Continuing the Commitment: AgriculturalDevelopment in the Sahel

August 1986

NTIS order #PB87-117644

Recommended Citation:U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Continuing the Commitment: Agri-cultural Development in the Sahel—Special Report, OTA-F-308 (Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, August 1986).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 86-600555

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

Foreword

In 1985, rain came to the Sahel and provided partial relief from its latest drought.For the moment, hunger in West Africa is largely forgotten. However, many ques-tions remain unanswered regarding why this area remains so poor and so vulner-able after nearly a decade of development assistance.

In June 1985, the Technology Assessment Board approved the requests of threecongressional committees and five Board members that OTA address some of thesequestions as part of our study of low-resource agriculture in Africa. Although OTA’sfull study will not be completed until late 1987, we agreed to provide an earlierreport focused on development in the Sahel. This special report examines the recordof assistance to nine nations of the Sahel in West Africa, explores the lessons learnedin a decade of efforts, and suggests policy implications for more effective U.S. as-sistance there and elsewhere in Africa. The report emphasizes the technical andinstitutional factors that constrain development in one of the poorest regions inthe world. The committees that requested the study are: the House Select Commit-tee on Hunger, the House Science and Technology Committee (the Subcommitteeon Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment), and the HouseAgriculture Committee. Of OTA’s Technology Assessment Board, Senators Hatch,Kennedy, and Pen and Representatives Evans and Udall requested this study. Also,the House Foreign Affairs Committee supported this work.

This report draws on the expertise of a large number of people. In particular,we appreciate the assistance provided by approximately 100 Sahelian scientists,decisionmakers, and farmers and herders with whom we spoke, Also, we are gratefulto workshop participants, the advisory panel, and additional reviewers who helpedus determine the scope of the work and reviewed it to ensure its accuracy. Of course,OTA remains responsible for the analysis and the report does not necessarilyrepresent the views of individual members of the advisory panel.

Director

Low-Resource Agriculture in Africa Advisory Panel

Mary Anderson, ChairConsultant in International Economic Development

Bridges Project, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Eugene AdamsVice Provost for International ProgramsTuskegee UniversityTuskegee, AL

Haidari AmaniSenior LecturerUniversity of Dar es SalaamDar es Salaam, Tanzania

Leonard BerryProvost and Vice President for Academic

AffairsClark UniversityWorcester, MA

David BrokenshaDirectorUniversity of California Study Center for

the United Kingdom and IrelandLondon, United Kingdom

Cornelia FloraProfessorDepartment of Sociology, Anthropology and

Social WorkKansas State UniversityManhattan, KS

Jake HallidayDirectorBattelle-Kettering LaboratoryYellow Springs, OH

The Reverend Thomas Hayden*Director Social Concerns DepartmentSociety for African MissionsWashington, DC

Michael HorowitzPresident and DirectorInstitute for Development AnthropologyBinghamton, NY

Goran HydenProfessorDepartment of GovernmentDartmouth CollegeHanover, NH

Joseph KennedyDirector of International DevelopmentAfricareWashington, DC

David LeonardAssociate ProfessorDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley, CA

Shem Migot-AdhollaAssociate Research ProfessorInstitute of Development StudiesUniversity of NairobiNairobi, Kenya

Elliot Morss* *Acting DirectorCenter for Asian Development StudiesBoston UniversityBoston, MA

Bede OkigboDeputy Director GeneralInternational Institute of Tropical

AgricultureIbadan, Nigeria

Robert RodaleChairman of the BoardRodale Press, Inc.Emmaus, PA

John ScheuringTeam LeaderInternational Crops Research Institute for

the Semi-Arid TropicsBamako, Mali

*Resigned as of June 24, 1986.

iv

**Resigned as of April 24, 1986.

Anita SpringAssociate DeanCollege of Liberal ArtsUniversity of FloridaGainesville, FL

Aart van WingerdenPresidentDouble Harvest, Inc.Fletcher, NC

Garth YoungbergExecutive DirectorInstitute for Alternative AgricultureGreenbelt, MD

Executive Branch Liaisons

Cheryl ChristensenBranch Chief for Africa-Middle EastEconomic Research ServiceU.S. Department of AgricultureWashington, DC

Howard L. HillAssistant Director for Inter-Governmental

Climate ProgramsNational Climate ProgramU.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric

AdministrationRockville, MD

Marcus WinterChief of Agriculture and Rural

Development DivisionAfrica BureauU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

John ZarafonetisCoordinator of African Food Systems

InitiativeU.S. Peace CorpsWashington, DC

Low-Resource Agriculture in AfricaOTA Project Staff

Roger C. Herdman, Assistant Director, OTAHealth and Life Sciences Division

Walter E. Parham, Food and Renewable Resources Program Manager

Phyllis N. Windle, Project Director

Analytical Staff for the Special Report

George Scharffenberger, Contractor

Kathy Desmond, Contractor

Allen Ruby, Research Analyst

Chris Elfring, Editor

Additional Analytical Staff

Beckie

Bruce J. Horwith, Analyst

J. Kathy Parker, Analyst

Administrative Staff

Erickson, Administrative Assistant

Nellie Hammond, Secretary

Carolyn Swann, Secretary

vi

ContentsChapter Pagel. Summary and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3The Sahel Development Program and the Club du Sahel/CILSS

Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Poverty and Increasing Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Decade of Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Applying the Lessons: The Agency for International Development . . . . . . . 8Sahelian and Donor Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Other U.S. Actors in the Sahel.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Findings and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Is Further Support for the Sahel Development Program Justified?.. . . . . . . 12Can a More Effective Partnership Be Created? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Is the Strategy Commensurate With the Commitment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Is AID Working Against Itself? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Can Diverse Actors With Diverse Strengths Work Together? . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2. AID’s Sahel Development Program and the Club/CILSS Framework . . . . . . . . . 21The U.S. Commitment to Club/CILSS: The Sahel Development Program. . . . 22The Club/CILSS Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Evolution and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. The Sahel: Diversity and Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31The Sahel Yesterday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Societies in Transition in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Pastoral Systems in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Changing Social Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Social and Economic Development of Sahelian Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Profile of Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36The Sahel in the World Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The Growing Gap Between Food Production and Food Requirements. . . . . . 41A Diverse and Changing Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

A Harsh Environment: Climate, Rainfall and Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Impact of Human Activity on the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

4. A Decade of Lessons: Technologies Past and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Disappointments and Accomplishments.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Why Technology Failed To Solve the Problems and

More Promising Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58An Inadequately Understood Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Poorly Appreciated Socioeconomic Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61Guidelines for Sahelian Agricultural Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64The Integration of Traditional Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

5. A Decade of Lessons: Policies and Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Modes of Development and Development Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Participation: Leaving Out the Ones That Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Short-Term, Product-Oriented Project Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Complexity of Project Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Making Research More Appropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

vii

Chapter Page

Policy Disincentives and the Potential for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Agriculture’s Low Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Cereals Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Food Aid and Export Subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Encouraging Effective Marketing and Removing Constraints onPrivate Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Land Tenure and Regulation of Access to Natural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . 82Fiscal and Institutional Reform and Recurrent Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Limitations of Policy Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Beyond the Lessons: Critical Issues To Be Addressed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83The Balance Between Irrigation and Rainfed Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Food Production and Export Crops.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Strategies for the Livestock Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Population Programs: The 50 Million People Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88Production and Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90Issues and Priorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

6. Applying the Lessons: The Agency for International Development . . . . . . . . . . 95Incorporating the Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Evolving Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96AID’s Revised Sahel Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Implementing the Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................100The Internal AID Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........100Constraints on the Congress-AI. Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..104Development Assistance and Foreign Policy Objectives in the Sahel .. ...107

7. A Catalog of Other Actors in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . ........................111African Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................112

Sahelian Government Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...112Nongovernmental Sahelian Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........114

U.S. Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........117U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....117The Peace Corps... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................121African Development Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...123American Private Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....125Other U.S. Federal Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........127

Multilateral and Bilateral Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....,128Size of Programs and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................129Project Size and Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............130Sectors Where Funders Operate . . . . . . . . . ............................130Types of Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................131A Variety of Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............132A Diversity of Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........133

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....137

Appendix A: Appendix Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................145Appendix B: Other Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........151Appendix C: Additional Reviewers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................152Appendix D:OTA Field Visits-November 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......153

,.

Appendix E:Appendix F:

Page

The Sahel Development Strategy Statement—Executive Summary .158Assessment of the Sahel Development Program—ExecutiveSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........162

Tables

PageTable No2-1, U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Sahel, 1976-86, ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., , ... , , . 223-1.3-2,3-3.3-4.3-5.3-6.5-1.7-1,7-2.7-3.7-4,A-1.

A-2.

A-3

A-4,A-5.A-6.A-7.

The Sahel: Social and Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Agriculture-Related Social and Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Major Exports and Share of Export Earnings, 1980-82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Debt of Sahelian Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Land Distribution by Climatic Zone and Suitability of Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Sustainable and Actual Numbers of People in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Agricultural Exports and Imports as a Percent of Total, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . 86U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations in the Sahel . .....................117The Peace Corps in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....,122Collaborative Research Support Programs Active in the Sahel . ...........128Top 10 Donors to Sahelian Member Countries, 1975-83 ..................129General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983:DAC Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........145General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983:Multilateral Institutions (Non-OPEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........145General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983:OPEC Countries and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............146Who Finances What in Certain Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......146Sectoral Breakdown and Trend of Commitments From 1975 to 1983 .. ....147U.S. Aid to the Sahel, Fiscal Years 1975 to 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......148Amount Spent on Public Law 480 Commodities for the Sahel, 1977-86 ....149

Figures

Figure No. Page1-1.3-1.

3-2.3-3.3-4.3-5,3-6.3-7.3-8.

3-9.3-1o.

CILSS Countries of West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Commodity Price Trends for Peanuts, Cotton, Rock Phosphate, andIron Ore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Growing Debt Burden of Sahelian Nations, 1974-83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Index of Total Food Production in the Sahel, 1960-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Index of Per Capita Food Production in the Sahel, 1960-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Sahel Grain Imports by Commodity, 1966-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Sahel Grain Imports, 1967-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Total Amount of Food Grains Available in the Sahel, 1967-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Ratios of Food Aid, Grain Imports and Grain Availability in the Sahel,1967-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Climatic Zones in the CILSS Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Percentage Share of Wood in the Sahel Countries’ Supply of Energy,Mid-1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

.

In the Sahel, we walked on rock-hard crops when the current farmerswere children. Now the land seemed so infertile, the work to reclaim it so laborious, andthe odds against success so high, that we wondered at the farmers’ perseverance. Why notgo south, like so many had already done? One peanut farmer in Burkina Faso answered,

We have a proverb. If a tree has strong, deep roots, it lives through the dry season, even whenit loses all its leaves. I will stay and improve this land because my roots are in the soil. We dreamthat our children will return like the leaves when the land iS better.”

Chapter 1

Summary and Options

SUMMARY

Drought has long been a fact of life in theSahel region of West Africa. When the rainsfail, as they did for 5 years beginning in 1968and again from 1980 to 1984, crops wither, live-stock die, and people suffer. International re-lief efforts had funneled over $360 million ofemergency aid to the Sahel by 1974, but deal-ing with that immediate crisis would not pre-vent future problems in the region (37). The realchallenge for both Sahelians and the interna-tional assistance organizations was to avoid fu-ture crises.

One important question that arose was howbest to coordinate the multitude of assistanceefforts, donors, and recipients. And what bal-ance should be struck between relief, recovery,and development? Thus was born the Club duSahel/CILSS framework (see box A)–the Clubdu Sahel being a loosely structured associationof donors and Sahelians, and CILSS being anintergovernmental organization representingthe countries of the Sahel. Together, donors andSahelians agreed to commit themselves to a co-ordinated and sustained effort for developmentin the Sahel region, striving for a time whenthe region’s people could be assured a stableand sustainable food supply. The United Stateshas played an important role in this approach.

The Sahel Develepment Program1

and the Club du Sahel/CiLSSFramework

The Sahel Development Program (SDP) wascreated in 1977 by an amendment to the For-eign Assistance Act. SDP institutionalized the

‘In this study the phrase “Sahel Development Program” or“SDP” refers to the U.S. program authorized and appropriatedunder Sections 120 and 121 of the Foreign Assistance Act. SDPis the U.S. development assistance program affiliated with theClub/CILSS framework. Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Public Law 480 Food for Peace assistance to the Sahel are not con-sidered part of this program.

U.S. commitment to the unique Club/CILSSframework of development assistance—a co-ordinated, long-term, multinational effort bymajor Western industrialized nations in sup-port of the CILSS group of severely drought-affected West African States.

The Club/CILSS framework evolved from in-ternational public reaction to a tragic series ofdrought years (1968 to 1973) in the Sahel thatleft tens of thousands dead, decimated livestockherds, exacerbated environmental degradation,and disrupted already fragile economies. Club/CILSS set goals to increase self-sufficiency infood under conditions of ecological balance andsustainable growth in the region and to reducevulnerability to drought by improving agricul-tural production significantly and stabilizingthe environment. The scale and complexity ofthe challenge required a commitment to a“generation” of cooperation and financialassistance.

Both CILSS and the Club have evolved overthe past decade. However, the mandate andoperations of CILSS have remained controver-sial. Although CILSS was created largely as amechanism to increase aid flows, by the late1970s it increasingly sought responsibility toimplement its own regional projects. But CILSSperformance often has been mediocre. Its ef-fectiveness has been constrained by inconsist-ent member support, uneven leadership, andinadequate technical and managerial capabil-ities. In the past year, CILSS member stateshave agreed to limit its mandate to that of a re-gional think tank and to streamline the organi-zation’s structure.

The Club du Sahel has played a significantrole in tripling the flow of aid directed to theSahel. Donors have contributed $15 billion inassistance since 1975. The Club also providedkey sector analysis and helped bring the issuesof the environment, recurrent costs, and cereal

3

4

kina Faso.

policy reform to the attention of both donorsand Sahelians. The Club still suffers from somelack of coordination but its role in fostering in-formation sharing and coordination has beenappreciable. While the Club’s problems are lessserious than CILSS’s, the Club also suffers fromfluctuating support from its sponsors, the un-

even quality of its analysis, and disappointingresponses from donors and Sahelians follow-ing studies and discussions. Few Sahelians par-ticipate directly in Club Secretariat work. De-spite the shortcomings of the Club and CILSS,the multinational approach embodied in theirframework continues to be a unique and posi-tive characteristic of the Sahel effort and thisapproach does increase the effective use of in-dividual donor and Sahelian resources.

U.S. contributions to the Sahel developmenteffort, through SDP development assistancefunds, Economic Support Funds (ESF), andPublic Law 480—Food for Peace, haveamounted to $1.4 billion between 1976 and1986. SDP involves three distinct though relatedelements:

1.

2.

3.

the distinct line item funding mechanismand Agency for International Development(AID) management structure created by the1977 legislation;U.S. support for the multinational and re-gional aspects of the Sahel effort throughthe Club/CILSS framework; andthe specific strategies that guide the devel-opment and implementation of U.S. assis-tance programs to the region.

U.S. humanitarian and political and economicinterests in increased food security, develop-ment, and stability in the Sahel have changedlittle since the original SDP commitment. Al-though the region has few strategic resourcesand offers little prospect of commercial oppor-tunity for U.S. business for the short term, itborders a strategically important and more tur-bulent North Africa. The majority of the Sa-helian States are nonaligned, but take pro-West,moderate positions. They have growing politi-cal and cultural ties with the United States.

If the issue of food security in the Sahel isnot addressed today, the future will bring con-tinued problems and pain.

5

Figure 1-1 .—CILSS Countries of West Africa

Cape Verde Islands

SOURCE: U.S. General Accounting Office, Can More Be Done To Assist Sahelian Governments To Plan and Manage Their Economic Development? NSIAD-85-87(Washington, DC: Sept. 6, 1985).

6

Poverty and IncreasingVulnerability

The Sahel strategy was designed as a regionalapproach because the countries shared someimportant ecological, economic, historical, andcultural commonalities. Erratic rainfall hasplagued the Sahel for the past decade. Butdrought has been a major reality in Sahelianlife for at least 2000 years. Historically, the re-gion’s social, economic, and agricultural sys-tems evolved in dynamic symbiosis with theregion’s harsh environments. The environ-mental and economic vulnerability has in-creased over the past century with growing ex-ternal dependence during the colonial andpost-colonial periods, associated changes insocioeconomic systems, and increases in pop-ulation growth. There has been a correspond-ing, gradual erosion of “fall-back” strategies forcoping with drought such as a reliance on nat-ural systems and migration. These trends haveaccelerated over the past 20 years and led toeconomic stagnation, rising trade deficits anddebt, financial crisis, and growing dependenceon international aid to meet national food re-quirements.

While some indices of health, life expectancy,and education have shown impressive improve-ment, individual Sahelians, particularly peoplein rural areas, face income levels and livingstandards that remain among the lowest in theworld. In the past two decades, total agricul-tural production has increased by about 1 per-cent per year but yields remain low and in factmay be decreasing in certain areas. Agricul-tural production per capita has declined evenmore than it has in Africa as a whole (accord-ing to one estimate, 24 percent versus 16 per-cent) (138). Annual production and incomelevels continue to be determined by the vagar-ies of rainfall, unstable government policies,and inappropriate market prices,

The Sahelian environment has also comeunder increased stress. Changing social, eco-nomic, and production systems as well as

drought, land degradation, and declining fuel-wood supplies all contribute to the region’s vul-nerability. Unless there is appreciable tech-nological change, environmental degradationand high population growth rates will make itincreasingly difficult to reduce the region’spoverty.

Decade of Lessons

The Club/CILSS effort, and the U.S. SDP con-tribution within it, have provided modest tan-gible successes. Thousands of Sahelians havereceived technical and managerial training; in-frastructure (especially roads) has improved;and access to health care and literacy have in-creased. Sahelian institutional capacity also hasimproved—as illustrated by the fact that reliefefforts following the 1984 drought were muchmore successful in the CILSS states than else-where in Africa and relatively few lives werelost. Despite improvements, the Sahel is stillvulnerable; even with 1.2 million tons of emer-gency food aid in 1985, the drought added toincreased malnutrition and general economicdecline. Increased agricultural production andenvironmental stabilization remain elusivegoals even as the Club/CILSS framework is one-third of the way into the “generation” of com-mitment.

Despite this mixed record, Sahelians anddonors say that they have learned importantlessons that can serve as a foundation for moresuccessful efforts. The physical and human con-ditions on which Club/CILSS goals were basedremain valid. And while those involved some-times do not agree on specific actions, someconsensus has evolved regarding the nature ofmany fundamental issues. The following para-graphs highlight the lessons learned in the Sa-hel in the past decade.

Some of the past decade’s failure to meet ex-pectations may be the result of too much opti-mism regarding the existence of applicabletechnologies. Many agricultural technologiestransferred from other semiarid regions to the

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Sahel proved inappropriate to Sahelian ecolog-ical and social systems. Many of these errorswere the product of an insufficient knowledgebase regarding Sahelian natural and social sys-tems and an ineffective integration of thatknowledge into project design and implemen-tation, Sahelian farmers and herders were inade-quately consulted and their existing technol-ogies and adapative processes were overlooked.As a result of these setbacks, new guidelinesare emerging for technology development andadaptation. These include:

a focus on Sahel-specific solutions basedon increasing the existing knowledge baseand its effective use;increased farmer and herder input and acreative combination of indigenous and ex-ternal research, technology, and manage-ment systems;more localized research strategies tailoredto ecological and socioeconomic diversity;anda focus on the low-resource farmer andherder who comprise the majority of Sa-helian agriculturalists.

Agricultural technologies appropriate for theSahel must be low risk, low cost, sustainable,and create substantial production increases.

Photo credit: World Bank

Throughout the Sahel, families such as this one in Maligrow crops using low-resource technologies.

The need for sustainability is tied to the addi-tional recognition of the need for a strong fo-cus on conservation and improvement of thechallenging Sahel environment, especially itstree cover, grasslands, soil, and water re-sources. An important complementary objec-tive will be to slow population growth, althoughsocial resistance and a failure on the part ofdonors to understand that resistance lessen theprospects for short-term progress. Other areasof critical research needs that have been iden-tified include: varietal and agronomic improve-ments for major cereal crops; small-scale irri-gation technologies; soil fertility; agro-forestry;food processing; agro-climatology; and animalnutrition. In the social sciences, population dy-namics, farming systems, marketing, and ex-tension are key areas. The slow process of de-veloping human resources, in particular, thebuilding of institutional capacity, is essentialto long-term sustainability. Overall, it must berealized that technology development, adapta-tion, and transfer will be slower and more com-plex than had been assumed. Thus research ef-forts in the Sahel must be better organized andcoordinated among the multitude of interna-tional and national research institutions oper-ating in the region.

How technologies are organized into pro-grams and projects also has been a factor in thepoor performance of development assistance.Too often, farmer participation has been morerhetorical than real. Environmental stabiliza-tion and institutional development have beenpoorly served by the short-term, production-related, discrete projects that have dominatedassistance to the Sahel. Project design has beenoverly complex relative to both Sahelian anddonor management capacities while the bur-den of recurrent costs has been too great forfinancially strapped Sahelian governments.New long-term, participatory approaches whichfocus on institutional development, are simpleto manage, demand few recurrent costs, andgive sufficient attention to delivery systems areessential for a more successful strategy for thefuture.

Misguided government policies are a furtherfactor in poor performance in the Sahel. Cereal

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pricing policies, artificial exchange rates, in-flation, debt management, low investment infood crops, and a range of measures discourag-ing initiative have proven to be disincentivesto increased food production and effective dis-tribution. In recent years, major donors haveengaged in a spectrum of dialog, incentives, andpressure to convince Sahelian governments tomodify their policy structures. There is generalconsensus on the need for policy reform andpromising major reform programs have begunin several countries. However, so far adequateanalysis linking such measures to farmer deci-sionmaking is lacking and the ultimate impactis unclear. Which segments of society are mostlikely to benefit from what specific policies, andin what timeframe? How will political factorsaffect the outcome? Will policy reform aloneaccomplish as much as its proponents believe?Donor governments’ policies on such issues asinterest rates, trade, and international debt alsoaffect Sahel development. The effects of largequantities of international food aid that havepoured into the Sahel, even in years of relativelygood rainfall, remain controversial. Althoughbetter steps to determine needs and coordinatedonor response have begun under Club auspices,donor commitment to such efforts is tentative.If agricultural strategies are to be effective, thebroad economic policy environment, in bothSahelian and donor countries, must be consist-ent with development goals.

Beyond technologies, modes of assistance,and policies, the multinational effort in the Sa-hel has suffered from a lack of clarity and agree-ment on the definition of food security goals2

and the optimal means to obtain them. Fun-damental issues with significant impact on theSahel’s future have yet to be addressed. Whatshould be the balance between investment inrainfed agriculture and that in irrigation? Whatshould be the priority given to expensive riverbasin development? How much effort should

2CILSS has considered this goal to mean food self-sufficiencyfor the Sahel, meaning ultimately growing enough food to feedthemselves. Food self-reliance, the term more commonly usednow by the Club, includes the concept of growing export cropsto earn money to import some food. Food security essentiallymeans providing the people of the Sahel with long-term, depend-able access to food.

go into developing staple food crops relativeto export crops? Despite the particularly poorresults of past livestock efforts, is the currentde facto abandonment of that sector by donorsjustified? How should more effective livestockapproaches be organized? Should resources bedirected toward the better-watered south ortoward the more drought-vulnerable north?Which groups of people should be targeted—the poorest farmers, the most progressive,women? Each of these choices requires differ-ent strategies and has major implications forindividuals or groups within each nation. Un-less priority is given to addressing these issues,bilateral and multilateral assistance will be lessthan optimally effective.

Applying the Lessons: The Agencyfor International Development

AID’s effectiveness in applying the lessonsof the past decade in the Sahel faces constraintsin four areas:

1. the ambiguity of AID’s regional Sahelstrategy,

2. internal institutional characteristics ofAID,

3. the nature of AID’s relationship to Con-gress, and

4. the role of development assistance in over-all U.S. foreign policy.

These problems are not unique to the Sahel—they diminish the effectiveness of many AIDactivities—but they are particularly acute in theSahel because of the level and special multi-national characteristics of the U.S. commit-ment there.

The evolving strategies, experiences, and les-sons accumulated by AID have paralleled thoseof the other countries participating in the multi-national effort in the Sahel. The most recentAID SDP strategy statement (125)3 is groundedin basic Club/CILSS goals but it also has incor-porated many of the lessons learned in the pastdecade. It places priorities on agricultural re-search and production, policy reform, health

3See app. E containing the Executive Summary of AID’s 1986Country Development Strategy Statement for the Sahel.

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and family planning, training, infrastructure,conservation, and environmental protectionand it calls for a balanced and focused program“to identify and bring about the necessary pol-icy and institutional environment to enable de-velopment to proceed. ” The strategy supports“coordination of all donor and Sahelian pro-grams . . . through the Club/CILSS coordina-tion efforts” (125).

But AID’s SDP strategy is ambiguous in sev-eral areas and its implementation sometimesis not consistent with the past decade’s lessonsand existing congressional mandates on foreignassistance. The document does not provideguidance for the strategic choices necessary toallocate resources most effectively. The chang-ing focus toward policy dialog, institutional de-velopment, and infrastructure—though consist-ent with the lessons learned—could signal aretreat from direct assistance to the poor, de-pending on how that focus is implemented. De-spite the high priority given to agricultural re-search, AID has no Sahel-specific researchstrategy. AID has not seriously addressed theissues of effective farmer participation and at-tention to the specific role of women in Sahelianproduction, processing, and distribution sys-tems. Although the United States is the largestsingle donor of food aid, there is little effectiveintegration of food assistance into overall assis-tance strategies, During recent years, AID hasreduced its multilateral assistance in the Sahelin favor of direct country-to-country assistance,AID has dismantled its Sahel regional planningteam and taken a less active role in Club/CILSSactivities.

AID’s effectiveness in implementing its strat-egy also is constrained by internal institutionalcharacteristics. The numbers and skill levelsof AID’s staffing in the Sahel have not beencommensurate with the level of U.S. commit-ment. Although French language and Sahel-specific technical skills have improved, they arestill inadequate. The proportion of managersto technicians is high and too few personnelhave appropriate skills in agricultural sciences,macro- and micro-economic analysis, and hu-man resource development, The use of outsidecontractors, particularly from U.S. universities,

has increased the talent pool, but quality is stilluneven, turnover is high, and institutionallearning is limited. Sahelian staff are often un-derused and AID contact with beneficiaries andcounterparts is often inadequate.

AID’s program and project design systemsare cumbersome, slow, inflexible and oftendirected toward short-term, physical objectivesrather than longer term development goals. Sa-helian input, be it governmental or local, is oftenpro forma. Sectoral analysis, project identifi-cation, design, approval, implementation, mon-itoring, and evaluation are poorly linked andthe latter two ineffectively used. The incentivesystem is biased toward the designer and obli-gator of funds rather than those who effectivelyimplement projects. These factors contributeto a lack of accountability for program results.

AID’s subregional management structure forthe Sahel adds a layer of management thatsometimes complicates relationships betweenthe AID-Washington office and the field mis-sions and between the Sahel management unitand other offices within AID. However, themeasure of autonomy granted to SDP becauseit is separately funded insulates it somewhatfrom short-term policy shifts and internal strug-gles over allocation of resources. The separatemanagement structure within AID also facili-tates regional coordination with the Club/CILSS.

The third institutional constraint affectingAID’s performance in the Sahel concerns AID’srelationship with Congress. Congress playedan important role in the original U.S. commit-ment to the Sahel and has continued a high levelof interest and support. Nonetheless, aspectsof the Congress-AID relationship actually con-strain the attainment of foreign assistance goalsand the implementation of the SDP. Congres-sional policy mandates to AID under the For-eign Assistance Act and other legislation arecumulative and without priority. While eachmay be desirable in itself and the impact ofmany (e.g., basic human needs, the environ-ment, women in development, child welfare)has been at least partially effective, their num-ber and frequency of changes hamper the de-

- .

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velopment of consistent, long-term strategies.Consequently, these mandates may not be takenseriously and may result in creatively writtenjustifications rather than effective programs.

In another area of concern, procurement andfinancial controls are often unrealistic relativeto West African realities, and they do more toincrease costs, create delays, and tie up bothAID and Sahelian management time than to ac-complish their intended purposes.

The Sahel Development Program is only oneof a number of U.S. Government activities thataffect the Sahel. Food aid, agricultural pricesupports, policies on international debt, tradeand interest rates have impacts on the Sahelthat many experts consider more significantthan development assistance. Each of these pol-icy issues is dealt with by different committeesof Congress and different executive agencies.Resulting policies are often inconsistent withSDP goals.

The exercise of congressional oversightresponsibilities has added to AID’s already in-ordinate paperwork. Further, it has not beeneffective in meeting congressional informationneeds and it has had only limited impact onAID’s performance. Congress’ over-attentionto management detail—for instance, requiringnotification of minor project funding or tim-ing changes—not only increases paperwork, italso limits the agency’s flexibility to respondto evolving needs and opportunities. The work-ing relationship between Congress and AIDdoes not reflect the spirit of partnership withwhich SDP was begun and which is essentialto justify continuing levels of U.S. commitmentto the Sahel.

The role of foreign assistance within U.S. for-eign policy creates a fourth set of constraintsin attaining more specific development objec-tives. The SDP was born of the U.S. commit-ment to humanitarian concerns and long-termsocial and economic development. A long-term,multinational approach was deemed to be themost effective U.S. strategy to achieve those re-sults. The exercise of short-term foreign pol-icy objectives (e. g., political or commercialobjectives) can and has conflicted with the long-

term perspective. Increased bilateralism, theuse of conditionality with respect to politicalstances rather than development performance,and assistance tied to U.S. commercial inter-ests limit the effectiveness of U.S. commitmentsnot only in the eyes of Sahelians but also thoseof other donors.

Sahelian and Donor institutions

Building on the lessons learned during thepast decade to improve the development andapplication of technologies and make strategicchoices will not happen automatically. Devel-opment efforts in the Sahel will continue to beshaped by individuals and also by the charac-teristics of both the Sahelian and donor insti-tutions that implement the multitude of pro-grams and projects. On the Sahelian side,despite some progress, institutional capacityremains a major constraint to effectiveness ingovernmental agencies. Sahelian nongovern-mental organizations, including the private sec-tor, have diverse strengths but most have lowmanagement capacity and only local impact,Strategies that call for these groups to take overfunctions that are now imperfectly carried outby governments should be based on a realisticassessment of their abilities. Increased atten-tion to institution-building of all types will con-tinue to be an essential component of donorassistance programs.

Among multilateral and bilateral donors, di-verse strengths, weaknesses, types of assis-tance, and methods of operation are also reali-ties. Given the complexity of needs in the Sahel,an appropriate role should be sought for each.For example, the World Bank has begun to takean effective lead role in policy reform; France,the United States, and the World Bank are in-volved in agricultural research; the French,Americans, and Germans are active in forestry;and the OPEC countries, the World Bank, andthe European Economic Community have pro-vided substantial resources for transportationand infrastructure projects. The InternationalFund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), theDutch, and a multitude of private voluntaryorganizations are particularly geared to local

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action with low-resource producers. A degreeof specialization, possibly along the lines at-tempted by the Coordination for Developmentin Africa group (CDA)4 for Africa as a whole,could improve efficient use of resources. Tobe effective this would require much higherlevels of coordination than are currently thecase.

Each organization has its own internal char-acteristics that affect its ability to participatein the strategic directions called for by the pastdecade’s experiences. Therefore the UnitedStates needs to make a more careful analysisof the strengths and weaknesses of its variousinstitutional partners in the Sahel in order toidentify the comparative advantages of each inrelation to AID’s development strategy. Thisanalysis must be ongoing and flexible becausestrengths and weaknesses change over time, aswill elements of the strategy. U.S. funding andcoordination efforts need to be based on thisanalysis. For example, the United States hasstrong technical skills that give it an especiallyimportant role in supporting Sahelian agri-culture.

Other U.S. Government departments andagencies (e. g., Agriculture, Commerce, Treas-ury, the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-ration, and the Export-Import Bank) are alsoinvolved in decisions that affect the Saheliannations in ways that can complement or con-tradict AID strategies. The level and special na-ture of the U.S. Sahel commitment again justi-fies additional efforts to maximize consistency.

U.S. private sector investment currently playsa minor role in the Sahel. The reasons for thislow level, such as the current risks of invest-ment, language and cultural barriers, and com-petition posed by the better geographically andhistorically placed Europeans, especiallyFrance, will continue to limit the potential forthe short to medium term.

Other U.S. Actors in the Sahel

In addition to AID, a multitude of public andprivate U.S. organizations operate in or affectthe Sahel. The Peace Corps, the African Devel-opment Foundation, the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration, and a wide rangeof American private voluntary organizationshave programs in the Sahel. Despite the levelof overall U.S. commitment to the Sahel, fewof these other actors have developed Sahel-specific strategies. And while the independenceof each is essential to preserve their unique-ness and complementarily, better coordinationof strategies and appropriate collaboration inimplementation would increase the overall im-pact of U.S. assistance.

Photo credit: U.S. Peace Corps

4The CDA is a coordinating mechanism consisting of sevenlarge donors representing over half the development assistanceto Africa. Within the group, the United States has been assignedthe lead role in coordinating donor activities relating to agricul-tural research and health.

The United States provides various types of assistanceto Sahelian countries and future options are equallyvaried. Rose Bray boy is a Peace Corps volunteer fromMassachusetts; she is helping Senegalese women

make composted fertilizer from local materials.

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FINDINGS

Is Further support for the SahelDevelopment Program Justified?

Finding: A continued Sahel Development Pro-gram has the potential to provide greater foodsecurity, sustained economic growth, and arestored environment for the people of the Sa-hel. In doing so, it also can serve U.S. long-term interests. These objectives can only bereached by modifying both the strategy andits implementation. Current relatively highfunding levels and U.S. commitment can bejustified only if such modifications are made.

Option: Congress can continue the SDP as a dis-crete element within AID’s authorization and ap-propriation and as a separate management struc-ture within AID contingent on modifications inits strategies and their implementation. In theevent that AID does not modify the program ef-fectively, Congress can end SDP’s special statusand/or reconsider its funding levels.

The Sahel receives among the highest per cap-ita levels of U.S. development assistance of anyof the regions of the world. The SDP’s sepa-rate congressional appropriation and its dis-tinct management unit within AID underscorethe U.S. commitment, favor more consistentfunding, encourage congressional and AID at-tention, focus on long-range strategies, and fos-ter coordination with other donors. But theyalso increase workloads for both Congress andAID, add to management (complexities, and re-duce flexibility for managing the reduced re-sources available. The performance of SDP overthe past decade raises legitimate questions asto whether this special status and commitmentto the Sahel continues to be justified. What isthe likelihood of its future success?

The past decade in the Sahel has resulted inmodest tangible accomplishments. But majorsuccesses have been less obvious. The past dec-ade’s experience has revealed a more difficultpath than originally foreseen, although it hasalso revealed an unexpected resiliency in theregion’s natural and human resources. Tech-nologies to significantly improve Sahelian agri-cultural production do not now exist so there

AND OPTIONS

is little likelihood of a Sahelian “Green Revo-lution.” But payoffs are beginning to be real-ized and the foundation that has been built inthe Sahel provides cautious optimism for thefuture—a future where higher levels of Sahelianfood security can be achieved and where envi-ronmental degradation can be reduced. But itis a vision of the future that is attainable onlyif the lessons of the past decade are heeded.

The accomplishment of Club/CILSS goals willnot be determined by donors. Development inthe Sahel is the task of Sahelians. They, how-ever, have neither the financial resources northe skills to do it alone. The manner in whichSahelians and donors have worked together isa unique and increasingly promising featureof the Sahel effort. In that partnership, manySahelian leaders have recently made difficultand politically risky decisions in such areas aspolicy and fiscal reform and the improved al-location of limited investments. Sahelians haveshared and learned from the lessons of the pastdecade. Such an atmosphere is a necessary con-dition to obtain positive results from externalassistance.

While donors as a group can facilitate the ef-forts of Sahelians, no single donor can havesuch an impact. In the Club/CILSS framework,each member possesses a portion of the respon-sibility and a portion of the potential. TheUnited States has strong technical skills anddevelopment methods particularly appropriatefor the strategies essential for the next decadein the Sahel. They are different skills than thoseassumed in SDP’s earlier days. Rather thancapital-intensive agronomic techniques, rangemanagement methods, and irrigation technol-ogies, the needed expertise now include agri-cultural research methodologies, farming systemsand economic policy analysis, management andorganizational development, and data collec-tion and management. The experiences of thepast decade have revealed weaknesses in theapplication of U.S. resources and skills. Changesare being made in policy statements but it is

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unclear whether changes are also occurring inimplementation.

The nature of the challenge and level of com-mitment implicit in a determination to realizeClub/CILSS and SDP goals call for more than“business as usual.” The unique aspects of U.S.commitment to the Sahel can only succeed ifthey are accompanied by realistic and focusedstrategies, using approaches appropriate to theSahel, and human and technical resources com-mensurate with that commitment. Both Con-gress and AID have essential responsibilitiesin any effort to modify existing strategies andapproaches.

Finding: U.S. support for the Club/CILSS frame-work and other multilateral approaches hasincreased the effectiveness of U.S. and otherdonor assistance to the Sahel.

Option: Congress can continue U.S. support for thecoordinated, multinational approach to Sahel de-velopment of the Club du Sahel/CILSS frame-work. It can encourage AID to increase its cata-lytic role and active involvement in these andother appropriate coordinating mechanisms in-cluding those within Sahelian countries (e.g.,donor roundtables, consultative groups, ad hocpolicy groups).

Option: Congress can continue to fund and activelyinfluence the multilateral organizations and spe-cial initiatives that have potential for significantimpact in the Sahel (e.g., The World Bank andthe International Fund for Agricultural Develop-ment’s (IFAD) special funds for Africa).

The link between SDP and the multinationalClub/CILSS framework has been one of itsunique features. The effectiveness of CILSScontinues to be problematic but on balance ithas increased donor coordination and sharedanalysis, and opened a forum for discussionbetween donors and Sahelians that has en-hanced the use of U.S. resources. Multilateralapproaches and coordination have proven ef-fective and will be essential to continued pro-gress on critical aspects such as policy reform,coherent food aid policies, and focused agri-cultural research. The World Bank, IFAD, andothers have set up special funds for Africa with

strong potential for effective programs in theSahel.

Coordination will be equally important to ad-dress the critical strategy choices yet to bemade, U.S. costs specifically related to theClub/CILSS activities are minimal (approxi-mately $1.2 million per year) relative to the ben-efits gained. Any decision to alter commitmentto SDP should consider not only the effects onthe Sahel but also on U.S. allies who joined inestablishing this effort. The United States hasbeen actively involved in both the Club andCILSS, maintaining a low profile but playingan important and catalytic role. Future effortsto improve the performance of these institutionsneed to be consistent with this long-term part-nership. Support for CILSS should be condi-tional on its making progress toward neededreforms, but such conditionality should notjeopardize the ability of CILSS to build itsmanagerial and technical capabilities. Whilesupport for the Club/CILSS framework can con-tinue without a separate SDP managementstructure in AID and distinct funding line item,these two arrangements can increase effectiveU.S. support of the regional framework.

Can a More Effective PartnershipBe Created?

Finding: The relationships between Congressand AID are factors that limit the effective-ness of U.S. efforts in the Sahel.

Option: Congress and AID could work together toimprove communications on the Sahel and maketheir operating relationship closer to the partner-ship envisioned in the original Sahel commit-ment. Increased informal contacts, the possibil-ity of reciprocal intern programs in Washingtonor the Sahel, congressional participation in AIDworkshops on strategies and technical themes,and increased contacts between Congress andAID field missions are all possibilities to moreeffectively share information, coordinate deci-sionmaking, build trust, and enhance congres-sional policymaking.

Option: Congress can examine the Foreign Assis-tance Act in an attempt to limit and prioritize itspolicy guidelines and modify provisions that may

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be contradictory or inadvertently hamper AID ef-fectiveness. The Sahel could offer an opportunityto establish a short list of long-term policy guide-lines, streamlined operating procedures, and newprocurement, management, and reporting mech-anisms. The Sahel also could be used as an op-portunity to test multi-year appropriations for theSDP budget and for modifying congressionalnotification requirements.

Option: Relevant congressional committees can un-dertake an analysis of reporting requirements forregular written reports, special written reports,and for various hearings. They can eliminatethose that do not serve a justified informationfunction and streamline those that do. They canprovide AID with more specific guidance on theirinformation needs and thus increase the matchbetween what Congress needs to know with whatAID actually provides. AID’s annual report toCongress on the Sahel could be given particularattention in this regard.

The unique commitment implicit in U.S. sup-port for the Sahel provides both the opportu-nity and the justification to attempt to addressthe complex issue of congressional/AID rela-tions. The current relationship between Con-gress and AID has been described as quasi-adversarial by both sides. The result has beena lessening of effective communication and aretreat to a focus more on the form than on thesubstance of policies and strategies. Poor com-munication has inhibited the development ofabetter informed Congress on relevant Sahelianissues. This problem, however, is not uniqueto discussions of the Sahel but broadly affectsAID/Congress relations.

On the congressional side, the lack of trusthas blocked consideration of multi-year ap-propriations for the long-term research portionof AID’s program, limiting flexibility and add-ing a bias toward less appropriate short-termapproaches. It has led to increased reportingrequirements and strict enforcement in the Sa-hel of stringent financial control proceduresthat are unrealistic given the capacities of mostSahel countries. The burden has fallen dispro-portionately on already overloaded Sahelianmanagers. Low-level program or project fund-ing changes require time-consuming congres-sional notification. Poor communication keeps

Congress from accumulating enough detailedknowledge to make effective policy decisionson vital development issues.

On the AID side, the problems of its relation-ship with Congress translates into too muchtime and energy devoted to congressional re-lations, and the overselling of its program, lead-ing to unrealistic expectations in Congress,overreaction to reporting requirements, insuffi-cient understanding of the information needsof Congress, and the failure to use effectivelythe flexibility it has over such things as procure-ment regulations and the use of “no-year”funds.

Official U.S. policies guiding foreign assis-tance are contained in the Foreign AssistanceAct of 1961 and its subsequent amendments.Over the years, Congress has added new pri-orities and mandates (e.g., basic human needs,environment, women in development, capital-saving technology) through policy directives,earmarked funds for special purposes, and re-quired issue-specific reporting. It has rarely re-moved previous mandates nor ranked the im-portance of existing ones. The rapidity withwhich new mandates are added and theircumulative weight provide AID with little con-sistent guidance on U.S. objectives and priori-ties, limit flexibility to respond to specific lo-cal needs and opportunities, and work againstthe long-term consistency required for Club/CILSS goals.

Finally, other actions taken by Congress canindirectly affect the effectiveness of AID de-velopment efforts in the Sahel. The influencethrough Congress of domestic interest groupswhose particular “interest” may or may not beconsistent with effective development strate-gies can at times restrict or even conflict withAID objectives. One example is procurementrequirements, so-called “tied aid” that requiresU.S. sources of equipment and technical exper-tise. In the Sahel these measures dramaticallyincrease the costs of operations, provide littlelong-term commercial benefit to U.S. busi-nesses, while foregoing opportunities to en-courage local productive capacity and skill de-velopment. They also deter donor coordination

15

since each donor has distinct requirements re-sponding to its own interest groups, and thusincrease the administrative burden on Saheliangovernments.

Is the Strategy Commensurate With

Finding: AID’s regional strategy statement forthe Sahel is largely consistent with the les-sons of the past decade as well as with thecentral thrust of the Foreign Assistance Act,which directs AID to focus on the direct al-leviation of poverty. In several respects, how-ever, the strategy statement is ambiguous andquestions remain regarding its interpretationand implementation. Congress has the respon-sibility to ensure AID’s clarity in implemen-tation of the strategy. Means of congressionaloversight need to be modified to fulfill Con-gress’ intent when it created SDP.

Option: In setting policy directions and conduct-ing oversight of SDP, Congress can select a lim-ited list of policy priorities. These choices wouldset the principal agenda for Congress discussionswith AID. Congress could also address specificareas unresolved in the SDP strategy, such as al-location of funds to livestock and gender issues.

Option: To exercise its oversight authority on SDP,and to recognize the desirability of a more effec-tive working relationship with AID, Congress canadopt a graduated approach to such an “issuesagenda. ” It could start by clearly communicat-ing congressional policy priorities and issues toAID. It can then use that agenda to focus hear-ings and reports. If Congress judges AID’s re-sponse as adequate, it could respond by relaxingprocurement, reporting, and other requirements.In the absence of effective AID implementation,Congress could request additional special hear-ings, special reports, more specific policy man-dates, and strict earmarking of funds.

Option: To encourage AID to address key issues anddevelop essential missing components of SDP,Congress can request AID to explore such actionsas: reestablishing a Sahel Development PlanningTeam, undertaking issue- or sector-specific studiesby AID’s Science and Technology Bureau alongthe lines of the current Water Management Syn-thesis Project, and organizing international work-shops/conferences on specific issues similar to

its 1985 conference on river basin development.Congress can encourage AID to do analysis bylimiting new project starts until these strategy is-sues are addressed, while maintaining current ap-propriation levels necessary to fund the analysisprocess and ongoing programs worthy of con-tinued support.

AID has learned a great deal from its experi-ences in the Sahel. Its 1984 Sahel strategy doc-ument effectively outlines the disappointmentsof the past and discusses new approaches thatpromise better results in the future. The resultshave moved AID in directions espoused by abroad spectrum of Sahel authorities who iden-tify the lack of a conducive environment fordevelopment in the Sahel as a major factor inthe poor results obtained so far. The unfavora-ble Sahelian environment is understood to in-clude such elements as policy disincentives, in-stitutional and infrastuctural weaknesses, andthe lack of appropriate technologies. Increas-ing portions of AID’s portfolio are beingdirected to address these constraints, Nonethe-less, concerns remain regarding AID’s strategy:

●

●

●

●

Depending on how it is implemented,AID’s Sahel Regional Development Strat-egy could retreat from a focus on directassistance to the poor, Selection amongalternative measures and approaches andthe mix between “constraint removing”and “direct assistance” will determine theprobability and length of time required tobenefit small farmers.The strategy fails to address several key is-sues essential to the future direction of theSahel, such as the allocation of resourcesbetween irrigation and rainfed agriculture,between food and export crops, betweenecological zones, and between categoriesof farmers. These are not questions that canbe resolved easily or quickly yet AID hasnot given priority to resolving them.In its strategy statement and in the imple-mentation of the strategy, AID fails to ade-quately disaggregate its analysis on the ba-sis of gender nor does it put adequate stresson long-term, environmental sustainability.The strategy needs to go further in the proc-ess of focusing U.S. assistance to the Sa-

16

hel on the basis of U.S. capacities andstrengths in relation to the needs revealedby the past decade.

Ž Missing from the U.S. Sahel program area Sahel-specific research plan, a strategyfor the livestock sector, and a consistentapproach to population issues. Althoughmentioned in the strategy statement, inpractice AID has yet to implement effec-tive methods for increasing farmer andherder participation and institutionbuilding.

Is AID Working Against Itself?

Finding: Institutional characteristics internalto AID are constraints to optimal developmentand implementation of the U.S. Sahel strategy.

Option: There is little opportunity for specific con-gressional options in this area because most ofthe constraints are internal AID/executive branchmanagement issues. But Congress can help tobring these concerns to AID’s attention. Thesecriticisms are not new, yet little visible progresshas been accomplished. Once again, however, theuniqueness of the Sahel effort and its manageablesize provide the opportunity and challenge forAID to test new program and project design, man-agement approaches, and more effective systemsof monitoring and evaluation. The contradictionsinherent in a regional strategy of largely bilateralprograms could be diminished by more regularSahel Mission Directors meetings, the reestablish-ment of the Sahel Development Planning Team,the establishment of a separate regional techni-cal support unit either within the Regional Eco-nomic Development Support Office in Abidjanin the Ivory Coast or independently in the Sahel,and even the option of moving regional manage-ment, currently in Washington, out to the field.AID’s willingness to be more innovative couldbe enhanced by better Congress/AID collabora-tion on the Sahel, by congressional restraint inits direction and oversight of AID, and by con-gressional responsiveness to the costs that thedevelopment of alternative approaches couldinvolve.

OTA identified three sets of institutional fac-tors that limit AID’s effectiveness in the Sahel:staffing, AID’s programming and design sys-tems, and its management structure.

Although staff numbers have increased dra-matically since SDP’s early days, they are stilllow and and have recently been dropping rela-tive to the number of projects because of bud-get reductions. Ten years of programming inthe Sahel have increased the proportion of staffwith Sahel-specific experience. Still, French,local language, and cultural skills largely arelacking. The proportion of high level technicalstaff is low and the skill mix has not changedwith changing strategies. Turnover is high rela-tive to the time it takes to program, design, andimplement projects so people who begin a proj-ect rarely are held accountable for results. Thede facto incentive system is biased in favor ofthe designer and obligator and not the effec-tive implementor of the project. In many posts,local staff—the AID missions’ local “institu-tional memory” and source of vital cultural,economic, political, and technical knowledge—are underused.

AID’s systems of designing programs andprojects are cumbersome, mechanical, and in-effectively applied. They rarely link analysisbetween sectors or between the national econ-omy and small-scale producer. The separationof the component parts of the AID project sys-tem (i.e., identification, design, approval, im-plementation, monitoring, and evaluation)limits consistency, programmatic accountabil-ity, and institutional learning. It is a system thatis geared toward discrete, production-specificprojects rather than long-term programs withmore process-related goals. The system canmove with impressive speed to obligate fundsbut paperwork requirements and procurementbottlenecks leave gaps of up to 3 years betweendesign and project starts. The monitoring ofAID projects is limited by staff number and ispoorly integrated into project management.AID does perform significant project evalua-tions but they tend to be narrow, focusing onlimited objectives instead of wider impacts andgoals. Evaluation is ineffectively fed back intoproject re-design.

AID’s efficiency suffers from the size andcomplexity of its operations. Separation andpoor coordination between program offices,

budgeting, technical support, and evaluationunits constrain effective AID operations. Divi-sion of authority between Washington officesand the field and between the field missionsand contracted project personnel is often un-clear, overlapping, and inconsistently applied.The problems inherent in this lack of clarityare amplified under SDP because it has a rela-tively strong regional management unit basedin Washington. Mission directors, under thesupervision of the U.S. Ambassador and re-sponding to the requests of their particular hostgovernment, have resisted the efforts to enforcea regional strategy. At the same time, the spe-cial nature of the Sahel effort actually requiresa much higher degree of regional perspectiveand coherence than elsewhere.

Can Diverse Actors With DiverseStrengths Work Together?

Finding: Greater coordination and collabora-tion between various U.S. actors operating inor affecting the Sahel would increase the ef-fectiveness of the U.S. effort.

Option: Congress could request that all relevant U.S.Government-funded agencies establish Sahelstrategies that would highlight coordination withAID. These could include: the Department ofAgriculture (its Public Law 480 component andits technical assistance and research programs);the Department of Treasury (debt and lending pol-icy); Department of Commerce (tariffs and trades)and its National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration (drought and famine warning sys-tem, technical assistance and meteorologicalresearch); Peace Corps (village-level technicalassistance and organization); and the African De-velopment Foundation (local organization sup-port). Within Congress, an informal group of stafffrom relevant committees could meet periodicallyto discuss the consistency of actions under con-sideration by their respective committees andhow these actions affect overall U.S. objectivesin the Sahel.

Option: Congress could request AID to take a moreactive leadership role in fostering coordinationamong all US. publically funded development ef-forts in the Sahel. Some activities that might beappropriate include: interagency task forces, con-ference/workshops on technical themes, and in-country coordinating committees. Such an effort

will work only if a means is found to ensure in-formality, voluntary participation, and respect forthe diversity and independence of participants.

Option: Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) of-fer special potential to contribute to the type ofstrategies that are essential for future Sahel de-velopment. Thus Congress could request that anappropriate PVO group such as INTERACTION,PACT, CODEL, or others study and develop aPVO Sahel strategy stressing coordination withAID. The strategy could help PVOs already work-ing in the Sahel and others considering such activ-ities to think strategically and to increase coordi-nation and collaboration with AID, Peace Corps,and others. Such an effort would have to ensurethe voluntary participation and desired autonomyof each private organization.

In addition to AID, numerous other U.S.agencies (governmental and nongovernmental)are either active in the Sahel or their actionsaffect the implementation of SDP strategies orbroader Club/CILSS goals. Few of the U.S. pub-lic and private organizations working in the Sa-hel besides AID have a Sahel-specific strategy.The current level of their coordination and col-laboration with AID is variable. The diversityof their strengths, weaknesses, approaches, andactivities provides both opportunities and risks.As resources become more limited, it will beincreasingly important to avoid contradictoryactions or duplication of efforts. Thus improvedcoordination and collaboration are critical.

Other U.S. governmental agencies have amore indirect impact, either through their ex-ecutive branch actions or by policies set by Con-gress. In policies and actions as diverse as U.S.farm support, U.S. positions on internationaldebt burden relief, the funding of the variouscomponents of the International Monetary Fund,the World Bank and the United Nations affect-ing the Sahel, support for U.S. investment, etc.,decisions are made that have considerable im-pact on the Sahel. These actions can counter-act or complement U.S. development programs.There is no mechanism for and only limitedconsideration of the consistency of these di-verse actions, and decisionmaking responsibil-ity is scattered among various agencies andmultiple congressional committees.

Chapter 2

AID's Sahel Developmentprogram and the

Chapter 2

AID'S Sahel Development Programand the Club/CILSS Framework

IN BRIEF . . .

Congress asked the Office of Technology Assessment to study development efforts inthe Sahel as part of a larger assessment of low-resource agriculture in Africa. The Sahelis one of the poorest regions in the world and it has been the focus of a concerted, multina-tional assistance effort. But after a decade of projects and financial aid, there comes a timeto take stock: just how effective has development assistance been in the Sahel and what canbe learned from those experiences?

The United States has played a major role in the Sahel, The Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AID), as mandated by a 1977 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, managesthe Sahel Development program, a comprehensive, long-term approach to reaching food self-sufficiency while accelerating economic and social development. c hapter 2 looks at key aspectsof this AID program and the unique multinational Club du Sahel/CILSS framework of whichit is a part. Highlights of the chapter include:

Ž AID’s Sahel Development Program is unique among U.S. development efforts becauseit is a long-term commitment to a multinational effort with a regional focus and itreceives separate line item funding within the AID budget.

● The multinational Club/CILSS framework has been controversial and its effectivenesshas been constrained by inconsistent member support. CILSS in particular has beenhampered by uneven leadership and inadequate technical and managerial capabilities.The Club/CILSS approach, however, has served as a forum to combine and focus thetalents and resources of both donor and recipient nations.

● Despite some problems, the Club du Sahel and CILSS, with AID’s participation, havemade substantial contributions to improving the clmate for development in the Sahel,especially in the areas of sector planning, improved coordination, and increased aidflows.

Beginning in 1968, 5 years of severe droughtbrought death and misery to the Sahel regionof West Africa. Tens of thousands of peopleperished and up to one-third of the area’s live-stock was lost (14). Brought to the public’s at-tention by the news media, this crisis stimu-lated unprecedented international relief efforts.Over $360 million of emergency aid was fun-neled to the Sahel by 1974 (37).

In the aftermath of that tragedy, the concernsof both Sahelian and donor officials turnedfrom relief to recovery and finally to long-term

development. Could future crises in the Sahelbe prevented? How? And how much would itcost? Reflections on these questions gave birthto a unique experiment in international devel-opment cooperation—the Club du Sahel/CILSSframework, The nine countries of the Sahel andtheir major donors joined together in a coop-erative “contract for a generation. ” Its purpose:to increase the Sahel’s dependable access tofood and lay the groundwork for long-term de-velopment. The United States has been an ac-tive participant in the creation and operationsof the Club du Sahel/CILSS framework.

21

22

THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO CLUB/CILSS:THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PR0GRAM

By 1974, the United States had become the plan, presented to Congress in April of 1976,largest single food aid donor to the Sahel emer- outlined:gency relief effort, a commitment that was to the substance and sequence of a compre-grow into the U.S. Sahel Development Program (SDP) (136). Prior to the 1968 to 1973 drought,

hensive, long-term approach to development

U.S. development assistance to the Sahel hadin support of food self-sufficiency in the con-

been limited in accordance with the Kerry Re-text of accelerated economic and social devel-opment (133).

port of the late 1960s (141). This report recoin- . . mended that the United States confine its assis- The proposal concludes:tance program in Africa to a limited numberof countries with political, strategic, or eco-nomic importance to the United States. But inthe years following the drought, U.S. assistanceto the Sahel rose steadily reflecting a continuedhumanitarian interest by the public at large andparticularly by the Congressional Black Caucus.

. . . we are persuaded that the goals of this Sa-hel development program are attainable, Fromboth the humanitarian and technological pointof view, the long-term comprehensive develop-ment of the Sahel is a unique opportunity whichlies before us today. And the world communitycan and should accept this challenge (133).

In 1977, a further amendment to the Foreign

In December 1973, an amendment to the For-eign Assistance Act (sec. 639. B) supported U.S.involvement in an international long-term de-velopment effort for the Sahel and provided $25million for emergency and recovery needs. InJuly 1974, Congress authorized an additional$85 million and in late 1975 called on the ex-ecutive branch to begin immediate planning foran international Sahel program with the par-ticipation of African countries. The proposed

Assistance Act (Sections 120 and 121) formallycreated SDP within the Agency for Interna-tional Development (AID), thus institutionaliz-ing U.S. commitment to the Sahel and to theClub/CILSS framework. Development assis-tance to the Sahel under SDP (1978 to 1986) hastotaled $750 million (not including $91 millionin Economic Support Funds and $421 millionin Public Law 480 food aid). Total U.S. assis-tance to the Sahel from 1978 to 1986 has equaledapproximately $1.4 billion (see table 2-1).

Table 2-1 .—U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Sahel, 1976-86 (millions of dollars)

Sahel Development Public Law EconomicYear Program 480a Support Fund Total

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1979 ......., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1982 ...., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1986 (estimated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$ 35b

45b

507575939485

1039877

$ 2420322540564532559244

———————

$10184320

$ 596582

100115149139127176233141

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $830 $465 $91 $1,386apubllc Law 480 assistance data includes World Food Program and emergency food ald but does not !nclude ocean fre!ght Costs In flSCal year 1985. freight coststotaled $104 milllon

bDevelopment assistance to the Sahel before SDP existed.

SOURCES Data on SDP and ESF supplied by: U S Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa, Off Ice of Sahel and West Africa Affairs, “U S Ass{stanceto the Sahel, ” unpublished data, April 1986

Public Law 480 data supplied by: U S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Organ lzatlons, “Publlc Law 480, As.slstance to the Sahel, ” unpublished data, April 1988

23

The phrase “Sahel Development Program”has three usages, referring to three interrelatedcomponents. From the administrative/manage-ment perspective, SDP is the separate fundingline item within the AID budget and the dis-tinct management unit within AID which ad-ministers it. Second, it is a novel approach forU.S. development assistance because it is ex-

plicit support for and participation in the mul-tinational and regional framework of Club/CILSS process. And finally, it also refers to thespecific goals, objectives, strategies, and pro-grams that comprise U.S. development assis-tance to the countries of the Sahel as expressedin AID’s Sahel Country Development StrategyStatement (126). (See app. E.)

THE CLUB/CILSS FRAMEWORK

CILSS is the French acronym for the Perma-nent Interstate Committee for Drought Controlin the Sahel, an organization of nine SahelianStates originally formed in 1973 to coordinaterelief and recovery efforts.1 CILSS has beenan influential actor in the past decade’s effortin the Sahel, but its mandate and operationshave been controversial from the start. It be-gan as a mechanism to alert donors to the situ-ation in the Sahel and to focus appeals for assis-tance but its charter also suggested that it couldplay a coordinating role for drought control ef-forts (37).

At its first official meeting in September 1973,CILSS presented donors with a list requestingover 300 projects totaling $3 billion, an actionthat set the tone of the early years (75). Donorswere noticeably cool to this ‘‘shopping list” ap-proach, feeling that careful analysis of the prob-lems should be done first as a foundation fora coordinated strategy. Between 1974 and 1976,while CILSS and donor countries negotiatedto determine priority projects, the majordonors–France, the United States, the World

‘The original (;11.SS members included Burkina 1+’asn (ff]r-mcrl y ( J ppc r \’olta ), (;had, NI al i, \l a u rit a n ia, h’ iger, a n(l Sene-gal. The Gamhia and the (;ape \rcrdc Islands ~i’crc a(lln itt[~(i III1975. In January I gt36, the C1 [,SS Con fcren(:e of Hca(i\ of St,]tca pp rove(] t hf; a(l m i ss i(] n () f (; u i nf; a H i ssa u.

Bank, and Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations (FAO)—commissioneda number of studies of Sahel problems and po-tential. The studies suggested that the Sahel didindeed have the resources necessary to be self-sufficient in food, or at least to improve con-siderably its food security, by the end of thecentury. It would require, however, a coordi-nated, long-term effort of 15 to 30 years and$15 to $20 billion in new support. Priority, theyconcluded, would have to be given to agricul-ture, especially food crops that had been ne-glected in the past (37,133).

The role and operations of the Club du Sahelside of the Club/CILSS framework was equallyborn in controversy. Both the chaos of disasterand recovery assistance flowing into the Sahelfollowing the drought of 1968 to 1973 and thepotential offered by the CILSS call for a con-certed Sahel program clearly indicated the needfor a mechanism for coordination amongdonors and between donors and Sahelians. Yetthere was no common agreement on underwhat auspices that coordination should be ac-complished. FAO had established an office forrelief coordination as early as 1972 and theUnited Nations Sahelian Office (UN SO) beganoperations in 1974, with a focus on the envi-ronmental sector. The United Nations Devel-opment Program (UNDP) was also active andalong with UNSO provided early support forCILSS. Despite the level of United Nations (UN)activity, several donors, particularly the UnitedStates, West Germany, and several Saheliancountries, were against a UNDP or UNSO co-ordinating role. The World Bank, another log-ical possibility, was not interested.

24

The Black Caucus of the U.S. Congress, along ● to inform the international community onwith interested AID officials, is given credit for development prospects and needs in thethe idea to create a new coordinating structure Sahel;outside the UN system (37). Their only condi- ● to encourage cooperation between donorstion, included in later legislation, was that U.S. to implement projects requested by Sahel-contributions would be limited to no more than ian governments and CILSS and facilitate10 percent of the combined effort. The major the mobilization of resources; andproblem encountered was overcoming the war-iness of the French Government, whose con-tinuing post-colonial economic, political, andcultural ties led them to consider the Sahel astheir special sphere of influence. Eventually,however, the French Government agreed, moti-vated by changes in internal politics and thegrowing economic burden of the Sahelian Stateson the French treasury. Thereafter, the Frenchbegan to play a leadership role in the Club duSahel while the United States continued acatalytic but low key approach. Other donorsgreeted the proposal with varying degrees ofenthusiasm. Canada and West Germany wereparticularly cautious and until recently theWorld Bank maintained primarily an observerstatus. As the Club has clarified its role andproven its value, donors have increased theirsupport.

The Club du Sahel is set up as a loosely struc-tured, informal arrangement, without formalmembership—more of a forum than a develop-ment organization. More than 25 major mul-tilateral and bilateral donors join the CILSSmember states in Club activities. It is made upof a small Secretariat located at the Organiza-tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment (OECD) headquarters in Paris, irregulargeneral meetings (six have been held so far),and a common working group (organizedjointly with CILSS) of technicians broken upinto sect oral working groups whose responsi-bility is to map out medium- and long-termstrategies and organize ad hoc meetings ontechnical issues. Both donors and Saheliansparticipate in its meetings and working groups.

The Club’s first meeting was held in Senegalin 1976 where its purpose and mandate wereset :

● to be a forum for Sahelian nations to outlinetheir policies and priorities for medium-and long-term development and discussthem with donors (37).

The strategy that evolved out of the workinggroups and that was endorsed by the 1977 gen-eral meeting was based on the primary impor-tance of food self-sufficiency and ecological bal-ance for the Sahel. It emphasized agricultural

Photo credit U S Peace Corps

Increasing food security was one of the primaryobjectives of the Club/ClLSS effort and it remains a

● to support CILSS, the principal agency formajor goal of development assistance in the Sahel,

Here a Sahelian millet breeder works withregional cooperation in the Sahel; a Peace Corps agronomist,

- . .

production; ecology and forestry; fisheries; andthe integration of new themes such as recur-rent costs, cereals pricing, marketing, and stor-age. Its action program combined infrastructuralimprovements, human resource development,medium-term production projects, and longerterm approaches to develop irrigation poten-tial, particularly in the major river basins. Sub-sequent meetings refined the strategy in thelight of experience. A 1978 meeting focused at-tention on the crucial fuelwood crisis and en-couraged an increase in support for the forestryand ecology sector, A revised strategy adoptedin 1980 again emphasized the environment andits 1 ink to food self-sufficiency goals, In subse-quent meetings, the recurrent cost issue, therole of policy reform, continued coordinationproblems, and the lack of progress of agricul-tural programs have been added to the agenda.

25—

The 1984 revised long-term strategy, adoptedby the Club and the CILSS Council of Ministers,reflects these changes, Its main elements are:

●

●

●

●

to encourage private initiative and limit theextent of government intervention in thedevelopment process;to emphasize the need for policy reformand the establishment of sound economicfoundations as a precondition to devel-opment;to link the food security objective to over-all development of the agriculture sector;andto recognize that environmental stabilityis based on appropriate, integrated plan-ning in agriculture, forestry, and livestocksectors (123).

EVOLUTION AND CONSTRAINTS

Once donor support increased through theClub du Sahel, CILSS began to expand its man-date and its Secretariat in Ouagadougou, Bur-kina Faso. Through the Club working groups,CILSS participated in important studies andin preparing the 1977 Club/CILSS strategy doc-ument and subsequent revisions, CILSS in-creasingly played a more direct role in devel-oping and implementing regional projects suchas a large Integrated Pest Management project,With donor support, it created two specializedinstitutions, AGRHRYMET (Sahelian RegionalCenter for Agro-meteorology and Applied Hy-drology) in Niamey, Niger and the Sahel Insti-tute in Bamako, Mali. The latter was set up tofacilitate information sharing among Sahelianresearchers and to coordinate appropriate re-search projects. Repeating the pattern of its par-ent organization, the Sahel Institute also beganresearch efforts of its own,

The performance of CILSS, particularly inproject management and coordination, hasbeen mediocre. Like many regional organiza-tions in Africa and elsewhere, it has sufferedfrom a lack of member support; political ten-sion among members; and uneven leadership,

managerial, and technical skills. In the past,member countries have not insisted on strongaccountability. From the beginning, CILSSmember countries have been slow to providefinancial assistance while the personnel as-signed to CILSS had uneven qualifications.

But other problems related to support frommember nations have been more fundamental.While welcoming the increased aid flows thatCILSS has helped foster, member governmentshave been reluctant to give CILSS a coordinat-ing role that might interfere with their sover-eignty or direct access to donors. CILSS strat-egy and policy decisions have been poorlyreflected in the actions of member States. Noris the CILSS planning process integrated withthose of its members. Donors have found thatmany projects contained in the CILSS “firstgeneration” program were not part of nationaldevelopment plans or were considered low pri-ority, Many of these coordination and follow-through problems are explained by the fact thatthe CILSS Council of Ministers is for the mostpart comprised of Ministers of Agriculture, Ru-ral Development or Natural Resources; theseministries typically play minor roles in policy

26

decisions in most Sahelian States. Also, in-country CILSS national coordinating officeshave been poorly staffed and have limited lo-cal power,

Donor support also has been inconsistent.The original growth in the CILSS mandate waspartially supported by donors of the Club duSahel, Over time, major donors such as theUnited States have concluded that while thereis a role for regional analysis and dialog, in-stitutional weaknesses within CILSS and po-litical realities make national governments themore appropriate focus for most projects andprograms (125,132). For several years, CILSSignored donor criticisms but in 1985, follow-ing a change in CILSS leadership, growingmember State dissatisfaction, and increaseddonor use of conditionality in their financialassistance, CILSS agreed to revise its mandateto become more of a regional think tank andstreamline its operations. Although too earlyto be certain, it appears that CILSS has begunmuch-needed reforms,

The overall positive impact of the Club duSahel is also not without some qualification(137). The studies performed by the Club work-ing groups are not all of equal quality nor havethe Club/CILSS strategies had much impact onthe strategies and sector allocations’ of eitherSahelian governments or donors. For example,although assistance to rural development andrainfed agriculture has grown 7,1 and 16,1 per-cent each year, respectively, less than one-quarter of all donor assistance is going into ru-ral development and less than half of that sup-ports rainfed agriculture (25). Similarly, assis-tance to forestry and ecology is growing at animpressive 31.5 percent annually, yet it is stillonly 2 percent of total aid. (For trends in assis-tance to the Sahel, see app. A, table A-5.)

While coordination has been the hallmark ofClub activities, its lack remains a major obsta-cle to effective use of development assistance.The partnership between the Club and CILSSis an impressive step in development coopera-tion, but the Club can be criticized for taking

‘In a dekcloprnent sense, a sector is an area of’ puhlic in\rest-ment, e.g., the forestry sector, the li~’estock scctur, etc.

the initiative and leadership away from CILSSat times and because it has few Saheliansdirectly involved with the work of the Club Sec-retariat. There has been difficulty translatingagreements into action because of political andorganizational pressures. For example, theorganization has been unsuccessful in encour-aging donors to take action to use simplified,standardized project documents to reduce theburden on Sahelian governments.

It has also proven difficult to translate Club-sponsored agreements about donor coordina-tion into clear mandates for field representa-tives to work more closely together. The extentof the in-country coordination problem is in-dicated by the sheer number of donors andprojects. In 1983 in Burkina Faso, 29 majordonors were working on 119 separate projects,including 13 donors active in agriculture (27).In-country consultative groups or donor round-tables organized respectively by the World Bankand UNDP have so far proven to be of limitedsuccess due to a lack of clear support fromdonors’ home offices. Over the past 3 years,however, some improvement has been noted.In Senegal and Mali, donors have effectivelycoordinated strategies in working with therespective governments on the sensitive ques-tion of policy reform. Work sponsored by theClub on food aid coordination, though still inembryonic stages, shows signs of progress (27).Club/CILSS-sponsored antidesertification strat-egies and in-country meetings to consider howto implement strategies and deal with other co-ordination issues also have promising potential.

CILSS was created to tackle common prob-lems within a group of countries with histori-cal and cultural commonalities and shared eco-logical and economic constraints,3 But sharedproblems are not necessarily enough to be con-ducive to mutual solutions, The similarity ofSahelian economies and production systemsmeans that there is very little they have to of-fer each other in trade to increase mutual foodsecuri ty, Some authori t ies feel that thesubregional focus on the Sahel should be grad-

“1’he extent and rele~~an(; e to te(; hnolog} de~relopment of sinl-ila rit ies between Sahel states has been qua] i fied foil 0111 i n g thede~’elopment experiences of the past de(, a(ie. Stx; (:11. 4,

-

ually shifted to include the coastal economiesto the south of the Sahel, which provide bettereconomic complementarily with the Sahel.

Coordination with other multilateral and re-gional organizations remains a problem forboth the Club and CILSS. Overlapping mem-berships and mandates with UNSO, UNDP,CEAO, ECOWAS, the Conseil d’Entente, (thelast three are subregional economic coordina-tion bodies), the NBA, OMVS, and OMVG (Sa-helian river basin development authorities], andthe Organization of African Unity create dupli-cation and lack of coordination, Institutionalrivalries have also led to lost opportunities.

The future success of the Club/CILSS maybe jeopardized as the flow of assistance to theSahel diminishes. Aid to the Sahel peaked in1981 and then declined through 1983, Increasesin 1984 to 1985 are largely a reflection of emer-gency food aid, International economic difficul-ties, government budget cutbacks in most ma-jor donor countries, the drop in oil prices, andcompeting demands for aid from Eastern andSouthern Africa all combine to make futurelevels of assistance to the Sahel uncertain. TheOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-tries, which also participates in the Club, sup-plied $425 million (over 20 percent of the total)in 1981. This fell by more than 50 percent to$200 million in 1983 and is expected to fall fur-ther (25). New U.S. commitments for Sahel de-velopment assistance have fallen from a highof $103 million in 1984 to a projected $77 mil-lion in 1986. The Administration has requested$80 million for 1987. Although the Canadians,Dutch, and Italians have been increasing assis-tance to the Sahel, it is unlikely that these in-creases will compensate for the overall declinein aid.

Despite these problems, the contributions ofthe Club/CILSS process have been substantial.The Club has had a significant impact on theinternational development program in the Sa-hel through its regular meetings, the technicalanalysis and strategy proposals of its workinggroup (which includes both donor and Saheliantechnicians), and the ongoing process of reflec-

tion, information collection, and dissemination.Its major accomplishments include:

●

●

●

Sector Planning and Strategies: Sectoranalysis and strategy discussions have hadsubstantial impacts on the content and con-duct of both donor and Sahelian programs.The Club has assisted in increasing atten-tion on the priority of agriculture and foodproduction, the fuelwood crisis, the keyrole of cereal policies, and the problem ofrecurrent costs. Commissioned studies,and the collection and sharing of knowl-edge about the Sahel, have provided a solidbeginning for an effective database on theSahel,

Aid Flows: Club activities have played akey role in tripling aid flows to the Sahel.Between 1975 and 1984, total assistanceto the Sahel totaled $14.1 billion. (See app.A, tables A-1 through A-3.) Per capita assis-tance to Sahelians has averaged $44 perperson yearly, more than double that forsub-Saharan African as a whole and fourtimes that for Asia (25), Increased aid foragriculture and forestry can be at least par-tially attributed to Club sector analysis andstrategies. (See app. A, table A-5.)

Coordination: The Club has had a dual im-pact on coordination, helping foster coordi-nation between various donors and be-tween donors and aid recipients, Althoughthere is still need for improvement, theClub has fostered an improved dialog indevelopment assistance. The non-threaten-ing, less formal, “partnership of equals”atmosphere of Club/CILSS meetings andthe fact that the dialog has continued forover a decade have built an atmosphere oftrust regarding sensitive topics such asrecurrent costs, cereals pricing, and the re-forms of CILSS. The Club has taken thelead in discussing the coordination of foodaid and desertification and has begun orga-nizing in-country progress review meetingsof donors and host country officials to takestock of their efforts toward Club/CILSSgoals.

28

The Club/CILSS experience has brought tolight some important lessons (37):

• the advantages of subregional cooperation,Ž the importance of strategic thinking,Ž the value of donor coordination, and● the necessity for a “contractual” framework.

The failure to heed the latter—to implementagreed upon mutual obligations—has been per-haps the greatest weakness of Club/CILSS dur-ing the past decade. Progress in the Sahel de-pends on the common actions of all—Sahelianfarmers and herders, Sahelian governments,and donors. The role of each must be identi-fied and commitments carried out in action.Greater “conditionality” in relationships be-tween all partners is an essential part of im-proving performance in the future (38). Progresson policy reform and the reform of CILSS areexamples of what such an approach can ac-

On balance the Club/CILSS approach is animportant part of U.S. and international effortsin the Sahel. It has relatively low costs and hasmade an overall positive contribution in the re-gion, The evolving Club/CILSS mechanism hasthe potential to improve the effectiveness of thecombined contributions of donors and Sa-helians. The realization of that potential is, how-ever, far from assured. It will require continuedhigh levels of active participation by donors andSahelians. Some observers feel, however, thatthe U.S. commitment has diminished in recentyears. While the United States was active inthe beginning of CILSS, of late it has turnedfrom catalyst to critic. These criticisms havebeen significant in identifying needed reformsof both CILSS and the Club du Sahel, but somepeople have questioned whether the UnitedStates is willing to provide the resources to sup-port implementation of the suggested reforms.

complish.

Chapter 3

The Sahel:Diversity and

Transformation

Chapter 3

The Sahel: Diversity and Transformation

IN BRIEF . . .

The United States has played a key and catalytic role in the unique, coordinated, multi-national development efforts in the Sahel. The Club/CILSS framework provided an innova-tive strategy to combine the talents and resources of both donor and recipient nations ina concerted effort to strive for food security in one of the world’s poorest and most vulner-able regions. Over the past decade, inconsistent support from both donor and recipient na-tions, lack of coordination, management problems, and problems translating agreements intoaction have constrained the effectiveness of the Club/CILSS efforts in the Sahel. Despite theseproblems, the United States, through AID’s Sahel Development Program, has helped the Clubdu Sahel and CILSS make substantial contributions to development.

These efforts, from the beginning, were designed as a regional approach because thecountries shared some important historical, cultural, economic, and ecological elements.Chapter 3 outlines some of the important historical and cultural similarities and looks inparticular at the limits of the Sahelian environment and the future of food production inthe region. Highlights of the chapter include:

● The environment in the Sahel is diverse, both in the complexity of its ecological sys-tems and in the variety of its agricultural production and socioeconomic systems. Thesesystems are facing a period of rapid change.

● By many measures, such as infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy, Saheliannations are among the poorest in the world. Dependency on a limited number of low-value exports, high levels of debt, and other external economic influences limit theability of Sahelian nations to improve the quality of life for their people.

● One indication of the region’s great vulnerability is the growing gap between foodproduction and food requirements in the Sahel. Over the past two decades, Saheliancrop production has grown at approximately 1 percent per year while the rate of popu-lation growth during this time was about 2.8 percent.

● Recurrent droughts, poor soils, and other environmental factors have combined withchanging social and economic systems to exacerbate environmental degradation inthe Sahel.

A key lesson learned in the past decade is thatsuccessful development assistance efforts mustconform to the human and physical environ-ment. The environment in the Sahel is diverse,both in the complexity of its ecological systemsand in the variety of its agricultural produc-tion and socioeconomic systems that haveevolved over the centuries. Thus developmentefforts in the Sahel must be designed with an

understanding that the region is vulnerable, re-silient, and continually changing. This chap-ter reviews the history of agricultural produc-tion, the current and projected situation ofpoverty and development within the Sahel, therole of CILSS countries within the global econ-omy, the growing gap between food produc-tion and food requirements, and environmentalconstraints.

32

THE SAHEL YESTERDAY

Great empires–the Ghana, Mali, and Songhai–flourished in West Africa during the periodknown as the Middle Ages in Europe, In theheart of the Sahel, Timbuktu, Gao, and Djennewere centers of power, wealth, and learning,Caravans of camels brought slaves, gold, andsalt across the Sahara desert to the Middle Eastand North Africa. They carried back textiles,firearms, and the religion and culture of theIslamic empires. Over several thousand years,the trans-Saharan trade brought domesticatedlivestock and new crops such as rice, wheat,beans, bananas, and yams to West Africa.

People of the Sahel developed complex farm-ing and herding systems that were adapted tothe environment. Timbuktu was one of severalthriving agricultural regions in the Sahel (66).Farmers raised sorghum and millet, crops be-lieved to be indigenous to West Africa, wherethere was sufficient rainfall. They developedpatterns of shifting cultivation that allowed soilsto be replenished by fallow periods of up to 20years. Other farmers irrigated crops in thefloodplains of the major rivers, including theNiger, Senegal, and Gambia, planting differentcrops as the water receded (known as floodrecession cultivation).

Herders similarly developed various pastoralsystems. Some drove their herds of cattle,sheep, goats, and camels in no fixed patternto seek grazing lands (called nomadic pastoral-ism) in the northern areas bordering the Sahara;others migrated with their livestock in regularpatterns (called transhumant pastoralism), oftennorth in the rainy season and south during thedry season, and engaged in some cultivation(called agropastoralism). Another traditionalsystem of livestock farming, sedentary animalhusbandry, developed in the southern, higherrainfall zones, but was secondary to cultivationthere (8,50). While at times there were tensionsbetween the farmers and herders competing forlimited resources, more often theirs was a mutu-ally beneficial relationship where the herdersprovided milk, manure, and other animal prod-ucts to the farmers in exchange for food grainsand the use of their fields after harvest (crop

residues were dry season fodder for their ani-mals]. While both farmers and herders pro-duced food primarily for their own subsistence,they also produced enough surplus to feed smallnonagricultural populations as well as to sur-vive periodic droughts,

The decline of the great African empire inMali in the 15th century, and the defeat of theSonghai Kingdom by a Moroccan force in 1591,ushered in a long period of internal instabilityand raids. The Europeans arrived along thecoast in the late 15th century. The Europeansexpanded the ongoing slave trade, whichfostered these African inter-ethnic wars. Overthe course of the next four centuries, 6 millionslaves were taken from West Africa (66). Dakar,Senegal became a center of the enlarged At-lantic slave trade in the 17th century, whenslaves were sent from Africa to provide laboron the sugar plantations of the West Indies.Traditional production systems, though dis-rupted by the wars, raids, and slave trade,survived.

Meanwhile, African farmers graduallyadopted crops introduced by the Europeansfrom the New World and elsewhere (e.g., corn,peanuts, cotton, cassava, and fruits) (36,66). Theagricultural production systems were land-extensive, but they were sustainable becausethe population was small. They were also dy-namic, characterized by constant innovationand adaptation. Diversified handicraft produc-tion was also developed, including textilesmade from locally grown cotton. While themajority of agricultural and handicraft produc-tion was for subsistence, there was surplusenough for local and regional trade (59).

During the latter part of the 19th century, theFrench conquered much of the Sahel while Eng-land established control over The Gambia. Por-tugal retained the Cape Verde Islands. Thesechanges further disrupted traditional produc-tion systems. Under colonial rule, colonies wereconsidered providers of raw materials to Eur-ope and markets for its manufactured goods.The French and British, once they gained

33— —

administrative control of the Sahel in the 1890s,promoted export crops, especially peanuts andcotton, damaged local artisan industries by giv-ing favored tax status to European goods, andforced rural people into the cash economy byrequiring them to pay taxes in cash.

Efforts to develop export production in thecolonial period were of limited success, yet hadlasting impact on agricultural production in theSahel. Successes were limited to peanut pro-duction in Senegal and The Gambia (see boxB) and cotton production in Chad (59). Frenchpolicies to encourage export production in-cluded taxation, forced labor, and resettlement.Selective investment in research and infrastruc-ture complemented these policies. For exam-ple, French efforts to encourage cotton produc-tion in the 19th and early 20th centuries failed(66]. But in the late colonial period Frenchcotton researchers made available the betteradapted ‘‘Allen” variety brought from the UnitedStates and the French began an ambitious irri-gation scheme to encourage cotton production.

While emphasizing production of exportcrops, French colonial administrators gave onlymodest attention to food production, whichstagnated. They justified this neglect by not-ing that traditional farming methods changedlittle, and, except for severe drought years,enough food was produced to feed the people.At the same time, rice was imported to Dakarfrom French Indochina and sold to the grow-ing urban population. Since it required far lesstime to prepare, was available and inexpensive,urban residents came to prefer it to locallyproduced sorghum and millet,

Newly introduced animal and human dis-eases also disrupted traditional systems in theearly colonial period (1890-1920) (100), but theintroduction of preventive health measures be-ginning in the late colonial period probably hada greater effect because it decreased death ratesand increased population growth. The popu-lation of the Sahel increased from an estimated9 million in 1900 to 13.5 million in 1940, andgrew to 18 million by 1960 (60). Traditional agri-cultural production systems adapted to some

Box B.—Peanuts: How Colonial PowersFavored Export Crops

The story of the development of peanuts asan export crop in Senegal and The Gambia il-lustrates how colonial powers favored exportcrops for obvious economic reasons. Peanuts,desired by the Europeans as a source of vegeta-ble oil for cooking and soap, began to be ex-ported from Senegal and The Gambia in the1830s. Exports increased as the slave tradewas gradually suppressed, and peanuts be-came the dominant export in the last half ofthe 19th century. Small farmers with little cap-ital could grow peanuts using traditional toolsand methods and usually rotated them withfood grains. Wolof and Serer farmers dedi-cated more and more of their land and laborto peanut production in order to obtain cashneeded to pay taxes and to purchase the goodsthey no longer produced as well as new con-sumer goods. In addition, colonial rulerscleared new lands for peanut cultivation byconscripting men into forced labor brigades,a practice not abolished until 1946 (66).

With the expansion of the French oil indus-try after World War II, demand increased. TheFrench introduced improved seed varietiesand fertilizer, and land under peanut produc-tion increased dramatically (115). In the fol-lowing decades, increased population, with-out a concomitant intensification of peanutproduction, put pressure on the land in thePeanut Basin. Fallow periods grew shorter,eventually giving rise to semicontinuous cul-tivation in some areas, and ultimately reducedfertility and yields. Cultivators moved to newlands, at first good lands, but later increasinglymarginal lands, sometimes disrupting themigratory patterns of the pastoralists; othersemigrated to cities. Yet, despite some fluctua-tions in weather and prices, peanut exportscontinued to climb, reaching their peak in1975 to 1976 (59). Over the past decade pro-duction and exports have declined principallydue to falling returns.

of these many changes, but overall they becameless self-sufficient and sustainable.

34

Sahelian nations gained independence fromFrance in 1960; The Gambia won independencefrom Britain in 1965 and Cape Verde from Por-tugal in 1975. But the trends accompanying in-creased production of export crops and integra-tion into the world economy continued, withthe support of the new African governments,the French, and providers of development assis-tance. Agricultural development was not givenhigh priority and a large portion of the exter-nal funds for agriculture were used to developlarge-scale irrigation schemes to grow rice and

sugar, two crops that often substitute for im-ports, While France and the United States con-ducted some research on sorghum and millet,the majority of foreign aid to rainfed crops inthe 1960s went to cotton and peanuts. Mean-while, food production systems stagnated. To-tal food production increased because newlands were opened by increased numbers offarmers, but yields began to decline in areaswhere soil fertility was reduced, especially inSenegal and The Gambia.

SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION IN THE SAHEL

Integration into the global cash economy hadprofound implications for rural Sahelian soci-eties. The gradual transition of most farmersfrom generally subsistence-oriented to cashcrop production that began in the 19th centuryeven affected those farmer and herder house-holds that did not cultivate cash crops for ex-port, For example, in years with good rainfallsurplus food crops—sorghum, millet, rice, andmaize—were sold for cash. Increasingly, fruits(e.g., mangos, oranges, bananas, pineapples);vegetables (e. g., tomatoes, beans, onions, cab-bage, etc.); and nuts (e.g., karite) were producedfor sale. Integration into a money economy alsoaffected off-farm work and incomes of ruralpeople, especially in the dry season, and thevarious roles of men and women in the house-hold and in different production systems.

Migration

One of the responses to the need for cash inrural areas has been migration and this has re-sulted in considerable change in nearly everySahelian village, While migration is not a re-cent phenomena, it has increased significantlysince World War II. It reflects the inequity ofwealth and opportunity between Western na-tions and the Sahel, between urban and ruralareas within the Sahel, between export crop andsubsistence farmers, and between farmers andherders (33), Cash payments sent home bymigrants are a sizable though largely unmeas-

ured part of national income; in Mali, for in-stance, workers’ remittances from outside ofthe country in 1983 amounted to about $36 mil-lion (147). In some areas, remittances receivedin rural areas can be a more important sourceof cash than agriculture, yet they are not usu-ally invested in agriculture due to its low return.

Migration, predominantly by young men, canbe either temporary–often alternating with theshort growing season—or permanent. Whenyoung men migrate for seasonal work to theexport crop farms, or even to the large palmoil, coffee, and cocoa plantations in the coastalStates, the burden on women, the elderly, andchildren who grow food crops at home is oftenincreased. However, family incomes are in-creased by migration, and migration is a risk-reducing strategy for farm families becauseeven in times of drought there will be some in-come. Migration may occur to gain access tonew land or to exchange labor for cash on largerfarms, in cities, coastal States, or even Europe.It may also occur as a reaction to drought andincreased pressure on the land. An example isemigration from the densely populated MossiPlateau in Burkina Faso to less populated higherrainfall zones, where river blindness is beingcontained, in the southern part of the countryor northern Ivory Coast. By one estimate thereare 1.5 million citizens of Burkina Faso in theIvory Coast: each year 500,000 migrate for workin the dry season, and 100,000 never return(115) 0

35.

Pastoral Systems in Transition

The various forms of pastoralism in the Sa-hel have also been affected by the transitionto a cash economy. The fattening and sale ofbeef to urban dwellers using traditional mar-keting channels provided cash to herders, andsupplemented the food and goods they used fortrade, The numbers of animals rose rapidly be-cause of preventive health campaigns, deepwells, a decade of higher than average rainfall,and growing demand during the 1950s and1960s (59). Seasonal movement of the pastor-alists has become more difficult in recent yearsas farming has expanded onto rangelands andmovement across borders has been restricted.Several large-scale irrigation schemes claimedareas previously used for dry season grazingor for flood recession cultivation of crops. Thisrestriction on the pastoralists’ mobility has in-creased conflicts over access to land and waterresources (69). However, the traditional coop-erative relations between farmers and herdersare still common: e.g., FulBe pastoralists maytend livestock owned by Mossi sedentary farmerswith their herds, and thus ensure themselvesuse of the farmers’ pasture when they migratesouth in the dry season. Even while the tradi-tional herding systems have been primarily ori-ented to subsistence, transhument pastoralistsin the Sahel are efficient users of land: a com-parative study showed that transhument pas-toralists in the Sahel produced more animalprotein per hectare than the market-orientedranches in comparable areas in the WesternUnited States and Australia (8).

The 1968 to 1973 and 1984 droughts deci-mated many herds, forcing some herders toshift to farming (130) or migrate to the city, Dur-ing the drought many were forced to sell theiranimals, their only assets, at low prices to pur-chase food. The change was most dramatic inMauritania, where the combined forces ofdrought, economic modernization, war, andemancipation of slaves have forced pastoraliststo abandon their traditional way of life. Be-tween 1965 and 1975 the nomadic proportionof the population decreased from 65 to 35 per-cent (33),

In other Sahelian countries pastoralists whoformerly depended on livestock have turned tomixed systems of crops and livestock becausethe market is no longer a reliable source of grainor to acquire recognition of land rights (69,106),Perhaps 40 to 60 percent of livestock are nolonger in extensive pastoral production sys-tems. Additionally, the presence of tsetse flyand the lack of dry season fodder also constrainsedentary husbandry in higher rainfall areas.Despite these constraints, total herd size re-turned rapidly to pre-drought levels. Evidencealso suggests possible increased concentrationamong herders (22,67) and new forms of owner-ship. The sedentarization of pastoralists is be-ing accompanied by an increased number ofanimals owned by farmers and urban investors,A growing proportion of the traditional pas-toralists can only survive by emigration or tend-ing investors’ herds (9).

Changing Social Systems

Traditional social systems in the Sahel arealso being affected by the changes accompany-ing development, These changes are affectingthe interrelated and diverse systems of ethnicgroups, castes, and classes throughout the Sa-hel. Traditional class structures still function,especially in rural areas, although they arechanging as the production systems on whichthey were based are also being transformed (54).For example, the farmers endowed with pre-ferred land, especially those with large families,have been better able to take advantage of someof the new technologies (84). While customarylaw still governs land use rights in the Sahel,land ownership is becoming more common.Buying, renting, and speculating in land areoccurring and large-scale farmers, merchants,and religious leaders are acquiring land, some-times working it under types of sharecroppingsystems (28), In addition to private land acqui-sition, land concentration in the Sahel is alsoattributed to acquisition by parastatal organiza-tions1 in irrigation-driver development schemesand unintentional “demographic’ land expro-

36

priation—when population increases and tradi-tional inheritance systems lead to divisions ofland into areas insufficient for family subsis-tence—resulting in emigration (102)$

Development patterns in the Sahel have sig-nificantly affected the role and status of women.Studies have demonstrated that developmentoften worsened the situation of African women(7,24,114), In the past, subsistence-orientedeconomies had distinct roles for men andwomen, but they were closely integrated intothe family agricultural production unit. Withthe introduction of the cash economy, men gen-erally appropriated the functions relating tocash exchange, while women were left thoserelating to subsistence production. In the Sa-hel women play a great diversity of roles withinthe household, varying with ethnic group, caste,and class (24,1 11). The allocation of land is usu-ally controlled by men who give preference tothe higher value cash crops that they produceand whose cash return they control. The in-creased labor demands of the new technologies

for cash crops often means that women andchildren spend longer hours in the fields of theirhusbands or fathers as well as, in some cases,their own fields.

Despite the long hours spent obtaining waterand fuelwood and preparing food, rural Sa-helian women are increasingly entering thecash economy, supplementing family incomein a variety of ways. They market vegetablesfrom gardens, food crops, homemade crafts,and animal products (e.g., meat, leather, milk,cheese, eggs, etc.) as well as engage in small-scale trading, especially in the dry season.Herder women, about whom little has been re-searched, are generally responsible for market-ing milk (68). Since much of this trade is infor-mal, it is not included in national statistics andis often invisible to national planners. Themoney earned is used to pay taxes; pay forcelebrations and transportation; and purchasefood, textiles, medicine, school books, and otherconsumer goods that are transforming rural life.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SAHELIAN NATlONS

Profile of Poverty

The Sahelian nations are among the poorestin the world by any standard. By one often-usedmeasure, per capita gross national product(GNP), they averaged about $232 in 1983, farless than that of the developing countries as awhole ($787) (109), Accounting for inflation thereal per capita GNP was 17 percent lower in1983 than 1975 (26). By another measure, thePhysical Quality of Life Index, based on a com-bination of infant mortality, life expectancy,and literacy, the Sahelian nations average 27compared to 61 for developing and 96 for de-veloped countries (109). Related importantpoints include the following:

● Many infants die before their first birth-day, about 145 of each 1,000 born, com-pared with 15 in the rich nations, and 92in all developing nations (109). Up to a thirddie before their fifth birthday (125). Thismeans, hypothetically, that a woman must

give birth to three children to help ensurethe survival of two.

● The average life expectancy of a child bornin the Sahel in 1983 is 44 years, far less thanthe averages of 59 and 74 years of childrenborn in the rest of the developing and theindustrial countries, respectively (109).

• Less than 15 percent of the adults in theSahel are literate, far below the average of59 percent in other developing countries(109). Less than a third of primary schoolaged children are in school; enrollment ofmale children is double that of female chil-dren (147).

Yet significant progress has been made in re-ducing some aspects of poverty in the Sahel.Comparing these three indicators with thoseof a decade ago, life expectancy has increasedapproximately 5.75 years, infant mortality rateshave decreased by 25 per 1,000, and adult liter-acy rates have doubled (see table 3-1). However,

37—

Table 3-1 .—The Sahel: Social and Economic Indicators

GNPper capita Life Infant Adult Primary school

Population, Population GNP per growth rate, expectancy, mortality, literacy enrollment, 1982mid-1 984 growth rate capita, 1983 1960 to 1982 1983 1983a ratea (percent of age

Country (millions) (percent) (U.S. dollars) (percent) (years) (per 1,000) (percent)

Burkina Faso , 6.7

group)— .2 . 6 – 180 1.1 44(38) 148 (182) 9 (5-lo) 28 - -

Cape Verde . . . 0.3 2.7 210 NA 61(50) 80 (91) 37 (NA) NAChad . . ... . 5.0 2.1 80 –2.8 43(38) 142 (160) 15 (5-10) NAT h e G a m b i a 0.7 2.1 290 2.5 36(40) 200 (165) 20 (10) 56Mali . . ... . . 7.6 2.4 160 1.6 45(38) 148 (188) 10 (5) 27Mauritania . . . . 1.8 2.8 480 1.4 46(38) 136 (189) 17 (l-5) 33Niger . . . . . . . . 6.3 2,9 240 – 1.5 45(38) 139 (200) 10 (5) 23Senegal . . . . . 6.2 3.0 440 0.0 46(40) 140 (159) 10 (5-lo) 48aNU~b~rS ,n parentheses refer to 1970 through 1975

SOURCES John Seweli, et al (eds ), U S Fore/gn Po/Icy and fhe Th/rd kVor/d Agenda 1985-86 (New Brunswick, NJ Transact Ion Books 1985) Roger Hansen, et alThe U S and World Development Agenda for Action 1976 (Washington, DC Praeqer Publlcat!ons, 1976), and Robert S McNamara, The Cha//enges for Sub-Saharan Africa (Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture, Nov 1, 198;)

national averages obscure social and economicdisparities between households, especially inrural areas.

The total population of the Sahel was 35 mil-lion in 1984, a number that has doubled in the25 years since independence (59). Populationgrowth rates range from 2.1 to 3.0 in differentcountries (109), and now average 2.5 percentfor the region (26), This is less than the rate ofSub-Saharan Africa as a whole (3.2 percent) (81).Some Sahelian countries’ population growthrates have not increased over the past 20 years(147), in part due to emigration, and popula-tion densities are low compared to other de-veloping countries. Yet birth rates are high;about 47 children are born for every 1,000women each year, compared to 14 in the de-veloped nations, The average woman in the Sa-

hel gives birth to 6.5 children. The World Bankestimates that the population of the Sahel (ex-cluding Cape Verde) will be 52 million in theyear 2000, and will almost triple to 92 millionby 2025 (81).

About one in five residents of the Sahel livesin cities and Senegal is the most urbanizedcountry (see table 3-2). The average annualgrowth rate of the urban population over thepast decade is nearly double the total popula-tion growth. At independence an estimated 7percent of the population lived in the cities. Yet,if current trends continue one-third of the pop-ulation of the Sahel will be living in cities by2000 (37). One consequence of increased ur-banization is a reduction in the percentage ofpeople engaged in agriculture, down from 90to 95 percent in 1960 to about 80 percent now

Table 3.2.—Agriculture-Related Social and Economic Indicators

Percent Daily calorie AnnualPercent of of total supply per capita growth ratelabor force population Annual urban as percent of Percent of GDPa of agricultural

in agriculture in urban areas growth rate requirement from agriculture sectorCountry (1981) (1983) (1973-83) (1982) (1983) (1973-83)

Burkina Faso . . . . . 82 11 4.8 79 41 1.3 -

Chad b . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 20 6.6 68 64 (1982) –2.6 (1982)Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 19 4.4 74 46 5.0Mauritania . . . . . . . 69 25 4.6 97 34 2.6Niger . . ... ... 91 14 7.0 105 33 1.6Senegal . . . . . . . . . 77 34 3.8 101 21 0.3%DP– G r o s s Domest!c P r o d u c t –

. ————

bsome data for Chad from World Bank World Development RePOrt f984

SOURCE World Bank World Deve/opmenf Report 1985 (New York Oxford Umvers!ty Press 1985)

38

(21). While percentages vary by country, at least50 percent and probably more than 60 percentof the population is dependent on rain fed agri-culture, excluding Mauritania (28); and aboutone-fifth of the population is principally depen-dent on herding (140). While the number of peo-ple working in agriculture is estimated to in-crease from 11 million in 1980 to 15 millionin 2000, an annual 1.4-percent increase, thegreater urban growth rate will mean that whereeach farmer today must support 2.8 persons,by 2000 each will need to support 3,6 persons(28).

The Sahel in the World Economy

The three pillars of Sahelian exports arerainfed agricultural products, livestock, andminerals (see table 3-3), Sahelian exports arenot well diversified, with one or two commodi-ties providing most of each country’s exportearnings. Senegal has been the only country toat least partially diversify its export economy:peanuts were 50 percent of its export earningsin 1976 (34) but just 13 percent in 1982. Sahelianeconomies thus are extremely vulnerable to thevagaries of climate and world market prices.

The major export crops are peanuts and cot-ton, both rainfed crops grown in rotation withfood crops by small farmers. Peanuts, alsogrown as a food crop, are an important export

Table 3-3.—Major Exports and Share ofExport Earnings, 1980-82

Burkina Faso . . . .

Cape Verde . . . . .

Chad . . . . . . . . . . .

The Gambia . . . . .

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mauritania . . . . . .

Niger . . . . . . . . . . .

Senegal . . . . . . . . .

cotton (46%),a livestock (9%)c

fish (65%),c bananas (17%)c

livestock (43%),b cotton (31%)b

peanuts (51%)a

livestock (42%),c cotton (41%)c

iron ore (57%),a fish (43%)a

uranium (81%),a livestock (11%)c

peanuts (13%),a rock phosphate (13%),a

fish (12%),a petroleum products (25%)a

a I nternatlona} Moneta~ Fund, Bureau of Statistics, International FinarrcialStatistics Yearbook 1985 (Washington, DC” 1985), 1980-83 data for Burkina Faso,The Gambia, and Mali, 1980-84 data for Mauritama

bFood and Agriculture Organization, FAO Trade Yearbook IW (Rome 1985),

1980-83 data,C Food and Agriculture Organization, 1984 CourrtY Tables: Bas/c Data on the Agrf -

cu/tura/ Sector (Rome 1984) Data for I ivestock are not very reliable Sourcesd!ffer on most of these statistics

today only in Senegal and The Gambia, wherethey cover about 40 and 60 percent of the areacultivated, respectively (28). Production, acre-age planted, and share of export earningsreached their peak in 1975 and have since de-clined due to lower prices (which declined 50percent in real terms from 1975 to 1982), mar-keting difficulties, drought, soil degradation,and competition with other food crops (59).

Cotton is an important export crop in Bur-kina Faso, Mali, and Chad. Yields per hectareof cotton, the only crop where production hasintensified in the Sahel, increased fivefold be-tween 1960 and 1980. Total cotton productionreached a peak in 1978 to 1979, and in someareas both acreage and yields declined in theearly 1980s due to the war in Chad, lower in-comes from cotton, and the competition withcereals (28,59). However, in Mali and Chad cot-ton production reached an all-time high in 1984in the midst of the drought. Future prospectsare clouded by the fact that world prices havedropped steeply in the past 2 years as Chinahas entered the international market.

Livestock exports are very difficult to esti-mate accurately, but they are significant to Bur-kina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Exports areprimarily to the West Africa coastal Stateswhere livestock production is limited becauseof the tsetse fly. The recent drought devastatedherds and exacerbated a long-term trend: thereal value of live-animal and meat exports tothe coastal countries is estimated to have fallen50 percent in the last decade (59), On the otherhand, earnings from maritime fishing have beensteadily increasing. World market prices alsohave been falling for Niger’s uranium and Sene-gal’s phosphate. Demand for Mauritania’s ironore plummeted in 1982 to 1983 (37).

In general, strong world market prices of Sa-helian commodities caused production to in-crease in the 1960s and early 1970s; fluctuat-ing—but generally declining–world marketprices, erratic production, and increased costsof imports worsened the balance of trade in the1970s and 1980s (figure 3-1). However, declin-ing export earnings are but one major factorin the growing debt among Sahelian countries.

Figure 3-1 .—Commodity Price Trends for

2,000

1,000900

c 8000 700

L 600

E500

400

300—

200

100908070

Peanut meal and oil(yearly average)

1

39

Peanuts, Cotton, Rock Phosphate, and Iron Ore (constant price)

I

Peanut meal —P e a n u t o i l - - -

I1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

200

10090

o 807060

E 50

n 40

30

20

10

Year

Rock phosphate(yearly average)

I I

M o r o c c a n _

AnI

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985Year

Cotton(yearly average)

80

70

60

50

400

L

E

1098

7

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985Year

Iron ore(yearly average)

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

YearSOURCE: World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends 1985 Ed/t/on (Baltimore, MD The Johns Hopkins University Press 1985)

40

Others include: steep increases in oil prices;world recession; high interest rates; increas-ing protectionism; and internal policies on in-vestment, trade, prices, and exchange rates (80).The growing national debt limits economicgrowth and pressures governments to increaseexport earnings (thus to stress export crops overfood crops) and borrow more heavily.

The total debt of the Sahelian nations has in-creased more than tenfold since 1970, risingfrom $450 million to $4.9 billion in 1983 accord-ing to the World Bank or $5.6 billion accord-ing to the Organization of Economic Coopera-tion and Development (OECD) (26). Figure 3-2shows this trend of rising debt. Their debt nowis equivalent to over half of the GNP and twoto four times the export earnings of the Saheliannations as a whole (147). (See table 3-4.) Whilethe total debt is relatively small, comparing debtto GNP shows that most Sahelian nations aremore in debt than Brazil (where debt is 30 per-cent of GNP) or Mexico (49 percent) (147).Mauritania has the highest debt percentage inthe world, 178 percent. By 1982, two-thirds ofthe public debt of the Sahel as a whole camefrom official development assistance, with greatvariation between nations (ranging from 44 per-cent in Niger to 95 percent in Mali). From 1980to 1982, 75 percent of new loans to the Saheliannations were from foreign aid (25). While con-fessional loans provided as aid were primar-ily responsible for the increase in indebtedness,the majority of debt service is from nonconces-

Table 3-4.—Debt of

Figure 3-2.—Growing Debt Burden of SahelianNations, 1974.83

5.5

5.0

4.5

1.0

0.5

0

—

—

—1974 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

YearSOURCE World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing

Countries, 1984-85 Edition (Washington, DC 1985)

sional loans. In the mid-1980s, debt service pay-ments average 32 percent of Sahelian annualexport earnings and are rising (26), With theexception of Burkina Faso and Chad, the Sa-helian nations have debt burdens that are un-sustainable in relation to their resources andgrowth prospects (26). Since 1981, Senegal hascompleted five multilateral rescheduling of itsdebt, Niger four, and Mauritania one (146).

Sahelian Nations

Debt service

Amount of debtAmount

(millions of(million U.S. dollars) Debt as percent of dollars) As percent of

Country 1970 1983 1983 GNP 1983 exports 1981 1982 GNP 1981 exports

Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 398 38 243 14 2 11Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 136 43 128 14 0 10The Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 192 98 291 4Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 16238 927 89 413 37 1 24

Mauritania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 1,212 178 330 54 7 17Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 662 51 222 63 10 21Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 1,693 69 232 99 4 24SOURCES World Bank, World Development Report 1985 (Washington, DC: 1985), Club du Sahel/CILSS, Offic/a/ (leveloprnent Assistance to C/LSS Member Countr/es

In 1983 (Paris’ Organ lzatlon for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1985), Robert S McNamara, The Cha//enges for Sub. Saharan Africa, (Sir JohnCrawford Memorial Lecture, Nov 1, 1985), U S Agency for International Development, Country Deve/oprnenf Strategy Statement Sahe/ FY 1988 (Washing-ton, DC Aprtl 1984)

41

THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN FOOD PRODUCTIONAND FOOD REQUIREMENTS

Food security is a must. We must ensure thatvoltaics will no longer wake up in the morn-ing and ask themselves what they are going tofind to eat that day.

–President Thomas Sankara (90)Burkina Faso

The Sahel faces a growing gap between foodproduction and the population’s requirements.In the 1960s the Sahel, with the exception ofSenegal, was largely self-sufficient in cereals(37). Over the past two decades, Sahelian foodcrop production has increased by about 1 per-cent per year [22). Yet almost all increases inproduction have been due to more land beingcultivated rather than to more intensive use of

the land and higher yields per hectare, Yieldsper hectare of the major food crops, sorghumand millet, are lower than in other parts of theworld. Production was also adversely affectedby two major droughts and successive years oflower than average rainfall. The rate of popu-lation growth during this time, however, wasabout 2.8 percent—more than double that of therate of growth in cereal crop production (37).Thus, per capita food production has dropped—24 percent by one estimate—since the firsthalf of the 1960s, and has declined more thanthat of Sub-Saharan Africa (16 percent). (Seefigures 3-3 and 3-4.) That estimate, by USDA’sEconomic Research Service (138), excludes four

160

150

140

13000.

II

.

110

100

90

80

Figure 3-3.— Index of Total Food Production in the Sahel,a 1960-85

I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I 1 1 I1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

O Sahel + Sub-Saharan AfricaaData IS for Burkina Faso, Mall, Niger, and Senegal

SOURCE U S Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service Africa and Middle East Branch prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment February 1986

42

105

100

95

90

II

75

70

65

60

Figure 3-4.–index of Per Capita Food Production in the Sahel,a 1960-85

u

1 1 1 I 1 I I 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 l I l I 1 I I I I

I

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985Year

❑ Sahel + Sub-Saharan AfricaaD~ta ,s for Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Sene9al

SOURCE U S Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

Sahelian countries that have even greater fooddeficit problems: Mauritania, Cape Verde,Chad, and The Gambia.

By the mid-1970s, at the time of the forma-tion of the CILSS and the Club du Sahel, thisgrowing gap between food production and foodneeds was recognized as a critical problem.Achieving food security was identified as thefirst priority for the new effort. However,donors and recipients differed on what the goalmeant and how to achieve it. Sahelian nationshave traditionally stressed achieving regionalfood self-sufficiency, a position reiterated in theLagos Plan of Action, a major policy statementmade by Organization of African Unity in 1980.

The emphasis on increasing local food produc-tion reflects an awareness of their vulnerabil-ity to drought and of the disadvantages of aneconomic dependence on a few export com-modities and food aid. The other emphasis,articulated most forcibly by the World Bank(101,153), is on achieving food security by in-creasing national incomes through trade. Sincesufficient food is currently produced in theworld, that argument goes, what is required isa balancing of production for trade and pro-duction for consumption to reduce the lack offood security caused mainly by a lack of pur-chasing power. Thus nations and individualsshould produce whatever provides the great-est return. The different positions, while not

43

Figure 3-5.–Sahel Grain Imports by Commodity, 1966-84

1.5

1.4

1.3

1,2

1.1

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

01966 1970

I R i c e W h e a t

1975Year

1980

Millet/sorghum

—

—

-1-1984

SOURCE U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment February 1986

mutually exclusive, affect debates over relative cereals available in the Sahel. By 1985, at thepriority between food and export crops, rainfed peak of the drought, imports provided one-thirdand irrigated agriculture, crops and livestock, of the total cereal available. It is important toand other issues that will be described in the remember that the data on food production andnext chapters, consumption in the Sahel are at best only rough

In the past two decades, the Sahel’s supplyof food grains has increasingly come to dependon imports and food aid. The decline in per cap-ita food production has been accompanied byincreased imports of cereals. (See figures 3-5,3-6, and 3-7.) At the time of independence, forinstance, the Sahel (except for Senegal) receivednegligible food imports, During 1976 to 1982,a period between droughts, cereal imports fluc-tuated between 14 and 18 percent of the total

estimates (28). Data on imports, including bothcommercial imports and food aid, are morereliable.

Reduced foreign exchange earnings from ex-port commodities and mounting debt—as wellas a host of other reasons ranging from the avail-ability of surplus food from donor nations, ex-change rates, and other policies—have meantthat the gap between food production and con-sumption was not met by commercial imports

44

Figure 3-6.–Sahel Grain Imports, 1967-85

2.2

2.0 —

1.8 —

1.6

1.4 —

c

—

0.6 -

0 . 4

0.2 —

o

1

1967 1970 1975 1980 1985Year

+Food aidSOURCE U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

alone. (See figures 3-6 and 3-8.) Food aid, whichwas largely unknown in the Sahel before 1970,filled the gap. In 1983, food aid accounted for85 percent of cereal imports in Burkina Faso,80 percent in Cape Verde, 75 percent in Chad,55 percent in Mauritania, 50 percent in Mali,and 22 percent in Senegal (63). In 1985, halfof the cereal imports of the Sahelian nationswere confessional food aid.

Even with increased imports, the gap be-tween availability of food and food need is notbeing bridged completely. Current statistics onfood availability, even without considering un-even distribution of food, indicate an inade-quate diet according to the minimum caloricstandard set by the Food and Agriculture Orga-nization (FAO). Per capita consumption of ani-

mal products, already low, has also fallen sig-nificantly since the 1960s (59). However, cerealscomprise only a part of Sahelians’ diets and lit-tle data exist on consumption of uncultivatedfoods and animal protein, In rural areas, theseare traditional backup systems and are as im-portant as food aid in times of drought.

Subsidized imports have helped keep urbanfood prices low, but they also have affected peo-ple’s food preferences, Most food imports arerice and wheat, which reflect both surplus pro-duction in other parts of the world and in-creased demand for these products in urbanareas in the Sahel. These foods require less timeto prepare than do sorghum and millet. Wheatand rice are now the staple foods in the largecities in the Sahel, while sorghum and millet

45—

Figure 3.7.—Total Amount of Food Grains Available (produced and imported) in the Sahel, 1967-84

6,8

6.6

6.4t -

6.2

6.0

5.8

c2 5 . 4 1 -

4.2 — u

4.0 —

3.8 —

3.6 -

3.4 . I

1

1967 1970 1975 1980 1984Year

❑ Production + AvailableSOURCE U S Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

remain the staples in most rural areas. Rice isalso increasingly consumed by the better offrural residents because it is easier to prepareand store (2 I). This changing demand has animpact on farmers, reducing their incentive togrow sorghum and millet while the climate usu-ally prevents them from growing rice andwheat. One remedy is improved food process-ing technologies—to reduce women’s labor—for traditional cereals. For example, milletgrinders are becoming popular in urban andmore prosperous rural areas and have begunto increase consumption of millet in these areas.

A number of projections have been made offuture food needs, looking at probable trendsof both increased demand for and supply offood, for Sub-Saharan Africa (21). All agree that

the gap will continue to widen unless there aresignificant changes in either production or de-mand. For the Sahel, the Club/CILSS estimatedthat if productivity per unit of land and per agri-cultural worker does not increase, the cerealdeficit, roughly 800,000 tons in an average yearat the beginning of the 1980s, will exceed 3 mil-lion tons per year by 2000. Given existingtrends, even in years of normal rainfall, approx-imately one-third of the cereals consumed inthe Sahel will be imports or food aid. They ob-serve that “the present system is entering a deadend” (28).

However, the Club/CILSS concludes that theSahel’s resources for cereal crop production—principally sorghum and millet—are greaterthan its needs. Internal migration and new land

46

Figure 3-8.—Ratios of Food Aid, Grain Imports, and Grain Availability in the Sahel, 1967-85

1967 1970 1975 1980 1985Year

+ Imports as a percent O Aid as a percentof cereals available of cereals available

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

development in higher rainfall areas can helprelieve pressure on overworked land. But theywill not be enough to provide sufficient foodgrains to the growing urban population unlessthe rainfed cereal production systems are in-tensified and productivity increased througha number of means (28). While the report doesnot deal explicitly with the problem of chang-ing urban demand, it mentions the need to pro-

tect national markets against low-cost imports.The effect of changing urban food preferenceson demand presents a challenge to those whoseek to increase production of sorghum and mil-let through agricultural development projectsor policy and other reforms. Environmentaldegradation, exacerbated by the drought, pre-sents another challenge.

The Club/CILSS priority goal of increased Agricultural production in the Sahel is con-food security included a commitment to halt- strained by the environment, especially low soiling and reversing environmental degradation. fertility, erratic rainfall, and land degradation.

47

The recent drought exacerbated ongoing dam-aging trends and made them more visible; cat-tle dying of hunger because of a lack of naturalfodder and farmers unable to grow even sor-ghum or millet on hard-packed fields degradedby wind and water erosion were commonscenes.

A Harsh Environment:Climate, Rainfall, and Soils

The climate of the Sahel is extreme: a shortrainy season, usually between June and Oc-tober, characterized by often violent and un-predictable showers, is followed by a long dryseason. Rainfall is low, highly variable, and un-evenly distributed. Much of the rain that fallsis not retained in the soil and runs off. Thereare high temperature fluctuations between dayand night and low humidity during the dryseason—with the “harmattan,” a dry north-easterly wind, occurring from Novemberthrough February. Most important, recurrentdrought is a permanent feature of the Sahel (86).

Defined ecologically according to averagerainfall, the term “sahel” refers to the 200 to400 km wide semiarid zone between the 200mm and 600 mm average annual rainfall lines.The Sahel band extends across Africa and islocated between the Sahara desert and thesavannah of higher rainfall, termed the Sudanianzone.2 (See figure 3-9.) In the CILSS States, theecological “sahelian zone” covers 27 percentof Senegal, 39 percent of Mauritania, 40 per-cent of Mali, 7 percent of Burkina Faso, 50 per-cent of Niger, and 32 percent of Chad (86).

Of the 530 million hectares in the seven con-tinental CILSS countries, two-thirds are northof the northern limit of cultivation, the theo-retical line beyond which rainfed agricultureis no longer possible. Large yearly variationsof rainfall patterns, however, mean that the

ZDefinition~ of the major ecological zones in West Africa, bYisohyets of rainfall, used by AID and CILSS, BOSTID and theWorld Bank in its report on desertification (148) differ some-what. The World Bank definitions and map, while complex, areused here because of the availability of data about suitability ofland use (table 3-5) and sustainable populations (table 3-6).

rainfall lines (isohyets)3 only indicate an aver-age. Soils are suitable for cultivation on about60 million hectares—only 12 percent of the to-tal area. About 20 percent of this was actuallybeing farmed in the 1970s. About 150 millionhectares are classified as rangeland, wheregrazing is the best use of the land (148). (Seetable 3-5.)

Soils throughout most of the Sahel are shal-low and have low fertility. They especially lackphosphorus, nitrogen, organic content, andwater retention capacity. Common problemsinclude: wind and water erosion, concentra-tion of iron (laterization) and aluminum hydrox-ides, waterlogging, and hard clay layers (148).Soils vary from predominantly sandy to clay.Combined with uneven rainfall, this means thatthe Sahel is diverse agroecologically, evenwithin a given climatic zone.

Generally—but depending on specific rain-fall distribution in a given year–rainfed cropproduction ceases in areas that receive an aver-age of less than 350 mm rainfall. Millet pre-dominates in the areas up to 600 mm, whileabove 600 mm sorghum is the major grain cropand peanuts are important exports. Maize andcotton are grown in areas receiving above 1,000mm of rainfall (125). About 13 million hectaresare under rainfed cultivation in the Sahel: 70percent are under millet and sorghum; 23 per-cent under peanuts and cowpeas; less than 3percent each under cotton, maize, and rice (28).Yet 20 percent of the cultivable land is locatednorth of the 350 mm rainfall line (in zone IIIon figure 3-9). In years when rainfall is less thanaverage, that land is more suitable for pastoral-ism. This area of shifting use is one where con-flicts arise between farmers and herders, orwhere herders sometimes cultivate crops givensufficient rainfall (148). In times of drought, thefarmers and herders in these northern areas aregreatly at risk.

The Sahel region suffers periodic droughts;major ones occurred this century in 1910 to1914,1930,1940 to 1944,1967 to 1973, and 1980to 1984. BOSTID, after a paleoenvironmental

3An isohyet is a line drawn on a map connecting points re-ceiving equal rainfall averaged over an extended period of time.

48

/

/

I

\\

\\

\

0/ 0

//

// . – — —

//

I

0

49—.

Table 3-5.—Land Distribution by Climatic Zone and Suitability of Soils

Zone

Saharan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sahelo-Saharan ... . .Sahelian . . . . . . . .Sahelo-Sudanian . .Sudanian. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sudano-Guinean . . . . . . . . .

.Soil suitable for

Area Cultivation Pasture-.Million

Rainfall (isohyet)a hectares Percent

less than 200 mm 296 56200 mm to NLCb 56 11NLC to 350 mm 45 8350 to 600 mm 55 10600 to 800 mm 38 7more than 800 mm 40 8

Million Millionhectares Percent hectares Percent

50 14

13 29 28 6218 33 34 6214 37 19 5017 42 19 48

Total area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 100 62 12 150 28‘A” l~~h~~t ,~ ‘ lln~ dr’~n on ‘ map connecting points–recetvlng equal rainfall averaged over an extended period of timebNLC—Northern Llmlt of Cultlvatlon

SOURCE World Bank, Desert/f/cat/on (n the Satrellan and Sudan/an Zones of West Afr/ca (Washington, DC 1985)

and historical review, concluded that little sig-nificant long-term climatic change has occurredin the Sahel during the last 2,500 years, anddrought is an inherent feature of the region.However, the present century may be the dri-est one in 1,000 years (86)$

There is an ongoing debate about the degreeto which human actions influence climate anddrought. According to one theory, clearingground cover increases the land’s reflectivityand this together with reduced evapotranspi-ration inhibits cloud formation. The diminishedrainfall degrades the environment further ina self-reinforcing process (11,86,148). Currentopinion accepts that human actions may affectthe local climate, but there is not agreementon their effects on climate over larger areas.

Desertification is also a major concern in theSahel. Researchers for the World Bank con-cluded that it is a complex, poorly understoodprocess that appears to be caused by interac-tions between drought and human abuse of theenvironment (148). Desertification can be de-fined as “the formation and expansion of desert-like patches around cities, villages, wells, andother centers of concentrated activity” (87). Oneform is the expansion of the Sahara desert, butmore serious is destruction of the natural re-source base further south in the Sahelo-Sudanian zone (zone IV on figure 3-9), wherecrop yields are falling in many areas. Signs ofdesertification include a reduction in theamount and diversity of plant and animal spe-cies, loss of water retention capacity, lessened

soil fertility, and increasing wind and water ero-sion (148).

Some experts question the data available onthe nature and extent of desertification (106).Careful environmental analyses have con-cluded that the natural systems are resilient,and if the pressure is relieved they can regener-ate or be rehabilitated (86,148).

By comparing actual populations with esti-mated carrying capacities of the land in eachof the climatic zones, World Bank researchersconcluded that the sustainable rural population,given traditional crop and livestock systems,is 36 million, a number greater than the presentrural population of 27 million. Some people,however, dispute the usefulness of the conceptof carrying capacity because of its relativity tochanges in climate, technology, management,and other factors. Degradation, while occur-ring in both the northern Sahel and to a lesserextent in the better watered south, was mostserious in the middle zones. The middle zonesare where the population already exceeds thesustainable level, and it is where trees are themost vulnerable and over-exploited (148). (Seetable 3-6.)

Impact of Human Activityon the Environment

Traditional land use systems were generallyin equilibrium with the environment, however,human activity began having negative impactson the Sahelian ecosystems centuries ago (86).

Table 3-6.—Sustainable and Actual Numbers of People in the Sahel (millions)

Crops/livestock Fuelwood

Sustainable SustainableSustainable Actual rural less actual Sustainable Actual total less actual

Zone population population population population population population

Saharan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0{

0.8}

–0.8 0.1{

0.8Sahelo-Saharan . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1,0 }

– 1.7

Sahelian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.3 4.0 –3.7Sahelo-Sudanian . . . . . . . . . 8.7 11.1 –2.4 6.0 13.1 –7.1Sudanian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 6.6 2.3 7.4 8.1 –0.7Sudano-Guinean . . . . . . . . . 13.8 3.6 10.2 7.1 4.0 3.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.3 27.0 9.3 20.9 31.0 – 10.1SOURCE Jean Gorse, “Desertification in the Sahelian and Sudanian Zones of West Africa,” Unasylva: An Internatioanl Journal of Forestry and Forest Industries 37(4), 1985

Colonialism, economic development, and pop-ulation increases in the 20th century haveresulted in cumulative damages to the envi-ronment. Overuse and abuse of the natural re-source base by increased numbers of farmers,herders, and city dwellers as well as by donorand African government-supported develop-ment have taken a great toll. Tree cover, grass-lands, and soils have all been harmed.

As a result, some experts conclude that hu-man and animal pressure must be reduced toallow the land to regenerate naturally. Varioussolutions have been proposed, including en-couraging migration, increasing the intensityof agricultural production, and increasing ru-ral incomes through other mechanisms. Thebiggest technical issues to be resolved includeloss of trees, destruction of grasslands, and re-duced soil fertility,

Loss of the Trees

In traditional agropastoral systems, trees pro-vide food, medicine, fuelwood, building mate-rials, and fodder for animals, Leguminous treesalso add fertility to the soil and prevent ero-sion. For example, the Acacia albida tree pro-vides shade and increases soil fertility becauseit fixes nitrogen, Its leaves and protein-rich podsprovide fodder for livestock in the dry seasonand mulch for the soil. But tree cover has beensharply reduced in the past several decades.According to one observer, two-thirds of theacacia trees within 60 miles of the Senegal Riverin Mauritania have disappeared in the past dec-ade (107).

Of the estimated 18 million tons of wood con-sumed in the Sahel annually, about 90 percentis for fuelwood. Only 15 percent of the region’senergy comes from sources other than wood(29), (See figure 3-10.) The constant search forfuelwood for cooking is one of the major fac-tors causing the loss of trees around cities andvillages. Since obtaining household fuelwoodis often the women’s responsibility, this short-age increases the time and labor women mustspend collecting wood, Commercialization offuelwood and charcoal has accelerated envi-ronmental destruction. As a result of increasedpopulation and urbanization, far more trees arebeing lost than are being regenerated or re-planted, despite a variety of forestry programs.

The shortage of fuelwood or alternativeenergy sources especially affects the poor;many poor families now only cook one meala day. In urban areas of Burkina Faso, 15 to20 percent of a typical salaried worker’s incomeis spent on firewood and charcoal; in Bamako,Mali the figure is 30 percent. Over 70 percentof the people of Niger face acute fuelwood scar-city (145). A 1983 Club/CILSS study concludedthat a growing regional fuelwood deficit willoccur in the next 5 to 10 years if present trendscontinue (29). In all but the most southern areas,fuelwood need already exceeds available fuel-wood supplies (148). (See table 3-6, ) Six of theeight Sahelian countries have an acute scarcity,where available supplies are insufficient to meetminimum requirements (145).

Other factors contribute to the loss of treecover. Land is being cleared to plant more

51

Figure 3-10.— Percentage Share of Wood in the Sahel Countries’ Supply of Energy, Mid-1970s

77

6069

93

01-- — —Cape Verde The Senegal Mauritania Mali

94

Upper Voltaa

66

NigerIslands Gambia

aNow Burkina Faso

SOURCE Club du Sahel/CILSS, Energy in the Development Strategy of the Sahel (Parts: OECD, October 1978)

Other

84

Wood

Sahel

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Fuel wood supplies 85 percent of the Sahel’s energy needs and its increasing scarcity alters people’s lives significantly.

crops. Shorter fallow periods and unrestrained also are cut to provide building materials or for-browsing of animals slow or prevent regrowth. age for animals during droughts.Trees are also lost because of fires: farmers burnfields as part of “slash and burn” shifting cul- Destruction of the Grasslandstivation methods (a low-cost method of fertiliz-ing the soil that is not sustainable under short Pastoralists’ traditional ways of using the landfallow periods); herders start fires to stimulate were low density and periodic and thus helpednew growth of grasses for dry season grazing; protect the grasslands. The current problem ofand hunters burn areas to flush out game. Trees grasslands degradation is due to a number of

52

factors including: increasing numbers of live-stock, concentrating herds around deep wells(boreholes) which replaced traditional shallowwatering holes, the associated breaking downof controlled access to water and pasture rights,and restrictions on herders’ mobility. As farm-ing expanded further and further into range-lands and irrigation projects were developedalong major rivers, pastoralists’ faced limitedaccess to dry season grazing. Therefore someherders moved into marginal lands or con-gregated near boreholes and consequently over-grazed the surrounding areas.

Some experts question, however, whetherovergrazing is a major cause of desertification.They point out other more important factorsthat contribute to the degradation of the grass-lands, such as expansion of cultivation intoareas better suited for pasture, fires, and ex-tended periods of low rainfall (106). Some ex-perts attribute the replacement of more nutri-tious perennial grasses with annual grasses toovergrazing combined with a long period of lessthan average rainfall (86,148). However, range-land experts have been unable to clearly iden-tify that such a change is occurring (48). Othersare concerned that browsing, especially bygoats, will lead to increased deforestation. Yetgoats and sheep have increased more rapidly

than cattle since 1970 because they are betteradapted to drought (86).

The processes of deforestation and grasslanddegradation reduce soil fertility by reducing thevegetative cover and making the soil vulner-able to erosion. The expansion of the areaplanted in cash crops, together with the needto produce more food for an increasing popu-lation, has shortened fallow periods, a tradi-tional way to restore fertility. Continuous crop-ping depletes the soil and fertilizers are usedonly on a small portion of the land, principallythat planted in cotton or irrigated crops. Con-tinuous cropping also makes the land moreprone to erosion. In certain areas, the use ofthe modern plow in place of traditional mini-mum tillage methods may also contribute to ero-sion. The use of crop residues for fuel, fodder,or fencing and the decrease in available ma-nure have further reduced the regenerativeprocess of traditional systems and reduced theorganic content of the soil. In a self-perpetuat-ing downward cycle, these processes interactwith drought and contribute to wind and watererosion to remove the relatively fertile topsoiland reduce the ability of the remaining soil toabsorb and store water.

Chapter 4

A Decade of Lessons:

Chapter 4

A Decade of Lessons:Technologies Past and Future

IN BRIEF . . .

The Sahelian environment is challenging. In the past, Sahelian farmers and herders de-veloped a diversity of productive agricultural systems in response to their harsh environ-ment. But changes in the last century have destabilized these traditional systems, leavingthe people increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of weather and economic forces. Chang-ing social, agricultural, and economic systems, including a growing dependence on worldmarkets, as well as drought, land degradation, and declining fuelwood supplies, all contrib-ute to the region’s vulnerability. The results are increasing poverty, food shortages, indebted-ness, budget crises, and worries about the future.

The Club/CILSS effort, and the U.S. contribution to it, have provided only modest tangi-ble successes, and technologies appropriate for the Sahelian environment have proved elu-sive to develop or adapt. But donors and Sahelians have learned important lessons that canserve as a foundation for future efforts. Chapter 4 analyzes the decade’s efforts at technologydevelopment in the Sahel and discusses guidelines for future programs. Highlights of thechapter include:

●

●

●

Contrary to early expectations, technologies appropriate for the Sahel did not existand many agricultural technologies transferred to the Sahel proved to be ineffective.Efforts to develop technologies for the Sahel were disappointing in large part becausethe environment and socioeconomic systems of the region were poorly understood.Agricultural technologies appropriate for the Sahel must be low risk, affordable, sus-tainable, and they must offer at least stabilized production along with the potentialfor substantially increased returns. Farmers and herders need to be included in projectdesign and implementation and special attention should be focused on the low-resourcefarmers and herders—women and men—who comprise the majority of Sahelian agricul-turalists.In general, technology development, adaptation, and transfer is more complex andslower than had been assumed. The lessons learned through both successful and un-successful projects in the Sahel can serve as foundations for future efforts, and justifya cautious optimism about the future in the region.

In 1984 and 1985, major drought again struck culture-based foreign exchange earnings de-the Sahel. Though Sudan and Ethiopia further clined significantly, adding a crippling blowto the east were the most severely affected, the to national economies already on the brink ofCILSS countries still required 1.2 million tons bankruptcy,of food aid (139). Relatively few people starved,but malnutrition, increased endemic disease, After almost one-third of the 25-year time-economic disruption, and displacement of peo- frame set under the Club/CILSS framework, lit-ple led to considerable human suffering. Agri- tle headway apparently has been made in at-

55

59-965 0 - 86 - 3

56

taining food self-sufficiency, environmentalstabilization, and economic growth. Despite thehigh expectations with which the “Sahel Ex-perience” was launched and the unprecedentedmobilization of over $15 billion in internationalassistance, the situation in the Sahel remainscritical. While there have been exceptions fromyear to year and from country to country, datapoint to a decade characterized by decliningper capita food production, stagnant or declin-ing yields of major crops, continuing environ-mental degradation, and little diminution of theregion’s high vulnerability to drought. More-over, a 1985 CILSS study predicts continuingdeterioration and recurrent crisis in the Sahelif the trends of the past two decades are notradically reversed (22).

Experts have tried to attribute the ongoingproblems in the Sahel to a continuing succes-sion of years with low and highly variable rain-fall. But one of CILSS’s goals was to reduce theregion’s vulnerability to drought—a goal thatobviously has not been met successfully. In part,Sahel experts now admit, the gap between ex-pectations and performance is a product of un-realistic original assumptions and goals (110).Both Sahelians and donors lacked knowledgeabout fundamental ecological and socioeco-nomic realities and unrealistically believed thattechnologies and models of development wereavailable or could be easily transferred andadapted from elsewhere. Disappointment wastherefore inevitable. According to Club duSahel Executive Director, Anne de Lattre: “Inthose early days, the Sahel program just didn’tdo its homework” (38).

On the average, the record of individual de-velopment efforts in the Sahel is poor, Programsto develop and disseminate improved, appro-priate technologies for rainfed agriculture havefailed to improve on traditional approaches(128). Programs to develop irrigation haveproven costly, slow, and of questionable eco-nomic viability. Livestock and range manage-ment programs have offered little improvementover existing systems. And despite the oftrepeated importance of the environment andparticularly the critical status of fuelwood re-

sources, investment in these areas has beencosts high, and success limited,

low,

Examples of poor performances are visiblein all sectors of development. Technologiesappropriate to the Sahelian environment andits socioeconomic realities proved illusive todevelop or adapt. Systems to deliver those tech-nologies to farmers and herders proved inade-quate. Infrastructure was a constraint; manage-ment skills were insufficient and projects werepoorly designed, The policies of the Saheliancountries proved to be disincentives to growth.

But this litany of failures to meet overall goalsand the lack of significant impact on the keyindicators of Sahelian food insecurity mask in-dividual project successes and positive changesthat have resulted from the past decade’s ef-forts by Sahelians and their international part-ners. A few of the successes include:

Better early warning systems, improved lo-gistics, and far better organization and co-ordination of food aid on the part of bothexternal donors and Sahelians were all fac-tors that helped prevent the 1984 to 1985drought from causing a wide-scale faminein the CILSS countries. The combined les-sons of a decade of activity had resultedin a Sahel better prepared and more capa-ble of responding to disaster.A significant factor in the relative successof relief efforts in 1984 to 1985 is the greatlyimproved infrastructure of the Sahel, espe-cially its road networks. Poor maintenance,however, is a continuing problem.Thousands of Sahelians have receivedtraining, increasing the long-term capac-ity of Sahelian institutions, Many are mov-ing into key positions, Through the U.S.Sahel Development Program alone, over1,350 Sahelians received high-level train-ing since 1978 (123).Production of millet and sorghum nearlydoubled in Niger; maize production has ex-panded impressively in Senegal, The Gam-bia, and Burkina Faso; and cereal yields,though on the average stagnant, have shownsome strong local increases such as those

57

in southern Mali. (22). Improved local va-rieties of sorghum are being used by farm-ers in Burkina Faso and Mali.Coordinated donor dialog with Saheliangovernments on the crucial need for pol-icy changes have resulted in promising re-form programs in Senegal, Niger, and Mali.Using the resources provided by PublicLaw 480, the Economic Support Fund, andthe Economic Policy Initiative, as well asits other ongoing bilateral programs, theUnited States has been a major participantin these efforts.Cotton production, using relatively inten-sified methods, expanded fivefold since the1960s and reached record levels in 1982to 1983 and 1983 to 1984 despite low rain-fall. Yields per hectare in some areas havereached those of major world producers.Access to education and health care hasexpanded rapidly, producing major in-creases in literacy and life expectancyrates. New models of primary health care,such as those developed by the Agency forInternational Development (AID) in Sene-gal, have succeeded in bringing health careto rural areas and are being expanded else-where in the Sahel. An international pro-gram to control onchocherciasis (riverblindness) gives hope that large tracts ofunderused land in southern Burkina Fasoand Mali might be farmed.Despite the poor performance of largeirrigation schemes, a growing numberof community or individually managed,smaller schemes show promise.Although the livestock sector programshave generally been judged failures, therehave been instances of success such asimproved animal health services and in-creased use of crop residues for fodder. InMali, the vaccine production unit of theCentral Veterinary Laboratory, supportedby the United States, has become largelyself-sustaining.In Burkina Faso, farmer-level techniquesto reduce erosion and improve soil qual-

ity have been developed and are beingadopted by farmers.

● Dune stabilization in Niger, the use of ani-mals for power in parts of Senegal, and thesuccess of some community reforestationprojects all provide evidence that somenew technologies are working.

These successes and others may have, at best,slowed the decline in Sahelian production andenvironmental systems. But they are the basisfor a cautious optimism about the future in theSahel. Though revealing a much more arduousand perhaps slower process of technology de-velopment and exchange than had been ex-pected, the experiences of the past decade havenot fundamentally called into question the po-tential of the Sahel to reach Club/CILSS goalsof increased food security.

A major change in the past decade has beenan impressive increase in Sahelians’ skills. Thisis partly a product of the training and partlythe experience learned through the develop-ment efforts of the last decade. It is a learningprocess shared by both Sahelians and donors,and it has helped participants to reach a grow-ing consensus on the nature of the most im-portant issues facing the Sahel (110).

These lessons are beginning to be incorpo-rated into action. Many donors, including theEuropean community, the World Bank, a num-ber of private voluntary organizations, as wellas the Club du Sahel and CILSS, have been in-volved in major evaluations and reorientationsof their Sahel strategies similar to those per-formed by AID during 1983 and 1984. SomeSahelian governments are going through thesame process.

The lessons include new perspectives andguidelines for technology development, orga-nization of programs and projects, and the needfor policies to allow them to work. Club duSahel Executive Director Anne de Lattre andothers see these shared lessons as the greatestaccomplishment of the Club/CILSS process andan essential reason for their optimism.

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WHY TECHNOLOGY FAILED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMSAND MORE PROMISING APPROACHES

Many Sahel development experts now agreethat technologies to improve Sahelian agricul-tural production substantially did not exist atthe beginning of the Sahel effort nor do theynow (38,45,125). A good portion of the first gen-eration of Sahel projects had been based on theassumption that technologies already availablein the Sahel, supplemented by those transferredand adopted from other arid areas, would besufficient to meet medium-term objectives. Thismistaken belief was a major factor in the poorperformance of many agricultural developmentprograms.

The best illustration of the disappointing re-sults of technology transfer in the Sahel are seenin the failed attempts to increase cereal cropproduction, Improved varieties of wheat, rice,and corn were at the heart of the Green Revo-lution of the 1960s in Asia and Latin America,and it was assumed that better varieties of mil-let and sorghum, which represent over 70 per-cent of Sahelian cereal production (28), woulddo the same for the Sahel, But despite nearlya decade of effort since 1975 (in addition to over40 years of previous French research), scien-tists have failed to come up with varieties thatperform significantly better than those alreadyin use by farmers in any but the higher rainfallareas (128).

In retrospect, Sahel experts agree that a lackof understanding and underestimates of the im-portance of key ecological and socioeconomicfactors led to the choice of inappropriate ex-isting or imported technologies and delayed ef-forts to develop technologies that were moreappropriate. To a large extent, the knowledgebase on which Sahel programs were built wasinadequate. But in many instances, and increas-ingly so as knowledge grew with experience,there was also a failure to integrate what wasknown into choices of technical objectivesand project designs. The lessons of the past dec-ade regarding technology development involvetherefore: 1) the identification of key ecologi-cal and socioeconomic factors, 2) the specific

knowledge regarding those factors learnedfrom experience, and 3) the implications ofwhat has been learned for future strategies.

An Inadequately UnderstoodEnvironment

The broad question of environmental degra-dation in the Sahel, particularly the visibleprogress of desertification, is seen by Sahel ex-perts as a high priority in the future. Recentpatterns of agricultural development are con-tributing factors to degradation (87,93). In-creased care to avoid negative environmentalimpacts in agricultural project activities andthe explicit integration of environmental limi-tations into long-term strategies are essentialto the development of technologies appropri-ate for the Sahel (22).

The rate of destruction of trees is of particu-lar concern given the importance of the forestrysector both in terms of domestic energy require-ments and overall environmental stability.Though policy makers have been slow to re-spond and past actions have been largely dis-appointing, authorities insist on the need forhigh-priority, forestry-related development ac-tivities (37). Those failures have led to severalimportant conclusions for future strategies:

• the need for new approaches to replace thelarge-scale tree plantation efforts using im-ported species of the 1970s and a better bal-ance between plantation and community-level, small-scale approaches using bothbetter adapted imported species and localspecies’ (55);

● the need for a closer association betweenforestry and agriculture, to be achieved inpart by increasing farmers’ perceived in-terest in forestry (18) and improving institu-

‘Srniill-scale communit~ forcstrj p r o j e c t s , hu~jcicr, haircproven to he more costly than originally assumed and managwmcnt difficulties arc not automatically solt’ed h~ this approa(,h.i’(?r~r ] ittle rcsearc}l has heen (:on(]u(:te(i ;ihout the u]tinlatr po-tontia] of lo(:a] ~ariet ics in reforestation,

59

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Deforestation can have serious environmental consequences, CARE supported this shelterbelt project i n the MaggiaValley of Niger to prevent soil erosion and maintain crop productivity.

tional links between forestry and agricul-ture departments and programs; and

• the need for a parallel focus on the devel-opment and extension of conservationtechnologies: for example, more efficientcharcoal production, continued work onfuel-efficient wood burning stoves,’ brushfire control, and the development of alter-native energy sources.

The past decade has also taught a muchgreater appreciation of the importance andresiliency of natural plant and animal commu-nities despite conditions of drought and in-creasing human pressure, Researchers are be-ginning to understand that these systems are

important sources of food and medicines, par-ticularly during times of drought when culti-vated crops fail and domesticated livestock die.Knowledge of natural systems and their regen-erative processes needs to be integrated intodevelopment strategies, and future programsneed to include protection and development ofthose systems.

The lessons of the past decade point to fourkey environmental factors relevant to agricul-tural objectives in the Sahel:

1.2.3.4,

the Sahelian climate,its soils,agricultural pests, anddiversity,

These lessons also indicate the need for in-creased attention to general problems of envi-ronmental degradation beyond agriculture,

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The Sahelian Climate Sahelian Soils

Sparse and highly variable rainfall are theprinciple characteristics of the Sahelian cli-mate. And though still poorly understood, geo-logical and historical evidence suggest that an-nual weather patterns in the Sahel are subjectto long- and short-term patterns making recur-rent drought a permanent feature of the region(86). Scientists speculate that rainfall patternsof the past two decades could be part of an ex-tended period of low rainfall. Unfortunately,early decisions on the selection of improvedcrop varieties and tree species for the Sahelwere based on the assumption of a return tohigher than average rainfall patterns of the1950s and early 1960s. Therefore, unrealisticassumptions regarding rainfall were a majorfactor in the poor performance of many of thenew varieties of sorghum and millet broughtto the Sahel from elsewhere, in their lack ofresponsiveness to increased fertilizer usage,and in the failure of attempts to introduce newforage crops and exotic fuelwood species (20).

The implications for future strategies are clear,Drought must be accepted as a permanent andhighly probable feature of Sahelian life and beincluded as a major factor in the determina-tion of technical objectives. Given the certaintythat even under the most favorable scenarios,at least 90 percent of Sahelian cereal produc-tion will continue to be produced under rainfedconditions, a better understanding of Sahelianclimatology is essential (22). The 1975 creationof the Sahelian Regional Center for Agrometeor-ology and Applied Hydrology (AGRHYMET) asa specialized institution under CILSS was a posi-tive step, but the development of AGRHYMET’scapacity has been slow and its role is limitedto data collection. A more systematic analysisof AGRHYMET data and data from the U.S.National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency,which has been using remote sensing to im-prove early warning systems for famine, isneeded to increase long-range forecasting ca-pacity. Linking climate and agronomic infor-mation has the potential to reduce risks anddecrease the variability of agricultural produc-tion under varying rainfall (112).

The failure to appreciate adequately the lowfertility and other characteristics of Saheliansoils was a further reason for the poor perform-ance of many of the millet and sorghum vari-eties brought to the Sahel from India and else-where (77,98). In some instances, soil andrainfall characteristics have combined to leadto the poor performance of introduced varieties.Runoff rates are extremely high in many areasof the Sahel—up to 40 percent by some esti-mates (77)—due to the intensity of rainfall andpoor absorptive capacity of soils. High runoffnot only means inefficient use of what little raindoes fall but also further degradation of soilsthrough erosion. Compensating for poor soilquality must bean explicit factor in agriculturaldevelopment strategies in the Sahel.

Continued research also will be needed toclassify soil types as a basis for crop breedingand agronomic research programs, and to in-crease and apply knowledge regarding the com-position and structure of Sahelian soils, Thecomplex relationships between water, soils, andplant physiology under conditions of low rain-fall still are understood inadequately, The de-velopment of low-cost strategies to increase soilfertility and improve other soil characteristicsin low rainfall areas is challenging but critical,Most Sahelian soils are poor in phosphorus andnitrogen, The use of simple rock phosphatesfound in several regions of the Sahel has po-tential for relieving the former constraint whiletechniques relying on organic fertilizers or im-proved plant-associated nitrogen fixation mayprovide alternatives to costly chemical fer-tilizers (98). More research is needed on bothalternatives,

Pest Problems

A wide variety of diseases and pests (e.g., in-sects, weeds, rodents, and birds) —many uniqueto the Sahel—have also hindered attempts toincrease agricultural production, Though sev-eral large integrated pest management projectswere launched (e. g., the CILSS Integrated PestManagement Project and AID’s Regional Food

61.- -.

Crop Protection Project), their effectivenesswas limited 3 and pest issues were not ade-quately addressed in many plant breeding andagronomic programs (89), Several of the newcereal varieties introduced were particularlysusceptible to pest damage and changing agro-nomic practices, such as continuous cultiva-tion, increased weeds. In some instances, pestproblems have increased in drought years, fur-ther reducing the improvements that had beenachieved in several better-yielding varieties.

Although the extent of preharvest and post-harvest losses due to pests is debated, insuffi-cient attention has been given to determiningtheir extent or to developing alternatives (2).Again, however, the need is not only to learnmore but to better integrate research results intoprograms. Due to their high cost, lack of avail-ability, and safety considerations, the use ofchemical pesticides is impractical for the imme-diate future except under limited circumstances.Pest resistance as an objective in breeding pro-grams and improved agronomic practices (e.g.,physical removal, cropping patterns) hold themost potential for reducing preharvest lossesdue to pests.

Diversity

The most crucial characteristic of Sahelianecology that was underestimated in most agri-cultural development efforts is the number anddiversity of Sahelian soils and microclimates.Rainfall variability over time and location isextreme, especially in low rainfall areas. Sev-eral kilometers can make the difference be-tween modest yields and total failure. Fertilityand other soil characteristics can also varywithin short distances. Pest problems, too, arehighly location-specific. Improved technicalpackages were often developed on the basis ofassumed “average” rainfall and soil character-istics of a given area—a concept of little practi-cal use when high variability means that the“average” rarely corresponds to the actual con-

ditions faced by farmers and herders. In in-stances where successful technologies werebased on local data, attempts to spread thosetechnologies more broadly have achieved poorresults (93)$

More appropriate research and developmentprograms require knowledge of the degree ofdiversity and the frequency or probability ofany particular combination of environmentalconditions occurring. What are the differentsoil types? What is the probability of a 20 per-cent greater or lesser rainfall on a given field?How likely are pest outbreaks? Given the vari-ous possibilities, which ones should determineresearch objectives? These are the type of ques-tions that will need answers in the developmentof new Sahel strategies. The lesson of the pastdecade is that the failure to factor in diversitycan be as disastrous to development strategiesas the failure to accept the persistence ofdrought.

Poorly Appreciated socioeconomicSystems

A lack of understanding concerning Saheliansocial and economic systems was a further rea-son for the failure to develop technologiesappropriate to the Sahel. Over the course of thepast decade, the various actors in the Sahel haveput different degrees of effort into anthropo-logical, sociological, and economic analysis,The United States is considered to be one ofthe leaders in this regard. The studies have beenof uneven quality and, as the knowledge basehas expanded through experience, the problemseems to be one of ineffective integration ofsocioeconomic analysis into the processes oftechnology development and exchange. The les-sons of the past decade underscore several keycharacteristics that are essential to futureefforts.

The Influences of Poverty

Poverty is the fundamental reality facing thevast majority of Sahelian farmers, Poor farmerswhose very survival depends on producing suf-ficient quantities of food are understandable}

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reluctant to adopt technologies that increasethe risk of failure, By conducting a combina-tion of agricultural and nonagricultural activi-ties (including migration of individual familymembers), farm households spread rather thanconcentrate risk, Farmers and herders in theSahel are also particularly cash poor and tendto minimize inputs, especially cash invest-ments. In one example, a 40-percent increasein returns was necessary before farmers wouldrisk adopting new technologies (57).

These high risk-avoidance and the low-inputpreferences in farmer decisionmaking were notadequately appreciated nor integrated into thesearch for appropriate technologies for the Sa-hel. These factors were certainly significant inthe poor adoption rates of the technologies thatwere introduced, In fact, many of the agricul-tural, livestock, and forestry technologies in-troduced in the Sahel actually have increasedrisk (55). There are numerous examples of newseeds, practices, and animal breeds that, whilehigher yielding, were more susceptible todrought, pests, and diseases than traditional ap-proaches. The implications of these lessons arethat in the future, technologies must be lowerrisk, lower input, and provide higher returnsif the majority of the Sahel’s low-resourcefarmers and herders are to benefit (43). Particu-lar attention to not increasing risk is, moreover,not only necessary for better adoption rates,but the only defensible position when dealingwith the poorest Sahelian farmers.

Labor Supply Factors

Contrary to original assumptions, labor sup-ply has proven to be a major constraint in Sa-helian agricultural production systems and inthe willingness to adopt new technologies. Theseasonal nature of Sahelian agriculture and thelack of alternatives to human labor create la-bor bottlenecks at periods of peak labor need:planting, weeding, and harvesting, Despite highpopulation growth, these bottlenecks have inmany cases increased because of several fac-tors: rural-urban migration, increased schoolattendance, breakdown of the traditional fam-ily production unit, and continuing high levelsof debilitating disease. Second, labor availabil-

ity is influenced by competition for labor fromalternative activities. Risk avoidance strategiesspread labor among activities rather than con-centrating it on increasingly risky agriculturalactivities. The proportion of nonagricultural in-come in most rural households is high, Also,drought and desertification have increased thetime spent in such essential activities as woodand water collection, usually by women, andhas meant less time available for agriculture.

Thus, the limited labor supply has affectedthe outcomes of development activities. A studyto determine why oxen cultivation was notadopted in most of the Sahel showed that theprohibitive cost was the extra labor requiredto maintain the animals (39). One reason whymost irrigation schemes failed to successfullyencourage farmers to grow two successivecrops of rice was competition for labor fromrainfed agriculture or, during the dry season,perceived better alternative income opportu-nities (e. g., migration to cities, vegetable pro-duction) (76). The lesson learned is that futurestrategies must either be based on new technol-ogies that do not greatly increase labor demandsor on those that provide sufficient returns andcan effectively compete for labor. There is a spe-cial need to develop technologies to increasethe productivity of labor input (e.g., improvedmechanization) and to develop broader ap-proaches to labor supply, including labor-sav-ing technologies in other areas such as foodprocessing, water and fuelwood collection, andfuel-efficient cooking technologies, Comple-mentary programs such as health and nutritionimprovement could also help increase the ef-fectiveness of available labor.

The Role of Women

The past decade has also provided importantlessons regarding the importance of recogniz-ing gender factors in most food production sys-tems in the Sahel, In the Sahel as elsewhere,poor project performance has often been tiedto the lack of careful gender analysis and thefailure to integrate the implications of that anal-ysis into the development of production strat-egies (13,23). Agricultural extension, credit, andother inputs usually have been directed toward

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Photo credit: World Bank Photo credit U S Agency for International Development

Most grain is ground by hand throughout the Sahel. Therefore women, such as these from Burkina Faso, spend hourspreparing food Mechanical grinders can cut labor needs and free women’s time for other activities.

men (5). Yet women provide a major portionof total labor input for cereal production andalso have responsibilities for food processingand storage and household maintenance. Incereal grain improvement projects, women’slabor constraints are thus particularly critical(104).

Studies of development efforts in Africa havedemonstrated unexpected results caused by the

production in Mali) have been usurped by men.

In livestock development projects, the empha-

sis on cattle (controlled by men) over goats andsheep (controlled by women) and within cattleprograms on beef as opposed to milk produc-tion have benefited men disproportionately andoften decreased women’s income. The lessonsof the decade call for an expanding knowledgeabout gender roles and also for better method-ologies to apply that knowledge.

lack of gender focus [7,24,41 ,42,44,1 14). In- Economic Realitiescreased opportunities for cash income, even inactivities traditionally reserved for women (e. g., Development efforts in the Sahel often wererice in The Gambia and Senegal or vegetable based on faulty assumptions about the economic

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realities facing the Sahelian households. Withfew exceptions, Sahelian agricultural produc-tion involves low-input, low-productivity sys-tems and they provide low returns. Most expertsfeel that opportunities for further expansion ofsuch “extensive” production systems are be-coming limited and that expansion of currentsystems has resulted in lower yields and nega-tive environmental effects in some areas. There-fore, many authorities feel that efforts to in-crease output substantially must rely on changesin production that use a wide variety of inputsmore efficiently.

Such strategies face considerable obstacles.Low-input, risk-avoidance strategies and therelatively high cost and marginal productionincreases of the technologies offered over thepast decade have been factors in their pooradoption. Returns to farmers and herders from“improved” technologies often were not worththe investment (93). But the focus on produc-tion and inputs has missed the even more sig-nificant constraint of low market demand andlow prices. This has been particularly the casefor grains such as millet and sorghum where,with the exception of drought years when thefarmer has little to sell anyway, demand islimited (84).

The “food gap” at the national level has nottranslated into higher demand or prices for thecereal crops produced by most Sahelian farm-ers. Rather, demand has grown for importedrice and wheat, which is competitively priced,more easily prepared and, to many urban dwell-ers, better tasting. The economic rationality ofincreasing millet and sorghum productionunder these conditions is questionable. Themore successful adoption of new technologiesin cotton, and to a lesser degree in peanuts, hasbeen related to their higher economic return,For the latter, falling world prices, the end ofinput subsidies, and fixed low prices have re-sulted in significant reductions in areas planted.The current precipitous drop in cotton pricescould well have a similar effect. Efforts to in-crease production must therefore be geared alsotoward increasing income by increasing produc-tivity (particularly labor productivity), by low-ering input costs, and by expanding marketdemand.

Diversity

The lack of appreciation for the great diver-sity in production systems in the Sahel, eacha response to a specific set of ecological andsocioeconomic factors, was a key design weak-ness of many livestock and crop developmentactivities (24,67,93), Substantial differences ex-ist between households, ethnic groups, andcastes in crucial areas such as access to land,labor and capital and services, gender and agegroup roles, cultural designations of “accept-able” occupations, traditions of communal eco-nomic activity, the importance of agricultureas opposed to other income sources, and rightsto surpluses produced. Project designs basedon simple models of average farm householdsfailed to recognize or integrate the diversity ofsocioeconomic and cultural contexts repre-sented in any given community—differencesthat often determined responses to proposedtechnologies. The implication for the future isthat there is a need for far more localized—ortargeted—approaches and technologies.

Guidelines for SahelianAgricultural Technologies

Scientists and planners working in the Sa-hel speak of the need to reorient the search foragricultural technologies to respond to the les-sons learned in the past decade. Most agree thatenvironmental and socioeconomic factors haveconstrained the efforts of the past. An analysisof these factors gives rise to several broad char-acteristics that should guide the search fortomorrow’s technologies in the Sahel, Thoughnot a revolutionary reversal, these character-istics represent important changes that manyagricultural researchers in the Sahel are alreadyadopting (77), These technology characteristicscan be grouped into four categories: stability,affordability, improved returns, and long-termenvironmental sustainability.

Stability

It is the variability of rainfall rather than itsgenerally low levels that provides the greatestchallenge to agricultural research in the Sahel.For example, new technologies must be able

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to perform not only during periods of low rain-fall but also when the rains are relatively high.Considering the prevalence of rural poverty andvulnerability, improved technologies for farm-level food security must begin by striving to pro-vide production stability. Several approachescould be used to help increase production sta-bility:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Use crop breeding programs to developmore quickly maturing varieties that arealso resistant to moisture damage in laterstages.Improve water management, emphasizingtechniques for reducing and concentrat-ing run-off and increasing infiltration suchas tied ridges, contour ridges, micro-catchments, and improved plows.Develop a better understanding of Sahel-specific agro-climatology, linking predic-tion capabilities with agronomy,Improve pest control and storage methods,Develop appropriate irrigation techniques,Small-scale irrigation traditionally hasplayed an important role in the stability ofSahelian agriculture and efforts are neededto support innovators and study the mosteffective methods to realize the potentialof the Sahel’s surface and subsurface waterresources,Use the Sahel’s diversity as an advantage,building on traditional strategies to obtainstability by combining a range of differentcrops or even noncrop activities. Examplesinclude mixed cropping; intercropping ofdifferent varieties of the same crop; intro-duction of new crops; mixed crop/livestock/tree systems; nonagricultural income-generating projects; inland fisheries devel-opment; and technologies for improvingthe output of natural systems—wildliferanching, artificial seeding of natural spe-cies, and improved harvesting and proc-essing techniques,

Affordability

With few exceptions, Sahelian farmers arelow-resource farmers. New technologies gen-erally must respond to their low-input strate-gies. Inputs such as fertilizer, animal power,

other forms of mechanization, improved seed,pesticides, or improved animal health and nu-trition measures will only be adopted if theircost is low relative to their probable return. Be-cause probable returns for cereals and mostother crops are low, technology developmentmust seek inputs that are correspondingly in-expensive, This pertains not only to inputs pur-chased with cash but also to labor and to landwhere it is scarce,

Improved Returns

New technologies must be low risk, afforda-ble, and they must also provide adequate in-creases in returns, Since it is likely that the valueof existing agricultural products will not in-crease greatly, either new, higher valued com-modities will have to be introduced or the tech-nologies used to produce existing commoditieswill have to be improved to make current prac-tices more profitable, Attempts to find newcommodities for the Sahel have been largelyunsuccessful. Experimental sunflower pro-duction in The Gambia, export production ofvegetables and fruits in Senegal and Mali, andincreases in cashew and sesame production inseveral countries provide at best modest pros-pects. Strategies to increase demand for or en-hance the competitiveness of Sahel-producedcereal grains (e. g., improved processing andstorage technologies for millet and sorghum,decreased subsidies for imported grains, ormore active trade protection measures and sub-sidies) are also possible.

Technologies need to be developed that pro-vide food stability under low input levels whilealso responding well to increased inputs andbetter management. For the particularly chal-lenging case of low-value cereal crops, substan-tially higher yields are possible if they are grownin rotation with export crops such as cotton,Higher input systems often are associated withimproved management and the residual effectsof fertilizer used on previous cash crops is sig-nificant. For example, average yields of milletand sorghum cultivated in rotation with inten-sified cotton production in Mali are as muchas 40 percent higher than those in the surround-ing area (20).

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Long-Term EnvironmentaISustainability

Continued environmental degradation andstagnating or even falling yields have led Sa-hel experts to view long-term sustainability asa critical criterion for new agricultural tech-nologies. Although the evidence is controversial,many people feel that the impact of develop-ment activities inadvertently may have de-creased long-term sustainability, For example,development activities may contribute to theloss of soil fertility through continuous culti-vation and the expansion of agriculture ontomarginal lands; increased pest problems frommonocropping; overgrazing and soil compac-tion from livestock concentration around deepwells; salinization and waterlogging in irriga-tion projects; and increased aluminum toxic-ity and acidity levels where commercial fertil-izers have been used continuously, Technologydevelopment must include long-term environ-mental sustainability as a key research ob-jective.

The Integration of TraditionalTechnologies

The poor performance of introduced technol-ogies has given development experts a new ap-preciation for the environmental and socioeco-nomic appropriateness of traditional Saheliantechnologies. Centuries of experience have ledto successful techniques such as mixed crop-ping patterns; herder migration patterns andwater management techniques; seed selection;the use of ash as fertilizer; food storage andprocessing technologies; the food and medici-nal value of indigenous fruits, berries, leavesand barks; the use of natural systems as foodreserves during drought; and other adaptationsto the environment. While most traditional pro-duction systems are well adapted to the Sa-helian environment, farming and herding sys-tems are falling behind population growth andenvironmental change.

It is essential to integrate traditional and newtechnologies in agricultural research. This in-tegration can suggest low-input innovations tohelp traditional production systems keep up

Photo credit: George Scharffenberger

Wild plants supplement other foods during shortages.One former Peace Corps Director in the Sahel reportsthat the fruits being gathered here are boiled for hours,

then “taste like bologna. ”

with changing environmental and socioeco-nomic conditions. The traditional approachescan act as starting points to develop appropri-ate new technologies,

More than any individual technology, the dy-namic adaptive processes by which Africanfarmers and herders collect information, exper-iment, and continually adjust their own tech-nologies is considered to be a helpful startingpoint for research and development efforts(103). Charles Weiss, former World Bank Sci-ence and Technology Advisor, summarized thefuture direction needed for technology devel-opment and selection for Africa agriculture:

For Africa’s smallholders, the major techno-logical task is the development of improved

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technologies which are adapted from and more patterns of work, must not require heavy front-productive than traditional technologies and end investments or recurrent costs, and mustwhich are sustainable socially, ecologically, in- not place too much of a burden on the limitedstitutionally, and economically. This means managerial abilities of government officials orthat they must be suited to ecological condi- African small farmers (143).tions of Africa, should not disrupt traditional

Chapter 5

A Decade of Lessons:

Chapter 5

A Decade of Lessons:Policies and Choices

IN BRIEF . . .

Overall, efforts to develop technologies for the Sahel have been disappointing, This isin large part because the environment and socioeconomic systems of the region are inade-quately understood. Guidelines for future technology development, however, can be drawnfrom these disappointments. For the future, technology development must include a focuson solutions appropriate to the Sahel; increased farmer and herder input; a creative combina-tion of indigenous and external research, technology, and management systems; more local-ized research strategies tailored to ecological and socioeconomic diversity in the Sahel; andspecial attention to the low-resource farmers and herders who comprise the majority of Sa-helian agriculturalists. In general it must be realized that technology development, adapta-tion, and transfer will be slower and more complex than had been assumed. AID and otherparticipants in the Club/CILSS framework are beginning to incorporate these lessons intotheir planning and activities.

Technology development, however, is only one part of development assistance. The pastdecade has also taught many lessons related to the importance of how assistance is designedand implemented, and how the policies of donors and recipients affect the outcome of devel-opment efforts. Chapter 5 examines characteristics that have contributed to the poor resultsof the past and opportunities for future efforts. Highlights of the chapter include:

● Four general institutional problems contributed to the poor results in the Sahel: thelack of effective participation by the intended recipients of the assistance; the inade-quacy of a short-term, product-oriented approach; the complexity of project design;and the inappropriateness of much of the research conducted.

● Misguided Sahelian and donor policies are a further factor in the poor performancein the Sahel. Cereal pricing policies, artificial exchange rates, poor debt management,low investment in food crops, indiscriminate food aid, and a range of measures dis-couraging initiative have proven to be disincentives to increased food production andeffective distribution. If agricultural strategies are to be effective, the broad economicpolicy environment in both Sahelian and donor countries must be consistent with de-velopment goals.

● Beyond technologies, modes of assistance, and policies, the multinational effort inthe Sahel has suffered from a lack of clarity and agreement on the definition of foodsecurity goals and the optimal means to obtain them. Many fundamental issues, suchas the balance between investment in rainfed or irrigated agriculture, have yet to beresolved.

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MODES OF DEVELOPMENT AND

Our policy is that the point of aid is to elimi-nate aid,–Thomas Sankara, President of Burkina Faso (90)

The experiences of the past 10 years havetaught the importance of how technologies arecombined and then applied in programs andprojects. The methods used in designing andimplementing development activities are as di-verse as the participants involved. Within thatdiversity, however, several characteristics ofthe institutional actors have contributed to thepoor results of the past decade. Four problemsstand out: the lack of effective participation bythose to whom projects were directed; the short-term, product-oriented project approach ofmost efforts; the complexity of project design;and inappropriate research.

Participation: Leaving Outthe Ones That Count

As happened elsewhere in Africa, develop-ment strategies in the Sahel were built on theassumption that technologies to increase small-scale farmer and herder productivity wouldcome from outside those production systems,African governments and international donorsalike saw traditional farmers and herders as in-herently conservative, even backwards. Theyviewed traditional cultures as obstacles andtheir technologies as inefficient (67,103). Butplanners failed to appreciate the advantages oftraditional systems and the systems introducedfrom Western conditions have caused problems(58). In retrospect, many experts view the lackof effective farmer/herder participation in allphases of project design as a significant factorin poor project results.

The lack of recipient input explains the in-appropriateness of many technical approachespromoted in Africa (10,103). Who but farmersthemselves could best have explained the ra-tionality of their decisionmaking, their culturalvalue systems, village and farm level econ-omies, and the diversity of patterns of socialorganization? Even where such input wassought, perceptual biases shared by most “ex-

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Photo credit: George Scharffenberger

Local farmers and herders are experts whose knowledgeoften has not been tapped, and development assistance

has been less effective as a result.

perts,” foreign and African, often hid or dis-torted the realities of the poor (19). The tradi-tional knowledge of farmers and herdersregarding such things as natural forest systems,effective plant associations, and pasture char-acteristics was a valuable resource that was leftlargely untapped.

But development observers believe that thelack of effective participation has had a morefundamental negative impact beyond the lostopportunity for more accurate information. Ex-perience in the Sahel and elsewhere points tothe conclusion that the extent to which farmersand herders are involved in technology selec-tion and development and the conceptualiza-tion, design, implementation, monitoring, andevaluation of projects greatly influences thelikelihood of success (67,116). The failure to in-clude Sahelians was a failure to build on theirmotivation, energy, creativity, demonstratedentrepreneurial skills, and proven resilience.

The disappointing results of the past can onlybe reversed if farmers and herders are givena more central and responsible role in projectdecisionmaking. The top-down, implicitly pa-ternalistic underpinnings of many development

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efforts in the Sahel need to be replaced withless hierarchical, more service-oriented struc-tures and partnerships, According to an offi-cial of Burkina Faso’s agricultural research in-stitution: the farmers themselves should definethe problems and suggest solutions. There istoo much condescension, What is needed is tobuild a partnership between donors, nationalinstitutions, and farmers.

Creative methods need to be developed to im-prove the two-way flow of information betweenfarmers and herders and development agencies(both Sahelian and donor) as well as means toimplement what have been up until now largelyrhetorical calls for increased farmer participa-tion and responsibility. The community devel-opment approach of the 1960s and 1970s wasboth ineffective and ineffectively applied. Re-definitions of the role of the extension agent,increased farmer input in determining researchobjectives, and alternative participatory re-search methods integrating farmers as partici-pants are all required (57).

Beyond information flows, the question of in-creasing farmer and herder responsibility indevelopment projects is even more crucial andunquestionably more difficult, Logic and ex-perience demonstrate that only when farmersand herders see their own interest in and feel“ownership” of projects can they be success-ful. This is especially the case in the realm ofenvironmental protection where the divergencebetween perceived private interest on the partof farmers and herders and public good in theeyes of government or donor officials is great.Because rigid enforcement of conservationrules is impractical on economic grounds, theonly means to reconcile the two is to changeperceptions and support appropriate solutionsthrough participatory approaches,

Achieving effective participation is highlyproblematic. Divergence between rural inter-ests and those of urban classes; economic andsocial differentiation between rural householdsand within households; and conflicting inter-ests between farmers and herders, different eth-nic groups and different clans all complicatethe task of organizing participatory develop-

ment models. And while many see the poten-tial in better organized farmer and herdergroups as effective partners for development(58), the political implications of better orga-nized, more vocal farmer groups raise questionsabout whether the governments of most Sa-helian States would be likely to accept such achange. Despite these challenges, a shift inresponsibility is essential. As a Club/CILSSstrategy paper observed:

Producers should cease being dependent,assisted persons and take their future fully intotheir own hands; by contrast, the developmentorganizations should progressively limit theirrole to provide groupings with the assistanceand services they require, while granting themmore decisionmaking power (28).

Short-Term, Product-OrientedProject Approaches

Most donor-assisted efforts in the Sahel (otherthan those of the French) have been organizedinto discrete, short-term (2- to 5-year) projects. *Objectives are commonly set (and reinforcedthrough monitoring and evaluation) in termsof quantifiable results—in theory to indicateprogress toward less tangible goals. A numberof factors have converged to favor this type ofprogramming including various institutionaland political pressures (Sahelian and donor) forrapid, quantifiable results; the original empha-sis on technology transfer for which this modeof assistance seemed appropriate; donors’ de-sire to control use of their resources; and a de-sire for flexibility in the event that progress wasunsatisfactory.

The nature of the development challenge inthe Sahel is such that the goals and many ob-jectives of the Sahel effort can only be achievedon the basis of a sustained, cumulative, long-term effort. Contrary to early assumptions, theSahel effort has required more extensive adap-tation and development of new technologiesthan originally assumed. It takes an average of

‘Club du Sahel estimates put the percentage of total aid to th{’Sahel in nonproject assistance (e. g., te(’b 11 i(:al assista n(:~;, re-w;a rc h, sc ho] a rsh ips, food aid, balance of i]ay’men ts, and b~l d get~[l[)~)ort) at 34,1 per(; ent from 1975 to 1983 (25),

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10 years of continuous work to produce a newcrop variety and another 5 to 10 years to gainits widespread adoption—a process poorly servedby short-term project aid (45). While in prac-tice many research and extension projects havebeen renewed or followed by similar efforts,there have often been significant delays andcontinuity has suffered, Other major effects ofthe

●

●

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short-term project approach include:

Insufficient Data Collection/Analysis: De-veloping an understanding of year-to-yearvariations in rainfall and the seasonal na-ture of production systems requires ex-tended periods of observation. Time con-straints mean that insufficient field dataare collected prior to final design,Lack of Systems Approach: Short time-frames and required quantifiable outputsencourage simplified models of farmingsystems that focus on the individual sec-tors rather than the relationships betweenthem. In the field, this limits flexibility.Lack of Focus on Institutional Develop-ment: Short-term projects and evaluationbased on quantifiable indicators encourageforeign technical assistance to take controland favor physical outputs over capacity-building goals. Rather than working throughexisting institutions, the tendency has beento add new organizational structures thatare rarely sustainable following projectcompletion.Inefficient Use of Training: Training com-ponents of many short-term projects havehad key African technicians or managersleave as expatriate project personnel arrive,then return to take over later with littlehands-on experience or support.Bias Against Sustainable Technologies:Short-term objectives and evaluation cri-teria bias technology choices toward quickproduction without consideration for long-term environmental or institutional sus-tainability.Increased Coordination Difficulties: Thediscrete project approach amplifies coordi-nation difficulties and has tied up key Sa-helian management and technical staff inresponding to multiple and often overlap-

ping or inconsistent donor administrativeand program demands (85,134).

The past decade has confirmed that it willnot be easy to achieve Club/CILSS goals. “Tech-nology transfer” has become technology devel-opment, much of it dependent on first build-ing the basic knowledge base. Participatoryapproaches to development take t ime toorganize and implement. The poverty of themajority of farmers and herders and their atti-tudes toward risk and innovation indicate theneed for slow, gradual intensification of pro-duction systems. Efforts such as river basin de-velopment, because of cost and complexity, areinherently long-term. Sahel specialists agreethat these long-term needs require programsand projects with a corresponding perspective.They feel that current project length and thevarious biases toward short-term, product-related results need to be changed to longer,more flexible programs with objectives relatedto broader, long-range impact and systems-based strategies. The long timeframe has im-plications for project financing as well. For ex-ample, longer payback periods will requireincreased grant or confessional elements offinancing.

A related error in many Sahel project designswas to overestimate the capacity of Sahelianinstitutions, Shortages of managerial and tech-nical skills, planning experience, financial con-trol systems, and the ability to absorb recur-rent costs translated into the inability ofSahelian institutions to either fulfill their roleswithin development activities or to sustainthose efforts after a project’s end. In many in-stances, Sahelian roles in donor-sponsoredprojects involved the delivery of crucial com-ponent technologies and inputs such as exten-sion advice, credit, mechanization services, fueland maintenance for irrigation pumps, veteri-nary services, seeds, fertilizer, and crop pro-tection services. The lack of effective deliverysystems was among the principle reasons forpoor performance of agriculture-related devel-opment activities, In many instances, assistanceactually made weak institutions even less ef-fective, The massive influx of aid and the de-

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mands of multiple projects often overwhelmedthe capacity of already weak administrative andtechnical services (4,127,134).

After reflecting on the lessons of the past,many experts consider the commitment to long-term development in the Sahel as a commit-ment to institution-building, i.e., to increasingthe capacity of Sahelian institutions (formal,nonformal, governmental, nongovernmental,regional, national, and community) to take onthe tasks of agricultural and rural development,Indeed, some consider the lack of more im-provement in institutional capacity as the great-est failure of efforts in the Sahel (57). But in-stitutional development is complex and poorlyunderstood, particularly in the context of in-formal institutions at the village level. Institu-tional development requires learning throughexperience, and this requires both opportunist yand time. It is poorly served by rigid or stand-ardized formulas, short-term projects, dis-jointed project-specific training courses, ortechnical assistants who take over while Sa-helians watch from behind.

Several Sahel development authorities pointto the long-term institutional relationships be-tween American universities and research in-stitutions in India as being major factors in de-veloping the capacities of Indian institutionsto play the key role they did in the Green Revo-lution in that country, Though similar effortswere tried in Nigeria in the 1960s and are cur-rently being introduced in Cameroon, they havenot been a part of the Sahel effort. The languagebarrier places a major practical constraint onnon-francophone donors such as the UnitedStates.

AID’s support for the Central Veterinary Lab-oratory (CVL) in Mali is, however, an exampleof success in institution-building. Although AIDsupport is continuing, the CVL’s vaccine pro-duction service is now largely self-sustaining,It has taken over 12 years of ongoing supportbut is an example of the slow but sustainableprogress that is possible with such a commit-ment, The lesson for the future is that institu-tion-building–the long slow process of build-ing capacity—must be a significant element of

M

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

AID’s support for the Central Veterinary Laboratory inMali has been long-term and it is now paying off

because the laboratory is self-sustaining invaccine production

all development strategies if Club/CILSS goalsare to be realized.

Complexity of Project Design

The problems of the short-term, discreteproject approach are amplified when projectdesigns are overly complex. First generationSahel agricultural programs attempted to de-velop and d inseminate combinations of inter-dependent technologies delivered to the farmeras “packages. ” But the package approachproved to be disappointing in the Sahel for sev-eral reasons: often some elements of the pack-age were less well researched or even unavail-able, the total level of resource investment(usually capital and labor) was only appropri-ate for the wealthier farmers, and the stand-ardization of packages was poorly suited to thediversity of ecological and socioeconomic con-

texts (93,126). Projects tended to be ‘‘over-designed” in the guise of rigor. Assumptions,goals, and objectives were overly optimistic,Many designs were overly detailed and inflex-ible, which required unjustified levels of inter-vention in local systems and gave little al-

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lowance for farmer ini t iat ive or change.Consequently, the proportion spent on techni-cal assistance in total project costs has beenexcessively high. Often the result was expen-sive, top heavy, and difficult to administerprojects predestined not to meet objectives. AnAID livestock project is typical: $13 million of$17.5 million is devoted to foreign technicalassistance.

The problems associated with the complex-ity of project design were multiplied in theso-called integrated rural development (IRD)projects that became popular in the mid-1970s.Promoted by the World Bank, IRDs attemptedto address a broad spectrum of farmer needsmore or less simultaneously: food and cash cropproduction, animal husbandry, forestry, health,education, water supply, community develop-ment, and others. Theoretically, it was an ad-vance to recognize the diversity of concernsfacing farmers, but the integration of the vari-ous components was never achieved. Inade-quate analysis of socioeconomic data; narrowdisciplinary perspectives of scientists workingon the projects; and the fact that the responsi-bility for different components fell on differ-ent, often competing government agencies,combined to turn most IRDs into administrativenightmares. They became rural developmentsmorgasbords, as an uncoordinated successionof extension agents, community developmentworkers, and technicians vied for farmers’ at-tention and scarce resources. Other donors, too,lacked clear and specific strategies and becameoverextended into multiple program, sector,and geographic areas (128).

The Sahel Development Planning Team sum-marized the results of development assistanceprojects in the Sahel this way:

. . . projects tended to result in an enlarged gov-ernment superstructure; to require more skilledmanagement staff than most countries had tooffer; to foster myopic views of “progress” atthe top (so many plows, so many bags of fer-tilizer delivered) and confusion at the farmerlevel (were debts to be repaid or not?); and togenerally box agricultural development into aseries of discrete efforts with artificial, oftenoverly optimistic, timeframes, inhibiting rather

than promoting increasingly productive use offarmers’ resources (126).

The challenge identified by past experienceis thus to move to new modes of assistance moreconsistent with the nature of the Sahel and thelong-range goals of food security, environ-mental stabilization, and economic growth.Alternatives that focus on broader goals andobjectives for different economic sectors, inwhich several donors participate, are one op-tion. An example is the current cooperation onpolicy reform. Other forms of longer term pro-gram assistance (e.g., budget support, food aid,long-term technical assistance, etc.) are also op-tions to explore. Projects will continue to havean important role, but they should be based oneffective Sahelian participation at all stages.They should be longer term, more flexible, andfocused on increasing capacity and sustaina-bility as well as production, In addition, theyshould make realistic demands of the mana-gerial and resource capabilities of both Sa-helians and donors.

Making Research More Appropriate

Given the importance of research in the Sa-hel effort, it is important to determine how itshould be organized to be more effective andhow it can best integrate the lessons of the pastdecade. Many of those lessons have alreadychanged some research goals to bring themmore into line with Sahelian ecological, social,and economic realities. But other questions re-main. How much research is justified? Whatare the research priorities? How do current re-search methods need to be modified? Howshould research be organized among the nu-merous institutions involved?

How Much Research Is Justified andWhat Are the Priorities?

In general, the objective of research and de-velopment is to accelerate the rate at which sci-entific knowledge is transformed into site-spe-cific technology thereby improving the testedmenu of alternative technologies available tofarm families (49).

77-.

What kinds of agricultural research are most promising? Many authorities now seek to improve reliable local practices,such as these sorghum silos in Burkina Faso.

A major conclusion drawn from examiningthe experiences of the past decade is that thescientific knowledge base about the Sahel, itsecology, and its natural and human systems isinadequate. But financial resources for all de-velopment activities are likely to be limited forthe foreseeable future, so it is crucial to decidehow much fundamental research is needed andhow much research should be devoted to ap-plying the research results already available.Some experts believe that substantial techno-logical breakthroughs are not possible for Sa-helian agriculture and that resources would bebetter invested in the application of the few im-proved technologies that already exist, Butmany agree that the existing research findings,particularly in the social sciences, have not beenadequately integrated into development pro-gramming and design, Most feel that a greateremphasis on research—both basic and applied—is essential.

Before research priorities can be set, overalldevelopment strategies have to be more clearlydetermined. Critical research areas include: im-

proved low-resource varieties and agronomicpractices for millet and sorghum, water and soilmanagement, agroforestry, food processing,animal nutrition, inland and coastal fisheries,and small-scale irrigation systems. The failuresof the past indicate the need for more exten-sive social science research generally but par-ticularly in participatory methods, farming sys-tems, population dynamics, marketing, andextension techniques. And importantly, thereis great need for a better integration of the so-cial and physical sciences.

How Should Methods Be Modified?

The absence of effective farmer and herderparticipation in agricultural research is botha cause of failure and a missed opportunist y. Butmoving beyond that general agreement to con-crete methods for increasing farmers’ roles inresearch is much more controversial. Definingresearch objectives, refining hypotheses onwhich research is based, suggesting possiblesolutions, and testing and adapting results areall areas for increased farmer and herder in-

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put. Many experts feel that the focus of researchmust shift from the research station to thefarm—a view for conducting research that iscalled the farming systems research (FSR) per-spective. In addition to farmer participation,FSR has the benefit of including the “wholerange of bio-technical and socioeconomic re-search and analyses which place at the centerof the analysis, factors affecting the welfare ofthe farm family” (49). But FSR and participa-tion are not necessarily synonymous. Frenchresearchers have used on-farm methods for dec-ades in the Sahel but their success has been asl imited as more tradit ional research ap-proaches. Critics claim that such methods arenot necessarily examples of participation, butcan be examples of using farmers as researchtools (19).

In the American version of FSR, farmers intheory have more flexibility and control but theactual implementation has been inconsistent,The interdisciplinary basis of FSR has alsoproven difficult to achieve in practice by sci-entists often unable to escape their individualdisciplinary perspectives, FSR is slow and la-bor-intensive and therefore costly. When usedas one component of a short-term project whichseeks quantifiable results, the temptation toooften has been to take control from the farmer.While more adapted to the diversity of Sahelianenvironmental and socioeconomic systems,findings tend to be location-specific. Thoughintellectually appealing, some question whethersuch a level of disaggregation in research isjustified on economic grounds. In theory, FSRis designed to bridge the gap between researchand the farmer—as a support to the role thatunder traditional agricultural developmentmodels is assigned to extension agents. Theweakness of extension services in the Sahel andthe tendency of many externally financed andmanaged FSR programs to be poorly integratedwith national research efforts have resulted inFSR often falling between research and exten-sion rather than bringing the two together,

Farmers in theory have input into the defini-

services in the Sahel have been ineffective inthis regard because of limited training, support,and supervision. Where extension has beenused and supported, as in several of the cottonprojects, success in bringing farmers and re-searchers together has been much greater (84),The much more challenging task of tapping intoand supporting farmers’ own research, seen bymany as an important facet of research, has yetto be adequately attempted in the Sahel.

How Should Research Tasks Be DividedAmong the Many Research OrganizationsActive in the Sahel?

A multitude of actors are involved in researchand agricultural training in the Sahel, and co-ordination is a problem (40), At least four In-ternational Agricultural Research Centers ofthe international agriculture research systemare working in the Sahel (IITA, ICRISAT, ILCAand WA RDA).2 Regional projects sponsoredunder various auspices (e. g., Organization ofAfrican Unity, CILSS) in topics such as inte-grated pest management, climatology, and foodgrain research and development are also under-way, along with research efforts by individualSahelian States. The French operate a branchof their own research network in the Sahel. Re-search in many donor-sponsored projects isconducted fairly autonomously from Sahelians.Important questions arise: Is the division ofresponsibilities between different levels of re-search and extension clear and is it optimal?How best can these efforts be coordinated?

A wise way to identify priority research needsis to work directly with farmers and herders.In most cases, this occurs through extensionagents. Priorities are passed on to national re-searchers who, if they do not have the facilitiesto respond, in turn pass them on the interna-tional centers, The international centers per-form primary research, the results of which goback to national researchers for field testingand further adaptive research before being

‘IITA is the International Institute for ‘I”ropic; a] Agriculture.

tion of research goals through the extension ICRISAT is the International Crops Research Institi]te for theSemi Arid Tropics. ILCA is the International I,i\resto{; k Centre

service, Extension services should be the link for Africa, WARDA is the West African Rice [le~e]opment Asso-between farmers and research, But extension (; i at ion.

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brought out by the extension agent to thefarmer,

There is general agreement that, apart fromthe extension services, the national level re-search institutions are the weakest link in thechain. Some experts feel that greater in-countryefforts by the international centers and regionalgroups are required at the country level to over-come this weakness. Others argue that resourcesshould be devoted to building the capacities ofthe national institutions themselves because na-tional researchers must be involved in or havethe capabilities to perform basic research in or-der to be effective in adaptive research.

Sahelian and French scientists are generallymore critical than U.S. scientists of the Inter-national Agricultural Research Center modeland argue that investment in the internationalcenters has siphoned resources from nationalinstitutions, They propose networking betweennational programs as an alternative means ofbuilding the “critical mass” of research effortsneeded to achieve significant results. But thecosts of building research capacity at the na-

tional level is high and many countries lack ade-quate management ability. Thus AID has basedits strategy to support African agricultural re-search on building capacity in a limited num-ber of institutions, each serving an ecologicalregion. For the Sahel, AID has selected Sene-gal as the country whose research institutionswould receive aid, assuming that its results willbe adapted for other Sahelian States (122). Eachof these approaches has validity.

The critic, 1 research needs for the Sahel andthe resource constraints that research faces callfor coordination among the various parties asthey work to create models for research. Thereality of each Sahelian State desiring its ownresearch capacity, the long-term desirability ofbuilding local capacity, and the diversity of eco-logical conditions among and within countriesare factors that argue against the practicalityand effectiveness of focusing efforts in just onecountry or bypassing national institutions infavor of efforts by international researchcenters or independent research by donors.

More appropriate technologies and better de-velopment methods are essential if future ef-forts in the Sahel are to be more effective thanthose in the past. But these alone will not besufficient. According to the 1983 AID assess-ment of its Sahel program:

Overshadowing all good intentions were (andare) central government policies and philoso-phies which inhibit individual initiative, aredisincentives to production, misallocate re-sources, improperly train, subsidize, urbanize,discourage trade, overregulate and misdirectdevelopment. . . . The effect was and is an envi-ronment which compromises and makes moredifficult and expensive successful completionof critical primary sector development projects(128).

Most of the policies that reduced the effectsof agricultural development efforts were man-ifestations of the centralized orientation of the

newly independent Sahelian States and the im-plicit urban bias of their government policies.They were built on highly centralized admin-istrative and economic structures that were in-herited at independence and were supportednot only by the more politically vocal segmentsof society but, at least in the 1960s and 1970s,by much of the donor technical assistance theSahel nations received.

Agriculture’s Low Priority

Following the then-popular theories of eco-nomic development, agriculture in the Sahelwas viewed by the new governments (and theirforeign advisors] as a source of support for in-dustrialization and growth. Government mo-nopolies controlled the purchase of exportcrops from farmers at prices often considera-bly below the world market price. The price

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difference was used to provide the State withfinancial surpluses in hard currency. The so-called “stabilization” funds thus generatedwere de facto taxes on the agricultural sectorused to finance government operations in in-dustrialization and infrastructure development,or to subsidize prices for imported cereals con-sumed by the urban population. The propor-tion of government operating and investmentbudgets going into agriculture has been con-sistently below agriculture’s 34,6 percent aver-age share in gross national product (22). Andwithin agriculture, a much higher proportionof support has gone into research, extension,inputs, and marketing for export and importsubstitution crops than to food crops.

African leaders have realized this inadequatepublic investment in agriculture as a major pol-icy failure and have set a target of 20 to 25 per-cent of total public investment by 1989 (91,92).Among donors, agriculture’s priority has alsobeen low despite strategy statements to the con-trary. Between 1975 and 1983, direct donorassistance to rainfed agriculture in the Sahelrepresented only 9.3 percent of the total (onlyhalf of which was for food crops) with an addi-tional 7.6 percent going to irrigated agricultureand 6.9 percent to river basin development. Yet22 percent of donor support went to food aidand balance of payments support. The valueof the food aid provided was more than doublethe support for rainfed food crop production(25) (see table A-5 in app. A).

The use of government or parastatal agen-cies to provide inputs to Sahelian agriculture(e.g., credit, fertilizers, extension advice, andirrigation) has been another area where the realneeds of the poor farmers and herders are givensecond priority to other interests. Parastatals’inefficient management and swollen person-nel rosters have provided farmers and herderswith ineffective support. Parastatals absorblarge portions of the government and donorfunds invested in agriculture. Farmers arecharged for the services of these agenciesthrough lowered commodity prices and directfees, further reducing their returns and thustheir incentive to adopt new methods or to in-crease production, For example, in one irriga-

tion project in Mali, the ratio of governmentworkers to farm families has at times ap-proached one to one. Farmers sometimes payup to 20 percent of their rice harvest (e. g., 400kg of rice per hectare with average yields of2,000 kg per hectare) for services that some ex-perts describe as “nothing.” The remaining riceis sold to the parastatal agency responsible forthe project at a fixed price below the marketlevel,

Cereals Policies

In the often volatile post-independence po-litical climate, the major threat to regimes inpower came from the urban population. Thus,the new governments concentrated servicessuch as schools and health care facilities in ur-ban areas. Low income and high unemploy-ment in urban areas also encouraged govern-ments to keep costs of living low to maintainpolitical stability. This has translated into cheapfood policies for the cities. Though some at-tempts were made to use local cereal produc-tion for this purpose,] throughout the 1960sand 1970s urban food supply was increasinglyassured through subsidized imports, artificiallyhigh exchange rates, preferred customs treat-ment, and controlled prices. The low relativeprice of imports and changing preferences forwheat and rice have shrunk the demand for lo-cally produced cereals,

The importance of improved cereal policiesis clear, but the specifics of what those policiesshould be are less clear, Several nations of theSahel (e.g., Senegal, Mali, Niger, and The Gam-bia) are taking steps to remove subsidies for im-ported cereals and flour, and to increase or doaway with fixed prices for locally producedgrains. In Burkina Faso and Mali, cereal mar-keting boards are being reorganized. Whetherthese measures will ultimately increase demandfor local grains is uncertain. High productionlevels during the 1985 to 1986 season have cre-ated low prices in Sahelian grain markets, and

‘1 n Mali, forced cereal deliveries ~1’cre tried wh ilc clscl~’herethere ~~’crc attempts to fix i)rices and enforce go~wrnment pur-chasin~ monopolies. The latter had ]itt 1(; effect (lLIe to the 1nefii -c ienc it?s of the pu rc has i ng entities and the i n~f!n u it j’ o f f a rmcrsto a~’oid them.

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Sahelian governments do not have the finan-cial resources to maintain high producer prices.Continued urban preferences for rice andwheat and the volatility of the residual marketfor millet and sorghum are likely to limit sig-nificant increases in demand and thus will con-tinue to limit incentives to farmers.

Food Aid and Export Subsidies

Other nations’ policies also contribute tolower demand for Sahelian cereals, The agri-cultural policies of major cereal exporters (espe-cially production and export subsidies) (15) andhigh levels of food aid are factors in loweringdemand for domestic cereal production. In theSahel, food aid has provided as much as 5 per-cent of aggregate cereal grain supply even inhigher rainfall years. In 1985, this rose to 20percent. The extent to which food aid directlycompetes with locally produced grain is de-bated, but indirectly, its long-term presence inlocal food markets reinforces changing tastesfor cereals either not grown (wheat) or ineffi-ciently grown (rice) in the Sahel. Though studieshave tried to determine the impact of food aid,their conclusions are ambiguous and there hasnot been a comprehensive study of food aid ef-fects specifically in the Sahel (63,78,129). Thepotential for harm, however, indicates a needfor careful, Sahel-specific study and particu-larly for care in determining how much foodaid is appropriate and how it should be used.

This problem is difficult to address politically.Commenting on the contradictory effects offood aid on long-term development, the 1983AID evaluation of its Sahel program observesthat:

While most concede that these imports [offood aid] are dangerously distorting to the do-mestic cereals sector and that they help createdependency, their short-term utility frequentlyprevails over desired independence (128).

AID has been slow to systematically addressthe potential disincentive effects of food aid.For example, in belated response to the 1979Bellmen Amendment to Section 401(b) of Pub-lic Law 480, AID has recently provided its fieldmissions with guidelines to assess issues of

price disincentive and availability of storagefor food aid (121).

As with other areas of policy reform, a mul-tinational approach to food aid as is currentlybeing attempted under Club du Sahel auspicesis probably the most promising effort possible(27). Improved monitoring and more effectiveearly warning systems being organized collec-tively by donors and Sahelians are required notonly to determine urgent need when it doesarise but to minimize overreaction and result-ing disincentive effects.

While food emergencies must be determinedon a local basis, they should be responded toin the context of national or regional strategies.In situations of established need, food aidshould be the last recourse. A first step towardmobilizing support of this principle is cautiousdonor responses to “triangular” food aid, wheredonors provide cash to purchase surplus foodin other portions of the same country, region,or elsewhere in Africa (27). This would provideincentives to African farmers and facilitate theestablishment of broader cereal markets in theregion. Though major donors have expressedsome support for this approach in emergencies,they have much less enthusiastically acceptedthe use of “triangular” food aid to cope withongoing structural food shortages.

Encouraging Effective Marketingand Removing Constraints on

Private Initiative

It is necessary to remove marketing con-straints if farmers are to take advantage of in-creased prices. Many Sahelian marketing mo-nopolies for export crops are being dismantledor restructured, Possible improvements in mar-keting systems to increase local economic activ-ity include: transportation (particularly ruralroad systems, removal of restrictions on pri-vate transporters, and improvement of water-based transport where appropriate); market in-formation systems; development of coopera-tives; and storage facilities. Many authoritiesfavor removing subsidies on agricultural inputssuch as fertilizer and agricultural machinery

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because they see these as inefficient and costly.In several Sahelian countries, such subsidieshave been reduced or eliminated but the resulthas been a sharp decline in input use. Otherexperts, pointing out the need to reduce farmerrisk if sustainable, intensified productionchanges are to occur, favor the short-term con-tinuation of selective subsidies (16). They feelthat subsidies on designated inputs will resultin more specific and quicker responses thanless focused increases in producer prices.

Various other constraints to private initiativecould also be removed. Reduced governmentcontrols on cereal marketing could be extrap-olated to a broad range of potential private sec-tor activities affecting agriculture and ruraldevelopment--e.g., agricultural input distribu-t ion, credit, transportation, and local process-ing (1 25]. The spontaneous success of privatemillet grinding operations illustrates the poten-tial of the small-scale private sector when con-trols are absent. The extent to which such activ-ities should be “liberalized” or “privatized” andthe current capabilities of the private sector totake them over are subject to considerable de-bate. Yet general agreement exists on the ben-efits to be gained from lessening restrictionson independent economic operators, be theyindividuals, formal cooperatives, or less formalproducer groups.

Land Tenure and Regulation ofAccess to Natural Resources

Reforms in land tenure and other legal andinformal systems determining access to andcontrol of natural resources are policy ques-tions needing better analysis. A major con-straint to effective analysis of the impact of landtenure and resource access is the lack of knowl-edge of the traditional rules and customs thatare often more influential in determining usepatterns than formal laws. Evidence of rapidchanges and of disruption in what may havebeen the environmental balance in these tradi-tional systems as the result of drought, thegrowth of the market economy, the introduc-tion of new public domain laws, and increasedpopulation pressures underline the urgency ofthese aspects of policy. Programs to encourage

farmers and herders to invest in upgrading thefertility of their land, to plant trees, or to begincommunity controlled fuelwood plantations ornatural brush regeneration projects are influ-enced by these questions of future access andownership. Equitable methods for determiningrights to land in irrigation projects, and for com-pensating those who lose access to land dueto the construction of irrigation systems, areparticularly crucial as river basin developmentplans proceed. These are complex problemsboth technically and politically. They will re-quire different answers for different land uses,and land reform programs should be designedcarefully so they do not create new inequities.

Fiscal and Institutional Reform andRecurrent Costs

Sahelian governments’ support for the agri-cultural and rural development sectors has beenundermined by fiscal crises and institutionalweaknesses. Overstaffed civil services, ineffec-tive management, corruption, outdated reve-nue laws, and inefficient tax collection systemshave combined with general economic declineto increase government deficits from 1.4 to 12.6percent of Gross Domestic Product in 1975 tobetween 9.6 and 22.0 percent in 1984 (22). Tech-nical assistance to help Sahel governments im-prove their revenue systems and encouragethem to tackle the sensitive task of reducinggovernment staff are essential parts of futuredonor assistance.

Donor attention to the question of recurrentcosts, a further important contribution of theClub/CILSS process, has highlighted the nega-tive impacts of donor assistance on Sahelianfiscal health and has increased sensitivity tothe still controversial subject of how much aidcan be successfully absorbed by a country, theso-called “absorptive capacity” for aid (4). Sincerecurrent costs are one important factor affect-ing absorptive capacity, most donors have re-sponded by agreeing to fund some recurrentcosts (125). However, some experts caution thatsuch a practice creates a “delusional systemthat can never be financed by domestic re-sources” (45). Recurrent costs should be

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financed only if the Sahelian institutions real-istically can be expected to take them over inthe long term.

Limitations of Policy Reform

Policy reform in the Sahel is a necessary butstill insufficiently understood precondition nec-essary to carry out the strategies envisioned un-der the Club/CILSS framework. While the needfor an economy less encumbercd by govern-ment regulation and monopolies and the needto increase incentives to farmers are generallyaccepted by most Sahel specialists, the detailsof what exactly should replace current policiesand how those incentives should be structuredis controversial. To be effective, they must bebased on careful analysis of data rather thanabstract theories or ideology. Microeconomicdata and analysis o f Sahelian production sys-tems and of the linkages between macrolevelpolicies and microlevel responses are inade-quate. Within countries, the impacts of particu-lar policy changes are likely to be different o n

different groups (6,45). The diversity of econ-omies across the Sahel means that reform pro-grams will hate to be care fully tailored to eachindividual situation. Group interests, oftenpowerful ones, arc at stake and the politicalrisks are considerable. The extent to which theprivate sector can be expected to take over

many of the functions currently being per-formed by governments and parastatals mustbe realistically assessed. Where appropriate,private sector development and support activ-ities may be necessary to ensure that such rolesare fulfilled effectively,

The lack of more active African participationin the process of policy reform analysis is amissed opportunity to share perspectives on theneed for specific reforms and is a constraintto those reforms being ultimately adopted. Re-forms determined by external donors andforced on Sahelian governments lead to mini-mal commitment, yet strong commitment is es-sential to sustain the reform process in the faceof inevitable political resistance,

Policy reform strategies are not panaceas,They are necessary but not sufficient conditionsfor the type of future envisioned for the Sahelunder the Club/CILSS framework. Policy re-forms must be carefully integrated with broadstrategies. Within broad policy directions, thereare many choices to be made that will deter-mine the ultimate impact. I t makes little senseto develop strategies for agricultural dc\elop-ment calling for significanthelian research and extensionprograms are to be gutted byor policy reform,

increases in Sa-programs if thosebudget cutbacks

BEYOND THE LESSONS: CRITICAL ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

While reflection on the lessons learned fromthe past decades has helped create consensuson what issues and broad directions for the fu-ture are most important, there is much lessagreement on the relative importance to begiven each component, on how the parts re-late to each other, and on how those generaldirections should be translated into specific ac-tions. The early stages of the Club/CILSS ef-fort often gave precedence to the mobilizationof resources over the setting of priorities,

Almost a decade into the “contract for a gen-e r a t i o n , the issues have become clearer. The

reality that resources are limited—environ-mental, technological, managerial!, and espe-cially financial-means that important choiceswill have to be made. The choices made todaywill have implications reaching far into the fu-ture. Selecting one option may effectively elim-inate others. Proposals for massive river basindevelopment along the Senegal and GambiaRivers, for instance, involve major environ-mental and economic choices that could wellforeclose the possibility of returning to previ-ous production systems. The remainder of thischapter will be devoted to highlighting a fewof these outstanding critical issues,

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The Balance Between Irrigation andRainfed Agriculture

The priority to be given to the developmentof irrigation is perhaps the most crucial issueto be resolved as the Club/CILSS program entersits second decade, Though providing far lessthan requested by Sahelians, donors nonethe-less have invested nearly $1.8 billion in irriga-tion and river basin development since 1975(25). But donors must now consider what por-tion of future investment is appropriate for ir-rigation and how irrigation investment shouldbe allocated between different irrigation ap-proaches.

The catastrophic drought from 1968 to 1973sparked calls to develop the Sahel’s consider-able irrigation potential to “drought proof” theregion. Although estimates vary, the irrigationpotential of the Sahel is considered to be as highas 2.3 million hectares. Only 75,000 hectareswere under controlled irrigation in 1977 (30).With such potential for expansion, Saheliansand many donors felt that increased irrigationwas vital to attain food security and possiblycreate surpluses for export.

Experience with irrigation over the past dec-ade, and particularly with large-scale schemes,has been disappointing (30,125). Costs for bring-ing new land under irrigation have been high(as much as $10,000 per hectare) even withoutcounting the costs of the major engineeringworks that would be required for future expan-sion. Operating costs have been higher than an-ticipated, in large part because of inefficientmanagement by parastatal agencies. Produc-tivity of irrigated areas has been highly varia-ble but generally is lower than expected, Watermanagement has been poor, engineering de-signs sometimes faulty, and maintenance oftennonexistent. One study found that for every hec-tare of new land going into irrigation almostas much land was being withdrawn, mostly dueto improper management (30), Original cost-benefit calculations assumed two crops peryear, but this has proven difficult to attain. Ex-pansion of irrigation also has created substan-tial socioeconomic disruption (e.g., concentra-tion of land rights, loss of access to land for

women, loss of water and pasture access forherders, the loss of traditional flood recessionfarming, and the problems associated with largeresettlement schemes) and has given rise tofears of probable negative environmental im-pacts (e. g., increased water-borne disease; pos-sible destruction of fish, wildlife, and plant com-munities; salinization and waterlogging of soils)(76).

Given the potentially mushrooming costs andlow productivity of irrigation efforts so far,some critics suggest that the considerable re-sources going into irrigation might be betterused to address the constraints of dryland agri-culture. Irrigated cereals production receivedalmost three times more donor assistance thanrainfed cereals production from 1975 to 1983,even though 95 percent of cereal productioncomes from dryland farming or traditional ir-rigation systems (25). Critics point out that,given the nature of the Sahel’s major watersheds,even irrigation will be subject to the effects ofdrought. However, proponents of higher irri-gation investment, including most Saheliangovernments, still see irrigation as a key ele-ment in food security (22). They counter thatthe limited potential for significant technologi-cal advance in dryland agriculture and the ever-present factor of recurrent drought make irri-gation the only solution for avoiding continualdependence and cyclical tragedy. They feel thatthe technological basis for improved perform-ance of irrigation already exists and that theless formidable tasks of improving managementof irrigation systems and reducing social andenvironmental costs can be addressed. Irriga-tion, they point out, is a slowly maturing in-vestment. The poor performances of the pastindicate the need for patience and more deter-mination if Club/CILSS goals are to be met.

The management issues, particularly inchoices between different approaches to irri-gation, are key elements in the debate over whatpriority should be given to irrigation. Small-scale irrigation schemes are receiving growingattention as a means of overcoming the limita-tions of large-scale approaches (83,116), Al-though still modest in their productivity, small-scale approaches using simple pumps and even

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manual water lifting devices are seen by manyas cost-effective because the overhead costs ofmassive engineering works are avoided andmanagement problems are reduced. Otherspoint out, however, that the movement towardsmall-scale approaches does not in itself solveall the problems of larger schemes and in factmay have problems of its own. Engineeringproblems exist in scaling down known irriga-tion technologies while the problems of coordi-nating water use for a multitude of small usersare complex. While most agree that large irri-gation schemes have been unsuccessful, manyfeel that the problem is less one of project scalethan management scale. Poorly managed small-scale irrigation projects also have failed.

Over the past decade, many Sahelian farmersadopted a wide variety of simple irrigation sys-tems using wells, recessional and flood plainflooding, and permanent and seasonal swamps,But these traditional African forms of irriga-tion have been largely ignored by Westerndonors. For instance, little effort has gone intoimproving the 250,000 hectares currently un-der recessional and swamp irrigation (60). Also,the Sahel’s considerable yet still insufficientlyexplored groundwater resources remain largelyuntapped.

The answers to questions regarding irriga-tion’s priority in overall Sahel strategies can-not at this point be resolved. Experience overthe past decade has raised sufficient doubtsabout the economic, social, and environmentalviability of proposed large-scale irrigation andriver basin development approaches to indicatethe need for considerable caution before pro-ceeding. The comparable costs and probablebenefits of alternative irrigation approachesand investment in dryland agriculture areequally uncertain. The promising potential ofsmaller scale systems requires focused inves-tigation to provide policy makers with muchclearer information.

Food Production and Export Crops

Similar sets of issues and choices surroundthe development of rain fed agriculture. Of par-ticular importance is the optimal balance be-

tween investment in cereal crops and in exportor import-substitution crops. Experts agree thatboth colonial and immediate post-independenceagricultural strategies were biased in favor ofexport crop production—a bias that most Sa-hel observers agree has inhibited progress inexpanding traditional cereal production. Cer-tainly redressing the imbalance between foodand export crops is important, but few expertssee it as a simple question of switching totallyfrom one to the other. What should be the op-timal mix?

Many authorities argue that a strong role forexport crops in agricultural strategies is stilljustified. Following economic principles ofcomparative advantage, they theorize that Sa-helian countries could have access to more foodby developing export crops or other products’in which the Sahel is relatively more produc-tive and then using export receipts to purchasethe food needs that are unfilled by local pro-duction. They point out that the largest andfastest growing portion of the “food gap” is ac-tually rising demand for wheat and rice andthese are grown in small quantities and rela-tively inefficiently in the Sahel. Expansion ofirrigated rice production is particularly’ uneco-nomical given the high costs of production rela-tive to rice’s price on the world market,

The fact that agriculturally based exports ac-count for 14 to 83 percent of total foreign ex-change earnings in various countries in the Sa-hel and that food imports are an important partof total imports means that increased exportproduction in the Sahel can help meet foodsecurity and also increase total foreign ex-change earnings (see table 5-1).

The current debt crisis has turned increasedforeign exchange earnings (and the reductionof foreign exchange costs) into a vital part of’strategies for short- to medium-term financialsurvival. Increasing foreign exchange earningsis also required for successful implementationof strategies to improve food production. Im-portant inputs to intensify agricultural produc-tion (fuel, fertilizer, equipment, and irrigation

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Peanut production shaped the history of the Sahel and remains a major source of exports. Debate regarding the relativebalance between food and export crop production focuses on crops such as peanuts.

Table 5-1 .—Agricultural Exports and Importsas a Percent of Total, 1983

Agricultural exports Agricultural importsas a percent of as a percent of

total exports total imports

Burkina Faso . 830/o 19 ”/0Cape Verde . . . 19 29Chad . . . . . . . . 63 10The Gambia . . 54 31Mali . . . . . . . . . 77 25Mauritania . . . . 14 42Niger . . . . . . . . 21 12Senegal . . . . . . 29 27

SOURCE Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985 Country Tables Basic Dataon the Agricultural Sector (Rome” 1985)

infrastructure, etc. ) presently have to be im-ported. Balancing its call for greater emphasison food production, the World Bank’s influen-tial work, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, encouraged African States tointensify efforts to diversify and increase agri-cultural production for export (153).

However, strategies with high export cropcomponents should be approached with somecaution because of the deterioration in the in-ternational market for the principal Sahelianagricultural exports. For example, peanut

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prices have been low generally and during thelast cropping season the world price for cot-ton dropped drastically. The potential is limitedfor major diversification into other more profit-able or more reliable export production. Whileno one argues for complete self-sufficiency,critics of the World Bank prescription arguethat export-biased strategies result in continuedhigh dependence on forces beyond the controlof each count r}’ and therefore high risk (12).The use of straight cost/benefit analysis to de-termine rates of return does not sufficient y ac-count for the ‘‘dependency’ factor. While it istrue that world cereal supplies, at least for themedium-term, appear to be sufficient to fill thegap between Sahelian food production and con-sumption and that food aid is likely to remainavailable, Sahelians believe that too great a reli-ance on external sources for food reduces theirindependence and increases vulnerability. Thehigh priority they give to irrigation is largelya product of that perspective. The assertion thatdemand for millet and sorghum is largely re-sidual due to growing preference for wheat andrice can also be challenged. Improved meth-ods for processing and storing millet and sor-ghum, and an end to subsidized prices forwheat and rice, could increase demand for lo-cal commodities.

The issue of optimizing investment strategiesbetween food crops and exports is further com-plicated by the fact that in reality the two pro-duction systems are often highly linked. Pea-nuts are both an export and food crop. In mostcases, cereal and export crops are grown bythe same households and thus are integratedinto single management systems. Intercroppingof export and food crops is often practiced. Pro-grams to develop one affect the other. In south-ern Mali, for example, the after-effects of fer-tilizer use on cotton has significantly raised theyields of the cereal crops grown in rotation withcotton. Throughout the Sahel, farmers involvedin successful intensification programs on ex-port crops appear to use better agronomic prac-

tices and have better yields on food crops thanthose who do not take part in those programs(20). Investment choices between food and ex-port crops must therefore be based on a muchmore thorough understanding of householdproduction systems as well as more explicitagreement on overall goals.

Strategies for the Livestock Sector

Efforts to improve the productivity of Sa-helian livestock systems over the past decadehave been largely unsuccessful (46,58,67,130).As a result, major donors such as the UnitedStates and the World Bank are evaluating thoseexperiences. The United States has concludedthat there is little that can be done to improveexisting pastoral systems (125). Even though itis a priority to Sahelians, AID is limiting newprogramming in the livestock sector.

How much investment in the livestock sec-tor is justified? The lack of success in past live-stock programs and an emerging recognitionof higher land-use efficiency in traditionaltranshumant systems (8) have led many expertsto agree with Club du Sahel officials in theirstatement that: “it is perhaps unreasonable tolook for greatly increased production from Sa-helian herders” (37). They point to how littleis known about current systems, particularlypastoral systems, and their complex social andcultural underpinnings.

But what really is the problem: a lack ofknowledge or a lack of application of the knowl-edge that is already there? In most donor re-search strategies, livestock have been given lowpriority (58), Yet livestock is the source of liveli-hood for up to one-fifth of the Sahel i an people,and it contributes 22 percent of Gross Domes-tic Product (125). Thus the livestock sector can-not be ignored,

Developing livestock strategies can be com-plex because of the diversity of livestock sys-tems in the Sahel. The problems and opportu-ni t ies for l ivestock development among

59-965 0 - 86 - 4

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extensive pastoral systems are very differentfrom those of sedentary animal husbandry sys-tems further south. Development of strategiesfor the former is hampered by a lack of agree-ment on the relationship between pastoral live-stock production and environmental degrada-tion, While experts agree on the importance ofoptimizing range management as part of envi-ronmental strategies, there is considerable dis-agreement on the extent of current degradation,its causes, and preferable solutions. Most be-lieve that total herd size is increasing above thepresent capability of remaining natural pastureto sustain them. Their solutions tend to focuson programs to decrease herd size in the Sahelzone by increasing off-take rates, by encourag-ing migration to the south, and by integratinglivestock into crop production systems (130).They also seek to improve the management ofgrasslands and water resources through a widerange of activities (e.g., improved forage crops,water management on pasture land, reseedingusing natural systems, fencing) but these lat-ter projects have largely failed.

Some authorities focus on traditional graz-ing rights as a “tragedy of the commons” argu-ment where free access to communal land en-courages abuse by the individual herder (97).These claims are countered by those who ar-gue that traditional systems of water and graz-

Photo credit: World Bank

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Livestock, such as goats, sheep, and cattle, are an important feature of Sahelian agriculture but many questions remainregarding effective assistance to herders.

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ing rights did in fact control access but the prob-lem is now the disruptions to those systemscaused by the spread of cultivation, politicalinterference, and the establishment of semiper-manent public-access watering points (67), Al-though a return to previous management sys-tems is unrealistic, decentralized systemswhere herders control rangeland and water areseen as the best alternatives (69). Others see im-proved animal health and marketing possibil-ities as the best means to increase the produc-tivity and reduce the negative environmentalimpacts of livestock.

The current confusion over what should bedone in the pastoral subsector has convincedmany that the greatest potential lies with en-couragement of increased mixed farming sys-tems in higher rainfall areas (27,50). Sociocul-tural factors and animal health and nutritionconstraints are key obstacles to expanded andmore productive mixed farming. Animal nu-trition is particularly problematic given the re-duced grazing areas and lower nutritional valueof grasses in the higher rainfall areas. Thesezones are where tsetse fly and other animalhealth problems are also greatest. Success inprojects encouraging mixed farming activitieshas so far been limited, but increased numbersof cattle are being purchased by farmers. Giventhe potential benefits to both livestock and cropproduction (improved forage, animal power,improved soil fertility, etc. ) under the more in-tensified management systems, proponents feelthat such strategies should be the principal fo-cus for future livestock programs.

Other important questions regarding overalllivestock sector strategies remain largely un-answered. How much emphasis should beplaced on small ruminants versus cattle? Howmuch on meat production versus milk produc-tion? These options have implications not onlyon total production and productivity of the live-stock sector but also on who will benefit most,How should livestock development be in-tegrated into a broader strategy of resourcemanagement? Several experts feel that govern-ments and donors should reserve the northernsections of the Sahel for extensive pastoral sys-tems (148) while concentrating crop intensify-ing production activities further south.

The importance of Sahelian livestock systemsis undeniable. But the donor programs have sofar failed to give it much priority or sufficientresources. A more concerted emphasis on live-stock, on the development of specific strategiesfor the diversity of systems under which ani-mals are produced, and the integration of thosestrategies into overall food security strategieswould appear essential in the pursuit of Club/CILSS objectives.

Population Programs:The 50 Million People Question

A further critical issue to be addressed in theSahel is that of population. The demographicrealities are sobering. If current rates of in-crease continue, by the year 2000 the Sahel willhave 50 million inhabitants, nearly double whatit had in 1973. Growth of this magnitude chal-lenges food production tremendously. In Sene-gal, for example, it is estimated that develop-ment of the nation’s entire irrigation potentialover the next two decades would do little morethan keep up with the food needs that resultfrom national population growth.

Are the high population growth rates a causeof hunger in the Sahel? Although few expertssee population growth as a primary cause ofthe African crisis, high population growth ratesdo put great pressure on Sahelian countries toexpand food production, employment, and in-come (61). In some areas high growth rates haveled to reductions in fallow periods, and in-creased the cutting of trees and brush for fuel-wood, thus contributing to environmental deg-radation. Growing populations also strain thecapacity of governments to provide health, edu-cation, and other services. In times of drought,large populations are particularly at risk.

But to a great extent, population growth ratesare an outcome and not a cause of the Sahel’ssocial and economic realities, They are theproducts of low productivity and poverty. Al-though reduced over the past two decades, childmortality rates in the Sahel remain among thehighest in the world. Children provide a high

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proportion of agricultural labor. The impor-tance of labor as a constraint in many agricul-tural production systems and the obligationsof children to care for their parents in old agecombine to reinforce high fertility patterns. Insome urban settings, traditional customs andvalues that had acted to restrain fertility ratesare breaking down as societies face rapid so-cial transformation. High fertility rates are asso-ciated with high infant and maternal mortal-ity. They also affect women’s well-being andproductivity.

Many of the population-related problems inthe Sahel are largely problems of high rates ofurban population growth—not enough jobs, notenough services, and the growing demand forimported foods. In the medium and long term,however, unless population growth slows oragricultural technologies advance sufficiently,the capability of rural agriculture to feed thepeople of the Sahel will be exceeded on a muchwider scale than today.

Attempts to address the population issue faceseveral constraints. Disagreements exist be-tween the perspectives of donors and Sahelianofficials on the nature of the population issue.Many Sahelians believe that the importance oflabor in Sahelian agricultural systems makeshigh population growth essential to increasedproduction, i.e., each new child might repre-sent a new mouth to feed but he or she alsorepresents two hands to work. They feel thatthe best way to lower population growth ratesis to attack poverty. There is evidence, how-ever, that these attitudes are slowly changing.Several Sahelian countries were among thosewho adopted the Kilimanjaro Program of Ac-tion on Population in 1984 which called for en-suring the availability of family planning serv-ices to all. Both the Lagos Plan of Action anda recent CILSS/CEA report highlight the con-straints of high population growth rates. In TheGambia and Mali, family planning activitieshave been implemented in urban areas, thoughwith modest results (22), and Burkina Faso isin the process of considering a major popula-tion initiative (105).

Still, the Sahel has a long way to go. Moderncontraceptive methods are practiced by less

than 1 percent of the population (147). The lackof success so far is largely due to a poor under-standing of socioeconomic, cultural, and reli-gious dimensions of the issue. Data on fertilitypatterns and on reasons for fertility decisionsnecessary for program development are se-verely lacking. Education for both men andwomen is a likely starting point (142). But reach-ing agreement on what the specific role andpriority of population programs should be inoverall strategies will require a concerted ef-fort of both Sahelians and donors,

Production and Equity

Many of the critical issues to be addressedin the Sahel relate to a debate in developmenttheory which contrasts strategies for increasedproduction with those for increased equity. Inthe 1970s, dissatisfaction with the “trickledown” approach to development, wheregrowth generated by leading industrial sectorswas assumed to eventually increase generalwelfare, resulted in calls for more poverty-centered approaches, The desire for a new fo-cus led to alternatives that called not only forgrowth but growth with equity. Embodied inthe “New Direction” legislation for U.S. for-eign assistance and in the World Bank’s es-pousal of the “basic human needs” approach,the focus was on the poorest and least advan-taged. Not only was it suggested that equity ob-jectives were not inconsistent with growth butthat indeed, a focus on equity might even bean optimal strategy for accelerating growth.Many of the strategic issues currently facingthe Sahel come down to choices between op-tions that are related to the debate betweengrowth of production versus reductions in pov-erty. Should Sahel strategies focus on geo-graphic areas or groups with the greatest po-tential for higher production? Or should theyinstead be directed toward the poorest and mostvulnerable? And to what extent are the two ap-proaches mutually compatible?

Geographic Area

What geographic strategy is best—drawinga defensive “Maginot Line” against desertifi-cation in the Sahel or abandoning the most se-

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verely affected sections of most Sahelian Statesand focusing on the better rain fed areas (105).The former strategy would focus resources onenvironmental protect ion and restoration tohalt desertification and work to develop agri-cultural and livestock technologies for the lowrainfall zones, Some experts feel that peoplein more severely affected areas may be morereceptive to innovation because of the urgencyof their situation (7).

Others, however, are skeptical. Not only arethe technical and logistical challenges in thenorthern regions likely to be costly and com-plex, but the pace of environmental change isfast and technologies are not productive enoughfor farmers to outpace declining productivity(74). The costs of concentrating efforts in thebetter-watered southern parts of Sahel i an coun-tries are considerably lower and the potentialfor short to medium increases in productionare greater.

But what about the large numbers of peoplein the north? To benefit from new technology,can they or will they move to the south? Forthose who will not or cannot resettle, what willbe their fate? Irrigation offers some potentialbecause many of the better irrigation possibil-ities are in the north, But there is an equity-related aspect of the irrigation versus rainfedagriculture argument. Even if the maximumarea of land were brought under irrigation, itcould accommodate only a portion of the totalrural population. How will the food securityof the rest be covered in years of poor rainfall?And what of equity? Ratios of investment toproduction over the past decade have been 60times higher for irrigation than for rainfed agri-culture (25). Is such a disparity justified?

Should Assistance Be Aimed at RuralSubgroups?

If so, which ones? The past decade has shownthe existence of a higher level of socioeconomicdifferentiation in the Sahel than had been as-sumed. Some people feel that the successfultechnologies of the past decade have benefitedthe better-off groups while having little or pos-sibly negative effects on the poorest segmentsof rural society, The absolute poverty of most

farmers and herders has meant that even low-cost techniques have been within the means ofonly a small minority. If the poorest are to be“targeted” it will require a further scaling-downof technology and, in some cases, programs de-signed specifically for particularly disadvan-taged groups.

But does targeting the poorest work? Manyexperts say no, that the potential for increas-ing yields among the poorest farmers is verysmall. Low cost, improved technologies are notavailable nor likely to be developed. The poorestfarmers are already too vulnerable and shouldnot be asked to increase their risk through in-novation. Thus some experts believe that smallfarmer strategies should continue to be gearedtoward the middle range of farmers who, stillpoor by most standards, are the only ones whohave the means and the security to innovate.Encouraging these farmers, while allowingpoorer farmers to continue with existing tech-nologies, would increase total production andalso bring indirect benefits to poorer farmers,such as part time employment on the farms ofthe innovators (84). Special attention to thepoorest or any other group is unlikely to resultin increased production if it is not based ona careful assessment of their ability and poten-tial to use effectively the increased resources.Many experts feel that targeting does not workbecause the more powerful are able to win backthe advantage through other means.

In the case of women, however, the experi-ence of targeting has been at least partially suc-cessful. Studying eight large agricultural devel-opment projects in the Sahel, Kathleen Cloud(23) has concluded that:

A

Both equity and efficiency are served by proj-ects that take explicit account of men’s andwomen’s roles in agricultural systems and de-sign realistic ways of providing them with pro-ductivity increasing resources.

broader study of aid programs for the WorldBank comes to the same conclusion (17).

To be more effective, targeting can be in-direct, Choices in research for crops that areproduced and consumed by the poor offer op-portunities to focus resources on poverty-

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millet and sorghum as opposed to cotton, goatsand sheep as opposed to cattle, and milk pro-duction as opposed to meat production. A fo-cus on food processing technologies wouldhave a potentially large impact on women, Inpolicy reform, too, choices made in the specificsof price decontrols, in the scale of private sec-tor enterprise to be supported, in land tenurelaws, grazing rights, and fuelwood taxes havedifferential impacts on different socioeconomicgroups and these can be used to reinforce anequity or antipoverty strategy. Better data andimproved methods for social cost/benefit anal-ysis of specific policy reforms—which groupsgain and lose—could help ensure that policyreform inthe poor.

fact does have positive impacts on

Issues and Priorities

Many issues remain to be addressed as de-velopment strategies change to reflect the les-sons of the past decade, Each issue is associ-ated with a broad range of opinion, Many ofthese differences of opinion occur because welack adequate knowledge about the Sahel andabout the development process.

But for many of the issues, the different opin-ions on how to proceed reflect differences inobjectives. On the Club/CILSS goal of “food self-su f f i c i ency , surface agreement betweendonors and the CILSS states masks subtle butsignificant differences. Those differences in

turn lead to divergent responses to such basicissues as the relative priority given food versusexport crops or irrigation development versusrainfed agriculture. Similar confusion has re-sulted because different donors set different ob-jectives to meet major goals, At what level isthe objective of “food security” to be applied?Is food security primarily an issue for the grow-ing urban population or is it interpreted to re-fer to all Sahelians, including rural people inyears of drought. How are growth and equityto be balanced?

Whether all those involved agree or not,choices will be made. Who will make thesechoices? On what basis and in what institu-tional context will they be made? Will theunique regional cooperation among Saheliansand the international dialog between donorsand Sahelians be a major factor in shapingthem? The progress made so far in clarifyingthe issues of what needs to be done is remarka-ble. But the process of addressing the remain-ing issues will set the stage for future successor failure and will determine the shape of theSahel of tomorrow.

Sahel experts are frank about the mistakesof the past and insistent on the need to learnfrom those mistakes. Adjustments in strategyare already taking place. But they must also ad-dress a host of questions and issues that so farhave been left unanswered.

Chapter 6

Applying the Lessons: The Agency

Chapter 6

Applying the Lessons: The Agencyfor International Development

IN BRIEF . . .

The experiences of the past 10 years have taught important lessons about how technol-ogies are combined and applied in development programs and projects. Four problems standout: the lack of effective participation by the intended recipients of the assistance; the inade-quacy of a short-term, product-oriented approach; the complexity of project design; and theinappropriateness of much of the research conducted to support development efforts. Al-though more appropriate technologies and better development methods are essential if fu-ture efforts in the Sahel are to be more effective than those of the past, it is equally importantto ensure that the policy environment is supportive. Low priority for agriculture, inappropri-ate cereals policy, constraints on the private sector, and the need for fiscal reform have allhindered development. Appropriate policy reform alone is not sufficient to obtain food secu-rity for the people of the Sahel, but it is a necessary part of the process.

The challenge for future development efforts in the Sahel is to move to new modes ofassistance that are more consistent with the nature of the Sahel and the long-range goalsof food security, environmental stabilization, and economic growth. The United States cancontinue to play a key role in this multinational development effort if it can incorporate thepast decade’s experiences into a more effective strategy. Chapter 6 examines how AID hasresponded to the lessons learned in the past decade in the Sahel. Highlights of the chapterinclude:

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The most recent revision of AID’s Sahel development strategy (1984) shares many basicClub/CILSS goals and it has incorporated many of the lessons learned in the past dec-ade. It places priority on agricultural research and production, policy reform, healthand family planning, training, infrastructure, and environmental protection. It alsocalls for continued coordination of all donor and Sahelian programs.AID has not seriously addressed the issues of effective farmer and herder participa-tion or given adequate attention to the importance of women in Sahelian agriculturalsystems. To date, the gap between rhetoric and reality is substantial.AID’s effectiveness in applying the lessons of the past decade faces constraints in fourareas: 1) the ambiguity of AID’s regional Sahel strategy, 2) internal institutional char-acteristics of AID, 3) the nature of AID’s relationship to Congress, and 4) the lack ofagreement about the role of development assistance in overall U.S. foreign policy.These problems are not unique to the Sahel—they diminish the effectiveness of manyAID activities—but they are particularly acute in the Sahel because of the level andspecial multinational characteristics of the U.S. commitment there.

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INCORPORATING THE LESSONS

Evolving Strategies

The United States was a major actor in de-veloping the multinational Club/CILSS frame-work and has continued to play an active rolein the evolution of its strategies. The Agencyfor International Development’s (AID) SahelDevelopment Program objectives and strategieshave largely paralleled those of the Club/CILSS.A 1976 AID proposal to Congress outlined abroad, phased approach to obtaining increasedfood security and building a foundation forlong-term growth in the Sahel. AID concluded:

While the return of normal rains in 1974helped overcome the immediate emergency, itwas clear that this region could not return toits traditional system and hope to survive. Foodproduction had to be modernized, Traditionallivestock systems, which existed on otherwiseunprofitable lands, had to be modified to per-mit greater conservation of the rangelands. In-deed, whole new farming systems need to beintroduced so that farmers could afford to ben-efit from more of the advantages of modern-ization. Only in this way could the area becomecapable of meeting its own basic needs for foodand development (133).

Under the proposed program, the short-termphase of the strategy, 1976 to 1980, was to in-clude immediate application of existing tech-nologies in crop production, protection, andstorage; use of information from small-scale ef-forts in larger integrated rural development,dryland farming, regional range management,and livestock production projects; infrastruc-ture studies; health care and training programs;studies to prepare longer term, river basin de-velopment projects; and training and institu-tion-building. The medium-term phase, 1980 to1990, was to focus on expanding the produc-tive capacity of dryland farmers, adding newtechnologies, expanding commercial activity,and continuing preparation for the long-termprojects, The final phase, 1990 and onward,would tap the larger resources of the region,particularly the river basins, in a move towardfood self-sufficiency and self-sustaining eco-nomic growth.

To support this strategy, AID developed abroad, multisector project portfolio in each ofthe Sahelian countries and was actively involvedin the development of the Club and regionalinstitutions such as CILSS and the Senegal,Gambia, and Niger River Basin developmentorganizations. Projects in agricultural researchand extension, crop protection, livestock andrange management, integrated rural develop-ment, forestry, health, small-scale irrigation,and river basin development predominated.Training, much of it at U.S. universities, wasa major component of many projects.

The experiences and lessons AID learned inthe Sahel in implementing that program aresimilar to those of the larger Club/CILSS ex-perience. 1 Through experience, AID learnedthat much of its short- and medium-term strat-egy was based on inaccurate technical and in-stitutional assumptions, The “extension” focusof most projects failed for want of appropriatetechnologies or of effective systems to deliverthem to farmers and herders. AID came to rec-ognize the shortcomings of complex designthrough experiences in integrated rural devel-opment projects in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger,and Senegal. Though many experts still believeits response was inadequate, AID has been aleader in emphasizing the long-term danger ofthe environmental problems in the Sahel andwas active in reforestation and conservation,This taught many lessons about the difficultyand high cost of large-scale approaches andspurred the increased use of pilot communityforestry and agro-forestry alternatives, AID alsowas active in highlighting the issues of recur-rent costs and cereal policies. Although AIDhas remained active in the Club/CILSS proc-ess, its original enthusiasm and active support,particularly for CILSS, has moderated follow-ing that organization’s less-than-hoped-for rec-ord, AID instead has shifted its attention tobilateral approaches.

‘See the executive summary of AID’s 1983 SDP evaluation(app. F).

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The specific impact of AID’s Sahel Develop-ment Program (SDP) is difficult to separate fromthe overall multidonor effort. Although AID’sparticipation in the Club/CILSS framework wasinfluential, AID programs represent less than10 percent of all donor assistance to the Sa-hel.’ AID’s record in individual country pro-grams and projects is similar to that of the en-tire donor community. Overall, AID projectsoften have fallen short of their objectives butthey have not done significantly better or worsethan others. There have been some accomplish-ments, but AID has shared in a general failurein livestock and rangeland management, dry-land farming, and integrated rural develop-ment. It has been most successful in aspectsof training, socioeconomic data collection, re-forestation, rural health, and though the finalimpacts are yet to be seen, in recent agricul-tural research and policy reform efforts. Likeits partners in the Sahel effort, many of AID’sgreatest accomplishments have been the lessonsit has learned about the nature of the develop-ment challenge and about identifying the issuesthat donors and recipients in the Sahel mustaddress for the future.

AID’s Revised Sahel Strategy

In 1984, AID modified its Sahel strategy torespond to a series of internal and externalevaluations. The “Fiscal Year 1986 Country De-velopment Strategy Statement”3 for the Sahelexplicitly attempts to incorporate the lessonsof the past decade’s experiences (125). Consist-ent with other major donor thinking, the strat-egy speaks of food “self -reliance’ ’-the goal ofmeeting food needs through a combination ofproduction and trade, rather than food “self-sufficiency” as had earlier been the goal for themultinational effort. The revised strategy state-ment embodies several additional modifi-cations: 4

“I’he LJnited States has, howmer, contributed 26 percent ofall food aid and 16 percent of total donor effort in dryland agri-culture. (See table A-4 in app. A.)

‘Th]s document is actual]} a regional de~wlopment strategjsta tern ent hut the c o~’er t i tl e o f the document was i ncorrec tl~’prlntcd as the Sahel “Countrj” I)e\elopment Strateg}’ Statement.

The executive summarj of the 1$)84 strategy 1s contained ina [)1). E

an increased role for economic stabiliza-tion and policy reform using policy dialog,Economic Support Funds, or Public Law-480 resources;a continued emphasis on increased foodproduction as the primary goal but new ef-fort to ensure that other activities (such ashealth, education, and forestry) are consist-ent with and complement strategies to in-crease food availability;an increased priority for research (espe-cially in agriculture, forestry, livestock,water management, and the environment)in recognition of the inadequacies of ex-isting technologies;a decrease in livestock programs for pas-toral production systems;a cautious but systematic approach to irri-gation development focusing on small-scale systems and rehabilitation of exist-ing systems;an increased importance given to the roleof the private sector; andmore focused project portfolios with fewersectors and fewer pr-ejects.

These and the other provisions of AID’s newstrategy are consistent with the conclusionsdrawn by other Sahel authorities from the pastdecade’s experiences. But more detailed anal-ysis of the Sahel strategy and AID’s subsequentsubmissions to Congress raise questions aboutthe extent to which several aspects of the SDPhave actually incorporated the lessons of thepast decade. Several important issues are in-adequately addressed in the statement and themanner in which others are to be implementedis left ambiguous.

A Return to Trickle Down?

AID’s current strategy for the Sahel focuseson creating a better “environment” for devel-opment programs to work. It includes increasedfinancial incentives to Sahelian governmentsto support policy reform, for example, to softenthe impact of things such as urban food priceincreases, with the hope that the ultimate im-pact of the reforms will “trickle down” to ben-efit the entire population. The strategy also callsfor programs to increase local productive ca-

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Photo credit: U.S. Peace Corps

Policy reforms are an important part of AID’s revised Sahel development strategy. One goal is to ensure that marketplacefood prices reward farmers adequately.

pacity through infrastructure and institution-building activities and increased research ina wide range of sectors.

The way such “constraint removing” devel-opment strategies are organized, however, canhave very different impacts on the lives of thepoor majority which AID is directed by Con-gress to help. Is the new AID strategy a depar-ture from existing strategies that focus on di-rect assistance to the poor? Which prices areto be adjusted? Whose standard of living willbe maintained? Which institutions are to be sup-ported, which roads built, which crops re-searched? Each of these questions illustratesthe type of critical choices that can have verydifferent impacts on the poor. Is the focus toimprove the development “environment” pri-

marily to increase aggregate economic produc-tion rather than reduce poverty? Neither theconsensus of development experts nor the les-sons learned in the past indicate that it is desira-ble to return to the “trickle down” developmenttheories of the 1960s. But AID’s Sahel strategylacks guidance on this issue and bolsters fearsthat the current administration’s aid policiesare a general retreat from assistance to the poor(88).

The Role of the Farmer and Herder

The AID strategy document continues to di-rect activities toward small agriculturalists andmentions the need for greater farmer partici-pation in research and other activities, but itis unclear about how the role of those farmers

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is to be defined or about which farmers are tobe included. The crucial strategy question ofhow to balance the search for higher economicproduction with greater equity is not addressedor even acknowledged as a problem, There isno mention of the demonstrated importance ofgender analysis as an essential element in allproject activities. The call for farmer and herderparticipation can mean many different thingsand i n AI D’s Sahel strategy its meaning is un-clear. While the strategy acknowledges the effi-ciency of traditional production systems, thereis no discussion of how those traditional tech-nologies could he better integrated in futuretechnology development and diffusion.

Addressing the Issues

The AID strategy fails to address many of thecritical issues identified in the previous chap-ter. How are increasingly scarce resources tobe allocated between irrigation and drylandagriculture, between food and export crops, be-

tween different ecological zones or socioeco-nomic groups? How should the livestock sec-tor be approached? How are population issuesto be addressed? What pattern of internationaltrade relations should the Sahelian States pur-sue and what portion of food security shouldbe filled by trade? SDP officials in Washingtonand the field recognize the importance of theseissues but the strategy does not give high pri-ority to their resolution. Each issue involveschoices which, by their nature, must be madeby Sahelians. But donors, collectively and in-dividually, have a responsibility within theClub/CILSS partnership to help in the data col-lection and analysis necessary to support thesechoices.

Setting U.S. Priorities

AID’s strategy supports the overall goal of in-creased food production, but provides no guide-lines for setting priorities within that goal.While claiming that AID is narrowing the range

Photo credit U S Peace Corps

Al D’s strategy for development in the Sahel leaves some critical issues unresolved, for example, how the United Stateswill assist herders,

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of projects under SDP and withdrawing fromsectors where its expertise or management ca-pability has proven too limited, the strategystatement does not indicate what those areasare or how they are to be determined. The listof critical areas provided in the program’s 1985report to Congress is extensive and does notindicate a narrowing of focus. The UnitedStates has strengths in water resource devel-opment, socioeconomic data collection andanalysis, macroeconomic policy analysis, agro-climatology, research methodologies, forestry,fisheries, food processing, and other areasneeded in the Sahel. A more systematic match-ing of those strengths with specific programpriorities would enhance the AID strategy.

While addressing the need for activities in everysector to be consistent with the goal of in-creased food production, the strategy itself failsto integrate its discussion of sector activitiesinto a systematic whole, The absence of ade-quate emphasis on the interrelatedness of activ-ities at both the national and the farm levelcould lead to a continuation of the unconnectedprogram approaches of the past, There is a par-ticular need to take advantage of the opportu-nities and flexibility provided by “programassistance” such as Economic Support Funds,food aid, and more general technical assistanceto complement project activities. More effec-tive integration of food aid into global agricul-tural sector strategies is essential,

Lack of a Systematic Approach

Setting priorities is clearly important, but sois establishing links among the components.

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY

AID’s new strategy contains inherent ambi-guities that could potentially create problemsand inconsistencies as it is implemented. Theimpact of the new strategy will depend on howit is implemented. Many elements suggestedin chapter 4 and embodied in AID’s new strat-egy have been part of AID’s professed strate-gies since the beginning of the Sahel effort. Theimportance of farmer participation, the needto look at agricultural productivity in the con-text of environmental sustainability, the keyvariable of “risk perception” among farmers,the importance of institutional developmentand others are to be found in program descrip-tions, project documents, and evaluationsthroughout the 1970s. While AID, like otherdonors, has been gaining experience and exper-tise, the gap between stated strategies and ac-tual performance—between rhetoric and real-ity—is often wide.

AID officials and observers frequently sug-gest that the key to increasing AID’s effective-ness in the Sahel is less a question of refining

its strategies than of removing the obstacles thatblock those strategies from becoming viableprograms and projects. Observers both insideand outside AID identify several institutionalcharacteristics that may partly explain thegap between strategy and implementation. Al-though these factors are interrelated, they canbe categorized into those specific to AID inter-nally, those that are the product of AID’s rela-tionship with Congress, and those more gen-erally related to AID’s role within U.S. foreignpolicy.

The Internal AID Context

Characteristics internal to AID that observersfeel constrain its effectiveness in the Sahel in-clude staff issues, factors that limit direct con-tact with farmers, elements of its programmingand project design systems, and tensions be-tween centralized and decentralized decision-making.

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AID staff in the Sahel has been limited in bothquantity and quality. In 1974, only Senegal andNiger had full AID missions and only 25 Amer-ican staff served the entire region. By 1978, thatnumber expanded to 96 and by 1984 there were130 direct-hire American positions (125,134).But despite the speed with which AID missionsgrew, inadequate staffing of field missions wasstill cited as a major cause for the failure of foodproduction projects (127). Contrary to the rec-ommendations of internal audits, staff levelsin most Sahel missions have been reduced andplans call for further reductions, Not only havestaff shortages affected AID’s effectiveness, butthe prospects of further reductions could pre-clude the more labor-intensive analysis and on-going management required for participatoryand institution-building activities, Staff short-ages could force the agency to emphasize pro-grams with fewer management demands (e.g.,economic stabilization, infrastructure, and agri-cultural projects in more accessible, better-watered areas) rather than basing those deci-sions on considerations related to implement-ing its strategy,

The lack of appropriate skills and Sahel-spe-cific experience of many AID technicians andprogrammers involved in the development ofAID’s early Sahel programs were factors in thedesign errors of those programs. The lack ofSahel-specific expertise was particularly con-straining:

AID’s development effort initially had littleinformation and understanding of the physi-cal, institutional, and policy environment inwhich economic improvement was to takeplace (125).

U.S. expertise in arid land agricultural tech-nologies proved largely inapplicable for tech-nical and socioeconomic reasons, though manymistakes were made before this was realized.Much of AID’s Sahel staff is trained in generalprogram areas rather than in specific techni-cal fields. The proportion of generalists within

AID is rising and technicians complain thatthey have little input into major decisions,

The lack of French-speaking programmersand technicians has compounded the staffingproblem, resulting in: 1) major communicationproblems with Sahelian partners, 2) coordina-tion difficulties with other donors, and 3) diffi-culty in using the wealth of experience and datacollected by the French during the century oftheir presence in West Africa,

AID direct-hire staff are only a part of the to-tal personnel that AID uses in its Sahel opera-tions. A variety of contractors (individuals,universities, consulting firms, and privatevoluntary organizations) perform tasks rang-ing from logistical support to the design, im-plementation, and evaluation of AID projects.While the use of contract personnel has in-creased the pool of skills available to AID, itdoes not necessarily resolve staffing problems.Contract personnel, particularly early on, didnot have significantly greater Sahel experienceor French skills than did AID direct-hire staff,Costs are high (between $100,000 to $150,000per year for each contractor) and outside per-sonnel answer to institutions that often havedifferent objectives and agendas (65). More im-portantly, the use of short-term outside consul-tants reduces institutional learning within AIDand can limit the use of integrated strategies.

AID also hires local staff, but this pool of ex-pertise is poorly tapped. Local staff often arethe informal institutional memory of AID mis-sions, but they are usually occupied with rou-tine work and are infrequently used to help withprogram development and management. Thiswastes the potential their special perspectivecould offer and misses an opportunity to in-crease their skills in a form of internal institu-tion-building,

A decade of experience in the Sahel hasgreatly improved American expertise withinAID, in universities, and among consultants,The village-level work experience of the PeaceCorps has proven an effective training ground.But the turnover inherent in 2-year tours and

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the division of responsibilities between direct-hire and contract personnel have inhibited con-sistent institutional learning. The lack of abil-ity to speak French continues to be a problem,partly because U.S. universities have been ex-periencing declines in French language study.Also, U.S. universities not only appear to beexperiencing declines in enrollment in agricul-turally related programs (with the possible ex-ception of agricultural economics) but the train-ing they provide is relevant to U.S. agriculturalsystems, Thus AID is likely to face a continu-ing problem obtaining a future supply of appro-priately trained staff for the Sahel program.

Contact With Farmers and Herders

A strong need for a high degree of dialog be-tween donors and Sahelians exists at everylevel. Cultural and linguistic barriers, far be-yond French language skills, face AID staff andcontractors in the pursuit of that dialog. Whiledialog is difficult enough at the level of nationaldevelopment agencies, the communication gapincreases at the village level where the officiallanguages (French, English, or Portuguese) arerarely spoken and where cultural differencesare the greatest. In addition to linguistic andcultural skills, such a dialog requires desire,time, and a broad, open-minded perspective.

Institutional dynamics within AID limit theextent and effectiveness of contacts withfarmers and herders. Staff shortages, limitedtravel budgets, and overburdening paperworkare seen as particularly important in limitingcontacts. The lifestyle of most members of theofficial donor community, the majority of whomlive in prosperous enclaves within capital cit-ies, increases the perceptual gap between themand the rural poor (19). Some Europeans in theSahel feel that AID mission personnel are un-necessarily cut off not only from farmers butalso from government officials, “They tend tokeep to themselves, ” was a comment made byseveral otherwise sympathetic observers,

Weakness in Program and ProjectDesign Processes

Over the years, AID has developed a com-plex system for determining its strategies and

designing its programs and projects. Some as-pects of these systems limit the potential forthe type of long-term, integrated, flexible pro-gramming needed in the Sahel. OTA has iden-tified weaknesses in six areas:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Project Selection: The method by whichAID develops individual country strategiesmay not provide the kind of micro-leveldata collection and analysis needed to se-lect good projects.Analytical Skills: High level analytical skillsto do the economic, environmental, or so-cial analysis called for in program designare often lacking. As a result, “formula”solutions are substituted in place of country-specific programming. The diversity andcomplexity of the Sahel is often overlooked.Organization of Components: Sectoralanalysis and project identification, design,approval, and implementation, as well asmonitoring and evaluation, are performedby different groups and individuals, andincreasingly by contractors external toAID. While there are benefits from differ-ent perspectives and independent monitor-ing and evaluation, the lack of connectionbetween stages in a project leads to incon-sistency and lack of accountability, espe-cially among those responsible for programand project design. The separation is mir-rored in AID’s Washington managementstructure. Technical support, program,evaluation, and budgeting are located indifferent offices (even in different build-ings), with insufficient coordination amongthem.Evaluation and Monitoring: Poor linkageexists between evaluation activities andother parts of the system, so the lessonsof failure and success are often not usedto modify programs or design new activi-ties. Evaluation tends to take an “audit”approach based on narrowly defined andquantifiable objectives rather than on ques-tions of broader impact. In principle allprojects include ongoing monitoring, butin practice these receive insufficient re-sources. By the time problems are discov-ered, it is often too late to correct them (1 27)often making project management, in fact,

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crisis management. Furthermore, evalua-tions have been used more to identify fail-ures than to document reasons for suc-cesses. They are not used sufficiently bythe agency to institutionalize learning.Timing: Despite efforts to improve the sit-uation, projects often are not implementeduntil 3 years after their initial identifica-tion. In the meantime, many of the impor-tant assumptions and agreements on whichthey were based may no longer be valid.The lack of design flexibility makes adap-tat ion to changes difficult.Project Design: During the early phase ofSDP, AID reward structures were orientedto large prograrn size and rapid obligationof funds. Long-time, AID observers bemoanthe fact that AID still favors the designerand the obligator of funds over the projectimplementor r and manager. The result isa bias toward large-scale, complex projects,with inadequate attention to field realitiesor management capabilities within AID orthe host country.

1983 survey of Sahel AID missions reporteddesign problems contributed to project

difficulties in 24 of 25 projects. Two-thirds ofthe projects were judged to have been overlyambitious (128). The size and complexity ofprojects waS identified as one of six reasonsfor the failure or poor performance of all sevenfood production projects studied in another in-ternal AID audit ( 127).

Regional Strategy v. CountryPrograms

when SDP began, the concept of a coordi-nated, 10 rig-term, subregionally focused pro-gram with a separate budget and managementwas new to AID. It was controversial from thestart and it highlighted the already problematicrelationship between Washington and the field,Some AID Sahel field staff feel that AID isoverly centralized in its decisionmaking. At-tempts to mold country programs to correspondwith a regional strategy, particularly in the earlydays, exacerbated that problem. What does aregional strategy signify? What is its relation-s i p to A I D’s Africa strategy? How should the

individual country staff participate in the elabo-ration of the regional strategy? To what extentand by what mechanisms were individual coun-try programs to be made consistent with thatstrategy? What would be the balance betweenresource allocation to regional act it’ i ties as op-posed to country programs”? The answer to eachof these questions has varied over the courseof SDP’s history,

Tensions between the individual field mis-sions and regional management have existedfrom the program’s beginning, To many in thefield, even though SDP was the basis for creat-ing AID missions in the Sahel it was basically aWashington and Paris-based idea that never be-came a reality to the missions. It was fairlyidealistic and early SD P-generated regionalprojects often bore little relationship to theAID mission directors’ perception of countryneeds. While the regional approach to program-ming is appealing in theory, it is difficult inpractice, Country mission staff worked with na-tional governments that were often less thanenthusiastic about shifting resources to regionalorganizations. AID missions in the Sahel areu rider the supervision of ambassadors whosemandates are national, not regional and who,because the United States had few other inter-ests in the countries, often became much moreinvolved in AID programming than a ambas-sadors elsewhere.

Several aspects of AI D’s regional Sahel ap-proach have been downplayed in the past 4years. Contrary to the recommendations of the1983 SDP assessment, Al I) has disbanded themultidisiplinary regional planning team, basedin Bamako, Mali. that was charged with provid-ing support to country missions and with spear-heading the formulation of regional strategies.The proportion of regional programs (versusbilateral) within the Sahel budget has droppedfrom 40 percent in the early 1980s to under 30percent in 1985 and is projected to decline fur-ther over the next 4 years (125). Much of thefunding for river basin development is beingfolded back into bilateral accounts.

The decision to lessen the regional nature ofSDP has been based on what AID considers ani report ant lesson of the past decade. To a large

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extent, this decision reflects greater realismabout the limitations of regional developmentefforts. But, to a lesser extent AID risks losingsome of the potential that the regional perspec-tive and the Club/CILSS framework have inmaking the most effective use of all donor re-sources, While stressing the continuing impor-tance of international coordination through theClub/CILSS framework and related structures,AID has pulled back from active support of Afri-can regional institutions. AID’s current ap-proach is to “think regionally while implement-ing programs nationally” given that power andsovereignty continue to rest in the nation States(125),

How much these changes are changes of ap-proach rather than changes in the level of com-mitment to the Sahel or to the multinationalnature of the Sahel effort is unclear. They are,however, consistent with other changes in U.S.foreign assistance, which is generally movingtoward increased bilateralism (88). U.S. criti-cisms of CILSS have been important in that or-ganization’s recent reform. Continued U.S. sup-port is needed to maximize those gains and tofacilitate the limited but positive potential rolethat CILSS has to play.

Constrain-s on theCongress-AID Relationship

A second set of institutional factors that limitAID’s effectiveness in implementing its Sahelstrategy involves the manner in which AID andCongress work together. It includes the effectsof a generally poor working relationship be-tween the two and the specific mechanisms bywhich Congress tries to influence AID’s pol-icies. The formulation of the U.S. commitmentto the Sahel began in a close working relation-ship between Congress and AID (37). That part-nership has not, however, translated into asustained, working relationship in the imple-mentation of the Sahel program. Once the com-mitment was made, relations with Congress re-garding SDP have been largely consistent withthe pattern of Congress-AID relations gener-ally—a relationship that both sides have de-scribed as ineffective and, at times, borderingon the adversarial.

The timeframe and cost of the original U.S.commitment to the Sahel was not universallysupported in AID or in Congress. In order togain its acceptance, the concept was presentedwith expectations for dramatic short-term re-sults. Unrealistic congressional expectationswere in part the result of mistaken assumptionsabout the availability of technologies but theyare also in part due to the language in whichthe Sahel program had been presented, In thewords of AID field staff: “the program was cer-tainly oversold. ”

Some authorities speculate that the lack ofmore effective communication and the system-atic overselling of AID programs in justifyingits budget works against Congress developinga more sophisticated understanding of the long-term nature of the development process andthis ultimately generates unattainable goals forAID field staff. The problematic relationshipbetween Congress and AID inhibits the impactthe United States has in achieving Club/CILSSgoals. Short-term funding cycles, multiple pol-icy mandates, procurement and financial reg-ulations, and the conflicts created from dividedcongressional responsibilities on matters thataffect the Sahel all contribute to the lack of ef-fectiveness.

Funding

SDP receives funds as part of the annual con-gressional appropriation for foreign assistance.Lack of a strong domestic constituency for for-eign assistance and the complexity of the for-eign appropriations bill, which includes fund-ing for a broad range of military and economicassistance programs, multilateral agencies, andother U.S. programs operating abroad, and thecontroversial nature of many of these elements,have made it difficult to pass funding bills. In7 out of the last 9 years, funding has beenthrough stop-gap continuing resolutions. An-nual budget cycles inhibit achieving consistencyand the long-range strategies required for ef-fective programs in the Sahel.

In principle, the major advantages of the SDPportions of Sahel funding’ are the fact that

‘This does not include Econc)mic Support Funds or PuhlicI,aw-480 resources which are funded separately.

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they have been appropriated on a “no-year” ba- quire longer term, reasonably stable commit-sis, i.e., once authorized they do not have to ments. Policy mandates also act to diminishbe obligated that fiscal year, and funds cannot local flexibility to adapt programming to spe-be reassigned to other programs except for dis- cific local needs and host country priorities.aster assistance. The defensive relationshipwith Congress, however, has given rise to fears @procurement and Financial Controlswithin AID management that future fundingwill be reduced unless appropriated funds arespent quickly, As a result, AID has chosen notto use the no-year funding provision. The yearlybudget cycle puts added pressure on AID to pro-duce quick results to justify continuing fund-ing levels. The overall effect of the budget proc-ess is thus biased toward short funding cycles,quick obligations, and short-term projects.

Mutiple Mandates

Overall policy guidance on the objectives andfocus of U.S. foreign assistance programs areembodied in the Foreign Assistance Act of1961. A substantial amendment in 1973 definedthe “New Directions” for foreign assistance thatcalled on AID to focus its development assis-tance programs on the poor majorities in thepoorest developing countries. While the newpolicy eventually did have a major impact onAID programming, Congress/AID dialog onthese New Directions has not been easy (137).It has been complicated by a series of amend-ments to the Foreign Assistance Act that havemandated a succession of additional, more spe-cific new policy directions such as women indevelopment, family planning, infant survival,the use of private voluntary organizations, theenvironment, capital-saving technology, andothers.

AID’s attempts to appear responsive to thesedirectives have led to frequently changing pri-orities. Succeeding administrations, seeking toplace their own stamp on foreign assistanceprograms, have added additional and at timescontradictory directives to the field. As newmandates have been added, the old ones remainand confusion about the direction of program-ming grows. Field staff see the problem not inthe correctness of any individual policy ap-proach but rather in the rapidity with whichthe policies have changed. These changing sig-

The procurement and financial controls placedon AID by Congress have also constrainedAID’s operations. The general requirement touse U.S.-produced equipment and other projectinputs is a particularly sore spot in the Sahel,For historical as well as geographical reasons,most of the Sahel’s trade ties are to France andEurope. Congressionally mandated AID re-quirements to use American equipment haveproven ineffective in stimulating new marketsfor U.S. goods, a major objective of such meas-ures, Meanwhile, they have complicated andeven hindered project operations, Delivery timeof U.S. equipment has been long and inopera-tive U.S. vehicles, pumps, and other equipmentlitter the Sahel for want of spare parts, mainte-nance skills, or operating funds, Medicinesused in important AID village-level primaryhealth care programs often come with doseswritten in English, In addition, these “buyAmerican” requirements have led to the useof inappropriate capital-intensive technologies.

The United States is not the only donor withsuch requirements. Efforts at coordination inmultinational project development often havebeen delayed and in some cases stymied by con-flicting procurement regulations. The require-ment by each major donor to purchase equip-ment at home also increases the administrativeburden on the Sahelian institutions that mustdeal with the variety of equipment. So-called“tied aid provisions” for equipment and tech-nical assistance have greatly increased the to-tal cost of aid, and, from the perspective of theSahelian recipients, greatly diminished its valueto them. Again, the defensive relationship be-tween AID and Congress has resulted in AID’snot using its authority to waive tied aid in someareas of procurement.

Financial control has always been a majorarea of congressional oversight on AID, Therapid expansion of aid programs in the poverty-

nals disrupt programs that by their nature re- stricken and administratively weak Sahel and

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AID’s inadequate field staff resulted in a pre-dictable amount of mismanagement and somecases of misappropriation (134). In 1981, fol-lowing a series of negative audits, Congressenacted a section of the Foreign Assistance Actthat required the AID Administrator to deter-mine that Sahelian countries have adequatecontrols over assistance funds. While the re-sulting measures, and particularly the accom-panying efforts to improve management skillsunder the Sahel Regional Financial Manage-ment Project, have improved an admittedly un-acceptable situation, many observers feel thatthey have gone too far. The strictness of thenew regulations is seen to be unrealistic givencurrent Sahelian managerial and cultural real-ities. It has caused set-backs in the “partner-ship” between U.S. and Sahelian officials, hastied up both AID and Sahelian staff in excesspaperwork, and has eliminated the potentialpositive impact of more active participation bysmaller Sahelian businesses and PVOs. Whileproper financial control is unquestionably im-portant, a better balance between financial con-trol and development objectives would facili-tate AID’s work in the Sahel.

Congressional Coordination

SDP is just one of many U.S. programs andpolicies that affect the Sahel. U.S. decisions onfood aid, domestic agricultural price supports,trade policy, interest rates, and overseas invest-ment, as well as positions on international debtand finance as expressed through U.S. partici-pation in the International Monetary Fund, theWorld Bank, and other agencies, have varyingdegrees of direct or indirect impact on the Sa-hel, Policies affecting the value of the dollar,international cereal prices, interest rates, foodaid, and debt may affect the poor of the Sahelmore than development assistance. These pol-icy areas are usually dealt with by different con-gressional committees where the potential con-flict or complementarily with other actionsregarding the Sahel is rarely considered. Al-though better coordination between the execu-tive branch agencies that implement these pro-grams and policies is crucial, better internalcongressional coordination focusing on ways

to minimize “taking away with one hand whatwe give with the other” would greatly enhancethe coherence and impact of the U.S. commit-ment to the region.

Congressional Tools for Influencing AIDPolicies

Congress uses a variety of methods to enforceits policy directives to AID, such as require-ments for periodic written reports, congres-sional inquiries, legislative requirements forprocurement regulations, special reports, tes-timony, GAO audits, and congressional notifi-cation for program or budget changes. ManyAID staff feel that the major impact of congres-sional mandates and oversight is a substantialincrease in paperwork and bureaucratic hur-dles. Some estimate that they spend up to one-fourth of their time responding to congressionalinquiries or fulfilling internal administrativerequirements. Requirements for technical orcongressional notification for minor changesin project funding or timing, while not overlyburdensome, do create extra paperwork andhinder the flexible design systems needed inthe Sahel. Private voluntary groups working inthe Sahel and funded by AID report similar frus-trations.

But AID/Washington may compound theproblem by trying to anticipate Congress andby systematically going one step beyond con-gressional requirements. Some characterize theagency as “always looking over its shoulder”in its relationship with Congress, using fielddata to justify its budget requests rather thanas a basis for developing its programs. Theycontend that the field serves Washington’sneeds rather than the other way around.

The impact of congressional policy mandatesare often less than reported. Field staff havelearned to present what they are doing in what-ever terms are called for by current policy. Man-dated targeting of specific groups, such aswomen or the rural poor, or special programconsiderations such as environmental impactor health, can result in tacked-on componentsor paragraphs in project documentation ratherthan concrete integration into program design.

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The number of such mandates and the admin-istrative burden they bring discourage field stafffrom embracing the spirit of such directionsand more creatively implementing them. Stress-ing the uniqueness of each situation, field staffrankle at the rigidity of some measures suchas current requirement that at least 12 percentof funds pass through private voluntary orga-nizations (PVOs). AID staff did not disagreewith the positive role that PVOs can play butthey stressed the variability in PVO perform-ance and in opportunities for collaborating withthem. They questioned the wisdom of basingdecisions on general quotas rather than on care-ful analysis of needs and opportunities in a spe-cific country.

Many AID staff are frustrated that the part-nership between Congress and AID that gavebirth to the Sahel program in the mid-l970s hasnot been carried through i n operations, Com-pared to other programs within AID, the SDP’sspecial budgetary and management provisionsand the continuing congressional interest in theSahel are an advantage in these times of tightbudgets, but that special status may be erod-ing. Congressional/AID relations could be asource of opportunity, but instead they are seenby many as reducing AID’s ability to be effec-tive in fulfilling the U.S. commitment.

Development Assistance andForeign Policy Objectives

in the Sahel

Foreign aid generally lacks strong domesticsupport, so U.S. development assistance is oftenjustified in terms of U.S. “national interest. ”Those national interests are multiple-strategic,political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian.The interests most referred to in backing a [J. S.commitment to the Sahel are largely the last—humanitarian.

This is not to say that the expansion of theSahel program has been without other motives.The Sahel drought was seen by some as an op-portunity to make inroads into French politi-cal and economic dominance in the zone. In-creasing domestic political influence among

Americans respond generously to calls for faminerelief, especially when children are threatened withstarvation. Broader humanitarian concerns such aslong-term development assistance usually receive little

public support.

black Americans also challenged the State De-partment and AID to take Africa more seriouslyand end the neglect that had characterizedAmerica’s relationships with Africa. Thoughthe benefits to U.S. firms have been lower andless permanent than hoped for, tied aid provi-sions and especially food aid brought sizableeconomic gains back to the United States. Themoderate political stances of Senegal and Ni-ger are of at least some importance. Senegalhas been a particular} helpful moderatingvoice in African and international arenas. Ithas participated in peace-keeping activities inthe Middle East, Zaire, and Chad. Nonetheless,the primary justification for U.S. support ofSDP was built on the outpouring of public opin-ion following the 1967 to 1973 drought.

Since the change in administrations in 1981,the increased bilateralism in foreign assistanceand its use to support U.S. political positionshas led to fears that the primary basis of theU.S. development assistance to the Sahel mightbe changing from that of long-term develop-

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ment to short-term political interests. SeveralAID staff members felt that in the past, the Sa-hel Development Program had the advantageof being insulated from most political factors.That seems to be decreasingly the case. In the1984 Sahel Strategy Statement, political andstrategic interests in Sahel are mentioned ex-plicitly:

U.S. contact with the Sahel is compassion-ate but also pragmatic, the latter particularlywith regard to Senegal, Niger, and Chad wherewe have compelling political/security interests.U.S. political concerns in these and other Sahelcountries are inter-woven with numerous inter-national and domestic factors, economic con-siderations and humanitarian interests, Allhave a bearing on the achievement of U.S. ob-jectives in the Sahel and the Sahel DevelopmentProgram has a key role to play in accomplish-ing these goals (125).

Though the nature of the political and secu-rity interests is not elaborated, it presumablyinvolves growing U.S. concern with the de-stabilizing force of Libya in light of its troopinvolvement in Chad and alleged involvementwith dissident groups in several Sahelian States.

In another example of the change to morepolitical uses of AID’s Sahel assistance pro-grams, the State Department mandated cuts inproject funding to the new government of Bur-kina Faso in 1983 following a series of pro-

nouncements and actions considered unfavora-ble by the United States. New funding for theBurkina Faso AID program dropped from $11.2million in 1982 to $300,000 in 1984 and $40,000in 1985,6 As part of the cut, AID canceled oneof the most successful forestry projects in theSahel. Burkina officials and donors working inBurkina Faso were disappointed and frustratedat so blatant a disruption of long-term assistancein support of short-term political objectives. Theview that the United States is unreliable in itsdevelopment assistance could undermine thedevelopment of effective partnerships not onlywith Sahelians but with the other donors withinthe multinational development community.

Mixing political and security considerationswith developmental goals creates contradic-tions that often serve neither. In the Sahel, therelatively low level of security, political, andeconomic interests in relation to the humani-tarian and the exceptionally long-term natureof the challenge make it essential to focus ondevelopment to the greatest extent possible.U.S. national interests in the Sahel are bestserved by effective development programs.

“These figures are for bilateral economic assistance underSIIP. Food aid increased during the drought years to $12.4 mil-lion in 1984 and $19.6 million in 1985. The Peace Corps remainedin Burkina Faso throughout this period, See tables A-6 and A-7in app. A.

Chapter 7

A Catalog of Other Actorsin the Sahel

Chapter

A Catalog of Other Actors in the Sahel

IN BRIEF . . .

The United States was a major actor in developing the multinational Club/CILSS frame-work and has continued to play an active role in the evolution of its strategies. In recentyears, AID has made important, major policy revisions in its Sahel program in an attemptto incorporate the lessons learned in the past decade, but some important issues have beenleft inadequately addressed and AID’s strategy is ambiguous in certain areas. AID’s effec-tiveness is constrained by three other factors as well: internal institutional characteristicsof AID, the sometimes adversarial nature of AID’s relationship with Congress, and the lackof agreement about the role of development assistance in overall U.S. foreign policy.

AID is only one of many actors in the Sahel development effort. An array of Africaninstitutions, U.S. agencies other than AID, and various multilateral and bilateral donors havedirect and indirect effects on development in the Sahel. Chapter 7 reviews the roles, strengths,and weaknesses of some of these institutions. Highlights of the chapter include:

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Africans and African institutions must play the fundamental role in development inthe Sahel, though their strengths must be supplemented and their weaknesses addressed.Donors can complement and enhance these efforts.U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) can offer special development skills. PVOsgenerally can provide small-scale, low-cost, flexible approaches and often operate ef-fectively at the grassroots level. However, the quality of PVO efforts often can be un-even, they may lack technical skills, and they sometimes have limited impact.The Peace Corps and the African Development Foundation share many of the strengthsand limitations of PVOs. However, both of these organizations have begun new initia-tives that incorporate many of the lessons of the past decade.U.S. private sector investment currently plays a minor role in the Sahel and its roleis likely to remain limited for the short to medium term because of investment risks,language and cultural barriers, competition from Europeans, and policy-related con-straints. Policy reform could enhance the climate for U.S. private sector involvementin development in the Sahel, but reform alone would not change the situation substan-tially.At the heart of the Club/CILSS framework is a commitment of donors to work togetherwith the countries of the Sahel in a long-term, coordinated approach to development.Each of the different participants has its own specific agenda and characteristics (bothstrengths and weaknesses) that affect its ability to contribute effectively in the Sahelstrategy. A more concerted attempt is necessary to identify and build on the diversityof the many donors and recipients.

The ongoing processes by which strategies an effect on how people within the institutionsin the Sahel are being changed to reflect the carry out their roles,lessons of the past decade are being addressedby thousands of people in hundreds of institu- By understanding the strengths and weak-tions. The internal characteristics of these in- nesses of these institutions, policy makers canstitutions and their relationships to society have increase the likelihood that their strategies will

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112-. —

translate into successful development. Too egies for the Sahel would be incomplete with-often, donors focus their efforts on technical out examining several major categories of in-and economic analysis and overlook the equally stitutions, both Sahelian and donor, and theimportant analysis of institutional, social, and obstacles and opportunities their institutionalpolitical realities. Any discussion of future strat- environments provide.

AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

African institutions are central to the successof development assistance in the Sahel. Yet theweaknesses of African governmental andparastatal institutions have hampered their abil-ity to carry out development programs and thishas been one factor in the poor performanceof the past decade. A fundamental premise ofinternational assistance, and specifically of thepartnership between donors and Sahelians inthe Club/CILSS framework, is that the commit-ment is finite in both time and levels of re-sources. Assistance is intended to complementthe strategies of Sahelians themselves. Thus along-term commitment to building up the ca-pacity of these institutions is an important ele-ment in revised donor strategies,

Sahelian institutions (government or private,regional, national, or local) exhibit a wide rangeof characteristics that influence their abilities.They face many constraints but observers withlong experience in the Sahel believe that manypositive changes have taken place since inde-pendence. A number of promising institutionsand organizations have yet to be integrated intoofficial development strategies, so the futureholds continued new potential. The complex-ity of the constraints facing all institutions andthe lack of clear analysis on how to optimizethe contribution of each reinforce the need fordevising improved ways to coordinate effortsbased on a shared set of strategic directions.

Sahelian Government Institutions

A wide range of government institutions areinvolved in the design and implementation ofagricultural and rural development strategiesin each Sahelian nation. These include nationalpolitical organizations, local administrations,technical agencies, and parastatals of manyforms. Their specific roles and relative powers

vary from country to country. It is difficult togeneralize, but these institutions do share somecommon characteristics that affect their abili-ties to successfully implement programs andprojects.

Lack of Skills and Experience

The majority of Sahelian States are just 25years old. While Africans had some roles incolonial administrations, they rarely held po-sitions of major responsibility, Between 1952and 1963 only four university graduates in agri-culture were trained in Francophone Africa(47). Although the countries have made impres-sive advances in education and training, thereremains a great need for training opportuni-ties for Africans (4). Many senior agriculturalresearchers are expatriates. Sahelian educationalsystems, based on French colonial models, areoften lacking or inappropriate. But training pro-vided to Sahelians in institutions outside theSahel is also often inappropriate.

One difficulty faced by many new institu-tions, but particularly acute in research, is thenecessity of first filling administrative posi-tions. Often the best technically trained Sa-helians are not doing research, they are placedin administrative positions for which they havelittle training or interest, A recent analysis ofmanagement in African agricultural projectsindicated that bad policies and poor organiza-tion seemed to be the key constraints--not lackof skilled personnel, It recommended organiza-tional and management assistance, policy re-form, and action-oriented training (65).

The Legacies of Colonial Administration

Significant differences existed between theapproaches of different colonial administrat-ions, but overall they were largely based on

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hierarchical, authoritarian models, more de-signed for economic, political, and social con-trol than for development. Those models tendedto foster farmers’ dependence on governmentpersonnel and programs. Like their predeces-sors, Sahelian administrations tend to be highlycentralized. Lower officials operating in ruralareas have limited decisionmaking authority.And systems of rewards throughout the devel-oping world tend to move the most qualified,motivated people to the capital city while therural areas get less experienced and less com-petent personnel. Francophone systems of agri-cultural research and extension, which empha-sized basic research and export crops for betterendowed farmers, continue to influence the na-tional agricultural institutions that operatetoday (56).

Colonial administrative structures were oftenbased on values that differed from traditionalSahelian values, particularly in the areas of in-dividual responsibility and accountability. ForSahelians, de facto incentive systems are basedmore on personal or group loyalty than on per-formance. The absence of effective sanctions,the acceptance of certain levels of graft, andthe pervasiveness of “clientelism” are allmanifestations of alternative systems of rulewithin Sahelian institutions (35).

Lack of Resources

The past 15 years have brought Sahel govern-ments to the point of financial collapse, Thecauses are multiple. Revenues have declinedbecause of diminishing budget support fromthe former colonial powers, The drought-re-duced export crops and drops in world marketprices also contributed to declining revenues,Expenses, meanwhile, have remained high withoverstaffed civil services, heavy investment inunproductive infrastructure, growing debt serv-ice burdens, and the operating deficits of mostparastatals. The lack of priority given to theagricultural sector in the past was exacerbatedas budgets tightened in the late 1970s and early1980s. The result has been paralysis in manyrural development operations—especially ex-tension programs—with few resources to re-place the deteriorated equipment, little to sup-

port recurrent costs such as fuel and supplies,and difficulty paying salaries (4). Projects oftencould not be sustained after donor fundingended because Sahelian governments could notpay for recurrent costs. Strapped for resourcesand crippled by poor morale, these institutionscannot perform as expected.

Obstacles From the Outside

A recent General Accounting Office reportconcluded that the poor capabilities of Saheliangovernments to plan and manage developmentefforts is a significant factor in their slowprogress toward economic development (134).The study also found, however, that internalweaknesses are often compounded by the heavyadministrative workload imposed by the largenumber of donors and projects. For instance,last year there were at least 18 village watersupply programs, with as many donors, oper-ating in Mali, each with different equipmentand different approaches to training and recur-rent costs (57).

Some experts feel that the management per-formance of Sahelians has been relatively good,considering their institutional weaknesses andthe many responsibilities involved in manag-ing nearly $15 billion in development assistanceover the past decade, Sahelian institutions didmuch better helping identify needs and deliv-ering emergency food supplies during the 1984to 1985 food emergency than they had during1972 to 1973, evidence of the growth of theiradministrative capacity, Thus it appears thatSahelian institutions will be able to be increas-ingly effective in the future.

Despite these problems, several trends pro-vide opportunities to increase the effectivenessof Sahelian institutions and increase their ca-pacity to implement development strategies, Asthe number of university-educated Africans in-creases, more Sahelian staff will be availableto take administrative positions in governmentand parastatal institutions, Also, staff who haveaccumulated valuable experience working onpast donor-supported projects are increasing.These more skilled staff will help the institu-

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tions become more effective partners in devel-opment activities.

A new generation of Africans, more highlyeducated than their predecessors, is coming topower in both political and administrativerealms. These young leaders are dynamic, prag-matic, and sophisticated in dealing with ruraldevelopment issues. Additional positive trendsthat might help increase the effectiveness of Sa-helian institutions include: relative political sta-bility (with the exception of Chad); the growthof democratic institutions (political parties, la-bor unions, and legal systems in various coun-tries); increasing national identity and overalldecrease in ethnic and geographical divisions;growing acceptance by Sahelian leaders of thenecessity of policy reform and their initial suc-cess in implementing politically risky austerityprograms.

Nongovernmental SahelianInstitutions

Nongovernmental institutions in the Sahelhave great potential to play key roles in the de-velopment and implementation of future strat-egies for agricultural and rural development.Extremely diverse, nongovernmental institu-tions, including formal and informal ones, vil-lage level and national bodies, often have morelegitimacy with farmers and herders than gov-ernment institutions. Their direct grassrootsassociations put them in a strong position tofacilitate local participation and tap the bene-fits of traditional knowledge and agriculturalsystems.

At the same time, however, many of these in-stitutions display the same managerial, tech-nical, and organizational problems as publicsector institutions. Their relatively greater ef-fectiveness results largely because they aresmall and insulated from major developmentprograms and projects. However, this presentsone important drawback: because these insti-tutions are small and generally lack nationalimpact, increased support will likely have onlylimited effects. It is also expensive and com-

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Small stone dikes can trap water, halt soil erosion, andincrease crop production. AID supports this work inNiger. In Burkina Faso, an indigenous PVO works withthe regional government and a British PVO to helpfarmers improve the same technology and to share itwith farmers in other regions of Burkina Faso and

several other countries.

plex to use such diverse, widely dispersed in-stitutions.

Nongovernmental groups must be consideredwithin their political and economic context.Giving greater roles to alternative local non-governmental groups can cause conflicts withgroups currently holding economic and politi-cal power. A greater understanding of the dy-namics of each of these groups and of the con-text in which they operate is necessary todetermine their potential role in the implemen-tation of future development strategies. Whilethe diversity of nongovernmental groups makesgeneralizations difficult, it is useful to considerthe merits of four basic types of institutions:the traditional hierarchies, the indigenous com-munity self-help groups, African private volun-

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tary organizations (PVOs), and the African pri-vate sector.

Traditional Power Structures

The colonial and postcolonial experiences ofthe Sahelian nations have reduced the impor-tance of many precolonial social and politicalstructures, but some remain important in mod-ified forms (e. g., the traditional chieftaincies),and others has been enhanced through linksto the postindependence state (e. g., the Mus-lim Brotherhoods of Senegal). In the past, thesestructures have not been major actors in donor-sponsored agricultural development programsin the Sahel. But they have a potential role toplay because they have influence in rural areasand a n ability to mobilize people around suchissues as protection of the environment andcontrolled grazing on communal pasture (86).Additionally, such structures can provide im-proved access to traditional knowledge systems.

These potential benefits, however, must bemeasured against some risks. Many experts seethese traditional hierarchies as inegalitarianand working with them could exacerbate ex-isting inequalities (60). The new governmentof Burkina Faso, for example, is moving to limitthe power of the traditional chiefs. Nonethe-less, the potential seems to justify more con-sideration of some traditional groups; one ofthe lessons learned in the past decade is thatit is important to build on existing strengths,including local leadership structures and incen-tive systems. In the Dire´ zone of Mali, for in-stance, a Taureg Deputy has used his traditionalposition to settle pastoral refugees devastatedby drought and introduced mixed sedentaryfarming and livestock production.

Community Self-HeIp Groups

Community groups have long been major re-cipients for assistance from international pri-vate voluntary organizations. Whether definedalong family lineage, political, village, male/female, age group, or ethnic lines, forms ofcommunal groupings exist in most Sahelian

countries. Many of these groups were formedbecause of high labor requirements under tradi-tional production systems or the need to mobi-lize resources at times of disaster or for cere-monial obligations. Their forms and methodshave evolved and multiplied with changes invillage economies and social systems. For ex-ample, groups have expanded the use of col-lective fields and communal gardens thus in-creasing the output of the available land andproviding more income. To reduce individualrisk and cash outlays, self-help groups oftenshare tractors, plows, wells, and other sizableinvestments.

Community groups have had a much smallerplace in most direct official bilateral or mul-tilateral aid programs. To an extent, this is be-cause it is difficult and costly for major donorssuch as the Agency for International Develop-ment (AID) to develop and implement programsat the village level. Another reason, however,has been that Sahelian governments have beenunwilling to support such direct approaches,often seeing such community groups as threatsto their centralized administrations. Officialdonor efforts to increase cooperation or incor-porate these groups into larger rural develop-ment programs have met with varying degreesof success, However, the failure of many pastagricultural development activities and thesearch for alternatives focused on participationhave increased interest in informal village-levelinstitutions and have resulted in a looseningof controls on village-level groups in severalcountries,

Despite their potential, however, problemshave arisen in the relationship between com-munity groups and donors, Generally donorslack effective programming methods to workwith community groups. Donors sometimes ac-tually compete to fund projects and hastily orga-nized village groups appear with no otherraison d’etre than to receive such funding. Sud-den influxes of funds and supplies often haveundermined the strengths of existing groups,encouraged internal dissension, reduced in-

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dependence, and substituted a “welfare men-tality” for their original self-help orientation.

Sahelian Private VoluntaryOrganizations

Sahelian PVOs have proliferated recently.Different from community groups in their ori-gins and larger in scope, most are organizedon religious, ethnic, or geographical lines. Themajority were formed during the past decadeand suffer from the same lack of managementand technical skills as their government coun-terparts, Because they have a potential abilityto mobilize important constituencies, they havecome into conflict with centralized bureaucra-cies and political groups.

Nonetheless, African PVOs are expandingtheir role as effective intermediaries betweenexternal donors and community groups. In sev-eral countries (Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Bur-kina Faso) they have formed into loose coordi-nating federations to share information, andeventually, resources. Often governments andexternally based PVOs have encouraged andsupported this move. Despite their growingstrength and potential, the success of manysuch groups is based on the dynamism or skillsof one or a few individuals. Their impact isoften as limited as that of more traditional com-munity groups and designing programs to sup-port them is equally difficult. In several cases,their initiative and management capacity hasbeen overwhelmed by well-meaning donors try-ing to do too much too fast. Yet their potentialto mobilize people and resources at the villagelevel, linking them with resources from the out-side, is an important strength to consider in de-signing an overall assistance effort.

The African Private Sector

A major change in donors’ development ap-proaches over the past 5 years has been a newemphasis on the role of the African private sec-tor. In policy dialog, donors such as the WorldBank and AID are encouraging Sahelian gov-ernments to remove restrictions on their in-digenous private sector and let it handle some

functions and services currently provided bygovernment agencies.

The Sahel private sector has shown vibrancy,creativity, and success even under governmentrestriction (84). One example is the rapid de-velopment of small-scale private cereal millingoperations over the past 5 years. Many experts,however, see actions to increase the capacitiesof the private sector (e. g., training, credit pro-grams, and careful subsidies) as being as im-portant as removing restrictions.

Others, however, question how far and howfast the private sector will be able to respond(6) or even whether data are available to makesuch an analysis (45). Private sector develop-ment is uneven among Sahelian States, beingbest developed in Senegal. Government con-trols have produced a private sector profilewhere the majority of firms are very small. Therelatively few larger firms often owe their po-sition to State support rather than to higher effi-ciency.

The private sector is being encouraged to re-place many parastatals, but not all the parasta-tals are equally inefficient, Many of the publicsector functions that donors are encouragingSahelian governments to give to the private sec-tor involve activities that, due to high risk, geo-graphical isolation, low profitability, or highinitial investment, are beyond the financial ormanagement capabilities of existing firms,Others see the private sector as unlikely to pro-vide even the minimal levels of subsidies es-sential to encourage farmers to adopt intensi-fied practices. Finally, some experts point tothe lack of success of past small business de-velopment projects as evidence of the contra-diction inherent in asking relatively inefficientpublic sector organizations (be they Sahelianor donor) to increase the efficiency of the pri-vate sector.

Finally, many small farmers and herders havea long history of distrust of private grain mer-chants and traders—who because of their vir-tual monopoly would purchase agriculturalproducts at low prices following harvest, andthen resell them to the farmers at far higher

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prices in later months. Similarly, the consumer tinue. From the farmers’ point of view, the gov-goods these private traders provided in rural ernment parastatals provided at least someareas were highly priced. The imperfect mar- hope of protection from unscrupulous privateket conditions that fostered these abuses con- entrepreneurs.

U.S. ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AID), many other U.S. organi-zations, public and private, are active in theSahel. These include private voluntary organi-zations (PVOs), the Peace Corps, the AfricanDevelopment Foundation, private businesses,and other agencies of the U.S. Government.Each has different objectives, activities, and or-ganizational strengths and weaknesses. Coordi-nation among the various public agencies couldbe enhanced by careful analysis of how eachinstitution can most effectively join in a com-prehensive, better coordinated developmentstrategy. While the autonomy of private agen-cies and businesses is important, improved co-ordination with the directions agreed on in theClub/CILSS process would bring many bene-fits. Specific analysis of the key U.S. institu-tions operating in the Sahel can help facilitatethe development and implementation of moreeffective Sahel strategies.

U.S. Private VoluntaryOrganizations

PVOs are nonprofit organizations establishedby private citizens with a philanthropic pur-pose and they act to complement official assis-tance working in the Sahel. InterACTION, anassociation of over 100 U.S. PVOs working ininternational development, rehabilitation, andrelief, commissioned a survey of 150 U.S. PVOswhose efforts account for 80 to 90 percent ofPVO aid to Africa and found that these U.S.PVOs participated in many projects of varyingsizes in the Sahel (table 7-I).

Interaction estimates that 10 to 15 percentof the $460 to $600 million spent in Africa byU.S. PVOs in 1984 was spent in the Saheliancountries (144). Initial estimates are that spend-

Table 7-1 .—U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations(PVOs) in the Sahel

Number of Number ofCountry PVOs projects

Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 82Cape Verde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 12Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 30The Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 39Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 84Mauritania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 34Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 46Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 100SOURCE: InterACTION, Diversity in Developmenf U S Voluntary Assistance to

Africa Summary of Findings (New York InterACTION-American Coun-cil for Voluntary International Act Ion, 1985)

ing doubled in 1985 as a result of an outpour-ing for famine relief.

PVOs show a diversity of goals, activities,funding sources, and memberships. They col-laborate in a number of major coalitions: PACT(Private Agencies Collaborating Together; 5 ofthe 19 member agencies of this internationalconsortium are based in Latin America andAfrica), CODEL (Coordination in Development,an ecumenical consortium of 40 religious-basedPVOs), and InterACTION. Some work only inAfrica, like Africare; others, such as CARE,Save the Children, and Oxfam, have Europeanaffiliates,

In 1984, PVO projects in Africa were dividedamong the following sectors: community de-velopment (23 percent); refugee, famine, anddisaster relief (14 percent); food production andagricultural development (12 percent); medi-cine and public health (12 percent); family plan-ning and population (8 percent]; education (7percent); water (6 percent); small enterprisesand income generation (4 percent); construc-tion (4 percent); nutrition (3 percent); social wel-

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fare (3 percent); and environment (1 percent)(72).

The amount of public funding of PVOs in-creased after 1981 when the U.S. Congress di-rected the Agency for International Develop-ment to make available at least 12 and up to16 percent of AID’s development and disasterassistance funding to PVOs. The response tothe recent drought increased the amount of bothpublic and private funds available to U.S. PVOsworking in the Sahel. In 1985, Congress in-creased the PVO earmark from 12 to 13% per-cent for fiscal years 1986 to 1989. Congress de-fined PVOs as organizations obtaining at least20 percent of their annual funding for interna-tional programs from nongovernmental sources(131). However, funding available to PVOsthrough AID’s Sahel Development Program(SDP) account has declined from a high ofnearly $25 million in fiscal 1985 to less than$12 million in fiscal year 1986 (71).

In 1984,60 percent ($270 million) of all U.S.aid to Africa from PVOs was funded by the U.S.Government. Nearly half of PVO aid to Africa($220 million) was food aid, including the costsof ocean freight for the Public Law-480 Foodfor Peace Program. About 10 percent of PVOaid ($50 million) was derived from U.S. AIDgrants and contracts. Private cash contributionsamounted to about 20 percent ($100 million)of the total. The private share was 30 percentof the total when in-kind gifts (e.g., medicines)and services are included (72). The largest twoPVOs, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) andCARE, together provided two-thirds of all PVOaid to Africa. They received 70 to 80 percentof their resources from the U.S. Government,mostly Public Law-480 commodities and trans-portation costs. These ratios of government toprivate funding for PVOs in Africa are prob-ably similar to the ratios applicable in the Sa-hel, but specific breakdowns are not available.

The increase in public funding available toU.S. PVOs has created dilemmas for their mem-bers and African counterparts (108). PVOs de-sire to maintain independence in their Africanactivities whether or not they accept publicfunding. Some PVOs, for example, apply for

AID grants to support projects designed bythemselves. Yet, increasingly, they also applyfor contracts to do AID-designed work. Somefear that the latter activities will either distortor conflict with their other efforts. Other PVOs,for example, the American Friends ServiceCommittee and Oxfam-America, have electednot to accept any U.S. Government funding be-cause they are reluctant to depend on the U.S.Government financially for a variety of philo-sophical and other reasons.

Views differ regarding the efficacy of currentAID support of PVO activity in the Sahel. Sev-eral AID staff questioned the policy of earmark-ing a percentage of funds specifically for PVOsbecause this requirement contributes to AID’sinflexibility. Also, PVOs do not always have thebest record or expertise in the priority areas.PVOs frequently complain about the length oftime required for AID funding approval andabout procurement restrictions (tied aid) thatrequire them to purchase U.S. equipment andservices, often to the detriment of the project.

While most PVOs now agree that their pri-mary goal should be long-term development,many of their resources continue to be dedi-cated to short-term relief and distributing foodaid. Even those PVOs that normally do not dis-tribute food, like the Mennonite Central Com-mittee and Church World Service, did so dur-ing the 1984 drought. This demonstrated oneof the strengths of the PVOs: their ability tomove quickly to implement relief programswhen the need arises. CRS and CARE, thelargest distributors of Public Law-480 com-modities, distinguish between distribution ofemergency food aid for relief and their devel-opment programs using Food for Work, butthey stress the complementarily of the two pro-grams (79).

With the return of rain to the Sahel in 1985,PVOs are reassessing their immediate and long-term work. A large number are moving fromrelief to rehabilitation and development. Manyare using Food for Work, private funds, or acombination of private and public funds (Afri-care) to support projects to increase agriculturalproduction and restore the environment, such

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as antierosion projects or small-scale irrigationprojects.

Some PVOs question the role of food aid indevelopment, especially since late 1985 whenU.S. surplus commodities competed with lo-cally produced grain for storage and were saidto depress the price of local grain. In response,PVOs such as Church World Service in Sene-gal and Freres des Hommes in Paris are plan-ning ways to develop “triangular food aid”where they purchase African-produced foodcrops, store them, and sell them in food-deficitareas, This provides relief but, at the same time,increases market incentives for small farmers,Other PVOs are seeking ways to improve grainstorage and reduce price fluctuations. For ex-ample, several PVOs have established grainbanks in villages where they help local com-munities purchase locally produced grains atharvest and store them in the village for laterresale below rising market prices before thenext harvest to bypass private grain merchants.However, the success of these efforts often de-pends on government cereal policies.

PVO Opportunities and Limitations

Alternative Approaches to Development.—Many of the unrealistic expectations and mis-takes in the Sahel were common to programsof both official and private agencies workingwith small farmers. In contrast to official assis-tance, PVO programs are said to be more par-ticipatory, people-to-people rather than govern-ment-to-government. In theory, most stressbottom-up rather than top-down development,and reach the poorest of the poor. Without themany political constraints of official aid, PVOscan often work in countries or areas where offi-cial bilateral aid programs cannot, and use moreexperimental approaches. However, there is aneed for careful case-by-case evaluation of thestrengths and weaknesses of PVOs so they canbe more effective in the future (113). While thisevaluation is only beginning to be conducted(72,120), most observers agree that the PVOshave benefited many poor people, and that theyoften have more freedom than official groups

to attempt alternative approaches to devel-opment.

Small Scale.—PVOs have the advantage ofbeing able to work with smaller projects, manyon a village level. In addition, they are able todistribute relatively small amounts of moneyand test pilot approaches. Most provide sometechnical assistance and funding for materials,but require that the village supply labor. Whilesome PVOs limit the scale of their projects be-cause of limited resources, others receive largesums from public or private sources and real-locate them to several projects or an activitycarried out in a number of locations. One goodexample of this is the series of small-scale irri-gation projects carried out by Africare.

Many PVOs have learned that they can workeffectively at a level above the village level, andin turn increase their impact in the villages.Some groups, like the Overseas Education Fundin Senegal and the Unitarian Universalist Serv-ice Committee in Burkina Faso, have workedwith national-level Sahelian PVOs. Thus PVOsalso have an ability to strengthen local, regional,and national institutions—and also can contrib-ute to implementation of SDP strategies onthese levels.

Direct Access to Farmers and the RuralPoor.—Most PVOs prefer to work at the grass-roots level with local indigenous organizations.Many stress village-level agricultural and ru-ral development programs. While PVO head-quarters are usually in the capital city, field staffeither travel to the villages or live in smallertowns. Some PVOs employ African staff whoare from ethnic groups or rural areas whereprojects are implemented. Some PVOs havestaff members who have worked in the Sahelfor a number of years, and speak fluent Frenchand an African language. This experience andability to use staff outside the capital city helpsPVOs overcome the common urban bias ofmany assistance organizations. However, notall PVO staff are equally skilled. Many need togive more emphasis to less visible and well-offgroups. Nevertheless, direct access to farmersgives PVOs a good opportunity to obtain ac-

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curate data so policy makers can be better ableto judge the impact of their decisions,

Lower Costs.—U.S. PVOs are usually able toimplement projects at lower costs than otherU.S. groups for a number of reasons: 1) the payscales of their U.S. staff are lower than thoseof other U.S. officials, consultants, or univer-sity personnel; 2) they often implement projectsusing volunteer labor; and 3) their administra-tive costs generally are lower. U.S. PVO activi-ties, however, may have higher costs than thoseof African organizations, especially when tiedaid requirements or relatively costly U.S. per-sonnel are involved,

Flexibility.—PVOs often are not as bureau-cratic as official assistance agencies. They typi-cally have simpler, less centralized decision-making processes and lack many politicalconstraints. Often the country director has au-thority to implement projects and flexibility inmanaging them. PVOs have been praised fortheir altruism and open-minded acceptance ofAfrican realities. However, many PVOs com-plain about constraints connected with projectsfunded by AID. Specifically, PVOs feel that theneed to design projects in detail long before theyare funded and the bureaucratic difficulty ofchanging them midstream, as well as the lengthof time required to approve and actually fundprojects, all act to hinder their flexibility andeffectiveness.

African Institution-Building.—Most U.S.PVOs, like official donors, believe in acting inpartnership with Africans. But since U.S. PVOsoften have access to human, material, and fi-nancial resources that Sahelians do not, it canbe difficult to establish a mutual relationship.Thus PVOs are not always as effective as theycould be in helping build institutional capabil-ities in the Sahel.

Most PVOs are oriented to work with non-governmental organizations and do not provideresources to governmental entities. In an effortto run programs efficiently, PVOs sometimesbypass public officials who they perceive as in-effective or they set up parallel structures topublic programs, thus undermining the effec-tiveness of those programs. African public offi-

cials have complained about the lack of com-munication and coordination with PVOs,especially when the PVOs were setting up vil-lage organizations or projects that competedwith public agencies, indigenous institutions,or other PVOs. This competition reduces theeffectiveness of local and regional institution-building.

While U.S. PVOs often hire Africans as staff,they infrequently work as true partners withindigenous private organizations. This may bedue to the fact that the local PVOs are not struc-tured the way U.S. PVOs are structured: theindigenous PVO maybe working with only oneethnic group, or in certain areas, or it may nothave a full-time staff or compatible financialaccounting system. There are, of course, caseswhere PVOs have worked successfully with lo-cal organizations. For example, in BurkinaFaso, the Centre d’Etudes Economique et So-ciales de l’Afrique Occidental provides train-ing for village leaders working with Africareand CRS projects. In several Sahelian countriesU.S. PVOs belong to coalitions of internationaland indigenous PVOs. Yet there are difficultissues of project control, funding constraints,and operating styles to be resolved. The rela-tionship becomes especially delicate when aU.S. PVO channels U.S. AID funds to a localPVO. Several observers mentioned the harm-ful effect of too much money being made avail-able to local PVOs: the natural growth of thesegroups was being distorted, new national PVOswere springing up overnight and volunteer-based groups were pressured to hire staff.

Finally, the desire to have measurable resultsto show its members or financial supporterscan create a situation where the staff of the U.S.PVO do much of the work themselves, ratherthan supporting the efforts of the local groupto carry out the project. This pressure to pro-duce quantifiable results often constrains PVOeffectiveness in building local capacity, In theAfrican view, the major role of the outsidePVOs in Africa is to support and build the ca-pacity of the African PVOs (70).

Impact of Projects.—One commonly voicedcriticism of the work of PVOs is that the small

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scale of their activities limits their overall im-pact. PVOs are aware that there has been littleevaluation of the impact of their projects; theyacknowledge that it is difficult to judge thecumulative impact of their work or replicatesuccesses (120). They note that too often PVOprojects do not have strong marketing or eco-nomic development components nor do theytake into account recurrent costs, which limitsustainability. Lack of local involvement in thedesign and implementation of projects and thelack of local “ownership” of the project are keyconstraints to sustained impact.

To increase their impact, some PVOs arelearning to plan strategically and to work incoalitions. A current topic of discussion in thesegroups is the role for PVOs in policy reform.While there is little disagreement that macro-economic conditions and policies can cause thebest-run projects to fail, most PVOs feel thatthe policies and programs of African govern-ments and overall political conditions favora-ble to development are needs that the U.S. PVOscannot address directly (72). Others feel thatPVOs with local experience and credibility,especially those with successful economic de-velopment records, are in a good position toprovide data and advocate policy changes thatwould benefit the poor. In some cases, PVOsare engaging in policy reform on a local level.For example, a windbreak project sponsoredby CARE in Niger resulted in local resolutionof tree tenure and land management reforms,areas not yet included on AID’s policy reformagenda (120). Some authorities note that thelong-term effects of empowering local organi-zations will eventually result in significant so-cial, political, and economic change. The viewof African PVOs is that a principal role of out-side PVOs is to seek changes in the policies oftheir own countries conducive to developmentin Africa (70).

Lack of Technical Skills.–Traditionally,PVO staffs have not had a high level of techni-cal expertise, Not surprisingly, PVOs havemade the same technical mistakes as the offi-cial programs regarding food crops and live-stock in the Sahel. Some see their role as oneof diffusion of technology rather than devel-

opment since their strength is at the grassrootslevel. However, it is now generally acceptedthat promoting the adoption of new agriculturaltechnologies takes a high degree of technicalskill as well as cultural sensitivity and socio-economic understanding. In the past, this lackof technical skills has created problems, Forinstance, the lack of a research orientation byPVO staff implementing a highly successfulproject in Burkina Faso (reclaiming erodedland) make it less likely that others can dupli-cate the project. A recent AID study of PVOefforts worldwide concluded that the lack ofresources to collect baseline data before andmeasure effectiveness after implementation, to-gether with the absence of mechanisms forsharing lessons learned from successes andfailures, were key PVO weaknesses (120).

Concern also exists that the distinction be-tween PVOs and for-profit consulting firms isbecoming blurred by the increased governmentfunding available to the PVOs. For example,the AID contract process encourages PVOs tohire more technically qualified people but someare now sending people without the experience,language skills, and local understanding thatnormally are PVO strengths.

Many of the characteristic strengths of thePVOs can be used to increase their effective-ness in achieving some of the key objectivesof Sahelian development. Their limitations canbe compensated for with careful, coordinatedplanning that includes an honest analysis oftheir specific strengths and weaknesses in acountry or sector. However, to better achievethis there is a need for documentation and care-ful evaluation of PVOs’ successes and failuresin the Sahel. AID and PVOs should study theirpast performance in the Sahel—e.g., cost of tiedaid requirements, funding delays, lack of logisti-cal support, problems caused by AID’s projectdesign and monitoring requirements—and usethis information to improve AID’s ability towork more effectively with PVOs.

The Peace Corps

The Peace Corps has volunteers and pro-grams in six of the nine countries of the Sahel

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(Chad, Cape Verde, and Guinea Bissau are ex-cluded). The goals of the Peace Corps—to fos-ter development on a people-to-people basis,promote understanding of the United States indeveloping countries, and American under-standing of developing country societies—areachieved through a variety of programs. Thenumbers of volunteers and the major programsin each of the Sahelian countries in 1985 areshown in table 7-2.

A number of the projects that volunteers areengaged in relate directly to low-resource agri-culture including work in agricultural research,young farmer education, agricultural extension,agroforestry and reforestation, wood stoves,animal husbandry and health, agriculturalcredit and marketing, wells, small-scale irriga-tion and vegetable gardening, wildlife, gameranching, range management, seed production,rice production, fisheries, and beekeeping (95).

In addition, many staff within AID, the mul-tilateral institutions, and the PVOs working inthe Sahel are former Peace Corps volunteers.Their knowledge of the local culture, language,and country condition was an important con-sideration in their selection and gives them aunique perspective on their new tasks. In 1982,more than 10 percent of the AID work forcewere former Peace Corps volunteers (124).

peace corps Opportunities andLimitations

The Peace Corps shares some of the same in-stitutional opportunities that PVOs enjoy: small-

Table 7-2.—The Peace Corps in the Sahel

Number of Major Peace CorpsCountry volunteers program areas

Burkina Faso . . . . 75 Teaching English,agricultural education,reforestation

The Gambia . . . . . 55 Health, nutrition, forestryMali . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Woodstoves, water,

teaching EnglishMauritania . . . . . . 48 Agricultural extension,

health educationNiger . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Education, nutrition,

forestry, healthSenegal . . . . . . . . . 95 Rural development,

forestry, health

Total . . . . . . . . . 478SOURCE Peace Corps, Africa Region Briefing Book (Washington, DC: April 1985)

Photo credit: U.S. Peace Corps

This Peace Corps volunteer from Delaware works onvillage gardening, nutrition education, and fuel-efficient

stoves in Mauritania.

scale projects, direct access to the farmers andrural poor, and flexibility in programming. Asan independent government agency with aworldwide program, the Peace Corps has lessflexibility and is not as free of political con-straints as many of the PVOs. However, thepeace Corps’ funding base is more secure andpredictable than many PVOs.

Begun in 1984, a Peace Corps program calledthe Africa Food Systems Initiative was set upto be “a long-term (10 year) collaborative effortassisting up to 12 African nations in their strug-gle to reverse the decline in per capita food pro-duction and attain self-sustaining food systems”(96). Two of the four pilot countries involvedare in the Sahel: Mali and Niger. Building onpast Peace Corps experience, teams of volun-teers will work in activities designed to resolveproblems of preproduction (land preparation,water supply, inputs, agroforestry, animalpower, and implements); production (introduc-tion of improved varieties and agronomic prac-tices, fisheries, husbandry, and gardening); andpostproduction (processing, preservation, stor-age, marketing, and distribution). Most workwill be carried out on the village level.

The Africa Food Systems Initiative builds onthe trend to recruit more technically qualifiedvolunteers, while maintaining the traditionalstrength of the Peace Corps on the community,

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grassroots level. Its implementation will affectrecruitment, training, and programming.

The Africa Food Systems Initiative also buildson a growing collaboration between the PeaceCorps and PVOs and AID. The collaborationwith PVOs has taken many forms: volunteersassist PVO projects in their free time and havebeen assigned to work on PVO projects. Forexample, a fisheries Peace Corps volunteerhelped Africare establish a co-op in Niger. Afri-ca re , Pa r tne r sh ip fo r P roduc t iv i ty , andAprovecho Institute have used Peace Corpsvolunteers to carry out collaborative projectsin the Sahel (124). PVOs have provided materi-als and funding in response to volunteer re-quests. There are formal and informal systemsof information-sharing between the PeaceCorps and PVOs. Sometimes AID funding ofPVOs is also used by the volunteers workingon their projects.

Since the mid-1970s, increasing numbers ofpeace Corps volunteers have been assigned towork directly with AID projects. Collaborationof the Peace Corps with AID has its risks aswell as benefits. The risk is that local peoplemight come to identify the Peace Corps withan agency whose mission is more directlylinked to U.S. foreign policy. The benefits areincreased financial and technical resourcesavailable to the Peace Corps and grassroots out-reach for AID. AID has developed two “fastfunding” mechanisms for community-level de-velopment projects which are being used byvolunteers in the Sahel: the Ambassador’s SelfHelp Fund ($50,000 to $100,000 depending onthe country and year for commodity procure-ment for self-help projects) and the SmallProject Assistance Program (a $40,000 fund ineach country to support community self-helpefforts identif ied with the assistance ofvolunteers).

Institutionally, the Peace Corps shares sev-eral limitations with PVOs—those dealing withoverall impact and technical personnel. Institu-tional communication and coordination prob-lems with the African government entities areless than those encountered by PVOs. Becauseof the short-term nature of the volunteer assign-ments, and emphasis on local community orga-nization, local capacity-building is enhanced

by Peace Corps programming. However, be-cause volunteers stay for short tours of duty(normally 2 years) Peace Corps programminghas the built-in limitation of being short termand lacking continuity. This high turnover alsohelps account for the lack of an institutionalmemory and written record of over 20 yearsof Peace Corps village experience in the Sahel,Such a documentation of the accomplishmentsand lessons learned would provide valuable in-formation for those planning programs andactivities in the Sahel.

The Peace Corps does not have a Sahel-spe-cific development strategy or regional admin-istrative structure for the Sahel. The PeaceCorps staff in Washington have responsibilityfor a mix of Sahelian and West African coastalnations; the Country Directors meet on a muchlarger regional basis. This administrative struc-ture prevents the Peace Corps from develop-ing coordinated subregional programming andtraining strategies that could better use scarceresources and extend the impact of the PeaceCorps effort. Despite these limitations, thePeace Corps has the potential to continue toprovide an important contribution to develop-ment in the Sahel according to the strategy ob-jectives described earlier.

African Development Foundation

The African Development Foundation (ADF)is designed to support local self-help develop-ment efforts. Congress authorized the establish-ment of the foundation in 1980 to fill the gapbetween official U.S. assistance programs andthe needs at the grassroots level by deliveringassistance directly to people in rural commu-nities and urban slums. Wholly supported bypublic funds, the ADF funds small projects de-signed, implemented, managed, and evaluatedby Africans, who are required to include thepoor in this process to the maximum extentpossible.

The foundation began operations in fiscalyear 1984. When two officials resigned in thefirst year, Congress requested the GeneralAccounting Office to evaluate ADF’s capacityto carry out its mandate. There was congres-sional pressure to fund quickly and develop a

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number of policies and strategies before full-time staff was hired. The congressional award-ing of “no-year” money was critical for the earlysurvival and growth of the ADF. ADF nowseems to be on its feet (135) with core staff inplace and funding proceeding according to its5-year plan.

In the first 12 months of operation slightlyover $1 million was awarded to 13 projects in7 African countries. While both grants, loans,and loan guarantees are permitted, only grantshave been made. Grants have ranged in sizefrom $700 to $250,000, with an average size of$70,000. The foundation is active in 14 coun-tries in Africa, and has funded 70 projects.Eleven projects have been funded in the Sahelin Mali and Niger. The foundation will beginwork in Senegal and Mauritania in 1986. A re-view of the projects funded in the Sahel showsthat they take an integrated, local approach: sev-eral are helping transhument herders make thetransition to sedentary herding and includecomplementary activities such as vegetablegardening or poultry raising; others involveintegrated village development projects withmixed livestock and food production, irrigation,and other social services; and three are wom-en’s income-generating cooperatives.

ADF Opportunities and Limitations

ADF has some of the same institutional op-portunities as the PVOs: smallness of scale, di-rect access to the poor, lower costs, and flexi-bility (l). It also shares with the PVOs and PeaceCorps the limitations regarding smallness ofscale and impact, and these are accentuatedbecause it is so new,

However, the approach to development takenby ADF differs from that taken most often byboth the other official programs and PVOs be-cause it provides direct support to local com-munity groups. While ADF does have fundingcriteria, its congressional mandate enables itto support development strategies and pro-grams designed by Africans—rather than pre-selecting priorities and designing strategies andprojects with passive participation by Africans.It is based on the assumption that development

is essentially an indigenous, self-directed proc-ess and that the role of outside assistance is tosupport it,

In addition, African groups funded by ADFare supported through local African technicalassistance, authorized to purchase equipmentand supplies on the local market, and are au-dited by African accounting firms selected bythe foundation. In waiving tied aid require-ments, Congress’ intent was to strengthen Afri-can capabilities.

Because it provides direct support to localself-help efforts, often business enterprises, lo-cal capacity-building is central to ADF’s man-date. Its first priority is to work with villageorganizations, and its second priority is to workwith African intermediary organizations to pro-vide technical assistance to the local groups,thus strengthening both. Several of its fundingcriteria are also designed to strengthen localcapacity: ADF requires that the poor partici-pate in project design, implementation, man-agement, and evaluation, as well as garner ben-efits from the project; funding is limited to amaximum of 5 years to reduce dependency; andADF does not fund core salaries to increase thechances of sustainability.

An important limitation on ADF’s contribu-tion is its low priority in U.S. official develop-ment assistance. ADF was appropriated a to-tal of $8,5 million between 1980 and 1985 andan additional $3.87 million in fiscal year 1986(out of a total of $15 billion for foreign economicand military assistance). However, because ofthe previous money made available, the Foun-dation’s fiscal year 1985 budget was $4.5 mil-lion and the fiscal year 1986 budget is pro-grammed at $6.1 million.

The ADF mandate is clearly consistent withmany of the elements of the development ap-proaches needed in the Sahel. However, the de-gree to which ADF projects actually achievethese objectives, and the wider impact of theprojects it supports, have not yet been subjectto careful evaluation because funding startedso recently,

American Private investment

A number of donor agencies, including theWorld Bank, AID, and several Europeandonors, have given increased attention to therole of external private investment in ThirdWorld development. Nonetheless, even thoughthere is some U.S. investment in the Sahel, thepotential for significant increases is extremelylimited for the short to medium term, Tourismoffers some potential for increased foreign in-vestment, for example, in Senegal and TheGambia, but the net benefits of tourism to thelocal economy are reduced by the sector’s highdemand for scarce foreign exchange–e.g., bothto build and maintain the hotels and by nega-tive social effects. The Overseas Private Invest-ment Corporation (OPIC), which offers financ-ing and insurance to U.S. investors to coverexchange of local currency into dollars andlosses due to expropriation and war or revolu-tion, has not financed any projects in the Sa-hel but has insured five investors in the Sahel:four in Senegal and one in Niger. In SenegalOPIC is insuring Mobil’s oil refinery, Citibank,and two pharmaceutical projects of Warner-Lambert/Park Davis; in Niger, OPIC is insur-ing Citibank.

There has also been some activity in Saheliannations by the Export-Import Bank, which sup-ports U.S. exporters by enabling foreign buyers,including governments, to purchase Americangoods under various financing mechanisms.However, the Bank does not consider the Sa-hel as very promising for private investmentand has limited its support to providing short-term credit for private sector purchases in sev-eral countries,

OPIC and Export-Import Bank-supportedprojects are the only primary U.S. investmentsi n the Sahel. Most potential investors feel theycan make more money elsewhere. Using thesame logic as Sahelian farmers who chose notto accept proposed agricultural packages—businessmen feel there is not enough profitabil-ity in Sahel investment opportunities to offsetthe risk.

Beyond the obvious linguistic and culturalobstacles to increased U.S. private investment

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in the Sahel, most of the major constraints toincreased investment in and trade with theThird World identified by American businessrespondents to a Fowler-McCracken Commis-sion Survey are relevant to the Sahel (82). Thefollowing policy-related constraints are of par-ticular significance to U.S. business investors:

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Complex investment Codes of the SahelianCountries: Based on French models ofheavy State intervention, regulation, andcontrol in the private sector, Sahelian in-vestment codes are accompanied by a levelof bureaucratic and legal procedure unac-ceptable to most American investors.Restrictions on Ownership and Repatria-tion of Profits: Most Sahelian States requiremajority local partnerships and/or signifi-cant public sector interest in most invest-ment categories and restrict the repatria-tion of profits.Complex Labor Relations Legislation andRelatively High Wage Rates: Minimumwage legislation, social security benefits,pension requirements, and the forms andpractices of labor relations make labor rela-tively high-cost for the skill level it rep-resents.Political Instability: Perceptions of politi-

cal instability create a major disincentiveto foreign investment in the Sahel, Since1980, the civil war in Chad with Libyan in-volvement, coups in Mauritania, an at-tempted take-over in The Gambia, and theanti-capitalist rhetoric of the current gov-ernment in Burkina Faso have increasedthese uncertainties.

Despite efforts to alter disincentives, Sahelianand donor governments alike have been unsuc-cessful in attracting much new investment, oreven, in some cases, of retaining past levels.The overall decline of Sahelian economies, bothfrom production shortfalls and donor-encour-aged (or imposed) austerity programs, has cer-tainly been a factor in what amounts to a sub-stantial net disinvestment in the area by privatecapital since 1980. Other more structural con-straints limit external private investment andwill continue to do so even if the economies

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improve and policy obstacles are removed.These include:

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Poor Infrastructure: The lack of adequateroads, ports, airports, railways, access toinexpensive and reliable water and powerlimit private opportunities in the Sahel.Lack of Skilled Labor: General educationlevels, literacy, and technical skills remainlower in Africa than in almost any devel-oping region, The costs of sending and sup-porting foreign management and skilled la-bor are increasingly high.Small Market Size: The population and sizeof African States, their poverty, deficien-cies of marketing systems, customs differ-ences between States, export restrictions,and costs all cut the market size for Afri-can enterprises, limiting efficiencies ofscale and eroding potential profitability.Underdeveloped Local Private Sector: Theindigenous private sector in many Saheliancountries is poorly developed and thislimits opportunities for collaboration andjoint ventures.Lack of Raw Materials or Access to Them:With few exceptions (phosphate in Sene-gal, iron in Mauritania and potentially inSenegal, uranium in Niger, and the prin-ciple industrial agricultural products: cot-ton, peanuts), the Sahel has few raw mate-rials of industrial interest on which to buildindustry. At the same time, port and cus-toms constraints and transportation prob-lems for the land-locked states limits theeconomic viability of bringing in raw ma-terials from the outside.

Little private capital currently flows into theSahel and it is offset by outflows repaying past,external, private investment, For the low-in-come countries of Africa, outlays for repaymentof principal of private nonguaranteed loans ex-ceeded funds from new loans by $74.1 millionbetween 1981 and 1984. If interest paymentsare included in this calculation, African out-lays exceeded funds from new loans by $279.8million for this period (151). Accepting a basicpremise of the liberal free-market system, i.e.,that capital will flow to the areas of greatestopportunity, private investors see their poten-

tial role in Sub-Saharan Africa and particularlythe Sahel as more limited than development the-oreticians would hope. The basic factors thatunderlie these perceptions on the part of busi-nessmen are unlikely to change in the short tomedium term. Thus, it does not seem that atthis time U.S. private business investors arelikely to be significant participants in the Sahel.

The many constraints to increased private in-vestment notwithstanding, there are a varietyof prospects for economic development withinthe Sahelian countries, and between them andthe coastal States, that donor agencies cansupport—and perhaps even recruit the assis-tance of U.S. business in the long term. Someof these opportunities are small scale, build-ing on existing enterprises, The strategy forachieving improved food security includes find-ing ways of increasing nonfarm incomes of bothrural and urban people. Agriculture-related in-dustries can create links with farm-level agri-culture production. Certain U.S. PVOs, suchas Partners for Productivity and Technoserve,are already involved in this area, Alternativesources of outside private investment may bebetter suited to these types of activities thanare the larger U.S. multinational businesses. Pri-vate, church, and corporate foundations arestarting alternative investment funds, For ex-ample, the Ecumenical Development Cooper-ative Society and Women’s World Bankingmake loans and equity investments in small-scale economic ventures in Sub-Saharan Afri-can nations on confessional terms, Corporatesocial responsibility groups may be recruitedto provide financial or technical support. In theshort term, there is a need to collect informa-tion on sources of private funding in the UnitedStates that could be used by PVOs and othersworking in the Sahel,

In addition, some people interested in in-creasing U.S. private investment in develop-ing countries recommend increasing the roleof OPIC. Possibilities include restoring fund-ing for direct financing of projects and invest-ment feasibility y studies—but targeting them tosupport the strategies necessary in the Sahel.Both could be helpful in developing long-term

business development strategies for investorsinterested in the Sahel.

Other U.S. Federal Agencies

Coordination problems increase with thenumber of actors involved, especially wheneach has a different goal and perspective. Whilea certain amount of diversity in approach is tobe expected among U.S. Government agencieswhose work affects the Sahel, agreement on anoverall development strategy for the regionwould help increase the impact and avoid wasteof public funds. Improved awareness by eachof the actors of the objectives, strategies, andprograms of the others could help improve mat-ters. AID, because of its participation in theClub/CILSS process, is in a particularly goodposition to take more active leadership in try-ing to improve coordination among the U.S.Government agencies with programs affectingthe Sahel.

Although AID and the State Department playthe major policy roles in development assis-tance to the Sahel, other Federal agencies makeimportant contributions. The U.S. Departmentof Agriculture, particularly because of its rolein influencing policy for large amounts of foodaid, is key among the other U.S. Federal agen-cies. In addition to its departments with juris-diction over food aid, other USDA departmentsand programs which have valuable contribu-tions to make to Sahelian development include:the Office for International Cooperation andDevelopment in training and technical assis-tance (this office managed the Sahel ManpowerDevelopment Program); the agricultural re-search programs supported by the AgriculturalResearch Service, the Cooperative State Re-search Service, and the Forest Service; and theEconomic Research Services,

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration of the Department of Commercehas used its expertise in climate assessment insupport of Sahelian development. Throughsuch techniques as satellite imagery and datacollection from Sahelian countries, NOAAcompiles rainfall and crop production data usedin a Famine Early Warning System run in con-

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junction with AID. However, present tech-niques better estimate crop productivity peracre than total production. NOAA also supportsthe Sahelian Regional Center for Agrometeorol-ogy and Applied Hydrology (AGHRYMET) lo-cated in Niger.

Because of its role in relation to the Interna-tional Monetary Fund and World Bank, theTreasury Department is also an important U.S.actor. Monetary policies and debt issues of Sa-helian countries in particular are affected byits actions. OPIC has already been mentioned,as has been the Export-Import Bank. In addi-tion, the Office of Management and Budget, be-cause of its key role in allocation of public fundsfor all other agencies, is another key actor.

Insofar as AID funds the activities of vari-ous private organizations, including U.S.universities and private firms, such as consult-ing firms, it clearly has a role in coordinating

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

NOAA, along with AID, supports the Sahelian RegionalCenter for Agrometeorology and Applied Hydrology

near Niamey, Niger.

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their individual efforts. For example, throughthe Board for International Food and Agricul-tural Development, AID supports agriculturalresearch efforts of U.S. universities. Especiallyimportant are those of the Collaborative Re-search Support Programs (CRSPs) in whichU.S. universities work together with researchinstitutions in developing countries. The CRSPsactive in the Sahel are: sorghum/millet, peanut,bean/cowpea, and tropical soils. (See table 7-3.)

This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. If AIDis to take a leadership role in improving coordi-nation among U.S. agencies active in the Sa-hel, one of the first steps would be a carefulidentification of the various U.S. programs thateither currently do—or could have—bearing onmore effective achievement of the strategicdirections described earlier. Coordinationcould occur both in-country and in Washington.

Table 7-3.—Collaborative Research Support Programs(CRSPs) Active in the Sahel

CRSP Countries U.S. universities

Sorghum/millet . . Burkina Faso Kansas State University,The Gambia Purdue University, andMali Texas A&MNigerSenegal

Peanut . . . . . . . . . Burkina Faso University of Georgia andNiger Texas A&MSenegal

Bean/cowpea . . . Senegal University of Californiaat Riverside, University ofCalifornia at Davis, andUniversity of Arizona

Tropical soils , . . Niger Texas A&MSOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Board for International

Food and Agricultural Development, May 1986.

MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DONORS

In addition to understanding Sahelian insti-tutions, it is important to examine the Sahel’spartners in development—the internationaldonors. The aftermath of the Sahelian droughtof 1968 to 1973 witnessed not only more thana trebling in donor assistance but also an un-precedented proliferation of the number of ex-ternal organizations involved. They are bilateraland multilateral, governmental and private;they provide technical assistance, loans, grants,training, commodities, or merely good will. Thediversity of these organizations is great—fromtheir goals and objectives, to their strategies andmethods of operation. Given their great invest-ment in the Sahel and the influence they col-lectively have on development activities, thecharacteristics of these donor organizationshave fundamental implications for the imple-mentation of Sahel development strategies.

In 1984, total official development assistance(ODA) committed to the CILSS countries was$1.9 billion: about 69 percent of the assistancewas through bilateral channels and 31 percentthrough multilateral agencies (32). After steadilyrising through the 1970s, total ODA peaked in1981, declined through 1983, and rose nearly

to its 1981 level in 1984 because of increasedlevels of emergency food aid (26). The UnitedStates contributed 9 percent of the total ODAfrom 1975 to 1983;1 however, the U.S. com-mitment of $274 million in 1984 was 14 per-cent of the total. (Club statistics include all U.S.aid, not just development assistance under theSDP.) Including its contributions to the mul-tilateral organizations, the United States is animportant but not predominant donor in theSahel. (See table 7-4 and app. A tables A-1through A-4.)

At the heart of the Club/CILSS framework isthe commitment of the donors to work togetherwith the CILSS countries in a coordinated ap-proach to achieve Sahelian development. Whilethe various donors have a diversity of strengthsand resources, some of them are more impor-tant in relation to the regional strategies thanothers. The number and diversity of actors in-creases coordination problems and the poten-tial for duplication and conflicting priorities,However, the diversity of strengths also en-

IData regarding ODA in this section is from Club du Sahel/CILSS, Official Development Assistance to CILSS Member Coun-tries in 2983 (Paris: OECI), 1985) un]ess otherwise noted.

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Table 7-4.—ToP 10 Donors to Sahelian MemberCountries, 1975-83 (U.S. dollars)

Millions of Percent ofDonor U.S. dollars total aid

France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,247 18European Economic Community . . 1,540 13West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,067 9United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,041 9World Bank/International

Development Association . . . . . . 998 8Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 792 6United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 609 5Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554 5The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439 4African Development Bank . . . . . . . 411 3

Total of top 10 donors . . . . . . . . 9,698 80% a

Total commitments, 1975-83....12,201NOTE In 1984 $192 btlllon was the total committed

aof total Of flclal Development Assls!ance

SOURCE Club du Sahel/CILSS, Off/c/a/ Deve@ment Assistance to CILSSMember Counfnes In 1983 (Paris Organization for Economtc Cooperatlon and Development 1985)

hances the ability to deal effectively with thevarious challenges of Sahelian development (theinterrelated technical, policy, and institutionalissues), at various levels (farm, village, national,and regional levels).

The different multilateral and bilateral donorsactive in the Sahel have different institutionalstrengths and weaknesses arising from differ-ent purposes, perspectives, and histories. Thereare important differences in size of programs,scale of programs and projects, sectors withinwhich each operates, types of assistance pro-vided, and approaches to development.

Size of Programs and Trends

Decisions about the total resources to com-mit to recipient countries are made independ-ently by each donor as are many other decisionsregarding types of assistance and approachesto development.

The largest bilateral donors from 1975 to 1983were France, the Federal Republic of Germany,the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The largestmultilateral programs were those of the Euro-pean Economic Community (EEC), the WorldBank’s International Development Association(IDA), the U.N. agencies–World Food Program(WFP), U.N. Development Program/Food and

Agriculture Organization (UNDP/FAO), the In-ternational Fund for Agricultural Development(IFAD), and the African Development Fund ofthe African Development Bank (ADB).

France remains predominant among thedonors in the Sahel, continuing its historical,cultural, and economic ties with its former colo-nies, Many French expatriates are involved ingovernmental and parastatal bodies as techni-cal advisors and Sahelian governments receivea sizable portion of the external assistance un-der the French Assistance and CooperationFund (FAC). Recognizing the increasing costsof maintaining its influence over the region af-ter independence, France successfully pursueda strategy to involve other European donors inproviding assistance, especially through theEEC.

The Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC), who together with their mul-tilateral institutions are another significant setof donors, also have historical, cultural, and po-litical ties with the Sahelian nations includingmembership in the nonaligned movement andpan-Islamic movements. Petroleum income in-fluences OPEC’s levels of funding: after peak-ing in 1981 at $425 million, OPEC funding de-clined to $300 million in 1982 and leveled offnear $200 million in 1983 and 1984 (15 percentand 12 percent of total ODA in 1983 and 1984).

While the OPEC nations are reducing theirassistance, others are increasing theirs, in partas a response to the drought. Some bilateraldonors, for example the Canadians and Dutch,are increasing their assistance. Other donorsnew to the Sahel, such as Italy, Japan, and somePVOs, are now designing aid programs. Somedonors are active only in Sub-Saharan Africa;for example, the Economic Development Fund(EDF) of the EEC and the ADB. Other donorsconduct programs throughout the world butgive special status to the Sahel, such as Franceand the United States. Some donors concen-trate the majority of their resources in one coun-try: Sweden to Cape Verde, England to TheGambia, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait toMauritania. Senegal has received the mostassistance (from 1974 to 1982); The Gambia,Cape Verde, and Chad have received the least.

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Project Size and Scale

The regional development strategies in theSahel include a role for both large- and small-scale projects. Certain donors fund large pro-grams and projects, including the World Bank,IFAD, the OPEC nations, and AID. Becausesome types of projects or programs requirelarger amounts of funds, such as capital-intensive infrastructure (roads, dams and riverbasin development), balance of payments andbudget support, food aid, multisector (in-tegrated) rural development, funders who em-phasize these projects tend to be the largerdonors who make large commitments. Thelending institutions generally make larger com-mitments than grant-making ones: the FrenchCentral Fund for Economic Cooperation, ADB,and IFAD make large average commitments.However, some grant-making institutions, suchas AID and EEC’s EDF, have a tendency tomake larger grants than others.

Size of commitment and scale of project gen-erally show a positive correlation. Largeprojects, however, can impede local develop-ment. For example, large sums of money some-times can be counterproductive for small,community-based, approaches, According toone analysis of the World Bank’s effort to im-plement a poverty-oriented approach, the needto move large amounts of money was a majorconstraint to its success (3), IFAD is unique inits attempts to resolve the tension betweenlarge- and small-scale approaches: it commitslarge amounts of money to projects carefullydesigned and monitored for impact on a smallscale and local level, AID also has attemptedto resolve this tension by providing large grantsto U.S. PVOs for similar projects in a numberof villages.

Sectors Where Funders Operate

Various donors concentrate their resourceson different sectors (see table A-4 in app. A).Most of France’s funds from 1975 to 1983, forinstance, were for technical assistance, budgetsupport, and rainfed and irrigated agriculture.During the same period the United States con-centrated on food aid, rainfed agriculture, mul-

tisector rural development, and technical assis-tance. The OPEC nations primarily supportedtransportation and other infrastructure, mul-tisector rural development, and balance of pay-ments and budget support. EEC focused onfood aid, balance of payments support, infra-structure, and multisector rural development.

By coordinating complementary activities,donors can obtain greater impact and use re-sources more efficiently (17), For example,France provides as much funding for agricul-tural research as the United States, but placesmost of its funds and technical expertise in thenational agricultural institutions, with a smallpart going to the international research insti-tutions. This is the reverse of U.S. support. Theneed for more effective collaboration betweenthe national and international agricultural re-search institutions reflects a need for closer col-laboration among donors,

In each of the sectors, several bilateral andmultilateral donors predominate, For example,the World Bank/IDA and the United States havemajor programs in forestry and ecology. Sincethe mandate of the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office (UNSO) was expanded in 1978to help 19 African nations combat desertifica-tion (working together with the U.N. Environ-mental Program), most of the projects UNSOnow supports in the Sahel deal with conserva-tion issues.

Donors’ priorities change over time, Newcommitments to river basin development andlivestock have been declining recently, whilesupport for food aid and rainfed and irrigatedagriculture have been increasing (see table A-5 in app. A). The World Bank’s increased em-phasis on agriculture and rural developmentin the 1970s was an integral part of its BasicHuman Needs Approach; now its published re-search and policy statements also stress otherissues, including policy reform, population, andenvironment, However, donors’ stated priori-ties may differ from the actual allocation of re-sources, The Club/CILSS strategy stresses for-estry and environment in its policy statements,yet these areas receive less than 2 percent ofthe funds allocated. Most major donors call fordirect assistance to small farmers, while the ac-

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tual allocation of funds supports large-scaleprojects with only indirect benefits for farmers.For example, the greatest amount of IDA loansto the Sahel from 1975 to 1983 were for trans-portation and infrastructure ($276 million) andirrigation projects ($121 million; see table A-4in app. A), while agricultural projects stressedexport and irrigated, import-substitution crops.

Types of Assistance

Donors provide different general types ofassistance to countries or sectors withincountries—grants, loans, food commodities,and technical assistance. Certain donors mayprefer some types of assistance while recipi-ents may prefer others. Assistance from mul-tilateral organizations or aid packages from sev-eral donors can provide the flexibility to matchavailable assistance with the needs of re-cipients.

A number of institutions award grants: EDAof EEC, France’s FAC, AID, and the UNDP.Others provide loans: e.g., the World Bank,France’s CCCE, IFAD, and ADB. In the Sahel,more development assistance has been in theform of grants than loans. However, the trendis for an increasing portion to be loans: the 1980to 1983, 3-year average of ODA provided to theCILSS countries was 65 percent grants and 35percent loans, but the annual percent of grantsdeclined from 67 to 62 percent during this time.France, for example, provided two-thirds of itsassistance in 1983 in loans (through CCCE) andone-third in grants (through FAC).

Most development lenders make loans bothat market rates and on better-than-market, con-cessional terms, but only loans on discountedterms (e.g., loans by IDA of the World Bank andAfrican Development Fund of ADB) are con-sidered part of development assistance. Be-cause of their poverty, the Sahelian nations usu-ally receive confessional loans from theseinstitutions; Senegal is the only nation that hasreceived nonconcessional loans from the WorldBank.

Even though confessional terms delay the im-pact, these loans eventually must be repaid.

While the multilateral lending institutions playa major role in designing the projects they fund,the Sahelian governments face the greaterfinancial risk of whether or not the projectssucceed, The lending institutions’ first goal isensuring that previous loans are repaid, a per-spective that may lead to some conflict withthe Sahelian countries’ development priorities,Related tensions exist between donors withdiffering amounts of grant and loan funds fora certain country or sector, between conces-sional and market rate lenders, and betweenlenders whose mandates require short-termpayback and those with “softer” terms. Thissituation clearly calls for increased collabora-tion among donors on a country-by-country ba-sis. Until now, however, donor discussions ondebt primarily have related to debt rescheduling.

Another form of assistance is to provide com-modities, especially food aid, which may be dis-tributed by recipients as emergency food, usedin Food-for-Work type programs, or sold by Sa-helian governments at subsidized or marketrates. Donors may give commodities free ofcharge or sell them on confessional terms toSahelian nations. The United States and othernations provide food aid through bilateral andmultilateral channels. The United States, theU.N. WFP, and EEC are major providers of thistype of aid in the Sahel. Food aid totaled 14 per-cent of ODA to the Sahel in 1983, before theheight of the drought, and 40 percent of it wasprovided by WFP. WFP, which provided 60 per-cent of all U.N. assistance to the Sahel in 1983,distributes commodities received from theUnited States and other nations. At one time,its food assistance included animal feed (im-portant for the pastoralists in the Sahel) but thisis no longer the case (55). In its analysis of trendsover the past decade, the Club/CILSS concludedthat food aid had grown even in years of nor-mal rainfall, an annual average rate of growthof 7 percent from 1975 to 1983. This shows thatthe food aid is increasingly accepted as nor-mal and that commodities are being used moreas a form of budget support and less for emer-gency aid (25). The major drawback of this typeof aid is its possible negative effect on incen-tives for domestic food production.

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The actual extent of these negative impactsis controversial. In a recent survey of food pro-duction and food policies in 20 Sub-Sahara Afri-can nations, including all the CILSS nationsbut The Gambia, the Congressional ResearchService was unable to find any empirical studieson the effect of food aid on recipient govern-ment agricultural policies or on prices receivedby farmers (63). The role of food aid in relationto Sahelian agricultural development, espe-cially in relation to food policy reform, needsto be carefully evaluated. In this area, as in somany others, there is also a need for concertedeffort among the donors.

Many donors, including France, the UnitedStates, and FAO, also provide technical assis-tance. Technical assistance is usually classifiedas a grant or loan even if the money is usedto pay salaries and expenses of a person froma donor country, a practice that recipients feelreduces the value of such aid. The quality offoreign technical assistance to the Sahel hasbeen mixed and the costs are very high. Ques-tions can be raised as to its appropriateness,especially regarding the lack of Sahel-specificexperience of outside experts, and the degreeto which this limits institutional developmentof the recipients.

The UNDP provides U.N. funds and coordi-nates U.N. projects in Sahelian countries withtechnical assistance provided by other U.N.agencies, often FAO. Some projects are imple-mented by a U.N. agency, but financed bilater-ally. In addition, the technical assistance maybe in the form of assistance to raise funds fromother sources. For example, UNSO, set up in1973 to coordinate assistance of the U.N. agen-cies in the CILSS countries and help the Sahelrecover after the drought, identifies projectssupported by the African governments and thenfinds other bilateral or multilateral donors tofund them. While its administrative costs areborne by UNDP, it acts as a broker with an ar-ray of funders (including other African nations)rather than as a funder itself.

Many donor countries, like the United States,provide all of these types of assistance, some-times through different agencies. In addition,

there are other forms of assistance, such as loanguarantees and equity investments, and differ-ences in how they are provided. Some donorsprefer to be the sole funder of a large, visibleproject while others prefer to co-financeprojects with other donors; I FAD, for example,has co-financed half of its projects with theWorld Bank.

Faced with such an array of actors and mech-anisms of support, Club du Sahel Executive Sec-retary Anne de Lattre concludes that the beststarting point for donor coordination is:

. . . to introduce low-key, technical coordina-tion mechanisms at the country level startingwith various sectors [e. g., irrigation, reforesta-tion) where responsible nationals and donorscan discuss ongoing projects, try to solve pend-ing problems, and use their experience to planmore successful initiatives (38).

A Variety of Strengths

Donors possess a variety of strengths in thesubstantive areas of the overall developmentstrategy directions that are needed in the Sa-hel. Some PVOs and the Peace Corps, as wellas volunteers from other nations, are commonlyperceived to have a comparative advantage ingrassroots or village level work. The WorldBank and United States are considered strongin macroeconomic analysis and policy reformwhile the United States and France are experi-enced in agricultural research. The UnitedStates and West Germany have skills and ex-perience in forestry; the Dutch are strong insmall-scale irrigation. Of course, at any giventime in a specific country, the strengths of thepersonnel available in assistance organizationswill vary.

However, the perceived strengths need to bereviewed critically. For example, a concern ex-ists regarding the process by which analysisfor the World Bank’s recommendations for pol-icy reform is carried out, This is particularlyimportant because the Bank is seen as provid-ing the lead for AID and other donors that lackthe World Bank’s capability for economicanalysis.

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Reasons for the World Bank’s relativestrengths in policy reform include the advan-tage it has as a multilateral organization andbecause of its relationship with the Interna-tional Monetary Fund (IMF), though there isconcern about lack of coordination between theWorld Bank and IMF (17,99), Because of theBank’s centralized structure, most of the eco-nomic analysis is done by the Bank’s econo-mists in Washington, where 94 percent of theBank’s staff work (3). Criticisms are often heardthat economic analysis is based on generaliza-tions, untested beliefs such as the efficacy ofthe private market, and that these are appliedto all countries without much sensitivity to so-cial and economic costs to the people or po-litical costs to the government of a specificcountry.

So far, policy reform theories are largely un-tested in the Sahel. One official in a French de-velopment agency suggested that some eco-nomic advice is derived more from ideologythan analysis, This criticism has been directedat the United States, the World Bank, and otherdonors supporting policy reform and who makeit a condition of their assistance.

A Diversify of Approaches

Donors take different approaches regardingdegrees of centralization and intensity of man-agement, whether they employ a top-down orbottom-up approach, and degrees to which theirprograms are influenced by other goals suchas political or commercial interests. Some assis-tance programs are very centralized, with thevast majority of their staff in headquarters (e. g.,World Bank/IDA and I FAD), while others havea number of field offices and large numbers ofstaff in the Sahel (e. g., AID, UNDP, and FAO).Some donors (e.g., France) combine centralizedapproaches with field staff. Whether thesedifferences are advantages or not is hard tojudge. Some see the small number of WorldBank field staff as an institutional constraintpreventing implementation of the Bank’s pro-fessed poverty alleviation policy; but it also canbe seen as an advantage over AID in that oncethe Bank funds projects, it is not closely in-

volved in their implementation (105). Manage-ment approaches also vary, Different donorsrequire different numbers of people to admin-ister a given amount of money, with those thatfund large, capital-intensive loan programs gen-erally requiring smaller numbers of field staff,

Some programs and projects are more man-agement-intensive than others, For example,one of the strategic elements described as im-portant in previous chapters is the need for lo-cal participation and village level program-ming. Development, support, oversight, andevaluation of these types of programs requiresignificant amounts of staff time in relation tosums disbursed. The benefits of such an ap-proach for achieving the goal of providing moreeffective assistance to Sahelian food security—on the national, regional, and individual level—argue against further cuts in field staff and forrelieving field staff of some requirements, Theyalso argue for greater use of Sahelian staff andorganizations, perhaps on a contractual basis,and PVOs. They also indicate a need for a re-duction or simplification of a number of report-ing requirements for the local-level project im-plementors.

Another basic difference in approach is thedegree to which a particular donor espouses,and then implements, a top-down or bottom-up approach to development. Many PVOs, thePeace Corps, IFAD, and the African Develop-ment Foundation, for example, espouse abottom-up approach. On the other end of thespectrum are highly capital-intensive, large-scale, top-down government-oriented fundingprograms that favor infrastructure and balanceof payments. The rural development strategiesof the large funders, including the World Bankand AID, encourage bottom-up, participatory

development. However, their size and institu-tional characteristics constrain their ability todevelop and implement programs based onthose goals.

Another difference in approach amongdonors is the degree to which they are influ-enced by goals unrelated to development. TheDutch program, for example, has been charac-terized as more development oriented and less

134

tied to commercial interests than other bilateralprograms. The political pressures of groupssuch as American and European farmers, Ital-ian engineering firms, and Japanese and U.S.automakers, often result in policies that lessenthe effectiveness of development assistance, Forexample, tied aid requirements limiting the re-cipient to procure goods and services in thedonor country affected 43 percent of bilateralODA from DAC countries in 1982 to 1983.These requirements not only reduce the valueof the assistance but also result in the introduc-tion of inappropriate technologies. While mostof the European donors have tied aid require-ments similar to the United States, the OPECnations and multilateral agencies do not (147).

An oft-cited advantage of multilateral aid isthat it is not tied to the commercial or short-term political objectives of individual nations(57,147), although others challenge both of theseassumptions (3,94,99). A greater proportion of

multilateral funding goes to low-income coun-tries than does bilateral aid. Most bilateral fundsgo to middle income developing countries,often for nondevelopmental purposes (147).Bilateral aid is an increasing percentage of to-tal U.S. assistance.

Within the diversity of donor organizationsand forms of assistance, each has relativestrengths and weaknesses. The scope of thechallenge in the Sahel is broad enough so thereis a role for each, Since no one donor can meetall the needs, collaboration is essential to max-imize the impact and make the best use ofscarce resources. An effective U.S. strategyshould be based on a determination of the rela-tive strengths and weaknesses of the variousinstitutional actors and forms of assistance.Such an analysis must begin by consideringU.S. institutions and the potential they have forcontributing to the Sahel.

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1314

132.

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134

135.

136.

137.

138.

Food Aid and Development: The Impact andEffectiveness of Bilateral Public Law 480 Ti-tle I-Type Assistance, AID Program EvaluationDiscussion Paper, No. 15 (Washington, DC: De-cember 1982).U.S. Agency for International Development,Bureau for Africa, Livestock DevelopmentAssistance Strategy Paper (Washington, DC:Dec. 22, 1982).U.S. Agency for International Development,AID Partnership in International DevelopmentWith Private and Voluntary Organizations,AID Policy Paper (Washington, DC: Septem-ber 1982).U.S. Agency for International Development,Inspector General, Improvements Must BeMade in the Sahel Regional Development Pro-gram, Audit Report No. 0-625-81-52, Mar. 10,1981.U.S. Agency for International Development,Report to the United States Congress: Proposalfor a Long-Term Comprehensive DevelopmentProgram for the Sahel, Major Findings andPrograms (Washington, DC: 1976).U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office,Can More Be Done To Assist Sahelian Govern-men ts To Plan and Manage Their EconomicDevelopment? NSIAI)-85-87 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 6,1985).U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office,Issues Affecting Appropriations for the Afri-can Development Foundation, NSIAI)-85-62(Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, May 7, 1985).U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office,U.S. Assistance to the Sahel: Progress andProblems, Report No. ID-79-9 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Mar. 29,1979).U.S. Congress, House Committee on Govern-ment Operations, Legislation and NationalSecurity Subcommittee, AID’s Administrativeand Management Problems in Providing For-eign Economic Assistance (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct. 6, 1981).U.S. Department of Agricuhure, Economic Re-search Service, unpublished data and figures,Washington, DC, February 1986.

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Appendixes

Appendix A

Appendix Tables

Table A-1 .—General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983, DACa Countries(thousands of U.S. dollars)

Donors 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 2,230 $ 38 — — — —Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .France . . . . ..., . . . . . . . . . .Ireland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . .Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . .United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . .

3707,536

66,7893,490

177.194

8002,5108,3471,1301,9704,0476,925

71,322137,423

1,15224,25241,901

5,63219

277,675

29046,86457,9148,7185,761

18,32424,768

123,244135,802

$ 83321,59110,73019,160

519319,216

29710

38,74786,8833,969

16,38411,9678,798

130,11193,509

$ 2,90424,16169,727

2,116618

384,068

2,55026,59049,437

1,8512,962

38,5566,830

143,322209,760

$ 15,88738,820

7,306—

302,281

—25,27023,058

—8,365

22,6617,210

144,360164,517

$ 17,23765,14723,564

—144,099

33,84330,42563,535

1518,268

28,36211,175

139,35744,341

Total DAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $492,083 $772,354 $763,156 $965,452 $759,735 $609,504= Not available

aDAC_The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

SOURCE” Club du Sahel/CILSS, Official Development Assistance to CILSS Member Countries in 1983(Pans.Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,1985)

Table A-2.–General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983,Multilateral institutions (non.OPECa) (thousands of U.S. dollars)

Donors 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983international Development Association/

World Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 78,700 $110,100 $122,000 $166,300 $93,200 $127,000European Economic Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,793 240,194 180,063 239,224 202,474 152,921African Development Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,554 44,302 34,326 58,641 73,713 51,174International Fund for Agricultural

Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,650 22,400 19,702 10,986 13,000Cultural and Technical Development Agency . . . 320 2,546 2,025West African Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

— —5,814

International Monetary Fund Trust Fund . . . . . . .— —

22,445 — —

Total multilateral aid(l) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $166,367 $410,792 $389,073 $483,867 $380,373 $344,095Total United Nations (2)...... . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,607 78,082 101,227 97,790 72,020 110,304

Total(1) + (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $216,974 $488,874 $490,300 $581,657 $452,393 $454,399= Not available

%PEC–The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.SOURCE: Club du Sahel/CILSS, Of f/cia/ Deve/opn?enf Ass/stance to C/LSS Member Countries In 1983 (Paris” Organization for Econornlc Co.operat Ion and Development,

1985)

145

146

Table A-3.—General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983,OPEC a Countries and Institutions (thousands of U.S. dollars)

Donors

Algeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Arab Bank for Economic Development

in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Arab Fund for Economic and Social

Development of the United Nations. . . . . . . . . .Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African

and Arab Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Islamic Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OPEC a Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SAFAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1975

$2,426

—

—

——

900—

29,2428,2421,810

—7,500

12,90020,86814,008

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983— $ 2,000 $ 100 — $ 4,500

15,009

31,390

17,600 326 $ 9,000—

$ 35,000 6,671— —

— — — —50

95015,44255,57430,130

11030,600

1,000

—35,0009,097

85,706—

13,03017,750

—46,610

6,00040,46034,680

—48,18124,212

136,0021,400

—59,520

——

102,22153,751

8,11326,371

—34,0003,300—

67,93013.263

—41,060

———

116,78831,449

—11,098160,064

50.552 —Total OPEC countries and financial

institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $97,896 $361,420 $248,243 $425,713%PEC—The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countnes.

$301,831 $195,853

SOURCE” Clubdu Sahel/CILSS, Officla/ Deve/oprnenf Ass/stance foC/LSSfden?ber Courrtfiesifl 1983(Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operatton and Development,1985)

Table A-4.—Who Finances What in Certain Sectors (total commitments, 1975.83)

Millions of Millions ofU.S. dollars Percent U.S. dollars Percent

Balance of payments support:OPEC a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical assistance:France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

290253

75

484213

776925738

62753

EECb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Food aid and emergencyassistance:

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Multisectoral rural developmentOPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IDAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Irrigated farming:IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Budget support:France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rainfed agriculture:France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

262310

99

146144119114

51

16161313

6

344299135121113

Ecology-forestry:IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43718315010910388

331411

887

3332232215

171612118

Transport and infrastructure:OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

454276236136108

291715

97

12111910290

18171315

24020830

4740

6IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .%PEC–The Organization of Petroleum ExDortina CountriesbEEc–EUrOpea~ECOnOmlC C o m m u n i t y . ‘ -

CIDA—lrltematlOnal I)ewdopment AssociationlWorld Bank.

SOURCE” Club duSahel/CILSS, Officia/ Deve/opmentAssisfance to C/LSSMemberCountriesin 1983(Paris0 rgantzation forEconomicCo-operation and Development1985)

147

Table A-5.—Sectoral Breakdown and Trend ofCommitments From 1975 to 1983

Percent of Growthtotal a a i d trend

Nonproject assistance:● Development assistance

(technical assistance,research, scholarships) . .

● Operating assistance(including balance ofpayments and budgetsupport) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Food aid, emergencyassistance . . . . . . . . . .

Project assistance:. Rainfed agriculture. . . . . . . . . .• Irrigated agricuIture . . . . . .. Major river basins (OMVS, C

OMVG d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Reforestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .● Infrastructure (transport,

telecommunications, urbandevelopment) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Education and training . . . . . .. Water supply

(rural and urban) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Health . . . . . . . . . . .. Industry and tourism . . . . . . . . .

12.4 down

11.0 down

10.7 up

9.3 up7.6 up

6.9 27.4 Up down

2.4 down1 . 2 up1,5 up

19.6 up4.9 up

3.8 down3.0 up2.9 up2,0 down

aAverage I 975.83 commitmentsb lt ,~ estimated that half of these commitments are for food production, i e 45

percentcThe Senegal River Basin Development AuthoritydThe Gambia River Basin Development Authority

SOURCE” Club du Sahel/CILSS, Of fwial Development Assistance to C/LSSMember Counfr/es in 1983 (Pans Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1985)

148

Table A-6.—U.S. Aid to the Sahel, Fiscal Years 1975 to 1985 (millions of U.S. dollars)

Country 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985Burkina Faso:Economic assistance . . $ 5.3 $ 1.6 $3 .4 $ 11.4 $ 15.9 $ 9.2 .% 14.1Food aid . . . .

$ 11.2 $ 0.33.6 3.6 8.1 8.3

$ 2.89.5 12.2 15.1 6,8 7.2 $ 16.1 6.5

Peace Corps . . . . . . . 0.7 1.0 1,0 1.0 1.3 1.6Military assistance. ... 0.1

1.5 1.5— — — — 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 * *

Total . . . . . . $9.5 $6.2 $12.5 $20,7 $ 27.0 $22.9 $30.8 $ 19.7 $ 9.0 $ 17.7 $ 10.8Cape Verde:Economic assistance . $4 .0 $ 1.0 $2.3 $ 8.0 $ 2.9 $ 3.1 $ 3.6 $ 3.5 $ 2.2 $ 2.0 $ 2,0Food aid . ... ... . . 0.1 2.1 3.2 3.4 4.5 2.7 3.0 2,5 2.7 4,5 0.7Peace Corps ... ... . . — — — — —Military assistance. .,

— — — — — —— — — — — — — — — — —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4.1 $ 3.1 $5 .5 $ 11.4 $ 7.4 $ 5.8 $ 6.6 $ 6.0 $ 4.9 $ 6.5 $ 2.8Chad:Economic assistance . . $3 .9 $2 .2 $6.6 $ 11.2 $ 4.5 $ 0.2 – $ 3.7 $ 2.0 $ 11.0 $ 14.0Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.9 5.3 6.8 6.2 3.6 – 2.5 3.2 5.0 1.4Peace Corps . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0,8 0.9 1.4 0.7 – – – – – –Military assistance. — — — — — — — * 2.2 5.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 4.8 $3.9 $12.8 $ 19.4 $ 10.0 $ 3.8 – $ 6.2 $ 5.3 $ 18.2 $ 20.6The Gambia:Economic assistance . . $0 .7 $0.1 $ 1.3 $ 4.5 $ 4.7 $ 5.6 $ 1.2 $ 3.9 $ 3.7 $ 4.6Food aid . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 $ 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.8 2.0 1.3 1.1 0.4 3.3 0.7Peace Corps . . . . . . . . . 0,2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0Military assistance. . . . — — — — — — — — — — —

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1.9 $ 1.3 $ 1.2 $ 2.8 $ 5.9 $ 7.5 $ 7.7 $ 3.1 $ 5.1 $ 7.9 $ 6.3Mail:Economic assistance . . $13.3 $3.8 $10.0 $ 10.1 $ 16.6 $ 15.5 $ 14.5 $ 9.6 $ 9.9 $ 11.6 $28.5Food aid . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 0.2 5.3 1.4 0.6 – 0.8 4.3 11.1 1.5Peace Corps . . ..., . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.9Military assistance. . . . — — — — 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $22,7 $4.6 $10.6 $ 16.1 $ 19,1 $ 17.4 $ 16.0 $ 12.0 $ 15.5 $24.4 $ 32.1Mauritania:Economic assistance ., $ 1.7 $ 0.7 $ 1.7 $ 6.0 $ 6.3 .$ 2.7 $ 8.5 $ 6.3 $ 5.1 $ 4.9 $ 9.4Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 4.1 1,7 2.9 1.7 8.0 6.2 3.4 6.0 7.5 4.5Peace Corps . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5Military assistance. . . — — — — — — * * 0.1 0.1 0.1

T o t a l . . . , . . . , . . . $4.3 $5.1 $ 3.6 $ 9.2 $ 8.7 $ 11.6 $ 15.8 $ 11.2 $ 12.6 $ 14,1 $ 15.5Niger:Economic assistance $0 .2 $ 7.8 $6 .7 .$ 10.6 $ 10.9 $ 9.5 $ 13.7 $ 13.0 $ 21.0 $26.4 $ 25.0Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.8 4,2 0.4 2.8 0.1 1.0 1.4 2.1 0.8 0.5 –Peace Corps . . . . . . . 1.2 1,6 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.4 2,7 2.3 2.4 2.6Military assistance.. — — — — — — 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.2 5.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 9.2 $13.6 $8.4 $ 14.8 $ 12.9 $ 12.7 $ 17.4 $ 17.8 $ 24.0 $31.5 $ 32.8Senegal:Economic assistance . . $6 .3 $ 2.1 $8 ,7 $ 8.7 $ 15.0 $ 10.0 $ 14.8 $ 16.2 $ 19.1 $34.6 $ 37.1Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.7 2.9 11,2 5.9 15,1 18.6 12.8 12,3 14,7 4.6Peace Corps . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 2,0 1.8 1.9 2.0M i l i t a r y ass i s t ance , * ● 8.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0,4 2.5 3.5

Total ..,...... . . . . . $ 9.4 $6 .3 $21.1 $21.6 $22.8 $27.2 $35.7 $ 31.3 $33.6 $53.7 $47.2

Sahel regional:Economic assistance $13.5 $9 ,4 $ 8 . 9 $ 9.7 $ 7.9 $ 21.6 $22.2 $33.2 $32.7 $40.3 $22.9Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 – – – – – – – 0.2 – –Peace Corps ...... ., — — — — — — — — — _ _Military assistance. ,.. — — — — — — — — —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . $13.5 –$9 .4 $ 8.9 $ 9.7 $ 7.9 $21.6 $22.2 $ 33.2 $ 32.9 $40.3 –$22.9

Grand totals . . . . . . . . $79.2 $53.5 $84.6 $125.7 $121.7 $130.4 $152,2 $140.5 $142.9 $214.3 $191,0

“Less than $50,000NOTE” Food aid” is regular Public Law 480 and does not include emergency assistance, which amounted to about $50 million in fiscal year 1984 and $190 million

in fiscal year 1985. This table appears as calculated by AID

SOURCE: U.S.Agency for international Development, Bureau for Africa, Office of Sahel and West Africa Affairs, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,April 1986.

149

Table A-7.—Amount Spent on Public Law 480 Commodities for the Sahel, 1977-86 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

Burkina Faso:Total ., ., 7,940 8,144 8,596 11,473 13,916 5,963 6,876 12,419

Title I and III:Market value . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title IIM o n e y s p e n t 7,940 8,144 8,596 11,473 13,916 51963 6.876 12,419Predicted: Total : : : : . . .

Food ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Freight . . . . . . .

Cape Verde:Total .. ,. 2,391 2.150 2,852 1,357 3,733 2,294 2,444 3,361

Title I and III:Market value . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:Money spent 2,391 2,150 21852 1,357 3,733 2,294 2,444 3,361Predicted Total ’ . ..,

Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Freight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chad:Total, 4,223 4,446 4,076 1,750 20 2,275 2,351 5,284

Title I and IIIM a r k e t v a l u e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:M o n e y s p e n t . 4,223 4,446 4,076 1,750 20 2,275 2,351 5,284P r e d i c t e d : T o t a l

F o o dFreight .

The Gambia:Total 672 839 764 1,558 1,100 1,374 288 3,416

Title I and III: Market value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:Money spent 672 839 764 1,558 1,100 1,374 288 3.416Predicted Total .“

Food . .Freight: . :

Mali:Total 38 2,980 1,150 483 600 1,410 2,221 7,169

Title I and III: M a r k e t v a l u e 0 0 0 0 600 600 0 0

Title II:Money spent 38 2,980 1,150 483 0 810 2221 7169Predicted Total. .

F o o dF r e i g h t .

Mauritania:Total 1,664 2,258 1,111 6,795 6,501 2,448 4,905 8,570

T / t / e / a n d / / /M a r k e t v a l u e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:M o n e y s p e n t , 1,664 2,258 1,111 6,795 6,501 2,448 4,905 8,570P r e d i c t e d T o t a l

Food . .Freight . .

Niger:Total 255 2,039 92 1,087 1,141 2,498 303 795

Title I and III: M a r k e t v a l u e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:Money spent 255 2,039 92 1,087 1141 2,498 303 795Predicted Total “. : . . . .

Food . . . . . . . . .F r e i g h t ” :

19861985 (estimated)

19,663

0

19,66329,428.317,400.512,027.8

1,880

0

1,8802,315.01,533.0

7820

17,805

0

17,80539,011819,061519,9503

2,533

0

2.5333,29042,6334

657.0

23,991

0

23,99138,071219,436118,6351

6,602

0

6,60217,5336710403

10.4933

15,573

0

15,57357,887920.907736,9802

6.7891

0

a*

10,30566.78913,5165

3,0823

0a

*

4.15913,08231,0768

3,8161

0a

5,318.53,81611,5024

1,0952

0

a*

1,54001,0952

4448

9,9585

0

a

20.009.19,9585

10,0506

26554

0

a

3,900.0265541,2446

6,5730

0

a

11,187.86,57304,6148

Table A-7.—Amount

1977

Senegal:T o t a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 , 9 4 8

Title I and Ill:Market value ... ... ... 0

Title II:Money spen t . . . . . . . . . 2 , 948Predicted: Total . ., . ., . . .,...,.., ..,

Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Freight . . . . . . . . . .

Total for eight countries 20,131

Spent on Public Law 480 Commodities for the Sahel, 1977-86(in thousands of U.S. dollars)-Continued

. —1986

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 (estimated)— —

9,419 5,969 15,750 29,119 26,372 12,266 13,872 3,966 10,243.7b

0 0 7,000(111) 17,100 24,100 7,000 0 0 5,500

9,419 5,969 8,759 12,019 2,272 5,266a

13,872 3,986. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . 11,528.2 7,838.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,973.8 4,753,7.. .. . . . .. 4,554.4 3,084.5

32,275 24,610 40,262 56.130 44.634 31.654 54,886 92.033 44.213.3aData not yet avatlable.bcombines the prediction for Title II with the payment for Titles I and Ill (Sene9al 19~)NOTES” Title I and Ill are combined except where noted

Title II includes World Food Program (WFP) and Emergency SupplementsTitle II does not include ocean freight except where noted in 1985 and 1988 In these 2 years, only the market value of the commodities IS used to calculatethe final totals in order to maintain consistencyData from 1977434 IS money actually spent on commoditiesData from 1985-86 includes money projected to be spent on commodities and ocean freight as well as what actually was spent on food commoditie in 1985

SOURCE U S Agency for International Development, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, Off Ice of Food for Peace, April 1986

Appendix B

Other Contributors to the Special Reporton Development in the Sahel

Sahel Development Working Group I Sahel Development Working Group II

Philip BoyleVienna, VA

Vincent BrownDevres, Inc.Washington, DC

Donald FergusonOICD/TADU.S. Department of AgricultureWashington, DC

Jeff GritznerBoard on Science and Technology for

International DevelopmentNational Academy of SciencesWashington, DC

Claude BlanchiWest African ProjectsThe World BankWashington, DC

Jim HradskyU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

David ShearOrganization for Rehabilitation Through

TrainingWashington, DC

Christine MacCallumOverseas Education FundWashington, DC

Melinda Smale Vito StaglianoChemonics U.S. Department of EnergyWashington, D.C. Washington, DC

Dean Treadwell C. Payne LucasMoundsville, WV Africare

Robert WilsonWashington, DC

AfricareWashington, DC

Robert WinterbottomInternational Institute for Environment and

DevelopmentWashington, DC

151

59-965 0 - 86 - 6

Appendix C

Additional Reviewers of theSpecial Report on Development

in the Sahel

The following people reviewed drafts of this report. In addition, members of the assessment AdvisoryPanel and participants in the two OTA Working Groups also reviewed drafts.

Ellsworth Amundson, Deputy DirectorAFR/Sahel West AfricaU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Albert R. BaronProject Director for Sahel Evaluation ProjectDevres, Inc.Washington, DC

Ambassador Robert O. BlakeInternational Institute for Environment and

DevelopmentWashington, DC

Jerry CashionAfrican Development FoundationWashington, DC

Thomas CattersonAFR/TRU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Dennis Chandler, DirectorAFR/Sahel West AfricaU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Kathleen CloudINTERPAKSUniversity of IllinoisUrbana, IL

Anne De Lattre, Director of the SecretariatClub du SahelOCDE/OECDParis, France

Forest DuncanFVA/PPEU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Ted GaldiForeign Affairs Division

Congressional Research ServiceLibrary of CongressWashington, DC

Sherry GrossmanAFR/DPU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Benjamin H. HardyEquator Bank LimitedHartford, CT

Ray MeyerS&T/Agricultre/RNRU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Arlene MitchellUSDA/OICDTechnical Assistance DivisionWashington, DC

Wilford MorrisDepartment of Agricultural EconomicsPurdue UniversityLafayette, IN

Leonard Robinson, PresidentAfrican Development FoundationWashington, DC

Irving RosenthalOrganization for Rehabilitation Through

TrainingWashington, DC

Glenn SlocumClub du SahelOCDE/OECDParis, France

Abe WaldsteinGreat Falls, VA

152

Appendix D

OTA Field Visits-November 1985

Much of the material in this special report was gathered during extensive interviews with the followingauthorities.

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: NATIONAL AND BILATERAL

Bernard BachelierDelegu pour l’AfriqueCentre de Cooperation International en Recherche

Agronomique pour le DeveloppementParis, France

Byron BahlU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentBanjul, The Gambia

John BailisAgriculture Development OfficerU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentDakar, Senegal

Jim BingenInstitut SenegalaisDakar, Senegal

Jean Le Bloas

de Recherche Agricole

River Basin Development OfficeU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentDakar, Senegal

Pieter Van BlomChef du Project ARPON, L’Office du NigerSegou, Mali

Michel CasseDirecteur de Developpement RuralMinistere de la CooperationParis, France

Gene ChiavoroliMission DirectorU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentBamako, Mali

Albert CompaoreDirecteur de l’AmenagementForestler et du ReboissementMinistere de l’EnvironmentOugadougou, Burkina Faso

Beatrice DamibaMinistre de l’Environment etOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Tourism

Baudouin de MarckenU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

P. DoloChef Section du Recherche sur Cultures

Vivrieres et Olioageneuses (SRVCO)Bamako, Mali

Ollo Cherubim HeinOrganization Regionale du DeveloppementOuahigouya, Burkina Faso

David HunsbergerUSAID/River Basin Development OfficeDakar, Senegal

Marguerite Kabore, ChiefMadame Zare FantaFoyers AmelioresOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Francis KanCrop Protection SpecialistCasamance ProjectU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentDakar, Senegal

Boubacar S. KanteChef de la Division TechniqueOperation Haute Val1eeBamako, Mali

Herbert MillerMission DirectorU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

MBaye NDoyeDirecteurDepartment Productions VegetalesCentre Nationale de Recherche AgricoleBambey, Senegal

The Honorable Leonard NeherU.S. AmbassadorOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

153

154—

Jean Luis Neumann etMonsieur George d’AndlauCaisse Centrale pour la Cooperation

EconomiqueParis, France

Richard NewbergAgriculture Project OfficerU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentBamako, Mali

Issouf OuebraogoMinistre du DevelopmentOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Emmanuel Salmon-LegagneurMinistere de la CooperationParis, France

Zana SanogoDirection Recherche AgronomiqueInstitute d’Economique RuraleBamako, Mali

Wally SedogoBureau de ProgrammationInstitut Burkinabe pour la Recherche

Agronomique et Zootechnique (IBRAZ)

Min. de l’Education SuperieurOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Emny SimmonsU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentBamako. Mali

Mamado SissakoAssistant Agriculture Development OfficerU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentBamako, Mali

Roy StacyMission DirectorU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentHarare, Zimbabwe

Lamine TraoreProject ChefSemi-Arid Food Grain Research and

DevelopmentBamako, Mali

Pieter Van BlomChef Du Pro jet ARPONBamako, Mali

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL

Mr. Bonte-FreidheimDirectorDivision of Agricultural OperationsFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

Mahamane BrahExecutive DirectorComite Permanent Inter-Etas de Lutte Contre

La Secheresse clans le Sahel (CILSS)Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

H. BraunChiefFertilizer and Plant Protection DivisionFood and Agriculture OrganizationsRome, Italy

Donald S. BrownVice presidentInternational Fund for Agricultural

DevelopmentRome, Italy

Alioune CamaraCoordinator of the Sahelian Research and

Documentation CenterInstitut du SahelBamako, Mali

Gilbert ChildSenior OfficerWildlife and Protected Area ManagementForest Resources DivisionForestry DepartmentFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

M. ColletDelegue du Fends European, du DeveloppementBamako, Mali

G. d’AvoutDeputy DirectorDivision of Agriculture OperationsFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

155

Sinalou DiawaraHydrologistUnited Nation Sahel OfficeBamako, Mali

Hans ErikssonUnited Nations Sudano-SahelianOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Michael FurstWorld Bank RepresentativeBamako, Mali

Michel GrolleauClub du SahelOCDE/OECDParis, France

Eva JanssonUnited Nations Sudano-SahelianOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Ann de LattreDirector of the SecretariatClub du SahelOCDE/OECDParis, France

Frederick LyonsRepresentant Resident A joint

Office

Office

Programme Des Nations Unies Pour deDeveloppement

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Andre MartensClub du SahelOCDE/OECDParis, France

Dr. Peter J. MatlonDr. RomayaDr. LohaniThe International Institute for Research in the

Semi-Arid TropicsKamboinse Research StationOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Nora McKeon-ArmandoPeoples ParticipationFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

J.P. NastorgChiefWorld Food ProgramRome, Italy

A. N. NgongiChiefEast and Southern Africa BranchProject Management DivisionUN/FAO World Food ProgrammeRome, Italy

David NorseSenior Policy and PlanningAgriculture DepartmentFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

Sam OlowudeProject Officer for East AfricaInternational Fund for Agricultural

DevelopmentRome, Italy

Jean-Marc PirudellClub du SahelOCDE/OECDParis, France

Dr. Mar io Rodr iguezD i r e c t o rDr. Vas AggarwalDr. HulugallaDr. DialloDr. Joseph SuhInternational Institute of Tropical AgricultureSemi -Ar id Food Gra in Research and

DevelopmentOuagadougou, Burk ina Faso

Andrew RogersonWorld Bank RepresentativeOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Dr. ShettyThe International Crops Research Institute for

the Semi-Arid TropicsBamako, Mali

Dr. SindogoIBRAZOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Fironz SobhaniHabib KraiemJean Etienne YangoUnited Nations Sahel OfficeOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

156

Derek H. SuttonAgricultural Engineering ServiceAgricultural Services DivisionAgriculture DepartmentFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

Tarekegne TakaChiefRegional Bureau for AfricaField Program DevelopmentFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

Mama Garba Tapo

Banque Mondiale BankBamako, Mali

Harry W. UnderhillWater Resources, Development and

Management ServiceLand and Water Development DivisionFood and Agriculture OrganizationRome, Italy

Harmut J. von HulstChiefAgricultural Engineering ServiceAgricultural Services DivisionFood and Agriculture Organization

Assistant Resident

Lillian Baer

Representative Rome, Italy

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Guy de BonnevilleAfrica Consultants, Inc.Dakar, Senegal

Steve BrownDirectorCatholic Relief ServicesOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Robert ChambersInstitute of Development StudiesUniversity of SussexBrighton, United Kingdom

Charles CondaminesFreres des HommesVersailles, France

Lionel DerenoncortChurch World ServiceDakar, Senegal

Gilbert EduDiabate AnadouOuedrago BoureimaAfricareOuahigouya, Burkina Faso

Debbie FredoOverseas Education FundDakar, Senegal

Jacques GiriStrategie, Energie, Environnement,

DeveloppementParis, France

Directeur E’EtudesSociete D’Etudes pour le Developpement

Economique et SocialParis, France

Jeffrey L. GrayRepresentativeAfricareBamako, Mali

Martin GreeleyInstitute of Development StudiesUniversity of SussexFalmer, U.K.

Olu KaribCoordinatorAfricareFood for Work ProgramOuahigonya, Burkina Faso

Sandy LaumarkDirectorCAREBamako, Mali

Marc LevySecretaire GeneralGroup de Recherche at d’Echanges

TechnologiquesParis, France

Michael LiptonInstitute of Development Studies

157

University of SussexFalmer, U.K.

Richard LonghurstInstitute of Development StudiesUniversity of SussexFalmer, U.K.

John MorseMennonite Central CommitteeOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Mazide N’DiayeDirectorResean Africain du Developpement IntegreDakar, Senegal

Mathieu OuedragoOXFAMOuahigouya, Burkina

Nichel Ouedraogo

Faso

Noumouni Ouedraogo, etNebnoma SawadogoAssociation International dite Six S (Se Servir

de la Saison Seche en Savane et au Sahel)Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso

Paul RichardsDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity College LondonLondon, United Kingdom

Roger RiddellOverseas Development InstituteRegent’s CollegeLondon, United Kingdom

Gill ShepardOverseas Development InstituteLondon, U.K.

Mary TiffonOverseas Development InstituteLondon, U.K.

Sahr J. TonguResident RepresentativeAfricareOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

C.A. van DiepenSoil ScientistCentre for World Food StudiesCABOWageningen, Netherlands

The Sahel DevelopmentStatement -Executive

Appendix E

StrategySummary

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (AID) Sahel Country (Regional) Development StrategyStatement, published in April 1984 for use in fiscal year 1986, was developed by the Sahel DevelopmentPlanning Team in Bamako, Mali and the Washington Sahel Office and incorporated the lessons AID hadlearned in the region. Below is the executive summary from the statement.

The SaheI Development StrategyStatement

Executive Summary

The multi-donor Sahel Development Program(SDP) encompasses the combined efforts of muchof the world’s donor community in eight countries:Chad, Niger, Mali, Upper Volta, Senegal, The Gam-bia, Mauritania, and Cape Verde, It was initiatedin 1976, following several years of emergencydrought relief and reconstruction in the Sahel, In1978 Congress formally created AID’s contributionand commitment to the program with the provisothat U.S. participation be limited to ten percent ofthe total annual donor commitment. The goals ofthe SDP are food self-reliance under conditions ofsustained economic growth in a restored and stabi-lized environment. At that time, the program astermed “a Contract for a Generation, ” acknowledg-ing a 20- to 30-year timeframe for the participantsto achieve their goals. While AID is committed tothese same objectives, the U S. commitment is sub-ject to continuous review.

The economies of the Sahel countries which bor-der on the Sahara Desert are based predominantlyon subsistence, dry-land agriculture. The funda-mental obstacles to the development of this regionlie in the determination and implementation of thenecessary technical means needed to increase percapita agricultural production. To achieve this goalin the primitive conditions of the Sahel it is neces-sary to develop its physical, human, and institu-tional infrastructure. Most of the 35 million peoplein these eight countries are illiterate, widely dis-persed, and dependent on low-yielding agricultureand pastoralism. There is as yet no available alter-native technology which could be applied to rap-idly improve food production.

Between 1976 and 1982, the Western and Orga-nization of Petroleum Exporting Countries aiddonors committed approximately $8 billion to re-habilitation, budget, and balance of payments sup-

port, food aid, and development investment in theSahel, (An appreciable quantity of Eastern Bloc re-sources, mostly for military purposes, was also con-tributed.) For its part, AID committed $600 millionin development assistance plus $300 million in Pub-lic Law 480 food, and $10 million in EconomicStabilization Funds (ESF).

During this interval, cereals and livestock produc-tion regained their pre-drought levels and the aver-age quantity of cereals output modestly increased,Yet rainfall has continued to be markedly less thanthe annual averages experienced during the pre-drought decade of the 1960s. The absolute droughthas persisted in certain places (Cape Verde andMauritania) and returned periodically in others. Incertain respects, the region’s dependency is actu-ally worse given the high rate of population growth(2.5 to 3.0 percent annually) and the major disrup-tions, e.g., the oil shocks and world recession,within the global economy.

The net effect of the experience of 1976 to 1982has been, at best, very slow growth of average indi-vidual incomes, declining per capita production,and a net deterioration in the financial conditionand short-term economic prospects of the Sahelcountries. Sahelian external debt and annual debtservice have increased; export earnings have de-clined; fiscal imbalances exacerbated; and the over-all dependency of these countries on external, con-cessional resources has dramatically increased.

To cope with the harsh natural conditions of theSahel combined with the distressing internationaleconomy of recent years has been an Olympian re-quirement; to have recovered from the devastationof the initial drought, to have developed the capacityto withstand continuing drought, to have achievedreal per capita improvement, however limited, andto have undertaken substantial basic measures fordevelopment and future improved production arethe achievements of the Sahel States and the donoreffort to date. Much of the multi-donor aid to theSahel has been directed toward current consump-tion and economic stabilization. This type of aidwill probably be required for several years. But the

158

focus of the development effort has been to addressthe Sahelian production systems, some of the mostprimitive in the world and which are exacerbatedby an exceptionally harsh environment extremelylacking in natural advantages.

AID’s development effort initially had little infor-mation and understanding of the physical, institu-tional, and policy environment in which economicimprovement was to take place. The acquisition ofdata was painful, costly, and time-consuming. How-ever, systems were set up within the program toprovide a continuous and increasing flow of dataand to accumulate it as efficiently as possible. Atthe same time, AID mounted pilot investment ini-tiatives to assure the availability of the variety ofresources needed to achieve the program goals. Italso began efforts to establish conducive official pol-icies and public and private institutions, to providetraining ranging from general literacy through alltypes of relevant technical specialties, to constructinfrastructure, and to supply equipment.

The idea of the coordinated Sahel program is tomaximize the effect of all donor and indigenous ef-forts in development by first agreeing on priorityobjectives and then seeing to the most advantageousapplication of all available resources. By organiz-ing in a variety of ways under the auspices of thecooperative institutions established to implementthe program, i.e., the CILSS (The Permanent Inter-state Committee for Drought in the Sahel) and theClub du Sahel (organization of the donors), the effi-ciencies of coordination in the Sahel are being real-ized. It has worked to provide information and re-search, to share institutional resources and scarcepersonnel, to mount parallel actions where individ-ual efforts would have been inadequate, to resolveissues which threatened the success of everyone’seffort, and to minimize contradictions and redun-dancies, Thus, while this cooperation is far fromperfect, it has yielded tangible and substantialbenefits.

In early 1984 development in the Sahel is in itsearly stages, Economic transformation of this re-gion will only be realized over an extended periodand then only if systematic and deliberate supportis assured. In 1982 to 1983 and extending into 1984,AID, the Club, the CILSS and individual Saheliancountries carried out a number of assessments, au-dits, and evaluations in order to identify progress,problems, and required adjustments, These have ledto and will continue to yield improvements, for AID,in the type and extent of AID initiatives; for the pro-gram, in coordination and focus; and for CILSS,in the efficient use of resources. This introspection

haseryhas

159

revealed that the Program has achieved recov-and prevented the recurrence of disaster andmade some progress toward intermediate de-

velopment targets. But there have also been a num-ber of false starts and some tactical approaches havehad to be revised. It has become clear that the Sa-helian governments, because of limited financial re-sources (the recurrent cost problem), are not ableto contribute as much to development as had beenexpected. Moreover, many of the initial develop-ment actions were too diverse or not consistent withthe program priorities that shortages of indigenousskills were undercutting all initiatives.

A number of corrective measures have alreadybeen taken to address these issues, most impor-tantly, the community has come to understand thathopes for rapid improvement in production and in-comes based on implementation of better technol-ogies are not realistic at this time because effectivetechniques in the Sahelian environment are notknown or are too costly. In addition, we have foundthat we are obliged to assist to a much greater ex-tent than anticipated with current consumption,economic stabilization, policy reform, and humancapital formation.

The Strategy for the AID Program

We assume a continuing annual aggregate ofdonor assistance to the Sahel, in 1983 terms, ofabout $1.5 billion and an AID program of about $90to $100 million in development assistance (1983dollars) plus Public Law 480 commodities and someESF. We will have to help with the immediate prob-lem at sustaining current consumption levels andfinancial and economic stability by applying someof our resources to help with balance of payments,budgetary support, and food imports, The economicstabilization measures will be used to affect sub-stantial reform in official policies, institutions, andpractices where such adjustments are determinedto be required for effective implementation of eco-nomic development. We will use local currenciesgenerated from stabilization aid and food sales tofinance local costs associated with improved pro-duction.

Given AID’s own institutional priorities andstrengths, we will focus our overall Sahel programand individual country programs in a few selectedareas, consistent with our management capabilities.Priorities will be agricultural research and produc-tion, policy reform, health and family planning,training, infrastructure, conservation, and environ-mental protection. Not all of these initiatives need

160

be undertaken in each Sahel country because offunding and management limitations.

Given the agriculture production priority, AIDwill devote a preponderant share of its resourcesto dryland and irrigated food cultivation and ani-mal husbandry. Regarding the latter, livestock area very important resource for the Sahel. After ex-tended research and trial interventions, we havebecome convinced that traditional practices of pas-toralism are well adapted to the Sahelian circum-stances. However, there are significant opportu-nities for services and investments which will helpimprove the efficiency and aggregate output of live-stock products. Animal health services can be im-proved through known technology and veterinarytechniques. The pastoralists have proven theirwillingness to purchase these benefits when theyare available. In addition, surveys have revealedsubstantial areas of underused range and fodderbecause of the absence of nearby water points.Hence, AID’s interventions in the pastoral areas ofthe Sahel will focus on health delivery and waterpoints development, as well as on assisting theinstitutions which provide these services and train-ing. In the agriculture areas, AID encourages mixedfarming and animal traction and will undertakeselective research into the cultivation of fodder par-ticularly in conjunction with farm management andcrop rotation.

After many trials of a variety of technical inter-ventions, we still do not know enough about alter-native varieties, technologies, or systems of produc-tion to implement any broad-scale reform in rain-fedfood cultivation in the Sahel. It is true that therehave been limited successes with innovations suchas animal traction; special varieties of cereals; andnew crops, e.g., maize; and water management.These adaptations are implemented when they ap-pear to be appropriate. In addition, there will becontinuing attention given to paced training andexpansion of extension services, food crop protec-tion, supply of production inputs, improvement ofmarketing and distribution, and policy reform.However, because the knowledge required to im-prove agricultural production adequately to achievethe program goals is not yet available, the firstpriority must be agricultural research. This researchwill require training; close collaboration with thefarmers themselves; and intensive biological andtechnical investigation of promising alternatives ofvarieties, techniques, fertilizers, and farming sys-tems. Concurrently, we will undertake to developtraining institutions, the agricultural infrastructurealready installed, and that enabling infrastructureneeded to open up production possibilities.

Our investigations have convinced us that themost likely evolution of rain-fed agricultural pro-duction will not yield the output goals and sched-ule we have set for the program. This productionwill inevitably be hostage to periodic severe drought.It is therefore advisable and necessary to undertakea major effort in irrigation development to exploitthe considerable volumes of river water which nowpass through the Sahel unused. While much irriga-tion is currently practiced, only about 10 percentof the potential is being exploited. AID and othershave hesitated to undertake major efforts in irriga-tion because of the expensive infrastructure re-quired, the technical sophistication involved in theoperation, and the dismal experiences with manyinitiatives to date. Yet, irrigation development is re-quired to realize the region’s production potentialand assure food security and we are convinced thatthese problems can be overcome. We propose toproceed deliberately, to acquire the necessaryknowledge in selected pilot investments, to reha-bilitate infrastructure in place, and to gradually ex-pand the activity as our competence improves.

Development of human resources is sine qua nonfor economic improvement. Overall literacy in theregion does not exceed 20 percent. UnfortunatelyAID has neither the expertise (for this predomi-nantly traditional French system) nor the resourcesto address the overall education requirement. Butwe do foresee devoting an order of 15 to 20 percentof our resources to a variety of training initiativeswhich will assure the expertise required by our owndevelopment activities to improve the capability ofthose who work with our and the overall develop-ment program, provide the knowledge required bythe farmers and other target beneficiaries of our pro-gram and, selectively, contribute to general educa-tional planning and education.

Activities in public health and the integration offamily planning services into the public health sys-tems contribute to the productive capability of thepopulace. They are also necessary humanitarianmeasures in a truly threatening and unhealthy envi-ronment, and address the demand side of the foodsufficiency objective. The most effective interven-tions will be those which exploit the investment al-ready made in institutions and personnel by help-ing organize the system better and by providingbasic implements, medicines, contraceptives, infra-structure, and financial resources. The efficiencyof purchase and distribution of pharmaceuticals willhave pervasive systemic importance. Assistanceand training to provide better planning and infor-mation in the health ministries will also have broadbeneficial impact. The major service delivery inter-

161

ventions will be in the improvement or creation ofmaternal/child health clinics, the provision of serv-ices for oral rehydration (ORT), immunizationagainst childhood diseases, and the implementationof rural health systems (pilot rural health workerprojects). All the foregoing may include researchand surveillance components. AID’s health andfamily planning activities in any one country willcomprise only one or a few of the above becauseof our limitations of personnel and resources,

Our contributions to environmental stabilizationand energy conservation are through forest man-agement, protection of the woodlands, reductionof fuelwood consumption, plus erosion control andsoil conservation, There is continuing and acceler-ating degradation which stems principally from thecutting of trees and brush for fuel, There is yet noaccessible solution to the fuelwood problem. Con-sequently, we are forced to employ measures whichare useful in themselves but will only slow and notreverse deforestation, These actions include: 1) re-form of official practices in management and regu-lation of the woodlands; 2) research to discover ameans to appropriately counteract degradation; 3)training of researchers, teachers, and forest man-agers; 4) development and popularization of fuelconserving wood stoves (a process which has verypromising near-term possibilities); 5) scientific man-agement of natural forests; and 6) soil conservationand water management. While during the planningperiod there will be a constraint of limited absorp-

tion capacity in this sector, AID will press interven-tions to the optimum considering the fundamentalimportance of success in reversing environmentaldegradation.

A Balanced Program

The variety of actions required for a competentprogram of agricultural production must be imple-mented as a coherent whole. First, we will have toidentify and help bring about the necessary officialpolicy and institutional environment to enable de-velopment to proceed. Training and education willbe implemented as components of projects or willbe designed to generate those talents required forthe success of the production program, Publichealth interventions will occasionally be linked toagricultural initiatives or be located in those areasin which AID has undertaken other activities. Live-stock and conservation activities are frequentl y

integral to crop cultivation, etc. AID has learnedin the SaheI to focus its efforts physically andsectorally to ease management and to exploit com-plementarities.

Comprehensive and coordinated agricultural de-velopment will be achieved through the coordina-tion of all donor and Sahelian programs. This isaccomplished through a system (still in evolution)of frequent discussion of activities, collaborativeresearch, and information exchange at all levelsthrough the Club/CILSS coordination efforts.

Assessment of theProgram-

Appendix F

Sahel DevelopmentExecutive Summary

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (AID)"Assessment of the Sahel De-velopment Program” was developed by the Sahel Development Planning Team in Bamako,Mali, and published in March 1983. The Assessment identified the lessons learned fromAID activities in the region and was the basis for the 1984 Sahel Country (Regional) Strat-egy Statement. Below is the Executive Summary from the assessment.

Executive Summary and Conclusions

The present draft responds to a request fromAA/AFR, F.S. Rudy, to AFR/SWA for an assessmentof the Sahel Development Program which consid-ers, interalia, “how it relates to the original objec-tives and what changes should be made now in viewof political and economic developments in the Sa-hel” since its inception. The assessment finds that,despite problems encountered in their pursuit, theoriginal objectives of the Sahel Development Pro-gram remain sound and feasible. AID’s contribu-tion to the multidonor effort should be sustainedat its present proportional level.

As a result of the drought emergency of 1973, theUnited States, other donors, and the Sahelians de-veloped a comprehensive strategy which attracteda large and sustained volume of resources as wellas a strong commitment to long-term developmentof the region. The international community spentan estimated $1 billion on drought relief and post-drought rehabilitation from 1973 through 1974.From 1973 through 1982 the United States–throughdisaster assistance, Public Law 480, and the Devel-opment Assistance budget—has committed an equalamount of resources to the Sahel region.

The program in the Sahel is one of the best exam-ples of international cooperation for development.A responsive organizational structure was devisedto coordinate a large number of bilateral and mul-tilateral development initiatives. The system is farfrom perfect, yet it has credibly addressed manyof the basic problems of the region.

AID programs have been growing since the firstreconstruction assistance of 1973 and 1974. Thecomposition and orientation of AID’s Sahel Devel-

opment Program (SDP) has evolved significantly.Most of its weaknesses are traceable to the urgencywhich impelled the early development of the pro-gram and the deployment of appropriated funds ata pace which strained AID and host governmentmanagement systems, A number of projects soughtto stimulate medium-term food production in-creases based on over-optimistic judgments aboutthe availability of technical packages, the capabil-ities of cooperating institutions, and the financialcapacity of Sahelian governments. In addition, theprogram spread rapidly into forestry-ecology, pri-mary health, women’s roles, various kinds of train-ing, village water supply and several areas of thelivestock sector. The emphasis was on respondingas directly as possible to the basic needs of targetpopulations. However, many of the initial activi-ties involved institutional development aspects, andlater projects have been primarily oriented to suchobjectives. Numerous studies and analyses werealso carried out—especially within the CILSS/Clubstructure—that today influence policy. Early as-sumptions about technology were often hedgedwith investments in research. The results of thesevaried efforts have been mixed, but on balancehighly positive. The quality and effectiveness of theprogram has steadily improved as we have learnedfrom experience to better understand the Saheliancultural, administrative, institutional, and physicalenvironments.

AID’s SDP constitutes an important and propor-tionally appropriate component of the expandingmultidonor development program. If the currentlevel of effort is maintained in real terms, theCILSS/Club strategy goal of food self-sufficiencywith environmental stability and self-sustaining eco-nomic growth is an achievable goal, For this rea-son and because of the importance of AID’s role

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in the agricultural and rural development sectors,AID’s contribution should increase proportionatelywith the overall donor effort. These resources mustbe coordinated within a regional, multidonor frame-work that allows for change and flexibility in re-sponse to the lessons of experience.

Lessons Learned

1. Technical production packages are still inade-quate for all but some areas in higher rainfall zones.Selected technological improvements such as ani-mal traction or certain new crop varieties havefound useful application within specific agro-cli-matic zones and in certain farming systems, but onthe whole, the available technical packages have notprovided a basis for large-scale efforts to increasefood production. This indicates the need for moreemphasis on agricultural research and that mostarea-focused food production and integrated devel-opment projects need to be phased out or substan-tially redesigned and reoriented toward economi-cally and technically valid goals.

2. Agricultural research systems directed at de-veloping new production technologies must bestrengthened, refocused on farming systems, andselectively expanded. While it is important that in-ternational and regional crop-oriented research bestrengthened, it is also essential that the develop-ment of adequate national systems be given prior-ity. Promising cultural practices and crop varietiescoming out of international work must be evaluatedin the various regional agro-climatic zones andtested under farm conditions, The research net-works must ultimately produce superior technicalpackages for each agro-climatic zone, This impliesa great deal of increased attention and careful pro-gramming of additional resources for agriculturalresearch.

3. Our efforts to date have not placed enough em-phasis on the development of agricultural produc-tion systems and forging strong linkages betweentheir crucial elements. This implies a need for care-ful assessment of existing systems and selective tar-geting of institutional development assistance to fos-ter the development of adequate production supportsystems within a 10 to 15 year time horizon. Thereis a subsidiary need for agriculture-oriented edu-cation and human resources development strategiesat the regional and national levels.

4. Government agencies, including parastatals,should restrict themselves to roles that cannot beappropriately allocated to the private sector, How-ever, for historical reasons, and often in associa-

tion with AID, Sahelian governments are currentlyrelying on parastatals to furnish goods and serviceswhich ultimately should be handled by the privatesector, In such cases we need to help the govern-ments to formulate plans for the orderly transferof such functions to the private sector. On one side,governments and AID must disengage from pay-ing parastatals’ operating expenses and phase outsubsidized provision of goods and services so thatthe private sector can compete, On the other hand,positive strategies are required to enable the pri-vate and cooperative sectors to take up input andproduce marketing functions abandoned by gov-ernments.

5. Notwithstanding the success achieved in theCILSS/Club context in the pursuit of policy dialog,our programs at the national level have sufferedfrom inadequate concern with the resolution of pol-icy constraints to economic, and particularly agri-cultural, development. We should continue andreinforce efforts now underway to focus AID andother donor programs in ways that will induce es-sential reform.

6. River Basin and irrigation development mustcontinue to be pursued on a steady basis so that riverbasin planning frameworks and socioeconomicallysound irrigation models will be available to permitan acceleration of the pace of investment in irri-gated agriculture over the next 15 to 20 years.

7. The forestry and environment component ofthe program continues to be inadequate and the de-cline of the woodlands continues. Most research,training and the conservation measures underwayshould continue and our level of effort in these areasshould be increased substantially. We should, at thesame time, seriously investigate the attributes of amajor effort to establish plantations for urban fuel-wood s u p p l y .

8. Further livestock production activities shouldbe initiated only when we are sure of the technologybeing introduced, and it is clear that these offer eco-nomic returns superior to alternative agriculturalinvestments. Other initiatives in the livestock sec-tor should be limited to the development of socio-economically and technically sound solutions toproblems affecting productivity and producerincomes.

9. Notwithstanding all our good intentions to thecontrary, AID has taken on too many separateprojects and these have been too widely dispersedboth geographically and sectorally. There is a needto limit project selection to the Sahel developmentstrategy priorities of food self-sufficiency and eco-logical balance within the framework of suitablycomprehensive long-term strategies.

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10. The Sahel financial management problem aswell as other difficulties we have had in implement-ing our program serve to remind us that we mustplan and design our programs with scrupulous andrealistic attention to the financial and administra-tive capabilities of Sahelian institutions and ourown management resources. This means that wewill have to select our institutional development in-volvements with great care, recognizing that humanresource and financial constraints will often dic-tate long-term commitments and support of recur-rent costs. We must find ways of facing up to theneed to maintain adequate staff strength to man-age our programs in the field.

1, A CDSS-type strategy is required for the devel-opment of the Sahel as a region. Based on analysesof the broad options, it would lay out a programfor the phased development of: a) the institutionalcapabilities and programs in the agriculture and for-estry/ecology sectors; and b) the irrigated agricul-ture capacity required to help achieve food self-sufficiency, through trade as well as domestic pro-duction, by the year 2000. Unlike the present Re-gional Development Strategy Statement (RDSS), thenew strategy would address resource allocation is-sues in light of economic and technical analyses ofthe various trade-offs such as that between rainfedand irrigated agriculture.

2. Project selection must be guided strictly by thedictates of bilateral as well as regional programstrategies in pursuit of food self-sufficiency and eco-logical balance by the year 2000. This implies vig-orous development of agricultural and forestry/ecol-ogy sector strategies, complemented by derivedprogram priorities in human resources, health, andother supporting sectors.

3. The staff resources and the role of the SahelDevelopment Planning Team (SDPT) must bestrengthened. To the present complement shouldbe added an agronomist knowledgeable of irrigated

as well as rainfed systems, a river basin develop-ment specialist and a Deputy Director (Deputy Re-gional Development Officer or Program Officer).The latter is required to assure that the long-termplanning and other functions of the team are con-sistently pursued despite the heavy travel schedulesof the team members and Director, The SDPTshould be charged with analyzing and comment-ing on the feasibility and priority of all PIDs andall strategy documents submitted by Sahel Missions.The persons responsible for AID liaison with theCILSS Secretariat and the Sahel Institute shouldfunction as members of the SDPT. The SDPT havePM&R budgetary resources sufficient to carry outor commission studies required for strategy devel-opment.

4, The SDPT should be transferred to Ouagadou-gou so that its long-term planning studies and anal-yses can be carried out in collaboration with theCILSS Secretariat and be fed consistently into thedeliberations of sector working groups both at thisregional level and at the national level.

5. We need to continue and strengthen our effortsin financial and program management. This re-quires:

—an assessment of AID Sahel program manage-ment capacities and requirements in the field;

—stricter review and criteria for financial man-agement and accounting capabilities in everyproject, including the provision of technicalassistance where necessary; and

—a second generation of initiatives to strengthenprogram management capacities at the regionaland national levels;

—greater use of private sector accountants in de-sign, implementation, and monitoring of the Sa-hel program and projects;

—increased audit coverage of the program.6. A review should be conducted of the SDP

project portfolio in order to identify projects whichneed to be revised or phased out in light of theassessment findings, the Mission’s current programstrategies and the current RDSS.

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