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www.NovAtel.com Interference of An+,Jam Techniques with accurate +me determina+on Gordon Jolly Chief Engineer, An+,Jam Technologies NovAtel Inc. [email protected] NovAtel Proprietary www.NovAtel.com GPS Jammer Headlines Mainstream and Industry press make rou+ne pronouncements on the vulnerability of GPS (and other GNSS services) – the “Invisible U+lity” NovAtel Proprietary

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www.NovAtel.com,

!

Interference!of!An+,Jam!Techniques!!

with!accurate!+me!determina+on!

Gordon!Jolly!

Chief!Engineer,!An+,Jam!Technologies!

NovAtel!Inc.!

[email protected]!!

!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

GPS!Jammer!Headlines!

•  Mainstream!and!Industry!press!make!rou+ne!pronouncements!on!the!

vulnerability!of!GPS!(and!other!GNSS!services)!–!the!“Invisible!U+lity”!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

Within!the!GPS!community!there!is!a!LOT!of!concern!!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

What!is!the!problem!

•  Power!–!easy!to!overwhelm!

–  GPS!signal!at!sea!level!is!just!178aW!or!,127dBm!or!178x10,18W!!

•  from!a!25W!transmi]er!on!the!satellite!at!an!al+tude!of!21,000km!!

•  Signal!–!civilian!signals!are!easy!to!fake!

–  Military!signals!are!encrypted!and!access!is!very!+ghtly!controlled!

–  Civil!signals!are!in!the!public!domain!

•  Integrity!–!difficult!to!validate!

–  Military!and!Augmenta+on!service!(e.g.!WAAS)!include!integrity!monitoring!

–  Civil!are!unauthen+cated!–!use!at!your!own!risk!!•  Protec+on!

–  GPS!frequency!bands!are!protected!by!the!ITU!globally!•  including!FCC!in!the!US!

–  Detec+on!and!enforcement!cannot!yet!be!said!to!be!effec+ve!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

Civil!Vulnerabili+es!•  Jamming!sources!

–  Accidental!emissions!

•  Faulty!electronics!can!transmit!unwanted!signals!that!disrupt!GPS!

–  Individuals!using!‘Personal!Privacy!Devices’!to!avoid!unwanted!loca+on!tracking!of!their!movements!

•  “eBay!jammers”!available!for!$30,$300!

•  Claimed!ranges!of!<10m!ohen!underes+mate!impacts!

–  In!2012!study!by!Communica+ons!Research!Centre!Canada!focused!on!downtown!O]awa,!prevalence!of!jammers!in!vehicles!was!~1:70,000!

•  92!jamming!incidents!logged!over!5!weeks!(Approx.!3!per!day)!

•  Timing!vulnerabili+es!

–  Communica+ons!!

•  LTE!and!other!standards!require!be]er!than!1µs!accuracy!–  Power!distribu+on!

•  IEEE!C37.118,2005!Synchrophasor!Standard!specifies!be]er!than!1µs!accuracy!–  Time!stamping!

•  NASD!requires!+me!stamping!accuracy!of!be]er!than!3!seconds!

•  Time!stamping!for!forensic!and!algorithm!evolu+on!be]er!than!1µs!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

NovAtel,Proprietary,

A 100 Watt jammer will deny GPS for 50 km

www.NovAtel.com, NovAtel,Proprietary,

Precision!and!Cri+cal!Applica+ons!

Accuracy!

Low!

Relia

bility

High!

High!

Car!Naviga+on!

Cellular!Phone!

Vehicle!Tracking!

Unmanned!!Vehicles!

Precision!Aircrah!Landing!

Construc+on!!and!Mining!

Survey!Precision!!Agriculture!

Defence!Mapping!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

40 dB additional protection - navigation to within 400 m of jammer

www.NovAtel.com,

Effects!of!jamming!and!spoofing!

•  Jamming!–!noise!jamming!

–  Obscures!legi+mate!signals!(‘Loss!of!Lock’)!

–  Leads!to!inadequate!data!to!resolve!posi+on!and!+me!•  ≥4!satellites!needed!for!full!posi+on!&!+me!solu+on!

•  ≥1!satellite!needed!for!fixed!and!known!posi+on!to!resolve!+me!

–  Limited!satellite!introduces!large!geometric!errors!

–  Jamming,results,in,known,loss,of,opera9onal,capability,

•  Spoofing!–!broadcas+ng!a!false!signal!

–  Meaconing!–!capture!and!re,broadcast!

•  Posi+on!&!+me!solu+on!based!on!Capture!Antenna,!whose!signal!is!amplified!and!re,broadcast!

•  Target!Antenna!‘appears’!to!be!at!loca+on!of!Capture!Antenna!–  Spoofing!–!synthesizing!signal!for!broadcast!

•  Spoofer!can!define!any!posi+on!in!space!and!+me!and!apply!to!Target!Antenna!

–  Spoofer,capture,results,in,unknown,loss,of,opera9onal,capability,

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

Protec+on!op+ons!

•  Encryp+on!(e.g.!SAASM)!

•  Redundancy!(Mul+ple!Rx!&!other!sources)!

•  Receiver!robustness!

–  Integrity!monitoring!

–  Signal!strength!monitoring!

–  Geofencing/dynamic!thresholding!

•  Direct!Mi+ga+on!

–  Antenna!beamshape!op+ons!

•  Low!sensi+vity!close!to!horizon!–  Filters!

•  Notch!filters,!adap+ve!filters!and!sharp!roll,offs!–  Controlled,Radia9on,Pa?ern,Antenna,(CRPA),

•  To,maintain,longCterm,GPS,availability,•  Ac9vely,suppress,unwanted,signals,,(c.f.,noise,cancelling,headphones),

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

CRPA,101!

•  4,7!elements!

•  Analog!filtering!on!each!channel!

•  Digital!processing!

to!form!nulls!

through!

destruc+ve!

interference!

•  Conversion!back!

to!analog!signal!

•  Output!to!

receiver!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

GAJT:!GPS!An+,Jam!Technology!

GAJTC700ML,•  Integrated!7,element!CRPA!&!electronics!

•  Single,enclosure!for!direct!fit!to!platorms!

•  Vehicles!and!fixed!installa+ons!

•  Available!now,!off!the!shelf!

GAJTCAE,•  Compact!processing!for!4,element!CRPA!

•  Configured!

•  For!integra+ng!into!systems:!!

UAS,!small!ground!platorms!(e.g.!UGV)!

•  Prototype!demos!achieved!TRL,7!

•  Product!release!mid,2013!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

290!mm!

GAJT,700ML!

89!mm!

GAJT,AE!

www.NovAtel.com,

Ques+ons!and!concerns!raised!about!CRPAs!

•  What!is!the!latency!introduced!by!the!CRPA!processing?!

•  Is!the!latency!stable!over!+me?!

•  What!effect!does!CRPA!processing!have!on!the!posi+on!and!+me!solu+on!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

Latency!&!Stability!–!Test!Set,up!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

Receiver! Receiver!

Time!Interval!

Counter!

NovAtel!702GG!Survey!Antenna!

NovAtel!GAJT,700ML!An+,Jam!Antenna!

NovAtel!OEMV,3!Receivers!

Time,difference,between,two,setups,

NovAtel!628!Receivers!

www.NovAtel.com,

Latency!&!Stability!–!results!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

•  Data!logged!over!48!

hours!

•  Mean!offset!

293.3395µs!

•  Standard!devia+on!

±1.2ns!

www.NovAtel.com,

Suscep+bility!to!processing!influence!

•  iNAVFEST!2012,!hosted!by!US!Air!Force!at!White!Sands!Missile!Range!

•  Very!high!power!jammers!to!exercise!military!an+,jam!systems!

•  GAJT,AE!with!4,element!Antcom!Antenna!Array!used!for!test!

•  Scenario!switched!through!12!separate!jammers!one!at!a!+me!

•  RTK!solu+on!obtained!from!NovAtel!base!sta+on!outside!of!test!range!

–  cm,level!solu+on!will!show!any!systema+c!posi+on!offsets!linked!to!

jammer!mi+ga+on!

–  No!direct!+ming!reference!

•  Hypothesis:!

–  A"stable"PVT"solu.on"(posi.on"velocity"&".me)"that"shows"no"sta.s.cally"significant"change"in"posi.on"that"correlates"with"noise"jammer"status"will"confirm"that"CRPA"processing"does"not"have"a"systemic"impact"on".me"determina.on"

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

Suscep+bility!jammer!set!up!

•  Each!of!12!jammers!ac+ve!

in!turn!

•  GAJT!is!in!fixed!loca+on!throughout!

•  Phase!centre!of!!

GAJT,AE!antenna!

measured!rela+ve!to!RTK!

base!sta+on!(20km)!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

GAJT!

J,1!

J,2!

J,4,5,6,7!

J,11!

J,12!

J,8!

J,9! J,3!

J,10!

www.NovAtel.com, NovAtel,Proprietary,

1ns!rings!

Suscep+bility!–!spa+al!impact!

TRUTH,

,2.5!

,2!

,1.5!

,1!

,0.5!

0!

0.5!

1!

1.5!

,0.8! ,0.6! ,0.4! ,0.2! 0! 0.2! 0.4! 0.6! 0.8! 1! 1.2!

J,2!

J,3!

J,4!

J,5!

J,6!

J,7!

J,8!

J,9!

J,10!

J,11!

J,12!

TRUTH!

1ns!

3ns!

2ns!

www.NovAtel.com,

Suscep+bility!–!Time!impact!(clock!adjustments)!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9! 10! 11! 12! Jammer!

+67ns!

,67ns!

www.NovAtel.com,

Benign!+me!impacts!(no!jamming)!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

+67ns!

,67ns!

www.NovAtel.com,

Timing!suscep+bility!,!numbers!

•  Jammed!condi+ons!

–  Mean! !4.30m!(14ns)!

–  St.!Dev.! !3.51m!(12ns)!

–  RMS !5.55m!(18ns)!

•  Benign!condi+ons!

–  Mean !1.45m!(5ns)!

–  St.!Dev. !0.64m!(2ns)!

–  RMS !1.58m!(5ns)!

N.B."Time"constant"to"steer"receiver"TCXO"is"10I20"seconds.""Therefore"discrete"changes"in"environment"would"be"seen"as"impulse"response"as"the"TCXO"is"steered.""The"absolute"magnitude"of"the"change"is"on"the"same"order"of"magnitude,"i.e."10s"of"ns,"not"hundreds"of"µs."

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

Spoofing!resistance!

•  Under!some!circumstances,!a!CRPA!can!also!protect!against!spoofing!

–  Results!shown!for!protected!and!unprotected!Garmin!receiver!

NovAtel,Proprietary,

15!kmh,1!!No!Movement!

8km!Posi+on!Error!

Accurate!Speed!Accurate!Loca+on!

Accurate!Speed!4km!Systema+c!posi+on!

error!

Unprotected! Protected!

www.NovAtel.com,

Conclusion!

•  What"is"the"latency"introduced"by"the"CRPA"processing?"–  293.3395µs,±,1.2ns,

•  Is"the"latency"stable"over".me?"–  In,benign,condi9ons,,YES,,consistent,with,‘normal’,GPS,antenna,

•  What"effect"does"CRPA"processing"have"on"the"posi.on"and".me"solu.on"–  In,severe,jamming,condi9ons,9me,shi[s,of,10C20ns,is,expected,

•  GAJT!processing!latencies!are!stable!•  For!1µs!applica+ons,!GAJT!protects!against!noise!jammers!

without!contribu+ng!significant!errors!to!+me!determina+on!

•  There"is"evidence"that"GAJT"also"provides"a"measure"of"protec.on"against"spoofers"–  the"degree"of"protec.on"is"not"yet"fully"determined"

NovAtel,Proprietary,

www.NovAtel.com,

Ques+on!

•  IF:!

–  Accurate!and!Available!GPS!+me!is!a!necessary!part!of!!Cri+cal!Infrastructure!

–  GPS!+me!is!vulnerable!to!jamming!and!spoofing!

–  Holdover!is!effec+ve!only!over!finite!+me!periods!

–  Holdover!is!ineffec+ve!against!spoofers!•  THEN!

–  Is!robust!access!to!GPS!valuable?!–  Are!exis+ng!mi+ga+ons!and!augmenta+ons!adequate?!

–  IS,THERE,AN,ACTIVE,CURRENT,NEED,FOR,DIRECT,PROTECTION,OF,GPS,SIGNAL,ACCESS?,

•  e.g.,through,a,CRPA,or,other,similar,technology,

NovAtel,Proprietary,