By Claudio Foliti

6. Problems and dangers of democracy

Problems of democracyThree paradoxes (Diamond, 1990)

1. Conflict vs. consensus2. Representativeness vs. governability3. Consent vs. effectiveness (performance)

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Problems of democracyDangers (Schmitter, 1991)

• 1) Democracy's current ideological hegemony could well fade as disillusionment with the actual performance of neodemocraciesmounts and as disaffected actors revive old authoritarian themes or invent new ones sudden death (coup d’état)

• 2) Even if autocracy fails to experience a revival, democracies may stumble on without satisfying the aspirations of their citizens and without consolidating an acceptable and predictable set of rules for political competition and cooperation lingering demise

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Problems of democracyA taxonomy of dilemmas

1. Intrinsic dilemmas: that are intrinsic to modern democracy, no matter where it exists or when it came into existence

2. Extrinsic dilemmas: those that are extrinsic, in the sense that they call into question the compatibility of emerging democratic rules and practices with existing social, cultural, and economic circumstances.

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Problems of democracyIntrinsic dilemmas

1. “Iron Law of Oligarchy” – Roberto Michels, 19112. “Free riding” – Mancur Olson, 19653. Policy cycling4. Functional autonomy5. Interdependence

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The Iron Law of Oligarchy

• Roberto Michels was the first to observe that even in the most democratic of institutions, professional leaders and staff tend to possess certain advantages of incumbency that insulate them from the threat of being deposed by challengers.

• His "'Iron Law" implies that parties, associations, and movements --to say nothing of legislatures– all become increasingly oligarchic and therefore less accountable to their members or the public at large

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Free riding

• Mancur Olson may not have been the first, but he has been the most systematic in demonstrating that much of what sustains and is produced by democracy consists of public goods to which individuals have no rational incentive to contribute voluntarily.

• In the absence of private selective payoffs, citizens in a democracy should "learn" that it is not worth their while to vote, to join associations or movements, or even to participate in public affairs since their various discrete contributions will normally have little or no impact upon the outcome.

• Increasingly, they will leave most of this activity to professional "political entrepreneurs" acting more or less independently of their followers, constituents, or clients

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Policy cycling

• All modern democracies have to make decisions involving the uneven distribution of costs and benefits among groups and individuals.

• Whenever this is done by majority vote, rather than by unanimity, the possibility arises of "cycling," i.e., of unstable majorities formed by shifting coalitions composed of groups with incompatible preferences on other issues.

• If choices are presented pairwise, no stable majority emerges, and there may ensue a vacillating series of policy measures that pass in sequence, but have the net effect of alienating everyone.

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Functional autonomy

• All democracies must depend for their survival on specialized institutions that cannot themselves be democratic -the armed forces and the central bank are the most obvious examples.

• For these to perform their respective functions efficiently, they must be insulated from popular pressures and partisan competition.

• To the extent that the role of such institutions increases in a more turbulent, competitive, and (as we shall see below) internationally interdependent environment, the power of the experts who run these institutions will increase at the expense of congressional and executive leaders accountable to the citizenry.

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Interdependence• All contemporary democracies, even the largest and most powerful

of them, are entangled in complex webs of interdependence with other democracies and some autocracies.

• In principle, elected national leaders are sovereign (i.e., accountable to no authority higher than their own countries' constitutions).

• In practice, however, they are quite limited in their ability to control the decisions of transnational firms, the movement of ideas and persons across their borders, and the impact of their neighbors' policies.

• Their authority confined to nation-states, these leaders find themselves decreasingly capable of ensuring the welfare and security of their own citizens

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Problems of democracyExtrinsic dilemmas

1. Boundaries and identities2. Capitalist production, accumulation, and distribution3. Overload and ungovernability4. Corruption and decay5. External security and internal insecurity

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Boundaries and identities

• Problems of nation-building• Before, during, or after democratization?• There is simply no democratic way of deciding what a nation and

its corresponding political unit should be• Democratization itself may encourage actors to attempt

manipulations in order to create constituencies favorable to their respective purposes Majoritarianism– Slogans such as the self-determination of peoples and devices such as

plebiscites or referenda simply beg the question of who is eligible to vote within which constituencies, and whether the winning majority can legitimately impose its will on eventual minorities

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Capitalist production, accumulation, and distribution• The paradox of liberal economy and democratic responsiveness:• 1) capitalism must be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for

democracy; • 2) that capitalism must be modified significantly to make it compatible

with democracy• In the best of circumstances, the preceding autocracy may have already

concentrated profits, encouraged private accumulation, increased the state's fiscal capacity, developed the country's physical infrastructure and improved its international competitiveness, thereby doing much to resolve this dilemma

• The worst of circumstances, the ancien rigime leaves a legacy of corruption, protectionism, price distortions, foreign indebtedness, inefficient public enterprises, trade imbalances, and fiscal instability.

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• the problematic relationship between capitalism and democracy -"necessary, but necessarily modified” – is structural

• It stems from the root difference between a polity that distributes power and status relatively equally and an economy that distributes property and income relatively unequally

• Economic crisis Problems of consolidation• Austerity Disappointing of rising expectations and

disenchantment Populism

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Overload and ungovernability

• There is growing evidence from the older democracies that traditional partisan identifications, habits of self-restraint, trust in institutions, and belief in the legitimacy of rulers have all been persistently and markedly declining

• Causes of this decline: greater physical mobility, higher levels of education, more leisure time, decline in the quality of public education, increasing intellectual disaffection, and so forth

• Modern mass communications have made citizens vastly more aware of events taking place elsewhere in the world and of alternative means for pursuing their interests and passions

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• From parties to interest associations and social movementsThey are particularly important in expressing the demands of classes, professions, generations, religions, ethnic groups, and other segments of the population whose numbers preclude them from creating or dominating parties, but whose interests and passions motivate them to participate with special intensity

• New democracies thus need legitimacy in order to build institutions, and institutions in order to establish legitimacy

• Parties still provide the principal linkage between citizens and government, and it is likely that the choice of rules and institutions will involve bargaining between party leaders

• But new democracies will have to cope with (and govern with) the full range of associations and movements

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Corruption and decay: problems of the “political economy”

• From the amateur politician to the professional politician• Position of representation: unremunerated or remunerated• Today, not only do those who hold elected office expect to be

well-paid for their services, but many have no other source of income

• New democracies are usually born in a burst of civic enthusiasm and moral outrage against the corrupt decadence of the ancienrégime, so that the dilemma only emerges later.

• When it does, the effect can be particularly devastating, for politicians have less secure alternative sources of income, while citizens are less convinced of the need to pay their representatives generously

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• Transition and socio-economic transformations: property rights, industrial subsidies, price controls, privatization, deregulation, licensing of services and media, and the like

• Even where the thrust of change is toward "unleashing market forces," the process of accomplishing this offers very attractive opportunities for illicit enrichment on the part of the politicians who set the norms, sell off the enterprises, and award the contracts.

• Ironically, while the long-term intent is precisely to reduce the rent seeking intrinsic to public ownership and regulation, the short-term effect is to increase the potential payoffs to be had from the exploitation of public authority

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External security

1. The advent of democracy does not guarantee national security. Depending on a country's size, resources, strategic location, and neighbors, it may even make the problem worse. – Fledgling democracies can present an attractive "target of opportunity" to

aggressors - as the case of Bosnia tragically testifies.

2. Civil-military dilemma: extricating the armed forces from power and meting out justice for crimes committed during their tenure + giving the soldiers a satisfactory and credible role under democratic auspices

3. The promise of the NATO membership vs. the post-communist “functional vacuum”

4. The “neoliberal” cuts to the detriment of armed forces

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Internal insecurity

• On the one hand, there is the enhanced need for policing due to the likely increase in crime (higher crime rates, increases in political violence, and more frequent disruptions of basic services).

• On the other, there is the enhanced expectation that the police will respect due process of law and basic human rights.

• Few things can be more subversive of trust in institutions and the legitimacy of the government than the popular perception that "nothing has changed" at the level of face-to-face contacts between police authorities and the population.

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Huntington (Democracy for the Long Haul, 1996)

Problems of democracy1. The electoral competition promote conflicts2. Democratizing countries are more aggressive and war-prone3. Democratization and moral decayPossible dangers1. “Red return”2. Victory of parties or movements committed to antidemocratic

ideologies3. Executive arrogation, which occurs when an elected chief

executive concentrates power in his own hands, subordinates or even suspends the legislature, and rules largely by decree

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