87354772 Karl Kautsky 1946 Social Democracy vs Communism

8/13/2019 87354772 Karl Kautsky 1946 Social Democracy vs Communism

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Karl Kautsky

Social Democracy versus Communism

19461. The Origin of Socialism

What is it that divides the Social Democrats from the Communists? Like the Socialists, they are a

working class party. The emancipation of the workers is their common aim.

There was a time when oth had a common theoretical asis. !ut later a gulf developed etween them,

which cannot e ridged, however much we may desire and consider this necessary. This gulf arises

neither from a misunderstanding nor from a mere difference of opinion.

To reali"e how asolutely irreconcilale are Communism and Socialism, we must first look into the

history of the origin of Socialism. #t springs from two roots, one ethical and the other economic. The first

emanates from the natural instinct of man, the second from the nature of capitalist society and the

position of the workers as a class.

The demand $Lierty, %&uality, 'raternity( advanced y the men of the 'rench )evolution antedates all

written history. #t reflects the desire of all oppressed, e*ploited and their friends ever since there have

een oppression and e*ploitation. !ut this demand merely poses a prolem. #t does not indicate the road

to its solution. What this road should e has een variously conceived, depending upon varied social

conditions and the classes who have sought to find it. +nly under the capitalist mode of production has

the solution of this prolem, through the estalishment of a democratic social economy of the workers,

ecome possile and necessary. +nly through economic research, not through ethical indignation, can

this solution e achieved. Certainly it can never e achieved y mere impassioned desire for what, since

-/, has een termed $lierty, e&uality, fraternity.(

0ll socialist thinkers were reels against any kind of enslavement and e*ploitation. !ut they were also

research workers in the domain of economics.

The revolt1provoking study of the mass impoverishment generated y capitalist industry gave irth to

socialist ideas. #t was precisely this impoverishment, however, which y its very frightfulness so held the

workers down, that they were fre&uently rendered incapale of resistance. Whenever some few didrevolt, they knew nothing etter to do than to destroy machines and urn factories. !y such outursts of

indignation they succeeded only in multiplying their own misery.

The early socialists, therefore elieved that the working class could not emancipate itself y its own

efforts. #t was to e emancipated through the efforts of humanitarians, superior to the workers. #t soon

ecame clear, however, that little was to e e*pected from the statesmen and millionaires of the

ourgeois world. Side y side with the utopians who relied upon the well meaning ourgeoisie were

socialists who perceived that the power necessary for the reali"ation of socialism could come only from

the working class itself. !ut they, too, despaired of the masses. They addressed themselves to the small

group of the elite among the working class, those en2oying more favorale conditions than the average

worker. Together with professional revolutionists they were to enter into a conspiracy to capture politicalpower, and ring aout socialism y means of armed revolt. 'inally, there were socialists who,

permitting themselves to e deceived y the prospects aroused y the early laor movements,

overestimated the numers and intellectual power of the workers of their period and elieved that the


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working class needed only to ring aout democracy, namely, the universal franchise, in order to win

immediately the power of government and transform society in line with their desires.

0ll these schools, however they appeared to differ from each other, had this common characteristic3 they

looked upon the working class as theyfoundit, and sought a means for the immediate $solution of the

social &uestion,( i.e. for the immediate aolition of the misery and enslavement of the working class.

%very one of these schools critici"ed severly the other socialists, each perceiving clearly the illusions of

the others. %ach was right and all succumed to the criticism of time, which wrecked every one of them.

Then came 4ar* and %ngels who introduced the idea of developmentinto socialist thought, and

perceived the working class not only as it was ut also as it was becoming. #n their Communist

Manifestothey reali"ed that the working class had not yet advanced far enough to achieve immediately

its own emancipation and, further, that this could not e achieved through the universal franchise, the

efforts of the well1meaning portion of the ourgeoisie, or y the armed action of an advanced guard of

energetic conspirators. 0t the same time they also perceived that through the development of industry the

working class would grow in numers and organi"ation, while gaining constantly in intellectual and

moral power. #n this way laor would achieve the power to emancipate itself. To e sure it would have to

e educated to this. !ut this education, as 4ar* and %ngels reali"ed, could not e rought aout y men

who proclaimed themselves .the schoolmasters of the workers, ut through the e*perience of the classstruggle, forced upon the wage earners, y the conditions under which, they lived.

The1more the class struggle proceeds in a democratic environment, all other things eing e&ual, i.e. in an

environment of universal education, freedom of press and organi"ation and of universal suffrage, the

greater its educational influence. Long efore the instruments of democracy ecome the means for

ac&uisition of power y the workers, they constituted the means of its education in the task not only of

how to attain power ut also of how to keep it and apply it successfully in the uilding of a higher social

order.

0s 4ar* and %ngels saw it, the task for Socialists was not to ring aout the immediate solution of $thesocial &uestion( and the reali"ation of socialism, ut, first, to support the workers in the class struggle, to

help it understand the nature of capitalist society, its power relationships and processes of production,

and promote the organi"ation of Laor.

5roceeding from this point of view, 4ar* and %ngels sought to ring aout the union of all elements

participating in the class struggle for the lieration of the working .class into a strong mass party. !efore

their arrival upon the scene, each of the various socialist leaders and thinkers had put forward their own

distinct method for the solution of the social &uestion and opposed all other socialists who would follow

other methods. So it had come aout that socialism had served only to divide the working class. 4ar*

and %ngels tried to unite it, not to add a 4ar*ian sect to those already in the field.

We find emphasis of this already in the Communist Manifesto67-8. Speaking to their adherents, who

called themselves communists, 4ar* and %ngels said3

$The communists do not constitute a separate party, distinct from other working class parties.(

They demanded only that their adherents within the working class parties strive to develop $in advance

of the rest of the masses of the proletariat an understanding of the. conditions, the process and the

general conse&uences of the movement of the proletariat.(

Their actions were in line with this idea, as for e*ample in the 'irst #nternational, which had very few

4ar*ists ut plenty of 5roudhonists and, later, also !lan&uists as well as !ritish trade unionists, whoknew little of socialism.

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4ar* and %ngels understood well how to ring aout a firm union etween the world of socialist ideas

and the laor movement. 0ll truly working class parties of our time, which have arisen since the final

&uarter of the last century to take the place of preceding seas, rest upon this union. 0s working class

parties they fight for the interests of the working class: as Socialist parties they wage the class struggle as

a means of emancipation of all the oppressed and e*ploited, not of the wage earners alone.

The Socialist parties fight not only for shorter working hours and higher wages, unemployment

insurance and shop councils, ut also for the lierty, e&uality, fraternity of all human eings, regardlessof race, color or creed.

Such Socialist parties are ringing aout the reali"ation of 4ar*ist ideas even when they themselves are

not conscious of them. %very place where the capitalist mode of production e*ists, with few e*ceptions,

they have een irresistily on the march since the end of the last century.

Karl Kautsky


. Mar!ism an" the #Dictatorshi$ of the %roletariat&

There was nothing that 4ar* feared so much as the degeneration of his school into a rigid sect The same

fear was entertained y %ngels, whose scientific work is indissoluly linked with that of his friend 4ar*,

so that we always keep in mind oth 4ar* and %ngels whenever we speak of the 4ar*ist theory.

The worst reproach that %ngels could make against the first %nglish 4ar*ists was that they were

applying 4ar*ism in a sectarian spirit What would he have said, had he lived to see it aout a school of

4ar*ists, who, having captured the state power proceeded to make a state religion, of 4ar*ism, a

religion whose articles of faith and their interpretation are watched over y the government, a religion,

the criticism of which, nay the slightest deviation from which is sternly punished y the State: a

4ar*ism ruling y the methods of the Spanish #n&uisition, propagated y fire and sword, practicing a

theatrical ritual 6as illustrated y the emalmed ody of Lenin8: a 4ar*ism reduced to the status not only

of a state religion ut of a medieval or oriental faith? Such a 4ar*ism may indeed e called doctrinaire

fanaticism.

To 4ar* there was no ultimate knowledge, only an infinite process of learning. Therefore, his own

theory is not to e conceive as a collection of tenets which we must accept on faith. 4ar*ism itself is

nothing ut a definite process of learning: founded upon a definite method introduced y 4ar* and%ngels. This method itself, which 4ar* and %ngels called the materialist conception of history, is not

unalterale. #t is constantly eing improved, like a machine, through continued gain in e*perience

accumulated in its application. The principles underlying a given method of intellectual activity often do

not change as rapidly as do the results of that activity. The views of people under the influence of

constantly changing e*periences tend to change more easily than do the methods and forms o f thought

by which they are attained.!oth however, are regarded as in constant process of development. %ven the

materialistic conception of history did not, like 0thena, spring fully armed from the head of its

procreator: as a matter of fact it had two such procreators. These two were constantly developing it

throughout their lives and to the 4ar*ists e&ueathed the task of continuing the process.

To know and understand the line of this development is of the highest importance to every 4ar*ist aswell as to any one who wishes to make a critical study of 4ar*, prompted y a sincere desire for

knowledge, and not y the motives of the trickster lawyer who seeks to otain a conviction of his

opponent;s client at any cost.


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%very form of doctrinaire fanaticism, every attempt to turn 4ar*ism into an unalterale dogma is

contrary to 4ar*ist thought, which recogni"es no asolute truth ut only relative truth. This is not

scepticism, which denies the very possiility of asolute perception of the world, ut only a recognition

of the limitations of our perception. 0ll the truths which we recogni"e are not truths in themselves,

independent of time and places ut truths only as far as we are concerned, valid only for us, for our time,

for the space in which we live. %very such truth must govern our actions until more advanced perception

has e*posed and removed the it of error residing in the previously accepted truth.

=uite early in his career 4ar* reali"ed, and in this he proved superior to other Socialists of his day, that

the lieration of the working class could e achieved only y the working class itself, that no

paternalistic friend from the ourgeoisie, no select proletarian vanguard could accomplish this task for

the masses. !ut like other Socialists he had to admit that the masses were not yet ripe for the struggle.

>ow was this ripeness to e achieved? Through well meaning tutors from aove? rown1up people will

not sumit to the guardianship of tutors. Where this attempt is made either y Christians or y atheists, it

usually degenerates into a loathsome, priestly presumptuousness on the part of the tutor and a

hypocritical sumission of the tutored.

rown1ups can e taught y life alone. 4ar* e*pected the education of the working class to come from

life, that is to say, he e*pected it to come from capitalist development and its effect upon the workers.4ar* pointed this out already in the Communist Manifesto. #ndustry draws the workers together in

large numers and therey increases their class consciousness. 0t the same time that conflicts with the

employers grow, trade unions develop. The e*tension of the conflicts to all industry transforms the

occasional local clashes into a class struggle. This class struggle ecomes political, finding e*pression in

political changes. !ut the working class was not strong enough to overcome the forces tending toward

the pauperi"ation of the masses, which was the predominant feature of capitalism everywhere. The

Communist Manifestohad yet to prove the asolute impoverishment of the industrial proletariat.

$The modern worker, instead of improving his condition with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and

deeper under the circumstances affecting his own class. The worker ecomes a pauper and pauperismdevelops even faster than population and wealth.(

@nder such conditions, whence could come that moral and intellectual advancement which alone could

make possile the self1lieration of the working class?

4ar* e*pected it to come as a result of revolution, the advent of which he correctly foresaw. >e had

studied the 'rench )evolution. #t ore at the eginning a purely ourgeois character ut grew more and

more radical and finally led to the rule, only for a short time, to e sure, of the working class. The

revolution developed enormously not only the political courage ut also the political understanding of

the masses of the people, until then inert and ignorant. +pposed as 4ar* already was at the time of the

Communist Manifestoto the policy of plots and coups des mainspreached y the !lan&uists, he wasstill strongly influenced y their Aacoin traditions. #n the first months of B, in his articles on The

Class Struggles in 'rance, pulished in /B y %ngels in pamphlet form, he regarded the !lan&uists

as properly the workers; party of 'rance. They, aove all others, held his sympathies.

#n 7- 4ar* assumed that the forthcoming revolution would run the same course as did the reat

)evolution ut with a working class $much further advanced( y the growth of large industries. The

revolution was to last long enough to lift the working class &uickly to the necessary mental level. >ence

$the erman ourgeois revolution could serve only as a direct prelude to a proletarian revolution.(

This e*pectation was not reali"ed. The force of the erman revolution of 7 spent itself within a few

months and the working class as an independent factor played no part in it. What happened then was thesame thing that was to happen to 4ar* often enough later. >e correctly foresaw the direction in which

events were moving ut h mis2udged the rate at which they were moving.

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et none learned so readily from e*perience as did 4ar*, even when the e*perience ran counter to his

innermost wishes. 0lready in Septemer B he came out against the view that $we must strive to gain

power immediately( and declared that the workers might have to go through $B, 9, ere is what 4ar* said in -9 at a pulic meeting in 0msterdam following the Congress of the

#nternational at the >ague 6as reported y the (ei$)iger *olkstaatof +ctoer 9,-98

$The worker must some day achieve political power, in order to found the new organi"ation of laor: he

must overthrow the old political machine upon which the old institutions are ased, if, like the old

Christians, who neglected and despised such matters, he does not wish to renounce the kingdom of this

world.

$!ut we do not maintain that the means of attaining this o2ective are everywhere the same.

$We know that we must take into consideration the institutions, the haits and the customs of different

regions, arid we do not deny that there are countries like 0merica, %ngland and H if # knew your

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institutions etter # would perhaps add >olland H where the workers can attain their o2ective y

peaceful means. !ut such is not the case in all other countries.(

!y $other countries( 4ar* evidently meant first of all, the great centrali"ed police and military states of

continental %urope as they e*isted at that time. +n 0pril 9, -, in a letter to Iugelman at the time of

the 5aris Commune, 4ar* pointed out that the o2ective in ne*t attempt of revolution in 'rance would e

$no longer as heretofore to effect a change of hands of the ureaucratic military apparatus, ut to

demolish it, and that is the prere&uisite for every true popular revolution on the continent.(

#t was not granted to 4ar* to witness a third phase of the laor movement, esides the two indicated y

him, and which was already shaping itself aout the time of his death. The $civil strife and foreign wars(

of -/1- were not sufficient to destroy the ureaucratic1military apparatus of the continental

powers, ut their effects were nevertheless strong enough to wrest from these powers a certain measure

of freedom for the toiling masses, which enaled them to ac&uire not only great political skill ut also to

uild strong trade unions and proletarian parties. @nfortunately, this new phase was characteri"ed y

great ostacles at the eginning. #n prance the revolution of Septemer 7, -, was followed y the

loody suppression of the Commune in 4ay -, and thereafter y a period of dark reaction and

oppression of the proletariat which lasted almost until 4ar*;s death. #n 0ustria after EE came an era of

lieralism which, however, did not last long. For did the lieral era that set in in ermany after EEprove of long duration. #t ended with the anti1Socialist law of !ismarck.

4ar* thus had little opportunity to oserve the effects of democracy on the development of laor in the

military ureaucratic countries of continental %urope.

%ngels survived his great friend. >e lived to witness the aolition of the %*ception Laws in 0ustria, the

rescinding of the 0nti1Socialist Law in ermany, the eginning of the rapid growth of the laor

movement all over %urope. >e was thus in a position to sum up the results of this particular phase of

development for 4ar*ism. >e did this in his famous introduction to 4ar*;s Class Struggles in 'rance.

4ar* had never elieved in the possiility of ringing aout a revolution at will. Therein he differed

already in his early works from the !lan&uists. !ut as long as there was no political freedom for the

proletariat, he was compelled to wish ardently for the speediest possile coming of the revolution, first

as a democratic ourgeois revolution, which would ring the necessary political freedom. During the

fifties and si*ties he eagerly looked for signs of the coming revolution arising either from war or civil

conflicts.

!ut now the situation was &uite different. %ngels, too, saw the coming of the revolution, ut he hoped it

might e postponed. 0nd he feared new wars. They might ring on the revolution ut they threatened to

ruin the working class, the only revolutionary class that still e*isted. They might destroy the revolution

and impair the aility of the working class to utili"e it, for what was e*pected from the revolution wasthat it would ring not merely political freedom, ut power itself.

The e*pression $dictatorship of the proletariat( has een widely used in the past y many who are

oviously confused as to its meaning. 4ost people assume that it connotes a political aim the meaning of

which is self1evident and re&uires no e*planation. @nfortunately this is not so.

The e*pression comes from 4ar*. #n -B, in his Criti+ue of the ,otha %rogram, he wrote3

$!etween the capitalist and Communist society lies the period of change of one into the other. This

corresponds to a political transition period in which the state can e nothing else than a revolutionary

dictatorship of the proletariat.(

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ut never dictatorship. 'or 4ar* and %ngels the all important aim in the destruction of the centrali"ed

state apparatus was solely the estalishment of democracy.

4ar* and %ngels never e*plained why they characteri"ed this condition as a $dictatorship,( although it

was to spring from democracy. # assume they used the e*pression to denote a strong government.

Iarl 4ar* was not the only one to speak of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This idea is much older

than 4ar*ism. #t represents the oldest, most primitive form of a revolutionary Socialism which sought toemancipate the working people from e*ploitation and slavery not through peaceful socialistic

settlements, colonies or mutual aid associations 6another form of primitive Socialism8 ut y means of

forcile sei"ure of power. This idea is related to the Aacoin reign of terror in the 'rench )evolution.

#t was 'ranMois 6$racchus(8 !aeuf who after the overthrow of )oespierre sought to rally the

remnants of the 4ontagards to comat the rising capitalist regime and to supplant it with a socialism of

$crude levelling( 64ar*8. >e organi"ed $The Conspiracy of the %&uals,( which set efore itself the task

of overthrowing the capitalist government y means of an uprising of the propertyless and putting a

Communist regime in its place. Such a regime was to ring aout complete democracy, ut not

immediately. %*perience had shown that the workers permitted themselves to e led y the nose y men

of property and education.

The conspirators feared that through democracy the poor, ignorant people would once more fall victim to

these influences. 'or this reason a dictatorship was to e estalished y means of a popular revolution.

'reedom of the press was to e aolished, and no pulications were to e tolerated $which contradicted

the sacred principles of e&uality and the sovereignty of the people,( the steering committee, of course,

eing empowered to determine what was in contradiction with these principles. There were to e popular

elections, ut only after e&uality had een thoroughly estalished.

This was intended to e a dictatorship for $the transition period etween the capitalist and Communist

society.( #t was to e a proletarian dictatorship, ut not the dictatorship of the proletariat, since theproletariat was as yet too ignorant and unale to defend its own interests. #t was to e a dictatorship of

$little fathers( and spokesmen of the proletariat. The recently coined e*pression $an educational

dictatorship( 6Erziehungsdikatur8 characteri"es well this form of government.

The dictatorship of !aeuf was not designed to e a political state emanating from democracy, the

offspring of an ade&uate high level of working class development, ut a form of government which, in

view of the ackwardness of the proletariat, would seek at all costs to defend the interests of the workers,

ruthlessly and in the most e*treme manner possile. #t emanated from the conviction that democracy as a

means of emancipation of the workers must fail ecause the proletariat itself had failed, ecause it was

incapale of emancipating itself.

The $Conspiracy of %&uals( was uncovered and !aeuf was e*ecuted 6-/-8. !ut his conception of the

dictatorship of spokesmen of the proletariat as the sole instrument for the reali"ation of Socialism did not

die with him. #t was the product of certain specific conditions. Capitalist production left the masses of

the working people no escape from their misery other than a transition to a Socialist mode of production.

+nly the power of the state could cope with capital. !ut under the rule of capital the proletariat found

itself immersed in such misery that it lacked the capacity to achieve and to hold political power.

Wherever such conditions have e*isted and an opportunity arose, or appeared to e*ist, for the overthrow

of the prevailing regime y insurrection, the idea of such a dictatorship made itself manifest, taking its

root from the ackwardness and helplessness of the working masses, not from any high degree of the

proletariat;s intellectual and moral power and independence.

When the laor movement egan to develop in 'rance after the revolution of Auly


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they had nothing to e*pect from the ourgeoisie. They wanted to ring aout Socialism immediately, y

means of their own efforts.

The Auly revolution stimulated in the workers of 5aris the elief in the power of the arricade. This led to

a revival of !aeuf;s idea in !lan&uism.

!ut not all Socialists were !lan&uistically inclined. Some affiliated themselves with Louis !lanc, who

elieved fervently in the democratic repulic. Were not the poor and disinherited a great ma2ority of thenation? 0ll that was necessary was to provide them with universal, free and e&ual suffrage, a sovereign

parliament and complete freedom of press and organi"ation, and no power in the state could stem their

march to Socialism. Louis !lanc failed to perceive, however, that this achievement re&uired a highly

developed proletariat, for the development of which there had een little impetus efore 7.

5roudhon was opposed to oth these tendencies. >e perceived that under the then e*isting conditions the

proletariat could not achieve victory through democracy, ut he feared no less the dictatorship of a

Socialist minority ruling through an all1powerful state apparatus. >e, too, considered the proletariat as he

found it, rather than as it might ecome. >e regarded it as incapale of influencing the policy of the state

and to master it, and yet he felt that the emancipation of the workers could e accomplished only y the

workers themselves. To make this possile he sought to simplify the prolem. The workers, he argued,could not pursue an independent state policy of their own: on the other hand, they could master the

prolem of the individual communities. >e thus sought to arrive at Socialism y dissolution of the state

into a network of sovereign communities.

These in rief, were the various tendencies dominant among Socialists when 4ar* egan to think as a

Socialist. >e had never een in dout as to the hopelessness of ourgeois1philanthropic utopianism. The

only Socialism he took seriously was the Socialism emanating from the. laor movement. Jery soon,

however, he saw also the inade&uacy of the three tendencies outlined aove. >e perceived this

inade&uacy in the fact that the adherents of each of these tendencies sought to ring aout Socialism with

the proletariat as they found ita task that was oviously unreali"ale.

The utopians and !lan&uists likewise reali"ed the inaility of the proletariat to ring aout Socialism.

They saw the need of educating the proletariat to this task, ut this education was to e undertaken y

leaders superior to and standing aove the proletariat. +nly with the reali"ation of Socialism would it

ecame possile for the working people to rise to a higher level of development, and thus learn how to

govern themselves democratically. The e*pression $true democracy is possile only under complete

Socialism( is not a new revelation ut primitive pre14ar*ian conception.

4ar* discerned the weakness of this form of education of the proletariat y educators self1appointed to

the role of 'uehrers, or lifted to dominance and asolute power over itself y an ignorant proletariat

through insurrection or in some other way. This would mean making the emancipation of the workersdependent upon historical accidents, &uite improale accidents. 'or, as a general rule, it was not to e

e*pected that a few Socialist conspirators, supported y a weak, ignorant proletariat, could attain that

asolute power necessary for the e*propriation of capital, to say nothing of coping with the difficulties of

Socialist construction.

4ar* perceived that the education re&uired y the proletariat could e made secure not through anormal

circumstances ut only as it developed from a phenomenon characteristic of all capitalist states, a

phenomenon ine*orale in its force and powerful in its effects. This phenomenon was the class

contradiction etween capital and laor, the class struggle arising inevitaly from this contradiction. This

class struggle was an incontrovertile fact, regardless of its characteri"ation y lierals and fascists as a

4ar*ian $invention. $

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4ar* did not invent it. >e did not demand it. >e merely registered its e*istence and pointed out its

inherent, inescapale conse&uences. 0nd, as one of those conse&uences he emphasi"ed the education of

the proletariat to democracy and Socialism, which cannot prosper without democracy.

4ar* in -9 divided the countries of %urope into two groups. #n one H essentially 0nglo1Sa*on H it

seemed possile that the working class would attain power without violence. #n the other group 4ar*

included most of the countries of the continent where the attainment of power without a revolution

appeared impossile.

0fter the rescinding of the 0nti1Socialist Law in ermany there came into view a third su1division. 0s

heretofore it still appeared impossile for the proletariat in the military countries of the continent to come

into power without a revolution. !ut in most of these countries it was now highly desirale to postpone

the decisive clash with the state as long as possile. #n )ussia, on the other hand, it was most imperative

that the uprising of the people against the asolutist regime should take place as soon as possile.

We find, therefore, in the Second #nternational, founded in /, whose period covered this new phase

of development, three well defined currents. They are geographically distinct and spring from the

different types of government prevailing on the continent. %ach of them represents an adaptation to

conditions, and from a 4ar*ist point of view each was fully 2ustified. %ach of them could and did e*istalongside the others, ut not without some friction.

The human mind craves asolute solutions. #t is against its nature to contend with relativities. 0nd so, in

each of the three aove1mentioned divisions, there were many Socialists who regarded the particular

stand on the &uestion of revolution which was suited to their own countries as something that had an

asolute validity, independent of space and time. This was enhanced y the risk international

intercourse which made it possile for ideas to circulate even faster than commodities. !orn of the three

views representing the different su1divisions, all of which were reconcilale with 4ar*ism, came three

factions which opposed one another not only within the #nternational ut in some of the separate

countries as well.

Fevertheless, from year to year the Socialist parties grew in si"e, in unity and in intellectual power.

Karl Kautsky


0. The eginning of olshevism

)ussia, too, could not remain closed to the rise of 4ar*ism and of a Socialist working class party

founded upon its ideas. These met with even greater ostacles from the c"arist regime than did the earlier

socialist parties of non14ar*ian character. 0nother ostacle to 4ar*ian ideas in )ussia was her

economic ackwardness, which delayed consideraly the development of large, capitalist, mass industry

and with it the growth of an industrial proletariat in the large cities. Fo less a arrier to the development

of a park of working class struggle was the asence of democracy, which made impossile the

development of any party activity, any legal mass1organi"ation and a free press.

0dded to this was the fact that due to her ackwardness )ussia retained until aout the end of the last

century more pronounced traces of a primitive village communism than were to e found anywhere in%urope. Due to these factors, socialist ideas in )ussia continued to ear pre14ar*ian characteristics for a

longer period than in the West. The )ussian fighters for lierty and e&uality inherited socialist

tendencies from Western %urope. #t was natural for them to see the power for a socialist regeneration of


11/49

c"arist )ussia not in the numerically weak city workers ut in the great masses of the peasantry.

4oreover, the city workers themselves came largely from the village, the ulk of them remaining

peasant in their thinking and feeling.

The working masses in the cities and the champions of their interests among the intellectuals, namely the

students, were influenced much more y the ideas of a peasant socialism than y 4ar*ism. The

development of 4ar*ism in )ussia came later than in Western %urope, and the growth of its influence

upon the )ussian city workers was slow and difficult.

Fot until / did the groups who emraced 4ar*ian ideas ecome sufficiently numerous to venture

upon the estalishment of the )ussian Social Democratic Laor 5arty.

This was a thoroughly 4ar*ian party and rought forth leaders and thinkers who have enriched mightily

4ar*ian thought not only in )ussia ut throughout the world.

Fevertheless, the peculiar conditions prevailing in )ussia remained unfavorale for the development of a

consistent 4ar*ism. #n ermany, too, it made itself felt effectively only with the rise of her heavy

industry and after her political constitution had provided ample opportunity for the creation of free

working class organi"ations, a socialist mass literature, as well as the participation of the masses in

strikes and electoral attles. #n )ussia, even after the estalishment of the Social Democratic Laor

5arty, the industrial workers remained relatively small in numers, while retaining their peasant

viewpoint, without any working class consciousness of their own. 0dded to this was the fact that only a

secret press and secret organi"ations were possile, which, naturally, could not e developed eyond

painfully restricted proportions.

The conditions unfavorale to the development of 4ar*ian socialism remained. %ven many of those who

considered themselves 4ar*ists fell victim to these conditions. They interpreted 4ar*ism fre&uently in a

rather fanatical sense. 0nd involuntarily they in2ected into it in increasing measure ideas of a pre1

4ar*ian, !lan&uist or !akuninist coloration.

+utstanding among the 4ar*ists of this character was Jladimir @lianov, etter known as Lenin. >e

2oined the Social Democratic Laor 5arty at its inception. >e accepted its program, having helped

formulate it. What first rought him into conflict with the consistent 4ar*ists in the party was the

&uestion of party organi"ation. @nder the conditions prevailing in c"arist )ussia this organi"ation was of

necessity a secret one. Fevertheless, the intention was to give it a form conducive to the highest possile

development of the intellectual and spiritual powers of its memers and the promotion of independent

thinking among the greatest possile numer of the workers. This could e achieved only through closest

participation of all party comrades in party work, their intimate contact with the laor movement, i.e.

only through the widest possile measure of democracy within the party This was entirely in accord with

the ideas of 4ar*, who at the eginning of the movement regarded democracy less as a means of gainingpolitical power and more as an instrument of education of the masses.

The Communist League, which 4ar* and %ngels 2oined in 7-, was oliged to e a secret organi"ation

under the political circumstances then prevailing on the continent of %urope. 0nd such, indeed, it was at

the eginning. Such an organi"ation presupposes the vesting of its leadership with dictatorial power.

4ar* and %ngels declined to accept this, however. They 2oined the League only after it had ceased to e

a conspiracy, although it had een oliged to remain a secret organi"ation due to the asence of all

freedom of organi"ation. %ngels reports aout it as follows3

$The organi"ation 6of the Communist League itself was entirely democratic, with elected officials,

always su2ect to removal, therey putting an end to all urge for conspiracy, which re&uiresdictatorship.( 6Introductionto I. 4ar*, The Cologne Trial, Nurich B, p.8


12/49

The 'irst #nternational of E7, like its predecessor, the Communist League, was also compelled to

maintain secret organi"ations in some countries. Fevertheless, 4ar* and %ngels fought repeatedly

against transforming the #nternational into a conspiratory organi"ation, as 4a""ini would have it. 4ar*

won over 4a""ini. The first #nternational was organi"ed not dictatorially ut democractically. 4ar* was

also opposed to the manner in which the eneral Workingmen;s 0ssociation was organi"ed in ermany

in Ee egan to demand ever greater

powers for the central organ of the party and increasingly circumscried powers for the memership.

5aul 0*elrod, Jera Nassulitch, 0le*ander 5otresov, Aulius 4artov and, later, eorge 5lekhanov opposed

him. %ven )osa Lu*emurg, who was more inclined to side with him in other matters, e*pressed

misgivings on the score of dictatorship which Lenin sought to introduce in the party.

#n his pamphlet One Ste$ 'or2ar"3 T2o Ste$s ack6/78 Lenin went so far as to assert3

$!ureaucratism against democracy H that must e the organi"ational principle of the revolutionary

Social1Democracy against the organi"ational principle of the opportunists.( 6p.B.8

# take the following from a criticism of Lenin y )osa Lu*emurg in Die -eue eit6KK##.98. She

declared3

$The estalishment of centrali"ation in the Social Democracy on the asis of lind oedience, to the very

smallest detail, to a central authority, in all matters of party organi"ation and activity: a central authority

which does all the thinking, attends to everything and decides everything: a central authority isolating

the centre of the party from the surrounding revolutionary milieu1as demanded y Lenin1appears to us asan attempt to transfer mechanically the organi"ational principles of !lan&uist conspiratory workmen;s

circles to the Social Democratic mass movement. 6p.7, 7/.8

$Lenin;s ideas are calculated principally to promote control of party activity and not its development, to

foster the limitation rather than the growth, the strangulation rather than the solidarity and e*pansion of

the movement.( 6p.7/9.8

That was how )osa Lu*emurg characteri"ed Leninism from its very eginning

0lready in /7, )osa Lu*emurg discovered that all that dictatorship in the party could accomplish was

to stem and stifle the intellectual development of the workers. et, it is precisely in the early stages of alaor movement, in which alone a voluntary recognition of the dictatorship of any of its leaders is

9


13/49

possile, that the education of the workers to independent thinking and action is far more important than

the winning of power y the leaders.

'or this reason, as early as /7, )osa Lu*emurg perceived Leninism as an element inimical to the

higher development of the working class. Faturally, she could not then foresee all the destructive

influences it carried within itself.

#n the meantime, at the very eginning of Leninism, another e*tremely in2urious element ecameapparent side y side with its strangulations and stifling of the movement.

Like the od of monotheists, the dictator is a very 2ealous god. >e tolerates no other gods ut himself.

Those in the party who do not elieve in his divine infalliility provoke his fierce hatred. Lenin

demanded that the entire working class sumit meekly to his leadership. Those in the party who were

inclined to show more confidence in other leaders or to defend opinions of their own were regarded y

Lenin as the worst possile enemies, to e fought with any and all means.

>ence it was impossile for Lenin, as it is impossile for anyone who would e dictator of a party, to

work together with comrades who occasionally differed from him. >ence the impossiility of working at

all for any length of time on a level of e&uality with comrades of character and independence of thought.

Whenever dictatorship assumes powers in a party organism, that organism is ound to deteriorate

intellectually, for dictatorship either degrades the est elements, compelling them to surrender their

independence, or e*pels them from the party.

Dictatorship in the party starts out with the idea of ringing aout a split in the party. This is apparent in

the very nature of dictatorship. The dictator not only declines to comine his organi"ation with other,

independent working class organi"ations into a higher general organism, ut he does not even think of

cooperating at least occasionally with other socialist parties against the common enemy. Leninism had

hardly egun to manifest itself in the )ussian Social Democracy when it rought aout a split into4ensheviks and !olsheviks.

#ntellectual impoverishment of its own party, ostruction of the intellectual development of the workers,

their weakening y prolonged internecine conflict H these were the conse&uences of the Leninist party

dictatorship even efore the )ussian )evolution of /-.

That revolution rought with it a fundamental change in all social and political relations.

Karl Kautsky


4. (enin an" the /ussian /evolution of 191

The )ussian )evolution of 4arch /- occurred under circumstances which could not possily have

een more favorale for the socialist parties, even though not for the immediate introduction of

Socialism. The c"arist governmental machinery was in ruins, the osolete noility lay helpless, while the

capitalist class, its capital largely of foreign origin, showed itself impotent. 0ll1powerful were only the

workers and intellectuals in comination with the peasantry. 0mong these the Socialists were inoverwhelming ma2ority H the Social )evolutionists among the peasants: the Social Democrats,

4ensheviks as well as !olsheviks, among the wage earners and intellectuals.


14/49

0fter the fall of C"arism it appeared self1evident that the various Socialist parties, the Social Democrats

and Social )evolutionists would work together in the Soviets, and that the cooperation would emrace

oth wings of the Social Democracy, 4ensheviks and !olsheviks. 0nd why not? Did not all of them

have a common aim3 estalishment of a democratic repulic, the eight hour day, confiscation of the

land?

!ut Lenin disliked intensely any such cooperation with the Socialists. Long efore the revolution he had

formed his own organi"ation within the Social Democracy. This dual organi"ation was uilt on militarylines and within this organi"ation Lenin had estalished his own dictatorship. 'or this reason he had

rought aout a split in the )ussian Social Democracy in /< and declared war against all Social

Democrats who had refused to pay lind oedience to his leadership.

0fter the split of /< and as late as Auly, /7, shortly efore the outreak of the war, Lenin fought

itterly against unity with the 4ensheviks. During the war he continued to preach the idea of split not

only in the )ussian Social Democracy ut in the entire Socialist #nternational. 'or this reason he fought

itterly against any united front of the workers when such a united front ecame possile after the

revolution of /-.

Lenin was in Swit"erland when the revolution of 4arch, /-, occurred in )ussia. >e returned to )ussiaa month after the revolution and found a situation which made him very itter. Shortly efore his arrival

there was held an all1)ussian conference of Soviets which revealed a very great measure of agreement

etween the 4ensheviks and !olsheviks.

$There followed at the conclusion of the conference a 2oint meeting of the 4ensheviks and !olsheviks to

discuss unity of oth factions. These negotiations were stopped through the arrival of Lenin, who

succeeded in turning sharply the wheel of !olshevist policy, although not without stuorn opposition of

many influential !olsheviks.( OP

Lenin;s aim in the )ussian )evolution was to destroy not only all organs of self1administration, ut alsoall other parties and social organi"ations, e*cept his own.

To this end he employed falsehood, slander and rutal force against all opponents, among whom he

counted all Socialists, e*cept those who were willing to oey his commands. >e finally succeeded in

smashing all his opponents through his coup detatof Fovemer -, /-.

Fevertheless, efforts were continued y some to ring aout a government of all Socialist parties.

$0t this time Ninoviev, Iamenev, )ykov, )2a"anov, Lo"owski and other prominent !olsheviks

demanded the formation of a Socialist government composed of all Soviet parties. They declared that

formation of a purely !olshevist government would lead to a regime of terror and to the destruction ofthe revolution and the country.( O9P

!ut again Lenin won his point in the !olshevist 5arry. >e hoped that the elections to the 0ll )ussian

Constituent 0ssemly, which were then in progress, would ring him a ma2ority.

@ntil /- the !olshevist 5arty regarded the dictatorship within its organi"ation as a means of struggle

for democracy in the state, and Lenin;s fight for democracy in the state proceeded along the line of the

other socialist parties. Like the latter, as late as /-, he demanded the convocation of a Constituent

0ssemly on the asis of universal suffrage.

The elections to the Constituent 0ssemly revealed that the !olshevist 5arty had far from a ma2ority inthe Constituent 0ssemly. !ut the Socialist parties H 4ensheviks, !olsheviks and Social )evolutionists

H constituted an overwhelming ma2ority in the assemly. 6The !olsheviks had appro*imately one fourth

7
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15/49

of the memership, the Socialist )evolutionists having a ma2ority. HEd.8 +nce more the !olsheviks had

an opportunity to take part in a Socialist united front, which could e the asis of a government

supported y the overwhelming ma2ority of the people. 0 government founded on such a asis and

having virtually the entire people ehind it would have een in a position to crush without any difficulty

any attempt at counterrevolution. #n fact, any such attempt would have een nipped in the ud.

>ad the !olsheviks at that time agreed to a united front, )ussia would have een spared the three years

of civil war and the conse&uent horrile misery. 5eace and freedom would have made possile rapideconomic recovery and with it a speedy development of the working class, which in turn, would have

promoted the reali"ation of a large measure of Socialist economy and its successful administration. 0ll

this would have been possible without dictatorship, without terror, through the democracy of the

workers and peasants. To e sure, we cannot say with certainty that this would have actually come to

pass, ut this was the only road that offered a possiility of otaining for the people through the

revolution as great a measure of lierty and welfare as e*isting circumstances permitted. !ut this would

have een possile only through the estalishment of a revolutionary government supported y the

overwhelming ma2ority of the population. Such a government could have een set up only on the asis

of a united front of all Socialist parties.

This united front was rendered impossile y the insatiale yearning for power on the part of Lenin andother leaders of the !olsheviks. They dissolved the Constituent 0ssemly, which they themselves had

previously so passionately championed, and with the help of the politically ine*perienced and ignorant

soldiery drawn from the disorgani"ed army, whose support they had won y limitless and irresponsile

promises, they succeeded in sei"ing power, y means of which they strengthened their own parry,

organi"ed on militarist lines, and crushed completely all their opponents.

The !olsheviks attained power and have een ruling ever since not through the confidence and support

of the ma2ority of the people.

There were two roads open3 the road of a Socialist united front or the road of power for the !olsheviksalone over all other Socialists. #t was the !olsheviks who utili"ed a favorale comination of

circumstances to render impossile any united front in order that they might estalish their own

dictatorship.

>aving estalished this dictatorship, they inevitaly created a situation in which only the mailed fist,

unconcerned too much with intellectual and moral restraints, can e victorious.

To emphasi"e their differentiation from the Social Democracy the !olsheviks have called themselves

Communists since /.

@pon the ruins of democracy, for which Lenin had fought until /-, he erected his political power.@pon these ruins he set up a new militarist1ureaucratic police machinery of state, a new autocracy. This

gave him weapons against the other Socialists even more potent than shameless lies. >e now had in his

hands all the instruments of repression which c"arism had used, adding to these weapons also those

instruments of oppression which the capitalist, as the owner of the means of production, uses against

wage slaves. Lenin now commanded all the means of production, utili"ing his state power for the

erection of his state capitalism.

Fo form of capitalism makes the workers so asolutely dependent upon it as centrali"ed state capitalism

in a state without an effective democracy. 0nd no political police is so powerful and omnipresent as the

Cheka or .5.@., created y men who had spent many years in fighting the c"arist police, and knowing

its methods as well as its weaknesses and shortcomings, knew also how to improve upon them.

#t would have een asolutely unnecessary to resort to any of these instruments of repression had Lenin

agreed to form a coalition with the 4ensheviks and Social )evolutionists in /-. These parties

B


16/49

commanded the support of the overwhelming ma2ority of the population, as the elections to the

Constituent 0ssemly had shown. %verything of a truly progressive nature which the !olsheviks sought

at that time to reali"e was also part of the program of the other Socialist parties and would have een

carried out y them, for the people had empowered them to do so. The confiscation of the ig landed

estates had also een planned y the Social )evolutionists and 4ensheviks1they actually put it into

effect in eorgia. 0olition of illiteracy, marriage law reform, social welfare measures, children;s

homes, pulic hospitals, shop councils, unemployment insurance and laws for the protection of laor,

aout all of which such a ig1to1do is eing made in Soviet )ussia, have een attained to a much greaterand more perfect degree in capitalist countries where the democracy of laor has won any considerale

power. The sociali"ation of heavy industry, insofar as this would have appeared economically

advantageous, would likewise have een approved y the ma2ority of the Constituent 0ssemly.

0ll the innovations in the domain of social welfare in which the Communists take so much pride and

which so greatly impress tourists would have een introduced y the ma2ority of the Constituent

0ssemly, and in much etter fashion than the dictatorship has een ale to do, ecause the country;s

economic condition would have een immeasuraly etter. 0ll the social welfare measures in force in

)ussia suffer from lack of resources, the hasty and ill1prepared manner in which they have een

introduced, as well as from the methods of rutal force used y the dictators even in instances where

astention from force would have een more advantageous. 4any workers were therey emitteredagainst the new regime when their willing cooperation was possile and necessary.

>ow disgusting and unnecessary, for e*ample, have een the forms of struggle against religion in Soviet

)ussia. The dictatorship does not seek to find a sustitute for religion y promoting independent critical

thinking and knowledge H such methods are not in the nature of dictatorship. )eligious services and

institutions, sacred to the devout, are su2ect to the coarsest insults and humiliations. Without the

slightest necessity, harmless, devout folk are emittered and made to suffer while simultaneously the

free thinkers themselves are degraded y such low forms of anti1religious propaganda.

0ll such difficulties of social change as arise from lack of means, undue haste, opposition of thepopulation, would have largely een averted if these changes had een the work of the Constituent

0ssemly. They were accomplished directly or indirectly through the civil war, which was the inevitale

conse&uence of Lenin;s dissolution of the Constituent 0ssemly y the hands of his sailors in Aanuary

/.

The ma2ority ehind the Constituent 0ssemly was so overwhelming that not a single one of the c"arist

generals dared move against it. >ad any one of them ventured to do so he would have had no following.

These generals were emoldened to counter1revolutionary mutiny only afterLenin had dissolved

Constituent 0ssemly and enaled them to put forward the pretense of seeking to restore the rights of the

0ssemly.

>ad Lenin not dissolved the Constituent 0ssemly, )ussia would have een spared the civil war with all

its horrors, cruelties and destruction. >ow much richer the country would have een, how much greater

the good of the social transformationQ 0ll the enormous e*penditures of the military ureaucratic police

apparatus, insofar as it has een devoted to purposes of repression, could have een spared. These

e*penditures could have een applied to productive purposes for the promotion of the general welfare.

The population should have een accorded the greatest possile measure of freedom, freedom of the

press, of assemly, of organi"ation, of self1government. @nder such conditions the masses would have

speedily developed economically, physically, intellectually. 0ll this stimulation of independent thinking

and mutual confidence among the workers, peasants and intellectuals would have genuinely enhanced

the development of socialist production, of a nation of lierty, e&uality, fraternity.

This nole development was halted on the day when Lenin ordered his military ands to make an end of

the Constituent 0ssemly.

E


17/49

Certainly, the fact that it proved easy to dissolve it indicates the high degree of political immaturity of

the elements who dominated 5etrograd at that time H &uite ignorant soldiery who had ut one wish,

immediate peace, and who sensed that Lenin;s dictatorship was the one infallile instrument to ring it

aout.

Fot the confidence of the ma2ority of the working class ut the complication of the revolution y the war

rought !olshevism to power. 0nd ecause it did not possess this confidence it was compelled, once in

power, to maintain itself y terrorism, which it is employing to this day without the slightest prospect ofits mitigation.

#t is often said that terror elongs to the nature of revolution, that revolutions are not made with rose

water or silk gloves, and that this has ever een so.

#t is, indeed, a peculiar revolutionism which asserts that what has always een must ever e so.

4oreover, it is not true that there never were revolutions without terror. The great 'rench )evolution

egan in -/, ut the terror did not come until Septemer -/9, and only as a conse&uence of war. Fot

the revolution ut war rought aout the terror as well as the dictatorship. )evolutions resort to terror

only when they are driven to civil war.

This was asolutely unnecessary in )ussia in /-. Democracy had een achieved. The workers and

peasants were in power. The demands of laor could have een satisfied y democratic methods, insofar

as these demands were compatile with the interests of the peasantry and with the material resources

availale.

The rule of the overwhelming ma2ority in the interest of the overwhelming ma2ority does not re&uire the

use of rutal force in a democratic state in order to assert itself.

#n the election to the Constituent 0ssemly


18/49

>aving sei"ed control, Lenin at once conceived himself powerful enough to undertake from aove and

y utopian methods the carrying out of a task which until then he himself as a disciplined 4ar*ist had

regarded as unreali"ale, namely the immediate estalishment of the Socialist order of production with

the aid of an immature working class. #t should e noted that it was a &uestion not of village

communism, for the private economy of the individual peasant was preserved 6until the collectivi"ation

under Stalin HEd.8, ut of state economy in industry and commerce.

This was the task undertaken y Lenin, in opposition to the 4ensheviks and the Social )evolutionists,who declared the undertaking utopian and unreali"ale. They likewise denounced the dictatorship and

the destruction of democracy.

-otes

.Theodore $an, in his Continuation of 4artov;s 5istory of the /ussian Social Democracy6p.9/E8.

9.Theodore $an, in his Continuation of 4artov;s 5istory of the /ussian Social Democracy6p.


19/49

When the civil war in )ussia susided and all the hopes for a world revolution vanished, douts egan to

arise in the minds of the !olshevist rulers as to whether $military communism( would last long. Lacking

a asis in the initiative and discipline of the working class, this new regime could e maintained only

with the aid of a ureaucratic apparatus, as unwieldy as it was inefficient, and y means of military

discipline in the factories and rutal terrorism practiced y an all1powerful political police throughout the

state. $4ilitary communism( resulted in a constant fall of production and rought the country to an ever1

growing economic decline.

This was soon recogni"ed y the ma2ority of the !olsheviks themselves. Lenin created a reach in this

Communism y making some concession to private economy 6F%5, /98, and that gave the country a

short reathing spell. Lenin himself called it a respite. 0nd, in fact, )ussia under $military Communism(

was gasping for reath.

!efore the war Lenin did not find in the Socialist #nternational the favorale conditions for the

promotion of his party dictatorship in )ussia. To avoid eing isolated he was compelled to accept

democracy in the #nternational, not only platonically ut in fact. >owever distasteful he found some

decisions of the congresses of the #nternational, he confined himself to criticism, which was his right, ut

did not venture to defy them.

This situation changed after the World War had temporarily halted the functioning of the #nternational.

#n /B, a group representing some elements of the #nternational met in Nimmerwald, Swit"erland.

These were not entirely of the same opinions however. Some wanted to revive the old #nternational,

while others proposed the creation of a new, Third#nternational, from which all Socialist parties which

did not accept the demands of the founders of the new #nternational were to e e*cluded. The

!olsheviks, commanded y Lenin, were to form the nucleus of the new ody. 'rom the outset, therefore,

their o2ect was not to reuild ut to split the #nternational.

The war had hardly come to an end when they undertook to form the new, Third #nternational, in

opposition to the old one, which in the meanwhile 6// had again egun to function. The grandiosee*periment undertaken y the !olsheviks could not help influencing the Socialist parties of the Western

countries. These parties, until then united, now split. 0 part of them enthusiastically 2oined the

!olsheviks and egan to apply their methods in Western %urope and 0merica. This led to the rise of the

Communist parties. The ma2ority remained faithful to the old Socialist principles and re2ected the

Communist methods under all circumstances. 0s etween these two currents there soon appeared a third

one. The latter re2ects the !olshevik methods for its own country ut elieves that these methods a*e

2ustified in )ussia. Contrary to the democratic structure of the 'irst and Second #nternationals, the Third

or Communist #nternational, also known as the Comintern, was rigidly dictatorial. #t estalished its

permanent seat in 4oscow and ecame merely the tool of the )ussian government, which thus otained

a large numer of agents aroad, some of them sincere and enthusiastic supporters and others well paid

agents, ut all of them lind instruments of the 4oscow centre without any will of their own.

The times seemed to favor the Soviet rulers. They e*pected a world revolution which they, the world;s

most successful revolutionists, would lead. The dictatorship over )ussia was to e e*tended to a world

dictatorship.

!ut the calculations upon which they ased their plans for world domination proved erroneous. Their

dictatorship fitted the peculiar conditions then prevailing in )ussia ut was ahorrent to the peoples of

Western civili"ation. 4oreover, even in )ussia the Communist dictatorship could assert itself only

ecause of the anormal conditions which ensued upon the military collapse of /-.

+nly those who never understood the nature of the modern state could have e*pected a revolution inevery elligerent country at the end of the war. )evolutions occurred only in defeated military

monarchies. !ut in these, too, the Communists failed to win. Fo highly developed working class will

accept dictatorship, however proletarian its colors, as instrument of emancipation.

/


20/49

The idea of a Communist world revolution met with a &uite different fate than the Communist

dictatorship in )ussia. The latter was victorious and has een ale to maintain itself unroken to this day.

The former suffered complete failure. !ut the efforts to put the idea of a Communist world revolution

into effect did not pass without trace.

The Socialist oserver outside who failed to look eneath the surface was impressed y the spectacle of

the Soviet )epulic. Such an oserver did not understand that everything that was purely progressive in

the new state was merely the e*ecution of that which the other Socialist parties of )ussia had alreadypioneered and prepared. 0ll this they would have carried out through the Constituent 0ssemly with its

overwhelming Socialist ma2ority, under much more favorale conditions, with the enthusiastic

participation of the population, and in a manner much more rational than the !olsheviks have een ale

to do in the midst of civil war, which they themselves had provoked, with its conse&uent enormous

destruction of productive forces and e*tensive paralysis of the activity of the people.

The superficial Socialist oserver, his wish eing father to his thought, likewise failed to understand that

under democratic forms the revolution would have led to a speedy rise of the intellectual and economic

powers of the people, whereas under the dictatorship even the hopeful eginnings for the development of

the masses laid down in decades of struggle under C"arism were shattered. What impressed the

superficial oserver was the fact that for the first time in history a socialist party had come into power ina state, the largest in %urope.

'or this reason there was at first wide sympathy for Communist )ussia in the circles of Western

%uropean Socialism. !olshevism had ecome strong through dictatorship in the party. #t had succeeded

in achieving dictatorship in the state. Fow it would e satisfied with nothing less than dictatorship over

the world proletariat. 0ll those outside of )ussia who would not ow to such dictatorship were

denounced as enemies, even though they may have looked upon the Communist police dictatorship as

&uite all right for the )ussian proletariat. This failed to satisfy the 4oscow dictators. They called upon

all Socialists to recogni"e the wisdom and desiraility of this dictatorship for the entire world.

4any refused to go along with !olshevism to any such point. The !olsheviks insisted, however, that it

was the duty of every worker, and particularly of every 4ar*ist, to sumit to their dictatorship. Those

who declined to do so were randed as $class enemies, counter1revolutionists, miserale traitors, more

dangerous and corrupting than direct class enemies.(

The !olsheviks looked upon the ourgeois parties only as enemies with whom it was possile to

negotiate under certain conditions and to conclude an armistice. +n the other hand, they regarded the

Socialists as cowardly deserters or rascally mutineers, fit to e hung.

#n this manner the Communists succeeded in weakening very materially the forces of laor in all

countries, at a time when the old regimes had collapsed in many states, although no world revolution wasto e e*pected, and when the working class throughout %urope had attained a position of higher

significance. !y considering their dictatorship more important than the unity of the working class, the

Communists split the Socialists parties outside of )ussia after the war as they had split the Socialists

parties inside )ussia efore the war. They aggravated this division of the forces of laor y e*tending

the schism into the ranks of the trade unions.

The Communist parties which arose outside of )ussia as a result of this policy were foridden to have

any views of their own ut were oliged to follow lindly the orders of the centre in 4oscow. This

centre was always very adly informed as to conditions aroad, its mercenary tools and informers

reporting the situation not as it really was ut as the dictator in )ussia wished it to e. %very despot in

history was always thus misled y his servile tools. 0s a conse&uence, the Communists aroad werefre&uently drawn into senseless adventures, which rought them severe and often annihilating defeat and

which, in turn, were very detrimental in their prolonged repercussions upon the workers of the countries

in &uestion.

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have within their own ranks an ade&uate supply of talent capale of directing industrial plants. Their

operation had to e entrusted to $class enemies,( who from the eginning regarded the new economy as

misguided and destructive, and whose opposition was accentuated y the ill treatment accorded them.

Looked upon with distrust, they were su2ected to constant control y utterly incapale fanatical

Communists, and made the scapegoats for every failure. @nder the desperate conditions prevailing,

failures continued to multiply while the managers of Soviet industry, living in an atmosphere of

increasing terrorism, found themselves helpless in the hands of their Communists masters.

Lack of skilled laor constituted an additional difficulty. Shortage of such laor was also a feature of

c"arist )ussia, due to lack of proper educational facilities. The war had served to reduce still more the

numer of skilled workers, while curtailing the training of additional forces. This shortage was further

aggravated during the revolution when many skilled workers H provided they were Communists or $non1

partisans( H were transferred as a matter of favoritism from the factories to government 2os.

0ll this put industry at a great disadvantage. Worst of all, however, was the effect of the tremendous

state apparatus which the dictatorship had to set up in order to maintain itself. Fationali"ed industry was

su2ected to the domination of this machine which, under the circumstances, assumed increasingly larger

proportions. The dictatorship inevitaly rought aout a condition in which all organi"ations suordinate

to it were deprived of any independence. The asence of any outlet for open criticism made it necessaryto e*tend in ever growing measure the task of keeping watch over the state apparatus, in proportion as it

grew in scope and unwieldiness. This slow, top1heavy, artificial, ureaucratic machine vitiated the 2oy

and efficiency of laor. 0n inevitale concomitant of these conditions was the spread of corruption,

which certainly did not improve matters.

The leading !olsheviks themselves looked with dissatisfaction upon the degeneration of economic life

arising from the effects of the rampant ureaucracy. #ndividual departments came under the criticism of

the Soviet press. This was so called $self1criticism.( !ut all that these outursts of indignation against

the ureaucrats accomplished was punishment of a few scapegoats and individuals guilty of particularly

glaring inefficiency.

These were the reasons why Soviet industry was unale to move forward with any marked degree of

success under the F%5, although production did increase somewhat over that of /19, the period of

$military communism.(

5rices of industrial commodities rose aove pre1war and world1market levels. The purchasing power of

the peasant declined in growing measure as a result of the state;s determined efforts to keep down prices

of farm products. This gave rise to a dangerous oppositionist tendency on the part of the peasants, who

replied y cutting down production in the face of the dis&uieting growth of the population, which was

proceeding at the rate of more than


23/49

eneficient effects of new construction were to manifest themselves in an improvement of living

conditions within two to three years.

This was to e the 'ive ear 5lan. The plan was immediately put into e*ecution with all the "eal and

energy availale. !ut the causes which had contriuted to the failure of industry under the F%5, despite

the temporary improvement, remained unaltered3 lack of skilled laor, the outlawing of plant managers,

and particularly the crippling of production y the monstrous, ureaucratic machine which is

simultaneously the instrument of the governing apparatus of the dictatorship and the administrativeapparatus of production.

To the old misery which the 'ive ear 5lan inherited and perpetuated had een added a great deal of

new suffering. This was inevitale. The e*ecution of the plan re&uired immense capital. Where was this

to e otained? Capitalist industry creates tremendous surplus values which permit the capitalists not

only to live and to maintain e*pensive armies and navies, ut to accumulate also immense capital

reserves. Soviet industry has arely managed to pay wages and costs of materials. The costs of the army,

the police, the ureaucracy, the state controlled press, the Communist 5arty must e met for the most

part y e*ploitation of the peasantry. @nder these circumstances, how were the enormous resources

necessary for the reali"ation of the 'ive ear 5lan to e otained? Through loans from capitalist

countries of the $decayed West?(

These, to e sure, the !olsheviks tried hard to otain, ut the credits received, through maneuvers of

doutful moral character, were very far from sufficient. +nly from )ussia herself could the great ulk of

the capital necessary for the 'ive ear 5lan e sought, for the machinery re&uired and supplied y

foreign capitalists had to e paid for.

The prolem, could, therefore, e solved only y depriving the )ussian population, which contains

virtually no capitalists ut only wage1earners, peasants and intellectuals, of the product of its laor to the

e*tent which would arely keep it from revolting or dying of hunger in the streets. %verything that can

possily e s&uee"ed out of the people was sold in the world market at any price. The proceeds weredevoted to purchasing machinery and e&uipment from capitalists aroad. During the $5iatiletka(

6)ussian term for the 'ive ear 5lan8, there were accomplished indeed colossal things that aroused the

ama"ement and admiration of the capitalist world and of many Socialists who had previously maintained

a skeptical attitude toward the !olshevik e*periment. Some of them took the view which they

themselves had previously re2ected. They said, $Well, it is true that the !olshevik methods are not

suitale for us: nevertheless they seem to lead to socialist construction in )ussia.(

0n indirect criticism of this view was once offered y Lenin himself in the days of c"arism, when he was

ridiculing the c"arist government. #n Aanuary /B, he pulished in the newspaper *$erio"an article

aout the )ussian reverses in the war with Aapan, where he clearly proved that those reverses were the

result of )ussia;s lack of freedom, which hindered the efforts of energetic and selfreliant people withoutwhom it was impossile to win a war.

$%vents have proved,( wrote Lenin, $how right those foreigners were that tens and hundreds of millions

of roules were wasted on the purchase and construction of magnificent dreadnoughts, and who pointed

out that all these e*penditures were useless in the asence of people capale of handling modern military

machinery and navigating modern vessels.(

This applies oth to machines intended for destruction and those uilt for production. 4achines are

useless if there are no competent people to tend them.

#ndeed, what characteri"es modern production is not only a highly developed techni&ue ut also highly&ualified workers who know how to operate the latest machinery and who are to e found in sufficient

numers only in a democracy. These workers are the prere&uisites, even to a larger e*tent than the

machines, of a true Socialist society that guarantees welfare and freedom to all.

9


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#n )ussia, however, under the C"ar as well as under the !olsheviks all efforts have always een directed

toward importing the modern techni&ue of capitalist countries, ut not the freedom which creates modern

men.

#n the ;E;s of the past century, under the influence of the defeat suffered in the Crimean War, a lieral

movement sprang up among a section of the )ussian noility. This faction, after aolishing serfdom,

wanted to emulate the %nglish aristocracy in conducting a modern economy. The aolition of serfdom

rought to some of the landowners large indemnities which they used in the purchase of agriculturalmachinery in %ngland. !ut they could not import %nglish workers along with the machinery, or if they

could it was only in small numers. The peasants, who y law had 2ust een freed from serfdom ut who

in reality continued to e the slaves of the landowners arid of asolutism, showed little capacity for

handling modern machinery. The machines soon fell into disrepair and ecame 2unk.

The promoters of the 5iatiletka disregarded these early e*periences. They too, elieved that all that was

necessary was to import as many new machines as possile from the industrial countries. They forget

that it was necessary also to create the political and social conditions that furthered the development of

modern men. Still less did they think of the fact that such men cannot e developed as fast as new

machines are created, and, for this purpose, the 'ive ear 5lan was not enough.

!ut to create new machines in the face of a lack of &ualified workmen means not to increase the

productive forces of the country, ut only to waste its resources.

'urthermore, Stalin and his men during the 5iatiletka were wasting national wealth in a manner &uite

different from the method employed in the si*ties y the lieral landowners. The latter spent for the

purchase of machinery only such funds as would have een wasted in gamling, in trips to 5aris, etc.

The condition of their peasants did not grow worse on account of it. =uite different is the case with

Stalin. 0ll the wealth of )ussia which her e*ploiters had een ale to garner efore the World War y

accumulating the surplus value that flowed into their pockets had een spent or destroyed first in the

war, then in the civil war, and finally in conse&uence of the estalishment of a ureaucratic stateeconomy y the !olsheviks. The large sums of money needed for the creation of the new industrial

apparatus could e raised only e e*tracting as much as possile of the newly1created surplus value from

the laoring masses. !ut the productivity of these masses was &uite small. @nder C"arism the wages and

standard of living of the workers were pitifully low. They declined further during the world war and civil

war. During the F%5 period, they rose somewhat. Fow they have een greatly reduced again in order to

otain money for the purchase of machines.

'oreign tourists in )ussia stand in silent ama"ement efore the gigantic enterprises created there, as they

stand efore the pyramids, for e*ample. +nly seldom does the thought occur to them what enslavement,

what lowering of human self1esteem was connected with the construction of those gigantic

estalishments.

The )ussian land1owners imported machinery without improving the condition of the peasants or adding

to their freedom. This was the cause of the failure of their technical reform plan. The !olsheviks, on the

other hand, imported machinery y rendering the condition of the workers immeasuraly worse and

curtailing their freedom. They e*tracted the means for the creation of material productive forces y

destroying the most essential productive force of all1the laoring man. #n the terrile conditions created

y the 5iatiletka, people rapidly perished. Soviet films, of course, did not show this. !ut to convince

oneself one only has to in&uire of Western %uropean and 0merican workers who went to work in )ussia

to escape the capitalist hell and find happiness in the Soviet paradise. 0fter a short stay, these workers

hurried ack to their former $hell,( where conditions may have een ad enough ut yet more earale

than was the condition of the workers or even privileged persons on the other side of the Soviet order.

The results of the 5iatiletka have turned out to e terrile largely ecause the !olsheviks, not content

with setting up a large numer of gigantic industrial estalishments, undertook to transform the

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individual peasant economy forthwith into a gigantic collective economy, doing precisely that which

Lenin had prudently astained from. 'or Lenin was ale to win ecause he energetically supported the

demands of the peasants who were ent on taking possession of the land of the landowners. #t must e

noted, however, that this support was &uite unnecessary to the peasants, inasmuch as the Social

)evolutionists and 4ensheviks sided with the peasants in this &uestion and had promulgated the division

of the land among the peasants efore the !olsheviks had sei"ed power.

!ut Stalin needed money for a program of rapid industriali"ation on a gigantic scale. Those enterpriseswhich already e*isted were working on a deficit, and therefore the e*pedient of e*tracting more from the

peasants seemed all the more necessary. This method of procedure encountered many difficulties when

applied to the individual, free peasants who had enough resistance power. >ence, the idea of comining

the individual peasant holdings into gigantic collectives, the so called $kolkho"y,( ruled y the state.

'rom such enterprises, the state thought to collect a much larger share of their production than from

individual peasants. !ut the peasants would not 2oin the $kolkho"y.( Therefore they must e compelled

to 2oin them y force. Thus, the diligent and willing toil of free peasants was replaced with the

compulsory laor of unwilling serfs. 0nd the yield of such laor is always poor in &uality and &uantity.

#t can e managed only with the aid of the most primitive and simple tools of production. 0 man

working under compulsion will &uickly damage any kind of complicated tool. 0nd yet the kolkho"y

were supposed to e the last word of efficiency and modernity in agricultural economy. They weresupplied with the est 0merican implements. With the change to the new methods of production, cattle

were to a large e*tent slaughtered. The memer of the kolkho" was compelled to work with the new

implements of production which were not suited to him, for they re&uire free, highly1skilled workers.

The old implements, to which he had ecome accustomed, are gone. #t is easy to imagine the results

accomplished y a man working against his will and interests. 0nd in fact, since the introduction of

$Socialist construction,( the productivity of )ussian agriculture has een declining apprecialy. 0t

presentO9P there is real famine in that agricultural country. #n the days of the C"ar we were perfectly

2ustified in denouncing famine in )ussia as evidence of the rottenness of the political order. !ut the

famine in )ussia this year e*ceeds anything known efore. #t rages practically all over the @kraine, in

Forthern Caucasus and the Lower Jolga region, the most fertile sections of the country1the very ones in

which the collectivi"ation of agriculture has een most e*tensive.

There are some who admitting the economic weaknesses of the Soviet regime continue to have faith in

its aims and possiilities. !ut are not these economic weaknesses of the regime themselves due to the

fact that the social transformation possile under the historical and structural conditions prevailing in the

Soviet @nion cannot y the very nature of things e a socialist one? !y its very nature, the Soviet regime

cannot create anything eyond a purely governmental economy with an enormously unproductive

ureaucracy. #s this not the kind of economy the socialist character of which has always een denied y

Socialists?

The highly rationali"ed technology of some Soviet industrial plants which, like the rest of Sovieteconomy, are woefully unproductive when looked upon from any true economic point of view, is ut a

drop in the ucket as a positive factor when viewed from the standpoint of the interests of the national

welfare. Still, the !olsheviks continue to speak glily of the necessity of $greatest sacrifices( in the

present as the price of $future welfare.(

reat sacrifices cannot e waved aside &uite so easily. Who will guarantee that $the future welfare(

under the dictatorship will e anything more than a 'ata 4organa? This dictatorship is pictured y some

as the dictatorship of a minority animated y faith, enthusiasm and readiness for higher self1sacrifice in

ehalf of a great human ideal, and seeking to impose that ideal upon the great ma2ority of -,,

people.

# see the present generation of Communists, i.e. not those in the opposition ut those in power, in &uite a

different light. 0 few among them may still e regarded as idealists, ut too many of them have

succumed

Documents

87354772 Karl Kautsky 1946 Social Democracy vs Communism