81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera

7/31/2019 81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera

1/6

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA

A.C. No. 6697, Bar Matter 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC,

25 July 2006, Per Curium (En Banc)

The Court has emphasized that the judgment of suspension against

a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result inhis suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Judgment of suspension

against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of

suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action

includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this juris-

diction. The judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie

evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. Complainant must prove by sub-

stantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing

officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these

acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

On April 11, 2005, Zoilo Antonio Velez filed a complaint for thesuspension and/or disbarment of Atty. Leonard De Vera based on thelatter's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension orderrendered against him by the State Bar of California. Velez averred thatAtty. De Vera lacked the moral competence necessary to lead thecountry's most noble profession. It appears that Atty. De Vera handled aninsurance case in California involving a certain Julius Willis III whofigured in an automobile accident in 1986. He was authorized by the elderWillis (father of Julius) for the release of the funds in settlement of thecase. He then received a check in settlement of the case which hedeposited to his personal account. An administrative case was filedagainst him before the State Bar of California and it was recommendedthat he be suspended from the practice of law for three years. Thereafter,Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation wasaccepted by the Supreme Court of California.

On April 15, 2005, Atty. De Vera filed a letter-request with theCourt for his oathtaking as IBP National President.

In a regular meeting on May 13, 2005, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote,resolved to remove Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and asEVP. Atty. De Vera allegedly made untruthful statements, innuendos andblatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th NationalConvention of Lawyers on April 22, 2005, making it appear that thedecision of the IBP Board to withdraw the Petition questioning R.A. 9227,was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court, therebybringing the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole in public contempt anddisrepute, in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility for Lawyers which mandates that a lawyer shall observeand maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers andshould insist on similar conduct by others. It appears that the IBP Boardapproved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before the Court to questionthe legality and/or constitutionality of R.A. 9227, authorizing the increasein the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees. Atty. De

7/31/2019 81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera

2/6


Vera also allegedly instigated and provoked some IBP chapters toembarrass and humiliate the IBP Board in order to coerce and compel thelatter to pursue the aforesaid Petition. Moreover, he was alleged to havefalsely accused IBP National President Cadiz, during the said PlenarySession, of withholding from him a copy of the Court's Resolution granting

the withdrawal of the aforesaid Petition, thereby creating the wrongimpression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented himfrom taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus com-promising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President andthe IBP as a whole.

On May 13, 2005, the IBP issued a Resolution removing Atty. De

Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP. Thereafter, IBP

National President Cadiz informed the Court of the election of IBP

Governor Jose Vicente Salazar as EVP and requested that the latter's

election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National Presi-

dent in the event that Atty. De Vera was disbarred or suspended from

the practice of law or should his removal from the IBP Board and as EVP

be approved by the Court.

Atty. De Vera vehemently insists that there is no proof that he

misappropriated his client's funds as the elder Willis gave him authority

to use the same and that the latter even testified under oath that he

"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." He also questions

his removal from the IBP Board on the ground that he was denied "very

basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in

administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and

within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the

right to a fair hearing. He protests the fact that he was not able to cross-

examine the complainant, IBP Governor Romulo Rivera and that the latter

voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and

judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasizes the fact that Atty. Rivera

initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when

his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3

vote could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of

voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during

the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's

actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary.

Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he

7/31/2019 81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera

3/6


was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed

against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the

complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on May 13, 2005

wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein,

he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera

did argue his case.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not there is substantial proof that Atty. De Vera violatedCanon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers

2) Whether or not Atty. de Vera was removed for just and valid cause3) Whether or not Atty. De Vera was denied due process when he

was removed from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP

HELD:

Atty. De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two

years. His letter-complaint praying for the disapproval of the Resolution

removing him from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP is DISMISSED. The

election of Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP for the remainder of the term 2003-

2005 is AFFIRMED and he is DIRECTED to immediately take his oath

of office and assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. De

Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing

officer of the State Bar of Cal ifornia.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of Cali-

fornia, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice. No final judgment

for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite

a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his

license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme

Court of California. The Court has emphasized in the case of the

Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G.

Maquera that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a

foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension ordisbarment in the Philippines. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino

lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the

Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of

the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. The

judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of

unethical acts as lawyer. Considering that there is technically no foreign

judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the

State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of

unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by sub-

stantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing

7/31/2019 81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera

4/6


officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these

acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence of malpractice on thepart of Atty. De Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension

by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California. By insisting that hewas authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds, Atty. de Vera hasimpliedly admitted the use of his client's funds for his own personal use.This admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice.Consequently, Atty. De Vera now has the burden of rebutting theevidence which he himself supplied.

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client'sfunds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Respon-sibility is emphatic about this, thus:

A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYSAND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAYCOME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money orproperty collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each clientseparate and apart from his own and those of others kept byhim.

Atty. de Vera's act of holding on to his client's money without thelatter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity andpropriety. It is clear that he, by depositing the check in his own accountand using the same for his own benefit, is guilty of deceit, malpractice,gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only tohimself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot bedenied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorablydiminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust andconfidence. Atty. De Vera violated his oath to conduct himself with allgood fidelity to his client. That the elder Willis "expected de Vera mightuse the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of

consent to the use by Atty. De Vera of his client's funds. Rather, it wasmore an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed,use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character ofAtty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the courtand the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protectthe administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise thisimportant function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men inwhom courts and clients may repose confidence. The statutory enuncia-tion of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as alimitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer.

7/31/2019 81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera

5/6


The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.Considering the amount involved here - US$12,000.00 - the penalty ofsuspension for two years is appropriate.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just andvalid cause.

The IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of itsmembers pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, underwhich a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by reso-lution adopted by % of the remaining members of the Board, subject tothe approval of this Court.

Conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if notanimosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but

especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, isdiluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for thenthere would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through theBoard of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in anauthoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige andrepute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus beadjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from [he stressesthat invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public. Therefore,the IBP Board was well within its right in removing Ally, de Vera as thelatter's actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention weredetrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP.When the IBP board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesiveunit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Court enforce thecode of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improvethe administration of justice.

The IBP Board observed due process in the removal of Atty. de Vera as

IBP Governor.

The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, libertyand property. It cannot be said that the position of IBP EVI1 13 propertywithin the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to securityof tenure over said position as, in fact, .ill that is required to remove anymember of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by /^of the remaining members of the board- Even if the right of due processcould be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, theessence of due process is simply the opportunity Lo explain one's side.Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to anotice or hearing are not essential to due process of law, the constitutionalrequirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularlyestablished administrative agency Or tribunal. It is not essential that

7/31/2019 81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera

6/6


hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there isavailable trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses lo themaking of such determination may be raised and considered. Oneadequate hearing is all that due process requires. The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.

Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him andthat he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript ofthe stenographic notes of the May 13, 2005 meeting wherein he wasremoved, it is patent that he was given fair opportunity to defend himselfagainst the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Documents

81073335-Velez-v-De-Vera