8 STEPS IN THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

1. Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July 1945) Soviet action was the basis of the Long Telegram and the Iron Curtain speech

2. The Long Telegram, February 22 1946 Shaped US foreign policy: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

3. The Iron Curtain Speech, March 6 1946

- Shaped US foreign policy: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

4. The Truman Doctrine, March 12 1946

- A result of the Iron Curtain Speech and the Long Telegram

5. The Marshall Plan, June 5 1947

- Broader application of the principles behind the Truman Doctrine.

- Congress was compelled to pass the Marshall Plan after the Czech Coup.

6. Red Army occupation of Eastern Europe, 1945-7

- Contributed to need for containment.

7. Czechoslovakia Coup, February 1948

- Direct cause for the Marshall Plan.

- Contributed to need for containment.

8. Berlin Blockade, June 1948

- First direct confrontation between the US and the USSR in a proxy location.

Tehran, November 1943

1. Stalin, FDR, and Churchill discussed a definite date for the Normandy invasion (projected for May 1944) and in return Stalin would join in the Pacific once Germany fell.

2. Poland: Stalin wanted the territories seized in Poland from 1939-40 to remain under Soviet control. Stalin argued that Poland was the traditional launching pad for invasion into Russia, and his demands were agreed to.

3. Eastern Europe: Western Allies agreed to let the Soviets keep Baltic territories which were seized from 1939-40.

a. This defied the 1941 Atlantic Charter between the US and Britain.

Yalta, February 1945

At this point, the fall of German is within sight because the Allies opened a successful second front with the invasion of Normandy. The Red Army occupied much of Eastern Europe, which strengthened Stalin’s position at Yalta.

1. The Allies agreed on demilitarization, disarmament, de-Nazification, and division of Germany.

a. They wanted a weak post-war Germany.

2. Germany would be divided to four zones with each designated for the US, USSR, Britain and France.

a. Churchill was adamant that France should receive a zone. This ensured that the Soviet would only receive one fourth of Poland rather than one third, and that the cumulative Western Allied zone was larger.

3. Stalin demanded a larger portion of German reparations, so the Western Allies agreed to give him 25% of their reparations. (Stalin would receive 50% of the $20 billion in reparations)

4. The Allies agreed that the eastern Polish border would be redrawn to the Curzon Line.

a. Stalin demands from Tehran were granted.

5. Churchill wanted London Poles to take the government in Poland, whereas Stalin wanted a pro-Communist Lubin Committee.

a. This was the most severe point of disagreement during Yalta. Stalin’s actions were viewed as an attempt to spread communism.

6. The Allies signed the Declaration for Liberated Europe. Stalin agreed to let Eastern European countries have ‘free elections’.

a. This was seen as the greatest achievement of Yalta for the Western Allies; however Stalin was to break his promise in the future.

7. Stalin agreed to enter war with Japan after Germany fell, so long as he was rewarded with territory. He demanded South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands and the Western Allies agreed.

a. Stalin appeared expansionist.

8. Stalin agreed to join the UN; however he demanded that all 16 Soviet States receive a seat of their own. He was only granted three.

Between the Conferences

1. Roosevelt died in April 1945 and was replaced by Truman, who was more aggressive against the Soviets.

2. Germany surrendered unconditionally on May 7 1945.

3. Clement Atlee replaced Winston Churchill after the general elections occurred in the UK.

4. The Soviets occupied Berlin by the end of the war.

5. The US successfully tested its first atomic bomb at the Trinity site on the same day the Potsdam Conference began.

Potsdam, July 1945

1. The Allies could not agree on how to disarm, demilitarize, de-Nazify and divide Germany, so ultimately it was decided that each nation would deal with it in their own manner within their own zones.

2. Truman did not agree with the terms dealing with Poland set at Yalta and challenged the western frontier (the Oder-Neisse line).

3. Truman insisted that the Polish government be ‘re-organized’, because he did feel there was a ‘free and democratic’ vote.

a. Stalin offered to include more London Poles in the Lubin-dominated government, but this did not appease Truman.

4. Truman was strongly opposed to the Percentages Agreement between Stalin and Churchill in October 1944 because it gave the Soviets significant influence in Romania and Bulgaria.

a. Truman was opposed to a Soviet ‘sphere of influence’ developing in East Europe; however the Red Army was physically occupying the area. Tensions between Truman and Stalin rose.

5. Regarding the developments at the Trinity Site, Truman casually informed Stalin that the US had “a new weapon of unusual destructive force.”

6. The UN was established. The ‘Big 5’ had the power of veto.

Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’

To what extent did the Long Telegram shape American foreign policy?

Prior to the publication of the Long Telegram, Secretary of State James Byrnes described a position of “patience with firmness” in American foreign policy. Byrnes believed he had secured Soviet agreements for self-determination and revival of the world economy with his recent activity in foreign conferences,

but Soviet conduct suggested nothing of this. As a result of actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, by 1946 Soviet aggression became apparent.

Publication of the Long Telegram

1. Recent developments with the USSR:

a. Josef Stalin’s “Two Camps” speech to Moscow on February 9, which outlined the incompatibility of capitalism and communism.

i. Stalin’s speech dispelled notions of peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism in the post-war world, for the Soviets tactics reflected the promotion worldwide revolution and the ideological expansion of communism.

b. Conflict regarding Soviet aggression in Iran resulting from a defiance of the March 2 deadline for the withdrawal of military occupation in Azerbaijan.

i. Soviets attempted to assume spheres of influence over areas such as Iran, which reinforced the message in Stalin’s February 9 speech.

2. Kennan’s thesis states that “the USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence”

a. The publication of the Telegram reinforced that appeasement of Stalin was futile, and that the Soviets would have to be approached from a position of strength.

3. “…At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is ...instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”

a. Kennan asserted in the Telegram that the root of Soviet conduct lay deep within the foundation of the Soviet system, and no concessions from the outside world, including the United States, could effectively resolve conflicts with Russia.

4. The dispatch of the Telegram on February 22 1946 coupled with American-Soviet conflict allowed for the shift away from Byrne’s described policy.

Reception in the Department of the State

1. Navy Secretary James Forrestal made the Telegram a required reading among high-ranking officials in the Naval War College in Washington.

a. The Telegram was significant to shaping US foreign policy because of the impression it left on members of the State Department.

2. After prompting by Acheson, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) developed a constituency for aid programs to Europe in 1947.

a. Their purpose was the “co-ordination of economic policy in [Soviet] occupied areas, particularly Germany and Japan, with general objectives in Europe and the Far East.”

Effect on US Foreign Policy

See Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech, March 5 1946

Basis of the Iron Curtain speech

1. “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent[Europe].”

a. Churchill’s speech warned of the new Soviet danger in Europe. By 1946, Soviets dominated governments in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.

i. Stalin defied the ‘Declaration for Liberated Europe’ agreed to at Yalta.

2. “If [the West] become divided or falter in their duty… then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.”

a. Since the economic fall of Britain, a vacuum of power was left behind in Europe. Through the Iron Curtain speech, Churchill stressed that United States had a responsibility for protecting the world’s democracy since Britain no longer could.

3. Keely Rogers, The Cold War (2010). Churchill referenced the “clock of secrecy… over Europe within a few months of the end of the war.” The West could not monitor Stalin’s actions behind the iron curtain.

Soviet reaction

1. In March 1946, Stalin responded in a speech where he said “Mr Churchill’s position is a call for war on the USSR.”

2. In his March 1946 speech Stalin also said Churchill’s position was racist: “…only English-speaking nations are superior nations… call upon to decide the destinies of the entire world.”

3. The Soviets withdrew from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

4. Stalin initiated a new Five-Year Plan to strengthen the USSR.

Truman Doctrine, March 12 1946

Truman’s decision to provide aid to Greece and Turkey was affected profoundly by the Iron Curtain speech and the Long Telegram. These brought to attention the “polarization of power” and the need “for the United States to take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression or communist subversion” (Dean Acheson, 1946).

1. In his speech outlining the Doctrine, Truman said that the US had obligations to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

a. Truman adopted the message behind Kennan’s Telegram to present the Greek-Turkish situation as a struggle between democracy and despotism. He presented the situation as a moral struggle, and this solidified American commitment to communist suppression.

2. In February 1947, the British told the US they could no longer give support to Greece and Turkey.

a. Since the economic fall of Britain, a vacuum of power was left behind in Europe. Officials in the US State Department feared that Stalin would assume position over this vacuum if a stronger force did not intervene for the containment of communist expansion.

3. On February 27, President Harry Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson addressed Congress to the importance of continued assistance to Greece and Turkey.

a. If the USSR recovered from its post-war condition, it could establish military bases in a weakened Greece. A collapse of Greece would disparage morale of the neighbouring non-Marxist nation, Turkey. The fall of Turkey and Greece would be felt throughout Europe and the Middle East, specifically in Iran, Iraq, and Palestine, and communism would assume a domino effect over the area.

4. Congress allocated $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey

a. Assistance to Greece and Turkey would mark America’s acceptance of the historic British responsibility of protecting Europe from Soviet aggression

5. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War (1985). “The Truman Doctrine was a milestone in American history…From 1947 on…any threats to that Western system could be easily explained as Communist inspired…”

a. America intervention in the affairs of nations beyond inter-American borders was unprecedented during times of peace. The policy of containment outlined in the Long Telegram allowed for an appropriate means of initiating peacetime intervention.

Marshall Plan, June 1947

Containment and the Marshall Plan

1. It was a program for European economic revival, and General Marshall assured that “any government willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation by the United States”.

a. The Plan intended to cut links between the Soviets and its satellite states by elevating them towards economic independence. This would deprive the USSR of manpower, natural resources, and ability in agricultural and industrial production.

2. It was accepted by many nations, extending its impact to 270 000 000 people.

a. The Marshall Plan effectively divided Europe between East, under the Soviet Union, and west, under the leadership of the United States, while unifying anti-communist governments and raising morale of the public. This allowed for the rejection of authoritarian influences and the successful containment of communism.

3. Until May 1947 the French and Italian communist parties were members of ruling coalitions, and communists participated in the government of other West European states as well.

a. Behind Marshall's proposal lay American fears of a communist take-over in Western Europe, which remained war torn and impoverished. In sponsoring a European economic recovery which would contribute to political stability, Marshall aimed to undermine support for the communist left and to strengthen the political position of anti-communist parties and movements.

4. Indeed the British and French governments responded to Marshall's Harvard speech by inviting the Russians to a conference in Paris for July 1947 to discuss a European response to the plan.

5. The British and French insisted (in accordance with Marshall's express wishes) that any American aid programme had to be co-ordinated and organised on a pan-European basis. This was seen by the Soviets as a western device for interference in the economic and political life of the East European countries.

6. When the Eastern Bloc nations of Poland and Czechoslovakia attempted to claim Marshall Aid, Stalin intervened with political and financial pressure to prevent this.

a. The Marshall Plan was also successful in demonstrating Soviets aggression for anti-Communist propaganda used by the West in Europe; Stalin’s rejection to American offers of aid directed much of the blame for the partition of Europe towards the USSR.

Soviet Reactions

1. The Soviet responded to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in September 1947, when politburo member A.A. Zhdanov delivered what became known as the `two camps' speech to the Cominform. He stated that post-war developments resulted in ‘two camps’: “the imperialist and antidemocratic camp ... and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp”

a. Zhdanov's speech set out a new, cold war perspective for the European communist parties.

b. While Truman had called for a defence of the free world against communist subversion and coercion, Zhdanov demanded action to defend postwar leftwing gains from imperialist threat and encroachment from the establishment of ‘anti-Soviet’ blocs of countries—not only in Western Europe, but also South America and China.

2. The Soviets introduced the Molotov Plan in response to the Marshall Plan. It was a series of bilateral trade agreements between the Eastern States and Soviet Russia.

a. It was designed to establish definite ties between the Eastern Europe and Moscow.

3. The Molotov Plan resulted in the creation of COMECON in January 1949.

a. It was to ‘stimulate’ and control economic development in Eastern countries, as well as support collectivization of agriculture and development of heavy industry.

b. It was a centralized agency that linked Eastern bloc countries directly to Moscow.

Red Army occupation of Eastern Europe, 1945-7

1. Soviet military power

a. At Tehran the Allies agreed that they would withdraw troops from Iran once WWII ended. When the British troops were removed, Stalin left 30 000 Soviets in Azerbaijan.

i. Truman said Russia must be faced “with an iron fist and strong language.”

2. Salami tactics

a. ‘Baggage Train’ leaders from Eastern Europe who were in Moscow during WWII replaced government officials in the Eastern bloc states as the last step of the ‘salami tactics’.

i. They were considered ‘trustworthy’ by Soviets. This included Beirut, Kolarov, Pauker, and Rakosi who returned to Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.

b. Stalin supported pro-Communist uprisings in Greece.

i. This was in defiance of the Percentages Agreement with Churchill and prompted the Truman Doctrine.

3. State police and security/spy networks

a. Prior to the ‘free elections’ promised by Stalin in Poland, over 50 000 people were deported to Siberia.

b. Over half of the Polish Peasant Party in Poland was arrested prior to the elections. 1

4. COMECON

a. The Molotov Plan resulted in the creation of COMECON in January 1949, in opposition to the Marshall Plan.

i. It was to ‘stimulate’ and control economic development in Eastern countries, as well as support collectivization of agriculture and development of heavy industry.

ii. It was a centralized agency that linked Eastern bloc countries directly to Moscow.

Mr. X Article

1. This article was written by Kennan and published in Time Magazine in 1947. It reinforced the need to adhere to a strict policy of containment: “[The US] must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.”

a. Kennan had a reputation as the State Department’s key expert on Soviet policy and his opinion had a strong influence on Truman.

b. The article was published in Time Magazine. His expertise also gave him a profound influence over the American public opinion, and helped to antagonize the USSR.

Czechoslovakian Coup, February 1948

1. Czech officials showed interest in receiving Marshall Aid, and the West was sympathetic to Czechoslovakia because of their abandonment by the Munich Agreement of 1938.

a. Stalin feared that Czechoslovakia was moving West and undermined Stalin’s attempt to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe.

2. Stalin employed aggression and violence: the Czech Foreign Minister (Jan Masaryk) was found dead and twelve non-Communist government officials were forced to resign.

a. The Soviet’s use of force verified the warnings of the Iron Curtain speech and justified the use of containment outline in the Long Telegram.

3. Truman labelled the incident a “coup” that “sent shock waves throughout the civilized world.”

a. Truman used the Soviet example of violence to extend its influence as the grounds for financing the Marshall Plan. The Czech Coup was directly responsible for its passage in Congress.

Berlin Crisis of 1948

Reasons for the failure to unify post-war Germany

1. Germany’s key strategic position and the differing aims of the main powers:

a. Both France and the USSR did not want to see a resurgent united Germany.

b. The USSR wanted to exploit German reparations as much as possible, and was allocated $20 billion.

c. The US believed that the best way to recover Germany was also the best way to contain communist—with vast sums of economic aid.

i. Through the Marshall Plan, West Germany ultimately received $1 389 million.

ii. Britain endorsed the US view.

2. The increasing lack of trust between East and West as the Cold War developed.

a. It was clear by 1946 that Germany would be divided on political and economic terms between the Soviet Zone and the Western Zone.

3. The specific disputes between post-war powers within Germany itself.

a. The Soviets did not supply enough food to the Western Zones therefore the US and Britain stopped supplying the Soviet Zone.

b. 25 million tonnes of coal from the Western Zones were exported to Europe rather than the USSR.

i. The Soviets wanted coal but the US used it instead to assist in economic reconstruction of Western Europe.

c. In early 1947, the British and American zones were merged into one unit, called Bizonia.

d. In April 1946, the Soviets forced a merger of political parties to create a single party—the Socialist Unity Party.

i. Stalin was planning to incorporate a reunified Germany under Moscow’s sphere of influence

e. Stalin attempted to use the Communist Party of Germany to gain power in the Western zones.

i. However the West Germans were not compelled to support communist parties because they did not offer the economic assistance that the US did (through the Marshall Plan), and there was no chance of democracy.

f. At the London Conference of 1948, France, Britain and the US drew up a new constitution for West Germany. They would also integrate a new currency.

i. They concluded that cooperation with the Soviet Zone was futile.

ii. Stalin saw the introduction of a new currency as the establishment of a new Germany in the West, and this prompted his attempts to force the West out of Berlin.

The Berlin Blockade

This was the first direct confrontation between the US and the USSR in a proxy location.

1. Berlin lay 100 miles into the Soviet Zone in German.

a. The Western division in Berlin had to rely on receiving supplies by the west, delivered along road, rail and air corridors.

2. Starting in March 1948, Stalin began to restrict Western interests in Berlin. This was done primarily through transportation blockages.

3. Stalin began a total blockade of Berlin on June 23-4 1948. All roads, railways and waterways were closed, and electricity was cut.

4. During the blockade, more than 200 000 flights were made to Berlin in 320 days.

a. The West supplied West Berlin rather than respond with a military confrontation. The US was implementing containment.

5. By early 1949, the Soviets ended the blockade.

a. Stalin did not have the resources to continue the blockade; therefore the first Cold War crisis was a Soviet failure.

Results

1. In September 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was set up by the West.

a. The failure of the blockade meant that division of Germany was now certain.

2. In response, the Soviets set up the German Democratic Republic.

a. These arrangements demonstrated that neither side wanted to risk a united Germany that would be an ally to their enemy.

b. Europe was now clearly divided both economically and politically. This was a literal manifestation of the Iron Curtain.

3. NATO was formed in April 1949. This was between the US, Canada, and the Brussels Pact powers.

a. The West’s suspicions about Stalin’s intentions were confirmed by recent events (Soviet threat to Berlin, Czech Coup), and this emphasized a need for US defence commitments to Europe.

4. At the same time, US Congress approved military assistance programmes to help build Europe’s forces.

5. In May 1954, West Germany was admitted into NATO.

a. This confirmed Soviet fears of the dangers of an armed Germany on its borders.

6. In retaliation, the Soviets announced the Warsaw Pact in May 1954.

a. This brought all East European states into a single military command.

b. Now Europe was divided militarily, as well as economically and politically.

John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1998).

“…as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, a Cold War was unavoidable.”

Once Soviet documents were revealed after 1989-90, Gaddis’ view changed from post-revisionism to one that emphasized Stalin’s contribution to the origins of the Cold War. Stalin’s policies coupled with the Soviet totalitarian/authoritarian government drew the West into an escalation of hostility and a protracted arms race.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Knopf, 1945).

“ These[The Russians and Americans] alone are proceeding …along a path to which no limit can be perceived.”

Tocqueville predicted in 1835 that America and Russia would arise as world powers because each was the strongest representations of two conflicting types of power: democracy versus authoritarianism (“The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude.”). Therefore the Cold War was a conflict in the balance of powers.

George F. Kennan, The Long Telegram (1946).

“…the USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.”

Kennan asserted in the Telegram that the root of Soviet conduct lay deep within the foundation of the Soviet system, and no concessions from the outside world, including the United States, could effectively resolve conflicts with Russia.

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1532).

“All armed prophets won and the unarmed perished.”

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, Origins of the Cold War (1967).

“…the existence of any non-Communist state was by definition a threat to the Soviet Union.”