2005), numerousapproaches have called attention to the ecological dimension of cognition and thedevelopment of corresponding valid models. In this issue, Lucia Faiciuc asses thatmost of the existing theories explaining deductive reasoning could be included in aclassic computationalist approach of the cognitive processes. But are there weakpoints of such an approach? What would be the reasons for which new perspectives,dynamic and ecological ones, could gain in credibility? What could be their mostimportant tenets? The answers given to those questions in the paper include twomain points. The first one is that the present empirical data do not sustainunambiguously a symbolic computationalist perspective. The second one is thatapproaching deductive reasoning dynamically could have a significant advantage:the possibility to integrate more easily the research regarding the deductivereasoning with the results obtained in other domains of the psychology, in artificialintelligence or in neurophysiology. Finally, Aldo Mascareo outlines a theory ofcognition where the social is proposed to be dealt with from the very beginning.The author submits that if communication and any social emergent order are to be

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understood at all (and critically, it they are to be understood as constitutive of whatwe consider cognition) the explanatory value of self-referential systems theoryshould be brought to bear at the level of the social systems properties. Mascareodetails the particulars of his synthesis, focusing on the consequences of taking intoaccount symbolically generalized communication media and their potential role asa closure mechanism, in the causal/operational sense, of the social system.

We wish to end this editorial introduction by explicitly thanking the EditorialBoard of IPBS and very specially each and every participant author for the interestand dedication they have shown, and which has made possible this special number.

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Agustn Ibez holds a Ph.D. in Cognitive Sciences, and currently is a postdoctoral research fellow fromHeidelberg University, Germany. He is the head of Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, UniversidadDiego Portales, Chile. His research areas of interest are related to electrophysiological studies ofecological clues in language and social processes, in healthy participants, schizophrenics and Alzheimerpatients. At theoretical level, he is interested in explanatory pluralism and dynamic approaches tocognition.

Diego Cosmelli holds a Ph.D. in Cognitive Science from the Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France.After a postdoctoral work on enactive approaches to consciousness at York University in Toronto, Canada,he returned to Chile. He is an Associate Researcher at the Laboratorio de Neurociencias Cognitivas, Dep.de Psiquiatra of the P. Universidad Catlica and at the School of Psychology of the same university. He isalso Principal Investigator of the Sensory Neuroscience Ring for Science and Technology ACT45. Hiscurrent research is centered on the relation between sensorimotor processes, biological organization andconscious perception in human beings.

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Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism: Understanding Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of MindAbstractCognitive Sciences Versus CognitivismThe Emergence of Post-CognitivismTowards a Deep Foundation of Post-CognitivismIntentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of MindIntentionalityIntersubjectivityEcology of Mind

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