6. Key Security Safeguards - Roger Clarke · 6. Key Security Safeguards Roger Clarke Xamax Consultancy, ... ¥ Cash Transactions, incl. ... 'vouching' ¥ Channel Encryption

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COMP 2410 – Networked Information Systems

6. Key Security Safeguards

Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor, A.N.U. and U.N.S.W.

http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/NIS2410.html#L6http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/NIS2410-6 {.ppt, .pdf}

ANU RSCS, 24 March 2016

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Networked Information SystemsThis Series of Six Lectures

Network Infrastructure and Architecture1. Network Infrastructure2. The Architectures of Networked ApplicationsInformation Assurance and Security3. Security of Information and IT4. Malware and Other Attacks5. Data Protection and Privacy6. Key Security Safeguards

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Key Security SafeguardsAgenda

1. Minimum Safeguards2. Service Continuity and Recovery3. Incident Management4. Access Control5. Authentication of Assertions Generally6. Authentication of (Id)Entity

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1. The Absolute-Minimum Security Safeguards

1. Physical Safeuguards2. Access Control3. Malware Detection and Eradication4. Patching Procedures5. Firewalls6. Incident Management Processes7. Logging 8. Backup and Recovery Plans, Procedures9. Training10. Responsibility

http://www.xamax.com.au/EC/ISInfo.pdf

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Beyond the Absolute-Minimum SafeguardsRisk Asssessment, leading to at least some of:

11. Data Communications Encryption12. Data Storage Encryption13. Vulnerability Testing14. Standard Operating Environments15. Application Whitelisting16. Device Authentication and Authorisation17. Use of Virtual Private Networks 18. Intrusion Detection and Prevention19. User Authentication20. Firewall Configurations, Outbound

http://www.xamax.com.au/EC/ISInfo.pdf

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2. Natural and Non-Natural Disastersas Threats to Business Continuity

• Earthquake Newcastle 1989, Christchurch 2011• Tsunami Fukushima 2011• Cyclone Darwin 1974 (Tracy), Nth Qld 2011 (Yasi)

• Flood Brisbane 2010-11• Bushfire Canberra 2003, Victoria 2009• Terrorism World Trade Center 2001 ('9/11')

Some corporations went bankruptYet some survived despite losing 70% of their staff

http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/natural-disasters

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Business Continuity PlanningHow an organisation sustains and recovers its

business operations after a major security incident

• Identify Priority Business Processes(Use Risk Assessment techniques to do that)

• Implement Protections for People, and Other Assets• Identify Measures to Re-Acquire Key Assets• Specify Interim and Recovery Processes• Rehearse Those Processes• Review and update the Business Continuity Plan

Boyle & Panko 'Corporate Computer Security' Pearson 2013, p. 581-585

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IT Disaster Recovery PlanningHow an organisation sustains and recovers its IT infrastructure after a major security incident

• Identify Priority IT Infrastructure(Use Risk Assessment techniques to do that)

• Imagine Disaster Scenarios• Imagine Recovery Scenarios• Specify Processes• Rehearse Processes• Review and update the IT Disaster Recovery Plan

Boyle & Panko 'Corporate Computer Security' Pearson 2013, p. 585-590

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Key IT Infrastructure Issues

• Data

• Backup / Replication• Dispersal• Recovery Procedures

• Specified• Rehearsed

• People• Cross-Training• Dispersion

• Facilities• Duplication – Hot / Warm / Cold-Site

• Processing• Interim and Fallback (Manual) Procedures

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3. Incident Management

http://www.rogerclarke/SOS/ChgeCtl90.html#IR

IncidentDatabase

Detect Triage /Prioritise Assign Analyse Respond

Control

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4. Access Control

• Protect System Resources against Unauthorised Access

• Provide convenient access to the right people, to relevant data and software capabilities, by providing User Accounts with Privileges and Restrictions

• Prevent access by the wrong people to data and software capabilities

• Person-Based, or Role-Based (RBAC)

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The Internet

CellularNetwork

Corp.Router

BackboneRouters

HomeRouter

Fire-wall

Gateway

IAP

IAP

IAP

Web-ServerWeb-Server

IAP

Local AreaNetwork (LAN)

HomeLAN

Corp.Servers

Corp.Wkstns

Access Control Contexts

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Access Control Processes

Pre-Authenticationof Evidence of

Identity or Attribute

Permissions Storeor Access

Control List

Authenticationusing the Issued

Authenticator

AuthorisationAccessControl

Registerof

Authenticators

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Threats to Passwords1. Guessing2. 'Brute Force' Guessing3. Visual Observation4. Electronic Observation5. Interception6. Phishing7. Use of One Password for Multiple Accounts8. Discovery of a Password Database9. Compromise of the Password-Reset Process10. Continued Use of a Compromised Password11. Compromise of a Password Stored by a Service-Provider12. Acquisition and Hacking of the Password-Hash File

http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/Passwords.html

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Ways of Strengthening Access Control

• Channel Encryption, e.g. SSL/TLS, so that even if the password is intercepted, it is not ‘in clear’

• Transmission of only a hash of the password• Server-Side Storage of only a hash of the password• One-Time Passwords

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5. Authentication of Assertions

• Authentication: A process that establishes a level of confidence in an Assertion

• Assertion: A declaration made by some party

• Authenticator: Evidence relevant to an Assertion

• Credential: A physical or digital Authenticator

• Evidence of Identity (EOI)[[ Proof of Identity (POI) ]] An Authenticator for Identity Assertions

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Categories of Assertions

• About Real-World Facts• About Data Quality

(accuracy, timeliness, ...)• About Value• About Location• About Documents

• About Attributes• About

Principal-Agent Relationships

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

• About Identities• About Entities

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Value Assertion Value is transferred to/from an (Id)entity or Nym

Authentication of Value AssertionsFor Goods

• Inspect them• Get them put into

Escrow, for release by the Agent only when all conditions have been fulfilled

For CashRelease the Goods only:• For Cash On Delivery• After Clearing the

Cheque• Against a Credit-Card

Authorisation• After a Debit-Card

Transaction

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Attribute Assertion

• An Identity or Nym has a particular Attribute:• Age / DoB before or after some Threshhold• Disability, Health Condition, War Service• Professional or Trade Qualification

Authentication of Attribute Assertions• ID-Card and DoB (may or may not record ID)• Bearer Credential (ticket, disabled-driver sticker)• Attribute Certificates (with or without ID)

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NamesCodes

Roles

Identifier + Data-Items

Identity andAttributes

RealWorld

AbstractWorld

6. Identity and Identifier

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Entity andAttributes

RealWorld

AbstractWorld



The Entity/ies underlying an Identity

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RealWorld

AbstractWorld

Entifier + Data-Items



Entity and Entifier

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The Digital Persona

A model of an individual's public personalitybased on data and maintained by transactions

and intended for use as a proxy for the individual

A group of data items that together form a simplified representation of an identity

http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/CFP93.html (Feb 1993)http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/DigPersona.html (Jun 1994)http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/HumanID.html (Dec 1994)http://www.rogerclarke.com/ID/DP12.html (Sep 2014)

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TheDigitalPersona

<–––

Identity and

Attributes

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RealWorld

AbstractWorld

Record:

Entifier + Data-Items

Record:



Record:

Nym + Data-Items


m

n

m

n

1

1 1

n n n

Nymity

TheDigital

Persona

XX X

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Nym

A Digital Personai.e. a set of attributes of an Identity

that is sufficient to distinguish that Identityfrom other instances of its class

but that is not sufficient to enable

association with a specific Entity

Pseudonym – association is not made, but is possibleAnonym – association is not possible

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Nymality is Normality

aka ('also-known-as'), alias, avatar, character, nickname, nom de guerre, nom de plume,

manifestation, moniker, personality, profile, pseudonym,

pseudo-identifier, sobriquet, stage-name

Cyberpace has adopted thoseand spawned more:

account, avatar, handle, nick, persona, ...

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Common Nymous Transactions

• Barter transactions• Visits to Enquiry Counters

in government agencies• Telephone Enquiries• Inspection of publications

on library premises• Access to Public Documents

by electronic means, at a kiosk or over the Internet

• Cash Transactions, incl. the myriad daily payments for inexpensive goods and services, gambling, road-tolls

• Voting in secret ballots• Treatment at discreet

clinics, e.g. for sexually transmitted diseases

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(Id)Entification• Identification

The process of associating a Digital Persona with a particular Identity, by acquiring an Identifier for the Identity

• EntificationThe process of associating a Digital Persona with a particular Entity, by acquiring an Entifier for the Entity

• TokenA recording medium for an (Id)entifier

• Identity SiloA restricted-purpose Identity, and associated Identifier(s)

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Human Identification

• Identification GenerallyThe process of associating a Digital Persona with a particular Identity, by acquiring an Identifier for the IdentityApplies to natural objects, artefacts, animals, ...

• Human Identification in Particular• Acquisition of a Human Identifier

(Commonly a Name or a Code)• High-Reliability Lookup in a Database

(1-with-many comparison, a single confident result)

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Human Identity Authentication

• What the Person Knowse.g. mother’s maiden name, Password, PIN

• What the Person Has (‘Credentials’)e.g. a Token, such as an ‘ID-Card’, a Tickete.g. a Digital Token such as “a Digital Signature consistent with thePublic Key attested to by a Digital Certificate”

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A Sample Personal Device – The Mobile Phone• Entifier for the Product – model-name, model-number• Entifier for the Handset – Serial-Number of the device

• Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) – GSM / UMTS• Electronic Serial Number (ESN) or

Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID) – CDMA• Identifier for the Persona – Serial-Number of a chip,

the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)• Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) – GSM / UMTS• Removable User Identity Module (R-UIM) or

CDMA Subscriber Identity Module (CSIM) – CDMA• Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) – 3G

• Proxy-(Id)entifier – MAC Address / NICId, or IP-Address

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Human Identity Authentication• What the Person Knows

e.g. mother’s maiden name, Password, PIN

• What the Person Has (‘Credentials’)e.g. a Token, such as an ‘ID-Card’, a Tickete.g. a Digital Token such as “a Digital Signature consistent with thePublic Key attested to by a Digital Certificate”

Human Entity Authentication• What the Person Does (Dynamic Biometrics)

• What the Person Is (Static Biometrics)

• What the Person Is Now (Imposed Biometrics)

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Quality Challengesin Biometric Applications

Dimensions of Quality• Reference-Measure• Association• Test-Measure• Comparison• Result-Computation

Other Aspects of Quality• Vulnerabilities• Quality Measures• Counter-Measures• Spiralling Complexity• Consequences

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Ways of Strengthening Access Control

• What You Knowpassword, 'shared secrets'

• What You Haveone-time password gadget, a digital signing key

• Where You Areyour IP-address, device-ID

• What You Area biometric, e.g. fingerprint

• What You Dotime-signature of password-typing key-strikes

• Who You Are Known to Bereputation, 'vouching'

• Channel Encryption, e.g. SSL/TLS, so that even if the password intercepted, it is not ‘in clear’

• Transmission of only a hash of the password• Server-Side Storage of only a hash of the password• One-Time Passwords• Multi-Factor Use Authentication:

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Key Security SafeguardsAgenda

1. Minimum Safeguards2. Service Continuity and Recovery3. Incident Management4. Access Control5. Authentication of Assertions Generally6. Authentication of (Id)Entity

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COMP 2410 – Networked Information Systems

6. Key Security Safeguards

Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor, A.N.U. and U.N.S.W.

http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/NIS2410.html#L6http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/NIS2410-6 {.ppt, .pdf}

ANU RSCS, 24 March 2016

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Drill-Down Slides

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The Biometric Process

ReferenceMeasure

or ‘MasterTemplate’

MeasuringDevice

Matchingand

AnalysisResult

TestMeasureor ‘Live

Template’Measuring

Device

1. Enrolment / Registration

2. Testing

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Quality Challengesin Biometric Applications

Dimensions of Quality• Reference-Measure• Association• Test-Measure• Comparison• Result-Computation

Other Aspects of Quality• Vulnerabilities• Quality Measures• Counter-Measures• Spiralling Complexity• Consequences

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BiometricsReference-Measure Quality

• The Person's Feature (‘Enrolment’)• The Acquisition Device• The Environmental Conditions• The Manual Procedures• The Interaction between Subject and Device• The Automated Processes

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BiometricsAssociation Quality

• Depends on a Pre-Authentication Process• Subject to the Entry-Point Paradox• Associates data with the ‘Person Presenting’

and hence entrenches criminal IDs• Risk of an Artefact Substituted for,

or Interpolated over, the Feature

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BiometricsTest-Measure Quality

• The Person's Feature (‘Acquisition’)• The Acquisition Device• The Environmental Conditions• The Manual Procedures• The Interaction between Subject and Device• The Automated Processes

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BiometricsComparison Quality

• Feature Uniqueness• Feature Change:

• Permanent• Temporary

• Ethnic/Cultural Bias“Our understanding of the demographic factors affecting biometric system performance is ... poor” (Mansfield & Wayman, 2002)

• Material Differences in:• the Processes• the Devices• the Environment• the Interactions

• An Artefact:• Substituted• Interpolated

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‘Factors Affecting Biometrics Performance’(Mansfield & Wayman, 2002)

• Demographics (youth, aged, ethnic origin, gender, occupation)

• Template Age• Physiology (hair, disability,

illness, injury, height, features, time of day)

• Appearance (clothing, cosmetics, tattoos, adornments, hair-style, glasses, contact lenses, bandages)

• Behaviour (language, accent, intonation, expression, concentration, movement, pose, positioning, motivation, nervousness, distractions)

• Environment (background, stability, sound, lighting, temperature, humidity, rain)

• Device (wear, damage, dirt)• Use (interface design,

training, familiarity, supervision, assistance)

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BiometricsResult-Computation Quality

• Print Filtering and Compression:• Arbitrary cf. Purpose-Built

• The Result-Generation Process• The Threshhold Setting:

• Arbitrary? Rational? Empirical? Pragmatic?

• Exception-Handling Procedures:• Non-Enrolment• Non-Acquisition• ‘Hits’

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BiometricsConsequences of Quality Problems

• A Tolerance Range has to be allowed• 'False Positives' / 'False Acceptances' arise• 'False Negatives' / 'False Rejections' arise• Tighter Tolerances (to reduce False Negatives) increase

the rate of False Positives; and vice versa• The Scheme Sponsor sets (and re-sets) the Tolerances• Frequent exceptions are mostly processed cursorily• Occasional ‘scares’ slow everything, annoy everyone

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Design Factors Using BiometricsPrivacy-Sensitive and Cost-Effective

Technologies and Products• A Privacy Strategy• Privacy-Protective Architecture• Open Information• Independent Testing using

Published Guidelines• Publication of Test ResultsApplication Design Features• No Central Storage• Reference Measures only on

Each Person's Own Device• No Storage of Test-Measures• No Transmission of Test-Measures• Devices Closed and Secure, with

Design Standards and Certification• Two-Way Device Authentication

Application Design Processes• Consultation with the Affected Public

from project commencement onwards• Explicit Public Justification

for privacy-invasive features• PIAs conducted openly, and published• Metricated pilot schemesLaws, to require compliance with the aboveLaws, to preclude:• Retention of biometric data• Secondary use of biometric data• Application of biometrics

absent strong and clear justification• Manufacture, import, installation, use

of non-compliant biometric devices• Creation, maintenance, use of a

database of biometrics